States aggression in Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. Shortly afterward United States troops in Korea showed the intention of crossing the 38th Parallel and pressing on toward the Yalu River [China's frontier], and, because of this, the Chinese government could not but warn the United States government that we would not stand idly by if United States troops crossed the 38th Parallel and pressed on toward the Yalu River. This warning was conveyed to the United States through the Indian Ambassador. The United States government disregarded this warning and United States troops did indeed cross the 38th Parallel and press on toward the Yalu River.

"The Chinese people could only take the action of volunteering support to Korea in its war of resistance against the United States. But this action *was not taken until four months after the United States stationed its forces in the Taiwan Straits and exercised military control over Taiwan*, and not until United States troops had crossed the 38th Parallel and approached the Yalu River. Truman made many statements during these four months to explain this act of aggression against Korea; of course, they were futile. Moreover, he could not justify aggression in Taiwan, nor the stationing of United States forces in the Taiwan Straits. Furthermore, Truman failed to heed China's warning conveyed through the Indian Ambassador.

"After two years of negotiations an armistice was at last reached in Korea. *By 1958 Chinese troops had withdrawn completely from Korea.* But up to now United States troops are still hanging on in South Korea and will not withdraw. Moreover, the United States is still controlling Taiwan with its land, sea, and air forces, and the United States Navy and Air Force are still active in the Taiwan Straits. Isn't this the best proof that the United States government continues to pursue policies of aggression and war toward China? It is not necessary to cite in addition the numerous military bases maintained by the United States in Asia and the many aggressive military pacts which have China as their main target. *China, on the other hand, has not a single soldier abroad, and the treaties it has concluded with Asian countries are all treaties of peace and friendship.*

"Though the United States committed these acts of aggression against China, *would we use force to settle disputes with*

the United States? No! I declared already during the Bandung Conference in 1955 that the Chinese people were friendly to the American *people* and the Chinese government was willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States government to discuss existing disputes between the two countries, though the two countries had not recognized each other and had no diplomatic relations. This proposal of ours resulted, through the good offices of Britain, in ambassadorial talks between China and the United States which started August 1, 1955, in Geneva.

"In order to create a favorable atmosphere China released, before the talks began, eleven so-called 'prisoners of war,' following the mediation of Krishna Menon and UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's visit to Peking. Why are they referred to as so-called 'prisoners of war'? Because they were not captured on the Korean battlefield. With the exception of a few who chose, of their own will, to stay behind, all prisoners of war captured on the Korean front were repatriated after the armistice. Later, among those who stayed behind, some returned also of their own will. But the eleven so-called 'prisoners of war' were on a United States plane which intruded into China's air space, and were captured after their plane was hit. Both China and the United States had declared that the Korean War was restricted to Korea and did not extend to China. This plane was shot down in China. So China did not recognize them as 'prisoners of war.' Nevertheless, China released them—to create a favorable atmosphere for the ambassadorial talks at Geneva.

"That was the end of the so-called 'prisoners of war' issue.

"Besides the so-called 'prisoners of war,' however, there were two other categories of United States nationals in Chinese prisons. First were United States citizens, guilty of such crimes as sabotage and espionage, or who had in other ways violated the laws of China. Since 1955, we have released twenty-five such United States criminals when their terms were fully served or were granted clemency and released ahead of time for good behavior. One of the twenty-five chose to remain in China after his release. Of this category only three are now still serving sentences in China.

"There are two United States nationals in Chinese prisons of another category—a very special one. They are airborne

secret agents sent by the United States to China, namely, the very famous Downey and Fecteau. Allen Dulles of the United States Central Intelligence Agency could give you all the details, but perhaps he wouldn't want to give the information in such detail as we would. In early 1955, when Hammarskjöld came to Peking to discuss the question of the United States nationals in Chinese prisons, even he found it inconvenient to bring up their case for discussion. These two were in no way related to the Korean War, but were on a mission of pure espionage and secret-agent activity. If you are interested, I could show you some portions of the notes of my talks with Hammarskjöld for your reference. The notes have never been published.

"Five years have elapsed since the start of the Chinese-United States talks in August 1955. At the very outset, we proposed that disputes between China and the United States, including the dispute between the two countries in the Taiwan region, should be settled through peaceful negotiations, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States blocked all news of this proposal, but China later published it. Why did [John Foster] Dulles reject it? Because Dulles realized that reaching such an agreement implied that the next step would be discussions on how and when United States armed forces were to withdraw from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.

"We hold that the dispute between China and the United States in the Taiwan region is an international question; whereas military action between the Central Government of New China and the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan is an internal question. The United States has maintained that the two questions are inseparable. We hold that they can and must be separated. Since it has been possible for China and the United States to hold ambassadorial talks in Geneva and Warsaw, talks can also be held at the same time between the Central Government of China and the Chiang Kai-shek clique. The former is an international question while the latter is an internal question. Parallel talks can be conducted and solutions reached separately.

"In the talks between China and the United States, agreement on principle must after all be reached first before concrete issues can be settled. The two points of principle on which agreement should be reached are:

"(1) All disputes between China and the United States, including the dispute between the two countries in the Taiwan region, should be settled through peaceful negotiations, without resorting to the use or threat of force; and

"(2) The United States must agree to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. As to the specific steps on when and how to withdraw, they are matters for subsequent discussion. If the United States government ceases to pursue the policy of aggression against China and of resorting to threats of force, this is the only logical conclusion which can be drawn.

"This is the crux of the dispute between China and the United States. The activities and direction of United States policy toward China have been aimed at manufacturing 'two Chinas.' In this respect, both the Republican and the Democratic Parties aim at the same thing. . . . This scheme would probably be opposed not only by Mainland China, but also by the Kuomintang in Taiwan and the Chinese in Taiwan. Therefore such an approach would lead nowhere, but in the solution of Sino-U.S. relations it would tie things up in knots.

"We believe that a solution to Sino-U.S. relations will ultimately be found; it is only a question of time. But there is one point: if the United States does not give up its policy of aggression and the threat of war against China, no solution is possible. We do not believe that the people of the United States will allow their government indefinitely to pursue such a policy. *There is no conflict of basic interest between the peoples of China and the United States, and friendship will eventually prevail."*

I asked Chou whether the two principles he spoke of had been the topic of discussion for a long time in the Sino-American ambassadorial talks held at Warsaw.

THE PREMIER: Yes. The first principle was put forward by China at the end of 1955. The second principle was put forward in the autumn of 1958 at Warsaw.

QUESTION: Does the second principle include as well the question of the time and manner of the withdrawal from Taiwan?