

T 310130Z AUG 79 STAFF

31 AUG 79

/SAN FRANCISCO 25288

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

INTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTHROB

REFS: A. PR/SAN FRANCISCO 25174
B. PR/SAN FRANCISCO 25215
C. PR/SAN FRANCISCO 25233
D. DIRECTOR 499959
E. TEHRAN 54086

1. ON 29 AUGUST SDTHROB/1 (T/1) RECEIVED NEW, REGULAR IRANIAN PASSPORT FROM HAND OF NEWLY-ARRIVED IRANIAN CONSUL GENERAL IN SAN FRANCISCO, PND KHORRAM. THIS OBVIATES NEED FOR ANY MOLOCK DOCTORING OF OLD, EXPIRED PASSPORT BEING HANDCARRIED HQS.

2. IN LENGTHY, CORDIAL CONVERSATION WITH KHORRAM, WHO IS ABOUT 32 AND SAID HE WAS RECENTLY BROUGHT INTO FOREIGN MINISTRY BY IAZDI, T/1 GAVE KHORRAM HIS BACKGROUND. T/1 THEN OUTLINED HIS PREVIOUS, UNAVAILING EFFORTS TO ELICIT POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM RESPONSIBLE LEVEL OF REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT RE HIS DESIRE TO RETURN TO IRAN AND SERVE WITH SDJANUS SUCCESSOR ORGANIZATION OR OTHERWISE AS KURDISH EXPERT. T/1 ALSO STREW IN FOR INTEREST THAT HE HAD HAD FLEETING ACQUAINTANCE IN THE PAST (IN SECONDARY SCHOOL IN KERMANSHAH AND ON ENCOUNTER ABOUT TEN YEARS LATER) WITH DR. MUSTAYA CHAMRAN, PRESENT IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE HEAD. KHORRAM EVINCED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN ALL THIS AND SAID HE WOULD SEND A MESSAGE TO TEHRAN. (T/1 STILL BELIEVES THAT HE HAS A SLIM CHANCE OF GETTING REHIRED BY THE NEW REGIME AND WILL NOT GIVE UP IF ANY OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF.)

3. T/1 HAS MADE SECOND CALL TO DAUGHTER IN TEHRAN AND WANTS TO LOOK FOR CALL ON VISA MATTER FROM EMBASSY OFFICER. IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, T/1 NOW PLANS TO SEND HIS SON HAMID TO IRAN CIRCA 6 SEPTEMBER FOR TWO-THREE WEEKS WITH HIS POWER OF ATTORNEY TO NEGOTIATE SALE OF T/1'S TEHRAN HOUSE. T/1 WANTS TO USE PROCEEDS TO ENTER INTO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY PARTNERSHIP HERE WITH AN IRANIAN BUSINESSMAN. (JUST HOW HE INTENDS TO GET PROCEEDS OUT OF

201101 1700Z 091 70 143
TO: DIRECTOR 080755.
FROM: PRIORITY FR/SAN FRANCISCO TO TEHRAN.
INFO: AMEMB AJAX & VOICES 080705 081101
INFO: FR/SAN FRANCISCO 2000

1. PER PARA 6 REF, APPROVAL IS GIVEN FOR 12,822 PAYMENT AS
REQUIREMENT/SGSWIR BONUS. HOWEVER, AS ADDED CONDITION WE WOULD
EXPECT FUNDS TO BE PAID WHEN T/1 COMES UP WITH FAIRLY
CONCRETE ITINERARY/PLANES FOR EXPLORATORY EUROPEAN TRIP. (PLEASE
TEHRAN SHOULD BE PHASIBLE NOW GIVEN POSITIVE PASSPORT DEVELOPMENTS
AND T/1 GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF PRESENT LOCATION AND ACCOMPLISH
OF HIS PRINCIPAL BUSINESS CONTACTS. WE CONTINUE TO BE ANYLONG
FOR T/1 TO RECONTACT HIS ASSOCIATES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND
WHILE MAINTAINING PROBLEMS IN THIS CASE HAVE REPEATEDLY DEFERRED TRIP
APPROVAL OF ABOVE HAYAT WILL AND TRULY OBLIGES T/1 TO FINALIZE
TRAVEL PLANS AND REPORT FOR US.

2. PLEASED TO NOTE THAT T/1 HAS NOT COMPLETELY ABANDONED
HIS EFFORTS TO SEEK FUNDING SPECIALIST POSITION WITH REGIME IN
IRAN AND AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGARD. AS STATED IN PREVIOUS
TRAFFIC "ITINERANT COLLECTOR" PLAN HAS GOOD POTENTIAL BUT IS
ESSENTIALLY SECOND CHOICE IN ABSENCE OF T/1'S SECURING GOVERNMENT
JOB. P/S ENCOURAGE T/1 TO CONTINUE THINKING ALONG THESE LINES.
FACT PASSPORT WAS APPROVED AS QUICKLY AS IT WAS MIGHT INDICATE
T/1 REMAINS IN GOOD STANDING WITH REGIME AND IT NOT UNREASONABLE
TO SUPPOSE T/1'S CHANCES POSSIBILITY HE COULD RETURN TO IRAN IN
GOVERNMENT POSITION.

3. SCSWIR APPROVAL BEING PROCESSED. WILL ADVISE.
4. PER PARA 6 REF WE ARE CHECKING INTO THIS WITH ALIEN
AFFAIRS OFFICE. WILL ADVISE.
5. FILED 201-315995. RVW 21SEP89 DPV DGC.1 ALL SECRET

S F
R E T
#9413

CITY DIRECTOR 215725.

TO: PRIORITY PR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TERRAN.

WINTFL AJAJA FORBES SOTHERS

REFSY A. PR/SAN FRANCISCO 25331
B. PR/SAN FRANCISCO 25322

1. REGRET DELAY IN RESPONSE. HAS IN FULL RE-
BASE'S LATEST ASSESSMENT OF SDTRPOB/1 (T/1) CASE IN -A
SOSWIRL RESULTS PER REF A. WHILE IT CLEAR THAT PREVIOUS
MISGIVINGS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED, CONCUR THOSE ELEMENTS OF
MAKE-UP WHICH ARE SELF-SERVING AND/OR LESS THAN TOTALLY
FORTHCOMING DICTATE DEVISING A MORE CLOSELY SUPERVISED AGE
ROLE FOR T/1.

2. ACCORDINGLY CONCUR BASE PROPOSAL (PDR PARA 5 REF A)
T/1 BE REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH ISRAHIM ARMED AND
TRAVEL EXPEDITIOUSLY TO LONDON WITHOUT WAITING FOR ARRIVAL OF
PACKAGE FROM TERRAN. WE COULD ADDRESS PROPOSAL FOR SECOND
SOSWIRL FOLLOWING DEBRIEFING T/1 ON THE TRIP.

3. IN VIEW OF OUR DECREASING (THOUGH NOT ABANDONED) INTER-
IN T/1 PERFORMING DOOSE-LEASHED ITINERANT COLLECTOR MISSION,
POSSIBILITY HE MIGHT YET BE ABLE TO ACQUIRE TERRAN JOB WITH
PGOI BECOMES ALL THE MORE ATTRACTIVE. BELIEVE T/1 SHOULD
COOPERATE WITH KHORRAM TO THE FUL IN PROVIDING ANY INFORMATION
ABOUT HIMSELF (WHICH WE HOPE WILL BE NON-INCRIMINATING) IN ORDER
TO SATISFY KHORRAM'S REQUESTS (WHICH WE REALIZE ARE AT NOW
COMING REDUNDANT). T/1 SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO CONVEY IMPRESSION
KHORRAM THAT HE BORED AND LISTLESS IN HIS PRESENT SITUATION
EAGER TO RETURN TO IRAN IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SOON AS
BLF.

FILE: 221-322995. RV 15 SEP 99 DRV DQC.1 ALL SECRET
E T

20 SEP

SECRET 272386Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25424

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

MINISTER AJADA FORCES S/DTHRO3

REFS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25331
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25329
C. DIRECTOR 515775

1. FOLLOWING IS INTERIM STATUS REPORT TO
AS OF 2 SEPTEMBER T/1 WAS CONTINUING EFFORTS TO
NUMBER OF IBRASIM AHMED. HE HAD REPEATEDLY
LAW KHALAGHI IN TEHRAN AND EACH TIME GOT PUNISHMENT
CASPIAN T/1 ALSO TRYING TO GET AHMED'S WIFE
FORMER SIDJANUS OFFICER NOW LIVING IN LONDON
GO THROUGH KAHROM PASSED THROUGH SAN FRANCISCO
VISIT RELATIVE HERE, ABOL BOLUGHI, AND T/1
KAHROM TOLD T/1 THAT ANOTHER FORMER SIDJANUS
ALSO LIVES IN LONDON (T/1 REMEMBERS AMMAN
IN SIDJANUS KURDISH DEPARTMENT). T/1 FIGURED
THROUGH KAHROM AND LEARN AHMED'S PARTICULAR
COMMENT: WE INTEND TO QUIZ T/1 IN DETAIL
UNRECORDED CONTACT HERE WITH KAHROM. REQ
AMMAN)

2. T/1 HAS ALSO REPORTED THAT HIS YOUNGER
IS T/1 FIELD CALL FROM STATION RE HIS DOCUMENTS)
VISITORS VISA AND WAS PLANNING TO LEAVE TEHRAN
MOTHER (IF LATTER GOT IMMIGRANT VISA BY T/1
(T/1 WIFE) HAS NOT HEARD FROM CONSULATE
OF T/1 WILL DEPART FOR U.S. ON 6 OCTOBER
THAT SITUATION, HOWEVER, AND IF JALEH DEPARTS
WILL HAVE T/1 PASS SAME INSTRUCTIONS AS BY
DAUGHTER JILA AND ADVISE STATION LATTER
AND ADDRESS.

3. T/1 IN PROCESS OF DRAFTING CV PROC

E/1 T/1)
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CONSUL GENE

SECRET 261838Z OCT 75 DEFERRED TELETYPE
CITE WASHINGTON 5484 3.

TO: FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TEBRAN.

FROM: CNE/IRAN INFO P/3/59

SUBJECT: WNINTEL AJAJA FORRE SDTHROB - STATUS SDTHROB

- REFS: 1. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 255 9
- 2. DIRECTOR 525744
- 3. DIRECTOR 51577
- 4. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25334
- 5. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25118

1. WITH THE RECEIPT OF REF. WE HAVE REVIEWED IN DEPTH THE
ALREADY LENGTHY SDTHROB/1 (T/1) FILE AND, IN LIGHT OF OUR OTHER
EFFORTS AGAINST THE KURDISH TARGET, WE ARE REASSESSING WHERE WE
ARE GOING WITH THIS CASE AND THE OPERATIONAL USEFULNESS WE CAN
EXPECT FROM IT. WHEN THE T/1 CASE FIRST SURFACED IN FEBRUARY
1979, WE HAD LITTLE INFORMATION ON KURDISH ACTIVITIES AND FEWER
SOURCES. T/1'S BACKGROUND, EXPERTISE, AND CONTACTS WERE VIEWED
POTENTIALLY FILLING SEVERAL IMPORTANT GAPS IN BOTH OUR INTEL-
IGENCE COLLECTION AND OPERATIONS AND WE APPRECIATED THEM AND
CONTINUE TO APPRECIATE THE BASE'S RAPID AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSE
TO THE REQUIREMENTS AND THE T/1 CASE.

2. AS THE BASE IS AWARE, THE PACE OF THIS CASE HAS SINCE
SLOWED CONSIDERABLY. DUE TO THE INELUCTABLE NATURE OF THE IRANIAN
TARGET AND DURING THE INTERVENING TIME WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO
DEVELOP OTHER SOURCES ON KURDISH ACTIVITIES. THE REPORTING FROM
THESE SOURCES PROVIDES A BEGINNING TO COVERAGE OF KURDISH EVENTS. WHILE
THE COVERAGE OF THE TARGET IS NOT WHAT WE WOULD WISH IT TO BE,
OUR CONCERN WITH T/1'S POTENTIAL FOR KURDISH REPORTING IS THAT
IT HAS NOT REALLY STARTED AND EVEN WHEN HE DOES, IT APPEARS
HE WILL BE COVERING MUCH OF THE SAME GROUND AS OTHER SOURCES
AND WHITE REPORTERS. AS A CASE IN POINT, THE REF E NOTE
Mentions T/1 WAS ATTEMPTING TO GET IN TOUCH WITH IDEN A AND THAT HE
HAS ADDRESS BOOKS AND NOTES FROM TEHRAN TO BE ABLE TO

70779 065

SECRET 251858Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELETYPE

TO: WASHINGTON 548462

FROM: FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO THERAM.

INFO: CNE/IRAN INFO JR/S/58

SUBJECT: WMINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTHROB - STATUS SDTHROB/1 CA

NY WASHINGTON 548443

- 1. ITEM A: ALI HOMAN QAZI
- 2. ITEM B: JAMSHID AMANI

3. FILE 200-328995. RTM 250199 DR V Det.1

SECRET.

17 APR 79 03 16Z

SECRET 170004Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 420311.

TO: PRIORITY BONN INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, VIENNA.

WMINTEL RIBAT AJAJA CATOMIC INTEL

REF: BONN 88198 (NOT SENT/NEEDED TEHRAN)

1. WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ALMOST ANY LIGHT CATOMIC/19 (A/19) (IDENTITY TEHRAN ONLY) COULD SHED ON THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN (DPK), BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT IRAN. PLEASE IDENTIFY SUB-SOURCING, SPECIFICALLY, ON IRAN:

- A. WHO HEADS THE DPK IN IRAN AND ANY OTHER IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEADERSHIP?
- B. WHAT IS THE PARTY STRUCTURE, BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF IRAN?
- C. WHAT IS THE PARTY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS COUNTERPARTS IN IRAQ, SYRIA, AND TURKEY?
- D. WHAT IS ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY?
- E. IS QASEMLOU A MEMBER OF THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY? IF SO, DOES HE REPRESENT THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY WITHIN THE DPK?
- F. IS THERE A MILITARY WING OF THE DPK? WHO HEADS IT IF THERE IS?
- G. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DPK AND THE PLO?
- H. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE IRANIAN KURDS AND THE JUDEH PARTY?

ON IRAQ:

- A. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF CONTACTS BETWEEN IRAQI KURDS AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF IRAQ? HOW ARE THEY COORDINATING THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH KURDISH GROUPS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES SUCH AS IRAN AND TURKEY?
- B. WHAT ROLE, IF ANY, IS THE SOVIET UNION ASSUMING?

Handwritten signature

REF ID: A12121

DIRECTOR 308763

BONN INFO GERMAN

TEL AJAJA CATOY

BONN 94016

BEH. T. ERAN.

1. VERY MUCH APPRECIATED
D PROGRESS AGAINST THESE
(1) WAS RESENTED OF EACH
MENT DURING SEPTEMBER 7 AM.
R DISSENTING

EDWARDS LEFT CASE. POLICE REPRESENTATIVE
ATOMIC/19 NATIONALIST
INVESTIGATION SUPPORT. JUDICIAL PROSECUTION
NEARLY. WAS IN CONTACT WITH

2. C/19 CASE AND PRIORITY INTEREST
SING WALTER J. LANGUAGE. PROPOSE TDT NOW
SEPTEMBER, TO MEET WITH RELATIONSHIP
N BL ZON POLICIES APPRECIATE BONN
MEET AGAIN WITH

NATURAL ACCESS IS, HOWEVER, WILL OF
D LIKE TO HAVE ANOTHER SHOT AT HIM
O. BECAUSE OF IRAN BACKGROUND AND
CONTINUOUS DIALOGUE. ACCORDINGLY,
ARRIVING LATTER PART FIRST WEEK IN
AND DET ERINE HIS WILLINGNESS CON-
TAIN WITHIN CONSTRAINTS CURRENT
IS FIRM ITINERARY 4 SEP 74. WOULD
AVAILABILITY C/19 AND HIS WILLINGNESS

3. FILE 101-230414
SECRET
#8777

RVW 51AUG99 DRV DGC-1 ALL SECRET.

21 SEP 79 7 34Z

201634Z SEP 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 517454.

IMMEDIATE BONN INFO GERMANY, STUTTGART, TEHRAN, ANKARA.

BONN.

TEL AJAJA CATONIC

- A. BONN 84668
- B. DIRECTOR 515891
- C. BONN 84421

WE THINK REF B SHOULD ANSWER REF C. IF YOU ARE NOT IN
 REF B, IT AUTHORIZES REF C PROPOSAL WITH AN INITIAL
 DM 7500 TO COVER CATONIC/19 EXPENSES FROM MAY 79
 SEPTEMBER 79 AT DM1500/MONTH, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
 A THREE MONTH TRAIL PERIOD FROM OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 79
 ATT.

FILE: 201-8306414. RVV 20 SEP 90 DDF DGC.1 **SECRET**

SECRET 121121Z SEP 79 STAG

BONN 844210

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN, STAGART.

NTIL A AJA CATOMIC INTE

F: BONN 84420 (EGRN-7775)

1. REF REPORT OBTAINED IN COURSE OF TWO MEETINGS WITH CATOMIC/19 (C/19) DURING WHICH SUBJECT SPENT HANMERI DETAILS OF HIS FUTURE COOPERATION WITH US. BASIC AGREEMENT IS THAT C/19 WILL MEET BIVEST WITH NOWIKOWSKY COLLEAGUE FOR THREE MONTH TEST PERIOD PROVIDING INFORMATION ON EXTENT AND NATURE KURDISH MOVEMENT. HE IS ABLE TO SECURE FROM HIS CONTACTS BOTH IN AND OUT OF COUNTRY HE NOW FULLY COGNIZANT THAT THERE NO CHANCE OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR HIS MOVEMENT. C/19'S COOPERATION THIS BASED ON HIS DESIRE TO PRESENT HIS MOVEMENT'S SIDE OF STORY, AND KEEP PERSONAL CHANNEL OPEN TO WEST AND SOURCE OF PERSONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT. C/O TENTATIVELY AGREED PAY C/19 DM 1500 MONTH FOR EXPENSES (WHICH DOES NOT COVER HIS MONTHLY PHONE BILL DATING FROM MAY 1979) AND TO EXTEND THROUGH NEXT THREE MONTHS, AFTER WHICH TIME REVIEW OF PRODUCTION AND NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP WILL RESULT IN POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENT. C/19 UNDERSTANDS THAT HIS NOT FIRM COMMITMENT AND IS WAITING FIRST MEETING WITH NOWIKOWSKY COLLEAGUE TO CONFIRM AGREEMENTS. BASE PROPOSES STUTTGART OFFICER KEITH W. TOLBERG CASE OFFICER FOR C/19 AND EXPECTS TO HAVE NEXT MEETING FOR 20 SEPTEMBER. CLAIMED NATURE OF KURDISH COMMUNITY IN BONN DUBLING AREA NEGATES INVOLVEMENT OF BONN BASE OFFICER.

2. C/19 IS MOST DEPRESSED RECENT EVENTS IN KURDISTAN AND VERY RESENTFUL IN CONTEXT OF HIS PERCEPTION OF US INACTION IN FACE OF IRANIAN PERSECUTION OF KURDS. HE HAS ALREADY LOST THREE FAMILY MEMBERS TO FIGHTING. HE FEELS UNWELCOMED AND PESSIMISTIC ABOUT IMMEDIATE FUTURE WHICH HE VIEWS CONT

22 SEP 79

SECRET 220847Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 518777

TO: PRIORITY BONN INFO TEHRAN.

WMINTEL AJAJA CATOMIC

REF BONN 84621

1. AGREEMENT BETWEEN CATO IC/19 (C/19) AND NOWIKOWSKI REACHED TO SEP 79, IS THAT WE WILL PAY HIM DM1500 PER MONTH FOR EXPENSES INCURRED IN CONTACTING TURKISH TARGETS OF INTEREST EITHER BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON AND THAT, AS HE HAD BEEN DOING THIS FROM APRIL 1979 UNTIL WE RECONTACTED HIM IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1979, WE WOULD SUPPORT THOSE EXPENSES AT THE RATE DM1500 PER MONTH FROM MAY THROUGH SEPTEMBER. NOWIKOWSKI WILL PAY C/19 DM1500 IN APRIL 1979. WE WOULD ALSO PAY HIM DM1500 PER MONTH FROM OCTOBER THROUGH DECEMBER AS PART OF A CONTINUING TEST PERIOD TO DETERMINE USEFULNESS OF HIS INFORMATION. IN RETURN FOR HIS MONEY, C/19 HAS AGREED TO MEET EVERY TWO WEEKS WITH AN REACTION OFFICER RESPOND TO OUR REQUIREMENTS. AT THE END OF DECEMBER, NOWIKOWSKI AND C/19 AGREED THAT WE WOULD REVIEW THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION PROVIDED AND ADJUST HIS "EXPENSE ALLOWANCE" ACCORDINGLY. BILLS NEED BE PROVIDED TO SUPPORT HIS COLLECTION OF THIS MONEY. NOWIKOWSKI DOES HE HAVE TO ACCOUNT FOR EXPENDITURES.

2. HOPE THIS CLARIFIES MATTER. APPRECIATE BASE ON THIS SUBJECT.

3. FILE 281-88414. RW 21SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL

SECRET

46877

29 SEP

CTO . STUTTGART INFO GERMANY . HERAN . ANYARA . ISTA
CATOMIC INTEL
17957

27 SEPTEMBER 1979. CATOMIC G REPORTED FOLLOWING
D NOT BRING INFORMATION, F ISED PARAS. FIVE AND
DUE TO HOME ACCIDENT BUT AGAIN PROMISED FOR NEXT

THE MOST IMPORTANT FIGURE IN SURPRISE AFFAIRS IN IS
KNOWN FIGURE NAMED DR. MURAZI Z I Z WHO LIVES
AND ALWAYS MOVES AROUND WDAO SITE ESCORT OF
FILLED WITH SECURITY GUARD ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC
S POSITION WITH IRACI GOVERNMENT IS NOT KNOWN.
RANCE GIV IT IS PRESUMED TO BE HIGH IN
AZIZ WAS KNOWN IN AZERBAI AS IRANIAN ARMY
A Z Y A R AND WORKED FOR SHORT-LIVED
PUBLIC. AFTER COLLAPSE OF REPUBLIC, HE FLED TO
ENG IS KNOWN OF HIM UNTIL SURFACED IN BAGHDAD

3 SO E OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
ISEMO RATIC PARTY (K D) AT PRESENT ARE AS FOLLOWS:
A D/AL-RAHMAN O A S E M L T
B GH NI E U L A R A N - VICE PRESIDENT WHO WAS IN
CE VILE DASEMLU WAS ELECTED TO NEW LEGISLATURE IN
AGAN GOVERNMENT.
C AMMAD AMIN S A R A J I
D MU MMAD AMIN S S A Y I C H - I S L A M
E K A M M I R C H A S I
F M I R C H A S I
G M L A H R A S A L B A B I H A R A
S N A R M A M A D I

28 SEP 1990

C N R I 281653Z SZJZPB NIAFF

BONN 34952

DIRECTOR, STUTTGART INFO GERMANY TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL
AJAJA CATOMIC

A. STUTTGART 17987
B. BONN 34944

1. REF B REPORTED INTIL FROM 29 SEP MEETING WITH CATOMIC
(19).

2. SARDAR J A F, ONE OF LEADERS OF JAF TRIBE OF KURDS,
TRIED TO T/19'S SISTER (PARA EIGHT REP A). AFTER FLEEING
HE ULTIMATELY ARRIVED IN BAGHDAD WHERE HE BECAME
INVOLVED IN WORKING WITH IRAQI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ASSISTING
KURDS WHO WERE SAFE-HAVENED IN IRAQ. JAF TRIBE WAS
DURING IRAQI-KURDISH FIGHTING IN 70'S AND SARDAR APPARENTLY
AN SLATE. HE WAS SCHEDULED TO COME TO GERMANY ABOUT 21
THE IRAQI MILITARY GROUP AND TO MEET T/19 AND HIS SISTER.
MINUTE TRIP WAS POSTPONED SO SARDAR COULD MAKE TRIP
STAY, AND HE IS NOW SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE BONN 5 OCT.
ARRANGE FOR TOHLERNY TO MEET SARDAR.
TO T/19, SARDAR'S CHILDREN (3) HAVE BEEN ENTERED IN
AMERICAN SCHOOL, BUT WITH COST RUNNING OVER \$2,000

(THIS FIGURE CHECKS) T/19 HAS REQUESTED OUR ASSISTANCE.
CONSULTATION WITH BONN, TOHLERNY PROPOSES USING SCHOOL
PROGRAM WITH SARDAR SUGGESTING A "PAY-AS-YOU-GO"
IN RETURN FOR HIS CONTINUING COOPERATION. TARGETS
BOTH KURDS AND IRAQI SERVICE. METHOD OF COMMO WOULD
WHICH WE COULD UNDERWRITE) TO GERMANY "TO SEE FAMILY"
GIVE TRAINING AND SCSWIRL.

3. REQUEST TRACES SARDAR. ALSO REQUEST HQS APPROVAL THIS
PROPOSAL BY 5 OCT.

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SECRET 851436Z OCT 79 STAFF

DE BONN 85112

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, STUTTGART INFO GERMANY TEHRAN, AKAR, ANKARA, ISTANBUL.

MENTEL AJAJA CATOMIC

REF: DIRECTOR 526119

1. AS SPECULATED IN REF, SARDAR J A F IS DEED BROTHER OF SALAR. CATOMIC/19 (T/19) INFORMED TOMLERN 4 OCT THAT SARDAR JAF WILL BE DEPARTING BAGHDAD 5 OCT, ALTHOUGH LATTER DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER HE WILL BE COMING FIRST TO LONDON OR TO BONN. JAF WILL BE IN BONN ONLY FEW DAYS AND T/19 WILL BROKER MEETING BETWEEN JAF AND C/O AT THAT TIME. WILL USE THAT OPPORTUNITY TO EXTRACT WHAT INTELLIGENCE JAF MAY HAVE. WE MAY HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION CONCERNING IRAQI INVOLVEMENT WITH ANTI-KOMEINI CURDS, GUN-RUNNING TO CURDS AND MILITANT KURDISH LEADERHIP

2. GIVEN RESERVATIONS EXPRESSED REF, WILL SE THIS OPPORT TO MAKE FURTHER ASSESSMENT OF JAF. IF PROSPECTS LOOK GOOD, BASE PROPOSES TO UNDERWRITE JAF'S RETURN TO BONN ASAP FROM BAGHDAD. AT THAT TIME WE CAN BETTER ASSESS JAF'S ACCESS AND WHERE WE WANT TO GO WITH HIM. CAPABILITY

3. HQS: STUTTGART AND BONN RECEIVE LITTLE KURDISH TRAFFIC THAN MILDIST. IT WOULD AID CONSIDERABLY IN HANDLING KURDISH CASES IF WE COULD BE INFO ADVEES ON RELEVANT KURDISH REPORTS, SO AS TO AVOID DUPLICATION OF REPORTING AND TO BRING BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE UP TO SPEED.

4. SDTRIBE/1 C/O WILL BE MEETING WITH ASSET IN APPROXIMATE THREE WEEKS. THERE GOOD CHANCE SDTRIBE WILL HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF SARDAR JAF AND BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ASSESSMENT DATA.

5. FILE: 201-38644. RW- 5 OCT 80 DRV D9C1.
SECRET

11 OCT 79 15 02

FOR E T 181754Z OCT 79 STAFF

CONN 85221

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR 1 79 GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL
HEART

TEL SAJA CATOMIC INTEL

ROOM 85112

1. IN MEETING 12 OCTOBER 1979 WITH CATOMIC/13 (T) B
BROTHER-IN-LAW, SAHAR J A E. FOLLOWING INFORMATION

2. JAF IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH IRAQI GOVERNMENT
TO JAF KURDS WHO HOLD AN AREA EAST AND WEST OF KER
THIS AREA JAF HAS 1500 MEN, A NUMBER DELIBERATELY KE
IN ORDER TO GET QUALITY FIGHTERS. THEIR ORIGINAL ST
WAS OBTAINED BY TAKING THE FORTRESS ON DALAHO (SIC
KERMANSHAH IN LATE APRIL 1979. THEY OBTAINED FROM FOR
MORE THAN 1300 GERMAN G-3'S, AS WELL AS 100 LARGE G-3
PRESUMABLY THE G-3 IN THE MACHINE-GUN MODE; 12 U.S. M
STARS TWO SMALL ARTILLERY PIECES; AND THREE TRUCK
AMMUNITION. DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER, JAF SENT
GROUP AN ADDITIONAL 800 KALASHNIKOV'S WHICH WERE PROVID
IRAQI GOVERNMENT. THIS GROUP OPERATES IN THE KERMANSHA
ANDAJ AREA. TO THE EAST OF THIS AREA UP TO THE TRA
RDASHT-BANER AREA). THE KURDISH ELEMENTS ARE UNDER
THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP), AND IT WAS ALSO
ONLY THIS GROUP WHICH CARRIED OUT THE ATTACK, WHICH
NEWS RELEASE ON 6 OCTOBER BY THE IRANIAN AUTHORIT

3. JAF, WHO DEPARTED BAGHDAD 5 OCTOBER, HAS BE
PARIS FOR A MEETING ON 12 OCTOBER WITH B A E H T I Y
FORMER IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER. JAF HAS HEARD INFORMA
THE SHAH AND FND U M A I S I. FORMER IRANIAN OFFIC
WANT TO SEE HIM, BUT HE HAS NOT YET HEARD FROM EITHER
JAF EXPECTS TO HAVE A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM
HIS RETURN TO BAGHDAD, FOLLOWING HIS VISIT TO PARIS

IRAN

FORMER IRANIAN PREMIER BAKHTIAR'S NASCENT EFFORTS TO RETURN TO POWER (DOI: MID-OCTOBER 1979)

NOTE: A MEMBER OF A PROMINENT KURDISH FAMILY WHO HAS LONG-STANDING TIES TO KURDISH LEADERS, HE ATTENDED A MEETING WITH BAKHTIAR. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN FULLY ESTABLISHED.

1. FORMER IRANIAN PREMIER SHAPUR BAKHTIAR HAS BEEN HOLDING DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS WITH INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF VARIOUS KURDISH FACTIONS, AS WELL AS WITH EXILED IRANIAN GROUPS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S. BAKHTIAR HAS STRESSED TO THESE GROUPS THAT SHOULD HE RETURN TO POWER IN IRAN, HE WOULD FAVOR KURDISH AUTONOMY BUT NOT SEPARATION FROM IRAN. BAKHTIAR HAS ALSO INDICATED THAT HE HAS ENOUGH POLITICAL SUPPORTERS AND WILL SOON HAVE ENOUGH FINANCIAL AID TO CARRY OUT POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST THE KHOMEINI REGIME. HE FURTHER IMPLIED THAT HE HAS BEEN IN INDIRECT CONTACT WITH THE FORMER SHAH, BUT THAT HIS PAST LOYALTIES TO THE SHAH PLAY NO ROLE IN HIS PRESENT OR FUTURE PLAN VIS-A-VIS RETURN TO POWER IN IRAN.

2. BAKHTIAR HAS GIVEN MORAL SUPPORT TO THE KURDS AT KURDISH REQUEST, BAKHTIAR IS ALSO AGREED TO ENLIST THE AID OF FORMER SAVAK OR IRANIAN ARMY OFFICERS TO GO TO KURDISTAN TO TRAIN KURDISH MILITARY FORCES. BAKHTIAR HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH KURDS FROM BOTH THE KERMANSHAH AND MARABAD AREAS WHO WOULD LEAD THESE FORCES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS. HE IS PLANNING TO DISPATCH IN MID OR LATE NOVEMBER AN EMISSARY TO IRAN TO NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL AND MILITARY LIAISON WITH THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP).

3. IN ADDITION TO COMING TO TERMS WITH THE KURDS, BAKHTIAR REALIZES THAT HE MUST ESTABLISH SUPPORT WITH THE IRANIAN COMMUNISTS IF HE IS TO REGAIN AND RETAIN INFLUENCE IN IRAN.

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: BAKHTIAR SPEAKS WITH CONFIDENCE ABOUT HIS EVENTUAL RETURN TO POWER, AND GIVES EVIDENCE OF

29 OCT 79 17 13Z

291128Z OCT 79 INTEL

85775 ZNY XXXXX

CTOR INFO STUTTGART, GERMANY, BERLIN, TEHRAN,
ANKARA, ISTANBUL.

L AJAJA CATOMIC INTEL ZRWAGO

DATA: ZRWAGOO FOR THIRD COUNTRY CONTENT. SOURCE CATOMIC/19
MACAGONE OBTAINED. PLACE ACQUIRED OMITTED FOR SOURCE
PROTECTION. SEE BONN 85772 (NOTAL) FOR DETAILS OF
ACQUISITION THAT DO NOT AFFECT DISSEM. OBJ: S-1.
NO LIALSON. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-8386/1A. EG-7851
RVW 29OCT99 D9C.1 BY 855363.

FILED: 291128Z

SECRET 211240Z JUN 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 433506 (BIELINSKI ACTING)

TO: IMMEDIATE FR/LOS ANGELES INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WMINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTRANSIT

REF: A. DIRECTOR 461326
B. FR/LOS ANGELES 28253

1. CAR PICK UP SITE FOR SDTRANSIT Z/1:
2. GENERAL AREA WITHIN THE GENERALLY TRIANGULAR AREA FORMED BY ABBASABAD STREET ON THE SOUTH, BOKHAREST STREET ON THE WEST AND AN UNMARKED FOUR LANE DIVIDED ROADWAY THAT RUNS BETWEEN ARGENTINE SQUARE AND SHAHANSHANI EXPRESSWAY. THIS PLACES ARGENTINE SQUARE AT NORTH APEX OF TRIANGLE.
3. SPECIFIC AREA: PROCEEDING NORTH ON BOKHAREST STREET FROM ABBASABAD STREET TOWARD ARGENTINE SQUARE AT THE FIRST TRAFFIC LIGHT CONTROLLED INTERSECTION (AFTER CROSSING THROUGH THE ABBASABAD/BOKHAREST MAIN INTERSECTION ON THE RIGHT IS EIGHTH STREET. OPPOSITE SIDE OF INTERSECTION IS SEVENTH STREET. EIGHTH STREET RUNS BETWEEN BOKHAREST AND THE UNNAMED STREET CITED IN PARA ONE, BUT ALSO INTERSECTS CLOSE TO THE JOINING OF THE UNNAMED STREET AND SHAHANSHANI FREEWAY. SDTRANSIT Z/1 SHOULD STAND NEAR THE EAST END OF EIGHTH STREET ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE STREET. AS STREETS IN PROCESS OF BEING RENAMED Z/1 SHOULD FOCUS ON EIGHTH STREET BEING THE FIRST TRAFFIC LIGHT CONTROLLED INTERSECTION NORTH OF THE INTERSECTION OF BOKHAREST AND ABBASABAD.

BELIEVE Z/1 SHOULD BE ISSUED STATION OPS PHONE NUMBER (838-399 RPT 838-399) FOR OPEN CODE CALL IN TO TRIGGER MEETINGS. AS HIS VISITS TO TEHRAN LIKELY TO BE INTERMITTANT, SUGGEST THAT HE OFFER CASE OFFICER MEANS TO RETURN CALL AND THROUGH OPEN CODE ESTABLISH TIME/DATE FOR MEETING. POSSIBLE HE CAN BE NEAR TELEPHONE AT RELATIVE IN TEHRAN AT CERTAIN TIME FOR CASE OFFICER'S CALL.

5. FILE: 201-961845. R 21 JUN 79 DRV D9G.I. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

7 JUL 75 02 58z

C R E T 062015Z JUL 75 STAFF

FR/LOS ANGELES 2058L (HAGERUP ACTING)

PRIORITY TEHRAN, DIRECTOR INFO DIRTECH, ATTECH.

INTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORRE AQUARIO SDRTRANSIT

PS: A. DIRTECH 53270
B. DIRECTOR 469888
C. FR/LOS ANGELES 20577
D. TEHRAN 53506

1. ON 6 JULY SDRTRANSIT (T/1) MET WITH HAGERUP FOR MEET-
ING LAST TIME IN LOS ANGELES (FINAL MEETING 1500, 9 JULY). H
AS COMPLETED ALL ARRANGEMENTS TO DEPART, WITH EXCEPTION OF
PACKING SOME BOOKS WHICH HE LEAVING WITH FRIEND TO SEND TO H
ATER. HE HAS NOT YET SOLD CAR, BUT HE AND PURCHASER WERE G
ANY LATER IN AFTERNOON SAME DAY. HE WAS ADVISED OF REF B
AND DEMONSTRATED SURPRISE THAT SMITHIAN NO LONGER IN DEPUTY
PRINIPAL POSITION. HE SAID OTHER ASSIST TO REPLACE SMITHIAN VO
E FAMILY FRIEND (HASSAM) S A M A C H I A N, ELDERLY SPOKE
FOR THE PRINIPAL. RE BROTHER WHO MADE THE APPOINTMENTS, HE WA
TING ON BEHALF OF FAMILY AND NOT ON HIS OWN. T/1 SAID HE
T HAVE SPECIAL ACCESS BUT T/1 OF BROTHER WHO WAS LINKED BY
ANY AND ACTIVE IN TAKING CARE OF FAMILY REQUESTS. INTEREST
T/1 FAMILY MEMBERS. CONTACT AND FRIENDS WAS PUT OFF UNT
T/1 ACTUALLY IN CONTACT WITH STATION.

2. RE SW: HAGERUP HAD RECEIVED FINAL TEST LETTER FROM
DIRTECH OFFICER FLOOR BY EXPRESS MAIL ON 4 JULY. T/1 HEARD
IN CAR WITH EXCELLENT RESULTS. HE MUCH ASSURED BASE WITH
MESSAGE CAME CLEAR. BASE APPRECIATES THIS ADDED ASSISTANCE
INDICATORS CITED PARA 6 REF A WERE REVIEWED. A SINGLE
ADDITION WAS ADDED ONLY FOR USE IN OVERT TEXT. THIS WOULD
BE IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT T/1 WOULD BE FORCED UNDER DURESS
WRITE A/A ADDRESS. LETTER WOULD INCLUDE "DON'T SEND TRAM
AS I NO LONGER PLAN TO RETURN TO SCHOOL. IDOW IS A/A AND
FOR USE BY T/1 IN EVENT HE WRITES TO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA.

3. ON TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION: TELEPHONE NUMBER CITED

7 Jul 79 7 50 Z

E C R E T 062100Z JUL 79 STAFF
FM LOS ANGELES 20582 (HAGERUP ACTING)
: PRIORITY TEBRAW. DIRECTOR INFO DIRTECH. AIRTECH.
INTEL REPEAT AJAJA FORRES AQUAT C. SDTRANSIT
OPS: FM LOS ANGELES 205 1

- 1. IDEN A: PROFESSOR ROBERT M. CARTER, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA. TYLER BUILDING, 3681 FT STREET, LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA 90007.
- IDEN B: 557-785 REPEAT 959-785.
- IDEN C: ROMAYOUN.

2. FILE: 201-89 184 . RVW 06JUL99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECR

E C R E T
BT
9075

JUL 7

SECRET 1400Z JUL 79
CITE FR/LOS ANGELES 20589 (18) P AC INGO

TO: PRIORITY TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR
UNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORRES SETA II

REF: A. FR/LOS ANGELES 20589
B. FR/LOS ANGELES 20589

FINAL BRIEF MEET WITH SOURCE SENSITIVITY (T/D) ON 9 JULY
ADVISED IN T/I ADVISING THAT HE NOT DEPARTING LOS ANGELES
15 JULY. ALL MEETING ARRANGEMENTS REMAIN THE SAME.
FOR DEPARTURE WAS CALL FROM SOURCE OF T/I'S CLOSEST FRIENDS
WHICH HIS FATHER HAD JUST ARRIVED FROM TEHRAN. FATHER,
POLICE POU S H A H R. T A N I WAS RECENTLY
BY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WHEN HE BECAME 55. THIS
IS ONE OF THREE COUSINS; ANOTHER WITH SAME FAMILY NAME
AS THE RECENT MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER POSITIONS
DESCRIBED IN PARA 3 REF B. T/I HE WAS MOST RECENTLY IN
OF THE HIGHWAY PATROL. MORE IMPORTANTLY HE IS CLOSE FRIEND
OF THE PRESENT CHIEF OF POLICE. T/I ALSO DESCRIBED IN PARA 3
T/I WAS FRIEND OF T/I FAMILY. T/I WAS INVITED FOR DINNER
LAST JULY, HE WANTED TO POSTPONE DEPARTURE UNTIL NEXT IRAN AIR
SO HE WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO REQUEST LETTER OF INTRO-
DUCTION AND RECOMMENDATION FROM SOURCE TANI TO THE POLICE CHIEF

T/I SAW NO PROBLEM IN MAKING HIS FIRST CAR PICK UP
ON JUL 20 AND WILL BE AT SITE

FILE: 201-2981049. RW 20199 DRV 090.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T 251658Z JUL 78 STAFF

28 JUL 78

CITE DIRECTOR 482370.

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN INFO FR/LOS ANGELES.

PRINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTRANHIT

- REFS: A. TEHRAN 50700
- B. FR/LOS ANGELES 28581
- C. TEHRAN 50123

1. SUBJECT REF A WHO CALLED IS SDTRANHIT/1. FOLLOWING WAS CONTACT PLAN:

A. TELEPHONE CONVO. W/L WILL CALL STATION OPS NUMBER 556399 EXT 556398 AND WILL SAY HE. THIS IS MIKE. CAN I SPEAK TO CHARLES. WHEN CHARLES COMES ON PHONE HE WILL INCREASE VOLUME AND THEN MENTION THEY SHOULD GET TOGETHER FOR COFFEE OR TEA. THE PLACE OF CONTACT WILL BE CAR PARKING SITE LISTED BELOW. ALL OTHERS REGARDLESS OF WHETHER IF INVOLVED IS ONLY FOR CONVERSATION PURPOSES. THE DATE/TIME CAN BE SUGGESTED BY EITHER PARTY AND WORKING ON THE PHONE. NO MATTER WHAT AGREED, THE DATE TIME WILL BE 20 MINS AND TWO HOURS PRIOR TO TIME AGREED UPON. I.E., IF IT AGREED MONDAY NIGHT AT 2200, THE CAR PICKUP WOULD BE SUNDAY NIGHT AT 2000 HOURS. IN EVERY SITUATION SHOULD WANT TO CALL W/L, IT WILL HAVE TO BE PRE-ARRANGED BY W/L OR BY PERSONAL MEETING. THE TIME OF CALL WILL BE BASED ON SAME TWO/TWO SYSTEM. IF W/L IS TO BE ARRANGE TO BE AT HIS PLACE, DATE AND TIME MUST BE GIVEN. IF SUBJECT TO CALL IS W/L, DATE AND TIME MUST BE GIVEN. IF W/L IS NOT IN CALL WHEN IS MADE.

B. CAR PICKUP. W/L HAS REQUESTED CAR FROM MIKE. CAR PICKUP BE 20 JULY 1978 AT 2200 HOURS. IF MIKE CONTACT NOT MADE HE WILL REPORT TO LOS AND DATE OF EACH 3RD WORKING MONTH. MIKE WILL CALL MIKE. MIKE WILL BE NAME CAR PICKUP WITH ALWAYS BRING MIKE AND MIKE WILL BE IN WILL WANT IN TIME FOR WORKING OF THE NIGHT. MIKE WILL BE...

S E C R E T 211625Z JUN 79 STAFF

CITE BONN 62246 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL

WMINTEL AJAJA BYWAY CYLRO SDPICYLE

RE: A. DIRECTOR 44543 (444543)

S. BONN 81345

OF WASHINGTON 458972, 19 JUNE 79

1. PER INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CHIEF OF BASE, VALBO R. WELTROUSE CONTACTED SDPICYLE (S/I) AND ARRANGED A MEETING WITH HIM FOR THE EVENING OF 15 JUNE. THE MEETING, WHICH LASTED LONGER THAN TWO AND A HALF HOURS TOOK PLACE IN THE HOTEL IN COLOGNE. IT WENT SMOOTHLY AND WITHOUT INCIDENT. WELTROUSE PASSED THE ALIAS "JAN" TO S/I.

2. VALBO R. WELTROUSE CONTACTED VASILYCH VASILEVICH (S/I) IN COLOGNE. VALBO R. WELTROUSE (201-896468) KNOWN TO HIM IN ONE OF HIS FIRST MEETINGS WITH HIM, WHO DID NOT SHOW PICTURES OF LEAD SOVIETS TO S/I. VALENTIN SUGGESTED THAT S/I MEET WITH HIM AT 1200 HOURS ON 30 JUNE 79. VALENTIN WOULD MEET S/I ON THE STREET OPPOSITE THE SMALL CHURCH AT RHEINUFERBAYEN IN COLOGNE. S/I STATED THAT EXCEPT FOR THE 26 MAY MEETING HE HAD REPORTED ALL OF HIS MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIETS IN DETAIL TO HIS SENIOR SDJANUS CASE OFFICER.

3. ACCORDING TO S/I, HIS SDJANUS CASE OFFICER HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON THE KINDS OF SUBJECT TO DISCUSS WITH HIS SOVIET CONTACTS AND THE KINDS OF INFORMATION TO PASS TO THEM. S/I IS CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT THE INFORMATION WHICH HE PASSED TO THEM WAS GENUINE, AND THAT THEY TRUST HIM.

SECRET 211837Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 498994.

TO: PRIORITY BONN, ANKARA INFO GERMANY, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN

VIA AIR MAIL AJAJA SDJNRUS C/LEG SOFICKLE

- REF: A. ANKARA 44350
- B. WASHINGTON 496250
- C. BONN 53873

1. WE ARE, IN FACT, INTERESTED IN SOFICKLE'S (F/I) TRAVEL THROUGH TURKEY AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, IF HE WILLING TO VISIT THE IRANIAN KURDISTAN. AS ADDRESSEES WANT, EVERY'S KURDISTAN TRAVELING FAIRLY RAPIDLY AND BOTH AREAS OF PRIORITY INTEREST. SOFICKLE'S INDICATES, WE DO HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS CONCERNING TRAVEL IN TURKEY DUE FLAG POTENTIAL AND DANGER, AND WE WOULD BE CONCERNED OVER F/I TRAVEL IN IRAQ. AT SAME TIME, BELIEVE NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED IF F/I PROPERLY BRIEFED ON REQUIREMENTS MENTIONED CONCERNING HIS ACTIVITIES. ACCORDINGLY, WOULD WISH SOFICKLE RECONTACTING F/I AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE IF HE WOULD LIKE, IF POSSIBLE, FOR F/I BEGIN TRAVEL THIS WEEK OR NEXT AND ANTICIPATE TRIP LASTING ONE TO TWO WEEKS. IF F/I WOULD BE ABLE TRAVEL BOTH IRAQ AND TURKEY, DO NOT BELIEVE F/I WOULD SPEND MORE THAN TWO-THREE DAYS IN EASTERN TURKEY AND THAT REQUIREMENT IS IN IRAQ.

2. ARE PREPARED TO REIMBURSE COST OF F/I'S TRAVEL AND, IF WE RECEIVE SIGNIFICANT REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO REQUIREMENTS MENTIONED, PROVIDE SOFICKLE WITH BONUS DEPENDING ON QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF INFORMATION AND ITS FULFILLMENT OUR REQUIREMENTS.

3. WE WISH EMPHASIZE NEED FOR THOROUGH BRIEFING F/I ON REALITIES OF SITUATION IN EASTERN TURKEY AND KURDISTAN WHICH, BEING KURDISH, WE SURE HE IS FULLY AWARE. HE SHOULD BE CAUTIONED DANGER HE MAY ATTRACT ATTENTION TO HIMSELF BY HIS TRAVEL IN TURKEY AND HE SHOULD BE DISCREET AS TO WHO HE CAN TRUST AND HOW HE ACQUIRES INFORMATION, AS TURKISH SECURITY, ARMY

S E C R E T 201515Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 98532

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

WHINTEL AJAJA UNCAMEL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 419577

B. TEHRAN 52705

1. C/O BRIEFED UNCAMEL/1 GENERAL RELEVANT SECTIONS OF REFS. RE PARA 4 REF A, UNCAMEL/1 KNOWS NO ONE WITHIN IRANIAN COMMUNIST ELEMENTS BUT SAID SOMEONE WHO DOES - JACQUES V A R I N, WHO WORKS AT FR COMMUNIST PARTY (PCF) PUBLICATION "FRANCE-NOUVELLE". ACC TO UNCAMEL/1, VARIN HAD CLOSE CONTACTS WITHIN TUDEH WH INDIVIDUAL IRANIAN COMMUN- ISTS WERE LIVING HERE IN EXILE AN CLANDESTINITY. VARIN ALSO HANDLED PRINTING TRACTS FOR UNCAMEL/1 KNOWS VARIN PERSONALLY AND WILL SOLICIT HIS AID ON POSSIBLE TRIP TO IRAN. UNCAMEL/1 BELIEVES THE ALL AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (AFP) OFFICE IN TEHRAN IN CONFIR LBL AND WILL MAKE INQUIRIES WERE RE WHO IS WILL ADVISE.

2. INDEX VARIN. FILE: 248/3. RW 20APR99 DRV
D90.1.

S E C R E T

Minulote

DPK CADRE HADISIR MATA-MATI (FRIEND OF UNPUSIL/1)

DPK OFFICE 6 COLANDR VALLEY (NEAR KISEROWAN AND SHADARAN ST.)

TEL: 976-127

BRITISH SOCIETY HEAD W/STRE TO DPK

BRIDGE VILLAGE

NO-105 (SOMERSET/4-10-1955)

12 SEP 19 03 20

E C R E T 120633Z SEP 70
TO DIRECTOR 511486.

FROM IMMEDIATE WESTPORT AND IMMEDIATE BOMB, MUNICH, GERMANY.
ROUTINE TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL.

MINTEL RYBAT AJAJA TRAC

REFS: A. WESTPORT 4851 (INFO RELAYED ISTANBUL)
B. WESTPORT-40 (MORAL)

C. HQS HAS FOLLOWING INFO ON KEMAL HANF AL-N A Q I B (PREVIOUSLY
ASSIGNED 201-072561).

1. PER BAGDAD REPORT DATED 2 APRIL 1965, THE OFFICIAL BUNCH
SERVICE LISTED NAQIB AS A LIAISON OFFICER OF THE KURDISH STUDENTS
SOCIETY IN EUROPE (KSS) WHO GRADUATED FROM THE IRAQI AGRICULTURAL
SECONDARY SCHOOL AND WAS INTERMENT IN ROMANIA IN 1959/60, SPECIAL-
IZING IN GENERAL AGRICULTURE.

2. IN BOMB REPORT OF 31 MARCH 1965, NAQIB'S WIFE CLAIMED
SHE WAS FORCED TO WORK WITH THE ROMANIAN SECRET SERVICE
IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A PASSPORT TO JOIN HER HUSBAND IN GERMANY IN
1961. IN spite of claim to the contrary, NAQIB BELIEVED SHE WAS
STILL COLLABORATING AND THAT SHE WAS IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH THE
ROMANIANS.

3. WETA REPORT OF 25 NOVEMBER 1965 STATED THAT NAQIB CAME
TO THE EMBASSY IN TEHRAN AND ASKED TO SPEAK WITH A POLITICAL
OFFICER. INFO CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT (WHICH IS THE LAST ONE
IN FILE) IS ALMOST VERBATIM WITH INFO CONTAINED IN REF A. NAQIB
WAS TOLD THAT WHILE U.S. WAS SYMPATHETIC TO THE CAUSE OF
MINORITIES, OFFICIAL POLICY WAS THAT THE BEST SOLUTION WAS FOR AN
ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN OPPOSING FORCES. NAQIB STATED THAT HE
UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS WAS OFFICIAL U.S. POSITION AND THAT HE WOULD
NOT MISINTERPRET WITH LACK OF POLITICAL OFFICER TO HEAR HIS STORY
AS ANY INDICATION OF U.S. EMBASSY SUPPORT FOR BARRANI'S KURDS.

4. SUBJ APPEARS TO BE OF DEFINITE OPERATIONAL INTEREST AND,
PER REF A, PARA 2, SHOULD BE KEPT IN CONTACT WITH BOMB.

SECRET 111320Z SEP 70 STAFF
MUNICH 49619

DIRECTOR, BERLIN, PARIS, TEHRAN INFO GERMANY, BONN, ROME.

TEL CASCOPE AJAJA INTEL

FOLLOWING REPORT ON KURDISH REFUGEES IS FROM UNTESTED SOURCE
AND, WHO ACQUIRED INFO EARLIER THIS MONTH. WHILE OF INTEREST
ADDS, BELIEVE INFO TOO THIN FOR INTEL DISSEM.

1. IN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS KURDISH REFUGEES HAVE BEEN HEADING,
INCREASING NUMBERS, FOR WEST BERLIN SINCE THERE IS AN EXILE
ORGANIZATION THERE TO ASSIST THEM. THE REFUGEES ARE USING TWO
ROUTES TO WEST BERLIN:
-- FROM ROME VIA PRAGUE AND EAST BERLIN; AND
-- VIA YUGOSLAVIA, HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND EAST BERLIN
(VOIDING AUSTRIA).
THE REFUGEES HAVE VALID IRANIAN TRAVEL DOCUMENTS.

2. KURDS FROM IRAQ, IRAN, SYRIA, AND TURKEY ARE TO MEET
IN PARIS DURING THE WEEK 12-18 SEPTEMBER, IN ORDER TO AGREE ON A
COORDINATED COURSE OF ACTION.

3. BND ANALYTICAL COMMENT FOLLOWS: THE FLIGHT OF THE KURDS
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE LIMITED KURDISH
UPRISING IN IRAN WHICH FOR THE PRESENT HAS BEEN PUT DOWN. OTHER
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION MEANWHILE HAS CONFIRMED THE MOVEMENTS,
AND THE ROUTES USED. THERE ARE INCREASING SIGNS THAT A BROAD
KURDISH PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE WILL BE CONDUCTED IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
WE EXPECT OTHER LEFTIST IRANIAN GROUPS IN EUROPE TO JOIN THE KURDS
IN THIS CAMPAIGN. THESE OTHER GROUPS, WHICH ARE PRIMARILY MARXIST
ORIENTED, HAVE THEIR OWN SUPPORT BEHIND DEMANDS FOR ETHNIC
AUTONOMY FOR MINORITIES IN IRAN. THESE GROUPS WISH TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF THE RECENT KURDISH DEVELOPMENTS IN ORDER TO GAIN MORE
PROMINENCE, KN/ LIGET OF THE INCREASED SUPPRESSION OF ALL SECULAR
MIDDLE AND LEFTIST FORCES IN IRAN. THE WEST BERLIN-BASED KURDISH
SECRET ORGANIZATION ALLUDED TO ABOVE IS PROBABLY THE UNION OF

E C R E T 030147Z NOV 79 STAFF

TE DIRECTOR 545757.

TEL AVIV INFO MERRAN. AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, HAHMECHI, KUWAIT, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, PANAMA.

INTEL INTER PCI ZRWABOO

TEL AVIV 30031 (AFV-23)

1. NOT DISSEMINATING REF AS REPORT LA... SUBV...
 INFORMATION TO BE OF INTEREST. TQS APP... WITH SHAR... ASSE...
 THAT PRESENT IRAQI REGIME IS STRONG... COCT... OF TICE...
 OF METHOD OF RULING. HOWEVER IN THIS STAGE HQ HAS NO...
 EVIDENCE THAT AN INCREASE IN MILITARY ACT... AGAINST KURDIS...
 TOOK PLACE IN AUGUST. FOR ST... INFO... THIS...
 DHS SENSITIVE SOURCE REPORTING WHICH... UALLY FAIR... BELIE...
 LATOR OF SUCH STEPPED UP IF... IQI MILIT... ACT... IT... PARA...
 HAVE BEEN OF MORE INTEREST... IE IT HAD... DECIDED NOT SPEC...
 INFORMATION TO SUPPORT CLAIM... SUCH AS... REASE ACTUALLY TO...
 PARA TWO INFO ON RESETTLEMENT... SECTION... SETTING WHICH ALSO...
 COVERED IN BAGHDAD INTEREST... SECTION... SETTING WHICH ALSO...
 PROCEDURE AS ONE DESIGNED TO KEEP... HAND... OUTLET...

NO FILE - HVW INCV89 DR D93.1 AND SECRET

REPORT CLASSIFICATION
COUNTRY: SAUDI ARABIA
SUBJECT: HIZBULLAH IN SAUDI ARABIA

SOURCE: A SOURCE IN SAUDI ARABIA
CONTACT: [REDACTED]
REL. QUALITY: [REDACTED]

1. DURING THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS AND HAS BEEN FOR SEVERAL YEARS AT LOCATIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA, AMAR, AND HAD BEEN IN SAUDI ARABIA TO PREPARE FOR RETURN TO THEIR HOMELANDS IN SAUDI ARABIA. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT IN SOME CASES TELLS HIZBULLAH AFTER THEIR HAZARDOUS RESETTLEMENT FINANCIAL RELIEF TO HIZBULLAH ESTABLISHED.

2. BY THIS CONCESSIONARY... THE MILITARY HIZBULLAH INTO SUPPORT PRESIDENT SALDAN NUSAYN IN SAUDI ARABIA. (FIELD COMMENT: SEE REFIN... REPORTED THE RESETTLEMENT OF HIZBULLAH REAGERS IN IRAQ, ALSO TO BE... IN ANY EVENTUAL HOSTILITIES...

3. 407 (9 OCTOBER 1979).

4. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BAYASCUS, JERUSALEM, JIDDA, KUMAH...

REPORT CLASS: [REDACTED]
NO METHODS UNCOVERED - NOT RELEASABLE
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OF [REDACTED]

SAUDI ARABIA
HIZBULLAH
SAUDI ARABIA
HIZBULLAH
SAUDI ARABIA
HIZBULLAH
SAUDI ARABIA
HIZBULLAH
SAUDI ARABIA
HIZBULLAH

THE HIZBULLAH
IS TO ENLIST
AGENT OF
SMITH DIA,
THE SAUDI SOURCE WHICH
SAUDI ARABIA (HIZBULLAH
LITARY FORCE
GOVERNMENT.)

SAO,
TEMASU.

AGENCY SOURCE
NATIONALS-
SOLIANTS-

*Change
Toms
Bally*

OFFIRDB-51/1288-71

LIST: 1 NOVEMBER 1979

INFORMATIONS REPORT, NOT FULLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED IN FINAL PARAGRAPH

COUNTRY: IRAN
SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF GENERAL MOBASSER IN SKILL OPPOSITION
INCLUDING KURDISH LEADER WITH SMALL ARMY
(DATE: OCTOBER 1979)
SOURCE: A FORMER IRANIAN OFFICIAL OF PRISONER, UNDETERMINED
RELIABILITY. HE HAD GOOD ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION
LISTED BELOW.

1. GENERAL MANUCHEHR H A S H E M I, THE FORMER HEAD OF
THE LOW DISTRICT IRANIAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ORGANI-
ZATION'S (SAVAK) COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL ISS
SAVAK, AND OTHER FORMER SAVAK OFFICERS MET WITH GENERAL MOBASSER
ON FRIDAY, 19 OCTOBER 1979, IN LONDON. GENERAL MOBASSER SPOKE
OF THE NECESSITY FOR ORGANIZING A MOVEMENT TO ASSIST THE NEW
ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN IRAN BY GATHERING TOGETHER IRANIANS LIVING
OUTSIDE IRAN. HE BELIEVES THAT THE SUPPORTERS OF FORMER IRANIAN
PRIME MINISTER SHEHPOUR B A K H T I A R ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY
ORGANIZED TO FORM A VIABLE MOVEMENT AND THAT THE NEW MOVEMENT
SHOULD GATHER TOGETHER ALL OFFICERS AND KNOWN IRANIANS WHO RESIDE
IN LONDON. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: INFORMATION FROM OTHER RE-
PORTING INDICATES THAT MOBASSER HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN SUPPORT OF
BAKTIAR.)

2. GENERAL MOBASSER TOLD THE SMALL GROUP THAT A LEADER OF
A LARGE KURDISH TRIBE, THE JAFS, RECENTLY VISITED LONDON AND MET
WITH GENERAL MOBASSER. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS KURDISH LEADER
ALSO IN CONTACT WITH BAKTIAR.) THE KURDISH LEADER HAS A SMALL
ARMY OF 1000 MEN EQUIPPED WITH MACHINE GUNS AND RIFLES, WHICH IS
BASED ON THE BORDER OF IRAN AND IRAQ. HE DOES NOT NEED FINANCIAL
SUPPORT BUT HE DOES NEED MILITARY EXPERTS--AT LEAST THE TYPE OF
WELL-TRAINED OFFICERS WHO CAN TRAIN HIS SMALL ARMY.

1579 MAY -8 AM 7: 25

NNNNV ESB039MJA430
 RR RUQMR
 DE RUSBAE #7852/1 1271307
 ZNY CCCC ZZE
 R 071135Z MAY 79
 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9248
 INFO RUSBAE/AMCONSUL BOMBAY 7829
 RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 911
 RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 5665
 RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 4742
 RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 390
 RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 26
 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1678
 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5493
 RUMJET/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 2723
 RUEBTA/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 4472
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2942
 RUEBAS/AMCONSUL MADRAS 72
 RUEHPT/USUN NEW YORK
 RUHQOQ/CINCPAC
 RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TERRAN 2475

BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 NEW DELHI 7852

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12808 GDS 4/7/85 (GIBNEY, JON M.) OR-P
 TAGS: PORT, IN
 SUBJECT: INDIA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

REF: A/ STATE 41933; B/ BELGRADE 1967; C/ HAVANA 1861;
 D/ USUN 1277 (ALL NOTAL)

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: INDIA VIEWS THE NAM AS PASSING THROUGH A "CRITICAL PHASE" BUT HOPES, ACCORDING TO MEA JOINT SECRETARY (UN) M. DUBEY, THAT THE MODERATES IN THE MOVEMENT WILL BE ABLE TO CHECK CUBAN ADVENTURISM. THE GOI IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHER LIKE-MINDED MEMBERS TO TIGHTEN NAM PROCEDURES IN AN EFFORT TO CIRCUMSCRIBE CUBA'S FREEDOM OF ACTION AS CHAIRMAN. INDIAN PM DESAI HAS WARNED THE CUBANS THAT THE NAM MUST RETAIN ITS INDEPENDENT CHARACTER. AS A RESULT OF THESE "EXTREMELY FRANK" TALKS, THE GOI BELIEVES THAT THE CUBANS HAVE BECOME "VERY CAUTIOUS" AND ARE BACKING AWAY FROM AN IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION. INDIA IS URGING ALL NAM MEMBERS TO ATTEND THE HAVANA SUMMIT, BUT FEELS

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21 Jul 79 05 40z

E
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OO RUGMHR
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O 210142Z JUL 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO INDIAN OCEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 188761/01

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO ATHENS GENEVA OSLO ROME
THE HAGUE JULY 19

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 03059

DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT TO INDIAN OCEAN COLLECTIVE

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/18/85 (JONES, B.J.) OR-P
TAGS: PARM, UNGA, XO
SUBJECT: (C) INDIAN OCEAN: REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF
MEETING OF LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATES, JULY 2-13

REF: A) USUN 2843; B) USUN 2931; C) STATE 167419;
D) USUN 3010

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: DESPITE THE DESIRE OF NON-ALIGNED ACTIVISTS
TO USE JULY 1979 MEETING THAT HAD BEEN CALLED FOR BY
33RD UNGA AS A STEP TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE, PRELIMINARY MEETINGS OF
INDIAN OCEAN COMMITTEE WERE UNABLE TO RESOLVE MAJOR
POINTS OF DIFFERENCE AMONG MEMBERS. SAME DIFFERENCES RE-
EMERGED IN JULY MEETING. MAJORITY OF PARTICIPANTS SOUGHT
TO PROMOTE GALS OF COMPLETE DEMILITARIZATION OF AREA AND
REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION MEASURES, BUT MET OPPOSITION
FROM ALLIED STATES (AUSTRALIA, JAPAN AND GREECE) WITH
SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS WITH U.S., AND FROM INDIA.
EFFORTS OF PRESIDENT OF MEETING (FERNANDO OF SRI LANKA)
TO FIND BALANCED FORMULATIONS FOR FINAL DOCUMENT ACCEPT-
ABLE TO ALL FOUNDERED ON INTRANSIGENCE OF RADICALS SUCH
AS IRAQ. FINAL DOCUMENT, WHICH WAS "ADOPTED" WITHOUT
CONSENSUS, REQUESTS 34TH UNGA TO SET DATE AND TIME FOR
A FULL CONFERENCE AND FORESEES EVENTUAL TREATY ON AN
INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE. U.S., WHICH REMAINED
THROUGHOUT MEETING AS OBSERVER, WILL BE APPROACHED AGAIN
BY FERNANDO AS INDIAN OCEAN COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN IN NEAR
FUTURE, AND WILL NEED TO DECIDE ON WHETHER TO PARTICIPATE
IN FUTURE WORK OF COMMITTEE AND/OR CONFERENCE.
END SUMMARY.

26 Jul 79 02 32z

POL
CHG
ECON
RF
CHRON

NNNNV ES011BRA308
OO RUQMR
DE RUEHC #3073/01 2061918
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 251014Z JUL 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO NONALIGNED MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 5850
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5132
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 5641
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6075
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 6907
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0120
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 1014
RUFEBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1081
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8279
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 2901
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 8322
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2380
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 6827
RUEHBC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 2769
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6592
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 9434
RUDKPDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 4018
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 8377
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 3054
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 1900
RUESJP/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 7900
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7144
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9046
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 0797
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 7940
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5136
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 7903
RUDKBEQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 9004
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3440
INFO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9293
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 6022
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 1313
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 1600
RUTAOU/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 2751
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 2745
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0004
RUTABA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 3012
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 9344
RUFHTA/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO 8101
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 0019
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4163
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 6999

SECRET 210000Z JUL 79 STAFF

21 JUL 79

CITE DIRECTOR 480245

TO: WESS (XRT BRIGCP)

UNRECORDED BY THE EXISTOR

1. THE NATURE OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE SUMMIT AND ALLIANCE (NAM) SUMMIT CO. WESS IN HAVANA, 3-4 SEPTEMBER 1979. THE STAFF HAS BEEN ASKED TO FURNISH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO HIGH LEVEL POLICY MAKERS' INTEREST IN A MISSION NEW YORK HAS RECEIVED A 75-PAGE DRAFT OF A PROPOSAL FOR THE FINAL DECLARATION TO BE ISSUED AT THE SUMMIT. THE DRAFT WAS DISTRIBUTED TO ALL US MISSIONS ON 10 JULY 1979 WITH A DRAFT INTENTIVE TEST: "TRENDS AND OBSERVATIONS" BY THE FIRST WEEK OF AUGUST. STAFF CONSIDERS THE DRAFT A FLAGRANT ATTACK ON THE U.S. AND ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL AGAINST THE U.S. EVER TO BE CONSIDERED FOR RELEASE IN CIRCLES. STAFF IS PREPARING TO ENGAGE IN VIGOROUS DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY WITH NAM MODERATES, TO ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN SUBSTANTIAL OPPOSITION WITHIN THE NAM TO THE DRAFT. STAFF HAS REQUESTED PRIORITY BE ASSIGNED TO OBTAINING INFORMATION ON NAM COUNTRY ATTITUDES, REACTIONS, SUPPORT OR OPPOSITION TO THE CUBAN DRAFT AND REASONS THEREFOR. NAM COUNTRIES TO CONTACT DRAFT OF ANY INDICATIONS OF PLANS TO SUBMIT AN ALTERNATE MODERATE DRAFT.

IN ADDITION TO THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT IN PAR 1, ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO ADVISE WRT A REQUEST OF NAM ASSOCIATES PLANNING TO ATTEND HAVANA SUMMIT OR WRT ACCESS TO NAM SUMMIT PREPARATORY INFORMATION. WRT ARE ALSO REQUESTED TO ADVISE WRT WRT WILL HAVE ACCESS TO RETAINING NAM INDICATORS OF RELATED COUNTRY POSITIONS IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-SUMMIT PERIOD. FOR EACH AS TO PLEASE INDICATE THE NATURE OF NAM RELATED ACCESS AND FUNDING QUANTITIES WILL FORWARD TAILORED REQUIREMENTS. PLEASE ALSO ADVISE IF STAFF HAS NO ACCESS. IN SELECTED CASES, SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC PRIOR APPROVAL, HEADQUARTERS PREPARED TO ASSIST WITH TRIP EXPENSES. STAFF HAS STRONG INTEREST IN ASSISTS WRT ACCESS TO PLANS AND TACTICS OF CUBAN OR OTHER RADICAL WRT

SECRET 011323Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53823

TO: DIRECTOR.

WINTEL LUVINE KMSTONE

REF: DIRECTOR 480849

1. TEHRAN STATION HAS NO AGENT ATTENDING THE CUBAN SUMMIT. SOTRAMP/1 HAS BEEN TASKED TO PROVIDE INFO ON PARA ONE REF REQUIREMENT AND TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO ONE OR MORE MEMBERS OF THE PRESUMPTIVE IRANIAN DELEGATION. T/1 ALSO SEEKING INFO ON CUBAN DELEGATION REPORTED TO BE SCHEDULED VISIT TEHRAN BEFORE HAVANA SUMMIT.

2. WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

3. FILE: 200-300-112. RW 1 AUG 99 DRV D9C.

SECRET
SECRET

27 SEP 79 07 16z

S E C R E T 262122Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 521500.

TO: NESB.

FROM: NE/COPS

SUBJ: WNINTEL - MATERIALS FOR LIAISON

1. A RECENT INCIDENT AT AN NE STATION HAS AGAIN IMPRESSED ON US THE NEED FOR CAREFUL SCREENING OF MATERIALS TO BE PASSED TO LIAISON. IN THIS INCIDENT A CRITIQUE OF THE FIRST CUBAN DRAFT FINAL COMMUNIQUE WAS PASSED TO A LIAISON SERVICE WHOSE CHIEF RESPONDED WITH AN IMMEDIATE REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF SEVERAL PASSAGES. THE SERVICE HEAD POLITELY ASKED FOR BACKGROUND ON HOW THE CRITIQUE HAD BEEN CLEARED, AND AT WHAT LEVEL, AND COMMENTED THAT THE CRITIQUE SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN COMPOSED IN HASTE.

2. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE CRITIQUE WAS NOT A RESTATEMENT OF USG POLICY, BUT RATHER A PROPAGANDA SALVO HASTILY AIMED AT THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE. HOWEVER, WE HAD PLACED OURSELVES, THROUGH PASSAGE OF THE UNEDITED COMMUNIQUE, IN A POSITION WHERE OUR LIAISON CONTACTS WERE MILDLY DISTURBED AND WE WERE FORCED TO DEFEND OURSELVES.

3. A REVIEW OF THIS PARTICULAR INCIDENT AT HQS ENCOURAGED US TO TRY TO TIGHTEN UP COORDINATION ON SUCH MESSAGES BEFORE THEY LEAVE HQS, BUT STILL ULTIMATELY WE MUST DEPEND UPON THE COS AND STATION FOR A FINAL REVIEW WITH PARTICULAR REGARD FOR THE SENSIBILITIES OF THE HOST LIAISON SERVICES.

4. WE MIGHT ADD THAT WHILE THE ABOVE INCIDENT INVOLVED PROPAGANDA MATERIAL, PREVIOUS INCIDENTS HAVE INVOLVED THE UNFORTUNATE PASSAGE OF MATERIALS TO WHICH LIAISON SHOULD NEVER HAVE HAD ACCESS. THE ONLY SURE METHOD WE CAN RECOMMEND TO PREVENT SUCH "ACCIDENTS" IS A THOROUGH REVIEW OF EACH PIECE OF PAPER PRIOR TO PASSAGE BY AT LEAST TWO MEMBERS OF THE STATION. (ANOTHER INCIDENT TAUGHT THE LESSON THAT YOU MUST CHECK THE
PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 521500 S E C R E T
"EMPTY" ENVELOPE ALSO TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED MATERIALS REACHING LIAISON.)

5. NO FILE. RVW 24SEPT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

BT
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ZNY 55555 ZZB
 O 121353Z APR 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0050
 BT
 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 03077

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRG: STATE
 APPRV: CHG: CWNAAS
 DRFTD: POL: JDSTMPFL
 CLEAR: NONE
 DISTR: POL ECON ICA

E.O. 12065: RGDS 4/12/99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
 TAGS: PGOV, PINS, SEUM, IR
 SUBJ: YAZDI MEETING: REVOLUTIONARY TRIALS

REF: A. TEHRAN 3059, B. STATE 90053

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT -- THIS IS A REPORTING MESSAGE)

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE EXPRESSED U.S. CONCERN WITH SUMMARY NATURE OF TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS. YAZDI ACCEPTED CRITICISM, SAID GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO IMPROVE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE, BUT PUBLIC ANGER WAS SUCH THAT NEW GOVERNMENT HAD DIFFICULTY KEEPING REVOLUTIONARIES FROM KILLING FORMER OFFICIALS IN STREETS. TO UNDERLINE HIS POINT, HE SHOWED CHARGE SET OF GRUESOME PHOTOS FROM "OLD SAVAK FILES" OF PERSONS TORTURED TO DEATH AS EVIDENCE OF WHAT PEOPLE WERE MAD ABOUT. THE GOVERNMENT'S PROBLEM WAS IN CONVINCING REVOLUTIONARIES TO MAKE EVIDENCE PUBLIC. YAZDI ALSO NOTED THAT COUNTER REVOLUTIONARIES WERE AT WORK, AND SAID GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY GOT KHOMENI AGREEMENT TO HUMANITARIAN CLEMENCY AND SENTENCING POLICY. IMPLEMENTATION AWAITED RIGHT POLITICAL MOMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. AFTER PRESENTATION OF U.S. VIEWS ON TIES WITH NEW REGIME (REF A), CHARGE TURNED TO DISCUSSION OF REVOLUTIONARY TRIALS IN SPIRIT OF FRANK AND FRIENDLY DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS. DRAWING ON REF B GUIDANCE, CHARGE EXPRESSED CONCERN BEING FELT BY MANY IN U.S., PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO HAD SUPPORTED IRANIAN REVOLUTION, AT ACTION OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COURTS. THIS REACTION COULD SLOW DOWN PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION. JUST AS IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARIES SUSPECT U.S. OF CERTAIN THINGS, AMERICANS AND OTHER WESTERN NATIONS ARE DISHEARTED BY THIS APPARENT WARPING OF REVOLUTION AND THIS GENERATES QUESTIONS ABOUT REAL INTENTIONS OF REVOLUTIONARIES. CHARGE EXPRESSED USG AND PERSONAL HOPE THAT REVOLUTIONARY TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS COULD STOP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. U.S. INTEREST WAS HUMANITARIAN AND DID NOT REFLECT CONCLUSIONS OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS. RECALLING THAT DEPUTY PM HAD FLED IRAN BECAUSE OF HIS OPPOSITION TO THE SHAH'S REGIME AND LATER RETURNED TO SERVE HIS COUNTRY, CHARGE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT REVOLUTIONARY EXCESSES WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ALIENATE ANOTHER GENERATION FROM PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL LIFE. NOW IS THE TIME, HE SAID, FOR NATIONAL HEALING AND MERCY.

4. YAZDI WAS VERY FORTHCOMING. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PROBLEM, MANY PEOPLE HAD EXPRESSED SAME THOUGHTS TO GOVERNMENT. AT THIS POINT HE WENT TO HIS DESK AND WITH-

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ICA 6/25
CHG:LBLAINGEN
ICA:JSHELLENBERGER/BJH
POL:VLTOMSETH
ICA POL RF

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USICA WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

NEA, PGM/RC

DEPARTMENT FOR IR

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: US, IR
SUBJ: YAZDI COMMENT ON CUTLER

REF: A. TEHRAN 6279, B. TEHRAN 6379

1. (U) IN TV INTERVIEW BROADCAST JUNE 23 AND REPORTED SEPARATELY IN LOCAL PRESS JUNE 24, FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI WAS ASKED WHEN THE NEW AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WILL ARRIVE IN IRAN. IN REPLY, HE SAID, "IT IS THE RIGHT OF EVERY INDEPENDENT COUNTRY TO MAKE HER OWN DECISIONS. AS WE DISCOVERED THAT MR. CUTLER WAS COMING TO TEHRAN FROM A COUNTRY WHERE HE HAD BEEN CARRYING OUT IMPERIALISTIC OBJECTIVES, AND HIS PRESENCE HERE WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTERMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, WE WITHDREW OUR ACCEPTANCE OF HIM...THE U.S. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ONE DAY CAME TO THE MINISTRY AND SAID THAT OUR REJECTION HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY HIS GOVERNMENT AND ADDED THAT THE NEW AMBASSADOR'S NAME WILL BE MADE KNOWN LATER...PROBABLY IN SEVERAL WEEKS."

2. (LOU) COMMENT: THE SUBJECT OF A NEW AMBASSADOR DID NOT COME UP AT ALL DURING FORMER CHARGE NAAS' MOST RECENT CONVERSATION WITH YAZDI (REF A) ALTHOUGH IT DID IN CONVERSATION WITH AMIR-ENTEZAM A DAY LATER (REF B).
SHELLENBERGER##

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DE RUQMR 6941/01 184 **
 ZNW CCCCC ZZH
 O 031128Z JUL 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2441
 INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0156
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0155
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0160
 RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0130
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0132
 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0129
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0182
 RUSRLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0197
 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0160
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0232
 RUQMAN/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0131
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0172
 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0065
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0197
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHRG: STATE 7/3/79
 APPV: CHARGE: IBLAINGEN
 DRPTD: POL: VLTOMSETH
 CLEAR: NONE
 DISTR: CHARGE CHERN

BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 06941

EXDIS--MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/3/85 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M
 TAGS: PEPR, IR
 SUBJECT: US-IRANIAN RELATIONS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY: DURING MY INITIAL CALL ON FM YAZDI JULY 2 I REITERATED U.S. DESIRE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH IRAN. I EMPHASIZED THAT THE PROCESS OF REBUILDING OUR RELATIONSHIP MUST BE A MUTUAL ONE. YAZDI RESPONDED BY EXPRESSING HIS AND HIS GOVERNMENT'S APPRECIATION FOR OUR STATEMENTS RECOGNIZING THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES IN IRAN BUT CAUTIONED THAT RECOGNIZING THE REVOLUTION AND ACCEPTING IT ARE TWO DIFFERENT MATTERS. I GAVE YAZDI THE TEXT OF THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S JUNE 25 BACKGROUND STATEMENT CONCERNING THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN AMBASSADOR, WHICH PROMPTED YAZDI TO ASK JUST WHEN WE WOULD BE SENDING SOMEONE. HE ALSO WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WAS IMPLIED BY GEN. ROGERS' STATEMENT RE "SPECIAL FORCES" IN THE GULF AREA. END SUMMARY.
3. I BEGAN MY REMARKS BY STATING FOR THE RECORD MY GOVERNMENT'S APPRECIATION FOR THE HELP YAZDI AND HIS COLLEAGUES AT THE MFA HAD PROVIDED. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE ESPECIALLY APPRECIATIVE FOR HIS PERSONAL INTERVENTION IN TIMES OF DANGER AND STRESS FOR THE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO OUR MISSION IN IRAN. I SAID THAT I HAD COME TO IRAN AS A FRIEND, BOTH IN PERSONAL TERMS AND AS AN OFFICIAL OF THE USG. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SAY THAT MY GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO WORK IN JOINT EFFORT WITH THE PGOI TO REBUILD A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP, ONE THAT TAKES INTO FULL AND SYMPATHETIC ACCOUNT THE CHANGED SITUATION IN IRAN. IRAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND

DE RUQMER #7430/01 198 **
 ZNY SSSSS IZE
 O 171036Z JUL 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2669
 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN CE

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRG: STATE 7/17
 APPRV: CHG:LBLAINGETH
 DFPTD: POL:VLTOMSETH
 CLEAR: A/M:GENGAST
 DISTR: CHG

BT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 07430

EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/17/85 (LAINCEN, L. E.) OR-M
 TAGS: MASS, PEPR, IR
 SUBJ: MILITARY SALES TO IRAN

REF: STATE 179065 (NOTAL)

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: I MET WITH FM YAZDI AT HIS REQUEST JULY 16 TO DISCUSS, INTER ALIA, SALES OF MILITARY ITEMS TO IRAN. YAZDI RAISED THREE CATEGORIES, I.E., SPARE PARTS THAT IRAN HAD ALREADY PAID FOR, PARTS IT WISHED TO ORDER UNDER A NEW ACCOUNT, AND 747 REPAIRABLES WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO THE U.S. BUT HAD NOT YET BEEN RETURNED. I POINTED OUT TO YAZDI THE OVERRIDING NEED TO KEEP THE IRANIAN TRUST FUND SOLVENT AND REVIEWED FOR HIM THE ACTIONS WE HAD TAKEN TO ASSURE THIS. I EXPRESSED MY HOPE THAT PASSAGE OF THE DOD SUPPLEMENTAL WOULD ALLOW US TO GO FORWARD ON SPECIFIC MATTERS OF PGOI INTEREST, BUT CAUTIONED HIM THAT PASSAGE WOULD ONLY PROVIDE BREATHING SPACE IN WHICH TO SORT OUT THE RESOLUTION OF ALL OUTSTANDING CONTRACTS. I ALSO WARNED HIM NOT TO EXPECT THAT ALL SPARE PARTS, EVEN SOME THAT IRAN HAD ALREADY PAID FOR, WOULD NECESSARILY BE COMPLETELY AVAILABLE. END SUMMARY.

3. YAZDI CALLED ME IN ON JULY 16 FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE DISCUSSING THE SAME THREE CATEGORIES OF SPARE PARTS AS CHARGE AGAH RAISED WITH PRECHT ON JULY 11 (REPTTEL). I TOLD YAZDI THAT I FOUND MYSELF SPENDING MORE TIME ON THIS GENERAL ISSUE THAN ANY OTHER ASPECT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND NOTED THAT OUR OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE IN THIS REGARD HAD BEEN PREVENTING A SITUATION FROM ARISING IN WHICH FORCE MAJEURE WOULD PRECLUDE OPTIONS BOTH WE AND THE IRANIANS WOULD PREFER TO EXERCISE IN THE PROCESS OF REBUILDING OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ONE ANOTHER. I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WITH THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE SENATE-HOUSE CONFERENCE ON THE DOD SUPPLEMENTAL AND THE IMMINENT PROSPECT OF THE BILL BECOMING LAW IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE FAIRLY EXPEDITIOUSLY ON THOSE SPECIFIC MATTERS OF INTEREST TO IRAN. I ALSO POINTED OUT TO YAZDI THAT IN CERTAIN INSTANCES, SUCH AS THE OUTSTANDING CLAIMS OF THE IIAF'S FREIGHT FORWARDER (BEHNING INTERNATIONAL), THE USG WAS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE FRUSTRATION OF IRANIAN MATERIAL, BUT THAT WE HAD NONETHELESS TRIED TO BE HELPFUL

DE RUMR #8222 214 **

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

R 020849Z AUG 79

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3026

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 08222

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

CHRG: STATE 8/2/79

APPRV: CHARGE:LELAINEN

DRPTD: POL:VLTOMSETH:00

CLEAR: NONE

DISTR: POL2 CHO HF

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/2/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P

TAGS: FEPR, IR ,US

SUBJECT: U.S. CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. (U) THERE FOLLOWS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF AN MFA NOTE NUMBER 4600/4 DATED JULY 23:

"THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND HAS THE HONOR TO REFER TO THE DISCUSSIONS ON JULY 16, 1979 BETWEEN H.E. DR. EBRAHIM YAZDI AND H.E. MR. BRUCE LAINGEN, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN TEHRAN AND CALL TO THE ATTENTION OF THE EMBASSY THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

1. ON JUNE 21, 1979, GENERAL ROGERS, THEN U.S. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF AND RECENTLY ASSIGNED AS NATO COMMANDER IN EUROPE, STATED THAT THE U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IS PLANNING A 110,000-MAN STRIKE FORCE TO ENABLE THE U.S. TO LAUNCH OPERATIONS BY AIRBORNE FORCES ANYWHERE OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA. THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE OIL PRODUCING AREAS OF THIS REGION WERE SPECIFICALLY CITED AS POSSIBLE TARGETS OF OPERATIONS DURING TIMES OF EMERGENCY.

2. IT WAS ANNOUNCED RECENTLY THAT FOLLOWING WITH HOUSE MEETINGS OF THE POLITICAL STUDIES COMMITTEE ATTENDED BY SEVERAL CABINET MEMBERS ON JUNE 21 AND 22 THAT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT U.S. NAVAL UNITS IN THE PERSIAN GULF WOULD BE AUGMENTED AND THAT THE U.S. NAVAL AND MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WOULD BE EXPANDED.

3. A NUMBER OF SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS INCLUDING

VZCZC 271
OO RUEHC
DE RUQMHR #0205/01 2631340
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221336Z SEP 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3802
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 10205

E.O. 12865: GDS 9/20/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: IR, PGOV, PEPR
SUBJECT: CHARGE'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

REFS: (A) TEHRAN 10222, (B) TEHRAN 10224, (C) TEHRAN 10229

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI TUESDAY, AUGUST 18, FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR TO REPORT ON HIS TRIP TO THE U.S. AND TO GET YAZDI'S IMPRESSION OF THE HAVANA SUMMIT. MEETING WAS HELD IN CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE BUT YAZDI WAS NON-COMMITTAL ON MOST SUBJECTS RAISED SUCH AS SHERRY CASE, SHEBANI, AND GULF DISTRICT. WHEN QUESTION OF FREEDOM OF PRESS WAS RAISED, YAZDI CHARGED AS USUAL THAT WESTERN PRESS WAS IRRESPONSIBLE ON IRAN. END SUMMARY.

3. MEETING WITH YAZDI OPENED WITH A FULL DISCUSSION OF CONSULAR SECTION PROBLEMS, HOW MANY VISAS WE WERE NOW ABLE TO ISSUE, WHAT PERCENTAGE WERE STUDENTS AND HOW WE COULD ASSURE STUDENTS WERE PROCESSED QUICKLY. CHARGE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE HELP WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING FROM THE TEHRAN POLICE AND NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH WE WERE STILL HAVING PROBLEMS CONTROLLING THE VISA CROWDS, THAT POLICE CONTROL WAS GRADUALLY IMPROVING. CHARGE NOTED THAT OUR REFUSAL RATE WAS RUNNING AS HIGH AS 40 PERCENT BUT THAT WE WERE INTERVIEWING ABOUT 400 APPLICANTS A DAY INCLUDING 35-100 MEDICAL EMERGENCY CASES WHO WERE BEING SEEN ON A SPECIAL BASIS. YAZDI SEEMED ABSORBED IN THIS QUESTION AND PLEASSED THAT THE CONSULATE WAS FUNCTIONING.

4. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE NAM, UNGA, AND AFGHANISTAN (SEPTELS), CHARGE BRIEFED YAZDI ON HIS RECENT TRIP TO WASHINGTON. BRIEFING WAS DONE VERY FRANKLY IN EFFORT TO MAKE YAZDI AWARE OF WASHINGTON'S PERCEPTIONS OF IRAN AND OF THE ISSUES WHICH ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN BOTH TO THE USG AND AMERICANS IN GENERAL.

5. TO OPEN THE CONVERSATION CHARGE SAID THAT WE HAD TRIED DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH USG OFFICIALS AND CONGRESSMEN TO PUT IRAN IN SOME PERSPECTIVE: IRAN WAS NOT A COUNTRY GONE MAD RUN BY BACWARD MULLANS, BUT A COUNTRY WHICH HAS GONE THROUGH A SUBSTANTIAL REVOLUTION WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED. FOR INSTANCE IRAN HAS NOT YET COMPLETED ITS DRAFTING OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION. CHARGE SAID HE HAD POINTED OUT THAT US HAS SUBSTANTIAL INTERESTS IN MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND THAT HE THOUGHT THESE WERE SHARED BY

VZCZC 271

DE RUOMER #1004 2P9 **
 ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 P 161431Z OCT 79
 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4291
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 11004

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHANGE: STAT 10/16/79
 APPROV: CHARGE:LEBLINGEN
 TRFTD: POL:RASWIFT:GO
 CLEAR: NONE
 DISTR: POL2 CHS ICA
 ECOM CONS CHRON
 RF R/WCB

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/16/95 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
 TAGS: SHUM, IR, PINT
 SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES

REF: TEHRAN 10817

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING OCTOBER 10 DISCUSSION OF IRANIAN PRESS ATTACKS ON US OVER KURDESTAN, ACTING CHIEF OF MFA FOURTH POLITICAL DIVISION, PARSA KIA, ONCE AGAIN BROUGHT UP SUBJECT OF CHARGE'S TALK WITH INTERIOR MINISTER SABAGHIAN ON HUMAN RIGHTS. PARSA KIA IS INTELLIGENT, FRIENDLY TO US AND HIMSELF VERY WORRIED OVER THE "EXCESSSES" OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. HE SEEMED MAINLY CONCERNED WE HAD RAISED THE QUESTION WITH SABAGHIAN RATHER THAN COMING THROUGH FOMMIN YAZDI. THE FOREIGN OFFICE, HE SAID, COULD BE COUNTED ON TO KEEP SUCH DISCUSSIONS PRIVATE. IN ADDITION, FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI KNEW HOW TO TRANSLATE THE US'S REMARKS INTO LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD DO THE MOST GOOD IN COM OR AT LEAST WOULD NOT RAISE SO MUCH TROUBLE. US VIEWS, HE ASSURED US, WOULD, HOWEVER, GET THROUGH. US VIEWS, HE ASSURED US, WOULD, HOWEVER, GET THROUGH.

3. PARSA KIA POINTED OUT STANDARD SECULAR INTELLECTUAL LINK THAT REVOLUTION NOT YET FINISHED. AS YOU KNOW, HE SAID, THERE ARE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND WHILE WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THESE THINGS CEASE WE CAN NOT YET CONTROL THE SITUATION.

4. COMMENT: WHILE EMBASSY SYMPATHIZES WITH ANGUISH OF PEOPLE LIKE PARSA KIA AND REGRETS THE STORM THAT SABAGHIAN'S COMMENTS CAUSED AT A VERY INOPPORTUNE MOMENT, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF US PROTEST ON EXECUTIONS HAS RAISED EMBASSY'S CREDIT IN EYES OF MANY MODERATE IRANIANS. USG DISAPPROVAL PLAINLY TOUCHED VERY SENSITIVE NERVE ENDING IN IRAN, INDICATIVE PERHAPS OF THE GROWING UNFASE EVEN AMONG SUPPORTERS OF THE REVOLUTION AT THE OCCASIONAL EXCESSSES OF THEIR NEW GOVERNMENT. WE NOTE, BY THE WAY, THAT SABAGHIAN WAS A FORMER MEMBER OF THE IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE. LAINGEN
 BT
 #1004

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

TEHRAN 11004

NOV 22 PM 7:40

*****Z RUEHCR
DE RUEHC #50R2 2951526
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 221517Z OCT 79 ZFFA
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN FLASH 50R2
BT
SECRET STATE 2750R2

10/23

MODIS
CHEROKEE, EYES ONLY FOR LAINGEN

F.O. 12065: PDS-2, 10/22/99 (NEWSOM, DAVID D)

TAGS: PEPR, IP, IS

SUBJECT: THE SHAH'S ILLNESS

REF: TEHRAN 11152

313897 - Dr. Yazdi

~~the~~

1. FOLLOWING IS REPLY TO QUESTIONS RAISED IN REFTEL,
WHICH YOU SHOULD COMMUNICATE TO YAZDI.

A. WE HAVE ALTERED RELEVANT SECTION OF OUR PRESS
GUIDANCE, AND INFORMED SHAH'S REPRESENTATIVE
AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE WE WOULD EXPECT THAT NEITHER WE
(THE FORMER SHAH) NOR MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY
WOULD ENGAGE IN ANY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
WHILE IN THE UNITED STATES. UNQUOTE

P. WE CANNOT SPEAK FOR THE PRIVATE MEDICAL
AUTHORITIES IN CHARGE OF THE TREATMENT IN THE U.S..
IF YAZDI WISHES TO SEND HIS NAMES WE WILL BRING
MATTER TO ATTENTION OF MEDICAL AUTHORITIES...
WE CAN AT THIS TIME MAKE NO COMMITMENT.

CHRISTOPHER
BT
#50R2



Informed
Dr. Yazdi
of these points
on 10/23. He said
he would send me
the names of the
Dr. "

NNNN

ELC-5

AmEmbassy TEHRAN
INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONTROL NO. _____

ACTION: _____

CONFIDENTIAL

- INFO: _____
- AMB _____
- DCM _____
- SA _____
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- OR 1 _____
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- IRS _____
- TCTR _____
- FAA _____
- TU _____
- CRU 1 _____
- SHIR 1 _____
- TABR _____
- ISFA _____

P R 140715Z FEB 78
 FM AMCONSUL DHAIRAN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6018
 INFO RUQNR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 8149
 RUQNY/USLO RIYADH 252
 RUQHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 1263
 RUQHKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1282
 RUQHD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 393
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L DHAIRAN 0211

ACTION COPY

E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: ENRG, SA
 SUBJECT: ARAMCO CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION

1. CURRENT PRODUCTION: ARAMCO CHAIRMAN JOHN KELBERER (PLEASE PROTECT) RECENTLY TOLD CONSUL GENERAL THAT THE COMPANY'S PRODUCTION AVERAGED 7.5 MILLION BPD DURING JANUARY 1978. THE REDUCED PRODUCTION RATE REFLECTED SLACK DEMAND FOLLOWING PERIOD OF INCREASED DEMAND IN LATE 1977 AS BUYERS FILLED STORAGE FACILITIES IN ANTICIPATION OF AN OPEC PRICE RISE. ACCORDING TO KELBERER DEMAND HAS SHARPLY INCREASED IN FEBRUARY, PROBABLY BECAUSE OF BAD WINTER IN US AND ELSEWHERE, AND FIRST EIGHT DAYS OF THE MONTH WERE AT THE RATE OF 10 MILLION BPD.

2. FUTURE PRODUCTION CAPACITY: KELBERER DESCRIBED JANNAF ARTICLE BY STEVEN RATTNER IN INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE AS GENERALLY ACCURATE. RATTNER'S STORY REPORTED A STATEMENT BY ENERGY SECRETARY SCHLESINGER THAT SAUDI ARABIA IS "SCHEDULED" TO INCREASE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY MODESTLY BETWEEN NOW AND THE EARLY 1980'S AND THAT THE SAUDI'S SHOULD BE ABLE TO PRODUCE ABOUT 12 MILLION BARRELS A DAY BY ABOUT 1983 OR 1984, COMPARED TO ABOUT 10 MILLION BPD NOW. THE ARAMCO CHAIRMAN NOTED THAT THOSE FIGURES ARE ABOUT RIGHT IF THE REFERE (AS SECRETARY SCHLESINGER INTENDED) TO "MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY" (THE FORMER GENERALLY ABOUT 15 PERCENT LOWER THAN THE LATTER). OUR NOTES INDICATE A SMALL DIFFERENCE, HOWEVER, IN THAT KELBERER USED THE FIGURES 12.5 AND 10.5 MILLION BPD RATHER THAN 12 AND 10 MILLION BPD AS THE 1983 OR 1984 AND CURRENT MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE CAPACITY RESPECTIVELY WHEN HE DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH SECRETARY SCHLESINGER ON JANUARY 12.

CONFIDENTIAL

Econ

AIRGRAM

780026-1283

AB
RCB
RF

11:40
11:40
11:40

HANDLING	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	MESSAGE REFERENCE NO. A-6
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TO: Department of State

DEPT PLEASE PASS: ABU DHABI, DHAHRAN, DOHA, KUWAIT, RIYADH, **TEHRAN** FSE 2

FROM: Amembassy Jidda DATE: FEB 15, 1978

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, SA
SUBJECT: Saudi Oil Situation - 1978

REF:

SECRET

NO

DEPT. DISTRIBUTION

ORIGIN/ACTION
ED

AF	ARA	CU	EA
EB	EUR	INR	IO
L	NEA	PER	PM
REP	SCI	SS	SV
ABR	AID	AIR	ARMY
CIA	COM	ODD	DOT
FRS	HEW	INT	LAB
NAVY	NSA	NSC	OPIC
STR	TAR	TRSY	URIA
KMB			

LIMDIS
NOFORN

Summary The Saudi oil production ceiling of 8.5 million barrels per day (mmbd) is unlikely to be tested in 1978, a year of expected low demand. The SAG in fact seems prepared to reduce its production still farther to help support the current OPEC price structure, if necessary.

In spite of a projected soft demand for oil in the next two years, the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG) has authorized Aramco to increase productive capacity into the 1980's, although at rates less than the company would like. Due largely to the SAG's insistence that it remain on a self-financing regime (financing capital expenditures on oil production programs entirely out of its retained earnings), Aramco has had to reduce its production goals for the mid-1980's to a sustained rate of no more than 12.5 mmbd. Much of the expenditure will be for programs designed to maintain current production levels in oil fields experiencing pressure maintenance, salinity, corrosion, and other problems.

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

DRAFTED BY: ECON:GSBrown/DMeyers:rg DRAFTING DATE: 2/5/78 PHONE NO.: 213 CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: DCM:MWiley

CLEARANCES:

Concurrence *McC* Campbell

OPTIONAL FORM 247
(FORMERLY FS-DS-22)
MARCH 1975
DEPT. OF STATE

50247-107

GPO: 1975 O - 179-08

SAR 2 PM 10

AmEmbassy TEHRAN

ACTION: **ECON 5 INCOMING TELEGRAM**CONTROL NO. **6785**

CONFIDENTIAL

041330Z MAY 78

INFO: FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 902
 AMB/ INFO RUTAB/ AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 432
 DCM/ RUFHOL/ AMEMBASSY BONN 35
 SA/ RUEHEG/ AMEMBASSY CAIRO 181
 POL/ RUQMKM/ AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 178
 2/ RUDTC/ AMEMBASSY LONDON 72
 ECON/ RUQMDI/ AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO 253
 PM/ RUQNNI/ AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 538
 RUFNPS/ AMEMBASSY PARIS 321
 ICA/ RUFHRO/ AMEMBASSY ROME 49
 CONS/ RUQMN9/ AMEMBASSY SANA 200
 DR/ RUQHR/ AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 31
 R UEHDT/ USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 214
 ADM/ RIDOMBA/ CINCUSNAVEUR
 RUSNAA/ USCINCEUR
 GSO/ R UFRSGG/ COMIDEASTFOR
 BF/ RUHQMQA/ CINCPAC

PER BT

HU C O N F I D E N T I A L DJIBOUTI 631

RSO E. O. 11652: GDS
 MSG TAGS: EAID, PDIP, PDEV, BEXP, DJ, SA
 TSO SUBJ: SUBSTANTIAL SAUDI ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR DJIBOUTI

SCRO 1. AFTER MANY MONTHS OF GESTATION, A SAUDI ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TOTALLING
 CRO RLY U.S. DOLS. 60
 TCU MILLION WASK CONCLUDED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF DJIBOUTI THIS PAST
 MP WEEK AND ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY ON 2 MAY. THE PROJECTS COVER MANY
 DAQ CRITICAL AREAS, INCLUDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS, EDUCATION, IMPROVEMENTS
 MAAG IN PORT AND AIRPORT SERVICES, ROADS, RELIGION, HOUSING, HEALTH AND
 SOCIAL SERVICES.

AGH 2. FOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECTS. THE DOLLAR
 DEA TOTALS HAVE NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY. THEY WERE OBTAINED
 IRS FROM A REPUTABLE DJIBOUTI GOVERNMENT SOURCE:
 TCTR 2- ELECTRIC TURBINE FOR THE DJIBOUTI ELECTRIC COMPANY.
 CEOC THIS MACHIBC WILL PROBABLY BE PURCHASED FROM FRENCH FIRM THAT
 SUPPLIED EXISTING EQUIPMENT. VALUE: 4,000,000
 CEOR ADDITIONAL AIRPORT PARKING APRON. AT PRESENT TIME, ONLY ONE
 BOEING 747 CAN BE PARKED IN AREA OF AIRPORT TERMINAL. THIS WILL ADD
 CRU ONE ADDITIONAL TAXING AND PARKING AREA FOR LARGE AIRCRAFT. VALPE
 DOLS. 1,907,500
 SHIRL CITY FREEZING PLANT. TO ASSIST IN DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL LIVESTOCK
 TABR COMMERCIALIZATION. AT PRESENT TIME, MOST MEAT CONSUMED IN DJIBOUTI
 CITY IS IMPORTED. KVVBRJE. DOLS. 1,700,000
 ISFA SATELLITE EARTH STATION. THIS PROJECT WAS DESCRIBED IN EMBTEL
 354. VALUE OF PROJECT DOLS. 2,500,000
 FAA LOW COST HOUSING FOR CIVIL SERVANTS. FIRST TRANCHE COSTS
 DOLS. 5,000,000
 MICROWAVE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT EARTH STATION, ALSO DESCRIBED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

2-3
LAW
DEW
RF

SUBJECT: Bonn Economic Summit, Oil Policies, and Aid

PARTICIPANTS: H.R.H. Prince Saud bin Faisal
Minister of Foreign Affairs

H.E. Abdullah M. Ali Reza
Deputy Minister for Economic, Petroleum
and Cultural Affairs, Foreign Ministry

Richard Cooper
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Ambassador John C. West

Joseph O. Eblan
Counselor for Economic and Commercial Affairs

PLACE: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
summer office, Taif

DATE: July 22, 1978

DISTRIBUTION: An Embassies London, Rome, Paris, Tokyo,
Ottawa, Bonn and OPEC countries;
State (WEA/ARP; LB/FSE); Amb/DCA, ICA,
ECON.

Under Secretary Cooper opened the discussion stating that the President wished him to give Saudi Arabia a briefing on the Bonn Economic Summit. He stated that this was his first trip to Saudi Arabia. Prince Saud replied that he hoped that this would be the first of many visits by Under Secretary Cooper and that the Kingdom valued the insights provided by such visits.

Under Secretary Cooper then gave the Minister an in-depth briefing on the Bonn Economic Summit, particularly emphasizing the role of the Summiteers and the parallel group of officials of which he was part, nicknamed the Sherpas or guides. Cooper explained that the atmosphere of the Summit

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GDS

28 Jun 78 07 04Z 921

NNNNVV LS9043YAA657
 RR RUQMHK
 DE RUQMYA #0623 2081215
 ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 R 270955Z JUL 78
 FM USLO RIYADH
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 618
 INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU-DHABI 38
 RUEBMA/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 90
 RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 17
 RUEBEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 86
 RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 310
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 18
 RUQMEW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 61
 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 33
 RUQMNT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 12
 RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA 48
 RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 33
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 671
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 623

ACTION:
ECONS

INFO:
 AMB
 DCM
 POL2
 RM
 OR
 ICA
 AGR
 SHIRAZ
 CRUZ R11

E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: LFIN, SA
 SUBJ: SAUDI RESPONSE TO BUDGET DEFICIT
 REF: (A) JIDDA 09076, (B) RIYADH 605

1. THE EMBASSY HAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED LIKELIHOOD OF SAC DEFICIT THIS FISCAL YEAR. USLO HAS LEARNED THAT IN REVIEWING THE BUDGET THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WAS FACED WITH A MUCH LARGER PROSPECTIVE DEFICIT WHICH IT AVOIDED ONLY BY REQUIRING ALL MINISTRIES TO USE ONLY TWO-THIRDS OF WHAT THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE HAD AUTHORIZED THEM TO SPEND. THIS YEAR'S BUDGET WAS BASED ON THAT REDUCED TOTAL. AS A RESULT EACH MINISTRY HAS BEEN REASSESSING ITS PROGRAMS TO IDENTIFY WHICH PROJECTS CAN BE CUT. IN THE MEANTIME PROJECTS HANG IN LIMBO, FUNDS HAVE BEEN FORZEN, AND A MOOD OF UNCERTAINTY PREVAILS AMONG ADVISORS AND CONTRACTORS.

2. THE SHORTFALL APPEARS TO HAVE CAUGHT THE SAC COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE, LARGELY BECAUSE THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE HAD NO WAY TO SYSTEMATICALLY RELATE FUNDING DECISIONS TO ANTICIPATED REVENUES. REQUESTS FROM MINISTRIES WERE EXAMINED AND APPROVED INDIVIDUALLY WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO AN OVERALL SPENDING CEILING. ONLY AFTER THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE MADE BINDING FUNDING COMMITMENTS TO OTHER MINISTRIES DID IT ADD UP THE TAB. TO ITS HORROR IT FOUND THAT NOT ONLY WAS PROJECT FUNDING 40 PERCENT; IT WAS FAR IN EXCESS OF PROJECTED REVENUES BASED ON THE SAUDI OIL PRODUCTION CEILING OF 6.5 MILLION B/D. FINANCE PRESENTED THE FIGURES TO THE COUNCIL OF

Action

6 JAN 79 11 33Z

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VV ESA346RAA796

RR RUQMHR
 DE RUQMRA 0118 0061420
 ZNR UUUUU ZK
 R 061320Z JAN 79
 FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4400
 INFO RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 1750
 RUQIYA/USLO RIYADH 2476
 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 2644
 BT
 UNCLAS JIDDA 0118

ACTION
 POL3
 INFO
 AMB
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 OR
 ICA
 ADM
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 EC2
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(U- ENTIRE TEXT)

E.O. 12065: N/A
 TAGS: SOPH, SOCI, SA
 SUBJ: SAUDI SUPPORT FOR THE SHAH

1. AL-JAZIRA DAILY OF RIYADH FRONT-PAGE ON SAT. JAN 6, 1979, THICKER THAN USUAL HEADING TITLED "THE KINGDOM ANNOUNCES ITS SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME OF THE SHAH OF IRAN."
2. AL-JAZIRA CLAIMS THAT IT HAD, FOR THE SECOND TIME IN LESS THAN A WEEK, ACQUIRED AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH THE CROWN PRINCE EMBODYING AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL STATEMENT.
3. THE EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH THE CROWN PRINCE ELICITS THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENT:
 - A. "WE SUPPORT EVERY REGIME THAT ENJOYS LEGITIMACY IN ITS COUNTRY AND THE REGIME OF THE SHSH RESTS ON SUCH LEGITIMACY."
 - B. "THE BLOODY EVENTS IN IRAN SERVE NO INTEREST EXCEPT THAT OF THE ENEMY, AND WE HOPE THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD PUT AN END TO THOSE EVENTS BY THEMSELVES."
 - C. THE CONTINUATION OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN IRAN WOULD THREATEN THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL STABILITY IN BOTH THE GULF AND THE MIDDLE EAST REGIONS."
4. THE CROWN PRINCE BY WAY OF ELABORATION MADE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINT: "THE PRESENT SITUATION IN IRAN DOES NOT SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE IRANIANS THEMSELVES NOR INDEED THE INTERESTS OF ISLAM OF THE MUSLIMS." BASING OURSELVES ON THE FACT THAT THE SHSH, AS WE SAID, ENJOYS THE LEGITIMATE STATUS, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT WE SUPPORT HIS STATUS AND HIS PRESENCE."

UNCLASS

NNNNFBVV ESA833RAA598

OO RUQHR

DE RUQRA #4275 1571230

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O R 261200Z JUN 79

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHD IMMEDIATE 6277

INFO RUGMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 2522

RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH 3512

RUQMEI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1709

RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 7101

RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 207

RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 638

RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 725

RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 248

RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4249

RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS 226

RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 45

RUDTIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4171

RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1469

RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 659

RUDKSN/AMEMBASSY OSLO 47

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2029

RUESCI/AMEMBASSY QUITO 70

RUQHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 2723✓

RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1038

RUFYAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 248

RUEHAD/USIT BAGHDAD

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 4275

6 Jun 79 13 56z

*Ben
car
for
RP
shun*

PE

9F

DEPARTMENT PASS H FOR SENATOR CHILES

E.O. 12865: Y6/6/85 (BOVIS, H. EUGENE) OR-P

TAGS/ ENRG, PEPR, SA, US, OREP

SUBJECT: (U) CONVERSATION BETWEEN SENATOR CHILES AND CROWN PRINCE FAHD: FAHD'S VIEWS ON OIL.

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SENATOR LAWTON CHILES HAD AUDIENCES WITH CROWN PRINCE FAHD ON JUNE 4 LASTING MORE THAN TWO HOURS. MEETING WAS ALSO ATTENDED BY CHARGE, POL COUNSELOR, AND STAFF AIDES JORDAN AND COLLINS. THREE BASIC SUBJECTS WERE COVERED: MIDDLE EASTPEACE, SAUDI SECURITY, AND SAG ROLE IN DETERMINING OIL PRICING AND PRODUCTION. THE FIRST TWO SUBJECTS ARE REPORTED BY SEPTEL.

5 OCT 78

6 352

SECRET 8252 OCT 78 STAFF

CITT TEL AVIV 83

TO: TEHRAN INQUIRY FOR

WNINTEL INTEL

REF: TEHRAN 5438 (NIT-3750)

1. WITH STATION CONFERENCE WISH TO PASS REF ON
MISSION OF PASDARAN IN ISRAELI LIAISON SOURCED TO A
RELIABLE SOURCE.

2. NO FILE. RW 4 OCT 89 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET

BT
#9783

SECRET 251342Z SEP 79 DEPT STATE TELAF 008

STC TELAF 29787 SECTION 1 OF 4

TO WASHINGTON INFO TEHRAN

FROM MEXICO

SUBJECT: WINTEL PGI - DISCUSSION ON IRAN

THE FOLLOWING IS A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE LIAISON ON IRAN. THE STABILITY OF THE REGIME WHICH THEY WOULD LIKE TO GAIN AS A BASIS FOR A DISCUSSION BETWEEN OUR EXPERTS ON IRAN AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. LIAISON IS INTERESTED IN OUR ANALYSIS OF REACTION AND COMMENTS REGARDING THE POINTS AND ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD IN THE REPORT. WE WILL AS THEIR RESPONSE TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS RAISED AT THE END OF THE REPORT. THE ACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISCUSSION ARE TO BE WORKED OUT IN WASHINGTON. ZECOMPOD/16 HAS RECEIVED A MESSAGE REGARDING THIS REPORT. (REAR TEXT)

MAIN POINTS

THE REVOLUTION IN IRAN, WHICH DEPOSED THE SHAH AND BROUGHT KHOMEINI AND HIS EXTREMIST RELIGIOUS CAMP TO POWER, HAS NOT YET RUN ITS COURSE. THE KHOMEINI REGIME IS IN THE MIDDLE OF AN EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATE ITS HOLD ON THE GOVERNMENT AND TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE REVOLUTION BY CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS, AND NOW SUFFICIENTLY STRONG OPPOSITION HAS ARISEN SO FAR WHICH COULD CHECK KHOMEINI. THUS, THE MOMENTUM OF CONSOLIDATING THE REVOLUTION IS CONTINUING. HOWEVER, THE PROCESSES WITH WHICH THE REGIME IS STRUGGLING--SUCH AS DIFFICULTIES IN THE FUNCTIONING OF THE GOVERNMENT, ECONOMIC DISRUPTIONS, SEPARATIST FERMENT AND BUDDING DISOBEDIENCE AND RESISTANCE EVEN WITHIN THE ARMY--ROSE A THREAT TO THE LONG-TERM STABILITY OF THE REGIME. THE FACT THAT KHOMEINI IS AN OLD HAND AT THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE OUTCOME OF HIS PRESENT EFFORT TO ESTABLISH AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AND INSTITUTIONALIZE IT.

CLASS--SECRET--W/INTEL--W/FOUO--NO CONTRACT--OR COM

IRAN/SSR

MEMBERSHIP OF KURDISH DELEGATION TO THE SOVIET UNION
(DATE: EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979)

MEMBER OF A PROMINENT KURDISH LEADERS. HIS
LONG-STANDING TIES TO KURDISH NATIONALIST LEADERS,
PRESENT CONTACTS WITH THESE KURDISH LEADERS,
HOWEVER, ARE LIMITED AND HIS INFORMATION HAS
TUS FAR BEEN UNSUBSTANTIATED BY OTHER REPORTS.
SOURCE'S REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN
ESTABLISHED.

SIX-MAN DELEGATION OF KURDISH REPRESENTING BOTH
KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND OTHER KURDISH FACTIONS IN
IRAN TRAVELLED TO MOSCOW IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979 TO
WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS ABOUT SECURITY AND COORDINATE
THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN IRAN. THE
POSITION OF THE DELEGATION IS UNKNOWN, BUT IT DOES NOT
ALIAS AND OF THE MAJOR FIGURES IN THE IRANIAN KURDISH
MOVEMENT, MANY OF WHOM ARE NOW IN IRAN. THE
DELEGATION DOES, HOWEVER, HAVE THE MAJORITY OF THESE
LEADERS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY AND MEANS OF SOVIET
POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND ARMS SUPPORT FOR THEIR MOVEMENT
THE TURNS TO THE SOVIET UNION IS, IN PART, A REFLECTION OF
THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO HOLD KURDISH PERCENTAGE OF GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN AND
MOVEMENTS HAVE DECIDED TO BACK THE KURDISH MOVEMENT TO OBTAIN THE
EXTERNAL SUPPORT THEY NEED TO SECURE AUTONOMY WITHIN THE
IRANIAN STATE.

ACR: (18 SEPTEMBER 1979)

3. FIELD DISSEM: SEND TO ANKARA, ISTANBUL AND

TEHRAN

FOR CLASS SECRET-WAR NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-N
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY
NATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION

S E C R E T 251532Z SEP 79 STAFF
CHIEF STUTTGART 17937 SECTION 1 OF
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, BONN INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL
WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA CATOMIC
REF: BONN 84660 (NOTAL)

1. KEITH L. TOHLERNY HAD INTRODUCED T/19 TO A MEETING WITH CATOMIC/19
(T/19) 20 SEPTEMBER 1979 AT 1830 HOURS IN ROOM 1085 COLOGNE INTERCO
TINENTAL, AS ARRANGED. MEETING LASTED FOR ALMOST FOUR HOURS.
AND T/19 WAS PAID DM 7500 FOR PERIOD MAY 1979 THROUGH SEPTEMBER
1979 AT RATE OF DM 1500 MONTHLY "FOR EXPENSES" FOR WHICH HE SIGNED
HAND RECEIPT IN USUAL ALIAS. IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT MEETINGS WOULD
CONTINUE FOR THREE MONTH TRIAL PERIOD, I.E., OCTOBER THROUGH
DECEMBER, WITH DM 1500 MONTHLY AS "EXPENSES". THE NEXT MEETING
WILL BE ON 27 SEPTEMBER. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS WERE APPARENT.

2. ATMOSPHERE: TOHLERNY BEGAN BY EMPHASIZING HIS AGE
(SLIGHTLY INCREASED) AND HIS LONG BACKGROUND IN AREA, POINTING
OUT THAT HE HAD VISITED KURDISTAN, HAD KNOWLEDGE OF KURDISH
HISTORY, ETC. HE THEN ADDED THAT HE WAS GOING TO TALK TO T/19
LIKE A FATHER WHEN NECESSARY AND THAT IT WOULD BE FOR T/19'S OWN
GOOD. HE THEN STARTED TO QUESTION T/19 ON HIS SERIOUSNESS ABOUT
KURDISH PROBLEMS, GENTLY POINTING OUT THAT T/19 HAD HAD LITTLE TO
DO WITH KURDISH NATIONALISM DURING HIS ADULT LIFE AND AT THE SAME
TIME PRAISING T/19'S FATHER AND HIS CAREER. TOHLERNY CLOSED THE
INTRODUCTION BY NOTING HIS PERSONAL REGARD FOR THE KURDS AND
SYMPATHY FOR T/19'S DESIRE TO ASSIST HIS PEOPLE. ALL THIS WAS WELL-
RECEIVED BY T/19.

3. GOALS: TOHLERNY THEN RAISED QUESTION OF WHAT HE WANTS FROM
T/19. DESPITE T/19'S DESIRES, WE HAVE NO INTENTION AT THIS TIME OF
ASSISTING KURDISH NATIONALISM WITH ARMS OR MONEY AND T/19 MUST
BE AWARE OF THE REASONS FOR THIS. FURTHERMORE, WE DID NOT WANT
T/19 TO RETURN "BLACK" TO KURDISTAN, EVEN FOR VISIT AS THAT WOULD
POSSIBLY CREATE MORE PROBLEMS FOR EVERYONE. HE COULD BEST SERVE
HIS COUNTRY BY SUPPLYING ACCURATE INFORMATION ON WHAT WAS

JUL 7 1979

SECRET 114002 JUL 79 (ACTING)
CITE FR LOS ANGELES 20589

TO: PRIORITY TEHRAN INFO D...
UNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORRES

REFS: A. FR LOS ANGELES 20581
B. FR LOS ANGELES 20583

1. FINAL BRIEF MEET WITH SD... (T/I) ON 9 JULY
RESULTED IN T/I ADVISING THAT HE NOT DEPARTING LOS ANGELES
UNTIL 15 JULY. ALL MEETING ARRANGEMENTS REMAIN THE SAME.
REASON FOR DELAY WAS CALL FROM T/I'S CLOSEST FRIENDS
WHO ADVISED HIS FATHER HAD JUST ARRIVED FROM TEHRAN. FATHER,
GENERAL (POLICE) FNU S H A H R... T A N I WAS RECENTLY
RETIRED BY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WHEN HE BECAME 55. THIS
MAN IS ONE OF THREE COUSINS; ANOTHER WITH SAME FAMILY NAME
AS THE RECENT MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER POSITIONS
AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 3 REF B. T/I HE WAS MOST RECENTLY TH
CHIEF OF THE HIGHWAY PATROL. MORE IMPORTANTLY HE IS CLOSE FRIE
OF THE PRESENT CHIEF OF POLICE. T/I WAS INVITED FOR DINNER
REF B AS FRIEND OF T/I FAMILY. T/I WAS INVITED FOR DINNER
ON 8 JULY, HE WANTED TO POSTPONE DEPARTURE UNTIL NEXT IRAN AIR
FLIGHT SO HE WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO REQUEST LETTER OF INTRO-
DUCTION AND RECOMMENDATION FROM SHIRAZI TO THE POLICE CHIEF

2. T/I SAW NO PROBLEM IN MAKING HIS FIRST CAR PICKUP
ON 20 JULY AND WILL BE AT SITE

3. FILE# 201-0961045. RW# 20199 DRV D9C-1. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

S E C R E T 251858Z JUL 79 STAFF

28 JUL 79

CITE DIRECTOR 482379.

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN INFO FR/LOS ANGELES.

WNINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTRANSIT

- REFS: A. TEHRAN 53785
- B. FR/LOS ANGELES 28581
- C. TEHRAN 53586

1. SUBJECT REF A WHO CALLED IS SDTRANSIT/1. FOLLOWING WAS CONTACT PLAN:

A. TELEPHONE COMM: E/I WILL CALL STATION OPS NUMBER 838399 EPT 838399 AND WILL SAY "BE, THIS IS MIKE, CAN I SPEAK TO CHARLES". WHEN CHARLES COMES ON PHONE HE WILL EXCHANGE IDENTITIES AND THEN MENTION THEY SHOULD GET TOGETHER FOR COFFEE OR TEA. THE PLACE OF CONTACT WILL BE CAR PICKUP SITE LISTED BELOW. ANY OTHER PLACE MENTIONED BY EITHER PARTY IS MEANINGLESS AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED BECAUSE IF INCLUDED IS ONLY FOR CONVERSATION PURPOSES. THE DATE/TIME CAN BE SUGGESTED BY EITHER PARTY AND WORKED OUT ON THE PHONE. NO MATTER WHAT AGREED, THE DATE/TIME WILL BE TWO DAYS AND TWO HOURS PRIOR TO TIME AGREED UPON; I.E., IF IT AGREED MONDAY NIGHT AT 2200 HOURS, THE CAR PICKUP WOULD BE SATURDAY NIGHT AT 2200 HOURS. IN EVENT STATION SHOULD WANT TO CALL T/1, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE PRE-ARRANGED BY SW OR AT PERSONAL MEETING. TIME OF CALL WILL BE BASED ON SAME TWO/TWO SYSTEM. IF E/I IS ADVISED THAT HE WILL BE CALLED, DATE AND TIME MUST BE GIVEN. HE WILL ARRANGE TO BE AT HIS PARENTS HOME AT TIME CALL EXPECTED. HIS NUMBER TO CALL IS T/1 A AND CALLER SHOULD ASK FOR IDEN. THE BEST IF CALL MADE IN PERSI.

B. CAR PICKUP: T/1 HAS REQUESTED THAT FIRST DAY OF HIS CAR PICKUP BE 29 JULY BUT 28 JULY AT 2100 WITH ALTERNATE OF HIS 2200 HOURS. IF THIS CONTACT NOT MADE HE WILL REVERT TO HIS AND 15TH OF EACH SUBSEQUENT MONTH. USING WESTERN CALENDAR HIS WILL BE SAME CAR PICKUP SITE ALWAYS USING 2100 AND 2200 HOURS. HE WILL WAIT AT SITE FOR MAXIMUM OF TEN MINUTES. T/1 WILL

90 OCT 79 12 58z

C R 3 T 091206Z OCT 79 STAFF

BONN 8504

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, C

INTEL AJAJA SDFICKLE

091206Z OCT 79

IL

1. SDFICKLE HAS RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP TO TURKISH IRANIAN KURDISTAN. FELTHOUSE CONTACTED HIM ON THE EVENING OF 9 OCT AND SET UP A DEBRIEFING SESSION FOR 9 OCT IN DUE COURSE.
2. ONE OF THE REASONS SDFICKLE'S RETURN WAS THAT HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY IRANIAN (MILITARY) AUTHORITIES IN SALMAZ (SHAMR) AND DETAINED FOR FOUR DAYS. HE WAS ACCUSED OF ILLEGALLY CROSSING THE TURKISH-IRANIAN BORDER AND FAILING TO HAVE LEGAL DOCUMENTS. SDFICKLE SAID THAT HE HAD LEFT TURKEY FOR PURPOSE IN TURKEY. FORTUNATELY, THE LOCAL JUDGE AND THE AUTHORITIES IN IRAN WERE KURDS AND FRIENDS OF SDFICKLE'S FATHER. BEFORE, LET HIM GO. A NEWS ITEM ENTITLED "SON OF CHAM ARRESTED" APPEARED IN THE TEHRAN DAILY "KEYHAN," NO. 11, DATED 18 SEPT. WE ARE FORWARDING THE NEWSPAPER CLIPPING CONCERNING SDFICKLE'S ARREST TO HQS VIA TM NUMBER 4.
3. RESULTS OF THE DEBRIEFING SESSION WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. FILE: 096095L. RVN 09 OCT 79 DRV 0901.

S E R I E S

13 SEP 75 5

SECRET 122304Z SEP 75 STAFF

THE DIRECTOR 512252.

PRIORITY WESTPORT AND PRIORITY GERMAN COMMUNICE.
ROUTINE TEHRAN, ANKARA

INTEL HIBAT AJAJA

OP A. WESPORT 48618
B. DIRECTOR 31148

1. FOLLOWING ARE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR USE WITH SUBJ
(201-872561):

A. WHAT SUPPORT IF ANY ARE THE IRAQI KURDS GIVING THE
IRANIAN KURDISH GROUPS. WHAT EFFECTS ARE THE KURDISH DISTURBANCES
HAVING ON THE IRAQI ARABIC COMMUNITY. SPECIFIC REPORTING ON IRAQI-
KURDISH OBJECTIVES FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS OF INTEREST AND, IF
POSSIBLE, SOME KIND OF APPRAISAL OF HOW REALISTIC THESE OBJECTIVES
ARE AS WELL AS DETAILS OF KURDISH PLANS TO OBTAIN AUTONOMY, ETC.

B. OMITTING BARZANI'S, WOULD INCLUDE AS WELL AS BIO
DATA OF ALL KDP LEADERS WE CAN PROVIDE.

C. SOURCE'S COMMENTS ON POSSIBILITY THAT BARZANI AND
TALABANI FACTIONS WILL MERGE, PLUS DETAILS OF ANY RECENT MEETINGS
BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS AND A RUN DOWN OF ANY POSSIBLE SUPPORT THEY
MAY BE EXTENDING TO EACH OTHER.

D. DETAILS OF ANY POSSIBLE LIAISON BETWEEN THE KDP AND
THE IRAQI SHU'ABA GROUPS.

E. DETAILS ON NUMBER OF KURDISH FORCES, WHERE CAMPS ARE
LOCATED AND COMMENT ON HOW WELL ARMED THEY ARE, AS WELL AS ANY INFO
THEY GETTING OUTSIDE'S REPORT AND IF SO WHAT TYPE.

F. WHAT IF ANY SUPPORT ARE THE KDP OR TALABANI FACTIONS
GETTING FROM THE KRG OR I GOVERNMENT.

G. DETAILS PLUS DOCUMENTATION OF CHARGES THAT SOVIETS ARE

SECRET 120802Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE REF: 124219

TO: DIRECTOR.

WNA/INTEL (LWSHELL OR) (LSTER)

REF: DIRECTOR 51-173

1. WE CANNOT RECALL SEEING INTELL REPORTS OF SOVIET MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE PANIAN KURC'S ALLUDE TO PARA SIX REF. SUCH REPORTING F IDENTIFIED FOR US AND MAY BE REQUEST SENT. HERE IF NOT ALREADY

2. CREDIBLE REPORTING OF SUCH SUPPORT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE IDEAL FOR USE WITH SDPLD/1. IF NOT BEING WITH HEAVY IS NOT IMMINENT, MATERIAL MIGHT BE USED PENDING ON ATTRIBUTION) WITH SDURN/1, SDORCK/1 OR SDTRAMP/1.

3. NO FILE. *RUM 15SEP99 DRW 90

SECRET

4 JUL 79

INFO

SECRET 040310Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 408751

TO: PARIS INFO TEHRAN

WNINTEL RYBAT

REF: PARIS 11231

1. BAKHTIAR WAS IN BITTING CONTACT WITH SEVERAL TACTICAL OFFICERS DURING THE EARLY 1980'S. FOR OBVIOUS REASONS WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE RE-ESTABLISHING THAT CONTACT AT THIS TIME OR ANOTHER OF BAKHTIAR'S EARLIER CASE OFFICERS MIGHT BE ABLE TO TALK TO TDR PARIS. WOULD WELCOME STATION'S COMMENT ON HOW THIS MIGHT BEST BE BROUGHT ABOUT.

2. HAVE INFORMED STATE OF OUR INTEREST IN CONTACTING BAKHTIAR AND OBTAINED THEIR CONCURRENCE. ACCORDINGLY, AM. SADOR MAY BE BRIEFED IF AND AS STATION DEEMS DESIRABLE.

3. FILE: 201-0082201. PVW 05 AUG 89 DRV D90T ALL SECRET.

SECRET
BT
5562

5 SEP 79

E C R E T 02356Z SEP 79 STAFF

ITE DIRECTOR 507357.

O: TEHRAN.

MINTEL INTEL

REF: DIRECTOR 504035

1. FOLLOWING OBTAINED BY CUMMISKY AND GIBROFF IN REF MEETING 29 AUGUST AND DISSEMINATED TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS UNDERSTANDERS ONLY AS FIRDB-312/02101-79 31 AUGUST:

WITH REGARD TO HIS OWN PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN OPPOSITION PLANNING, IDEN REP (SUBJECT) SAID THAT HE ONLY RECENTLY HAD RESUMED AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN IRANIAN POLITICS. HE HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR AND INVITED TO MEETINGS. SUBJECT CLAIMS ALSO TO HAVE RECEIVED AN INVITATION FROM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO TRAVEL TO FRANCE FOR TALKS WITH THAT GOVERNMENT. SUBJECT HAS BEEN IN PERIODIC CONTACT WITH ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE U.S. FROM WHOM HE DID NOT IDENTIFY. SINCE HIS ARRIVAL HERE AND HAS BEEN TOLD TO EXPECT CONTACT FROM AN ISRAELI OFFICIAL SERVING IN THE U.S. FROM LONDON ON 1 SEPTEMBER. SUBJECT IMPLIED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS HELD ALONG IN ITS CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR IRAN. HE HAS CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR THE ISRAELIS STEMMING FROM HIS DEALINGS WITH THEM AND MILITARY COMMANDER IN IRAN. SUBJECT DENIES THAT HE HAS ANY CONTACTS OR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SHAH SINCE SUBJECT'S DEPARTURE FROM IRAN, ALTHOUGH HE DID ONCE RECEIVE A PHONE CALL FROM EMPRESS FARAH DIBA.

ADDED FOLLOWING COMMENT FROM SDENOM S/1: SUBJECT WAS HURT THAT THE SHAH NEVER REWIND TO CONTACT HIM IN THE U.S. AND AS A RESULT HAS BEEN BITTER TOWARD HIM. ACCORDING TO DENOMOUS/1, SUBJECT HAS NOT RECEIVED ANY FUNDS FROM THE SHAH OR THE SHAH'S FAMILY. END DISSEM.

18 SEP 79 03

TELETYPE 111533Z SEP 79 ST FF
TELETYPE 43721. SECTION 1 OF 2
DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, TEHRAN
NINTEL RYBAT AJ AJA SDSTAY.

EPS: A. DIRECTOR 602044
B. PARIS 11937 320 498

1. GUNION MET SDSTAY IN PARIS ON 6 AND 7 SEPTEMBER.
INITIAL CONTACT MADE ON 5 SEPTEMBER BY INTERNAL (HOUSE) PEOPLE
AT PARIS RESIDENCE WHERE HE STAYING. THERE WAS NO OTHER PEOPLE
CONTACT. AT FIRST FACE-TO-FACE MEETING HE SAID HAD TOLD NO ONE
OF MEETING, NOT EVEN BAKHTIAR. HE WAS ONLY AVAILABLE FOR MEETING
ON 6 SEPT BUT ON 7 SEPT THERE FOUR SESSION WAS HELD IN HIS ROOM.
GUNION'S ORIGINAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SDSTAY WAS IN FARSI, BUT THESE
CONVERSATIONS WERE IN FRENCH IN WHICH SDSTAY FLUENT. SDSTAY
IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED GUNION NAME AND WAS DELIGHTED TO BE
CONTACTED.

2. SDSTAY SAID THAT DURING BAKHTIAR PREMIERSHIP HE WAS
LIAISON WITH KHOMENI AND WAS FORCED TO LEAVE WHEN BAKHTIAR
GOVERNMENT FELL. HE SAID THAT BAKHTIAR WAS FRENCH PEOPLE
PROTECTION BUT HE, SDSTAY, DOES NOT AND PARES ASSASSINATION
ATTEMPT. HE HAS BEEN IN FRANCE SINCE FEBRUARY 79 WITH SON
AND YOUNG SON WHO LEFT IRA WITH HIS TWO ELDER DAUGHTERS
WERE ALREADY IN UNIVERSITY IN PARIS AND SON IN UNIVERSITY OF
LAUSANNE. HE HAS VILLA AT CANNES AND HAS LIVED THERE SINCE
FEBRUARY.

3. SDSTAY WAS TOLD THAT GUNION CONTACT WAS OFFICIAL AND
NOT PERSONAL, BUT CONTACT IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO SUBJECT. SDSTAY
TOLD THAT USG IRANIAN POLICE WAS RECEIVING HIGH LEVEL INFORMATION
AND THAT INFORMATION WAS WANTED IN TERMS AND ACTION IN ALL
POLITICAL GROUPS, HENCE THIS APPROACH TO HIM.

4. SDSTAY, WHO DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS BAKHTIAR ENEMY
AND POLITICAL STRATEGIST, SAY LEADERS AND BAKHTIAR
ANALYZED IRANIAN SITUATION IN TERMS OF ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL

15 SEP 75 262

SECRET 141612Z SEP 79 STAFF
CITE PARIS 12390 SECTION 1 OF 2.
TO: DIRECTOR INFO GENEVA, TEHRAN
WNI TEL RYBAT AJAJA SDUPBEAT
REF: PARIS 10928

RECENTLY, CRAMBES RECEIVED THROUGH THE MAIL A COPY OF A PUBLICATION CALLED, "IRAN LIBERATION", WRITTEN IN FRENCH (A COPY BEING POUCHED UNDER TM 562890 AND 562895). ENVELOPE HEAD LINE RETURN ADDRESS, ONLY SDUPBEAT'S NAME. THINKING THAT SDUPBEAT MAY BE IN CONTACT WITH BAHHTIAR (IN FACT WE AT FIRST THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE BAHHTIAR'S PUBLICATION), STATION DECIDED TO RECONTACT SDUPBEAT. THIS WAS DONE BY CRAMBES AND AN HOUR-AND-A-HALF MEETING WAS HELD ON 12 SEPTEMBER.

FIRST, SDUPBEAT'S PERSONAL SITUATION: HE WAS OFFICIALLY BROKEN AWAY FROM PRESENT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, REFUSED TO RETURN TO IRAN WHEN DIRECTLY ORDERED BY THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF. AS A RESULT, IRANIAN AMBASSADOR LOCKED HIM OUT OF HIS OFFICE AND ORDERED HIM TO VACATE HIS APARTMENT AND RETURN CAR, BOTH PROPERTY OF EMBASSY. SDUPBEAT, TO DATE, HAS REFUSED TO MOVE AND TOLD CRAMBES HE INTENDS TO HIRE LAWYER AND PROCEDURE MAY WELL TAKE YEAR OR MORE TO SETTLE. HE INTENDS RETURN CAR, EVEN THOUGH STRIPPED OF HIS DIPLOMATIC STATUS. SDUPBEAT MAKES IT A POINT TO ATTEND MANY MILITARY DIPLOMATIC FUNCTIONS TO WHICH HE STILL RECEIVES OFFICIAL INVITATIONS SENT TO HIS HOME. FOR EXAMPLE, ON 12 SEPTEMBER HE AND HIS WIFE ATTENDED PARTY GIVEN FOR NEW YUGOSLAV MILITARY ATTACHE. CRAMBES NOTICED THAT SDUPBEAT WAS GIVEN A VERY COOL RECEPTION BY THE CHIEF OF THE MILITARY PROTOCOL OFFICE, BUT OTHER DIPLOMATS SEEMED TO ENJOY TALKING TO HIM. HE ADMITTED THAT FINANCES ARE A BIG PROBLEM. EVEN IF HE DOES NOT MOVE OUT OF APARTMENT, HE WILL HAVE TO PAY RENT, MUST BUY NEW CAR, AND AS HE PUTS HIS FRIENDS WHO HAVE BEEN HELPING HIM FOR PAST SIX MONTHS MAY BE GETTING TIRED OF LOANING HIM MONEY. HIS

C R E T 311611Z AUG 79 STAFF

LONDON 1728Z

AUG 79 1432

DIRECTOR INFO PARIS, TEHRAN.

INTEL AJAJA SDFACE INTEL

LONDON 17051

1. ON 31 AUGUST, SDFACE/1 REP
OF BAKHTIAR ORGANIZATION IN LON
IRAL NASIR DJAHANBANY. SDFACE/1
LEADER" BY WEAT SDFACE/1 CALLS TI
REF.

HE HAD IDENTIFIED
IS TWO-STAR
BANYAN" WAS SELECTED
GROUP", DESCRIBED

2. ACCORDING TO THESE SAME SOUR
BEING ESTABLISHED IN SWEDEN, GERM
AS IN THE U.K. AND FRANCE. BIG
A BANK ACCOUNT HAS BEEN OPENE
MADE TO WEALTHY IRANIANS TO COME
HOTEL SOURCES THAT FORMER WAS
SHAH AND ASKED HIM TO CONTRIBU
D TO MAKE ANY CONTRIBUTION WEAS

ETIAR ORGANIZATIONS
SWITZERLAND, AS
T PRESENT TIME IS
AND AN APPEAL HAS
SDFACE/1 WAS TOLD
EMBASSY NOR ZAHEDI
SEH REPORTEDLY

3. AS RESULT OF MONEY PROBLEMS
OF GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE HAS BEEN POSTED
ABLE TO HACK UP ANNOUNCEMENT WITH
AND PROPAGANDA. FOR SAME REASON, LON
HAS ALSO BEEN POSTPONED. THERE WILL
SPEECHES, HOWEVER. (DJAHANBANY ATTEN
SDFACE/1 HAS ALSO HEARD RUMOR THAT (U
THE PRESENT IRANIAN REGIME ARE TALKING
IRAN EMBASSY HERE. THIS TALK SOUND
AMONG PEOPLE NEWLY CAUGHT UP IN ORGANIZ

S ANNOUNCEMENT
RESOURCES ARE
ATE PUBLICITY
REPORTED IN REF
IDE PART SUNDAY
ES ON 2 AUGUST.)
OD OPONENTS OF
STACING THE
OLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
CTIVITY.

4. DESPITE THE MONEY PROBLEM, THE
A SMALL-SCALE CHARITY PROGRAM.
ASKED ONE OF THE HOTEL GROUP IF HE
IN NEED OF MONEY. CONTACT SAYS THAT BIC

ATION HERE HAS
HIMSELF WAS
IRANIAN SEPARATELY
TO PROVIDE

E C T 1555Z SEP 79 STAFF
ITR PARIS 1 14
O: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.
NINTENAJAU G LGRENADE
EF: PARIS 9 63,

1. MASSA GHAZI, IRANIAN LEFTIST WHO ST U
FFICE URIN EKILE IN PARIS AND WHO HQS PLACE
ONNECT ON W H DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS ESPECIALLY
CURRENT Y IS WING IN TEHRAN. PER REF, GHAZI
OR HOW MAY I TO OBSERVE SITUATION THERE BUT
IS STAY

2. ACCOR NG TO GHAZI'S FRIEND, PAUL BALTA
EWSPAI F 'CO RESPONDENT, GHAZI HAS DECIDED
NDEFIN ELY BECAUSE HIS SOI IN HIS LATE TENS
EHRAN. BAL TOLD THIS TO G LGRENADE/1 IN MID
OLIDAY NC I SPAIN. BALTA SAID THAT HE SW G
HERE G AZI I VISITED FOR SETTLING SOME PPA
ETURNE TEH N AFTER ONLY 'EV DATS.

ARCHITECTURAL
INDICATED HAD
N SOUTH AMERICA,
ENT TO TEHRAN
HEN PROLONGED

LE MONDE
N TEHRAN
NSISTS ON LI ING
JULY 1979 WHI E
ZI IN PARIS
S AND THEN

3. BALTA AND THAT GHAZI PREFERRED LIVING
EACH FOR EDUCATING HIS SON AN WA
NFLUEN NG E S SON TO RETURN PARIS FOR SCHOOL
ONG AS HIS W DESIRED BEI G INVOLVED IN
E NEAR HIM. SHOULD GHAZI GAIN RETURN TO RES
RE AS EED G LGRENADE/1 CAN RENEW CONTACT
ACCESS C CH I VIA PARIS I STYMIED.

RIS OR AT
HOPEFUL OF
G. HOWEVER, AS
HAZI WANTED O
ENCE IN PARI WE
R PRESENT

4. FILE: 291-0960213. RVW 24 SEP 99 RV
OS CO ENT: ELAYED INFO T ERAN PER DIR 5122
N C ENT
BT
9563

C.1

PPJ - LA
L-C

6 OCT 79 U 192

SECRET 05 218Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUC

FROM BRUSSELS 7344

TO WASHINGTON INFO TEHRAN.

INFO: NE/IRAN INFO E/BNL/B

SUBJECT: UNINTEL INTEL AJAJA SDPRAW

SDPRAW/1 PROVIDED FOLLOWING INFORMATION AT 3 OCTOBER MEETING:

A. P/1'S FORMER BRUSSELS COLLEAGUE IN KADRAN WHO WAS ASSIGNED PARIS HAS BEEN RECALLED TO TEHRAN. P/1 SPOKE WITH KADRAN AND SAID RECALL WAS SOMEWHAT UNEXPECTED, BUT KADRAN THOUGH HE WOULD EVENTUALLY BE REASSIGNED OVERSEAS. HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN ARE STILL IN EUROPE BECAUSE CHILDREN ARE ATTENDING SCHOOL. PER P/1, KADRAN PLANS TO LEAVE FAMILY IN EUROPE UNTIL HE IS REASSIGNED.

B. P/1 SAID HE LEARNED FROM FRIENDS THAT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IS SENDING SECURITY TYPES TO EMBASSIES TO MONITOR DIPLOMATS' ACTIVITIES. P/1 SAID THEY EASILY RECOGNIZABLE BECAUSE THEY USUALLY EAT AND APPEAR OUT OF PLACE AT EMBASSY. P/1 COULD NOT CONFIRM SECURITY TYPE HAS ARRIVED BRUSSELS. DOES HQS HAVE ANY INDICATION IRANIAN GOVT HAS SENT SUCH INDIVIDUALS OVERSEAS?

C. SHAHOUR BAKHTIAR HAS ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT IRANIAN MISSION IN BELGIUM (THOUGH NOT P/1) FOR SUPPORT. P/1 EXPLAINED BAKHTIAR NOT LOOKING FOR MONEY AS HE RECEIVING FUNDS FROM SHAH'S INTEREST. BUT WANTS MORAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT. P/1 UNAWARE OF BAKHTIAR'S FUTURE PLANS ARE.

D. MEHDI CHAMRAN, NEW DEFENSE MINISTER, HAS LONG-TIME RELATIONSHIP WITH PLO. PER P/1, CHAMRAN SPENT TEN YEARS BEFORE REVOLUTION IN PLO MILITARY CAMPS IN MIDDLE EAST BEFORE RETURNING TO IRAN AFTER SHAH DEPOSED. P/1 LABELLED HIM LEFTIST, BUT COULD NOT DESCRIBE HIS POWER BASE OR RELATIONSHIP WITH KHOMENI. P/1 DID NOT KNOW CHAMRAN'S BROTHER, MOSTAFA.

DISPATCH

Chief, Near East Division
Chief, Persian Division
OS, Tehran

Cases of ... Paris
FORWARDING COPIES OF IRANIAN ...

WARNING NOTICE - INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

1. Attached are two copies (1 for ... JULY 1957
... of the National Union's publication ...
appears in Paris daily in Paris ...
are unable to read the publication ...
understand from IDEM who gave us these ...
bulletin is a compendium of the most newsworthy ...
events in Iran supplied by travelers, and ...
and letters from Iran.

2. We recommend that ... screen the ...
for information of possible political interests ...
opponents, or operational interest to Tehran, ...
other stations.

3. We recommend that ... screen the ...
for potential value of an outlet for material ...
of Perspectives, and retain it as ...
use in support of grey or black propaganda ...
The publication was discussed with ...
visit to Paris.

ERNEST W. ...

Attachment: as stated, w/c
u/s/c

- 1 - Addressee, w/c att h/v; idem u/s/c
- 1 - C. BUR, w/o att h/v; idem u/s/c
- 1 - CO, Tehran, w/c att h/v; idem u/s/c

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

OPAA-7147

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DATE: ... 1957
NO. FILED: ...
201 9 9 57

SECRET 21214 SEP 73 STAFF
CITY DIRECTOR 5100

TO: IMMEDIATE AIRS 1400 ROUTE 1000
WINTEL AKAJASDLSIPERT

REF: A. IIRAN 54747
B. TAPS 14307
C. DIRECTOR 495

TARGET: PAKA 6 REF [REDACTED] AND TIMKEN'S PROGRESS AGAINST IRANIAN
BEYOND PERMETERS WHOSE PROPOSAL GOES CONSIDERABLY
WHILE [REDACTED] WILLING CONSIDER, HOWEVER.

SOURCE: [REDACTED] INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHMENT FI REPORTING
SHIRAZI COMMUNIST GROUP AS QOM OR NAJIF AND AMONG LEBANESE
TROOPED THROUGH [REDACTED] WOULD BE NECESSARY DO SO UNDER VERY CON-
(S/L) APPLYING [REDACTED] THIS WOULD NOT INCLUDE SDSLIPPERT/1'S
OPERATION IS [REDACTED] PRINCIPAL AGENT. OUR AIM RE DEVELOPING S/1
WHICH WE WOULD LIKE [REDACTED] WILL ACT AS SPOTTER TO TARGETS OF INTEREST
WE ARE WILLING TO MEET, ASSESS, VET AND DEVELOP AS FI SOURCES.
DEVELOP [REDACTED] COMPENSATE HIM FOR THIS WORK WHEN SUCH LEADS
INTELLIGENCE [REDACTED] SOURCES OF INFORMATION HE PROVIDES IS USABLE
ARRANGEMENTS [REDACTED] OF COURSE, RECOGNIZE THAT SECURING S/1'S
THAT [REDACTED] SUCH LIMITED COMMITMENT ON OUR PART EASIER SAID
(AND [REDACTED] THAT S/1 VERY MUCH LOOKING FOR MORE FORMALIZED
INT [REDACTED] ARRANGEMENT, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT IN OUR BEST
HOW TO ENTER INTO SUCH COMMITMENT.

EQS WILLING TO PROVIDE REIMBURSEMENT TO S/1 FOR SERVICES
DURING PAST THREE MONTHS SUCH AS INTRODUCTIONS TO SD-
[REDACTED] AND JAVAD AL-AMIR AND APPROVE PARA 7 REF B PROPOSAL
S/1 US\$1,000 FOR THIS WORK. WE ALSO WILLING APPROVE SIMILAR
[REDACTED] FOR FUTURE SERVICES OF SAME NATURE. REMAINDER OF PARA 6
REF B PROPOSAL NOT APPROVED. WE ARE ALSO UNABLE APPROVE AT THIS
[REDACTED] S/1'S PROPOSED TRIP TO MID-EAST UNTIL S/1 ABLE PROVIDE US
WITH IDENTITIES PROSPECTIVE CONTACTS AND REASON BELIEVE THAT
THOSE CONTACTS WILL DEVELOP INTO PRODUCTIVE ASSETS. AGAIN.

JCN

1

E C E 212 312 312 312

ITE DIRECTOR. 89,

OD: TERN.

UNINTEL JAJ SDSM, 9PRT

REF: DIRECTOR 18662

1. YDE A: IMMIGRANT, U E A N I, PARIS RESIDENT WHO
CLAIMS SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP SHI'A COMMUNITY IN EUROPE.
LOEN SA: ATTEMPTED SADEER R U E A N I OF QOM.

2. FILE: 201-0961724. RVW 21SEP99 DRV D9C.1

AL SECRET

S E O E P
BY

SECRET 031100 MAY 79 STAFF

PARIS 09834

TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR.

EL AJAJA SDFORGIVE UNTRONT

UNTRONT/1 MET WITH SON OF SDF...
DURING THE MEETING, SDFORGIVE/1
INFORMATION TO UNTRONT/1.

ON 2 APRIL
PASSED THE FOLLOW-

SOMETIME AROUND THE IRANIAN...
TRONT/1), SDFORGIVE/1 WAS ARRESTED...
APPROXIMATELY HALF AN HOUR BY THE...
KHALKHALE, A MULLA. (COMMENT...
KHALKHALE'S FIRST NAME. BUT...
SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE...
SEARCHED IT AND TOOK SOME PAPER...
SDFORGIVE/1 AND HIS DAUGHTER, AND...
TOOK THE EQUIVALENT OF USD...
AND USD 7,000 BELONGING TO THE...
HIGH-LEVEL MEMBERS OF THE...
GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING EDHOR...
ED TO SDFORGIVE/1 AND INDICATED...
RETURNED. KHALKHALE WAS STRIPPED...
BUT WAS GIVEN ANOTHER...
SDFORGIVE/1 DID NOT MENTION...
DEPARTURE FROM TEHRAN, BUT SPECIALLY...
HUMILIATED BY THE INCIDENT...
HE ADDED THAT SDFORGIVE/1...
ALWAYS OPERATED MORE OR LESS...
THEREFORE, NOT WANT PUBLIC EXPOSURE

(15-20 MARCH...
DETAINED FOR...
DED BY ALI...
OUT/1'S NOT...
WAS A PROMINENT...
TO SDFORGIVE/1'S...
SPORTS BELONGING...
Y1 HIMSELF. THE...
ONGING TO SDFOR-...
NCE THE INCIDENT...
SIDE OF THE...
N-LAG HAVE...
E ITEMS TAKEN...
\$ LEADERSHIP OF...
UT/1 DOES NOT...
MENT TO BE PRIOR...
AT SDFORGIVE/1...
OT WANT TO TALK...
PRIVATE PERSON...
SCENES AND...
E ARREST.

TO DATE, SDFORGIVE/1'S PASSPORT...
IS DETERMINED TO LEAVE IRAN...
IF THE PASSPORT IS NOT RETURNED...
GIVE/1 WOULD OBVIOUSLY NEED...

H BEEN RETURNED...
DO SO CLAR...
UT/1 STATED...
STAINING

S E C R E T 312220Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 305277.

TO TEHRAN INFO PARIS.

WMANTEL AJAJA UNTROUT SDPO GIVE

RTPS: A. TEHRAN 34063

B. PARIS 11916

1. SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT SDPO GIVE/1 (S/1) WILL BE WILLING TO HAVE ANY SUBSTANTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH SDFORWARD/1 (F/1). HE WAS MOST RELUCTANT TO DO SO EVEN IN PRESENCE OF UNTROUT/1 (T/1) AND, GIVEN EVENTS OF PAST SIX MONTHS, WILL PROBABLY DO LITTLE MORE THAN RECRUTE F/1. WE CONCUR WITH TEHRAN'S COMMENTS THAT S/1 IS STILL OF HIGH OPS INTEREST, BUT GIVEN DIFFICULTIES OF MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH HIM, WE LESS SURE WE CAN MAKE ARGUMENT FOR MAJOR EFFORT AGAINST THIS TARGET.

2. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE, PREVIOUS CONTACT WITH S/1 WAS THROUGH T/1 WHO WOULD, MONTHS, TDY FROM PARIS TO TEHRAN TO MAKE MEETINGS, BE DETERMINED BY STATION OFFICER AND RETURN TO PARIS. SUCH TRIPS WERE OBVIOUSLY BURDEN FOR ACING T/1 AND HIS BEING STUCK IN TEHRAN IN AFTERMATH OF FEBRUARY REVOLUTION FURTHER COMPLICATED PROBLEM. FOR ALL OF THAT, WE MUST REALISTICALLY CONCLUDE THAT T/1 REMAINS ONLY VIABLE ROUTE TO S/1 IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE, AND DO NOT BELIEVE S/1 VIABLE ALTERNATIVE. WOULD LIKE SUGGEST, PENDING TEHRAN'S CONCURRENCE, PARIS DETERMINE T/1'S WILLINGNESS FOR TRAVEL TEHRAN TO AGAIN SEE S/1. NO COMMITMENT TO SUCH TRAVEL SHOULD BE MADE IF RESULTS SUCH APPROACH T/1 POSITIVE AND TEHRAN CONTINUES VIEW S/1 HIGH PRIORITY TARGET. WE WILL CONSIDER PROPOSAL S/1 RETURN TEHRAN FOR MEETING WITH AND DEBRIEFING OF S/1. T/1 WOULD, OF COURSE, ATTEMPT DETERMINE S/1'S RECEPTIVITY SUCH MEETING; PRIDE T/1'S DEPARTURE FROM PARIS.

3. HQS DID NOT RECEIVE REF A IDEN. PLEASE RETRANSMIT.

4. FILE: 281-3243-25; 281-3275932. RFW 31 AUG 79 DEW DCC

ALL SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

#2567

EM
etc

S E C R E T 202336 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE: DIRECTOR 517911

TO : PARIS, LONDON, INFO TTHRAN

WMINTEL AJAJA UNTRUT SDFORGIVE GNSIGHT

REFS: A LONDON 17825
3 TEHRAN 54241
C S 12419

1 MEETING ARE COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENT
EES. WEING ADD TO REF B REQUIREMENTS WHILE
.....

2 APPRECIATE LONDON AND PARIS ASSISTANCE THIS CASE
..... IMPORTANT WINDOW INTO RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY.

3 FILE: 201-079938 ; 201-243505 RW 19 SEP 99

ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

228

SECRET 2117Z 22 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 12629

TO: TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR, LONDON

VNINTEL AJAJA UNT D M SDFORGIVE

REFS: A. TEHRAN 12629
B. LONDON 12629

1. AS OF 22 SEPTEMBER UNTR0UT/1 HAD RECEIVED NO FURTHER WORD ON THE PART OF SDFORGIVE/1 TO EUROPE. AS SOON AS PARTICULARS KNOWN WILL ADVISE.

2. UNTR0UT/1 PROVIDED FOLLOWING INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO REF A. UNTR0UT/1 WILL DISCUSS WITH SDFORGIVE/1 WHEN THE LATTER. AS UNTR0UT/1'S RESPONSES TO INTEL REQUIREMENTS REPRESENT HIS VIEWS, WE ARE REPORTING INFORMATION IN OPERATIONAL MAT.

3. REGARDING OPERATIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT SDFORGIVE:
A. SDFORGIVE/1'S CURRENT RESIDENCE IS TEHRAN. HE OWNS A FARM BETWEEN TEHRAN AND QOM AND TRAVELS TO THE FARM ABOUT ONCE A WEEK. TO THE BEST OF UNTR0UT/1'S KNOWLEDGE SDFORGIVE/1 DOES NOT TRAVEL TO QOM. UNTR0UT/1 SAID THAT ANY SUCH VISITS WOULD SURELY BE REPORTED IN THE TEHRAN PRESS. SDFORGIVE/1 DOES NOT TRAVEL TO QOM BECAUSE HE WOULD BE EXPECTED TO PAY A VISIT TO ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL RELIGIOUS FIGURES, KHOMAYNI, HE WOULD BE FORCED TO VISIT SHARIAT-MADARAH, THIS POLITICALIZING HIMSELF.

B. SDFORGIVE/1 WAS AMONG THE "MAJORITY" OF "MULLAHS", I.E. MEN WHO WERE ACCEPTED AS RELIGIOUS FIGURES PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION AND WHO WERE NOT SIMPLY INSTALLED AS MULLAHS BY KHOMAYNI. UNTR0UT/1 HAS UNLAWFUL CONTACT WITH SDFORGIVE/1 HAS UNLAWFUL CONTACT WITH PRESENT IRANIAN MILITARY. UNTR0UT/1 SAID THAT ALTHOUGH SDFORGIVE/1 KNOWS SAZARAGAN, HE DOES NOT IF HE MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH HIM. HE WAS UNABLE TO ADDRESS HIMSELF TO ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT CONTACTS SDFORGIVE/1 HAS. SDFORGIVE/1 IS FAVORABLE TO SUNNI RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN IRAN. PER UNTR0UT/1'S VIEW SDFORGIVE/1 AS THE MOST ACCEPTABLE OF THE SHI'A CLERGY.

30 SEP 79

R E T 291255Z SEP 79 STAFF

PARIS 12943

PRIORITY TEBWAN. DIRECTOR INFO LONDON.

EL AJAJA UNTROUT SDFORGIVE

A. DIRECTOR 517941
E. TSERAN 54241

UNTROUT/1 ADVISED BACKUS STATION OFFICER MILIOTO ON 25 SEPTEMBER THAT SDFORGIVE/1 HAD ARRIVED IN PARIS 25 SEPTEMBER. UNTROUT/1 HAD SHORT MEETING WITH SDFORGIVE/1 EVENING 26 SEPTEMBER.

2. SDFORGIVE/1 TOLD UNTROUT/1 THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE TIME FOR TALK HAS PASSED AND THAT IT IS NOW TIME FOR ACTION. HE WOULD LIKE UNTROUT/1 TO GET A CLEAR STATEMENT ABOUT U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE MEGBINI REGION. IT SEEMS THAT SDFORGIVE/1 IS WILLING TO TAKE ACTIVE ROLE IN MOVEMENT MEGBINI BUT NOT INTERESTED IN SIMPLY PROVIDING US INFORMATION. THIS PROBABLY NOT A FIRM POSITION.

3. IT IS NOT YET KNOWN HOW LONG SDFORGIVE/1 WILL BE IN PARIS. HE WILL TRAVEL TO EGYPT FROM PARIS AS HE WAS INVITED TO VISIT SADAT BY AN EGYPTIAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL LAST BEFORE THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY CLOSED IN TEHRAN. SDFORGIVE/1 EXPECTS THE EGYPTIANS TO SUGGEST HE HEAD OPPOSITION FROM BASE IN CAIRO. SDFORGIVE/1 PROBABLY NOT WILLING TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT SACRIFICES THIS WOULD MEAN FOR HIM AND FAMILY.

4. SDFORGIVE WILL NOT TRAVEL TO LONDON.

5. UNTROUT/1 SAYS FOLLOWING QUOTE SUMS UP SDFORGIVE/1 ASSESSMENT OF PEP SITUATION IN IRAN: AS FAR AS HE KNOWS, 26 CENTURIES OF HISTORY, IRAN HAS NEVER CONSIDERED SUICIDE. SDFORGIVE/1 HAS A FARM NEAR QOM THAT HE VISITS ONCE A WEEK. HE DOES NOT GO INTO THE CITY AND IS AVOIDING CONTACT WITH BUREAUCRATS AND CLERGY. WITHIN NEXT FEW WEEKS HE INTENDS TO VISIT SHARIAT-MAZARA, WHO LIVES IN QOM. SHARIAT-MAZARA TRAVELLED TO TEHRAN

SECRET 100-79-5745

CITE DIRECTOR 5/24/52

TO: PRIORITY PARIS (SECRET)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000)

RE: MURDER OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

FOR PARIS AGAIN, APPROXIMATELY MAY 24, 1968, THIS

OFFICE HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT AN INDIVIDUAL

WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS BELIEVE WAS IN PARIS

ON MAY 24, 1968, AND THAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO

CONTACT WITH AN INDIVIDUAL WHOSE NAME IS

UNKNOWN TO THIS OFFICE AT THIS TIME.

IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU ADVISE THIS OFFICE

OF ANY INFORMATION YOU MAY HAVE CONCERNING

THE INDIVIDUAL WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS

BEING IN PARIS ON MAY 24, 1968.

YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS MATTER IS APPRECIATED.

VERY TRULY YOURS,

W. L. MOYER, JR., SAC, NEW YORK

100-100000-1000

ENCLOSURE

100-100000-1000

100-100000-1000

SECRET 100-79-5745

CITE DIRECTOR 5/24/52

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100-100000-1000

ENCLOSURE

100-100000-1000

100-100000-1000

~~JEM/CT~~
ACTION

152A.

015575

NNNNVV ESB036AAAB44
 OO BUQMRH
 DE BUQMLV #6083/1 3181400
 ZNY CCCCC 225
 O R 141255Z NOV 78
 FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2308
 INFO BUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 4253
 RUEFNS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 669
 ZEN/USINT BAGHDAD POUCH
 RUEFNS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 617
 RUEHHC/AMEMBASSY CAIPO 2132
 RUEFNS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 366
 RUEHHC/AMCONSOL DHAHMAN 3826
 RUEHOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 2192
 RUEKORT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 321
 RUEKRA/AMEMBASSY JIDEA 5832
 RUEFNS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS 338
 RUEHHC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 195
 RUEHHC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3107
 RUEHHC/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 3586
 RUEFNS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2022
 RUEHQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO 193
 RUEHHC/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4552
 RUEHHC/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1173
 RUEHHC/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 364
 RUEHHC/USTREAS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 BT
 C O N T I N U E I N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 KUWAIT 6328

ECM 2-
AMB-DCM
POL
CHRON

BRUSSELS PASS TO USMISSION EC

PARIS PASS TO USMISSION TO OECD

TREASURY FOR SECRETARY BLUEMENTHAL'S OFFICE

F.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: EFIN, ENRG, ECON, EU
 SUBJECT: VISIT OF UNDER SECRETARY COOPER TO KUWAIT

REF: (A) STATE 274100 (NOTAL), (B) KUWAIT 5738 (NOTAL),
 (C) ABU DHABI 2866 (NOTAL), (D) KUWAIT 5937 (NOTAL), (E)
 STATE 282393 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: DURING OCT 31-NOV 1 VISIT TO KUWAIT, UNDER SEC-
 RETARY COOPER MET WITH MINISTERS OF OIL AND FINANCE, THE
 AMB'S FINANCE ADVISOR, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE KUWAIT
 ECON. KUWAITI OFFICIALS APPRECIATED UNDER SECRETARY'S PRE-
 SENTATION ON WORLD ECONOMY AND OUR PROGNOSIS FOR THE DOLLAR

ACTION

001320

22 JAN 19 11 21 Z

VV ESA 02KWA551

OO RUGMHR
 DE RUGMKW 0370/1 022110Z
 ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 O R 221027Z JAN 79
 FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
 TO RUEHO/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2016
 INFO RUGMJI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 4393
 RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 986
 ZEN/USINT SACHDAD POUCH
 RUFHBB/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELSYUY
 RUEGRR/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 413
 RUGJHD/AMCONSUL DHAMRAN 3579
 RUGJOD/AMEMBASSY Doha 2299
 RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 390
 RUGMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 5981
 RUAQL/AMEMBASSY LAGOS 367
 RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIJREVILLE 204
 RUOTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3287
 RUGHAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 3683
 RUGMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 1765
 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2071
 RULSQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO 218
 RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4663 ✓
 RUGTKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 565
 RUGMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1212
 RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 396

ACTION

INFO
AMB

DCM
POL-2
PM
OR
CRU-E
SHIR
TSF

6/4A

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KUWAIT 0370 -

LINDI°

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

PARIS ALSO FOR JECD

E.E. 12065: QDS 1/22/75 (MAESTRONE, FRANK E.) OR-M
 TAGS: ENRG, OPEC, KU
 SUBJ: KUWAIT OFFERS SLIGHT INCREASE IN CRUDE PRODUCTION TO
 MAKE UP IRANIAN OIL SHORTFALL

1. (C - EMIRE TEXT)

CONFIDENTIAL

DEF 2-17

NNNNV ESR042XWA42
 RR RUQMR
 DE RUQMKW #2530/1 0301440
 ZNY CCCCC ZZB
 R 301328Z JAN 79
 FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2884
 INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 4409
 ZEN/USINT BAGHDAD POUCH
 RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2193
 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1446
 RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DEHRAN 3987
 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 2313
 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 6007
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3302
 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 3696
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSTOW 363
 RUQMNT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 1777
 RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA 1212
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
 RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR
 RUHQHQA
 RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4676
 BT

30 JAN 79 19 26Z

001980

ACTION

ACTION:
 PM 3
 INFO:
 AMB
 DCN
 POL 2
 ECON 2
 X ADM
 OR
 CRU 2
 S 6AM

file
Personnel

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KUWAIT 0530

CINCS FOR POLAD

LONDON FOR GLASPIE

F.O. 12065: GDS 1/30/85 (CLUNAN, JAMES L.) OR-P
 TAGS: MPOL, SOPN, EU, ZP, IR, US, UR
 SUBJ: (U) KUWAIT COMMENTS ON REGIONAL SECURITY

REFS: A) KUWAIT 0359, B) CAIRO 01843 (NOTAL), C) STATE 017001 (NOTAL)

1. (C) SUMMARY. KUWAIT PRESS HAS EXAGGERATED GULF SECURITY ASPECTS OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BROWN'S JANUARY 25 CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY. COMMENTING ON BROWN'S TESTIMONY, GOK SPOKESMAN HAS REJECTED ANY KIND OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE GULF AND SAID THAT KUWAIT HAS NOT SOUGHT SECURITY GUARANTEES OR PROTECTION FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. WHILE THIS STATEMENT IS MORE CATEGORICAL THAN HIS VIEWS REPORTED IN REF A REGARDING THE ROLE OF BIG POWERS IN THE GULF, SPOKESMAN'S REMARKS MUST BE SEEN AS PART OF POLICY BALANCING ACT WHICH GOK PLAYS AMONG ITS LARGE NEIGHBORS IN THE AREA AND BETWEEN THE SUPER POWERS.

2

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNUPDMVV ISA733KWA326
RR RUQMR
DE RUQMKW #3522 205 0945
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 240911Z JUL 79
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4089
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 4804
RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 779
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2486
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1688
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 2631
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 520
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 6406
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3543
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 3983
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 2066
RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA 1389
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4790
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 739
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1195
RUEHDI/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 809
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 3522

24 JUL 79 09 57z

POL
Charge
Chron

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/24/89 (SUTHERLAND, PETER A.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, W, KU, US
SUBJECT: (C) KUWAITI OFFICIAL COMMENTS FAVORABLY ON US ROLE
IN PEACE PROCESS

REF: (A) STATE 178999, (B) STATE 179404, (C) KUWAIT 3523.

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: JULY 22 CONVERSATION BETWEEN ADCM AND
SENPOR KUWAITI MFA OFFICIAL ELICITED POSITIVE COMMENTS ON
US ROLE IN PEACE PROCESS. END SUMMARY.

3. AFTER OTHER BUSINESS WITH KUWAITI MFA LEGAL ADVISOR
TAREQ RAZOQUI (PROTECT), ADCM MENTIONED OUR SATISFACTION
WITH MODEST PROGRESS ACHIEVED BY AMB STRAUSS IN BUILDING
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH SADAT AND BEGIN AND IN EST-
ABLISHING AN AGENDA FOR AUTONOMY TALKS (REFS A AND B). ADCM
INVITED RAZOQUI'S COMMENTS ON AMB STRAUSS' TRIP AND
ARAFAT'S MEETING IN VIENNA. DR. RAZOQUI, WHO IS CLOSE TO
THE FOREIGN MINISTER, ACKNOWLEDGED THE PREVAILING
MFA OPINION THAT THE VIENNA MEETING CREATED A MORE POSITIVE
IMAGE OF YASSER ARAFAT AND THE PLO, BUT HE THOUGHT
THERE WERE LIMITS ON WHAT EVEN THE MOST RESPECTED EUROPEAN
STATESMAN COULD DO FOR THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS.
AMERICA'S ROLE HE THOUGHT WAS DECISIVE: "YOU HAVE
TO TALK TO THE PLO." HE EXPECTED WE EVENTUALLY WOULD.

NNNTRJANVV ESA850KVA813
RR RUMHR
DE RUMKV #3653/1 2201300
ZNY CCCCC ZZ
R 161221Z AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4225
INFO RUMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 4840
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 571
RUFNBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 767
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 811
RUDKPHG/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 857
RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2500
RUGHOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 2664
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 819
RUMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 6432
RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3567
RUFHBA/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 818
RUMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 4013
RUMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 2096
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2275
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 527
RUMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4211
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1203
RUMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1335
RUEHXO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 651
RUDKPPG/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 144
RUFKAW/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 450
RUFKNA/USMISSION USRATO 824

CN 695

ECON
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 KUWAIT 3653

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEIC

PARIS ALSO FOR USEOCD

E.O. 12865: GDS 2/16/85 (SUTHERLAND, PETER A.) OR-M
TAGS: ENRG, PEPR, EXC, OPEC, ZP, TC, FR, KU
SUBJ: (C) EC-9/GULF ARAB DIALOG; DUTCH BRIEFING ON EC-9 AND GOK
CONCEPTS

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DUTCH CHARGE IN KUWAIT (PORTECT) HAS JUST TRANSMITTED
REPORT TO GOM ON STATE OF PLAY IN EC-9/GULF ARAB TALKS PROPOSAL,
DRAWING ON HIS OWN CONTACTS WITH GOK OFFICIALS AND DISCUSSIONS
HELD HERE AUGUST 14 AMONG REPRESENTATIVES OF EC-9 NATIONS. AT
HIS INITIATIVE HE BRIEFED ME ON AUGUST 15, ASKING THAT HIS ACTION
NOT BE REVEALED TO EC-9 MEMBER GOVERNMENTS. SOME OF HIS
BRIEFING IS PROBABLY REDUNDANT, BUT OWING TO CONSIDERABLE INTEREST
IN SUBJECT, I REPORT HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS ANALYSIS BELOW:

EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED IN FINAL PARAGRAPH

97,546 : KUWAIT/THE NETHERLANDS
 SUBJECT : KUWAIT OIL MINISTER'S VIEWS ON OIL PRICING AND GULF/EC DIALOGUE, AS EXPRESSED TO THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR. (DOI: 20 OCTOBER 1979)
 SOURCE : A SENIOR GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT OFFICIAL WITH ESTABLISHED ACCESS TO OIL MINISTRY INFORMATION. HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED.

SUMMARY: DURING THE COURSE OF A 20 OCTOBER 1979 MEETING, KUWAIT'S OIL MINISTER, SHAYKH ALI KHALIFA AL-SABAH, PROVIDED THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR WITH HIS VIEWS ON OIL PRICING AND THE GULF/EC DIALOGUE. ALI KHALIFA INDICATED THAT IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE KUWAIT WILL RAISE ITS OIL PRICES AGAIN. HE SAID KUWAIT CANNOT BE ASKED TO BE ONLY REASONABLE ONE WHEN EVERYONE ELSE, INCLUDING THE NORTH SEA PRODUCERS, ARE RAISING THEIR PRICES. AS FOR THE GULF/EC DIALOGUE, ALI KHALIFA SAID OIL PRICES WILL NOT BE A SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION. HE NOTED THAT THE SUBJECT OF POLITICS CANNOT BE AVOIDED, BUT IT IS NOT A POINT ON THE AGENDA. HE SAID THAT IF THE PARTICIPANTS CAN TALK SENSE TO EACH OTHER THE FOUNDATION WILL HAVE BEEN LAID FOR A BROADER DIALOGUE COVERING THE OIL PRODUCERS, THE DEVELOPING AND THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.

END SUMMARY.

1. ON 20 OCTOBER 1979, KUWAIT OIL MINISTER SHAYKH ALI KHALIFA AL-SABAH MET WITH THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR TO KUWAIT, GERRIT DO W. B E N D L E N, WHO WAS PAYING A FAREWELL CALL ON THE MINISTER PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM KUWAIT. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, ALI KHALIFA CONFIRMED THAT KUWAIT'S PRESENT CRUDE OIL PRICE RISE TO DOLLARS 21.43 WAS WITHIN THE OPEC PRICE LIMITS. HOWEVER, ALI KHALIFA SAID THAT OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS IRAQ HAVE AGAIN ADJUSTED UPWARDS, SO IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE KUWAIT WILL DO LIKEWISE.

2. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED IF IT MIGHT NOT BE WISE TO LET THE CURRENT PRICES REMAIN STABLE FOR A WHILE SO THAT THE ECONOMIES

TDFIRDS-315/1489-79
DIST: 30 OCTOBER 1979
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT
REPORT CLASS SECRET WMINTEL
COUNTRY: KUWAIT, LIBYA
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE KUWAIT-LIBYAN OIL PRODUCTION CUTBACK IN
NOVEMBER 1979 (SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: AN ARAB BUSINESSMAN WITH A WIDE CIRCLE OF FRIENDS,
ACQUAINTANCES AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATES IN VARIOUS ARAB
GOVERNMENTS. HE OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION FROM A TECHNICAL
ADVISOR TO THE KUWAIT NATIONAL OIL COMPANY. THE
REPORTING RELIABILITY OF THE ARAB BUSINESSMAN HAS NOT
BEEN ESTABLISHED, AND HIS INFORMANTS--THE TECHNICAL
ADVISOR AND HIS CONTACTS--ARE KNOWN ONLY FROM THE
DESCRIPTIONS PROVIDED BY THE ARAB BUSINESSMAN.

SUMMARY: KUWAITI RULER, AMIR JABIR AL-AHMAD AL-SABAH, HAS
GIVEN HIS SUPPORT TO A KUWAITI GOVERNMENT PROPOSAL TO CUT KUWAITI
CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION BY ONE MILLION BARRELS PER DAY BY
15 NOVEMBER, 1979. SENIOR OFFICIALS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND
PETROLEUM COMPANY OF KUWAIT ARE STILL STUDYING THE TECHNICAL
ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSAL ESPECIALLY THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF SUCH A
CUT WOULD HAVE ON GREAT BRITAIN, KUWAIT'S MAJOR ARMED SUPPLIER. I
KUWAIT GOES AHEAD WITH THIS CUT IN CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, LIBYA
INTENDS TO CUT ITS PRODUCTION OR HALT ITS CRUDE OIL EXPORTS TO
THE UNITED STATES. ALTHOUGH THE MOTIVES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES
DIFFER, BECAUSE KUWAIT WANTS TO PROTECT ITS ECONOMIC ASSETS AND
LIBYA IS MORE INTERESTED IN PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE UNITED STATES,
THEIR AIMS COINCIDE. END SUMMARY.

1. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE RELIABILITY OF THE
SOURCE OF THE PRESENT REPORT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED, THERE IS
NO CONFIRMATION OF THE DETAILS PROVIDED. THIS REPORT IS NEVER-
THELESS, OFFERED FOR GENERAL BACKGROUND, BECAUSE OTHER INDEPENDENT
REPORTING IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TRENDS INDICATED, I.E. THAT OIL
PRODUCTION CUTBACKS ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION BY KUWAIT AND THAT
LIBYANS HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN USING OIL AS A LEVER TO
INFLUENCE U.S. POLICY.)