

(5YY)

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
CONFIDENTIAL

September 2, 1979

L. Paul Bremer III, Esquire
Deputy Executive Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Jerry:

I have been very busy lately and I'm a bit behind on my correspondence. You've been having your hands full moving into a new job, too, I suppose. I hope Francie and the kids are settling in all right. Sharon, I gather from her letters, is beginning to pace a bit in Michigan; if she can't come out here fairly soon, she will move to Washington when school is out next year. Don't say it; you told me so.

Things are quite exciting in Tehran. Not surprisingly. I am spending about 85% of my time helping American businessmen distinguish between revolutionary rhetorical form and back-to-business substance. The Khomeini crowd really seem to want to get people back to work and they are willing to take the necessary steps (and make the necessary compromises in revolutionary terms) to do it if Americans will modify contracts to reflect the changes wrought by the revolution. I've had some successes, and my problem most often is to convince some of the American players that if they come out here to talk, they won't go up against a wall.

This brings me to goings on in Iran politically. Frankly, I disagree with our position that there is dual government, i.e., Bazargan and Khomeini. I suspect the dual government analytical construct is popular because it implies we can influence at least part of the policy machinery; to contend that Khomeini is the only real source of power means we then have to explain how it is we can protect our interests here by only indirect communication through a third party obviously not in sympathy with us on many questions (and itself not all that plugged in to the people that matter).

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GDS 9/2/85

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will be less crisp, and I expect he would rather see his new government concede a measure of reform--and freedom--from strength and when it is ready to do so than appease critics it can no longer so easily kick into line.

What of the implications for US interests? Well, if Khomeini is able to contain the disenchantments, you have improved prospects for internal stability and for unimpaired territorial integrity. Also, it is clear to me that, in addition to order, Khomeini wants to get people back to work to ensure a decent--and even rising by local measures--standard of living. (A moral and even austere Islamic Republic should not be supposed to mean either an idle or backward one, I have been told.) Thus, our interest in continued access to Iran's oil should be safeguarded by the new government's ability to maintain order in the oil fields and its need for earnings. Our interest in Iran's spending its oil earnings in the US should be advanced (if we don't blow it by not responding to expressions of interest) by their need--increasingly beginning to be realized--to translate oil dollars into jobs through either consumer imports or, much more likely, labor intensive projects that will lead to relatively labor intensive industries. (I think this bodes well for increasing oil production, too, eventually.) Finally, a confident Khomeini with a good grip on things at home and much skepticism of things Western is going to give us real problems on many multilateral issues. We need him at least as much as he needs us in the near term and so we don't have much to threaten him with. Particularly on Middle East policy, he is going to be a contrary force we will have to reckon with.

cc: CHG:VTomseth

OECD: Share of World Commodity Exports Shipped to Iran, 1977

Commodity	Percent								
	Selected OECD Countries								
	OECD	United States	West Germany	Japan	United Kingdom	Italy	France	Switzerland	Spain
Total ¹	1.7	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.0	2.0	1.1	2.1	1.1
Food	1.1	2.2	0.5	0.3	1.0	0.1	0.7	2.8	0.2
Raw materials	0.5	0.5	1.0	3.0	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.8	0
Manufactures	2.0	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.3	1.2	2.1	1.4
Chemicals	1.2	1.0	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.6	0.7	1.6	0.7
Semifinished	1.8	1.6	2.0	4.5	1.1	2.5	1.0	1.6	2.8
Wood, lumber	2.2	1.8	3.8	3.1	5.8	4.0	0.8	4.5	2.5
Paper	0.9	1.2	0.9	1.2	0.8	0.9	0.5	0.8	1.5
Textiles	1.7	0.6	1.5	4.2	1.8	1.1	0.8	1.8	3.5
Iron, steel	2.3	2.9	2.2	4.5	1.5	2.5	1.0	1.2	4.0
Nonferrous	1.1	0.5	2.0	5.7	0.7	1.8	0.2	3.2	1.0
Metal	3.4	3.5	3.0	6.6	2.7	6.0	2.2	2.2	2.9
Other	1.3	0.7	1.1	3.3	0.9	1.3	1.0	0.5	2.1
Machinery	2.8	2.3	4.2	2.2	3.2	3.8	2.4	1.9	1.3
Agricultural	1.1	0.8	1.6	1.7	0.8	1.7	0.4	0.1	1.0
Industrial	3.4	2.9	4.7	2.8	4.2	3.9	2.9	1.9	1.3
Office	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.5	1.3	0.2	2.2	0.2
Electrical	2.7	2.5	4.2	1.9	3.1	4.5	2.5	1.7	1.6
Transport	1.7	2.7	2.0	1.6	3.0	2.6	0.8	14.1	0.2
Motor vehicles	1.5	0.9	1.0	1.8	8.3	0.7	0.8	10.1	0
Motor vehicle parts	1.6	0.6	4.3	1.7	2.8	0.9	0.7	0.9	0.2
Aircraft	5.5	7.7	1.4	0	0.5	17.7	0.7	37.6	0
Other	1.2	2.1	1.8	1.3	0.5	5.6	0.7	2.1	0.7
Misc. manufactures	0.8	0.7	1.0	1.1	1.1	0.6	0.7	1.8	0.2
Clothing	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1
Scientific instruments	1.2	0.9	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.4	1.4
TV, radio, phonograph	0.6	0.2	0.6	1.0	0.2	0.2	0.4	1.2	0
Other	1.0	0.7	1.0	1.7	1.6	1.0	1.0	2.9	0.4
Other manufactures	6.8	13.5	2.5	1.1	7.3	1.5	0.1	2.9	0

¹ Total values include data for the following countries: Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and West Germany.

Unclassified

percent of its textiles exports. Japan will probably more than make up losses from a cutback in Iranian modernization by switching to China as a major market for Iran and steel exports. (U)

In 1977-78 the Japanese received \$1.1 billion in reported contracts from Iran; \$450 million were for power-related projects and \$120 million for construction of industrial facilities. The large Bandar Shahpur petrochemical complex being built by Japanese firms is not threatened by cancellation so far. Japan is anxious to negotiate a

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STATE
CHG: CWNAAS
CHG: CWNAAS POL: JDSTEMPEL
POL: DMCAFFEY, NGARRETT; ECON: CTAYLOR
CHG POL(3) OR, ECON ICA RF

- AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
- SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
- INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DAHBI
- AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
- AMEMBASSY AMMAN
- AKEMBASSY ANKARA
- USINT BAGHDAD
- AMEMBASSY BAHRAIN
- AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
- AMEMBASSY BONN
- AMEMBASSY CAIRO
- AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
- AMEMBASSY DOHA
- ANEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
- AMEMBASSY JIDDA
- AMEMBASSY KABUL
- AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
- AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
- AMEMBASSY LONDON
- AMEMBASSY MANAMA
- AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
- AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
- AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
- AMEMBASSY PARIS
- AMEMBASSY PEKING
- AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
- AMEMBASSY RABAT
- AMEMBASSY ROME
- AMEMBASSY TELAVIV
- AMEMBASSY TOKYO
- AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
- AMEMBASSY TUNIS
- USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
- CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

E.O. 12065: XDS 5/10/89 (NAAS, CHARLES) OR-M
TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, IR
SUBJ: FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PROVISIONAL ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT

(01Y)

1978 NOV -6 PM 12:5

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO: ~~TEHRAN~~ DHAKHAN
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

ANKARA
DOHA
ISLAMABAD
JIDDA
KABUL
KUWAIT
LONDON
MANAMA
MUSCAT
NEW DELHI
PARIS

A/M

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USINCPAC
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10828

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PORS, PINT, PGOV, SHUM, IR
SUBJ: POLITICAL/SECURITY REPORT NOV 6

SUMMARY: SHARIF-EMAMI GOVT RESIGNED, HAS BEEN REPLACED BY MILITARY GOVT UNDER GENERAL AZHARI. TEHRAN MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION ISSUED TOUGH DIRECTIVE. CROWDS NONETHELESS GATHERING IN DEFIANCE, AND SOME INCIDENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE. AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI CALLS FOR CALM, WITHOUT NEW MARCHES. ARMY SEIZED NIRT YESTERDAY. ARRESTS ARE

DRAPED BY POL: J. Berrett DRAFTING DATE 11/6/78 TEL. NO. 1187 CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED MIN: [Signature]

POL: [Signature] (contribution)

(01Y)

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 (Form 10)

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:
ACTION:
POL-3
AMB
DCM
E.O. 2
OK
ICA
ADM
R50
SERO
S/PROJ
14

(019)

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Page 2 of

108-6

MRH

EXPECTED. EMB ADVISED ANCITS TO SAY HOME TODAY. SANJAB

KHOMETNI JOINT COMMUNIQUE REJECTS COMPROMISE, CALLS

MONARCHY ILLEGAL. YESTERDAY'S DAMAGE WAS SELECTIVE AND

WIDESPREAD
WIDE-SPREAD. END SUMMARY

1. SHARIF-EMAMI GOVT HAS RESIGNED IN WAKE OF YESTERDAY'S
LARGE-SCALE RIOTING, TO BE REPLACED BY MILITARY GOVT HEADED

BY GEN QOLAM REZA AZHARI, CHIEF OF SUPREME COMMANDER'S
STAFF, AND ASSISTED BY CHIEFS OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICES.

EACH MILITARY CHIEF WILL SUPERVISE SEVERAL MINISTRIES,

WITH DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS IN HANDS OF CAREER UNDERSECRE-

TARIES. SHAH ~~WILL~~ ^{ED} ADDRESS THE NATION ~~LATE MORNING~~ ^{LATE MORNING (SEPTEL)}.

2. SHAH HAS TOLD AMBASSADOR PARLIAMENT WILL PROBABLY
BUT HE WAS NOT SURE (NOTE: SPEECH IN SEPTEL DOES NOT HAVE THIS).
BE DISSOLVED, AND THERE WILL BE ARRESTS OF DISSIDENTS,

BUT NO NATIONAL FRONT, PAN-IRANIST (PEZESHKPOUR) OR

BANI-AHMAD FOLLOWERS WILL BE ARRESTED. (COMMENT: THIS

might possibly
APPROXIMATELY LEAVE SUCH PROMINENT DISSIDENTS AS MINATCHI,

MOGHADAM, AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN LIABLE TO

ARREST.)

3. TEHRAN MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION THIS MORNING ISSUED

TOUGH NEW DIRECTIVE. REPEATING PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENT OF

NEW CURFEW HOURS OF 9 PM TO 5 AM, MLA RESTATED ORIGINAL

POLICY THAT GATHERINGS OF TWO OR MORE PEOPLE ARE PROHIBITED.

MARTIAL LAW VIOLATORS WILL BE WARNED BY AN OFFICER; IF

THEY DO NOT OBEY, TROOPS WILL FIRE ON THEM. ALL SCHOOLS

ARE TO REMAIN CLOSED THROUGH NOV 12. [HOWEVER, AS OF NOV 12]

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

50102-701

OPTIONAL FORM 102

(formerly FS-41)

January 1974

Printed at GPO

(022)

11-6-73

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

10835

FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN		CLASSIFICATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE	
E.O. 11652:	ACTION: SECRETATE WASHDC		
TAGS:	INFO: CONCERN ^{DISCONSIL} DHAHRAN		
SUBJECT:	USINT BAGHDAD		
ACTION:	AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI		
POL: 3	ANKARA		
AMB	BONN		
MIN	DOHA		
ECON	ISLAMABAD		
PM	JIDDA		
ICA	KABUL		
OR	KHARTOUM		
SY	KUWAIT		
ADM	LONDON		
DAO	MANAMA		
AFOSI	MUSCAT		
CRU	NEW DELHI		
scro	PARIS		
15	USCINCEUR VAYHINGEN GE		
	USCINCPAC		
	LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 10835		
E.O. 11652:	N/A		
TAGS:	PINS, IR		
SUBJ:	FIRST REACTIONS TO SHAH'S SPEECH		
REF:	TEHRAN 10817		
<p>1. ONE OPPOSITION REACTION WE HAVE COMES FROM RELIGIOUS AND HUMAN RIGHTS SPOKESMAN MINATCHI. HE SAID SPEECH IS NOT BAD IF MILITARY GOVT IS SHORT AND LEAVES THE WAY OPEN FOR A NEW COALITION GOVT TO EMERGE EASILY. EARLIER IN THE DAY, NATIONAL FRONT'S SPOKESMAN HAD SPOKEN OF THE</p>			
CHARTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE:	TELE. EXT.:	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
POL:GB/Amorakis	11/6/73	1110	MIN:CMW/as
CLEARANCES:			

A/m

ANNV ISB3240UA954
 TO RUQMER
 FM RUQMGU #4547/2 1701450
 RNY OCCCC ZHH
 I P 191425Z JUN 79
 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7137
 INFO RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 9525
 RUQBLE/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1527
 RUQZMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1309
 RUQOMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 8113
 RUQTHD/USINF BACHDAD 237
 RUQLEPA/AMCONSUL ADANA 9261
 RUQMPD/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 8149
 RUQFLAEA/AMCONSUL IZMIR 1460
 RUQBNA/USMISSION USNATO 8055

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 4647

LIMDIS

-- RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS: OKCUM SENSED THAT THE IRANIANS WERE NOT WELL INCLINED TOWARD THE SOVIETS. ONE POINT OF CONTENTION WAS THE WIDESPREAD BELIEF THAT THE SOVIETS WERE ASSISTING DISSIDENT GROUPS. IN CONTRAST, OKCUM NOTED THAT THE IRANIANS TOLD HIM THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THEUS WAS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN THIS TYPE OF INTERFERENCE.

-- ISRAEL: THE HARSHIST ATTITUDE WAS AGAINST ISRAEL. FEELINGS WERE STRONG, AND IRANIANS BELIEVED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE COLLUding WITH REMNANTS OF SAVAK TO SPUR TROUBLE AMONG DISSIDENT GROUPS.

-- IRAQ: THE IRANIANS COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE IRAQI POSITION, ESPECIALLY ON KURDISTAN WHERE THE IRAQIS WERE BELIEVED TO BE ASSISTING DISSIDENTS.

-- AFGHANISTAN: THE IRANIANS SHOWED AT LEAST "MORAL SOLIDARITY" WITH THE AFGHAN ISLAMIC REBELS. THE IRANIANS SAW THE TARAKI GOVERNMENT IN DIFFICULT STRAITS.

-- RCD: OKCUM FOUND THE IRANIANS NOT REPEAT NOT IN FAVOR OF USING THIS ORGANIZATION AS A VEHICLE TO PROMOTE REGIONAL COOPERATION. INSTEAD, THE IRANIANS WANTED TO DEAL BILATERALLY.

-- NEW ENVOY FOR TURKEY: THE IRANIANS WERE PLANNING TO ASSIGN A NEW CHARGE D'AFFAIRS TO ANKARA AND

4

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-323-822

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ACTION

①
 ZNY
 DE RUEHC 4510 0080021
 ZNY CCCCC ZZC
 O 070016Z JAN 79
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 9302
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 004510

8 JAN 79 06 59z

000413

E.O.112065 GDS, 1-7-85, (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PING, IR

SUBJECT: FURTHER REPORT OF RICHARD COTTAM

REF: TEHRAN 00366

ACTION

POL 3

INFO

AMB

DCM

PM

ECON 2

ADM

ICA

OR

CRU 2 X 3

1. DEP OFF CALLED COTTAM JANUARY 7 FOR REPORT TO SUPPLEMENT REFTEL. COTTAM STRESSED THAT GROUP AROUND KHOMEINI AND OPPOSITIONISTS IN TEHRAN WERE FEARFUL OF A MILITARY COUP WHICH WOULD LEAD TO BLOODY REPRESSION. HE SAID THAT IN HIS FINAL DAYS IN TEHRAN, JANUARY 2-3, OPPOSITIONISTS WERE QUITE DEFINITE IN THEIR INFORMATION ABOUT A COUP. THEY HAD NAMES OF SIX GENERALS, INCLUDING OVEISSI, RABII, AND KHOSROWDAD PLUS THREE OTHERS COTTAM COULDN'T REMEMBER WHO WERE THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY LEADERS. COUP PLANS BEING DRAWN UP IN A BUILDING OWNED BY "RESEARCH CORPORATION" ON SHAH ABBAS AVENUE. ACCORDING TO THE OPPOSITION, THE PLANNERS HAD DIVIDED TEHRAN INTO SIX DISTRICTS EACH UNDER A GENERAL OFFICER. ARRESTS AND APPLICATION OF STRICT MILITARY CONTROLS WOULD BE SET IN MOTION AT A GIVEN SIGNAL. MANY IN THE OPPOSITION FEARED THE U.S. WOULD BACK SUCH A COUP.

2. DESPITE HATRED FOR U.S. AMONG THE GENERAL POPULATION, COTTAM FOUND KHOMEINI'S CIRCLE AND OPPOSITIONISTS IN TEHRAN

READY TO THINK IN SOPHISTICATED TERMS ABOUT FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. HE DESCRIBED THEM AS AFRAID OF THE SOVIET UNION AND DESIROUS OF RELYING ON THE U.S. FOR IRAN'S DEFENSE. THEY DID NOT WANT A FORMAL DEFENSIVE RELATIONSHIP BUT DID WANT U.S. BACKING AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT. KHOMEINI'S FOLLOWERS THOUGHT MOSCOW WOULD BE GREATLY DISTURBED BY A GOVERNMENT IN IRAN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO MIGHT EXERCISE INFLUENCE BEYOND IRAN'S BORDERS, INCLUDING AMONG SOVIET MUSLIMS.

O 221358Z JAN 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC, MILIT IMMEDIATE 3240
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 01077

CHRG: STATE 1/22/79
 APPY: MIN: CWNAS
 DRFTD: POL: JDSTEMPEL: HG
 CLEAR: POL: GELAMBRAKIS
 DISTR: DOE AMB MIN-2
 DUMMY/CHRON

EXDIS

E.O. 12865: RDS-4 1/11/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P
 TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOV
 SUBJECT: LMI WANTS U.S. TO PUSH; CONFLICT WITH MODERATES;
 SHAPING UP

REF: TEHRAN 957

1. (C. ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: LMI'S ENTEZAM TOLD EMBOFF THAT LMI URGENTLY WANTS MEETING WITH SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS TO ARRANGE FOR PEACEFUL ARRIVAL OF KHOMEINI. LMI WANTS U.S. TO PUSH PRIME MINISTER, MAJLES, AND REGENCY COUNCIL TO RESIGN. POLOFF STATED SUCCINCTLY THAT THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT SOMETHING U.S. COULD DO AND EVEN ATTEMPTING IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE HARMFUL. COMPROMISE ON BOTH SIDES SEEMS NECESSARY. KHOMEINI ATTEMPT TO SET UP RIVAL GOVERNMENT ON HIS RETURN COULD BE VERY DANGEROUS. SOURCE SAID LMI STILL WISHED TO DISCUSS U.S. INTERESTS IN IRAN TO AVOID FUTURE CONFLICT. MEANWHILE, MODERATE RELIGIOUS SOURCE INDICATED OPPOSITION MEETING WITH MILITARY WAS CRITICAL, AND OBLIQUELY CONFIRMED REPORTS OF RIFT WITHIN RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. END SUMMARY

3. AMIR ENTEZAM, LMI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, TOLD EMBOFF STEMPEL MORNING JAN. 22 THAT LMI WISHED URGENTLY TO SCHEDULE MEETING BETWEEN KHOMEINI CHIEF BEHESHTI, LMI LEADERS BAZARGAN, AND GENERALS MOGHADDAM AND GHARABAGHI TO DISCUSS UNFOLDING KHOMEINI RETURN SITUATION AND URGED USG TO CONVINCE MILITARY THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA. (MINATCHI, OF SHARIAT-MADARI MODERATES, MADE SAME PITCH WITHIN AN HOUR OF ENTEZAM'S). POLOFF REPLIED TO BOTH THAT USG HAD DONE SO THE VERY MORNING, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. ENTEZAM SAID THE MILITARY APPROACH TO MILITARY WOULD PROBABLY LEAD TO A SETTLE WITHIN 24 HOURS; A NEUTRAL PLACE HAD ALREADY BEEN WORKED OUT (ENTEZAM WOULD NOT SAY WHERE); AND IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL KHOMEINI RETURN. (COMMENT: IT WAS CLEAR THAT ENTEZAM AND LMI GENERALLY NOW ACCEPT KHOMEINI'S JAN 26 RETURN AS A FACT.)

4. TURNING TO POLITICAL SITUATION, LMI SAID PROBLEM WAS NOW WITH PRIME MINISTER, WHO DID NOT WANT TO GIVE WAY, DESPITE "DISCUSSION" ON MATTER EARLIER. ENTEZAM SAID HE AND ONE OTHER LMI LEADER (NOT IDENTIFIED) WERE SCHEDULED TO SEE BAKHTIAR LATE AFTERNOON JAN 22. THEY WOULD PUSH LMI "COMPROMISE" (HIS WORD) WHEREBY REGENCY COUNCIL WOULD GIVE UP GOVERNING POWERS TO KHOMEINI-APPOINTED ISLAMIC COUNCIL. ENTEZAM SAID BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR USG TO PRESS BAKHTIAR, PARLIAMENT AND REGENCY COUNCIL TO RESIGN AND CLEAR WAY FOR ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.

0 201300Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 3407
R S C P R T SECTION 01 TEHRAN 21447

CHRG7: STATE 1/29/79
APPRV: DCM:CMNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTFMPPEL:G
CLEAR: 1-POL:GELAMBRA:G
DISTR: DCM-2 AMB BGT
DUMMY/CHRGV

TYPE

POL 12-2

INFO: 12000: RDS-4 1-29-79 (STEMPPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TELE: PORS, PINR, PINT, PJOV, IR
SUBJECT: LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) WILL TRY AGAIN FOR
DEAL WITH GOI

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: SENIOR LMI OFFICIAL SAYS DESPITE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ANGER OVER ARMY SHOOTINGS OF PAST TWO DAYS, MOVEMENT WILL ATTEMPT AT EVENING MEETING JAN 29 TO WORK OUT SUCCESSFUL DEAL WITH MILITARY TO ALLOW KHOMEINI TO RETURN TO IRAN. TWO PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS AT AGREEMENT WERE FRUSTRATED BY SHOOTINGS AND, SOURCE THOUGHT, PERHAPS BY "CONFUSION" IN PARIS. LMI HOPES KHOMEINI CAN BE BROUGHT TO IRAN WHERE MOBILIZING ELEMENTS OF LOCAL RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP AND IN-COUNTRY LMI ORGANIZATION CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR. BIGGEST STUMBLING BLOCK IS PUBLIC REJECTION OF BAKHTIAR BY KHOMEINI AND GREATER LEVEL OF EXASPERATION ON BOTH SIDES THAN EXISTED FIVE DAYS AGO. END SUMMARY.

3. LMI'S AMIR ENTEZAM ASKED FOR MEETING WITH POLOFF STEMPPEL (AND TO UNDERLINE URGENCY, EVEN OFFERED TO COME TO EMBASSY'S CAPAVANSARI RESTAURANT IN VIEW OF DIFFICULT SECURITY SITUATION) LATE MORNING JAN 29. HE BEGAN BY EXPRESSING LMI ANGER AT ARMY'S SHOOTING OF DEMONSTRATORS OVER PAST TWO DAYS, AND SAID LMI FIGURES FOR JAN 27 UNIVERSITY SHOOT-OUT WERE 47 DEAD, 740 INJURED. ENTEZAM NOTED POLICE IN SANANDAJ HAD "RUN WILD" ON JAN 26, AFTER KILLING OF POLICEMAN DAY BEFORE, AND SHOT DOWN PRG. (COMMENT: THESE FIGURES ARE PROBABLY HIGH.) ENTEZAM SAID HE PERSONALLY HEARD PRIME MINISTER GIVE ORDERS TO ARMY TO APPROX ENTIRE SANANDAJ POLICE FORCE DURING MEETING JAN 26 AFTER READING SAVAK REPORT WHICH BLAMED POLICE FOR INCIDENT.

4. EMPLOYE NOTED ARMY SEEMED UPSET WITH VIOLENCE OF PAST TWO DAYS, BUT OUR INFORMATION INDICATED BOTH DAYS' ACTIVITIES WERE STARTED BY THOSE OTHER THAN LMI-ASSOCIATED FORCES. ENTEZAM SAID HIS MOVEMENT WAS ALSO CERTAIN TUDEH ELEMENTS HAD BEGUN JAN 27 SHOOTING AT UNIVERSITY, AND THAT PERHAPS GOI PROVOCATEUR HAD STARTED ROCK-THROWING JAN 29. ENTEZAM SAID VIOLENCE WAS STILL GOI'S FAULT, AND HAD DISRUPTED DEAL WITH KHOMEINI. EMPLOYE SAID PERHAPS THIRD PARTIES WERE TRYING TO DISRUPT DEAL. LONG BACK-AND-FORTH DISCUSSION FOLLOWED ON CAUSES OF VIOLENCE AND FACT IT HAD INCREASED ANGER ON ALL SIDES AND INHIBITED POLITICAL SOLUTION.

5. ENTEZAM SAID BASIC PROBLEM NOW WAS KHOMEINI REJECTION OF BAKHTIAR BECAUSE OF THE BLOODLETTING. DESPITE

19 Oct 79 00 07z

S E C R E T 182250Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 535235.

TO: PRIORITY TEHRAN INFO PARIS, LONDON.

RIBAT SDPRETEXT

IRAN 54511

1. WE AGREE THERE IS NO REASON TO DISCLOSE TO GNGRAPH
COS'S TRAVEL IRAN OR OUR EFFORTS TO RESPOND TO PCOI'S
REQUEST IN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS. HOWEVER, IN VIEW RECENT
LEVEL EXCHANGE WITH GNGRAPH ON IRANIAN SITUATION, BELIEVE
WOULD TDI LONDON BRIEFLY ENROUTE HQS FOR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS
RECENT GNGRAPH PAPER ON IRAN AS POINT OF DEPARTURE. REQUESTS
COS/COM CONCURRENCE.
2. CONCUR NO CONTACT WITH SDPRETEXT THIS TRIP.
3. WOULD APPRECIATE ACCOUNT OF ANY DISCUSSIONS HELD
PAR WITH SDPLOC/1 ON RESUMPTION SOME FORM INTEL RELATIONSHIP.
4. NO FILE. RWV 18OCT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
R E T.

*no reply
needed*

PL00-19

~~SECRET~~

ENTEZAM

666-885

Mr. Cave wishes
discuss matter
revealed at meeting
with Charge.

Mr. Cave will be
in Stockholm
when E. arrives
22 Oct.

79 04 13z
CI NOV

S E C R E T 311613Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 543216.

TO: STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SDPLOD

1. ACCORDING TO SDPLOD/1 HE WAS PLANNING TO DEPART TEHRAN FOR STOCKHOLM ON 25 OCTOBER. HE WAS GOING TO PICK UP HIS WIFE IN STOCKHOLM THEN PROCEED TO OSLO TO PRESENT HIS CREDENTIALS. WHILE IN TEHRAN, SDPLOD/1 WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND ASKED US FOR ANY INFORMATION WHICH WE MAY HAVE WHICH BEARS ON THE SUBJECT OF IRAQI/IRANIAN RELATIONS. WOULD APPRECIATE COS CONTACT SDPLOD/1 AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND PASSING FOLLOWING REPORT TO SDPLOD/1, EMPHASIZING THAT REPORT FORWARDED BY ADLESICK IN REPLY TO CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY SDPLOD/1 IN TEHRAN.

2. TEXT OF REPORT AS FOLLOWS: "BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER, SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME CONVINCED THAT IRANIAN POLICY WAS TO ACTIVELY PURSUE ITS CLAIM TO BAHRAYN ISLAND THE IRAQI VIEW WAS ARRIVED AT AFTER CAREFUL STUDY OF NUMEROUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE BY IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS DETAILING THE IRANIAN CLAIM TO BAHRAYN.

"PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IRAN WAS ACTIVELY PURSUING ITS CLAIM TO BAHRAYN, IRAQI LEADER SADAM HUSAYN HAD THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, PARTICULARLY AFTER HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM YAZDI IN HAVANA DURING THE COURSE OF THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, HAS SOME PROBLEM IN DETERMINING THE PROPER WAY TO DEAL WITH THE PGOI. SADAM HUSAYN HAD ORIGINALLY HOPED TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN. AT THE MOMENT THE IRAQIS ARE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE PGOI, AS THEY INCREASINGLY BELIEVE THAT THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT REPRESENT MUCH AND REAL POWER LIES IN THE IRANIAN RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT WHICH IS HOSTILE TO IRAQ.

"DESPITE THE FAILURE TO PURSUE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. David Tourgeman, Second Secretary, Israeli Mission
Thomas Greene, Political Officer

Place : Tehran Palace Hotel Garden Restaurant

Time : Friday, April 2, 1965; 11:30 a.m.

Mr. Tourgeman commented that the Israeli operations here in Iran are almost clandestine. He said that while his Government was eager to expand relations with Iran, it realized the delicate position of the Iranian Government in recognizing both Israeli and many Arab countries, and therefore did not push contacts too much.

He said that, given the position of Iranian Jews who have immigrated to Israel, Iranians who study in Israel can be trained by former Iranians in the Persian language. This gives Israel a uniquely effective position in training agricultural technicians for small projects and small industrial projects. Tourgeman says his government will try discretely to expand Israeli aid to Iran in the coming year.

COMMENT:

Tourgeman was very cordial and seemed interested in maintaining a contact with the American Embassy. Our conversation lasted for over an hour, at the end of which he urged me to call him when I return from home leave.

POL: TGreene/mjs

Distributions:

MPH-POLreading
WAE
TG
BIO
CKU

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 4

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : POL - Mr. Toussaint

DATE: Nov. 12, 1970

FROM : L. Douglas Heck

SUBJECT: Visit of Mr. Ben-Yohanan of the Israeli Mission

Mr. Ben-Yohanan tells me that he has been in Tehran for about two and a half months. He came here from eight years in Israel, and he said he was pleased to have a change from assignments within Israel. He spent five years in Israel attached to the Prime Minister's office as a Political Assistant and the last two years in the same capacity with Foreign Minister Eban. He said the latter job took him on numerous missions with the Foreign Minister and he had little time at home. Before this assignment he served with the Israeli Mission in Helsinki. He considers himself a career foreign service officer.

Ben-Yohanan was not very forthcoming on the state of Iran-UAR relations. He said that economic relations were improving with Israel landing an increasing number of contracts for construction, etc., in Iran. Politically he said that relations had not changed much one way or the other in the last five or six years.

On the question of Iraqi forces in Jordan he had no information suggesting that King Hussein was being successful in ousting them. In fact, the failure of the Iraqi forces to participate in the recent conflict between Jordan and the Palestinians might make it more difficult for King Hussein to arrange for their removal from Jordan.

Ben-Yohanan said there were approximately 3,000 Jews left in Iraq. He doubted there was much hope of their early departure from that country. Things were increasingly unstable in Iraq and there were rumors of new executions, but he had no definite information.



CONFIDENTIAL

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: John D. Stempel, Political Officer, US Embassy
Yoram Shani, Israeli First Secretary

SUBJECT : Terrorists in Iran and Miscellaneous

DISTRIBUTION: Charge/ADCM, POL, POL/M, ECON, OR, USIS, (BIO),
NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B

DATE & PLACE: May 18, 1977, Xanadu Restaurant, Tehran

I briefed Shani on Secretary Vance's visit and indicated the trip had gone well. Shani said he had heard there was concern over the Secretary's comment which suggested the US and Iran did not agree on everything. I offered to provide him a transcript of the press conference to illustrate that this concern was unnecessary.

Alleged Terrorist Activity at Jewish Immigration Agency -- Shani said newspaper reports of an attempt by two terrorists to shoot their way into the Jewish Agency were only semi-correct. There were two men involved and both were killed. They had no connection with known terrorists movements, though one had served a prison sentence, allegedly for crimes against the state. Shani said it was not even clear that the pair were going to attack the Jewish immigration agency. Police stopped them on the street; the pair open fired and in the ensuing gun battle one terrorist took refuge in the Jewish agency where he was killed. The Iranians believe the pair were fanatical right-wing Moslems who may have been casing the Jewish Agency for future action.

A Second Terrorist Battle? -- Shani said friends of his reported there had been a terrorist shootout May 16 somewhere in Tehran when police cornered a group in two safe houses. The battle lasted two hours and security forces reportedly lost seven men when some of the terrorists were killed, but noted his friend said that all involved were eventually shot.

New Local Version of Rockwell Killings - Shani said a close friend of his, who said he had talked to a peripheral member of terrorist group which shot three Rockwell employees in August 1976, told him the following story which is being spread by the terrorist group:

The terrorist group was really after just one of the men -- a CIA Major (sic) who had landed in Iran about 14 hours before the killing, ostensibly with a complete scheme for tapping Tehran's telephone lines. The two other people killed were shot because they drew revolvers, but the principal target of the operation was "the CIA Major". (Comment: All of the employees killed had lived in Iran for sometime though one had just returned the night before from leave -- none were carrying weapons. The flaws in this story suggest an obvious propaganda attempt.)

NNNNVF

LWVV ESA158BRA003

PP RUMHR

DE RUEHC #0204/01 1300745

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

P 100237Z MAY 79

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUMZIN/USMISSION SINAI PRIORITY 9061

INFO RUMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 3902

RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0723

RUMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 9100

RUMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 2212

RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0970

RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 7714

RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4500

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 9245

RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 6088

RUMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 9393

RUEKJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0910

RUMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 7054

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2260

RUFHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8174

RUMNAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 4500

RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 1273

RUMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO PRIORITY 4660

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0722

RUMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 7821

RUMQG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 6465

RUFHOK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 7597

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2356

RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1586

RUMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 2259

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3139

RUMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 8662

RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 3064

RUMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA PRIORITY 3676

RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0354

RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2106

BT

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 118204/01

E.O. 12065 GDS 5/9/85 (GRIFFIN, PHILIP J.)

TAGS: EG, IS, PINR

SUBJECT: INTSUM 807 - MAY 9, 1979

LONDON FOR GLASPIE

PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY

DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM

OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

1. (C) THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL BEGIM SUBMITTED TO THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE LAST WEEK THAT DEALS WITH ISRAEL'S STAND ON THE NATURE OF AUTONOMY IS APPARENTLY BASED ON BEGIM'S ORIGINAL AUTONOMY PLAN OF DECEMBER 1977. ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, THE CURRENT PROPOSAL TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CAMP DAVID FORMULATIONS. HAARETZ COMMENTATOR BENZIMAN SAID BEGIM'S PLAN CONCLUDES WITH TWO UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS.

VV ESA543EIA076

RR RUQMR

DE RUEKJCS #1437 3050544

ZNY SSSSS

RUWNZXB I USS OURBPSBEACH

RHTMMSS I USS AYLWIN

RHTMMSS I USS JULIUS A FURER

RULYMTZ I USS NIMITZ

RUCLFEA I USS ELMER MONTGOMERY

RUWNNUL I AIRANTISUBRON THREE EIGHT

RUFAAA I HELANTISUBRON TWELVE

RULYOWA I CG FOURTH MAB

RULYALA I USS SARATOGA

RUHGF I AIRANTISUBRON TWO ONE

RULYHOV I USS SAIPAN

RUHGOAA I USS BLUE RIDGE

RUWNNUL I USS CONSTELLATION

RUEBLBA I USS JOHN F KENNEDY

RWDXAA I USS NEW ORLEANS

RUWNLHA I USS TARAWA

RWDXAA I USS ENGLAND

RUHJHNA I USS TUSCALOOSA

RULYIKE I USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER

RUHGF I USS KITTY HAWK

RULYEHA I COMCRUDESGRU TWELVE

RULYXXG I CTG SIX TWO PT TWO

RULYAHA I CTG SIX TWO PT ONE

RUHGOXA I CTG SEVEN SIX PT THREE

RUWNRDP I CTG SEVEN SIX PT FOUR

RUHGPBA I CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT THREE

RUHGPBA I CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT FIVE

RUHGPBA I CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUHGPBA I CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT ONE

RUHGPBA I CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX

RUHGOHA I CTG SEVEN NINE PT FOUR

RUYNSDF I CTG SEVEN NINE PT FIVE

RHMPMDD I CTU SEVEN NINE PT FOUR PT ONE

RUFAAA I HELANTISUBRON LIGHT THREE ONE

RUFAAA I HELSUPPRON ELEVEN

RUFAAA I HELANTISUBRON TWO

RWDXAA I USS ANCHORAGE

RHCFMDD I USS AUSTIN

RUWMBWA I USS ENTERPRISE

RUHGIW I USS MIDWAY

RUEOHUA I USS MOUNT WHITNEY

RUWNHKG I USS RAH ER

RULYMKA I CTF SIX TWO

RUWDFVA I COMPHIBGRUEASTPAC

RULYUSA I USS AMERICA

RULYOSA I COMCARGRU SIX

RHHMBRA I USS JOSEPH STRATTON

R 010537Z NOV 79

FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//JSI-7//

D DIA CURINTEL

AIG 7011

AIG 7033

BT

SECRET NOFORN 2966

DIADIN 304-2A (AS OF: 1500 EST 31 OCT 79)

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

Confidential

~~BA~~
~~AB~~
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file notes



File

1	✓
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Biographic Report

Yitzhak RABIN

Prime Minister of Israel

Confidential

BR-74-30
June 1974

SECRET

COUNTRY POLICY SUMMARY AND
PROGRAM ANALYSIS, IRAN

(Extract)

I. BASIC POLICY OBJECTIVES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

1. To maintain the sovereign independence and territorial integrity of Iran. This requires:

- a. The will of Iran to remain independent and to defend itself.
- b. The ability to discourage limited Soviet attacks on Iranian territory and, in the case of outright Soviet or Soviet-supported aggression, to delay it until Iran's allies can react.
- c. Enhancement of internal loyalties, especially in areas of Iran which might become subject to foreign-inspired insurgency.
- d. Ability to control such insurgency if it occurs
- e. The ability to discourage and, if necessary, to resist alone an attack by a neighboring country unsupported by the USSR.

2. To maintain the cooperative relationship between the U.S. and Iran, particularly in military matters. This requires:

- a. Continued Iranian understanding of the mutuality of Iranian interests and those of the Free World.
- b. A mutually beneficial military relationship between Iran and the U.S.
- c. A favorable U.S. image as effective guarantor of Iranian security and as a friendly power interested in Iranian independence and progress.
- d. Specifically, such an image not only with the present governing elite but also with the likely successors to that elite.
- e. Demonstration of our devotion to the objective of making Iran progressively less dependent on foreign assistance.

SECRET

سید زین‌الدین حضرت امام

TELEGRAM

11269

INDICATE
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO
210819Z DEC 77

FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	CLASSIFICATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 11269

7

ACTION:

E.O. 11652: N.A.

TAGS: OREP (WOLFF, LESTER)

SUBJECT: CODEL WOLFF TEHRAN SCHEDULE

REF: (A) STATE 302205; (B) TEHRAN 11074; (C) TEHRAN 10732

1. PRIME MINISTER HAS OFFERED TO HOST WORKING LUNCH FOR CODEL WOLFF TO BRIEF CODEL ON ITS INTERESTS. CONGRESSMEN PLUS SENIOR STAFF REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE INCLUDED.

EMBASSY WOULD PROVIDE IN-HOUSE BRIEFING (REF C) EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER LUNCH, DEPENDING ON TIMING. WIVES AND REMAINING STAFF WOULD BE PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY TO TOUR CITY BY BUS AND VISIT SHAHYAD MONUMENT, PER REF (C).

ALTERNATIVELY, IF CODEL DESIRES, PRIME MINISTER PREPARED TO BRIEF ENTIRE GROUP WITHOUT LUNCH.

2. AMBASSADOR STRONGLY ADVISES CODEL TO ACCEPT PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION. AMOUZEGAR IS AN ASTUTE, ARTICULATE, DYNAMIC INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN

POL3

AMB
DCM
SA
ADMIN
RSO
CRU
9sa

DRAFTED BY:

POL:JDStenpel:nbt

CLEARANCES:

DRAFTING DATE

12/21/77

TEL. EXT.

1112

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

CHARGE: JACK C. MIKLOS

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(Formerly FS-413(H))
January 1975
Dept. of State

AmEmbassy TEHRAN
INCOMING TELEGRAM CONTROL NO. *NWC*

ACT/AM
 11-3

MAR 12 1978

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NFO:

AMR/

P R 101605Z MAR 78

DCM/

FM CDDT NWC WASH DC

IA/

TO RUMYR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IRAN

POI/

INFO RUEHC/ SEC STATE WASH DC

ECON/

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PK/

SUBJ: NWK-9 FIELD STUDY TRIP

USIS/

A. YOUR MSG 220759Z FEB 78

CONS/

1. APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S ASSISTANCE.

DR/

2. GROUP WILL HAVE EIGHT MEMBERS, AS FOLLOWS:

ADM/

NAME	GRADE/ORG	PASSPORT NO.
CLAUDE L. CLARK	COL, USA	YV60RYUW
RICHARD H. HOWARTH	FSO-3	X118994
WILLIAM A. NAUGHTON	GS-14, DIA	Y122266
BARD E. O'NEILL	MAJ, USAF	Y1434068
PAT R. PAXTON	LTC, USAF	Y1447728
ROBERT G. SANDS	GS-14, DOD	Y1245988
PAUL D. TAYLOR	FSO-3	X129597
ROBERT H. THOMPSON	GS-14, NAVY	Y1293642

MAJOR O'NEILL IS THE GOUP FACULTY SUPERVISOR AND COL CLARK IS

SCNO/

CRD/

CEO/

WP/

THE GRUO LEADER.

SAG/

3. REVISED ITINERARY NOW FIRM. ETA TEHRAN APRIL 9, 2330 HOURS

MAAG/

VIA PAA 110. ETD APRIL 13, 0930 HOURS VIA IR409. PLEASE

AGR/

RESERVE FOUR DOUBLE ROOMS AT MEDIUM PRICE HOTEL.

DEA/

4. FOCUS OF GROUP INTEREST IS US SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

IRS/

INTERESTS IN PERSIAN GULF AREA. OF SPECIFIC INTEREST IN IRAN

TCTR/

WOULD BE: INTERNAL POLITICS AS THEY RELATE TO STABILITY AND NATION-

FAA/

BUILDING; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING, AND TRENDS AND

SIZES OF OIL REVENUES; THE IRANIAN PERCEPTION OF SECURITY DEVELOP-

MENTS IN THE AREA AND IRAN'S ROLE; AND THE DEVELOPMENT, READI-

NESS, AND MORAL OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

CRU/

5. GROUP APPRECIATES SCHEDULING DIFFICULTIES THAT MIGHT BE OCCASIONED BY NEW YEAR HOLIDAY BUT DESIRES MEETING AT HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. PAST GROUPS HAVE MET WITH HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY AND CURRENT GROUP WILL BE GRATEFUL FOR EMBASSY ATTEMPTS TO SCHEDULE SIMILAR CALL. OTHER DESIRED CALLS INCLUDE PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER, WAR MINISTER, FINANCE MINISTER, MINISTER OF PLANNING, MINISTER OF EDUCATION, AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY. TIME PERMITTING, A MEETING WITH SECRETARY GENERAL, RASTAKIZ PARTY AND VISIT TO NATIONAL DEFENSE

CONFIDENTIAL

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Armenian Leader's Views on Iranian Political Stability

PARTICIPANTS: Diyair Panossian, Armenian Archbishop of Tabriz
Der Houanessian Vartan, local businessman and Tabriz
delegate to the National Armenian Council
Michael J. Metrinko, American Consulate, Tabriz, Iran

DATE & PLACE: May 20, 1978, The Archbishop's Residence in Tabriz

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, CRU, CON, RSO, NEA/IRN, ISFAHAN, SHIRAZ
BIO, IRN/OIL/B

During the course of a four hour conversation and dinner held at the Archbishop's residence, Panossian expounded at great length on his fears for Iranian political stability. He claimed he has already voiced his views to the Armenian Catholics and to his own local advisory council, and that since the February events in Tabriz and the spread of violence throughout Iran, both the local Azarbaijan Advisory Council and the National Council in Tehran have begun to take the matter under very serious consideration. In his recent meetings with members of the upper hierarchy in Isfahan and Tehran, proposals for action in the coming troubles were a major topic of discussion. It is no longer a question of "if there is trouble," said the Archbishop, but exactly "when" the trouble will really begin.

Panossian claimed he has been undergoing a severe trial of conscience in the matter of Iran's future, and especially as it affects the present viability and future of his own episcopal see. At one point the Armenian congregation in the Azarbaijan numbered 200,000 people, he said, and now at the very most there are perhaps 7,000 left. The cultural and historical heritage of the Armenians in this area is immeasurable, even to the extent of Tabriz having been founded by an Armenian king and having gotten its name from the Armenian language. There are countless remnants of the Armenian presence scattered throughout the area, vacant monasteries, churches, old graveyards, etc., and the Archbishop feels a definite responsibility for these historical remains. When he first came to Tabriz, Panossian said he was following instructions and his own urges to try to maintain the Armenian community here as a viable and living one. He has now changed his mind, and albeit with deep regret, is establishing a personal policy of helping his followers to leave Iran. He cannot see any real future here for Armenians or Christians as a whole, and is caught between maintaining a very ancient and valuable religious presence in the Azerbaijan, or thinking about the real safety of his people.

PO:MJMetrinko/pjn

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : CONS - Mr. Goelz

FROM : SHIRAZ - Victor L. Tomseth

SUBJECT: Principal Officers' Meetings

DATE: 6/1



While I cannot speak for my colleagues, I found our recent principal officers' meeting convincing proof of the utility of holding these gatherings on a regular basis. I continue to believe that some kind of specific theme for each session tends to focus the participants' attention, and hence is a useful device for maximizing what can be accomplished during the relatively short time allotted. I think the first day's seminar on internal politics amply demonstrated this point.

For the future I suggest the following as possible themes:

--The Iranian educational system, the role of students in society, and the impact of study abroad. In addition to the principal officers themselves, I think it would be useful to include individuals from ICA, POL and CONS as key participants.

--Economic development in Iran, prospects for continued growth, and the implications for future political stability. ECON would clearly have to take the lead, but the Agricultural Attache, CONS and POL could also make valuable contributions.

--The country commercial program and the role of the constituent posts. The Commercial Attache and the Trade Center would have to do most of the work, but I would think that considerable emphasis should be given to consideration of practical techniques for improving the constituent posts' contribution to the overall effort.

--The Iranian military's role as an agent for modernization and a political force. If some military officers with field advisory experience could be recruited to participate along



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 28, 1978

Charles Naas, Esquire
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.
Tehran

Dear Mr. Naas:

The attached letter from Ambassador Little is self-explanatory. The Intelligence Community Staff is undertaking a follow-up experiment primarily to review the validity of the priority national intelligence needs and to assess the impact and effectiveness of the initial FOCUS review. Must keep in business you know!

We would very much appreciate your candid opinion. Our deadline for getting State views to Ed Little is August 11. If you do have any comments would you drop me a note or send a STADIS telegram Attn: INR/OIL, CCMoor.

As Ambassador Sullivan was in the Department, I showed him the attached package. He pencilled in an additional item on the list of priorities, and agreed that we should go ahead with the review.

Sincerely,

Carol C. Moor

Office of Intelligence Liaison
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 11652:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

TAGS:
SUBJECT:

INFO: USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY ASU DHABI

ACTION:

" ANKARA
" DOHA
" ISLAMABAD
" JEDDA
" KABUL
" LONDON
" MANAMA
" MUSCAT
" NEW DELHI
" PARIS

FOL-3

USCINCPAC WASHINGTON GE
USCINCPAC

10724

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AFOSI
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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN

SWR
TADR
ISFA

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PORS, PCOV, PINT, IR, SHOM
SUBJECT: POLITICAL/SECURITY REPORT, NOV 2
SUMMARY: SHAHJATMADARI SOFTENED EARLIER COMMENT ABOUT RESORT
TO ARMED INSURRECTION. I.S. LEADER SAJJAD REITERATED
CONDEMNATION OF VIOLENCE AND CALLED FOR SUPPORT OF CONSTITUTION.
MOUSAVI SAYS HE WILL ACCEPT "WHATEVER IRANIAN PEOPLE DECIDE."
GANJI AND AZNOUR REACT BITTERLY TO ANHDARI'S CHARGE OF
CORRUPTION AND DEMAND INVESTIGATION. IRAN AIR DOMESTIC FLIGHTS
GROUNDED BY POLITICAL STRIKE. INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS CONTINUE.
MUSVI MET WITH SHAM, LATER EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR SHAHJATMADARI

CLASSIFICATION

DATE AND TIME

CLASSIFICATION AND DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

11-2-78

ADRM:JMK

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

5/5

SECRET/NODIS

To : The Secretary
From: INR - David E. Mark, Acting

The Gathering Crisis in Iran

This paper outlines our perspective on the fast-breaking events in Iran and on the steps the Shah must take very soon. We conclude that only drastic measures by the Shah hold any promise for staving off a descent into chaos.

The Shah's attempts to appease his opponents have failed. The opposition is coalescing and gaining momentum, while he loses the initiative. The Shah himself has admitted in conversation with Ambassador Sullivan that immediate action is needed to quell the turmoil, but he seems unable to make up his mind what to do. Indeed, the process of consultations with Ambassadors Sullivan and Parsons betrays his inability to come to grips with the problems that face him. So far, the Shah cannot see beyond half-measures designed to defer hard decisions. If he has convinced himself that his ideas to date represent bold gestures or sweeping changes, then he is seriously out of touch with the current scene. His reversion to the moods of depression and vacillation he displayed in the early 1950's makes it doubtful that he can move to salvage what remains of national unity, unless others intervene on his behalf.

In our judgment, the Shah has only two choices:

- He can stay on as a constitutional monarch with severely limited powers. This would mean allowing a coalition of moderate politicians to govern the country with the backing of moderate religious leaders; or

SECRET/NODIS
XGDS-2

TELEGRAM

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INDICATE
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FROM
AMEMBASSY TEHRANCLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E.O. 11652:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

TAGS:

INFO: USINT BAGHDAD

SUBJECT:

AMEMBASSY ANKARA *ABU DUBAI*

ACTION:

DOHA

ISLAMABAD

JIDDA

KABUL

KUWAIT

LONDON

MANAMA

MOSCOW

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, PGOV, IR

SUBJ: LOOKING AHEAD: THE MILITARY OPTION

REF: TEHRAN 10267 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: A MILITARY TAKEOVER IS FEASIBLE, BUT AT HEAVY
LONG-TERM COST FOR U.S. INTERESTS AS WELL AS FOR IRAN.

END SUMMARY

1. IT HAS BECOME A COMMONPLACE IN TEHRAN CONVERSATIONS

DRAFTED BY:

DCM:CNH225/

DRAFTING DATE:

1110

TEL. DATE:

11/2/78

EXTENT OF AND TYPE OF REVISIONS:

AMB: [initials]

CLEARANCES:

OR: [initials] A/DCM:J.Mills

DAO:Col. TESchar [initials]

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

50102-101

-12-



CONSULATE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Isfahan, Iran

11/16/78

CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: BGen. Mostafa Mostafai, Chief of Police, Isfahan
BGen. Abolfazl Taghavi, Chief of SAVAK, Isfahan

Col. FNU Darabi, Chief-of-Staff, Martial Law Admin., Isf.

David C. McGaffey, Consul Isfahan

Date & Place: 11/15/78: Gen. Mostafai's residence; Col. Darabi's office
Subject: Threat to Americans from "underground" dissidents

Gen. Mostafai has been seriously ill, and I visited his home with flowers to wish him well, and found Gen. Taghavi there. During the conversation, Gen. Taghavi asked me about the extent and success of my program to expose all USC employees here to a briefing on personal security. I informed him that it had been partially successful, and would continue. Gen. Mostafai, who has been out of touch, asked him why he was particularly concerned now. Gen. Taghavi looked embarrassed, then said he was saying this unofficially, between friends, and would not want it repeated to Martial Law authorities. Both Mostafai and I assured him it would remain confidential. Gen. Taghavi then said that the success of Martial Law in minimizing public demonstrations may be driving individuals and small groups underground. After a long lecture on the "communist menace", especially involving the known terrorist groups, he admitted he had no evidence to show links between those groups and the people he was concerned with now, but he feared their tactics would be similar, and that they would quickly combine forces, sharing expertise, weapons, and training. He explained that, deprived of the release of public demonstrations, some extremists had been heard talking of assassination. He complained of his inability to get the Governor-General, Mr. Haghdan, to take precautions, and stated that he and other senior officials were taking extra security precautions. (This explained his previous calls to me about my security). He was now somewhat fearful that the extremists, not finding Iranian targets, could target Americans, who, he complained, still ignore routine precautions. He has nothing to indicate any threat, except his own fears, and his colleagues on the Isfahan Security Committee disagree with his threat assessment, but his fears remain. I promised I would do what I could, without revealing him as a source, to remind Americans of the necessity of personal security precautions, but shared with him some pessimism about the effectiveness of my warnings.

Note: Gen. Taghavi has never before shared his thoughts with me, holding himself to a discussion of firmly established facts. In

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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HANDLING	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	MESSAGE NUMBER 31
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TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFO: AMCONSULS ISFAHAN AND TABRIZ (VIA INTERNAL POUCH)
FROM: AMCONSUL SHIRAZ **DATE:** 11/21/78
O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH
REF:

DEPT. DISTRIBUTION
 ORIGIN/ACTION

AF	ARA	CV	EA
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L	NEA	PER	PM
REP	SCI	SS	SV
AGR	AID	AIR	ARMY
CIA	COM	DOD	DOT
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Navy	NSA	NSC	OPIC
STR	TAR	TRAV	USA
AMB			

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: Recent contacts with a variety of individuals in southern Iran have tended to reinforce the impression that the Consulate has had for some time now, i.e., that the Shah has little popular support and that opposition to him may be so profound that nothing short of his departure will eliminate it. The Shah's unpopularity among his own people in the face of his remarkable achievements may perplex foreigners, but at least a partial answer can be found in the nature of the Persian personality which has shaped the Shah's behavior as much as it has his subjects'. Despite a lowered level of violence following the installation of a military government on November 6, it would not appear that opposition to the Shah will go away. The movement against the regime has its inspiration in highly moralistic principles. Further, nowhere is anti-Shah sentiment greater than among the youthful majority of the Iranian population which does not appear amenable to compromise. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

There are seemingly few Iranians who have a positive commitment to the regime and/or the Shah. Those that do are limited almost exclusively to individuals old enough to remember really bad political and economic times and who

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION

DRAFTED BY: PO:VLTomseth:vlt	DRAFTING DATE: 11/21/78	PHONE NO. 32023	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: PO:VLTomseth
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CLERANCES:

Tehran, Iran
November 29, 1978

The Honorable
T. L. Eliot, Jr.
6601 Virginia View Ct.
Washington, D.C. 20016

Dear Ted:

Thanks for your letter of November 20. I have referred the consular business to Lou Goelz and assume that he can be helpful to your Afghan friend. I gather, however, that all these Afghan displaced persons have to be handled through the INS office in Athens. Therefore, she will probably be referred to Athens in order to ~~give~~ the proper processing to carry her onward.

Speaking of Afghans, we recently saw Ambassador Malikiar and one of his daughters. As you may know, the one who had been married to Daoud's son has arrived in Tehran and will have to undergo additional surgery because she apparently still has at least two bullets lodged in her body. It seems to have been a minor miracle that she survived the machine-gunning which killed all the rest of her family. Unfortunately, Leila is still in Kabul and it is questionable whether she will be permitted to leave in order to join the rest of the family.

I am sure, at this stage, that you are busy in your preparations to move to Medford and take over Fletcher. As I have told you before, I consider Fletcher very fortunate in having you as the new boss. At the same time, I am more than a little dismayed to learn about the casual manner in which the Foreign Service let you go. I am glad that at least Henry had the good sense to share my sense of loss at your departure.

We are currently facing the test of strength which we expect to emerge from Moharram. I personally have confidence in the good sense of the Persian people and don't



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

DEC 1 1978

Your Excellency:

This is to thank you for the hospitality extended to me and my party by you and your government last week. The discussions with you gave us a better understanding of the problems facing you.

I have reported to the President on our discussions and he has asked that I reaffirm to you the importance of extreme moderation in the forthcoming OPEC meeting. Such moderation in the setting of petroleum prices is crucial for the health of the world economy and for the President's efforts to combat inflation and to correct the unwarranted decline in the dollar.

I look forward to the opportunity for seeing you again.

With sincere best wishes,

Sincerely,

(signed) W. M. Blumenthal
W. Michael Blumenthal

His Excellency
Gholamroza Azhari
Prime Minister of Iran
Tehran
Iran



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

DEC 1 1978

Your Imperial Majesty:

I have reported to President Carter on our conversation and he has asked me to repeat to you his firm intention to support your efforts to restore civil order and to move toward a broadly-based civilian government as soon as circumstances permit.

You were most gracious to receive me and the Members of Congress. You gave us a better, sober understanding of the problems which you confront.

In the light of these problems, I particularly appreciate the role you expect Iran to play at the forthcoming OPEC Conference. Moderation in setting petroleum prices will be vitally important for the success of the President's efforts to combat inflation and to correct the unwarranted decline of the dollar.

I hope to call on you again under less trying circumstances.

With sincere best wishes,

Sincerely,

(signed) W. M. Blumenthal

W. Michael Blumenthal

His Imperial Majesty
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
Shahanshah of Iran
Tehran
Iran

S E C R E T

ACTION

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RUFEGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0599
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 3930
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0441
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 2252
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 3013
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 7710
RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 3772
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4015
RUSBKE/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 5694
RUFHOLD/AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE 4267
RUQMPL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 9314
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R.O. 120555: GDS 12/9/78 (PRECHT,B.)

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN SITREP NO.36, 12/9/78

1. ~~ON~~ THE EVE OF ASHURA, A TENSE CALM PREVAILS IN MUCH OF IRAN. IN A LAST-MOMENT EFFORT TO HEAD-OFF A BLOODY CONFRONTATION, THE GOI ANNOUNCED THAT RELIGIOUS PROCESSIONS WOULD BE PERMITTED DURING THE NEXT 48 HOURS. TEHRAN'S CURFEW HAS BEEN LIFTED FROM 9 P.M. TO 11 P.M. FOR DECEMBER 10 AND 11 TO FACILITATE RELIGIOUS SERVICES. PRIME MINISTER AZHARI ASSURED AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN TODAY THAT ADEQUATE MEASURES WOULD BE IN PLACE SUNDAY TO CONTAIN DEMONSTRATIONS IF THEY BECAME VIOLENT.

2. TEHRAN IS REPORTED QUIET THROUGH MID-DAY DECEMBER 9. SCATTERED INCIDENTS OCCURRED WITH THE MILITARY MAKING SPOT CHECKS OF VEHICLES SEARCHING FOR ARMS, LEAFLETS, ETC.

S E C R E T

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COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

003016

DRAFTER: VLTomseth
CLEARED: GBLambrak

V 380-381
RUEHL

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHL

INFO: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 006-007 RU@MBI
 AMEMBASSN ANKARA 004-005 RU@MGN
 USINT BAGHDAD 005-006 RUEHLR
 AMEMBASSY BONN 0012-0013 - RUFHOL
 AMEMBASSY CAIRO 004-005 RUEHEL
 AMCONSUL DHARAN 001-002 RU@MDH
 AMEMBASSY DOHA 001-002 RU@MD
 AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 50-51 RUFHFT
 AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 009-010 RUSBQD
 AMEMBASSY JIDDA 002-003 RU@MRA
 AMEMBASSY KABUL 008-009 RNSBLK
 AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 001-002 RU@MKM
 AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 001-002 RU@MKW
 AMEMBASSY LONDON 008-009 RUOTC
 AMEMBASSY MANAMA 009-010 RU@MAM
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 009-010 RUEHMO
 AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 004-005 RU@MT
 AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 004-005 RUSBAE
 AMEMBASSY PARIS 011-012 RUFNPS
 AMEMBASSY BEIJING 001-002 RU@MSPG
 AMEMBASSY RABAT 003-004 RU@KBT
 USLO RIYADH 002-003 RU@MYA
 AMEMBASSY ROME 007-008 RUFHRO
 AMEMBASSY TOKYO 002-003 RUEHKO
 USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE RNSNAAA
 UNCINCPAC RUH@HQA
 USCOCOSOUTH RUFRSHH

TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PINS, IR

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/17/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P

SUBJECT: The Bazargan Government One Month Later and Prospects for the Future

1. C - entire text.
2. Summary: The Bazargan Government, after one month in office, remains extremely ineffectual. The unexpected suddenness with which it came to power, lack of a policy on how to employ the former regime's bureaucrats, police and military officers, collapse of the military and law enforcement agencies, and Khomeini's tendency to undercut

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RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 029
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 034
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 035
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 020
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 024
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 021
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 012
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 030
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 048
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 041
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 049
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 054
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 045

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 3543

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/3/85 (TOMSETH, F.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PINS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S REFERENDUM AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: TURNOUT FOR IRAN'S REFERENDUM WAS LARGE AND THE VOTE WAS OVERWHELMINGLY IN FAVOR OF THE NATION'S FORM OF GOVERNMENT BECOMING AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. HOWEVER, THE WAY IN WHICH THE REFERENDUM WAS ORGANIZED AND CONDUCTED HAS LEFT SOME ELEMENTS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY DISGRUNTLED. WHETHER THIS DISGRUNTLEMENT CAN BE CONTAINED OR NOT WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER A SENSE OF POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN THE FORMULATION OF IRAN'S NEW CONSTITUTION IS ACHIEVED, AND WHETHER RAPID PROGRESS IS MADE TOWARDS ITS PROMULGATION. THE PROSPECTS IN THIS REGARD ARE NOT PARTICULARLY GOOD SINCE THE GOVERNMENT HERETOFORE HAS BEEN IN THE POSITION OF REACTING TO KHOMEINI'S PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE SHAPE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC RATHER THAN TAKING THE LEAD IN DEFINING ITS PARAMETERS. THE GOVERNMENT MUST CAPUTE THE INITIATIVE ON THIS ISSUE IF IT IS TO PREVENT PRESENT GRUMBLING FROM BEING TRANSFORMED INTO ACTIVE, PERHAPS VIOLENT OPPOSITION. END SUMMARY.

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE
CHG: CWNAAS
POL: VLTOMSETH
POL: GBLAMBRAKIS
POL: ECON, ICA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BONN
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AMCONSUL DHARAN, IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY RABAT
USLO RIYADH, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USDOCOSOUTH

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/8/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, PGOV, ELAB, ECON, SHUM, IR
SUBJ: POLITICAL SITREP, APRIL 8, 1979

1. (C - ENTIRE TEST)
2. SUMMARY: TRIALS, EXECUTIONS CONTINUE. GROWING UNREST AMONG THE UNEMPLOYED. SHORTAGES AND PRICE INFLATION BECOME

POL 1
AMB FILE

Tuesday, April 10, 1979
Room 2172, RHOB
9:00 a.m.

Committee on Foreign Affairs

BRIEFING ON THE SITUATION IN IRAN BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM SULLIVAN

Change
POL JWS
-HMF
✓ NC
WTF

1. Trends in country: is it likely to be very unstable for next year at least; how are economic realities impacting on revolutionary policies; what are the good and bad trends you see; how strong do you perceive anti-American feeling to be; how serious are regionalist sentiments.
2. Government-Religious leaders relations: law and order problems and Barzagan efforts to stabilize situation; continuing trials and executions -- what are trends; who governs Iran today?; what is the mood of people; what is situation in Tehran, other big cities, and rural areas; does Barzagan still enjoy the Ayatollah's confidence.
3. Security situation and leftist groups: what is security situation like today; who controls the streets of Tehran; who performs police function; what types of weapons are now in private hands; what is role of the leftist groups which are the principal ones and how much strength do they have; to what degree are they benefitting from their tighter organization.
4. Pro-Shah elements: have the pro-shah groups gone underground; do you see the possibility of SAVAK-types or military types that were supportive of Shah regrouping for possible action; what are these groups doing today?.
5. US presence today and the role of US Embassy: How many official Americans are in Iran today (embassy staff and military types); what US government facilities in the country are now not in our possession; what is security like at the embassy; who guards Embassy; can anyone gain access to the compound during embassy hours.
6. Future relations: what access have you and others had to the new government officials; what types of relations do they want with the US; How many military advisors do they want and in what roles; how do you see relations developing; what is extend of US investment and what investments are in jeopardy.
7. Iranian foreign policy: what trends are emerging in Iran foreign policy; how are ties today with East Bloc; what will be our major policy problems with Iran in coming months;
8. Iranian oil policy: what oil policies regarding production and price do you see the Iranian government following; do they want to maintain production above 3 m/b/d; are economic realities forcing them to increase production as much as possible; what is the situation among oil workers; do Iranians want foreign experts and technicians to return to help them.
9. Minorities: what is the situation for Bahais, Jews, Armenians, Assyrians and others today; is there any violence against them; are many seeking to leave; what is the mood in these communities.
10. Status of US military equipment and Iranian armed forces: do we have any knowledge of sensitive US equipment getting into unfriendly hands; status of F-14 and their security; unity of three armed services; control of bases; readiness of military;

CONFIDENTIAL

THE REVIVAL OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM: THE CASE OF IRAN

William E. Griffith

The Iranian revolution has highlighted one of the principal religious and political developments of our time, the revival of Islamic fundamentalism, from Indonesia to Morocco and from Turkey to central Africa.¹ In the short run it will cause more problems to the West. In the long run, however, it may be more dangerous to the Soviet Union in Muslim Soviet Central Asia.²

The western model of modernization, industrialization, and rational bureaucracy, of an agnostic intelligentsia and consumerist masses, has had

¹O.C.R., "Grollender Islam in Indonesien," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, April 27, 1978; Hd., "Islamische Aufbruchstimmung in Malaysiaen," *ibid.*, Feb. 22, 1979; Gérard Viratelle, "La révolution afghane à l'épreuve de l'Islam III. La révolte des religieux," *Le Monde*, March 22, 1979; for Egypt, the regular coverage by J.C. Peroncel-Hugoz from Cairo in *ibid.*; for Pakistan, Dieter H. Khalid, "The Phenomenon of Re-Islamization," *Aussenpolitik*, Engl. ed., no. 4, 1978; Fu'ad Matar, "Cover Story: From the Gulf to the Atlantic--the Egyptian Rejection," *Al-Mustaqbal* (Paris), Oct. 21, 1978 (JPRS 72491, Dec. 21, 1978), and "After Expanding Circle of Opposition, al-Sadat Breaks Truce with Muslim Brotherhood," *Al-Dustur* (London), Oct. 30, 1978 (*ibid.*).

²For background, see Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). The authors point out the similarities between the national communist views of Sultan Galiev, its principal representative, and Tan Malaka, M.N. Roy, Ben Bella (explicitly), and Jose Carlos Mariátegui. There are considerable similarities to 'Alī Shari'atī as well. See also Bennigsen, "Muslim Conservative Opposition of the Soviet Regime: The Sufi Brotherhoods in the North Caucasus," in Jeremy Azrael, ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 334-348.

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INFO RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 5716
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E.O. 12865: RDS-4 5/2/09 (BINNS, J.R.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT IR UK
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT ON IRAN

REF: (A) STATE 96936 (B) STATE 105473 (C) LONDON 7020

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT) THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MET MAY 1 IN LONDON TO PREPARE AN UP-TO-DATE ASSESSMENT ON IRAN. THIS REPORT IS NOW AVAILABLE IN INR AND REFLECTS RESPONSES TO SOME OF THE QUESTIONS FLAGGED IN REF A. OTHER QUESTIONS OF INTEREST TO THE DEPARTMENT ARE NOT TREATED OWING TO LACK OF RAW MATERIAL AVAILABLE TO HMG AND TO THE USG.

2. THE BRITISH HAVE HAD NO DIRECT CONTACTS WITH KHOMEINI (REF B). RECENTLY, HOWEVER, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN DID SEE HIM AND CONVEYED HIS IMPRESSIONS TO AMBASSADOR GRAHAM. WE ARE TOLD THAT THE FRENCHMAN FOUND THE AYATOLLAH LUCID AND COHERENT. (PARIS 13410).

BREWSTER
BT
#8702

NNNNKRI

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Summary: If characteristics can be attributed to nations, one of the most blatant Persian traits is the inability to accept responsibility for anything that turns out badly. With only a few exceptions, much of the post revolution rhetoric and sub rosa commentary in Iran today is aimed pointedly at the U.S.A. End summary.

2. Attacks by the Winners: Khomeini leads the presently-in-power-pointing-finger group with an almost daily blast at the U.S.A. According to Khomeini, the U.S.A. was responsible for the Shah's excesses and for just about everything else wrong with Iran. The U.S.A. is still working to destroy Iran and all of the trouble in the economy, as well as the regional fighting is tied to Satanic Uncle Sam. A host of other orators echo Khomeini's line, and every day sees a new accusation in the press. Among others, charges against America include: Having her eyes on Iran's oil (Khomeini); being responsible for the suffering of the Baluchi peoples (Ayatollah Khameneyi); not wanting peace to return to Iran (Khomeini)' stirring up trouble among the Kurds in Turkey (the People's Fedayan); plotting with SAVAK to kill a whole series of journalists, religious and political figures (Keyhan newspaper), etc. The list goes on and on. The search for a scapegoat for all of Iran's ills is not limited to the U.S.A.

3. Israel, the UK and the USSR have also come in for a share, albeit relatively minor, of the political and religious tirades. The Shah was, ~~after all~~ ^{however}, totally under U.S. control as far as the Khomeini party

Department of State

Foreign Service of the United States of America

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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E.O. 12065: XDS-4 5/3/09 (STEMPEL, J.D.)OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOV, IR
SUBJ: HEIGHTENED TENSIONS AFTER MOTAHARI'S ASSASSINATION

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT) THIS IS A REPORTING CABLE.
2. SUMMARY: ASSASSINATION OF AYATOLLAH MOTAHARI HAS SHARPLY ~~INCREASED~~ ANXIETIES AMONG GOVERNMENT AND RELIGIOUS ~~LEADERS~~. ~~BARAGAN~~ FARGAN GROUP HAS CLAIMED CREDIT, SAYS YAZDI, ~~ENTORAM~~ AND GHOTBZADEH ARE NEXT. SUSPICIONS OF U.S. LIKELY TO INCREASE. END SUMMARY.
3. FROM NUMBER OF SOURCES AND PERSONAL OBSERVATION OF POLOFFS FOLLOWING IS ACCOUNT OF IMPACT AND REVERBRATIONS OF ASSASSINATION OF AYATOLLAH MORTEZA MOTAHARI EVENING MAY 1.
4. PGOI AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAVE BECOME VISIBLY MORE ANXIOUS ABOUT THEIR OWN SAFETY IN WAKE OF ASSASSINATION, WHICH WAS THOROUGHLY PROFESSIONAL JOB CARRIED OUT TO HIT A MAN UNDER SUBSTANTIAL SECURITY PROTECTION. REPORTS THAT HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAVE NOT BEEN ~~SENTED~~, AND IT IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT ~~GROUP~~ (AT LEAST TWO WERE INVOLVED) THAT HIT HIM MUST HAVE KNOWN THIS AS WELL. EMBASSY'S OWN MUJAHIDIN GUARDS HAVE PERCEPTIBLY HIGHER EDGINESS THAN BEFORE, AND SHOOTING IN EVENINGS HAS PICKED UP AGAIN IN SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL SECTORS OF CITY. FAR NORTHERN PART OF CITY HAS BEEN LARGELY QUIET, ACCORDING TO TWO OBSERVERS. SOME NEWSMEN REPORT TENSENESS IN OTHER PROVINCIAL TOWNS BUT NOT SUBSTANTIAL VIOLENCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5448

\$ POL 2

pol/sec report
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STATE 5/25/77
APPRV: CMC:NAAS
DRFTD: POL:TOMSETH
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL CHG RSO
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RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0891
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0869
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0895
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0898
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0883
RUQMDE/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE 0868
RUQMDD/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0878
RUFHPT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT IMMEDIATE 0187
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0118
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0181
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0122
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0856
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0883
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0144
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 0878
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0185
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0888
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0128
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0862
RUDXBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0872
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0883
RUFERO/AMEMBASSY ROMX IMMEDIATE 0888
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0872
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUEHQQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUPRSHH/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05448

Jones

POL ROUTING	
VT	<i>5</i>
JS	<i>✓</i>
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DA	<i>D</i>
JL	
VIS	
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NG	
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E.O. 12865: GDS 5/25/88 (TOMSETH, VL) OR-P
TAGS: PORS, ASEC, PINT, IR
SUBJ: ANTI-U.S. DEMONSTRATION MAY 25: SITREP AS OF 1330 LOCAL TIME

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT: REPORTING MESSAGE)
2. DEMONSTRATORS BEGAN TO DISPERSE FOLLOWING FINAL HALF HOUR OF HARANGUING AND SLOGANEERING DURING WHICH TENSIONS AMONG PARTICIPANTS APPEARED TO INCREASE MARKEDLY. AS DEMONSTRATORS BEGAN SLOWLY TO DRIFT AWAY, AT LEAST ONE GROUP, WHICH WAS DESCRIBED BY OUR MOJAHEDIN SECURITY FORCE AS "COMMUNIST" AND WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN MADE UP OF MARXIST FEDAYIN-E-KHALQ AND THEIR SUPPORTERS, ATTEMPTED TO MARCH EAST ALONG TAKHTE JAMAL AVENUE AGAINST THE FLOW OF THE DISPERSING DEMONSTRATORS BEGINNING ABOUT 1230 THIS GROUP AND PERHAPS OTHERS STATED SCUFFLING WITH ONE ANOTHER. AFTER SEVERAL MINUTES OF TOLLING AND PROING ALONG THE STREET AND CONSIDERABLE SHOUTING OUR MOJAHEDIN FORCE FIRED APPROXIMATELY SEVEN SHOTS IN THE AIR AND SOON THEREAFTER THE CROWD MELTED AWAY. FYI: WE HAD

2

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5932

Tehran

DE RUQMER #5932/01 158 **
 ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 R 071325Z JUN 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEEC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1885
 INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0121
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0128
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0130
 RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DRAHRAN 0105
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0104
 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0150
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0145
 RUSELK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0161
 RUQMEW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0125
 RUOTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0189
 RUCMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0099
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0141
 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0044
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0158

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHARGE: STATE 6/7/79
 APPRV: CHARGE: CWNAAS
 DRFTD: POL: VLTOMSETH: M.
 CLEAR: POL: NGARRETT
 DISTR: CHG POL-3 OR
 ECON DAO ICA
 MAAG RF

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BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 05932/1

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/7/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
 TAGS: PINS, PINT, SCUL, IR
 SUBJECT: WAITING FOR GODOT--IRANIAN STYLE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE.)

2. SUMMARY: THERE IS GROWING UNHAPPINESS IN IRAN WITH KHOMEINI'S REVOLUTION. MANY OF THE DISENCHANTED LOOK TO THE U.S. FOR A SIGN OF APPROVAL FOR THEIR PLOTTING AGAINST KHOMEINI WHICH, THEY MAINTAIN, WILL GALVANIZE THEM INTO ACTION. BUT THEY, AND ALMOST ALL OTHER POLITICAL GROUPINGS POTENTIALLY OPPOSED TO KHOMEINI, ARE SO MESMERIZED BY THE MYTH OF EXTERNAL MANIPULATION OF INTERNAL IRANIAN AFFAIRS, SO POLITICALLY BANKRUPT IN TERMS OF ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS WHICH MIGHT ATTRACT A MASS FOLLOWING, THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO LEAVE THE FIELD TO KHOMEINI BY DEFAULT. KHOMEINI'S MOVEMENT SUCCEEDED PRECISELY BECAUSE HE WAS ABLE TO MOBILIZE AN INTERNAL IRANIAN RESOURCE--THE CONTINUING HOLD OF ISLAM ON MUCH OF THE POPULATION--AND BECAUSE KHOMEINI WAS PREPARED TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE WHEN OPPORTUNITIES AROSE. NONETHELESS, HIS COMMITMENT TO AN IDEALIZED AND UNWORKABLE POLITICAL MODEL, AS WELL AS THE LACK OF HIERARCHICAL DISCIPLINE WITHIN HIS MOVEMENT AND THE SHIA CLERGY, STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT HE WILL NOT BE SUCCESSFUL IN CREATING THE KIND OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC HE ENVISIONS. ONLY THE EMERGENCE OF A POLITICAL FORCE WHICH, LIKE KHOMEINI'S MOVEMENT, CAN ATTRACT A MASS FOLLOWING BUT WHICH ALSO HAS AN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE UP TO THE DEMANDS OF ADMINISTERING A COUNTRY AS COMPLEX AS 20TH CENTURY IRAN CAN CHECK THE CURRENT SLOW BUT STEADY SLIDE TOWARD CHAOS. THERE IS, UNFORTUNATELY, NO CANDIDATE FOR THIS ROLE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. END SUMMARY.

3. WE ARE FREQUENTLY APPROACHED THESE DAYS BY INDIVIDUALS REPRESENTING A VARIETY OF POLITICAL GROUPS, SPECIAL INTERESTS AND CABALS, ALL OF WHOM ASSURE US THAT THEY ARE

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 5932

S E C R E T

TEHRAN 6234

Alison

DE RUQMH #6234/01 165 **
 INY SSSSS ZZH
 I 141232Z JUN 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2043
 INFO RUQMEI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0133
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0139
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0135
 RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0110
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0113
 RUSBDQ/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0165
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0157
 RUSBLX/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0172
 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0137
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0203
 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0110
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0149
 RUQHMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0040
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0169
 BT
 S E C R E T TEHRAN 06234

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRG: STATE 6/14/79
 APPRV: CHARGE: CWNAAS
 CRFTD: POL: DCMCGAFFEY:
 CLFAR: POL: VLTOMSETH
 DISTR: CEG POL-3 OR
 ECON ICA RF

5-7

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 6/14/89 (MC GAFFEY, D.C.) OR-P
 PAGES: PINT, PINS, PEPR, IR, US
 SUBJECT: A FAREWELL TO ALARMS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT; REPORTING CABLE.)

2. SUMMARY: THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE FOR A NEAR TERM IMPROVEMENT IN THE IRANIAN SITUATION. MOST LIKELY PROSPECT IS CONTINUED LACK OF GOVERNMENT WITH INCREASING VIOLENCE, FOLLOWED BY THEOCRATIC AUTOCRACY OVER A DIMINISHED IRAN OR A LEFTIST TAKE-OVER WITH RESISTANCE: ALL THREE INDICATE ECONOMIC COLLAPSE. VIOLENCE WILL BE INCREASINGLY ALONG CLASS LINES. U.S. HAS CHOICE OF RETREAT OR INTERVENTION. THIS CABLE REPRESENTS A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT BY FORMER ISFAHAN PO MCGAFFEY AT END OF THREE YEARS IN IRAN. MOSTLY IN THE PROVINCES. END SUMMARY.

3. THE OVERRIDING CHARACTERISTIC OF IRANIANS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS IS SUBLIME SELF-INTEREST, ACCOMPANIED BY A REFUSAL TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY. THE DISASTROUSLY SKEWED "DEVELOPMENT" OF IRAN IN THE LAST TEN YEARS WAS CAUSED TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT BY POOR CENTRAL PLANNING AND VENALITY AT THE TOP, BUT WAS PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF DELIBERATE CHOICES BY THE MASSES OF IRANIANS FOR PERSONAL AGGRANDIZEMENT OVER NATIONAL INTEREST. CONVERSATIONS WITH INDUSTRIALISTS, LANDOWNERS, MERCHANTS, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, WORKERS, AND PROFESSIONS OVER THE YEARS ELICITED THE COMMON ADMISSION THAT THEY KNEW THEIR ACTIONS SPELLED FUTURE TROUBLE FOR IRAN, "BUT, AS LONG AS EVERYONE ELSE IS DOING IT,..." THIS CHARACTERISTIC CARRIED OVER INTO POLITICAL ACTION AND THE REVOLUTION. CYNICAL SUPPORT FOR CONTRADICTORY POLICIES (E.G., CONSTITUTIONALISTS SUPPORTING ANTI-CONSTITUTION KHOMEINI), IRRELIGIOUS WAVING OF THE BANNER OF RELIGION, ETC., WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE STATEMENT, "WHEN I, THROUGH THIS PROCESS, OBTAIN POWER, I WILL CORRECT THESE INCONSISTENCIES." MOST IRANIANS KEPT THEIR EYE ON

S E C R E T

TEHRAN 6234

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(COPY TO FILE)

*meet this am
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July 4*

CLASSIFIED



AMERICAN EMBASSY

TEHRAN

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OO RUQMR
DE RUEHC #9957 1941813
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O 131739Z JUL 79
R 030015Z WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3451
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 180957
E.O. 12065 GDS, 7/12/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: BDIS, IR

SUBJECT: COMMERCIAL DISPUTES

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT IF IRANIAN BUSINESS CLIMATE CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE LEGAL DIFFICULTIES FACING GTE COULD BE EXTENDED TO OTHER COMPANIES WITH DAMAGING EFFECTS ON A BROAD SPECTRUM OF US COMMERCIAL INTERESTS. WE WOULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS AS TO STEPS WE MIGHT TAKE TO LIMIT SUCH DAMAGE FROM COMMERCIAL DISPUTES. IT SEEMS PROBABLE--AND PREFERABLE--THAT MOST DISPUTES BEST BE HANDLED ON A COMPANY-TO-PGOI BASIS WITH USG INVOLVEMENT ONLY ON REQUEST. IN ANY EVENT, OUR INFLUENCE IS CLEARLY VERY LIMITED. WE WONDER, HOWEVER, IF WE MIGHT NOT BE HELPFUL IN SEEKING TO REACTIVATE OR CREATE NEW CHANNELS THAT COULD REDUCE PROBLEMS THAT RESULT FROM COMMUNICATIONS FAILURES AND MIS-UNDERSTANDINGS -- DIFFICULTIES THAT HAVE APPARENTLY COMPLICATED GTE CASE.

3. SPECIFICALLY, WE WONDER IF IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO SEEK TO REVITALIZE IRAN-AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND THE BUSINESS COUNCIL. (WE ASSUME THE JOINT COMMISSION CONVEYS TOO MUCH OLD REGIME FLAVOR.) EITHER OR BOTH OF THESE PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS COULD PROVIDE A FORUM IN WHICH THE PGOI COULD EXPLAIN ITS POLICIES ON CONTRACT REVIEW, PERFORMANCE BONDS, WORK PERMITS, PROTECTION OF EXPATRIATES, ETC. IN TURN, REPRESENTATIVES OF AMERICAN FIRMS COULD EXPRESS THEIR CONCERNS AND QUESTIONS RELATING TO RESUMPTION OF ACTIVITIES IN IRAN. OWING TO ABSENCE OF SIGNIFICANT US BUSINESS COMMUNITY IN TEHRAN, MEETINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED MAINLY BY VISITORS, PRESUMABLY DELEGATIONS COMING TO TEHRAN. MEMBERSHIP OF US GROUP COULD INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF VARIETY OF BUSINESS INTERESTS, A LAWYER AND PERHAPS AN ACADEMIC OR OTHER NEUTRAL PERSON. AGREED MINUTES OF MEETINGS COULD BE DISTRIBUTED TO LARGER

We need to answer this
What about RI.7
ECON chg Pol RF Chrol
meeting w/ Sahr.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-32-323

25

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7635/1

Felton

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHRG: STATE 7/19/79
 APRV: CHARGE:LELAINGEN
 DRPTD: POL:VLTOMSETR:GO
 CLEAR: 1.DAO:TSCHAFER
 2.ECON:RBASH
 3.ICA:JSHELLENBURGER
 4. A/MGGAST
 5. POL:TAHERN PC-2
 DCM ECON
 DAO MAAG ICA
 RF
 DISTR: POL2 DCM ECON
 DAO MAAG ICA
 RF

DE RUQMHR #7635/01 203 **
 ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 R 221124Z JUL 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2740
 INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0190
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0186
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0195
 RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0164
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0167
 RUSEQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0227
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0221
 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0232
 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0195
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0276
 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0162
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0204
 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0092
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0235
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIRINGEN GE
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 07635

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/19/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
 TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PINT, IR
 SUBJECT: QUARTERLY POLITICAL ASSESSMENT

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS ATTEMPTS TO MEASURE IN QUANTITATIVE TERMS, AT LEAST IN A CRUDE WAY, THE DEGREE OF PROGRESS MADE SINCE THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION TOWARDS RESOLUTION OF THE ANOMALY OF A DUAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE REVOLUTION'S SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED VICTORY. WE CONCLUDE THAT, DESPITE AN APPEARANCE OF A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF NORMALITY, THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (PGOI) HAS BEEN GENERALLY UNSUCCESSFUL IN ASSERTING ITS POLITICAL AUTHORITY. THE INFORMAL STRUCTURE--THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES AND THEIR ADJUNCTS--CONTINUES TO THRIVE, AND INDEED HAS STEADILY BECOME MORE ENTRENCHED AS A PARALLEL SOURCE OF AUTHORITY. A CONCOMITANT FEATURE OF THIS ABNORMAL STATE OF AFFAIRS HAS BEEN GROWING POLITICAL DISSIDENCE. IN RECENT WEEKS, THE PGOI HAS FOCUSED ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS AND THE PROSPECT OF A POPULARLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT BEING IN PLACE BY EARLY AUTUMN AS THE SOLUTION TO THE CONUNDRUM IT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO RESOLVE BY OTHER MEANS. END SUMMARY.

3. THIS REPORT ATTEMPTS TO ASSESS IRAN'S CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN TERMS OF QUANTIFIABLE INDICATORS. TO DO THIS POSES SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEMS, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF OFFICIAL DATA WHICH MIGHT BE APPLIED TO A MODEL FOR MEASURING TRENDS. GIVEN THE GREAT SUSPICION IN PRESENT-DAY IRAN OF USG ACTIVITIES OF ALL KINDS, AS WELL AS THE GENERAL INSECURITY IN MANY AREAS OF THE COUNTRY, IT IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR EMBOPFS TO GATHER THE NECESSARY DATA THEMSELVES EXCEPT

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 7635/1

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES

SUBJECT: Alternative Views from the Provinces

SUMMARY

Nine letters, written in both Farsi and English, received during the past two months from as many Iranian friends -- former students, colleagues (high school teachers), and close friends -- living in Shiraz and Khorasan portray post-Pahlavi Iran in a somewhat different light than American Embassy and American press reporting. Shiraz and certain remote areas of Khorasan appear calm and peaceful, generally free of violent incidents. Inhabitants of these two areas have welcomed the demise of the Pahlavis and the establishment of an Islamic Republic, and yet criticize freely and fearlessly their new leaders, including Khomeini. Although high school students throughout Iran, even those in the remotest towns, were greatly politicized, schools were running normally by Now Ruz. Although a sense of betrayal and hypocrisy of Carter's human rights policy led most to lividly condemn the USG, affection and respect remained for individual Americans. While the correspondents recognized the great problems confronting post-Pahlavi Iran, few desire to flee. On the contrary, most of these nine correspondents, inspired by the undreamed of quick success of the Revolution in toppling the Shah, seek to participate actively in the transformation of their society. In short, these predominantly young, lower-to-middle class "provincials" remain optimistic six months after the Shah's departure.

The diversity in correspondents is great: in education, from eleventh graders in high school to two masters degree holders; in age, from sixteen to about fifty-five; in experience, from an isolated villager who has only traveled to Mashhad once or twice in his life to an urbane Shirazi who has traveled widely in Europe (but not the US); in social class, from tribal lower class to urban upper middle class.

In only two respects can the correspondence of such a varied group be generalized. First, all now approve wholeheartedly of the overthrow of the Shah. Several students participated

NUMBER #8931/01

NY 0000 014

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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO RUEHC/SYCSIA/T WASHDC 3105

INFO RUOMPI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0219

RUOMJU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0218

RUENAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0222

RUOQOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0193

RUHQE/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0254

RUOMBA/AMEMBASSY JINNA 0249

RUOPL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2260

RUOMK/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0220

RUOTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0309

RUOMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0198

RUQBMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0230

RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0118

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0267

RUENAA/USINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STATE 8/7/79
APPR: CHARGE/ELBLINGT
TRPTD: ADM:TESIUD:30
CLEAR: POL:VLTOMSER
ISTR: POL2 CCG ADM
ICA: ECON
RF

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 000310

P.O. 12065: GDS 6/7/85 (SKUD, TIMOTHY E.) OR-P

TAGS: PINS, ECON, PORS, MILI, SCUL, ELAB, IR

SUBJECT: ISFAHAN AND SHIRAZ

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: EMPOFF SKUD RECENTLY SPENT ABOUT TWO WEEKS IN SHIRAZ AND ISFAHAN. HE FOUND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY RELATIVELY GREAT BUT UNEMPLOYMENT HIGH. REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES IN BOTH CITIES REMAIN ACTIVE. THE TRIBES OF FARS PROVINCE SEEMED TO BE TAKING A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION. THE U.S. IS STILL WIDELY BLAMED FOR IRAN'S TROUBLES, INCLUDING THE REVOLUTION ITSELF. SKUD FOUND GROWING UPPER AND MIDDLE CLASS DISSATISFACTION BUT THE LOWER CLASS REMAINS GENERALLY LOYAL TO KHOMEINI AND THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE CHANGE IN SITUATION OF THE MILITARY. END SUMMARY.

3. EMPOFF SKUD RECENTLY PAID VISITS TO CONSULATES IN SHIRAZ AND ISFAHAN. THE FIRST IMPRESSION OF SHIRAZ WAS THAT THE CITY HAD RETURNED TO NORMAL. THE BAZAAR WAS ACTIVE, MOST RESTAURANTS AND THEATRES HAVE REOPENED, AND THE STREETS ARE BUSY UNTIL LATE AT NIGHT. HOWEVER, MOST FACTORIES AND CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS REMAIN INACTIVE OR WORK HALF-DAYS (WHICH ARE CONSUMED BY TEA-DRINKING AND CONVERSATION). LARGE NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED COULD BE SEEN ON STREET CORNERS OR AT PUBLIC OFFICES BRINGING THEIR PLEIST TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, THE LABOR OFFICE, OR THE KOMITEH. ANOTHER SIGN OF THE REVOLUTION IS THE PROLIFERATION OF KIOSKS AND SIDEWALK VENDORS, WHO FORMERLY WOULD HAVE BEEN ASKED TO MOVE ON.

4. THE CITY WAS RESPLENDENT FOR THE CELEBRATION OF THE BIRTHDAY OF THE HIDDEN IMAM.

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 8831/1

DE RUQMHR #8916 221**
 ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 R 090820Z AUG 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3151
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 08916

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHRGE: PROG 8/9/79
 APPRV: CHG: LA AINGEN
 DRPTD: ECON:ADSSENS
 CLEAR: NONE
 DISTR: ECON-3 CHG POL
 RF CHRON

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/9/85 (LAINGEN, L. B.) OR-M
 TAGS: EGEN, IR
 SUBJECT: ECONOMIC ANALYTICAL REPORTING SCHEDULE

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. THE FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY TEHRAN'S PROPOSED ECONOMIC COMMERCIAL ANALYTICAL REPORTING SCHEDULE THROUGH DECEMBER 1979.

AUGUST:

- THE BUSINESS CLIMATE IN IRAN-GUIDANCE FOR U.S.
- BUSINESSMEN

SEPTEMBER:

- REVIEW OF THE POOR PEOPLE'S FOUNDATION
- ATTITUDES OF IRAN'S OIL FIELD WORKERS

OCTOBER:

- OIL-OLICY DEVELOPMENTS
- IRANIAN AID TO THE LDC'S- POLICY AND PROSPECTS

NOVEMBER:

- MANAGING IRAN'S FINANCIAL SURPLUS
- ELECTRIC POWER PROSPECTS IN IRAN

DECEMBER:

- AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

3. WE WILL UPDATE THIS SCHEDULE APPROXIMATELY EVERY SIX MONTHS UNLESS THE DEPARTMENT PREFERS AN ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT. LAINGEN##

BT
 #8916
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 R 130458Z ATJ 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
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CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHRG: SUAVE 9/12/79
 APPRV: CHARGE: LBLAIN EM
 DRPUD: POL: VLUOMSEUH: JC
 CLEAR: 1. FCN: RSCHELL
 2. CONS: RMOREI EL
 DISTR: POL3 CHG ICA
 ECON DAO CONS
 ADMIN MAAG RI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECUION 01 OF UEHRAN 09990

E.O. 12865: GDS 8/12/95 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P

TAGS: PEPR, IR
 SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. INTRODUCTION: RECENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN INVOLVED HERE, RANGING FROM COMPUTED SECURITY TO VISA OPERATIONS TO GTF TO THE SHERRY CASE, HIGHLIGHT SEVERAL SPECIAL FEATURES OF CONDUCTING BUSINESS IN THE PERSIAN ENVIRONMENT. IN SOME INSTANCES THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED ARE A PARTIAL REFLECTION ON THE EFFECTS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. BUT WE BELIEVE THE UNDERLYING CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL QUALITIES THAT ACCOUNT FOR THE NATURE OF THESE DIFFICULTIES ARE AND WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY CONSTANT. THEREFORE, WE SUGGEST THAT THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS BE USED TO BRIEF OUR TSG PERSONNEL AND PRIVATE SECURITY REPRESENTATIVES WHO ARE REQUIRED TO DO BUSINESS WITH AND IN THIS COUNTRY. END INTRODUCTION.

3. PERHAPS THE SINGLE DOMINANT ASPECT OF THE PERSIAN PSYCHE IS AN OVERRIDING EGOTISM. ITS ANTECEDENTS LIE IN THE LONG IRANIAN HISTORY OF INSURABILITY AND INSECURITY WHICH PUT A PREMIUM ON SELF-PRESERVATION. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF IT IS AN ALMOST TOTAL PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH SELF AND LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR UNDERSTANDING POINTS OF VIEW OTHER THAN ONE'S OWN. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, IT IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO AN IRANIAN THAT U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW MAY PROHIBIT ISSUING HIM A TOURIST VISA WHEN HE HAS DETERMINED THAT HE WANTS TO LIVE IN CALIFORNIA. SIMILARLY, THE IRANIAN CENTRAL BANK SEES NO INCONSISTENCY IN CLAIMING FORCE MAJEURE TO AVOID PENALTIES FOR LATE PAYMENT OF INTEREST DUE ON OUTSTANDING LOANS WHILE THE GOVERNMENT OF WHICH IT IS A PART IS DENYING THE VALIDITY OF THE VERY GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE CLAIM IS MADE WHEN CONFRONTED BY SIMILAR CLAIMS FROM FOREIGN FIRMS FORCED TO CEASE OPERATIONS DURING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.

4. THE REVERSE OF THIS PARTICULAR PSYCHOLOGICAL COIN, AND HAVING THE SAME HISTORICAL ROOTS AS PERSIAN EGOTISM, IS A PERVERSE TENDENCY ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE WORLD IN WHICH ONE LIVES. THE PERSIAN EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT NOTHING IS PERMANENT AND IT IS COMMONLY PERCEIVED THAT HOSTILE FORCES ABOUND. IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT EACH INDIVIDUAL MUST BE CONSTANTLY ALERT FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST THE MALIGNANT FORCES THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE HIS ENEMY. HE IS OBVIOUSLY JUSTIFIED IN USING ALMOST ANY MEANS AVAILABLE TO EXPLOIT



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

recd 9.26.79 (1)

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Circulate

September 13, 1979

~~SECRET~~

9/30 ~~PK~~ AS - FYI a return
FA - J BL
send to Gen 10/17

The Honorable
L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.
American Embassy
Tehran

Dear Bruce:

Here is a copy of the paper you requested. I also send for your background reading a contingency (on Afghanistan) paper done in PAB. Please protect both carefully.

*Destroyed
2/14/79*

I had lunch with George Cave on Monday, following his return. I believe you have received virtually all of the substance of his two conversations through standard reporting. There are no plans for follow-up meetings and that is an open question. The fellow seems to think he might come here as Ambassador. He indicated to George there is a high regard for you personally.

The main nourishment I took from George was (1) a deep sense of inadequacy in governing among the leadership, a desire for U.S. help, but an inability to ask for or even accept it; and (2) concern over the strength of clerical influence, optimism (like us) on that count for the long term but fear that the Majlis elections might produce only mullahs -- meaning that the long term might be that much longer away. The interesting idea is that Khomeini himself shares some of these worries and is also unable to work around them. Anything you can contribute to broaden our knowledge of who is thinking what in the inner circle will be welcome.

////

Finally, here is a paper I did and for which DN added the sentence at the top of the second page.

Sincerely,

M

Henry Precht

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DE RUMER #0088 259 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161113Z SEP 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT

CLASS: LIMITED OFFICIAL
CHRG: USICA 9/16/79
APPRY: USICA:PAO:JGRAV
DRFTD: USICA:PAO:JGRAVES
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: ICA-2 CHARGE PO*
ECON CRU

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 10088

USICA

FOR CURRAN FROM PAO SPECDIS

E.O. 12065: N/A
SUBJ: CPAO WORK GOALS

REF: USICA 52725

I PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING GOALS FOR MY OER "CONTRACT":

1. (NO. 1 IN REPTTEL) ASSESS AND ADJUST POST ORGANIZATION, RESOURCES, AND STAFF TO MAKE THEM APPROPRIATE TO POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. STAFF HAS ALREADY BEEN GREATLY REDUCED, AND I PLAN TO DEVELOP A NEW STAFFING PATTERN AND NEW JOB DESCRIPTIONS BY JANUARY. AS NEW OPPORTUNITY DEVELOPS TO PROMOTE U.S. INTERESTS, WILL ADJUST RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND STAFF ASSIGNMENTS.
2. (NO. 2 IN REPTTEL) DEVELOP INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS WHICH INCLUDES ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY STRUCTURES, LIBERAL AND RADICAL-LEFT REVOLUTIONARY STRUCTURES, AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT IF AND WHEN THE PROPOSED NEW CONSTITUTION IS IN FACT ADOPTED AND SPAWNS A NEW GOVERNMENT. REBUILD PHYSICAL DRS OPERATION WHICH WAS DESTROYED DURING REVOLUTION (ALL RECORDS WERE CONFISCATED). BUILD UP A PRACTICAL DRS USING TITLES RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL NAMES, AND BEGIN USING THIS LIST OF "PARTICIPANTS" FOR PUBLICATION DISTRIBUTION AND SELECTION OF AUDIENCES FOR PROGRAMS. IN CONJUNCTION WITH IAS, BEGIN ESTABLISHING "RECIPIENT" CATEGORY WHICH MAY CONTAIN SPECIFIC NAMES RATHER THAN JUST TITLES. I WOULD ALSO HOPE THAT WE COULD BEFORE THE YEAR IS OUT IDENTIFY A NUMBER OF PROGRAM INSTITUTIONS, BUT THIS WILL OF COURSE DEPEND ON THE POLITICAL CLIMATE (NO IRANIAN ORGANIZATION WOULD DARE WORK PUBLICLY WITH US AT PRESENT).
3. (NO 9 IN REPTTEL) PROMOTE USE, BY LIBRARY'S NATURAL AUDIENCE AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS IMPORTANT TO THE MISSION, OF OUR LIBRARY'S REFERENCE SERVICE AND COLLECTIONS. I WILL ALSO ENCOURAGE THE LIBRARY TO COOPERATE WITH THE IAS IN DEVELOPING WAYS TO BUILD UP THE PERCEPTION THAT THE CULTURAL CENTER IS OF GENUINE SERVICE TO THE COMMUNITY, I.E., IMPROVE RELEVANT REFERENCE MATERIALS, COUNSEL STUDENTS, AND STRENGTHEN HOLDINGS IN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.

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CHARGE*

CHRON

BT
 S E C R E T STATE 267001

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4, 10/11/99 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TAGS: PEPR, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN BRIEFING

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EGYPTIAN EMBASSY OFFICERS ZANT AND HAREDY CALLED ON NEA/IRN OCTOBER 10 FOR A BRIEFING ON IRAN. IN GENERAL EGYPTIANS APPEARED TO SHARE GENERAL LINES OF OUR ASSESSMENT SUMMARIZED BELOW.

3. THE ECONOMY: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION STILL DOWN 50 PER CENT. OIL PRODUCTION HOLDING 3.5 - 4.0 MILLION B/D WITH REVENUES PROBABLY EXCEEDING 1978. GREATEST DEFICIENCY IS LOSS OF EXPERIENCED MANAGERS. UNEMPLOYMENT ESTIMATED 20 - 40 PERCENT; INFLATION 20 PERCENT. GOOD AGRICULTURAL YEAR. SPOTTY SHORTAGES SOME MERCHANDISE. GENERALLY SLOW MOVEMENT TOWARDS RECOVERY. ENCOURAGING THAT INCREASING NUMBER OF US FIRMS BEING PAID AND SOME AGREEING TO RESUME WORK (FLUOR ON ISFAHAN REFINERY, AMC TO ASSEMBLE JEEPS).

4. KURDS AND ARABS: RECENT OUTBREAK OF BOMBINGS AND ARMED ATTACKS CONSIDERED SERIOUS. DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIME, HOWEVER, AS THERE HAVE BEEN MOMENTS OF SERIOUS DIFFICULTY FOR PGOI IN THE PAST.

5. ARMED FORCES: SLOW MOVEMENT TO REGROUP. NEW COMMANDER OF IAF APPEARS STRONG AND DETERMINED. OUR CONTACTS WITH IRANIAN MILITARY GENERALLY BUSINESSLIKE AND POSITIVE IN TONE.

6. LEFT AND MIDDLE CLASS: LYING LOW. SMALL IN NUMBER, NO MASS APPEAL, FRAGMENTED, LACK OF STRONG, CHARISMATIC LEADERS. POTENTIAL AUGMENTATION OF STRENGTH SHOULD PRESENT REGIME STUMBLE BADLY. TUDEH PARTY SMALL AND DISCREDITED BY SOVIET LINKAGE.

127

Copies should go to
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*Return this
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AmEmbassy London INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION OFFICE NOTIFIED

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CONFIDENTIAL IMMEDIATE

FROM: **USNATO**
NO: **7205**

STADIS
FOR GLASPIE

*FCO Dept
Wed, Oct 31 11:00am
The Dept New York
Dennis D...
Maurice "Robin" ...*

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/19/85 (GLITMAN, MAYNARD)
TAGS: IR
SUBJECT: (C) UPDATE ON IRAN

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. PLEASE PASS TO HENRY PRECHT FROM HOPPER.
3. ALL ITEMS IN YOUR TALKING POINTS PAPER WERE USED, IN ADDITION TO INR'S ASSESSMENT.
4. UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT BUT SOME HESITANCE TO MAKE FIRST HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT.
5. MODERATE EXILES SEEN AS HOPELESS AT BEST, DANGEROUS AT WORST. COMFORT WAS EXPRESSED THAT PRESENT CLERICAL REGIME IS SO CLEARLY NOT ASSOCIATED WITH WEST THAT AT LEAST WE NEED NOT BE BLAMED FOR ITS HUMAN RIGHTS FAILINGS. MOREOVER, ITS PECULIAR NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS CHARACTER IS A TEMPORARY BARRIER TO COMMUNIST ADVANCES. MEANWHILE ITS NON-MATERIAL CAST MAKES IRAN UNLIKELY PROLIFERATION CANDIDATE FOR MEDIUM TERM. FINALLY, IT IS AN INVERTED REVOLUTION.
6. MOST FELT SOVIETS WERE LAYING BACK WAITING FOR EVENTUAL SOCIAL REVOLUTION. TOTAL AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULD LOOK FOR STEPS TO INCREASE REGIMES CONFIDENCE IN WEST, AND EQUALLY IMPORTANT SEEK CALM, GRADUATED STEPS TO BOLSTER NEIGHBORING MODERATE STATES.
7. FRENCH AND GERMAN MINISTERS HAD FRIENDLY MEETINGS WITH YAZDI IN NEW YORK. THE FORMER IN SCHEDULED BILATERAL, THE LATTER IN UNPLANNED CONTACT AT RECEPTION. BOTH, HOWEVER, HAVE LISTS OF BILATERAL ISSUES ON WHICH THEY NEED CONCRETE RESULTS BEFORE THEY WOULD CONSIDER HIGH-LEVEL VISITS.
8. OTHERS SAW GREATER RISK OF LEFT-WING REACTION WITHIN SIX TO TWELVE MONTHS.
9. YOUR IDEAS TO LOOK FOR PRACTICAL STEPS WERE WELCOME BUT PROVOKED FEW IMMEDIATE RESPONSES. SOME THOUGHT BOTH TURKEY, WHOSE EMBASSY REPORTEDLY HAS ESTABLISHED GOOD CONTACTS, AND INDIANS, MIGHT USEFULLY PLAY MIDDLEMAN ROLE WERE IT NOT FOR COUNTERVAILING PROBLEMS. SOME THOUGHT THEY MIGHT ALSO BE USED TO PASS CAUTIONARY WORDING TO SOVIETS. NOTHING CAME OF THIS.
10. ASIDE FROM IRAN'S POLE WITH PLO -- WHICH ALSO CAUSED LATTER SOME PROBLEMS -- THEIR FOREIGN POLICY IS NOT PROBLEM NOW FOR WEST. KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER CLERICAL REGIME COULD ADD RATIONAL STRUCTURE OF MODERN GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

Cheron
TEHRAN 11405 1/2

LE RUQMR #1405/01 302 **
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 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0320
 RUSEQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0396
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIEDA 0414
 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0393
 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0361
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0474
 RUOMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0319
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0358
 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0228
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U.S. Government Printing Office: 1979-704-830

BT
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION #1 OF TEHRAN 11405

E.O. 12865: GDS 10/29/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
 TAGS: PINT, SA, IR
 SUBJECT: MILLIONS MARCH FOR UNITY AND KHOMEINI

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. MILLIONS OF IRANIANS PARTICIPATED IN OCTOBER 26 MARCH IN TEHRAN AND THE PROVINCES TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR THE LEADERSHIP OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND FOR UNITY OF IMAM (KHOMEINI) AND OMMAT (NATION). THE MARCH HAD BEEN CALLED BY THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY (IRP), LED BY AYATOLLAH BEHESHI. IN TEHRAN A CROWD ESTIMATED AT OVER ONE MILLION PEOPLE CONVERGED BY VARIOUS ROUTES ON TEHRAN UNIVERSITY WHERE THEY LISTENED TO SPEECHES, CHANTED SLOGANS, AND HELD FRIDAY PRAYERS.
3. MARCH AND MEETINGS WERE ORDERLY. IN TEHRAN, CROWD INCLUDED MANY WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND UNIFORMED MILITARY PERSONNEL. THERE WAS A GENERAL HOLIDAY MOOD, AND HARASSED MARSHALLS DID AN EXCELLENT JOB OF KEEPING ORDER AND GOOD SPIRITS. CROWDS FILLED ALL STREETS SURROUNDING TEHRAN UNIVERSITY AS WELL AS UNIVERSITY GROUNDS, WHICH WERE TOO CROWDED FOR MANY PERSONS TO PRAY.
4. AT FOREIGN MINISTER'S SUGGESTION, VISITING DEPTOFF PRICHT, ACCOMPANIED BY EMBASSY POLOFF AND WORRIED-LOOKING OFFICIAL FROM MFA PROTOCOL ATTENDED PRAYERS AND RALLY. FC GET PAST GATE GUARDS, QUICK-TINKING MFA OFFICIAL INTRODUCED U.S. VISITORS AS "FROM THE SENEGAL EMBASSY." FORTUNATELY, NO ONE INVOLVED KNEW MUCH ABOUT SENEGAL. ONLY OTHER FOREIGNERS IN EVIDENCE WERE SENEGALESE AMBASSADOR (HEAD) AND SEVERAL NEWSMEN. CROWD WAS MILDLY CURIOUS AND FRIENDLY TOWARD FOREIGN GUESTS. THERE WAS NO HOSTILITY WHATSOEVER.

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 11405 1/2

DE RUQMHR #1523 386 **
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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4582
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 APPRV: CHG:LBLAINGEN
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 11523

FOR UNDERSECRETARY COOPER FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12965:N/A
 TAGS: OTRA (COOPER)
 SUBJ: VISIT

Ad CRV
Subject from
OK
11.4

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1979-204-830

1. I WANT TO RENEW THE SUGGESTION WE TOUCHED ON WHEN WE TALKED IN LATE AUGUST THAT YOU CONSIDER STOPPING BY IRAN ON SOME UPCOMING TRIP IN OR THROUGH THE AREA. ONE OF OUR LIMITATIONS HERE IS THAT WE HAVE NOT HAD ANY POLICY LEVEL VISITORS - INDEED WE HAVE HAD NONE SINCE THE REVOLUTION. THE TIME HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN GOOD, BUT ON THE WHOLE IT IS BETTER NOW AND WE WOULD WELCOME THE ADDED SUPPORT IN OUR EFFORTS TO ENHANCE OUR CREDENTIALS WITH THE NEW IRANIAN LEADERSHIP THAT A SENIOR VISITOR COULD BRING TO BEAR.

2. THE PGOI'S OWN POLICY DIRECTION IN THE ECONOMIC AREA IS STILL IN A GOOD DEAL OF DISARRAY, AND MAY REMAIN THAT WAY FOR SOME TIME - THE GOVERNMENT STILL BEING PROVISIONAL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTING PROCESS NOT YET COMPLETE. HENCE THERE ARE REAL LIMITS ON WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE IRANIAN SIDE. BUT WE CAN BENEFIT FROM A TIMELY REAFFIRMATION OF OUR READINESS TO WORK WITH THE PGOI IN A MUTUAL PROCESS OF BUILDING A NEW RELATIONSHIP IN THE IMPORTANT ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL/OIL AREAS.

3. WE HAVE IN MIND A FAIRLY BRIEF STOPOVER, DURING WHICH YOU COULD GET SOME POLICY POINTS ACROSS IN DIRECT CONVERSATIONS WITH SENIOR PGOI TYPES, POSSIBLY SUPPLEMENTED IN AN INFORMAL SEMINAR AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE IRAN AMERICAN SOCIETY ON A QUIET, INVITATIONAL BASIS.

4. IF YOU CONTINUE TO THINK WELL OF THE IDEA, WE WOULD WELCOME KNOWING SOMETHING OF POSSIBLE TIMING SO THAT WE COULD TAKE SOME SOUNDINGS FROM LAINGEN

BT
 #1523

NNNN

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum

TO : DCM: MR. MIKLOS
THROUGH: COMM: MR. ELLSWORTH
FROM : ECON: David R. Patterson *DRP*

DATE: April 29, 1974

SUBJECT: Fifteen Best Contacts

1. Bahram Chubin and Dr. Parviz Mina. I was introduced to Mr. Chubin by my predecessor. He works for Dr. Mina and also sometimes for Drs. Fallah and Eghbal, in a staff aide - speechwriter capacity. He is an excellent source on personalities and conflicts -- in fact, is the only member of NIOC who will discuss such matters with me. Through him I have occasional access to his boss, Dr. Mina, who will sometimes give me glimpses into one side's view of oil policy issues and who has authorized his statistical department to provide very useful production and income statistics to me.
2. Dr. Mostapha Mansouri, Director General for Petroleum of the Ministry of Finance. I also met Dr. Mansouri through my predecessor. He is the only man I can talk to about Iran's position in OPEC. He is friendly and pleasant, but extremely discrete, and will only occasionally give hints of things to come. Usually, he is a faithful proponent of the official line, which of course is very useful.
3. E. N. Tomlinson, number 2 financial man in OSCO. I see Mr. Tomlinson rarely. He provides (under the table) OSCO monthly reports on exploration, development, production and exports. These are vital, so I don't embarrass him by maintaining close personal contact. He will be leaving in a year or so, and I will have to try to find another way to obtain these from OSCO or NIOC.
4. Mohsen Shirazi, Head of Project Planning, NIGC. I obtained Mr. Shirazi's name from Drysdale of Kalingas and called on him, because I needed one authoritative source from whom I could get information on gas and gas projects and with whom I could check out information on these subjects obtained elsewhere.
5. Mr. A. Farid, Head of Statistics, Oil Studies and Petroleum Districts Affairs, NIOC. I called on Farid because I need access to NIOC statistics on oil and gas. I obtained Dr. Mina's authorization to Farid to give me statistics rather freely, and since then have obtained from Farid numerous statistical tables, maps, etc. What information I have been able to get on the bidding for exploration rights in new areas has also come from Mr. Farid.



CONFIDENTIAL

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

POL - Ahmad Jaffarbhoy

March 28, 1976

POL - Hawthorne Mills

PER

Duties of the Embassy Political Advisor

: Position Description, dated April 13, 1975

This memo is being written to supplement the general and specific responsibilities outlined in the Position Description for the Embassy Political Advisor job, a copy of which I believe you already have.

The section on General Responsibilities is being supplemented with the following specific duties (numbers refer to those under Section A of the Position Description):

1. I do not need to tell you that personal contacts are all important in doing your job well. You already have a wide range of friends, acquaintances, and contacts of which you make effective use. I would suggest that you compile a list of people who are knowledgeable on a variety of subjects. There are a few additional areas where you might begin to expand your contacts. One such area would be media representatives such as the Pars News Agency and the NIRTV. At the Senate and Majles you already have some contacts. I suggest that you broaden these to include people who work with various parliamentary committees and those who handle bills pending before the Parliament. The Resurgence Party offers another institution in which you should develop contacts that can be of use to us. Officers in the section already know many of the officials in the RPPI, but it would be helpful if you could cultivate some of the staff people who work for the Deputy Secretary General and some of the party committees. Keep in mind that some of the more useful contacts in all of the above institutions can be added to our No-Ruz gratuities list next year.
2. The Position Description contains in Section C some specific topics about which you are expected to give Embassy officers the political background. One of these is the RPPI. As we approach the Party Congress scheduled for this summer, you will want to provide us information about the organization of the Congress, whether foreign observers will be invited, etc. A continuing item of interest is the Shah-People Revolution. You should compile information about implementation of its various principles so that we can occasionally update our previous analysis. Under the general heading of Educational Developments, we would like to know more about the specific conditions of service which are required in exchange for tuition payments by the GOI. Our understanding of university-level education would be much

*These topics wanted
revisions. This an
Petrovants. I mean
is working on them.*

CONTACT LIST

Archie M. Bolster

The names and biographic sketches given below are arranged by functional categories for easier reference. I readily acknowledge indebtedness to the excellent contact list compiled by Larry Semakis in 1969, from which I have extracted information on some of the contacts we have shared over the years since my Tehran tour of 1963-66.

FOREIGN MINISTRY

Reza Ghassemi. This officer is undoubtedly the best informed department chief in the MFA. He not only knows the backgrounds of the countries he works on (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, North and South Yemen), but he also journeys with Foreign Minister Khalatbary to these countries and is directly involved in official visits by representatives from these countries. Ghassemi claims to work something like 16 to 18 hours a day, which is impressive even allowing for exaggeration. I have several times reached him after 6:00 p.m. at the office. Ghassemi is one of the few MFA officials who will on occasion give detailed information over the phone once you have established rapport with him. Ghassemi appears to be in his early 40's. He is rumored to be a SAVAK official on loan to MFA, yet he himself talks of a long career spent with the MFA. Ghassemi speaks good French and only fair English: I have handled our conversations in Persian which he finds suitable so long as we supplement detailed points with an occasional French or English word. Although quite accessible during office hours, Ghassemi has turned down every social invitation issued to him. His direct line is 321294.

Kazem Shiva: This official stands in marked contrast to Ghassemi. Although he served in New Delhi at the same time I did, he seems to have absorbed nothing from his experience and talks about subcontinent affairs in vague generalities. He also handles relations with Turkey and Cyprus and there, too, comes across as someone ill prepared to go beyond vague policy statements on the need for cooperation and good relations. Shiva has at least two children studying in Paris, one at the School of Fine Arts.

AIRGRAM

INCO 15 Jan
FOR RM USE ONLY

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A-105

SECRET

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO: Department of State
 INFO: CORRUPTION SHAHR, TABRIZ
 FROM: Embassy TEHRAN
 SUBJECT: Corruption* in Iran - A Problem for American Companies

RECEIVED
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 JUN 21 2 46 PM '72
 RS/AS
 ANALYSIS BRANCH

Recd
8-14-77

DATE: JUN 20, 1972

SUMMARY

Practices considered corrupt in the West have been accepted and routinely practiced in Iran throughout its history. Changing attitudes on the part of technocrats and business, and sensitivity to the issue on the part of political leaders including the Shah, have produced a fluctuating and ambiguous situation in which corruption continues to be widely practiced and accepted, but is coming under increasing disapproval and efforts at reform. This airgram describes the problems which this situation presents to American companies doing business here. It concludes that in most cases, corrupt practices are not necessary for American companies here. The Embassy is undertaking a program to encourage U.S. firms to avoid such practices and to help them with the various problems which this difficult and delicate issue creates.

American companies coming to Iran discover a bewildering array of informal, extra-legal methods of conducting their relations with the Government of Iran and even with other companies. Some of these methods are indispensable and are not really corrupt practices in the Iranian context. The line between necessary and acceptable methods, and unacceptable ones (unacceptable at least to some circles and groups in Iran), is indistinct and easily crossed.

*The word "corruption" is used here to describe a range of practices which would be considered corrupt in the U.S. As noted repeatedly in this airgram many Iranians do not consider some or all of these practices corrupt.

SECRET

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

In Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: *[Signature]*
 ECON: *[Signature]* / *[Signature]* / *[Signature]*
 Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by:
 OCM: Mr. Heck *[Signature]*

POL Mr. Toussaint
 ECON Mr. Lehfeldt

572 JUN 11 1972

100-100000

CONFIDENTIAL

BAZARGAN, Mehdi

thus lost all credit in the clerical milieu but still has some prestige as a former Mosaddeq deputy; Dr. Ali Akbar Hajjizadeh, a former Dean of the Faculty of Letters in Tehran and former deputy, who is regarded as a good scholar; Mohammad MASHKATI-KHANI, who teaches principles of Sunni jurisprudence and whose influence is limited by his Sunni background; Dr. Mojtaba KHALABI, regarded as one of the best Islamic scholars in Iran but also as erratic and eccentric; and Dr. Abdol Hossein ZARENGOU, an honest, hard-working scholar without outside interests and respected as such.

5. Other Faculties: The most "political" faculty at the University of Tehran has long been the Faculty of Technology whose starry petrel, Professor Mehdi BAZARGAN, leader of the "Freedom Movement of Iran," is currently in jail after having been convicted on charges of treason. According to all reports, Bazargan is still highly popular at the Faculty of Technology, even among students who generally remain aloof from political matters. Two other professors at that faculty, Abdol Hossein SHALABI and Hoosain SHARIFI, have also been identified as National Fronters (A-351). On the other hand, Professor Ahmad HAJI, who broke with Mosaddeq in 1952 and became one of his leading opponents, is also respected for professional competence and personal courage.

The university has a Council for Scientific Research on which are found some of its more important scientists. Its chairman is Chancellor Balch and its vice chairman is Professor Hossein Mirza (see Law Faculty). One of the most respected members is Professor Mohammad Hossein MANSOURI-GHAREMI, a research scholar in parasitology and head of the Institute of Public Health Research. A modest man, he does not on brief acquaintance give evidence of the exceptional qualities that some of our university contacts attribute to him. (One of them said he is "very popular and highly respected," another said "you can put him in charge of any organization.") Dr. Amanatollah DOGHAN-PAIR, another member of the Council, and the head of the Department of Physics, is said to be much respected and interested in socio-political ideas. Dr. Ali Asghar AZAD, Professor of the Science College and Chief of the Atomic Center of the University, is a respected scientist but a poor administrator. Dr. Haidar SHAHBAZI, Dean of the Faculty of Pharmacology, is a respected constitutionalist and may speak out if the climate changes even slightly. Dr. Hossein RAHMATI, of the Cancer Research Institute, is said to have latent influence due to his integrity, his courage, and his known interest in political and social problems. Professor Mohsen HOSSEINI, a leading mathematician and member of the Council, has philosophical interests extending beyond his discipline. He has been noted, and continues to be noted, as one professor who has repaid the hospitality shown to him in the Soviet Union with panegyrics about the advanced state of mathematics in that country, comparing that progress favorably with the status of the science in the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

Tehran, Iran

August 19, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am honored to be able to extend, on behalf of the entire American community in Iran, our best wishes on the great festival of Eid-e-Fetr. We rejoice with you in the joy and festivity of this occasion. We take this opportunity also to wish you and your people all success in your efforts to build a new and strong Iran, a country and people whose friendship matters greatly to all Americans.

Sincerely,

L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Mehdi Bazargan
Prime Minister of Iran,
Tehran.

مهدی بازرگان-۲۵

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 291950

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PPDC, IR

SUBJECT: EID-E GHORBAN MESSAGE

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER MEHDI BAZARGAN AT APPROPRIATE TIME:

QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: IT IS MY PLEASURE TO EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF IRAN MY BEST WISHES ON THE HOLY OCCASION OF EID-E GHORBAN. MAY YOU AND YOUR COUNTRYMEN BE BLESSED WITH HEALTH AND HAPPINESS AND MAY YOUR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF YOUR COUNTRY MEET WITH SUCCESS. WE IN AMERICA SEEK TO WORK WITH YOU AND YOUR ASSOCIATES IN DEVELOPING AN ENVIRONMENT OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND POSITIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO PEOPLES AND COUNTRIES. WITH BEST WISHES, JIMMY CARTER. FIS EXCELLENCY, DR. MEHDI BAZARGAN, PRIME MINISTER OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, TEHRAN. UNQUOTE.

2. THE WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TEXT BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF GOI WISHES TO DO SO. VANCE

BT
#1850


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978-250-344

Mehdi BAZARGAN
(Phonetic: bazarGANN)

IRAN

Member, Executive Committee, National Front (since at least August 1978)

A professor, politician and businessman, Mehdi Bazargan has a long history of opposition to the Shah. He is one of the leaders of the Iran National Front--usually referred to as the National Front (NF)--and a member of the seven-man NF Executive Committee. The front is a revival of the NF of the 1950s, a coalition that supported Prime Minister (1951-53) Mohammad Mosadeq in his power struggle with the Shah. After Mosadeq was overthrown, many NF members fled the country and moved to Europe or the United States; Bazargan, who had been an active supporter of Mosadeq, stayed in Iran and continued to work against the Shah, using his flair for injecting religious themes into his demagogic rabble-rousing. (C)



In mid-1978 Bazargan emerged from a period of relative political inactivity. He spoke at several rallies, during which he called for a return of truly constitutional government, expanded freedom of the press, total independence of the judiciary, and free elections. In October 1978 Bazargan went to Paris to see exiled religious opposition leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Bazargan is a moderate compared to Khomeini, who calls for the end of the Shah's rule and the Pahlavi dynasty. Bazargan heads the Liberation Movement of Iran and the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedom. (C)

A Career in Opposition

The son of an Azerbaijan merchant, Bazargan was born in 1905. He attended school in France for eight years. After receiving a degree in thermodynamics from the University of Paris, he returned to Iran in 1936 and subsequently served as assistant professor, then professor, and

(cont.)

ORIGINAL CL BY 024030
REVIEW ON *E. B. 1998*
EXT BYND & YRS BY 024030
REASON CGA (1)(2)(7)

CONFIDENTIAL

CR M 78-16626

VZCZC 431

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PP RUEHC RUQMRA RUEHEG RUEHTV RUQMBE

DE RUQMRH #0756/01 262061S

ZNY CCCCC ZZJ

P 090612Z OCT 79

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4136

INFO RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JILDA 0362

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0123

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0071

RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0029

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 10766

E.O. 12065: 3DS 10/7/95 (SENS, A.D.) OR-E

TAGS: PINT, FIN, IR

SUBJECT: BANI-ASSADI: TOWARDS A RESTRUCTURED IRAN

REFS: TEHRAN 12321

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: IN ORDER TO LEARN MORE ABOUT HIS CRUSADE FOR RECONSTRUCTION (REFS), TLY ECONOFF CALLED ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HOSSEIN BANI-ASSADI. THE CRUSADE (JIHAD) IS SEEN AS A PRIME MOVER IN A PLAN FOR RESTRUCTURING THE COUNTRY, OF WHICH BANI-ASSADI IS ONE OF THE ARCHITECTS. THIS TEL DISCUSSES THE GOVERNMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE PLAN. SEPARATE MESSAGES WILL DEAL WITH THE CRUSADE ITSELF.

3. GENERALLY, BANI-ASSADI (AND APPARENTLY OTHERS LIKE HIM) HAS FOUND PORTIONS OF THE KORAN, SHARIA AND RELATED SOURCES CONFIRMED BY HIS STUDIES OF MANAGEMENT THEORY IN U.S. UNIVERSITIES. ALTHOUGH MANAGEMENT THEORY IS IN NO WAY CONSIDERED TO BE OF EQUAL DIGNITY WITH THE KORAN, IT SEEMS TO BE ACCEPTED IN SOMEWHAT THE SAME LITERAL FASHION. ASSUMING THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY MOMENTUM CONTINUES, AND THAT BANI-ASSADI HAS THE INFLUENCE THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE, IRAN WILL BE REORGANIZED ON A HIGHLY ECLECTIC THEORETICAL BASE.

4. THAT MANAGEMENT THEORY NORMALLY CONTEMPLATES A MODERN CORPORATION, AND NOT AN ENTIRE DEVELOPING COUNTRY GOING THROUGH A REVOLUTION, DOES NOT SEEM TO PERTURB BANI-ASSADI. HE DOES NOT DOUBT THAT REVOLUTIONARY IRAN COULD PUT INTO POLITICAL PRACTICE MANAGEMENT THEORIES STILL TOO ADVANCED FOR MOST CORPORATIONS. AFTER ALL, SAYS BANI-ASSADI, THE REVOLUTION ITSELF REPRESENTS A MIRACLE. END SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

5. CENTRAL TO BANI-ASSADI'S THINKING IS THE KORANIC EXHORTATION THAT BELIEVERS AVOID DISSENSION, ACHIEVE CONSENSUS, AND ABOVE ALL, PARTICIPATE. JIHAD, HE POINTS OUT, MEANS CRUSADE, BUT ALSO EFFORT OR STRUGGLE. ONE OF THE EVILS OF THE OLD REGIME WHICH LED BANI-ASSADI TO RETURN TO THE U.S. FOR GRADUATE STUDIES WAS ITS PERPETUATION OF AUTOCRACY, AND THE DAMPENING OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND INITIATIVE WHICH GOD IMPOSES ON THE BELIEVING MUSLIM.

VZCZC 431

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1976-204-830

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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 SECSTATE WASHDC, PRIORITY

E.O. 12065: N/A
 TAGS: PEPR, US, IR
 SUBJ: INTERVIEW IN IRAN TIMES - DR. IBRAHIM YAZDI

1. AYANDAGAN OF MAY 9 REPORTED AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN THE IRAN TIMES (A U.S. PAPER) WITH THE SON OF FOREIGN MINISTER DR. IBRAHIM YAZDI. THE INTERVIEW DISCUSSES DR. YAZDI'S U.S. CITIZENSHIP STATUS, PURPORTEDLY QUOTING A FORMER EMBASSY TEHRAN OFFICIAL.

2. EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF PERTINENT PORTION FOLLOWS: QUOTE IN PRESENT CONDITIONS IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TAKES ANY STEPS AGAINST YAZDI, IT IS PROBABLE THAT HE MAY LOSE HIS U.S. CITIZENSHIP. HE ADDED THAT IT WILL BE SILLY FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO CANCEL YAZDI'S CITIZENSHIP. HE ADDED: IF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IMPRISONS YAZDI, HE WILL ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF THE U.S. CONSULATE IN IRAN. IF HE MAKES ANY COMPLAINTS FROM THE PEOPLE IN CHARGE OF THE PRISON, THE U.S. EMBASSY IN IRAN WILL FORWARD A PROTEST TO IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AND RETURN HIM TO THE USA. THE OFFICIAL ADDED: THESE POSSIBILITIES ARE SILLY IN FACT. UNQUOTE.

3. AS DR. YAZDI HAS REPEATEDLY DENIED U.S. CITIZENSHIP HERE, THIS STORY WILL BE EMBARRASSING, AND WE EXPECT QUESTIONS ABOUT IT. PLEASE PROVIDE THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE INTERVIEW, AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE, ASAP. NAAS##

S E C R E T

Believe that the Dr. Yazdi of your 20 September letter to Charlie Naas is probably Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, a dentist, with whom Embassy officers have been in contact in the past. Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi was one of the founders in 1946 of the Islamic Society of University Students, an anti-communist but pro-Mossadegh Islamic fundamentalist organization. It was led by Muhammad Maghshab and Qolam Ali Bazargan. In 1960, Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi was an employee of the "Drug Production Company". No further information.

from CIA 10/2/78

S E C R E T

8 Aug 79 11:12

SECRET 213010Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 496384.

TO: TEL AVIV INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, TEHRAN,
HAWAII, MANAMA, NBU DEABI, MUSCAT, SANA, CAIRO, TRIPOLI, TUNIS,
ALGIERS, RABAT, CASABLANCA.

MINTEL INTEL

REF: TEL AVIV 29171

1. REGARDING REF, HOS NOTES THAT ISRAELI DIAISON'S UPDATES
THE INFORMATION IT WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE INCLUDES BASICALLY FIVE
NEW TOPICS:

- A. SYRIAN-IRAQI UNIFICATION EFFORTS
- B. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
- C. IRAQ'S ROLE IN THE GULF
- D. IRAN
- E. THE YEMINIS.

HOS CONCURS IN SHARING SELECTED INTELLIGENCE ITEMS ON THESE SUBJECTS
WITH THE ISRAELIS. OVERALL, WE FIND NO MAJOR PROBLEM WITH THE
TOPIC AREAS IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS EXPRESS AN INTEREST EXCEPT TO
TREAT THE CAUTION ADDRESSES NOT TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE IN-
TERESTS OF ALLY COUNTRIES SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN, WITH
EXCEPTION OF INFORMATION OF AN EARLY WARNING NATURE. HOS WILL
RESPONSIBLY FOR PROVIDING INFORMATION WHICH INDICATES SERIOUS
CONCERN THAT INSTABILITY THAT WOULD AFFECT THE ISRAELIS. INFO ON
TOPICS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY SCREENED TO PRECLUDE ACCUSATIONS OF
UNLAWFULLY USING HOS'S NEGOTIATING POSITION BY PROVIDING THE ISRAELIS
WITH BEHIND-THE-SCENES INFORMATION.

2. HOS FEELS THAT THE CONTINUED PASSAGE OF SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS TO THE ISRAELIS HELPS GIVE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT A

SECRET 121655Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

WTE WASHINGTON 51199Z. SECTION 1 OF 2.

TO: TEL AVIV INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEPUSALEM, TEL
FROM: NE/ISR INFO NE/SLJ, NE/EL, NE/PAL, NE/IRAN, NIO/NESA, OPA/ME

SUBJECT: WNINTEL - MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING

1. THE MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING WAS HELD AT HEADQUARTERS ON
6 SEPTEMBER 1979 FOR MOSSAD REP MOSEH MOR. LIAISON AGENDA YK/28/9
79 WAS USED AS BASIS FOR THE BRIEFING.

SYRIA

2. REGARDING THE RIOTS AND DISTURBANCES IN LATAKIA LAST WEEK
WHICH FLARED INFO CLASHES BETWEEN SUNNIS AND ALAWITES, THE NFAC
ANALYST SAID THIS IS THE FIRST SERIOUS DISTURBANCE WE KNOW OF IN
LATAKIA. THE KILLING OF THE SHAYKE IS THE ONLY BACKGROUND REASON
WE KNOW OF THAT PROVOKED THESE RIOTS. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT DETAIL
AS IT SHOWS HOW THE SITUATION CAN GET OUT OF HAND OVER A MINOR
INCIDENT. THE ALAWITE REGION IS NOT IMMUNE FROM ATTACKS, AS IT
APPEARED TO BE BEFORE. WE DO NOT KNOW WHO KILLED THE SHAYKE. THIS
REALLY DOES NOT MATTER AT THE ALAWITES AND SUNNIS ARE PREPARED TO
ASSUME THE WORST ABOUT EACH OTHER ANYWAY.

3. THE NFAC ANALYST SAID THAT ALTHOUGH WE HAVE HEARD RUMORS
THAT A DEFENSE COMPANY WAS USED WE HAVE INDICATIONS THAT A SPECIAL
FORCE BATTALION AND TWO REGULAR ARMY BATTALIONS WERE USED.
ALL THREE UNITS FOLLOWED ORDERS AND RESTORED ORDER. THIS IS SIGNIFI-
CANT IN THAT REGULAR BATTALIONS ARE MOST LIKELY TO BE SUNNI, AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GENERAL POPULATION, WHILE THE SPECIAL FORCE
UNIT WOULD BE ALAWITE. ACCORDING TO THE NFAC ANALYST, THE HEAVY
CASUALTIES MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM THE HEAVY HANDED TACTICS OF THE
MILITARY UNITS ON TOP OF THE CASUALTIES CAUSED BY THE RIOTING ITSELF.

4. THE NFAC ANALYST SAID THE RIOTING HAS INCREASED ALAWITE
CONCERN IN LATAKIA ABOUT SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD'S ABILITY TO KEEP
CONTROL. SOME ANONYMOUS ALAWITES FEEL THAT ASSAD'S ANTI-TERRORISM

SECRET 258914Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITEHRRAN 54298

TO: ELAVIV.

WHINTL INTEL

REF: A. TEL AVIV 29692
TEHRAN 54287

1. AFP INTERVIEW WITH MADANI DEALS WITH SAME GENERAL SUBJECT MATTER AS REF B. AS ISRAELIS KNOW OF SDTRAMP/J AND HIS EMPLOYMENT, REF B COULD NOT BE PASSED TO THEM WITHOUT SERIOUS RISK OF SOURCE COMPROMISE. IT IS THEREFORE NOT FOR LIAISON.

2. NO FILE. RVW 25 SEP 79 DRV-DSC.I. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

SECRET 196722 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54249

TO: TEL AVIV INFO DIRECTOR

WHINTEL INTEL

REF: A. TEL AVIV 19647

B. TEHRAN 54226 (817-18,729)

1. CONCUR PASSAGE REF TO ISRAELI LIAISON, ATTRIBUTED
GENERALLY RELIABLE SOURCE, DELETING PARAS ONE AND THREE FIELD
COMMENTS, AND WITH FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL CHANGES: AT BEGINNING
OF PARA ONE, DELETE "MINISTER OF LABOR BARIJUSH FORUMAR" AND
SUBSTITUTE "AN IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL." DELETE "FORUMAR"
FROM BEGINNING SECOND SENTENCE PARA ONE AND SUBSTITUTE "THE
OFFICIAL."

2. NO FILE. RWV 19 SEP 96 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
G R I

TOP SECRET

Tel-Aviv
July 18, 1977

MINUTES FROM MEETING HELD IN TEL-AVIV BETWEEN H.E. GENERAL M. DAYAN,
FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL AND H.E. GENERAL H. TOUFANIAN, VICE MINISTER
OF WAR, IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN

General Dayan welcomed the Guest and expressed his wish that the General convey to His Imperial Majesty, General Dayan's gratitude for the time His Imperial Majesty spared during their most interesting discussion they had during General Dayan's recent visit to Teheran. General Dayan remarked that he was deeply impressed with His Imperial Majesty's wisdom and insight in world affairs and was grateful for the thorough global tour d'horizon which His Imperial Majesty was kind enough to spare.

General Dayan continued to note that this was the best lecture in international affairs which he has heard in years, indicating that this does not exclude similar exposés he had occasion to listen to by American and other world leaders.

General Toufanian responded by remarking that, as Staff Officer to His Imperial Majesty, he is familiar with His Imperial Majesty's views and global concepts which from time to time he tries to convey to Americans. Unfortunately, however, he has to say that he finds Americans' mentioning, Senators in particular, unfamiliar in geography and ignorant in world affairs.

General Toufanian continued to say that His Imperial Majesty was rather apprehensive concerning the policies and objectives of the new Administration in Israel, and that he (General Toufanian) is under instruction to exchange views with General Dayan on this subject.

General Toufanian remarked that there are very few countries in the immediate region on which one can rely, mentioning in particular the present situation in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey. General Toufanian stated that Iran is very interested in mutual reliance with Israel, and continued to say that it is in the interest of Iran that Israel internationally project its desire for peace and not for war.



Commander in Chief
ISRAEL NAVY

Tel - Aviv 18.6.78

Dear Gen. Toufanian

Having returned home I would like to express my thanks for your hospitality.

Meeting you and discussing the various subjects with you was a pleasant and interesting experience.

I am sure that ties of friendship between our nations and navies have gained from this opportunity.

May I assure you of my deepest esteem and wish you personally and to your country all the best.

Sincerely yours,

M. Barkai, RADM
Commander I.D.F. Navy

ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES LTD.



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May 23, 1978.

LWF-4 Investigation Stage Objectives & Program

1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 A program for the development of a combat aircraft which will be designed to serve in the high-technology environment of the 1980's and 1990's is a multi-year activity. In order to assure that the end-result will satisfy the needs of the operator and will do so with the minimum practical expenditure, the first stage must contain a detailed study of the existing and forecasted operational requirements; the technologies which are presently available and applicable; and the predictable development and the service life of the aircraft.

At the end of the investigative stage, the operational requirements will have so been delineated that the technical specifications of the aircraft will be prepared and the development program defined.

- 1.2 The proposed first (investigative) stage for the LWF-4 program is predicted to require 12 to 18 months and its estimated cost is \$ 25,000,000 (twenty five million U.S. dollars).
- 1.3 The proposed first-stage effort forms an integral part of a total program which will develop and produce a combat aircraft capable of competing with any plane it will meet during its projected service life. However, it is so structured that should the parties involved elect to terminate the program at the end of this stage, the findings of the investigators and the results of the study will provide useful data for future use by the parties.

2. TASK STATEMENT

- 2.1 The first stage shall determine the best program management structure and organization. It shall identify the development risks and present a plan for eliminating them.

./..2

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and
Subsidiaries:

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505 Park Avenue, 10022
Tel. 486-5900

BRUXELLES:
50, Ave. des Arts
Tel. 5131455

LONDON:
193-197 Regent St., W1
Tel. 01-437-5484

PARIS:
120, Bd. Malesherbes.
Paris 75017
Tel. 766-04-06

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

Mr.
M.S.H.

To: Political Section

From: R.H. Bushner (RHB)

Subject: Dr. Shapur Bakhtiar

September 29, 1954

According to a reliable ~~xxxxxx~~ Iranian source in the NIOC, Dr. Bakhtiar's activities as Labor Officer in Khuzistan were almost entirely devoted to strengthening his political position. Bakhtiar was attempting to obtain election to the 16th Majlis as Deputy from Khuzistan. In order to build himself up with the laborers he would do such things as presenting benefit checks from the Laborers' Welfare Fund to each laborer personally, pointing out, "It is I the honest Bakhtiar who give you this check; the money would never come to you if the matter were left to the Government", etc. The source remarked that this was hardly fair as Bakhtiar was in a position to hand out the checks only because of his Government appointment and all the work of preparing the checks was done by the AIOC Administrative staff.

The source added that when it became clear that Dr. Raji might win the Majlis seat coveted by Bakhtiar ~~xxxxxxxx~~ unless the latter obtained the votes of outlying Khoramshahr, Andimeshk, etc., Bakhtiar took extreme measures. He instigated bus company laborers who were being laid off as surplus by the AIOC with the authorization of the Ministry of Labor, and finally brought on a strike in which the laborers lay down in the roads in front of the busses.

The source also remarked that Bakhtiar took in Bakhtiari tribesmen who visited Abadan. Bakhtiar's French wife allegedly found it most irksome to have about fifty Bakhtiari tribesmen sleeping in her front room every few days. However Bakhtiar apparently kept tight control over her refusing to permit her to dance, or even attend local entertainments. During the Mosadeq regime she returned to France for a time.

According to the source Bakhtiar is a poor administrator, as well as a political opportunist. The source explained how Bakhtiar would go over the head of Dr. Fateh, Assistant Manager of the Refinery, who was responsible for assisting in making Company policy. Bakhtiar would also call Fateh in the presence of a complaining workman suggesting immediate action to meet the laborer's desire. Fateh could not of course take action on such individual cases and this would give Bakhtiar an opportunity to insist on action and leave the worker with the impression that it was Fateh and the Company who were resisting the righteous demands of the worker and the sincere efforts of Bakhtiar.

The source described Bakhtiar as a man with well developed theoretical ideas on politics who never forgot political matters for a moment. A real intriguer was the source's epithet for Bakhtiar.

RHB ushner/ rhh

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Page 1 of 1

INFORMATION REPORT

A. Completely reliable. B. Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D. Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged. Documentary: Based on original document.

SECRET
WFORE/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	Iran	REPORT NO.	WIT-5552
SUBJECT	Comments of Shapur Bakhtiar	DATE OF REPORT	20 June 1961
		NO. OF PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	WIT-5530

DATE OF INFO. 1 June 1961
 PLACE & DATE ACQ. Iran, Tehran (1 June 1961)

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Government official (F) with good connections in political opposition groups. Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. Shapur Bakhtiar, member of the executive committee of the National Front (NF), said on 1 June that the nationalists had certain connections with the Soviets. In his view, Soviet policy toward independent countries had changed considerably since the death of Joseph Stalin. The Soviets, he felt, were now willing to support genuine nationalistic movements in a country, and had given up the idea of imposing Communist-controlled governments in such countries. He found the Soviet attitude toward nationalism proving to be quite attractive.
2. Bakhtiar said that Ali Amini, Prime Minister, had appointed a small group of his friends to talk with representatives of the NF about cooperation between the NF and the government. Bakhtiar did not feel that any significant progress would be made.
3. Bakhtiar said that Mohammad Mossadeq was passe as a leader, but would always symbolize the nationalist spirit of the country. He said if he were appointed Prime Minister, his first act would be to pay his personal respects to Mossadeq at his villare. Mossadeq belonged to another era, and would have no active role in running the country again.

Source Comments: Bakhtiar probably will be named spokesman for the National Front.

Field Comment: See WIT-5530 for another report of Amini's efforts to obtain NF support. Bakhtiar probably was aware that his remarks would be made known to United States officials.

The extent to which Dr. Bakhtiar's attitude toward the Soviets is shared by other leaders of the NF is not clear, but it is evident that NF leaders do not accept the premise that a neutral Iran having economic and political ties with the Soviet Union will inevitably drift into the Soviet orbit. Bakhtiar did not elaborate on what he meant by "certain connections."

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF SOURCE: A. Completely reliable. B. Usually reliable. C. Fairly reliable. D. Not usually reliable. E. Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F. Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or insufficiently tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1. Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2. Probably true. 3. Possibly true. 4. Doubtful. 5. Probably false. 6. Cannot be judged. Documentary. Based on original document.

CONFIDENTIAL
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	Iran	REPORT NO.	WII-5579
SUBJECT	Interview with Shapur Bakhtiar	DATE OF REPORT	3 July 1961
	1. Biographic	NO. OF PAGES	7
	2. Opinions	REFERENCES	0

DATE OF INFO. June 1961

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Iran, Tehran (25 June 1961)

DATE ACQ.

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. NOTE FOREGOING EXPLANATION.

SOURCE: Competent American observer (B).
Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. Biographic data on Shapur Bakhtiar is as follows:

a. Age: 47.

b. Education: Early schooling, Isfahan; "my first B.A." in Beirut; "my second B.A." in France. He attended the Sorbonne and faculties of political science and law, receiving licenses from all in 1939. By 1946 he had earned his doctorate in law.

c. Languages: Persian, Arabic, French, English (a little), and German (a little).

d. Occupations: University of Tehran professor.

e. Travel: France, Germany, Austria, England, Lebanon, Egypt, Palestine and Iraq.

f. Bakhtiar is a member of the National Front (NF) council, executive committee, and general organizational committee, and has special responsibility for the organization of "iversity of Tehran students of the NF."

g. Bakhtiar is a man of medium height, trimly built. His well-tended mustache, rather high forehead, and slightly wavy hair give him a suave and dapper look. He dresses well, and tends to appear more European than Iranian. Bakhtiar's appearance is supplemented by his behavior. His mannerisms are often European. He frequently injects French or English words or phrases in his Persian conversation. Having spent at

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

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DISTRIBUTION

Pal

French

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Embassy TEHRAN

230

November 2, 1961

Conversation with Shapur BAKHTIAR

There is enclosed a Memorandum of Conversation with Shapur BAKHTIAR, a member of the executive committee of the National Front.

For the Ambassador:

Harry H. Schwartz
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

Enclosure:

- 1. Memorandum of Conversation.

cc: All Consulates Iran

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Cleared with Mr. Turner.

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CONFIDENTIAL

IRAN

Shapur BAKHTIAR

Member of Central Council of National Front

The leader of the activist wing of the National Front (NF), Shapur Bakhtiar is a member of the Central Council of the NF and a member of the Executive Committee of the major NF component, the Iran Party. He is preparing to challenge the NF's leader, Allahyar Saleh, for control of the loosely organized opposition movement. He describes Saleh as both too old and too moderate to effectively lead the NF, and blames the NF's present state of disorganization on its leadership. Bakhtiar would forge the NF into a strongly organized party with an emphasis on youth.



(PRE-1955)

The former head of the NF University Committee, he is distressed at the decline in NF influence among Tehran University students, and the corresponding growth in the influence of the NF's major rivals, the Tudeh (Communist) Party and the fanatic, religiously oriented Freedom Movement of Iran (FMI). Bakhtiar opposes revolution and prefers a party which can gain its ends through legal methods. He objects to the Shah's control of the Government; although Bakhtiar would retain the Shah as head of state, he would place the Government under a strong Prime Minister. Internationally, he would have Iran follow a path of neutrality similar to that of India. It would be pro-West, but on close terms with the USSR, accepting economic aid from both camps. He is especially opposed to military alliances such as CENTO. Bakhtiar is bitterly opposed to Communism, and considers himself a socialist of the French syndicalist school.

Shapur Bakhtiar was born in 1914, the son of a khan of the Bakhtiari tribe. He received his early schooling in Isfahan, then attended a French college in Beirut, where he earned his first BA. In 1930 he went to France, earned another BA at the Sorbonne and in 1939 received licenses from the Paris University faculties of political science and law. He served in the French army until the fall of France. In 1946 he earned an LLD. Returning to Iran, he joined the Labor Ministry, and in 1946 took part in a strike against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) while chief of the Khuzistan Labor Office. His opposition to the AIOC and its labor policies earned him much popularity among the Khuzistan workers, some of which he still retains. In 1948 he ran unsuccessfully for the Majlis, and was accused of having the tacit support of the Tudeh Party. AIOC complaints led to his dismissal from the Labor Ministry the following year.

*Shahpur
Bakhtiar*

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Shahpur BAKHTIAR, Iran Party Leader and National Front member
Martin F. Hers, Counselor for Political Affairs
Archie M. Bolster, Second Secretary

Place: Mr. Hers's Residence

Date: November 4, 1964

In expressing his willingness to meet with Embassy officers to discuss matters of mutual interest, Bakhtiar said that he had talked with Embassy officers on numerous past occasions but had the impression that although there was general agreement among them on broad policies they had some individual opinions which were different. Bakhtiar said he had been surprised to hear from an Embassy officer not long ago that the Embassy considered that the Shah "must rule as long as he is alive." Bakhtiar said he was astonished to hear such an opinion expressed with such finality. He went on to praise the American political system and the hope and example which it gave to the world. Bakhtiar then began to analyze American interests in Iran, beginning by saying that he thought the United States' long-run interests here would be best served by developing a government responsive to the wishes of the people which would permit a degree of political freedom. He described himself as a royalist, but one who wants to see the Shah reign and not rule.

Bakhtiar made light of the present government as a group of hypocrites who promise everything and deliver very little. He said he could stand some lies if they stemmed from honest ignorance, but that he could not put up with deliberate hypocrisy. When asked if he did not think that there were some sincere patriots in the government doing their best for progress, he admitted that there were a few but said that the government would never last. He said the government's instant reaction to foreign criticism was proof that it felt insecure.

In talking of opposition policies, Bakhtiar spoke only in generalities and made it quite obvious that neither he nor his followers in the Iran Party have any real plan of action to achieve their demands. In fact, he was reluctant even to specify for whom he was speaking. He was gently critical of Allahyar Saleh, portraying him as a man with too many scruples to be a resolute and effective leader, but he did not reveal which men or which groups might replace Saleh's leadership. He said plans are underway for a meeting at which the various ideas might be sorted out but it was far from certain that the Government would permit such a meeting.

Although Bakhtiar said that at subsequent meetings with Mr. Bolster he would be willing to go into detail, we were left with the impression

Group 4
Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: May 19, 1965

PLACE: Caspian Hotel Tea Room

PARTICIPANTS: Shahpur BAKHTIAR, National Front leader
Archib M. Bolster, Second Secretary of Embassy

The National Front Underground?

Bakhtiar confirmed rumors that the National Front is beginning to move underground because it is not allowed to operate overtly. He gave few details of this development except to say that small cells of six to seven people were being constituted and that in order to avoid attracting the attention of the security forces these cells would refrain from any publishing activities. These cells would of course meet secretly and would concentrate on organizational matters for the present. Bakhtiar professed to be unhappy at this prospect of an underground National Front because covert action for him means a negation of the constitutional approach he prefers, but he repeatedly indicated that in the absence of freedom to operate overtly this new course was the only one open to the National Front.

US Support of the Shah

Bakhtiar covered much familiar ground on this point, reiterating previous statements (see Nov. 4 memo) that the US has supported the Shah so fully that nationalists have had no possibility of getting a fair hearing. While he was critical of our military aid, he observed that the military organization is not effective and thus the guns "pointing at Iranians rather than defending them" are not considered a threat to nationalists. He had more distaste for American moral support of the Shah, which he said left nationalists with no hope of possible future American backing should they try to gain greater freedom of political activity. He could provide no example of this moral support, and when asked what he would recommend that the US do to make its policies more palatable to Iranian nationalists his only answer was that the US should decrease its support of the Shah.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, National Front
John Stempel, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy
Tehran

DATE & PLACE: September 24, 1978 - Iran Sokna Apartments

SUBJECT : National Front Moderate on Iranian Politics

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, POL/M, ECON, OR, USIS, BIO, DAO
NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B, AMCONSUL ISFAHAN

A close contact of U.S. Consul McGaffey had offered to set up a meeting between a National Front figure and an Embassy officer. When Stempel arrived at the appointed rendezvous, Dr. Bakhtiar introduced himself. There were no others present. Bakhtiar said it was important to have contacts with the Americans even if they would not agree on many things. It was important for the Americans to realize that the opposition has no confidence in the Shah. When Stempel pressed Bakhtiar as to whether the National Front would participate in parliamentary elections next year. Bakhtiar replied that this would not be possible unless there was freedom to discuss problems and to organize. "We need six months of freedom, not extreme freedom, but at least the right to meet and organize." He said if this is not done, leadership of the opposition would pass to the fanatics. Martial Law was unnecessary because it hindered the organizational process and it was not really necessary to maintain public order.

Relations within the National Front: In response to a question, Bakhtiar described the Front as a group of pretty independent people. He said that he and Dr. Karim Sanjabi and Dariush Forouhar had not advocated violence and cooperation with religious fanatics. Eng. Bazargan, on the other hand, and his group had cooperated fully with religious individuals associated with Khomeini and Shariatmadari. Bazargan mixed politics and religion, and negotiations with his group had fallen apart because he had allowed his friends to push him toward the religious group. Bakhtiar said the Front would make common cause with any organizations except the Communists and the Free Masons, who were not like the Free Masons he respected in America and France. Bakhtiar thought the reconstituted National Front could make common cause with more moderate religious elements and that this was the only hope to develop a massive following for social democracy.

Political Situation Now: He described National Front press coverage in France and Britain as good--much more satisfactory than

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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PARTICIPANTS: Shahpour Bakhtiar, Iran Party Leader and Member
of Executive Board of the National Front,
John D. Stempel, Political Officer
W. Gregory Perett, Political Officer

DATE & PLACE: October 22, 1978; Bakhtiar's Home, Tehran

SUBJECT : Internal Politics

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, ECON, OR, DAO, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA
INR/OIL/B

Bakhtiar expressed great concern over the near future of Iran in light of pervasive civil unrest. While he also looks ahead to the elections, he said they will not matter if the government cannot defuse the present combination of strikes and agitation. The next month is critical. If troublemakers such as the Tudeh Party cannot be brought under control, the Soviets will infiltrate the country, especially in the north and west, and the Baluchis may also move against the integrity of Iran.

He saw some hopeful signs on the religious side. National Front representatives, as well as Dr. Minatchi and Bazargan (whom he was careful to separate from the Front) were in contact with Khomeini in Paris. He was pleased that Minatchi and Bazargan have said reform should come under the Shah. The mullahs cannot rule Iran. Khomeini, meanwhile, has shown new flexibility. Bakhtiar felt that Khomeini's move to France broadened the Ayatollah's horizon a bit. In Paris he meets many Iranians who have studied in the West, including America. He has not changed fundamentally, but he now attacks the Tudeh Party, a position he did not take previously. In addition, Khomeini has dropped his insistence of two or three months ago on an Islamic government. He speaks instead of the need for Islamic justice. Nonetheless, Khomeini's personal hatred toward the Shah still dominates other factors. If Ardeshir Zahedi, visiting in Paris, tries to contact Khomeini, Bakhtiar thinks the Ayatollah will refuse to receive him. Even Shariatmadari would reject such a meeting.

As for a way out of the immediate crisis, which Bakhtiar repeatedly said he desperately wants, the present government is ill-equipped to find it. The Shah does show a certain new mellowness, but the Cabinet is riddled with untrustworthy men. Five ministers are ex-Tudeh Party members and six or seven are Freemasons, including Sharif-Emami, the leader of Iranian masons. Forugh and Amin are also Freemasons; Bahktiari had forgotten the other names but would furnish them later.

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