

TELEGRAM

1572 MAR -7 AM 11:49 E2-29

INDICATE
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

02332

FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFICATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

E.O. 11652: ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC
TAGS:
SUBJECT: INFO: AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
ACTION: AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

7

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 02332

ECON5

E.O. 11652:N/A

AMB
DCM
POL2
~~pol-1~~
USIS
OR
AGR
CRU
SHIR

TAGS: EFIN, EAID, ELTN, IR, TU

SUBJECT: IRANIAN/TURKISH ECONOMIC RELATIONS

REF: A. 76 TEHRAN 12237, B. STATE 55731

SUMMARY. BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND TURKEY ARE STILL IMPEDED BY THE UNRESOLVED ISSUE OF TURKISH TIR TRANSIT TAXES. EVEN WERE THAT IMPEDIMENT OVERCOME, GOI SOURCES ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC CONCERNING PROSPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING CREDIT ASSISTANCE ENVISAGED IN THE ~~OCTOBER~~ 1975 DOLS 1.2 BILLION PROTOCOL. ANALYSIS CONTAINED IN REF A AND PREVIOUS, I.E., MUTUAL PRIDE AND INTRANSIGENCE BASED ON CULTURAL/HISTORICAL FACTORS, STILL APPLIES. END SUMMARY.

1. THE FIRST AND ONLY MEETING OF THE IRANO-TURKISH JOINT MINISTERIAL COMMISSION FOR ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION MET IN ANKARA IN OCTOBER 1975. THAT MEETING RESULTED IN THE INITIALING

DRAFTED BY: ECON:CTaylor:db	DRAFTING DATE 3/6/78	TEL. EXT. 1120	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: SECRET ECON:CTaylor:db
CLEARANCES: E/C-ROR:db	CHARGE:JCMiklos		

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 352(H)
(Formerly FS 432(H))
January 1975
Dept. of State

AmEmbassy TEHRAN
INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONTROL NO. 5068

E 2-29

APR 6

ACTION:

Encl

R 340139Z APR 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUHQIV/AMBASSY ANKARA 3703
INFO RUHQOL/AMBASSY BOMBI 1389
DCM / RUHQPS/AMBASSY PARIS 8221
RUHQHR/AMBASSY TEHRAN 3578
SA / RUHQRA/AMBASSY JIDDA 2523
POL 2 RUHQD/AMBASSY LONDON 1969
ECON / RUHQRY/AMBASSY ROME 5554
PM / RUHQDY/AMBASSY LONDON 9915
RUHQYK/AMBASSY TOKYO

ET
COPY

USIS / N 4454
CONS / BT
OR / C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 STATE 085814/1

ADM / E. O. 11652: GDS

GSO / TAGS:EFIN, TU
BF /

PER / SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN TURKISH FINANCE MINISTER AND
HU / TREASURY SECRETARY

RSO /
MSG / 1. SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL MET WITH FINANCE MINISTER
TSO / WUEZZINOGLU ON THURSDAY, MARCH 23. ALSO ATTENDING ON THE
SCRO / TURKISH SIDE WERE VIRAL GUCSAVAS, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
CRO / TREASURY, AND AMBASSADOR ESENDEL. PARTICIPATING ON THE
TCU / U. S. SIDE WERE ASSISTANT SECRETARY BERGSTEN AND RICHARD
FISHER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY.

MP / 2. THE FINANCE MINISTER BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD BE
DAQ / SIGNING A LETTER OF INTENT WITH THE IMF THAT AFTERNOON. HE
MAAG / THEN DESCRIBED THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS CONFRONTING TURKEY AND
AGR / THE MEASURES THE GOVERNMENT HAD UNDERTAKEN TO DEAL WITH
DEA / THEM. HE SAID THAT THE STANDBY PROGRAM WOULD BE FOR TWO
IRS / YEARS AND WOULD INVOLVE SDR 300 MILLION (APPROXIMATELY 360
TCTR / MILLION DOLS) IN ADDITION, TURKEY WOULD RECEIVE AN
CEOC / UNSPECIFIED AMOUNT UNDER THE COMPENSATORY FINANCE FACILITY,
CEOR / WITH THE WITTEVEEN FACILITY A LATER POSSIBILITY. ASSISTANT
SECRETARY BERGSTEN NOTED THAT IT WOULD BE PERHAPS THREE
MONTHS BEFORE THE WITTEVEEN FACILITY WOULD BE IN PLACE,
WHICH SEEMED TO COME AS A SURPRISE TO THE MINISTER.

CRU / 3. SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL THEN ASKED THE FINANCE MINISTER IF
HE THOUGHT THESE MEASURES WERE SUFFICIENT TO TURN THE
SHIR / SITUATION AROUND. THE FINANCE MINISTER REPLIED THAT HE
TABR / HOPED SO BUT THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES
ISFA / FOR U. S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT. HE THEN MENTIONED A "PORTUGAL
TYPE" OPERATION FOR TURKEY. HE SAID HE KNEW THAT THE
ADMINISTRATION WOULD NEED TO GO TO CONGRESS ON THIS AND
THIS WOULD POSE PROBLEMS. NONETHELESS, HE ASKED IF AN
EFFORT LIKE THIS COULD BE MOUNTED, WHEN "THE TIME IS RIPE"
HE NOTED THAT TURKEY WOULD NEED ASSISTANCE NOT JUST THIS
YEAR, BUT NEXT YEAR AS WELL. HE THEN MADE A VAGUE REQUEST
FOR A TREASURY "GREEN LIGHT" TO PRIVATE BANKS TO ENCOURAGE
THEM TO LEND TO TURKEY.

142

CONFIDENTIAL

GDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Amembassy TEHRAN

Place: Residence of the Canadian Ambassador, at dinner

Date: April 30, 1978

Participants: H.E. M. Rahmi Gumrukcuoglu, Ambassador
of Turkey to Iran
Clyde D. Taylor, First Secretary

Subject: Turkish-Iran Dispute Over Turkish Road
Tax and Turkish Plans for New Embassy
in Tehran

Distribution: AMB/DCM NEA/IRN
POL EUR/SE
OR Amembassy ANKARA
ICA USMission EC BRUSSELS
ECON

Turkish/Iran Dispute Over Turkish Road Tax

Upon being queried concerning the real reasons for the impasse between the two countries concerning the tax over Turkish roads, the Ambassador said that he had virtually given up on any formal solution. By way of background, he said that he negotiated the first agreement with Iran in 1963 for transit across Turkey, an agreement which provided unequalled benefits to Iran relative to other countries. Over the course of years he had negotiated 22 road protocols and thus felt very much at home with that subject. He said that Turkey could be considered somewhat like a Panama in that it had as a natural asset its position as a link to Europe

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GDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

28 JUL -6 AM 7:17

TELEGRAM

 INDICATE
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

E2-29

FROM	AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	CLASSIFICATION	LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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52: ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

06428 7

CT: INFO: AMEMBASSY ANKARA

ON: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 06428

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PEPR, IR, TU

SUBJECT: NEW IRAN-TURKEY TRADE AGREEMENT

1. IRANIAN AND TURKISH REPRESENTATIVES HERE ARE CELEBRATING CONCLUSION OF IMPORTANT TRADE AGREEMENT WHICH CALLS FOR IRAN PROVIDING TURKEY ONE MILLION TONS CRUDE OIL AND ONE-HALF MILLION TONS FUEL OIL OVER A PERIOD OF ABOUT A YEAR IN RETURN FOR TURKISH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, MAINLY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS BUT INCLUDING SOME INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS (GLASS· CEMENT)

AGREEMENT WAS REPORTED IN TEHRAN'S ENGLISH LANGUAGE PRESS OF JULY 5 AS A LETTER OF INTENT SIGNED BY VISITING TURKISH MINISTER FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS ~~HIKMET~~ CETIN AND GOI'S MINISTER FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND FINANCE (MEAF) YEGANEH

2. UNDER SECRETARY IN MEAF EMPHASIZED TO EMBOFF THAT AGREEMENT WAS NOT RPT NOT A BARTER AGREEMENT. GOI, HE SAID, MUST AGREE

Y1 mb brakis/ECON:RCBrewin	DRAFTING DATE 7/6/78	TEL. SRT. 1110	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: ADCM:RCBrewin
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CLASSIFICATION

 FORM 152(H)
 (Formerly PS-413(H))
 January 1975
 Dept. of State

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~RF~~
p. 8 2-29

NNNNVV ESB#12GUA324
RR RUQMHR
DE RUQMGU #5123/1 1940805
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 130002Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDO 2605
INFO RUFLEPA/AMCONSUL ADANA 0036
RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 142
RUQMPL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 6150
RUFLAEA/AMCONSUL IZMIR 72
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 520
RUCMNM/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 191
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1124
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5843
RUQMII/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 174
BT

13 Jul 78 09 03z

010284

ACTION:
ECONS

INFO:
AMB
ICM
JOL.2
PM
OR
AGR
ICA
SHIRAZ
CRUZ R16

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 5123

E.O. 11652 N/A

TAGS: ENRG, EFIN, IR, IZ, TU
SUBJ: PROGRESS IN TURKISH NEGOTIATIONS WITH PETROLEUM SUPPLIERS

REF: (A) TEHRAN 6420, (B) ANKARA 4745, (C) TEHRAN 2454,
(D) ANKARA 4630, (E) ANKARA 1647, (F) ANKARA 3053,
(G) ANKARA 2576

SUMMARY: TURKEY CONTINUES TO WORK OUT BILATERAL PAYMENTS ARRANGEMENTS IN ORDER TO ASSURE CONTINUATION OF ITS IMPORTED PETROLEUM SUPPLY. IRAN HAS AGREED TO EXTEND CREDIT TO TURKEY FOR IRANIAN CRUDE AND FUEL OIL AND TO ACCEPT VARIOUS TURKISH EXPORTS. TURKEY IS HOLDING DISCUSSIONS WITH AN IRAQI DELEGATION IN HOPES OF REPAYING ALMOST ONE-HALF OF TURKEY'S PETROLEUM DEBTS TO IRAQ THROUGH TURKISH EXPORTS.
END SUMMARY.

1. AFTER SIGNING FIVE-YEAR AGREEMENTS ON BILATERAL TRADE AND CREDIT WITH LIBYA IN MAY AND AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE FOR THREE YEARS OF BARTER TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN JUNE, TURKEY HAS TURNED TO TWO MORE PETROLEUM EXPORTERS IN ORDER TO ASSURE THAT ITS OIL SUPPLY CONTINUES. IRAN AGREED ON JULY 4 TO FINANCE TURKISH IMPORTS DURING THE NEXT YEAR OF 1.5 MILLION TONS OF IRANIAN CRUDE AND FUEL OIL AND TO ACCEPT UNSPECIFIED QUANTITIES OF TURKISH EXPORTS. ON JULY 10, TURKEY BEGAN DISCUSSIONS WITH AN IRAQI DELEGATION, REPORTEDLY IN HOPE OF REPAYING ALMOST ONE-HALF OF TURKEY'S PETROLEUM DEBTS THROUGH TURKISH EXPORTS OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS AND REFINANCING THE REST. TURKEY WANTS TO PERSUADE IRAQ, ITS PRINCIPAL OIL SUPPLIER, TO RESUME OIL EXPORTS TO TURKEY THAT HAVE VIRTUALLY HALTED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1978.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Ret. 10.5

NNNNVV ESB004GUA039
 OO RUQMER
 DE RUQMGU #5650/1 2531415
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O R 101405Z SEP 79
 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 TO RUEFC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8206
 INFO RUFLEPA/AMCONSUL ADANA 9512
 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 286
 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 507
 RUQMPL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 8573
 RUFLAEA/AMCONSUL IZMIR 1760
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1448
 RUQMER/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6149
 RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 8319
 RUFRRSH/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
 BT
 S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 6560

POL
 CHRGR
 ECON
 1-MAAG
 2-DAO
 3-RF
 CHRN

E.O. 12065 RDS-2 (DILLON, ROBERT S.) OR-M
 TAGS: PINS, PINT, TU
 SUBJ: (S) SECURITY SITUATION IN EASTERN TURKEY

REF: (A) STATE 226728 (NOTAL); (B) TDFIRDB-315/14865-79;
 (C) ADANA 199; (D) ADANA 191; (E) ANKARA 6538;
 (F) TEHRAN 0858; (G) USDAO ANKARA 6 898 0348 79;
 (H) ANKARA 3533.

1. (S) -- TNITE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATIONS IN EASTERN TURKEY. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN CONTROL IN TURKEY'S EASTERN KURDISH PROVINCES, THE GOT HAS TRADITIONALLY USED A CARROT-AND-STICK APPROACH, COOPTING TRIBAL LEADERS AND LANDOWNERS WHILE MAINTAINING A STRONG MILITARY PRESENCE. IN RECENT YEARS, THIS APPROACH HAS BEEN TESTED BY GREATER KURDISH POLITICAL ASSERTIVENESS, RISING ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF SOME YOUNG, EDUCATED KURDS IN REVOLUTIONARY MARXIST, SEPARATIST, TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THE ECEVIT GOVERNMENT HAS ADAPTED A "SOFT APPROACH" TOWARD DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN TURKEY WHICH PERMITS EXPRESSION OF CONTROVERSIAL IDEAS WHILE TRYING TO STRENGTHEN LEGAL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS. THIS "SOFT APPROACH" CURRENTLY HAS THE BACKING OF TURKEY'S SENIOR MILITARY LEADERSHIP, BUT IT APPEARS TO TROUBLE TURKEY'S CONSERVATIVE KEMALIST ESTABLISHMENT AND SOME UNIT COMMANDERS IN EASTERN TURKEY, WHO WOULD PREFER TO QUELL DISSENT WITH GREATER FORCE. ALTHOUGH THESE MILITARY COMMANDERS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT A POSSIBLE KURDISH SEPARATIST UPRISING, WE DOUBT THAT TURKEY'S FRACTIOUS RADICAL KURDISH GROUPS



Department of State

GF. Class. V- TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

R 160200Z DEC 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS

CONFIDENTIAL

11635

ACTION
CON-3

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 225989

CN 11635
DEC 16, 1971
1210

INFO
AMB
DCM
POL
CRU

INFORM CONSULS

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF VISAS TO JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS

REF: CA-3836 OF AUGUST 18, 1971

POUCH
KHOR
TABR

9/1cf

1. DEPT HAS JUST LEARNED OF ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO LONDON, ZAID RIFAI. INCIDENT OCCURRED APPROXIMATELY 1000Z DEC 15 NEAR JORDANIAN EMBASSY. ACCORDING OUR INFORMATION RIFAI RECEIVED ONLY MINOR WOUND BUT HIS AUTOMOBILE CAME UNDER HEAVY GUNFIRE. THIS LATEST INCIDENT, FOLLOWING IN WAKE OF PRIME MINISTER TELL ASSASSINATION IN CAIRO, DEMONSTRATES FEDAYEEN DETERMINATION TO CARRY ON THEIR CAMPAIGN OF ASSASSINATION AGAINST KEY GOJ FIGURES. ACCORDING TO PREVIOUS REPORTS, EXTREMIST WING OF FATAH IS BEHIND THIS CAMPAIGN.

2. ACCORDINGLY, WE TAKING HAND LOOK AT VISA POLICY WITH REGARD TO INDIVIDUALS HAVING PAST AND PRESENT AFFILIATION WITH PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS. WE EXPECT ISSUE SHORTLY UPDATED AND MORE COMPREHENSIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS MATTER. MEANWHILE, POSTS SHOULD REQUEST EMBASSY AMMAN CLEARANCE BEFORE ISSUING VISAS TO JORDANIAN NATIONALS (EXCEPT GOJ OFFICIALS) OR PALESTINIANS. POSTS SHOULD ALSO BE ALERT TO FACT THAT FEDAYEEN IN PAST HAVE GENERALLY TRAVELLED ON SYRIAN AND ALGERIAN PASSPORTS. GP-3. RCGERS

ROUTING	
Action	Initials
CON	<i>[Signature]</i>
DCM	
PO	<i>[Signature]</i>
PPT	

CONFIDENTIAL

AmEmbassy TEHRAN
INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONTROL NO. 16040

ACTION:

CONFIDENTIAL

Cemo-3

INFO: R 252244Z NOV 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
AMB 1 TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS NOV 28 1976
DCM 1 BT
SA _____ C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 289668
POL 1 VISAS INFORM CONSULS
ECON _____
PM _____ E.O. 11652: GDS
USIS _____ TAGS: CVIS: (JIRYIS, SABRI AND SARTAWI, ISSAM)
CONS _____
OR _____ SUBJECT: APPLICATIONS BY PLO MEMBERS

ACTION COP

ADM _____ 1. RECENTLY TWO MEMBERS OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION
GSO _____ ORGANIZATION (PLO) OBTAINED VISAS. SABRI JIRYIS, BORN IN
BF _____ GALILEE, PALESTINE ON DECEMBER 4, 1938, OBTAINED A VISA
PER _____ FROM NICOSIA ON OCTOBER 8. JIRYIS, WHO HAS NOW BEEN ADDED
RSO 1 TO THE VLOS, PRESENTED A PRESUMABLY GENUINE SUDANESE
MSG _____ PASSPORT IN THE NAME OF SABRY ELYAS GIRAS SHOWING DPOB AS
TSO _____ DECEMBER 12, 1938, KHARTOUM, SUDAN. HE REPRESENTED
SCRO _____ HIMSELF AS A LAWYER AND LEGAL ADVISOR TO A RESEARCH CENTER
CEO _____ IN BEIRUT, LEBANON. HE WAS GRANTED A 9-1/2 VISA FOR
MP _____ A ONE-MONTH VISIT TO NEW YORK AND FOR RESEARCH AT THE
DAQ _____ LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.
MAAG _____ 2. ISSAM SARTAWI, BORN IN 1931 IN NABLUS, JORDAN, WAS
DREP _____ TRAVELING WITH JIRYIS. HE IS LISTED IN THE VLOS AND THE
AGR _____ DEPARTMENT DOES NOT KNOW WHEN OR WHERE HE OBTAINED HIS VISA.
DEA _____ ALL POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO SEARCH THEIR VISA FILES FOR
FHWA _____ ANY RECORD OF AN APPLICATION IN THE NAME OF SARTAWI OR ANY
IRS _____ VARIANT SPELLING SUCH AS SEPTAWI, ARTAOUI, OR SITAWI. FOR
TCTR _____ THOSE POSTS FILING CHRONOLOGICALLY, THE DEPARTMENT WOULD
APPRECIATE ANY CHECK YOU CAN MAKE. THE ONLY TIME FRAME
TU _____ KNOWN TO US IS THAT JIRYIS' VISA WAS ISSUED ON OCTOBER 8
CRU 1 AND HE ENTERED THE COUNTRY, PRESUMABLY WITH SARTAWI, ON
SHIR 1 OCTOBER 19. SARTAWI MAY ALSO HAVE PRESENTED A SUDANESE
TABR 1 PASSPORT.
ISFA 2 3. THE EFFORTS OF JIRYIS AND SARTAWI TO OPEN A PLO
INFORMATION OFFICE IN WASHINGTON ATTRACTED PRESS ATTENTION
AND RAISED QUESTIONS AS TO HOW THEY HAD BEEN PERMITTED
TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES. JIRYIS' VISA HAS BEEN RE-
VOKED AND SARTAWI IS BELIEVED TO HAVE DEPARTED THE
COUNTRY. ALL POSTS SHOULD BE ON THE ALERT FOR ANY NEW
APPLICATIONS BY SARTAWI OR JIRYIS UNDER THEIR OWN NAMES
OR VARIANTS THEREOF. JIRYIS COULD ALSO BE SPELLED GERIUS
OR JIRJIS. ANY POST RECEIVING AN APPLICATION FROM AN
INDIVIDUAL WHO COULD BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH EITHER JIRYIS
OR SARTAWI SHOULD SUSPEND ACTION AND INFORM THE DEPART-
MENT. ROBINSON
BT

11-FL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNVMYZVV ESA935BRA171
OO RUOMHR
DE RUEHC #9511/01 243043R
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 310224Z AUG 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

001200

CN 1282

~~CHARGE~~

CHRN

TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2890
RUOMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9135
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 6113
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4498
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 2348
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 6661
RUOMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 1176
RUEHUB/USINTI HAVANA IMMEDIATE 8753
RUOMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 2279
RUUJHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU IMMEDIATE 0246
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4192
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SUVA IMMEDIATE 1686
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2859
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 3689
RLDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 0968
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9779
RUDTIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7691
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8678
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1454
RLDKGPO/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8579
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0994
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1317
RLDKPNC/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3156
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2141
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 5909
INFO RUOMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 4352 ✓
RUOMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 4959
RUOMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 5513
RUOMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA IMMEDIATE 5559
RLDKXR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5079
RLDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3667
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1555
RUOMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0364
RUOMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8433
RUOMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0644
RUOMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 9684
BT

✓ A POC
50) CAC
~~9) [unclear]~~

(29)

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 229511/01

EXDIS

C.O. 12365 RDS-1-3 8/29/88 (DRAPER, MORRIS)

TAGS: UNSC PORG XF IS LE MARR MOPS

SUBJECT: SOUTHERN LEBANON SITUATION

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BY SEPTEL FROM USUN YOU WILL BE SEEING TEXT OF STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR YOUNG AT SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING OF AUGUST 29 ON THE LEBANON SITUATION. THIS IS A MAJOR STATEMENT OF U.S. POSITION IN TWO IMPORTANT RESPECTS:

PP RUQHR
DE RUQMMT #1737 2690840
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 260818Z SEP 79
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5971
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1451
BEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0267
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0448
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0673
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0883
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1325
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0612
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0906
RUQHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0552 ✓
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 1737

002228
POL
CHRG
ECON
RF
CHRN

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 9/26/89 (BUCK, STEPHEN W.) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, PLOS, MU, IR, XF
SUBJECT: OMANI OBSERVER COMMENTS ON IRANIAN/PLO RELATIONS

REF: MUSCAT 1681 (NOTAL)
1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. OMANI MFA POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR MULALAH HABIB IS AN EXPERIENCED OBSERVER OF IRANIAN/ARAB RELATIONS, HAVING SPENT THE PAST THREE YEARS AS OMAN'S AMBASSADOR TO IRAN (BEFORE THAT HE WAS AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO). A SHI'A, HE RECENTLY (C. SEPT. 19-21) RETURNED TO TEHRAN TO PRESENT AN OMANI PROPOSAL ON SECURITY IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ TO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT (SEPTEL). DURING A CALL BY DCM SEPT. 25 HE HAD THE FOLLOWING TO SAY ABOUT THE REPORTED PLO REQUEST FOR USE OF THE TUMBS AND ABU MUSA ISLANDS (REFTEL): PLO/IRANIAN RELATIONS IN GENERAL.

3. EVEN IF IT IS TRUE THAT THE PLO HAS ASKED THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES FOR ACCESS TO OR USE OF THE TUMBS AND ABU MUSA, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD ACCEDE TO SUCH A REQUEST. IMMEDIATELY AFTER KHOMEINI CAME TO POWER THERE WAS A "HONEYMOON" BETWEEN KHOMEINI'S GROUP AND THE PLO BECAUSE OF PAST PLO SUPPORT. HOWEVER, THIS SOON ENDED. A PLO OFFER TO RECRUIT PALESTINIAN TECHNICIANS TO REPLACE WESTERN EXPERTS IN THE OIL FIELDS WAS NOT TAKEN UP. THE GOI TURNED DOWN A PLO REQUEST TO EXPAND PLO "CULTURAL AND INFORMATION CENTERS" TO A NUMBER OF CITIES BEYOND THE EXISTING ONES IN AHWAZ AND KHORAMMSHAR. THE GOI HAS FOUND THE PLO CONNECTION SOMEWHAT OF AN EMBARRASSMENT AND A NUISANCE, ESPECIALLY PLO ACTIVITY INSIDE IRAN. HENCE THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO MOUTH A PRO-PLO LINE IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, WHILE RESTRICTING ANY EFFECTIVE COOPERATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION. PERHAPS BECAUSE THIS IS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE WAY, KHOMEINI'S GROUP DOES CHANNEL ASSISTANCE TO DESTITUTE SHI'A IN SOUTH LEBANON THROUGH THE PLO. IN SUM, PLO/IRANIAN TIES ARE NOT AS CLOSE AS PRESS REPORTS AND PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS WOULD MAKE THEM OUT TO BE.

4. COMMENT: WE LEAVE IT TO MORE EXPERIENCED IRAN WATCHERS TO JUDGE THE ACCURACY OF HABIB'S RENDERING OF IRANIAN/PLO RELATIONS. WE WOULD VENTURE THAT AS A SHI'A ARAB DIPLOMAT RESIDENT IN IRAZFATER KHOMEINI'S TAKE-OVER, HE WAS IN A GOOD POSITION TO FOLLOW THE SUBJECT.

WIELY

BT
#1737



There Has To Be a Palestinian State

Henry S. Sizer
American Embassy, Muscat

Being a peripheral observer of the Arab-Israeli controversy, I hesitate to insert my two bits into the discussion. Certainly more is going on than is disclosed in the cables we see at my present post. Yet I am dismayed at the unending deadlock on the crucial Palestinian question and at the tendency of official U.S. statements to go off in vaguely contradictory directions on this issue. Our statements sometimes seem designed to avoid a head-on scrutiny of the problem and sometimes seem to take a position, only to flip-flop away from it. The comments below are aimed at this confusion, hopefully with constructive effect.

Washington's Dilemma

If I judge correctly from U.S. statements over the past year or so of intensive negotiations, our policy on the Palestinian issue contains the following Delphic elements:

-- We believe there can be no lasting peace without "a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects," and the settlement must "recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." So far, so good, but this language says very little. In effect, we

are stating only that we consider the Palestinian problem to be a key part of the controversy. The use of the term "legitimate rights," which we studiously avoided until the Carter administration, and the reference to a Palestinian "people" are not without significance, but no definition of a policy is revealed.

-- We believe the Palestinians should "participate in the determination of their own future," whatever that means. This was President Carter's Aswan wording, which the White House carefully repeated at the end of Sadat's visit. It is thus a current and authoritative version of our vague policy. Reportedly, this guarded language stems from our desire to find a common denominator for negotiations; if so, it shows how painfully bland we have become in the search for agreement.

-- We favor a Palestinian "homeland." This utterance, dating from March 1977, looks like a real position, but it can mean several things. The term conjures up the 1917 Balfour Declaration that led inexorably over three turbulent decades to the sovereign State of Israel. We say we'll accept whatever Palestinian "entity" the

- I. Efforts by the Palestinian Fedayeen to gain influence in Iran reflect the rivalry between the more moderate elements led by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat and the radical groups, particularly the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
- A. Arafat seems to have largely succeeded in having his own organization, Fatah, dominate Palestinian activities in Iran, and he has helped prevent the radical groups from gaining an important role.
 - B. The contacts, however, that have existed for several years between the radical Palestinian organizations and Iranian leftists are continuing.
 - C. The PFLP for more than five years has had ties to the Chariks and has trained them at bases in Lebanon. Representatives of the two groups have apparently met during the past few months to discuss further cooperation.
 - 1. The PFLP also has contacts with other Iranian leftists, particularly dissidents in Khuzestan, and probably with anti-Khomeini elements of the Mujahedin.
 - 2. There are unconfirmed reports that PFLP leader George Habbash met secretly with leftists in Abadan earlier this summer.

As-Sa'iq (The Thunderbolt)Executive Summary

(C) A creation of the Syrian Ba'th Party, Sa'iq's orientation and goals as part of the Palestinian resistance movement are invariably identical with Syrian national interests as they relate to the movement. With the exception of the 1976 Syrian-Palestinian confrontation in Lebanon, during which it sided with Syria, Sa'iq has been part of the moderate mainstream of the Palestine Liberation Organization. It seeks the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) With 2,500 members, over half of whom are members of the Syrian Armed Forces, Sa'iq is the second largest fedayeen group. Its branch-type organization is answerable to the Syrian Army G-2; training is with the Syrian military and from its instructors and Soviet advisors; arms, generally of Soviet and Warsaw Pact manufacture, are of Syrian origin and include SA-7 missiles, antiaircraft and antitank weapons.

(U) Constrained by its Syrian tie, Sa'iq is not known for actions in Israel and the occupied territories. Its only international terrorist operation was aimed at disrupting Soviet Jewish emigration and took place in Western Europe.

Black June Organization (BJO)Executive Summary

(U) Intransigently rejectionist, the BJO demands that all Arab and Palestinian efforts be directed at armed struggle against the Zionist enemy and calls for the destruction of "reactionary" Arab regimes and the removal of moderate Palestine Liberation Organization leaders. Formed originally by Fatah dissidents (and now having about 500 members), the BJO is harshly critical of the current Fatah leadership because of its lack of revolutionary zeal and pursuit of armed struggle.

(U) Having perpetrated only one international terrorist incident, a hijacking in 1974, the BJO became a tool of Iraq's surrogate warfare against moderate Arabs and Palestinians, attacking Syrian diplomats and embassies, and assassinating PLO officials. With the post-Camp David Iraqi-Syrian-Palestinian reconciliation, the BJO heyday may be over.

(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) Iraq provided a special hijacking course, other training, and all weapons. BJO terrorist materiel was very sophisticated, including sniper rifles with infrared night-vision scopes and plastic bags which hide weapons and foil X-ray scanners. Although organizational information is limited, operatives have been known to work in small cells or teams. The BJO also deployed a vituperative propaganda weapon.

SECRET 221320Z MAY 79 STAFF

22 MAY 79

OTS BIRUT 53948

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

WHINTEL INTEL MRJUCE MJBARGE

REFS: 1. DIRECTOR 53961
2. TEHRAN 53328

1. IN LAST MEETING WITH MJBARGE/1 (B/1) WE WENT ON REQUIREMENTS POSED IN REFS. HE WILL ENDEAVOR TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON THOSE HE COULD NOT ANSWER.

2. WHAT ARE THE LOCATIONS OF THE PLO TRAINING SITE. THE PLO TRAINING TEAM IS CURRENTLY CONDUCTING TRAINING IN THE "ABBASABAD ARMY CAMP. THIS LOCATION IS ONLY TEMPORARY HOWEVER, AND B/1 EXPECTS THE PRIMARY TRAINING SITE TO BE MOVED TO AN AS YET UNDETERMINED LOCATION.

3. WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF PLO OFFICE IN AHWAZ, KHUZESTAN? B/1 DOES NOT KNOW THE EXACT FUNCTION OF THE OFFICE. B/1 ALSO DOES NOT KNOW WHAT SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES THE OFFICE IS ENGAGED IN OR HOW MANY PALESTINIANS HAVE BEEN SENT THERE. B/1 COULD ONLY MAKE GENERAL COMMENTS ON PALESTINIAN ACTIVITIES IN KHUZESTAN, SAYING THEY WERE PLAYING A "GOOD ROLE." IN GENERAL, B/1 SAID THAT PALESTINIAN EFFORTS IN KHUZESTAN HAD BEEN TO ACT AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE PEOPLE ON ONE SIDE AND KHOMEINI AND THE GOVERNMENT ON THE OTHER. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN EFFORTS WAS TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN KHUZESTAN FROM "BLOWING UP." B/1 DOUBTED THAT ANY EFFORTS WERE BEING MADE IN KHUZESTAN TO GAIN IRANIAN ADHERENTS FOR FIGHTING IN PALESTINE. IN ANY CASE, B/1 KNEW OF NONE. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO B/1, "LARGE" NUMBERS OF IRANIANS HAVE APPROACHED THE PLO OFFICE IN TEHRAN VOLUNTEERING TO GO TO PALESTINE TO FIGHT. THESE HAVE ALL BEEN REGISTERED, BUT THERE ARE NO CURRENT PLANS TO SEND THEM TO PALESTINE. CONTINGENCY PLANNING

23 May 79 10 42Z

SECRET 230925Z MAY 79 STAFF

DATE BEIRUT 53953

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

VNINTEL INTEL AJAJA MJBARGE

REF: DIRECTOR 435188

1. MJBARGE/I (B/I) RESPONSES TO PARA 2 REF REQUIREMENTS, CONCERNING ACTIVITIES OF KHOMEINI SUPPORTERS IN LEBANON, ARE SET FORTH BELOW. B/I'S KNOWLEDGE ON THIS SUBJECT IS RATHER LIMITED.

2. B/I IDENTIFIES THE "AL-AZAR" MOVEMENT AS BEING AN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT MADE UP OF FARSI FOLLOWERS OF KHOMEINI. HE COULD NOT PROVIDE INFORMATION CONCERNING ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH "AMAL" OR DETAILING ITS SUPPORT FROM KHOMEINI.

3. OTHER THAN SAYING THAT HUSAIN-A' HUSAYNI HAD A "GOOD" RELATIONSHIP WITH KHOMEINI, B/I COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY DETAILS OF THAT RELATIONSHIP.

4. B/I SAYS THAT KHOMEINI, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, PLAN TO EXPORT THEIR REVOLUTION TO ALL MUSLIM COUNTRIES. B/I HAS HEARD KHOMEINI SPEAK ON THE SUBJECT, AND KHOMEINI HAS MENTIONED EXPORTING THE REVOLUTION NOT ONLY TO LEBANON, BUT ALSO TO IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, INDIA, PAKIS AND AFRICA (IN GENERAL) AND EVEN TO THE PHILIPINES. B/I DOES NOT KNOW KHOMEINI'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, NOR DOES HE HAVE AN IDEA AS TO THE ROLE WHICH KHOMEINI ENVISIONS FOR LEBANON'S SH

5. B/I SAID THAT THERE IS VERY LITTLE COORDINATION OR COOPERATION MILITARILY BETWEEN FAJAN AND "AMAL". POLITICAL TIES ARE SLIGHTLY STRONGER, BUT ARE STILL VERY FLIGHTY. B/I SAID HE COULD NOT ESTIMATE THE STRENGTH OF "AMAL", BUT HE DID KNOW THAT IT HAD DECREASED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THE DISAPPEARANCE OF MUSA SADR.

6. B/I BELIEVES THAT IRANIAN SHIA ARE CONTINUALLY VISITING

ORGANIZING IT. THE NEW DEFENSE MINISTER, DR. MUSTAFA
A CIVILIAN WHO WAS PREVIOUSLY IN THE U.S.
IS MARRIED AND HAS CHILDREN. CHAMRAN WENT
TO BEHABON IN 1972 AND JOINED IMAM MOUSA SADEH'S FOLLOWERS. HE
WAS APPOINTED AS A MILITARY OFFICIAL IN SADEH'S ARMY AND STAYED
WITH THE MOVEMENT UNTIL THE VICTORY OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.
HE PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY IN THE REVOLUTION AND CONTRIBUTED TO THE
VICTORY. HE WAS ALSO A TEACHER IN A SCHOOL IN TIRE WHILE IN
LEBANON. THE IRANIANS CONSIDER HIM TO BE SMART, TRUTHFUL AND
HIGH MORAL STANDINGS. HE IS A TIMELESS WORKER AND VOICES FEEL
COMPLIMENTED. HE IS ABOUT 47 YEARS OLD AND TALL, TANNED AND
PARTIALY BALD. MUCH IS EXPECTED OF HIS PERFORMANCE WITH THE
ARMY IF CONDITIONS PERMIT AND TIME ALLOW.

5. THE IRANIANS CONSIDER LIBYA TO BE AN ARSENAL OF WEAPONS.
THEY ARE AWARE OF THE PRESENCE IN LIBYA OF CUBANS, SOVIETS,
BULGARIANS, TURKS AND OTHER NATIONALITIES, WITH THE
CUBANS AND SOVIETS IN THE MAJORITY. ALSO IN LIBYA ARE LARGE
NUMBERS OF ARABIC AND PAKISTANI (HEADQUARTERS COMMONLY IN
TRIPOLI) WHO ARE TRAINING AND RECEIVING ARMS FROM
LIBYA. ALSO PROVIDE MILITARY TRAINING FOR PALESTINIANS AND
OTHERS. SOUTH AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS. THERE ARE ALSO CUBAN
MILITARY PERSONNEL IN LIBYA WHO ARE AWARE. THERE ARE ALSO
VER, APPROXIMATELY 3000 CUBAN MEDICAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL AND A
NUMBER OF CUBAN CONSTRUCTION WORKERS WHO ARE ARRIVING IN THE
FUTURE. THERE ARE ALSO MANY PAKISTANI, ITALIAN AND BANGLADESHI
ADVISORY PERSONNEL IN LIBYA.)

6. AC... (17 OCTOBER 1979)

7. FIELD DESSEM: SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS,
JERUSALEM, JEDRA, KUWAIT, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI.

8. BEFORE CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--EXEMPT FROM
AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY EXECUTIVE
ORDER 11652 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL P
CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

BT

PAKISTAN



LAND

803,000 km² (includes Pakistani part of Jammu-Kashmir); 40% arable, including 24% cultivated; 23% unsuitable for cultivation; 34% unreported, probably mostly waste; 3% forested

Land boundaries: 5,900 km

WATER

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 nm (fishing 200 nm; plus right to establish 100 nm conservation zones beyond territorial sea); 200 nm exclusive economic zone
Coastline: 1,046 km

PEOPLE

Population: 80,171,000, excluding Junagadh, Manavadar, Gilgit, Baltistan, and the disputed area of Jammu-Kashmir, (July 1979), average annual growth rate 3.0% (current)

Nationality: noun—Pakistani(s), adjective—Pakistani

Religion: 97% Muslim, 3% other

Language: official, Urdu, total spoken languages—7% Urdu, 64% Punjabi, 12% Sindhi, 8% Pushtu, 9% other; English is lingua franca

Literacy: about 17%

Labor force: 22 million (1978 est.); 60% agriculture, 16% industry, 7% commerce, 15% service, 2% unemployed
Organized labor: 5% of labor force

GOVERNMENT

Legal name: Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Type: parliamentary, federal republic; military seized power 5 July 1977 and temporarily suspended some constitutional provisions

Capital: Islamabad

Political subdivisions: 4 provinces—Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and North-West Frontier—with the capital territory of Islamabad and certain tribal areas centrally administered; Pakistan claims that Azad Kashmir is independent pending a settlement of the dispute with India, but it is in fact under Pakistani control

Legal system: based on English common law, accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations; president Zia's government has established Islamic Sharia courts paralleling the secular courts and has introduced Koranic punishments for criminal offenses

National holiday: Pakistan Day, 23 March

Government leader: President and Chief Martial Law Administrator Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq

Suffrage: universal from age 18

Elections: opposition agitation against rigging of elections in March 1977 eventually led to military coup; military promised to hold new national and provincial assembly elections in October 1977 but later postponed them, now promised for 17 November 1979

Political parties and leaders: Pakistan People's Party (PPP), pro-Bhutto wing, Mrs. Z. A. Bhutto, moderate wing, Maulana Kauser Niazi; Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, Asghar Khan; National Democratic Party (NDP), Sherbaz Mazari (formed in 1975 by members of outlawed National Awami Party (NAP) of Abdul Wali Khan, who is de facto NDP leader); Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani; Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a coalition of six parties including Pakistan Muslim League (PML)—Pir of Pagaro group; Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), Tofail Mohammed; Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), Mufti Mahmud

Communists: party membership very small; sympathizers estimated at several thousand

Other political or pressure groups: military remains strong political force

Member of: ADB, Colombo Plan, FAO, GATT, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAC, ICAO, IDA, IFC, IHO, ILO, IMCO, IMF, ITU, IWC—International Wheat Council, RCD, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO, WSC, WTO

ECONOMY

GNP: \$15.0 billion (FY78 est.), \$200 per capita; average annual real growth, 4.0% (1970-78)

Agriculture: extensive irrigation; main crops—wheat, rice, and cotton; foodgrain shortage, 2.3 million tons imported in FY79

Fishing: catch 197,550 metric tons (1978 est.)

Major industries: cotton textiles, food processing, tobacco, engineering, chemicals, natural gas

Electric power: 3,495,000 kW capacity (1978); 15.9 billion kWh produced (1978), 205 kWh per capita

Exports: \$1,342 million (f.o.b., 1978); cotton (raw and manufactured), rice

Imports: \$2,735 million (c.i.f., 1978); foodgrains, edible oil, crude oil, machinery, transport equipment, chemicals

Major trade partners: U.S., U.K., Japan, West Germany

Aid (including Bangladesh prior to 1972): economic—U.S. (FY70-77), \$1.5 billion committed (excluding what is now Bangladesh); U.S.S.R. (1970-77), \$495.8 million; China (1970-77), \$418.3 million; Eastern Europe (1970-77), \$72.6

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AmEmbassy TEHRAN

ACTION: *Pol 3*

INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONTROL NO.

P R 091150Z FEB 78 **CONFIDENTIAL**

FEB 10 1978

file: Christian Rescheduling of Payment 5, etc

INFO: 1
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ISFA 1

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5805
INFO RUHQGV/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3461
RUHJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 989
RUHJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 2498
RUSELK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 7597
RUSEXR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 4738
ZEN/AMCONSUL LAHORE 4721
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3048
RUSEAZ/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7859
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1833
RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4224-S
RUHQGA/CINCPAC
RUSNAA/CINCEUR
RURBA/COMIDEASTFOR
BT

ISLAMABAD 1454

C O N F I D E N T I A L
PACOM AND EUCON FOR POLAD

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR, PK, IR, IN
SUBJECT: SHAH OF IRAN DROPS BY FOR LUNCH

REF: A) ISLAMABAD 1387 (NOTAL) B) ISLAMABAD 0935 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: DURING BRIEF FIVE HOUR STOP IN ISLAMABAD FEBRUARY 5, THE SHAH BRIEFED GENERAL ZIA ON HIS TALKS IN INDIA, RAISED -- BUT DID NOT PUSH -- HIS COMMON MARKET SCHEME, AND MET BRIEFLY WITH THE MAJOR NON-PPP POLITICAL LEADERS, REAFFIRMING TO THEM (AND TO GENERAL ZIA) HIS CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF PAKISTAN. PAKS SEEM GENERALLY PLEASED WITH OUTCOME OF VISIT BUT REMAIN APPREHENSIVE OVER LONG-TERM INDO-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP AND HOW IT WILL AFFECT PAKISTAN'S INTERESTS. END SUMMARY.

2. SHAH OF IRAN ARRIVED FROM DELHI AT 1100 FEBRUARY 5 AND BEFORE DEPARTING AT 1600 CALLED ON THE PRESIDENT, MET WITH CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR (CMLA) GENERAL ZIA, AND ATTENDED A LUNCHEON HOSTED BY THE PRESIDENT. BEFORE LUNCH, HE HAD FIVE-MINUTE TALKS WITH SEVERAL OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL LEADERS, INCLUDING WALI KHAN AND BALUCHI LEADERS, MANY OF WHOM ALSO ATTENDED LUNC.

3. SHAH'S TALK WITH ZIA WAS TETE-A-TETE AND THE WORKING LEVEL AT THE MFA HAS NOT YET BEEN BRIEFED FULLY ON THE DISCUSSION. AT SAME TIME, IRANIAN TEAM LED BY FOREIGN MINISTER KHALATBARY MET WITH PAK OFFICIALS, INCLUDING MFA SECRETARY GENERAL AGHA SHAHL. BASED ON NEWSPAPER REPORTING AND OUR CONVERSATIONS AT IRANIAN EMBASSY AND MFA, WE UNDERSTAND FOLLOWING TOPICS WERE COVERED IN BOTH MEETINGS.

--- BRIEFING ON INDIA VISIT - SHAH REPORTEDLY TOOK MOST OF MEETING WITH ZIA TO BRIEF (AND REASSURE) HIM ON HIS TALKS WITH INDIAN LEADERS. AMONG ISSUES COVERED WERE THE INDIAN OCEAN, IRANIAN AID TO VARIOUS PROJECTS IN INDIA, AND IRANIAN/INDIAN TRADE PROSPECTS.

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8829

IIFO RUQMCU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3735

RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 1272

RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 2817

RUS9LK/AMEMBASSY KAGUL 8268

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3418

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1181

RUS9AE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8634

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2394

RUQHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4724

RUSSNR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 5889

ZEN/AMCONSUL LAHORE 5438

RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 361

RUHQHA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

BT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 3 ISLAMABAD 8524

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: MNUC PEPR PARM PK US FR

SUBJ: PRESS AND GOP REACTIONS TO REPROCESSING DEAL CANCELLATION
SURPRISINGLY MILD

REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 8288 (B) ISLAMABAD 8318 (C) STATE 214621
(D) STATE 215958 (E) STATE 215958

1. SUMMARY: PAKISTANI REACTION TO THE FRENCH DECISION TO CANCEL ITS REPROCESSING PLANT CONTRACT WITH PAKISTAN -- AND TO THE ALLEGED AMERICAN PRESSURES INSTRUMENTAL IN EFFECTING THE FRENCH ACTION -- HAVE BEEN SURPRISINGLY MILD SO FAR. OFFICIAL REACTION TO THE (NEVER FULLY ACKNOWLEDGED) CANCELLATION HAS BEEN LIMITED TO REMARKS BY CMLA GENERAL ZIA DELIVERED TO A PRESS CONFERENCE ON AUGUST 23 (REF B) AND SOME PORTIONS OF A LONG SPEECH ON THE SUBJECT OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION DELIVERED BY FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR AGHA SHAKI ON AUGUST 29.

THE EMBASSY HAS LEARNED THAT AN OFFICIAL GOP POSITION STATEMENT IS IN PREPARATION AT THIS TIME BUT WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE IT WILL NECESSARILY TAKE A MORE ABRASIVE OR COMBATIVE LINE THAN WE HAVE SO FAR SEEN.

PRIVATE SECTOR COMMENT REPRESENTED BY INDEPENDENT PRESS ARTICLES AND EDITORIAL COMMENT HAS RANGED FROM VIRULENT CONDEMNATION OF US AND FRENCH MEDDLING TO BLASE DISINTEREST IN THE WHOLE MATTER. THE OFFICIALLY-INSPIRED (IF NOT CONTROLLED) PRESS HAS TENDED TO EMPHASIZE THE SORROWFUL ASPECTS OF PAKISTAN'S ABANDONMENT BY HER FORMER GREAT FRIEND (THE US) RATHER THAN ANY ANGRY DENUNCIATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION
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 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9218
 INFO RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1762
 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2218
 RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 3809
 RUSELK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1757

BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 34818

EXDIS

EXDIS

ACTION
 DCM2
 INFO
 AMB
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E. O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: MNUC, PARM, TECH, PK
 SUBJECT: PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE HARD-
 LINES ON REPROCESSING PLANT

1. PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR IQBAL AHMED AKHUND (PLEASE PROTECT SOURCE) TOLD ME THE OTHER DAY THAT PAKISTAN HAS EVERY INTENTION OF FINISHING THE REPROCESSING PLANT ON ITS OWN. HE SAID IT WOULD TAKE LONGER THAN IF FRANCE HELPED, BUT THE GOP WAS DETERMINED TO GO AHEAD. HE ASSERTED THAT PAKISTANI COMPLETION OF THE PLANT WAS NOT CONTRARY TO US LAW (I.E. THAT THE GLFNN AMENDMENT APPLIES ONLY TO TRANSFERS OF EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, OR TECHNOLOGY BETWEEN COUNTRIES). HE CONTINUED THAT THE US WAS MESMERIZED BY THE NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE AND WAS NOT TAKING A BALANCED VIEW OF THINGS. HE VIRTUALLY ADMITTED THE THE PURPOSE OF THE PLANT WAS MILITARY -- TO GIVE THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE, INDIANS, AND OTHERS A PERCEPTION OF A PAKISTANI MILITARY CAPABILITY. BUT HE ALSO VIGOROUSLY JUSTIFIED THE PROGRAM ON OTHER GROUNDS AND INSISTED PAKISTAN UNDERSTANDS NON-PROLIFERATION. IN THE PAKISTANI VIEW, HE SAID, THE INDIAN AND AFGHAN SITUATIONS MANDATED THE NEED FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY. THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT PAKISTAN WOULD EXPLODE A DEVICE; IT MEANT SIMPLY THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DO SO.
2. IN RESPONSE TO ALL THIS, I ARGUED THAT THE BEST WAY TO ASSURE PAKISTAN'S SECURITY WAS TO MAKE SURE IT HAD FRIENDS. I SAID THAT FOR PAKISTAN TO GO AHEAD WITH THE PLANT WOULD MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT

11 Jul 79 10 02z

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VV ESA25@HJC352

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3832
INFO RUOMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4146
RUJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 565
RUMJN/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 1732
RUJJK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 3380
RUCMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 703
RUSPLK/AMEMBASSY KATH 19
RUMJHT/AMEMBASSY KATH 1741
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4112
RUEKMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1402
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1056
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3122
RUQHR/AMEMBASSY TEMAN 5331
RUHQHQ/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

BT
SECRET SECTION 9 OF 6 ISLAMABAD 7789

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12865: FD53/4 10 JULY 1999 (HAGERTY, H.G) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV EGEN EFIN PINT PEPR MNUC PK
SUBJECT: (U) PAKISTAN AND ZIA UL-HAQ AT THE TWO-YEAR MARK

REFS: (A) 78 ISLAMABAD 11831 (B) ISLAMABAD 7074 (C) ISLAMABAD 3532
(D) ISLAMABAD 323 (E) ISLAMABAD 4521

1. (S)-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. (SUMMARY): NOW IN THE EARLY DAYS OF HIS THIRD YEAR IN POWER, GENERAL MOHAMMAD ZIA UL-HAQ CAN LOOK BACK WITH PRIDE AT MANY OF HIS ACCOMPLISHMENTS AS CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR AND PRESIDENT; THESE INCLUDE BRINGING THIS COUNTRY OF NEARLY 80 MILLION BACK FROM THE EDGE OF CIVIL WAR, KEEPING THE PEACE (AND HIS COOL) AT HOME AND ABROAD DURING A PERIOD OF MOUNTING UNCERTAINTY IN THE REGION, AND PROVIDING PAKISTAN WITH REASONABLY COMPETENT AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT. THE COUNTRY IS TROUBLED, HOWEVER, AND AS IT MOVES TOWARD THE ELECTIONS HE HAS PROMISED FOR NOVEMBER AND TO THE PROSPECT THEREAFTER OF TURNOVER TO AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT, THE OVERALL LEGACY OF THE ZIA YEARS IS MIXED. ZIA'S "FAILURES" APPEAR TO US (AND TO MANY) TO OUTWEIGHT HIS "SUCCESSSES."
THIS REPORT ATTEMPTS TO CATALOG ZIA'S RECORD AT THE TWO-YEAR MARK, TO ASSESS HIS POSITION AND THE NATIONAL MOOD, AND TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE. IT CONCLUDES THAT PAKISTAN'S FUTURE IS NOT BRIGHT AND THAT THE

NNNNVV ESB074MJC032
RR RUQMHR
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INFO RUMJDX/AMEMBASSY DACCA 3308
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 809
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 8312
ZEN/AMCONSUL LAHORE
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4121
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1409
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1072
ZEN/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5339
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ISLAMABAD 7850

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PINT, SHUM, PK

SUBJ: (U) STUDENTS MARCH ON DAILY "MUSLIM"

REFS(A) ISLAMABAD 7631 (B) ISLAMABAD 7631

1. (U) THE NEW AND REFRESHINGLY OUTSPOKEN ENGLISH LANGUAGE DAILY "MUSLIM" MADE ITS OWN FRONT PAGE JULY 12 WHERE IT REPORTED BEING THE VICTIM OF AN ATTACK BY STUDENT ACTIVISTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONSERVATIVE ISLAMIC JAMIAT-E-TULABA. ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE 100 STUDENTS FROM QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY ARRIVED IN A UNIVERSITY OWNED BUS ON JULY 10 (A HOLIDAY ON WHICH ONLY A SKELETON STAFF WAS WORKING). THE STUDENTS SHOUTED OBJECTIONABLE SLOGANS, INSULTED A FEMALE REPORTER AND "STORMED" THE FIRST FLOOR OFFICES OF THE PAPER.

2. (U) ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLE THE GROUP STAYED AT THE "MUSLIM" OFFICES FOR APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES AND TRIED TO BREAK INTO THE EDITORIAL AREA OF THE PREMISES. THROUGHOUT THE "HOOLIGANISM" A JEEP-LOAD OF POLICE STOOD BY WATCHING BUT NOT STOPPING THE STUDENTS. IT ALSO REPORTS THAT THE STUDENTS WHO STORMED THE "MUSLIM" WERE THE SAME WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY PICKETED THE U.S. AND INDIAN EMBASSIES (REFA).

3. (U) COMMENT: THIS "ATTACK" WAS TOTALLY IGNORED BY THE URDU AND OTHER ENGLISH-LANGUAGE PAPERS ON THE

Pol
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3 29213

NNNVV ESA251MJC106
PP RUQMHR
DE RUSBD #8102 2001000
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 190837Z JUL 79

19 JUL 79 11 29Z

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3972
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1104
INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4159
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 576
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 1745
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY Dacca 3403
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 816
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 8456
RUMJHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 1758
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI 8352
ZEN/AMCONSUL LAHORE
RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4134
ZEN/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5346
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 8102

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 19 JULY 85 (HAGERTY, G.G.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, PGOV, SHUM, PK, IN
SUBJECT: (C) ZIA UL-HAQ, ELECTIONS, AND THE INDIAN SITUATION

REFS: (ALL NOTAL): (A) ISLAMABAD A-49 (B) ISLAMABAD 7706
(C) ISLAMABAD 5223 (D) NEW DELHI 12615 (E) ISLAMABAD
8048

1. (U) ALL ENGLISH-LANGUAGE PAPERS REPORT THIS MORNING
A SHORT PAKISTAN WIRE SERVICE GIST OF COMMENTS MADE BY
PRESIDENT ZIA UL-HAQ IN A RECENT INTERVIEW WITH NEWSWEEK'S
TONY CLIFTON. SUBJECTS ADDRESSED INCLUDED GENERAL AND
LOCAL BODIES POLLS, THE BHUTTO WOMEN, THE PAKISTAN PEOPLES
PARTY (PPP), AND THE GENERAL'S OWN FUTURE.

2. (U) IN HIS REMARKS, ZIA:

-- REAFFIRMED HIS RESOLVE TO HOLD GENERAL ELECTIONS
THIS YEAR, EVEN IF THAT MEANS PUTTING OFF HIS CHERISHED
HOPES OF HOLDING ELECTIONS BEFOREHAND TO DISTRICT AND MUN-
ICIPAL COUNCILS (REF. A);

-- ADMITTED THAT THERE ARE CONDITIONS -- INTERNAL
DISORDER OR EXTERNAL THREAT -- WHICH COULD EFFECT THE
ELECTION SCHEDULE, BUT SAID HE FORESEES NO SUCH CONDITIONS
AT THE MOMENT;

-- REASSERTED HIS FAITH IN THE LOCAL BODIES SYSTEM
HE HAS OFFERED AS A MEANS OF GETTING DEMOCRACY FUNCTION-
ING AT THE GRASS ROOTS LEVEL, BUT TOOK NOTE OF UN-
ANIMOUS OPPOSITION FROM THE NATION'S POLITICIANS WHO,
HE SAID, APPEAR TO HIM TO WANT TO GET THEMSELVES ELECTED
FIRST AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL SO AS TO BE ABLE TO
INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF LOCAL BODIES POLLS;

-- PLEDGED THAT THE PPP WILL HAVE FULL FREEDOM
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS; HE CLAIMED CREDIT

memorandum

CONFIDENTIAL
 August 1, 1979

DATE:

REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

Masood Akram
 Economic Advisor

SUBJECT:

Islamic Rally at Peshawar University

TO: Douglas B. Archard
 Principal Officer

Beginning from July 21, 1979, a three-day rally of Islami Jamiati-Tulaba was held at the campus of Peshawar University under the auspices of their NWFP Branch. Fairly elaborate arrangements were made to receive the delegates to the rally who came from all over the country. Transportation, boarding and lodging facilities were arranged by very enthusiastic workers of Islami Jamiati-Tulaba of Peshawar University. It is somewhat difficult to say how many out-of-town delegates attended the rally. Estimates vary from 500 to over 1,000. Delegates included a twenty-man delegation from Saudi Arabia. The total audience in certain sessions exceeded 3,000 persons.

According to Shabir Ahmed, a medical student at Peshawar University, and Irshad ul-Haq, a businessman, both enthusiastic supporters of Jamaat - i - Islami (J.I.), who attended the rally, the declared objective of the rally was to infuse the spirit of Islam in Pakistani youth, and prepare the young generation for handling the responsibility of an Islamic society. With this end in view, sermons by learned scholars of Islam, speeches by leaders of J.I. and meetings for recitation and interpretation of Quran, were organized during different sessions of the rally. An exhibition dealing with the history of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan was also held.

The rally received a good will message from Maulana Maudoodi, the founder of J.I. who predicted a resurgence and the final supremacy of Islam. A number of top leaders of J.I. came to address the rally. They included Professor Ghafoor, Professor Khurshid, Mian Tufail Mohammad, Qazi Hussain Ahmed and others. Prominent among the student leaders were Liaqat Baluch, Shabir Ahmed, Arbab Afridi, and Zafar Jamal Baluch. Practically all the leaders of the J.I. who addressed the rally talked about the basic themes: (1) Greatness of Islam as a solution for the problems of today's world with special reference to Pakistan, (2) the rather precarious state of Pakistan's national economy, and (3) Jihad and Islamic resurgence. For instance, Professor Khurshid said that Islam is the only religion which came to overshadow everything else

CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12065 GDS July 31, 1985 (ARCI Ak.), DOUGLAS B.) OR-M

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 (REV. 7-78)
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 RUMJPC/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
 DE RUSBOD #1932 2941120
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 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0364
 INFO RUMJPC/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 062
 RUMJPC/AMEMBASSY JIPDA 925
 RUMJPC/AMEMBASSY KANUL 97B1
 RUMJPC/AMCONSUL KARACHI 8941
 ZEN/AMCONSUL LAHORE 9749
 ZEN/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
 RUEHC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4292
 RUEHC/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1542
 RUMJPC/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5473
 RUMJPC/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
 RUEHC/SECDEF WASHDC
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POL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 11923

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

S. 12055: RIS4 10/10/95(SAGEBITY, H.C.) OR-P
 T. 12055: PINT, PGOV, SEUM, MPOL, PK
 S. 12055: (C) JOURNALIST SAYS ZIA PLANS NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AFTER
 REFERENDUM ON ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT

REF(A) ISLAMABAD 11843(B) ISLAMABAD 11815

1. (C) M.A. MANSURI, "DAWN" ISLAMABAD CORRESPONDENT --
 AMONG MOST KNOWLEDGABLE AND WELL-SOURCED JOURNALISTS IN
 TOWN -- TOLD EMBOUY SHERMAN OCT 19 THAT PRESIDENT ZIA
 UL-HAQ INTENDS TO MOVE PAKISTAN TOWARD WHAT IS BEING
 DESCRIBED AS A "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT" (NG), PROBABLY SOME-
 TIME EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR. MANSURI PREDICTED METHOD
 TO BE USED WILL BE A PRELIMINARY REFERENDUM IN WHICH THE
 PAKISTANI VOTER WILL BE PRESENTED WITH A SIMPLE BINARY
 CHOICE BETWEEN AN "ISLAMIC" FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND A
 "NON-ISLAMIC" FORM. MANSURI CHARACTERIZED THIS AS
 "STACKING THE DECK," AS PAKISTANIS COULD NO MORE VOTE
 AGAINST ISLAM THAN AMERICANS COULD AGAINST APPLE PIE.
2. (C) ONCE THE REFERENDUM IS COMPLETED, MANSURI SAID,
 THE PRESIDENT CAN CLAIM HE HAS AN OVERWHELMING MANDATE
 TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. HE WILL THEN CALL TOGETHER POLITICAL
 AND MILITARY LEADERS FROM WHOM HE WILL PUT TOGETHER A
 "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT."

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Victor J. OSIPOV, Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy, Tehran; Walter G. Ramsay, Second Secretary, American Embassy

Place: American Embassy, Tehran

Date: April 9, 1966

Mr. Osipov called on me at his request. I last met him, briefly, at the Hungarian Embassy National Day reception on April 4, he then asked for an appointment to see me to reciprocate my call on him at the Soviet Embassy on February 12. Our conversation lasted 50 minutes and was entirely in Persian. The following points were covered:

1. After the usual amenities, I explained to Osipov that I was receiving him in an unused office (Chancey Room 105) because we unfortunately do not have a regular reception room. This led into a few minutes discussion of the relative architectural merits of the Soviet Embassy, built along older, sumptuous lines, and the more starkly modern American Embassy. Osipov asked if I had ever visited the Soviet "Club". After an involved conversation to establish just what club he was talking about (the Club for Soviet Embassy personnel on Avenue Stalin), I said I had been there once about a year ago to see a Polish Embassy film show. Osipov then asked if I would like to visit the club sometime. I did not respond to this invitation and he did not pursue the subject.

2. 23rd Communist Party Congress. I asked if Ambassador Zaitsev had returned to Tehran and said I assumed he was a delegate to the 23rd Communist Party Congress in Moscow. Osipov confirmed that their Ambassador was a delegate to the Congress and said he would not return for several more days, as he would stay on in Moscow for discussions of economic questions, etc. I expressed mild surprise, since the Congress had terminated the previous day. Osipov explained that "discussions" among delegates to the Congress would nevertheless continue for a few days, that they would concentrate principally on economic questions, but would not be restricted to questions of Soviet internal affairs.

CONFIDENTIAL

Worth keeping in
our Iran - Source?
file and B12 file
M

Beal
file

29 October 1970

P-Memo #63-70

MEMORANDUM FOR: Political Section
FROM : CAS
SUBJECT : Remarks of the Press Attache of the Soviet
bassy, Syroyezhkin, on Iran-Soviet relations

The following information from a reliable source is for your information and use and need not be attributed to CAS:

The Press Attache of the Soviet Embassy, Syroyezhkin, commented on relations between Iran and the Soviet Union. He strongly criticized the propaganda policies of the Iranian Government and said: The Iranian Ministry of Information is actually a branch of the U.S. Information Section, and the general lines of the propaganda policies of that ministry are being designed by Iranian officials working at the USIS. News items connected with the Soviet Union and neutral countries are being published and broadcast in a pungent and malicious way, whereas the news dealing with the U.S. and Western countries are made public with "special decorations".

Syroyezhkin noted that recently an anti-Communist conference was held in Tokyo in which Iran was represented by Rahim Zehtab Fard, the editor of Eradeyeh Azarbaijan, and another person. The Ettela'at newspaper had published the statements made by Fidel Castro's sister at the conference in which she had impudently attacked Communism. One cannot, he continued, understand the purpose of Iranian newspapers when they publish such provocative items--except to think that it is part of the work accomplished by American saboteurs who pay money to Iranian newspapers to have such articles and items published.

Syroyezhkin then mentioned the publication of a book on the situation of Iranian villages. But the book was banned and the author arrested. Another well-known writer, whose pen name is Beh-Azin and real name is Mahmud E'temadzadeh, had in an article highly commended the author's work, confirming its contents. He, too, was arrested.

1 Feb. Caracas
2 Feb. BIO - SSA

AG
H
B

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Guennady Kazankin, Second Secretary,
Russian Embassy
John D. Stempel, First Secretary

DATE & PLACE: June 16, 1976 - Shiraz Nights Restaurant (in
Zargandeh)

SUBJECTS: Isfahan Religious Murders, Soviet-Iraq
Relations, and Sadat's Visit to Iran

COPIES TO:

AMB/DCM	OR	NEA/IRN
POL	SECURITY	INR/RNA
POL/M	BIO	INR/OIL/B
ECON	Amconsul ISFAHAN	CHRON

Kazankin picked me up as usual in front of the Embassy. With him were two of his children who had been playing at the Soviet Embassy during the morning, Boris, 9, and Natasha, 13. We dropped his children off at their home in the Russian summer compound in Zargandeh and ate lunch at a nearby restaurant. Random pleasantries aside, the following were items of interest:

Isfahan Religious Murders

Kazankin was determined to get my views on the killing of Ayatollah Shamsabadi (see Tehran A-101 of May 27, 1976 NOTAL) and the resulting turmoil surrounding the capture of the alleged killers. He returned to the subject three or four times, knowing I had just spent 7 days in Isfahan. I replied there seemed to be a surprising lack of interest in the subject; most Isfahanis thought the true killers had been arrested. In response to my inquiry as to what stories he had heard, Kazankin replied that many religious figures were really against the government. I allowed as how perhaps the full story of the killing had not come out, but went no further. He added that there seemed to be a real struggle between the religious leaders and the government going on, albeit underground. I said there was some dissatisfaction with the change from a Moslem to a Persian dynastic calendar, then pressed him for more details. He said there had been some unrest in Qom, and we both agreed this would be significant if Mashad also showed some signs of unease. (Mashad, Qom, and Isfahan are the centers of Moslem religious fervor and organization in Iran).

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TELEGRAM

1378 SEP -7 PM 12:46

Para 2
 IN CASE OF
 DISCREPANCY
 CONTACT
 DIRECTOR
 08547

FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
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E.O. 11652:
 TAGS:
 SUBJECT:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC
 CIA WASHDC
 DIA WASHDC

7

ACTION:

INFO: USLO PEKING
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

08547 !

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4

TAGS: PEPR, PINS, IR, CH, PINT,
 SUBJECT: SOVIET EMBASSY COMMENTS ON HUA VISIT TO IRAN

POL-3

SUMMARY: SOVIETS APPEAR MIDLY CONCERNED ABOUT HUA VISIT AND

AMB
 DCM
 ECON-2
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 USIS
 OR
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ARE PROBING FOR POSSIBLE UNANNOUNCED MILITARY AGREEMENTS
 BETWEEN IRAN AND CHINA. END SUMMARY.

SHIR
 TABR
 13/

1. ACTING CHIEF OF POL SECTION WAS SEATED ACROSS FROM
 GOLOVANOV
 SOVIET POLITICAL OFFICER VLADIMIR ~~GOLANOV~~ (A KNOWN KGB
 OFFICER) AT DINNER EVENING SEPT 6 AT HOME OF FINNISH CHARGE.
 AFTER USUAL BANTER ABOUT RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES' INVOLVEMENT
 GOLOVANOV
 IN RECENT UNREST, ~~GOLANOV~~ PRESSED FOR U.S. VIEWS ON RECENT
 HUA VISIT AUG. 29-SEPT 1. EMBOFF REPLIED IT WAS SIMPLY
 MUTUAL GETTING TOGETHER OF TWO COUNTRIES CONCERNED WITH
 IRAN
 OTHERS' ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION. / SAW POSITIVE RELATIONS
 WITH CHINA AS COUNTER WEIGHT TO POSSIBLE SOVIET PRESSURE AND
 GOLOVANOV
 POTENTIAL INVOLVEMENT WITH DISSIDENCE WITHIN IRAN. ~~GOLANOV~~

DRAFTED BY POL: JDS tempel: lab	DRAFTING DATE 9-7-78	TEL. CAT.	CONTACTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: DCM: CWNeas
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CLASSIFICATION:
 OR: (subs)

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 1521H
 (Formerly FS-413(11))
 January 1975
 Dept. of State

SECRET EXDIS

NNNNYV ZSE064BRA131
RE RUQMBR
DE RUEEC #5841/81 3271919
ZNY #SSSS ZZE
R 231745Z NOV 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUFZNA/USMISSION USNATO 1891
RUOMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 6842
RUEHYO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8085
RUOMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARAKUM 9926
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 3575
RUEHIT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4253
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4884
INFO RUQMBR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6258
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3425

BT
SECRET SECTION 21 OF 82 STATE 296841/21

Handwritten: 24 Nov 78, FILE, ACTION, DCM-2, INFO, AMB, POL, ADM, CRU-DUMMY, 2/gsp, Pol 2-2

Handwritten: I think hints of Sov involvement here need not be dismissed and of hand in our local conversations. It helps the moderate position. 68

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

EXDIS

TAGS: UR, US, IR

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POSTURE AND INTENTIONS REGARDING SITUATION IN IRAN

REF: TEHRAN 11357

1. FOLLOWING IS INR ANALYSIS OF SOVIET POSTURE AND INTENTIONS REGARDING SITUATION IN IRAN. YOU MAY DRAW ON THIS ANALYSIS, AS APPROPRIATE, IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS. IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS, YOU SHOULD ALSO ASK FOR HOST GOVERNMENT'S ASSESSMENT AND VIEWS ON SOVIET MOTIVATIONS AND APPROACH.

2. BEGIN TEXT. INTRODUCTION. BREZNEV'S STATEMENT ON IRAN ON SUNDAY UNDERSCORES INCREASING SOVIET CONCERN OVER EVENTS IN IRAN AND UNCERTAINTY OVER WHAT MEASURES THE US MAY BE CONTEMPLATING. THE TIMING OF HIS COMMENTS SUGGESTS THEY WERE INTENDED TO OFFSET RECENT WESTERN PRESS-PLAY ON SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN CUBA AND REFLECT SOVIET SENSITIVITY TO ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE USSR IS INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT DISTURBANCES IN IRAN. WE FEEL THAT WHILE THE SOVIETS MAY BE TEMPTED TO MIDDLE, THEY REMAIN UNDECIDED AND ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TEMPORIZING.

3. BREZNEV'S STATEMENT. WE BELIEVE BREZNEV'S

SECRET EXDIS

USSR

Viktor Grigor'yevich AFANAS'YEV

Chief Editor, Pravda

Viktor Afanas'yev (pronounced ahfahNAHSyef) has been chief editor of *Pravda*—a newspaper that serves as the official voice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)—since March 1976. He succeeded Mikhail Zimyanin, who moved up to become a member of the Central Committee Secretariat, the Party's top executive body. Afanas'yev had previously served since 1974 as chief editor of the CPSU theoretical journal *Kommunist*—a post he assumed after working for nearly 6 years as deputy chief editor at *Pravda* under Zimyanin's direction. In 1976 Afanas'yev became a voting member of the CPSU Central Committee and succeeded Zimyanin as board chairman of the USSR Union of Journalists.



(1976)

The Rewards of Moderation

While Afanas'yev has no direct career ties with any member of the Soviet leadership, he probably has few detractors among them: Whether from personal conviction or a recognition of the political realities, he has remained a steadfast "middle-of-the-roader" during recent years, his views apparently consistent with the official consensus. An illustration of Afanas'yev's typically balanced approach is his stand on the application of technology to economic management: While advocating the widespread use of computers as a management tool (a fairly progressive idea in the Soviet context), he has balanced that stand with a warning that technicians in charge of those computers must always remain under close Party control. Afanas'yev is the author of *Fundamentals of Philosophical Knowledge*, a Marxist textbook, and such monographs as "Scientific Administration of Society," "Problems of Integrity in Philosophy and Biology," and "Scientific Communism." He has been a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences since 1972 and a member of the editorial board of the Academy's journal *Voprosy Filosofii* (Questions of Philosophy) since at least 1969.

Early Life and Career

Viktor Grigor'yevich Afanas'yev was born on 18 November 1922 in Aktanysh, a village in the Tatar Autonomous Republic. He served in the Soviet Army from 1940 until 1953, graduating by correspondence in 1950

USSR Andrey Mikhaylovich ALEKSANDROV-AGENTOV

Aide to CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev

One of five publicly identified aides (*pomoshchniki*) to General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Andrey Aleksandrov-Agentov (pronounced ahlek-SAHNdruf-ahGHENTuf) is Brezhnev's chief foreign policy adviser. He also serves as the General Secretary's key speech writer and accompanies him on most of his trips abroad. Since 1971 Aleksandrov has constantly accompanied Brezhnev in his meetings with US officials, including the summit talks held in the United States in 1973. Aleksandrov-Agentov (often shortened to Aleksandrov) has worked closely with Brezhnev for nearly 15 years, in a relationship that one observer has described as an attraction of opposites—Brezhnev, the Party apparatchik of humble origin, and Aleksandrov, the urbane and cultured model of a 19th century diplomat.



(1974)

In the blurred division of responsibilities among Brezhnev's aides, Aleksandrov's area of specialization appears to encompass American affairs and the larger East-West problems, probably including arms control matters. As Brezhnev's chief foreign policy adviser, however, Aleksandrov might be described more accurately as a generalist who coordinates and screens information flowing in from Soviet institutions with some responsibilities in the area of foreign policy—the Foreign Ministry, the Committee for State Security (KGB), foreign studies institutes, and certain departments of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). This kind of wide-ranging authority has inevitably produced some friction with the foreign affairs bureaucracy and, according to a former high official in the Polish Foreign Ministry, Aleksandrov has made many enemies. His position with Brezhnev, however, remains secure, as shown most recently in March 1976 by his promotion to nonvoting membership in the CPSU Central Committee.

Early Life and Career

Andrey Mikhaylovich Aleksandrov-Agentov was born on 16 April 1918 in Altay Kray in Siberia. He studied German and Scandinavian languages at Leningrad State University and then joined the Foreign Ministry in 1942. Aleksandrov was trained in the diplomatic service in Stockholm, working under Aleksandra Kollontay, a former associate of Lenin's and the Soviet

USSR

Vladimir Sergeyevich ALKHIMOV

Chairman of the Board, State Bank

A leading figure in the Ministry of Foreign Trade for over a decade, Vladimir Alkhimov (pronounced ah-HEE-muf) was appointed chairman of the State Bank of the USSR (Gosbank) in October 1976. The appointment came as a surprise to some Soviet and international business and banking figures, who had long expected him to succeed either Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolay Patolichev or the elderly First Deputy Minister Mikhail Kuz'min. As Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade since 1967, Alkhimov had



(1976)

been responsible for the international financial aspects of foreign trade, including oversight of the Ministry's Main Foreign Exchange Administration and of the Foreign Trade Bank (Vneshtorgbank). He played the leading role in negotiations with West European countries and Japan for massive state credits during 1974 and 1975.

Proponent of US-Soviet Ties

Alkhimov has been cochairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council and a member of the US-USSR Joint Commercial Commission. A "softliner" on US-Soviet economic relations, Alkhimov has been an outspoken proponent of expanded trade with the United States. He told a US business executive in 1975 that most-favored-nation status was important, "but not that important," and that the key economic issue was the volume of credits allowed the USSR. A few months later, Alkhimov admitted to a visiting US congressman that the Soviet Union was not gaining anything by its policy of restricting emigration and that it should be abandoned.

Alkhimov has dealt frequently with US officials, both in Moscow and the United States. During May-June 1973 he came to this country to aid in the arrangements for the visit of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev. At the same time Alkhimov took part in the negotiations that led to the signing of a US-USSR Convention on Taxation and that resulted in an agreement with the US Export-Import Bank to extend more than \$180 million in credits to the USSR. He has visited Washington, D.C., twice (1974 and 1975) in his role as cochairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council. In September and October 1975 he served on the Soviet negotiating team that met with US officials in Moscow

USSR

Aleksey Konstantinovich ANTONOV

Minister of the Electrical Equipment Industry

Since 1965 Aleksey Antonov (pronounced ahnTOHnuf) has presided over the Soviet Union's expanding electrotechnical industry as Minister of the Electrical Equipment Industry. A respected administrator with a strong engineering background, he oversees a Ministry responsible for a wide range of electrical equipment, particularly that related to the generation and transmission of electric power. His articles on Ministry operations have appeared widely in the Soviet press, and he has been publicly candid about



(1974)

both the Ministry's successes and its shortcomings. Antonov has been a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) since 1940 and a voting member of the CPSU Central Committee since 1971.

The Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry occupies a leading role in the Soviet economy. Its progress in the development and production of large-scale electrical equipment determines, in large measure, the rate at which industrial expansion takes place, particularly in the developing Siberian and Central Asian areas. Under Antonov's leadership, improvement of conventional electrotechnical equipment has proceeded alongside research in exotic power systems using superconductor and electron beam technology. Antonov's realistic evaluation of Soviet technical competence has also resulted in extensive contact with Western firms to provide the additional technical input and materials needed to fulfill Ministry objectives.

Early Life and Career

Aleksey Konstantinovich Antonov was born on 8 June 1912 in Grodno in Belorussia. The son of a teacher, Antonov worked as a mechanic during the early 1930's. He graduated from the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute in 1935. From 1937 until 1957 Antonov worked successively as an engineer, head of a laboratory, a deputy chief designer, a shop and production chief and a chief engineer at plants in the aviation industry. When former Premier Nikita Khrushchev abolished most Ministries in 1957 in favor of the regional councils of the national economy (*sovnarkhozy*), Antonov was appointed to the prestigious Leningrad *Soonarkhoz*. He served there as chief engineer (1957-59), deputy chairman (1959-61) and chairman (1961-65). He was also a member of the bureau of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee during 1961-

Classified by 88489
Exempt from automatic downgrading and
declassification under
E.O. 11652, executive orders
8823
Automatically declassified on
Date Inapplicable to Determination

USSR

Eduard Asaturovich AYKAZYAN

Chief, USA Section, Foreign Relations Administration, State Committee for Science and Technology



(1975)

Eduard Aykazyan (pronounced eyekuhzYAHN) joined the Foreign Relations Administration of the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) in 1972. As deputy chief (1972-73) and now chief of the USA Section, he has been a frequent contact for visiting American scientific and commercial delegations. A skillful negotiator, Aykazyan is currently charged with the day-to-day administration of scientific and technical exchanges conducted under the joint US-USSR cooperative agreement signed in 1972. His duties range from such mundane matters as arranging hotel accommodations for visiting American delegations to such important tasks as negotiating the purchase of sophisticated American equipment and technology.

Frequently Aykazyan is called upon to smooth the ruffled feathers of both American and Soviet exchange delegates because of seemingly impossible bureaucratic obstacles and delays on both sides in implementing research programs. Anxious to establish good working relationships with his American counterparts, he has pledged to try to eliminate red tape on the Soviet side and to reply quickly and forthrightly to American requests to visit Soviet research facilities.

High-Level Connections

During his service as chief of the USA Section, Aykazyan has developed a close personal and working relationship with influential GKNT Deputy Chairman Dzherman Gvishiani. The son-in-law of Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin, Gvishiani has played a key role in establishing technical and commercial exchange agreements with the United States. According to US officials, Aykazyan has been given progressively more authority by his mentor, and he frequently prepares briefing papers for Gvishiani prior to formal negotiating sessions.

Aykazyan is always cognizant of the political undertones of formal scientific and technical negotiations. He adroitly avoids questions that would

USSR

Ivan Ivanovich BODYUL

***First Secretary, Central
Committee, Communist Party of
Moldavia***

Agricultural specialist Ivan Bodyul (pronounced BODEyool) has been first secretary of the Communist Party of Moldavia since May 1961. His career and that of Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), crossed paths during the early 1950's, when Brezhnev was Moldavian first secretary and Bodyul headed one of the district Party committees. Bodyul is known today as one of the General Secretary's staunchest supporters—a reputation that was enhanced in 1971, when he publicly described Brezhnev as the "leader of the Communist Party and the State." (Nikolay Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, is titular Chief of State.)



(1975)

Agricultural Innovator

Moldavia's economy is principally agricultural, and Bodyul—despite a conservative orientation in other areas—has been one of the Soviet Union's most innovative leaders in agricultural administration. In 1969 he proposed the creation of locally elected, producer-oriented collective farm councils as an alternative to the existing centrally controlled agricultural bureaucracy, a proposal that has since been fully implemented in Moldavia. During the 1970's he started organizing agro-industrial complexes and production councils of collective and state farms as a means of improving coordination among various agricultural enterprises. In 1973 a stream of interested officials from other areas toured Moldavia to study the republic's collective farm councils and other agricultural innovations; they were personally escorted by Bodyul, who delights in the national attention his innovations have attracted. The republic was accorded high level recognition in June 1976, when a decree of the CPSU Central Committee ordered Party and government organs to accelerate the creation of interfarm associations and agro-industrial complexes. The decree mentioned Bodyul's republic at the head of a list of various regions in the Soviet Union where such experiments have been conducted.

Ideological Conservative

In contrast to his fresh approach to agriculture, Bodyul's views on other matters have closely followed the established dogma. He has accused the

USSR

Konstantin Ustinovich CHERNENKO

Secretary, CPSU Central Committee; Chief, General Department, CPSU Central Committee



(1970)

An associate of General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's for more than 20 years, Konstantin Chernenko (pronounced cherNENkuh) has been a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) since March 1976. He also serves as chief of the Central Committee's General Department, a post he assumed in July 1965. Chernenko's responsibilities in the Party Secretariat defy precise definition, but his election to that body probably increased the importance and authority of the General Department, which was already a key link in the CPSU command structure.

Expediting Policy Decisions

As chief of the General Department, Chernenko oversees the handling of all communications and correspondence generated by the CPSU Politburo and other leading Party organs. One of his chief responsibilities is the shepherding of memoranda, draft speeches, and other important documents through the Party's decisionmaking machinery—a no easy task in a system where decisions are so often deferred to the highest levels. Chernenko's department also performs a number of other sensitive functions, including the processing of citizens' complaints to top Party officials, issuing and safeguarding Party membership cards, and maintaining CPSU archival materials.

Party Historian

In recent years Chernenko has played a leading role in the publication of most collections of official CPSU documents. He was the senior member of the editorial board for *The Party Worker's Guide* (an annual reference work that lists important Party and government documents) from 1966 until 1969, when that duty was shifted to his first deputy, Klavdiy Bogolyubov. One reason for the shift became apparent in 1970, when Chernenko joined Petr Fedoseyev, then director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, as coeditor of *The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, a monumental, multivolume compilation of

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USSR

Leonid Vital'yevich KANTOROVICH

Head, Problems Laboratory of Economic-Mathematical Methods and Operations Research, Institute of Management of the National Economy



(1975)

An internationally recognized creative genius in the fields of mathematics and the application of electronic computers to economic affairs, Academician Leonid Kantorovich (pronounced kahntuhROHvich) has worked at the Institute of Management of the National Economy since 1971. He has been involved in advanced mathematical research since the age of 15; in 1939 he invented linear programming, one of the most significant contributions to economic management in the twentieth century. Kantorovich has spent most of his adult life battling to win acceptance for his revolutionary concept from Soviet academic and economic bureaucracies; the value of linear programming to Soviet economic practices was not really recognized by his country's authorities until 1965, when Kantorovich was awarded a Lenin Prize for his work. International recognition came in October 1975, when the mathematician was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics jointly with T. C. Koopmans, a Dutch-born American economist who discovered the same concept independently a few years after Kantorovich.

In addition to his mathematical research, Kantorovich has been directly involved in developing improved designs for high-speed digital computers, an activity apparently motivated by the Soviet Union's need for improved computers in solving large economic planning problems.

The Institute of Management of the National Economy

The Institute of Management of the National Economy was established to train high-level economic and industrial administrators in modern methods of management, production organization and the use of economic-mathematical methods and computers in planning. When the institute opened in early 1971, Premier Aleksey Kosygin and Party Secretary Andrey Kirilenko attended the ceremonies, thus suggesting the importance that the Soviet Government and Party attach to the application of modern management techniques to Soviet industrial administration and economic planning.

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USSR

Aleksandr Akimovich ISHKOV

Minister of the Fish Industry

Aleksandr Ishkov (pronounced ish-KOFF) has been a leading administrator of the Soviet fishing industry since 1939. He has held ministerial rank or its equivalent for over 30 years. He was named Minister of the Fish Industry for the third time in his career in October 1965. Ishkov has survived periods of severe public criticism, and he continues to head an industry that now employs some 700,000 people and uses 18,000 ships. He has been a nonvoting member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee since 1956.



(1974)

Expanding Operations

During the past decade, the Soviet fishing industry has steadily expanded the scope of its operations. This expansion has been accomplished in part through agreements with many less-developed countries, by which Moscow provides credits and grants in exchange for concessions for its shipping fleet and repair facilities. Such measures have allowed the USSR to explore new waters, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere, at a time when 200-mile economic zones and conservation agreements are beginning to restrict Soviet activities in more traditional fishing areas.

Early Life

Aleksandr Akimovich Ishkov was born on 30 August 1905 in Stavropol, located between the Black and Caspian Seas. At the age of 14 he served as an apprentice in an electrical shop where he later became assistant foreman. During 1924-30, Ishkov served as secretary of the agitation and propaganda department of a local Party committee and as secretary of a Komsomol committee.

Fishing for a Career

Detailed information on Ishkov during his early career is lacking, but all Soviet biographies agree that in 1930, at age 25, he forsook any interest he may have had in Party work and began his long career in the fish industry. It is not known how he developed an interest in that field; perhaps his early Party and Komsomol responsibilities were in a region adjacent to the sea. At any rate, during the 1930's he worked in local and union organizations of the

USSR

Mikhail Stepanovich KAPITSA

**Chief, First Far Eastern
Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs**

Since 1970 Mikhail Kapitsa (pronounced KAHpitsah) has been chief of the First Far Eastern Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a member of the Ministry's policy-making Collegium. A senior Soviet expert on China, he has specialized in Asian affairs during his more than 20-year diplomatic career. He previously directed the Foreign Ministry's Southeast Asian Department (1966-70), and during 1960-61 he was Ambassador to Pakistan. Kapitsa is currently responsible for China, Korea and Mongolia. In his role as a Collegium member, he coordinates general policy questions handled by the other three Asian departments in the Foreign Ministry.



(1969)

Professional Diplomat and Scholar

More articulate than most other Soviet officials, with a free-wheeling personal style, Kapitsa often gives the impression that he is expressing something more than the official stand on issues. He is a physically imposing man—almost 2 meters tall—with an authoritative and sometimes explosive manner. Extremely self-confident, he is often expansive and bantering during discussions with US officials, as he presents his views regarding China and Chinese matters. Kapitsa is one of the Soviet Union's most voluble Asian experts, outspoken and overdramatic but worth listening to, according to foreign officials.

Doctor of Historical Sciences Kapitsa has combined an academic career with his diplomatic work: In 1961 he became a professor at the Institute of Oriental Languages at Moscow State University. He serves on the editorial board of the journal *Problems of the Far East*, and he has been a prolific author of books and articles on China. Kapitsa often writes under pseudonyms, one of which is "M. Ukraintsev." In 1968 he wrote *To the Left of Common Sense*, in which he surveyed the development of the Maoist line since 1949. In that publication he described the increasingly anti-Soviet posture of the Chinese leadership and asserted that China was the Soviet Union's main problem. In 1969 Kapitsa published a bitter attack on China entitled *PRC: Two Decades, Two Policies*. Kapitsa has been nominated several times for corresponding membership in the USSR Academy of Sciences but has not been elected.

USSR

Nikolay Timofeyevich GLUSHKOV

Chairman, State Committee for Prices

Nikolay Glushkov (pronounced glooshKOFF), a former administrator of the Soviet nonferrous metallurgical industry, was made Chairman of the State Committee for Prices in August 1975. The post had been vacant for over a year; his predecessor, Vladimir Sitnin, had been released in mid-1974. Glushkov may be a protégé of Vladimir Dolgikh, a Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Secretary for heavy industry, with whom he served in the Krasnoyarsk region of the USSR during the 1960's.



(1975)

The responsibility of the State Committee is to establish prices, in coordination with the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), for the main products of heavy industry, for major types of food and clothing and for certain other consumer goods. The Committee was set up in 1965 in connection with a national economic reform that sought, among other things, to rely more heavily on prices as a stimulus toward greater economic efficiency, technological progress and higher product quality. Initially attached to Gosplan, the State Committee for Prices was upgraded to direct subordination to the Council of Ministers in late 1969.

Service in Siberia

Nothing is currently known concerning Glushkov's education or early career; even his age is unrecorded. He was first identified in the Soviet press in 1961 as deputy chairman of the Krasnoyarsk (Central Siberia) Council of the National Economy (*sovmarkhoz*), part of a system of regional economic supervisory bodies that existed during 1957-65. Glushkov served on the Krasnoyarsk *sovmarkhoz* until at least 1964, by which time he had become its first deputy chairman. During this period he was probably associated with Dolgikh, who then worked in the Krasnoyarsk region as director of the Noril'sk Mining and Metallurgical Combine.

By 1968 Glushkov had moved to Moscow and had become chief of the Main Economic Planning Administration of the Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy. In 1974 he was made a Deputy Minister. In that capacity he met at least three times with representatives of US firms for talks on joint metallurgical projects in the Soviet Union. These projects included the

USSR

Georgiy Markovich KORNIYENKO

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

In October 1975 Georgiy Korniyenko (pronounced kurnihYENkuh), chief of the Foreign Ministry's USA Department since 1966 and a member of the Ministry's policymaking Collegium since at least 1968, was promoted to Deputy Foreign Minister. He is now one of ten deputies. He continues, however, to deal exclusively with US affairs, and his promotion seems to indicate the importance the Soviet leadership attaches to its relationship with Washington and to reflect high regard for Korniyenko.



(1977)

Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov, head of the Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), has described Korniyenko as a man "strong in battle" who wields more influence than his post as department head would suggest. Korniyenko is said to be respected by the Communist Party's Politburo and Central Committee leaders for his grasp of American affairs. There have been indications that Korniyenko has been actively involved in internal Soviet SALT deliberations.

Korniyenko, who speaks English well, has been dealing with US officials since his tour (1960-65) at the Embassy in Washington. He has participated in every US-Soviet summit meeting since 1972 and was frequently present during meetings between Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Soviet colleagues have stated that Korniyenko considers US-Soviet relations to be a serious competition in which policy changes are determined by national interests and each country seeks to improve its position without expecting to win unilateral concessions.

Korniyenko is a sober and logical man who is able to recognize valid information and analysis. In 1969, when he was assigned to the Soviet SALT delegation, Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin described him as taciturn but as someone who would understand the statements of his US counterparts at SALT. Understanding or not, Korniyenko can be a tough negotiator: US officials, after a substantive conversation with him in 1974, described him as being "his usual cantankerous self" on a number of issues.

USSR

Georgiy Arkad'yevich KARAVAYEV

Minister of Construction

Georgiy Karavayev (pronounced kuhrahVAHyef), a career construction bureaucrat, has been Minister of Construction since 1967. Karavayev first attained the rank of Deputy Minister in the early 1950's and later served twice (1953-61, 1963-67) as the number-two man in the State Committee for Construction Affairs (Gosstroy). A member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) since 1940, he became a voting member of its Central Committee in 1976.



(1974)

Supervising a total work force of over a half million people, Karavayev works in one of the weakest and most inefficient sectors of his country's economy. The Soviet construction industry is fraught with problems such as delayed projects, low managerial skills, careless workmanship, poor quality materials and irregular delivery of supplies to construction sites. The Minister's problems in this area are compounded by the organizational morass in which he must work. In addition to Karavayev's Ministry, construction is carried on by eight other ministries (the Ministries of Industrial Construction, Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises, Rural Construction, Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, Transport Construction, Power and Electrification, Installation and Special Construction Work, and Land Reclamation and Water Resources). Directing and supplementing the work of those ministries is the task of Gosstroy.

The division of responsibility among Soviet construction agencies is obscure. For example, the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Industrial Construction and the Ministry of Rural Construction all build grain elevators. Residential housing has been built by the Ministry of Industrial Construction, hospitals have been built by the Ministry of Transport Construction, coal mines by the Ministry of Construction, and kindergartens by the Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises.

In an environment so open to bureaucratic infighting and empire building, Karavayev has at least held his own; despite his industry's pervasive shortcomings, he has managed to retain his post for a decade. In 1971 he assumed his first Party responsibilities when he was elected a nonvoting member of the CPSU Central Committee. Two years later he was given the Order of Lenin on his 60th birthday "for services to the Soviet State."

USSR

Aleksey Nikolayevich MANZHULO

Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade

Aleksey Manzhulo (pronounced munZHOOloh) has been a Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade since August 1970. He had previously served in the Ministry since 1962 as chief of the Administration for Trade with Western Countries. One of ten Deputy Ministers, he oversees general trade matters relating to Western Europe, Africa, North and South America and international economic organizations. He is also responsible for overseeing bilateral trade agreements with capitalist countries. With such wide geographic responsibilities, Manzhulo has traveled frequently to countries throughout the world.



(1974)

Contacts with Americans

Manzhulo's efforts to promote Soviet-American relations date from 1959, when he supervised a Soviet scientific and cultural exhibition in New York City, personally escorting then President Dwight Eisenhower through the Soviet pavilion. Four years later Manzhulo visited the United States as part of a wheat purchasing delegation. Throughout 1972 he participated in meetings of the US-USSR Trade Agreement Working Group, and he traveled to the United States twice that year (January and September) for negotiations with US Government officials.

In February 1975 Manzhulo headed the Soviet delegation to the first meeting in Moscow of the US-USSR Working Group of Experts, established in 1974 to facilitate economic, industrial and technical cooperation. Two months later he accompanied then Treasury Secretary William Simon during the latter's visit to the Soviet Union to attend the meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission. In August Manzhulo met in the United States with officials of the Soviet-American Trading (Satra) Corporation, an American-owned firm that promotes trade with the USSR. The Deputy Minister also attended United Nations General Assembly sessions in April 1974 and September 1975.

Views on Soviet-US Trade

A US businessman characterized Manzhulo in 1975 as being among those Soviet trade officials who are most enthusiastic about commercial relations with the West. In April 1976 Manzhulo wrote an article in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*

USSR

Igor' Dmitriyevich MOROKHOV

First Deputy Chairman, State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy

Doctor of Technical Sciences Igor' Morokhov (pronounced MORuhkuf) is a leading administrator and chief spokesman for the Soviet domestic and international civilian atomic energy programs. He has been First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy (GKAE) since joining it in 1960, and he has served as the Soviet representative on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 1966.



(1974)

Associated with the GKAE for 15 months longer than its Chairman, Andronik Petrosyants, Morokhov has a wide range of interests and responsibilities in atomic energy matters; he frequently serves as acting Chairman of the GKAE in Petrosyants' absence. His primary responsibility is that of drafting and executing agreements on peaceful uses of atomic energy with foreign governments, involving such topics as peaceful nuclear explosions, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the safeguarding of atomic information and materials. His role in Soviet nuclear programs is so pervasive that he is frequently called "Mr. Atomic Energy" by his colleagues in the USSR.

While genuinely interested in nonproliferation and in limiting nuclear weapons buildups, Morokhov is an ardent proponent of peaceful uses of atomic energy, including the use of atomic explosions for excavating new canal routes and creating storage cavities in deep salt deposits. Commentaries on nuclear issues believed to be written by Morokhov have appeared in the Soviet press under the alias I. Dmitriyev. Personal views and statements by Morokhov probably are an accurate barometer of the official Kremlin position on most nuclear issues; he faithfully adheres to the Moscow line when discussing atomic energy policies and undoubtedly plays an influential role himself in establishing those policies.

Skillful Negotiator

Morokhov's most important accomplishment to date was heading the Soviet delegation during negotiations for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty/

Minister of the Automotive Industry

Viktor Polyakov (pronounced puh-lyahKOFF) was appointed Minister of the Automotive Industry in July 1975, a month after the death of his predecessor, Aleksandr Tarasov. Polyakov, who had served as Deputy Minister of the Automotive Industry for the previous 10 years, was elevated to First Deputy just prior to Tarasov's death. He is perhaps best known for his role in planning, organizing and directing the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant in Tol'yatti, which began producing cars in 1970. In 1974 he became general director of the Volga Production Association, a collection of Soviet automotive enterprises that includes the Tol'yatti facility.



(1975)

Dependence on Western Technology

Polyakov heads a Ministry that has relied heavily on Western technology during the last several years for the development of modern production facilities. As director of the Volga Plant, he supervised the introduction of Italian design and production concepts by the Fiat Company. Ministry officials also have negotiated with US companies for the purchase of technology and equipment for the huge Kama Motor Vehicle Plant at Naberezhnyye Chelny. The infusion of Western know-how has resulted in a dramatic increase in automobile production; there are plans to market a Soviet car, the Zhiguli, in the United States soon.

Early Career

Viktor Nikolayevich Polyakov was born in Tomsk in central Siberia on 3 March 1915. A trained engineer who came up through the ranks, he had become chief of the planning and research department at the Stalin Motor Vehicle Plant in Moscow by January 1954. During 1954-57 the Soviet press identified Polyakov as chief engineer of the Small Displacement Motor Vehicle Plant (MZMA), now known as the Moskvich Motor Vehicle Plant. Replacing V. P. Ivanov as director of the MZMA in 1960, Polyakov directed the production of Moskvich automobiles for 4 years.

In early 1964 Polyakov was temporarily diverted into administrative work with the Moscow Council of the National Economy (*sovnarkhoz*), one of a number of regional economic supervisory bodies set up by then Premier Nikita

Secretary, CPSU Central Committee

Yakov Ryabov (pronounced RYAHbuff) was elected a Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee in October 1976, after having served since January 1971 as Party first secretary of Sverdlovsk Oblast, a key industrial area with one of the largest Party organizations in the Soviet Union. Ryabov's duties in the Secretariat apparently involve supervision of the defense industry. His election brings the number of Party Secretaries to 11, of whom Ryabov, born in 1928, is the youngest.



(1976)

The election of Ryabov to the Secretariat makes him a man to watch. Not only is he now a member of the Party's top executive body, he also seems to be a protégé of Politburo member Andrey Kirilenko, who is regarded as a logical candidate to succeed Leonid Brezhnev as leader of the CPSU. Kirilenko himself had served in the Sverdlovsk Oblast Party post while a nonvoting member of the Party Presidium (now Politburo), and he still retains ties to the area.

Whatever Ryabov's connections with Kirilenko, he has earned a reputation as a capable leader in his own right: Ryabov has saved millions of rubles through the efficient management of Sverdlovsk's industrial enterprises. He is a prolific writer on key issues such as labor productivity, technical progress, central versus regional planning, production associations and the role of the Party organizations in the reconstruction of Soviet industry.

He has been a voting member of the CPSU Central Committee since April 1971.

Industrial Initiatives and Economic Views

In recent years Ryabov has become known for his program of increasing industrial production by remodeling and enlarging existing plants with minimum investments. Kirilenko singled out this activity for praise in a March 1975 article in the journal *Kommunist* (published by the Central Committee) and noted that a Central Committee decree had approved Ryabov's initiative. In a 1976 *Pravda* interview, Ryabov himself boasted that his oblast had saved 600 million rubles in the last 5-year period by remodeling instead of building new plants.

USSR

Eduard Amvrosiyevich SHEVARDNADZE

*First Secretary, Central
Committee, Communist Party
of Georgia*

One of the youngest regional Party leaders in the Soviet Union, Eduard Shevardnadze (pronounced shevard-NAIDZeh) became first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party in September 1972, at the age of 43. He was a newcomer to the Georgian Party hierarchy, having served in the government for the previous 7 years as republic minister of internal affairs, charged with the preservation of law and order. The chief factor in Shevardnadze's promotion was his experience as a police administrator.



(1976)

In the Soviet Union, Georgia has long been known as an enclave of high living and fast money. Its most important economic activity, wine production, is one of the oldest and the best loved branches of Georgian agriculture. Georgians are freedom loving and individualistic; they have always lived by looser rules than other Soviet nationalities, first because former Premier Iosif Stalin (himself a Georgian by birth) indulged them, and later, apparently, because the pattern had been established.

Disciplinarian in a Loose Republic

Former police official Shevardnadze, who has nurtured an image as a firm, austere disciplinarian (the Georgians refer to him as the "boss"), has tried since 1972 to overturn the habits of generations regarding easy virtue, political corruption, underground capitalism and heavy drinking. The Georgians are not giving in easily. Shevardnadze's cleanup campaign met with early and continued foot dragging, and during his first year as Georgian Party leader he encountered considerable bureaucratic opposition. Speakers at an August 1973 Party Plenum hinted at disorders among the public at large, and rumors of anonymous threats against Shevardnadze and his family were prevalent throughout 1973.

Several recent developments indicate that Shevardnadze's cleanup campaign in Georgia has been intense, broad and continuous. An underground Soviet publication that appeared in 1975 claimed that nearly 25,000 persons had been arrested in Georgia in the past 2 years. (A Soviet who visited Georgia in late 1974 reported that 13,000 Party and Komsomol

USSR

Nikolay Ivanovich SMIRNOV

*First Deputy Commander in
Chief of the Navy*

Fleet Admiral Nikolay Smirnov (pronounced smirNOFF) was identified as First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy in October 1974. As the navy's second in command, Smirnov supervises day-to-day functions and makes most of the operational decisions. From 1969 to 1974 Smirnov, a submariner, had served as Pacific Fleet commander, overseeing the USSR's largest naval surface force and second largest submarine fleet. He is regarded by many Western observers as the most likely officer to succeed Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Sergey Gorshkov when he retires.



(1971)

Early Life and Career

Born on 10 September 1917 into a Russian peasant family, Smirnov joined the Navy in 1937. He graduated from the Higher Naval School *Imeni Frunze* (the Soviet Naval Academy) in 1939 and assumed line duties, which included submarine command in the Pacific Fleet during World War II. He joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1942. His immediate postwar whereabouts are not clear. He may be identical to the captain 2nd rank (equal to a US naval commander) of the same name who was attached to the Soviet Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol in July 1947. Smirnov's Soviet biographies indicate that after the war he held command positions in the Black and Baltic Fleets and that from 1945 to 1957 he rose from commander of a submarine to chief of staff of a unit of submarines. A 1966 Estonian newspaper article mentioned him as a former member of the Military Council of the "Baltic Front" involved in the wartime defense of the capital city of Tallinn.

Smirnov attended the General Staff Academy (a joint services war college with a 2-year course at flag and general officer level) in Moscow, probably sometime in the 1950's. He was assigned to the Black Sea Fleet as its chief of staff around 1960; he was a rear admiral with that fleet in December 1961 when he signed the obituary of an officer formerly with that command. Smirnov remained with the Black Sea Fleet until 1964 when, as a vice admiral, he was transferred to the Main Naval Staff in Moscow, probably as

USSR

Semen Kuz'mich TSVIGUN

**First Deputy Chairman,
Committee for State Security**

A career intelligence officer, Col. Gen. Semen Tsvigun (pronounced TSVEEgoon) has been First Deputy Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB) since 1967. As the senior deputy to KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov, he is second in command of the organization that is responsible for both internal security (including the secret police) and most of the country's foreign intelligence activities. Since 1971 Tsvigun has been a nonvoting member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) status attained by few of his predecessors.



(1974)

Successor to Andropov?

Tsvigun is regarded by many observers as the most obvious candidate to succeed Andropov as KGB Chairman. An apparent "Brezhnev man" (he has career and possibly family ties to CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev), Tsvigun has served as acting Chairman in Andropov's absence and has been unusually visible for a KGB officer, participating in public ceremonies and even trying his hand as a novelist. Tsvigun's promotion, however, would be a break from recent precedent: The last Chairman to be chosen from within the KGB ranks was Lavrentiy Beriya, whose political ambitions led to his execution in 1953. Tsvigun's apparent ties with Brezhnev, moreover, could weigh against his selection if the collective leadership is intent on keeping the top KGB post in politically neutral hands.

Novelist and Watchdog

The most prolific author among the senior KGB officers, Tsvigun has but one basic theme—vigilance against internal and external subversion. While his fellow officers also stress the vigilance theme, he seems to do so more persistently and crudely than most. In recent years Tsvigun has been a contributor to such Party journals as *Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye* (Political Self-Education), *Agitator* and *Kommunist*. He is the author of two books: *My Vernemsiya* (We Shall Return), 1971, a semi-autobiographical novel about partisan warfare in the Ukraine; and *Taynyy Front* (Secret Front), 1973, an account of Western intelligence operations directed against

USSR

Kirill Stepanovich SIMONOV

**Chief, Transport and
Communications Department,
CPSU Central Committee**

Kirill Simonov (pronounced sim-OHNuf) took over the Transport and Communications Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee in June 1962, after a career of over 20 years in Soviet railroads. An engineer and station master in the early 1940's, he rose to prominence among Soviet railroad researchers and administrators by 1960. In his present position Simonov serves as the channel of Party policy for Soviet maritime, rail, river



(1960)

and road transportation and for communications systems such as radio, telephone and television. A member of the CPSU since 1943, he has been a member of its Central Auditing Commission since 1966.

Early Career on the Railroad

Kirill Stepanovich Simonov was born on 17 April 1917 in Petrograd (now Leningrad). There are reports that he was a political officer in 1939 during the Russo-Finnish War, but it seems more likely that he was then a student at the Leningrad Railroad Institute, from which he graduated in 1940. During the latter year, he went to work for the October Railroad in the same city, learning his trade under conditions of wartime bombardment and blockade. By 1947 Simonov had become chief of a division of the railroad. Shortly thereafter he transferred to an administrative position in the Ministry of Railways. Selected for further training in 1949, he completed the Academy of Railroad Transport in Moscow in 1951, earning a candidate of technical sciences degree and the title of associate professor. Simonov returned to the Ministry of Railways in 1951. A year later he was named a division chief in the Ministry's Central Scientific Research Institute. In 1955 he became chief engineer of the Main Administration of Railroad Traffic.

Expanded Influence

In 1957 Simonov's career in the railroad ministry took an upward turn. He was appointed deputy chairman, and later that year first deputy chairman, of the Ministry's Scientific and Technical Council. At the same time he began to make official visits abroad. On one of those visits a colleague declared that Simonov's position was more influential than his title indicated

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DIRECTOR.

INTEL CKTOP

1. SOTRAMP// ADVISED 29 JULY THAT (FNU) VARTAMIAN HAS RETURNED TO TEHRAN AFTER FOUR YEARS ABSENCE. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN IRAQ. SPEAKS FLENT PERSIAN. BELIEVE I// SAID HE ASSIGNED HERE WITHIN OCTA, BUT IT MIGHT BE TASS. WILL CONFIRM.

2. I// SAID VARTAMIAN'S WIFE IS OR WAS A KOSYGIN WIFE. VARTAMIAN'S APPARENTLY ENJOY PERKS ACCRUING TO HIS KIND OF FACILITY: CASH, ETC.

3. SEEMS LIKELY THAT, EVEN WITHOUT FIRST NAME AND PATRONYMIC, VARTAMIAN'S COLORFUL BACKGROUND MAY SERVE TO IDENTIFY HIM. IS HE AN TO RES?

4. FILE: DEFR. RVL 30JUL 79 08V.09C.1. ALL SECRET
SECRET

3 AUG 1978

R E P T 2182 AOC 79 STAFF

DIRM 407883.

TEHRAN

TEL CKD

REF: TSPR 53807

1. SUBJECT REF IS LEVON PARIRONICH VARTANIAN (DOB: 31 MAR 23, YEREVAN (ARMENIA)). (PER SUBJECT, NAME SOME TIMES RUSSIFIED AS PAVLOVICH BY SOVIETS.) DPOB: 29 SEP 32, LNINGRAD. (SON, SUREN, DOB 50, DAUGHTER, NATALIYA, DOB 53 (POSSIBLY DOCTOR/SURGEON); WAS ATTENDING MEDICAL SCHOOL IN MID-70'S).

2. SUBJECT RECEIVED ADVANCED DEGREE FROM UNIVERSITY OF MOSCOW IN ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY. MAJOR FIELDS OF INTEREST WERE ISLAM AND PERSIAN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE, PERSIAN CULT AFFAIRS. SPEAKS VERY GOOD FARSI, POOR ENGLISH, GOOD RUSSIAN AND MINIMAL ARMENIAN. IN 69 SUBJECT BECAME MEMBER OF "BIG COUNCIL OF SOVIET WRITERS" (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED BY SOURCE, BUT POSSIBLY UNION OF WRITERS. THIS WOULD ACCOUNT FOR PERKS SUCH AS ACCESS TO DACHA, ETC.) SUBJECT RECEIVED "ORDER OF LENIN" IN 1970.

3. SUBJECT WAS TASS REP IN TEHRAN MAY 67 - OCT 71. SERVED AS FIRST SECRETARY, TABUL, SEP 75 - AUTUMN 77.

4. SUBJECT'S BROTHER, IGOR (221-745634), DOB 25 JAN 36, FORMERLY SERVED AS SOVIET CONSUL, IRAQ (BASRAH), AND WAS OF OCT 72 WAS SECOND SECRETARY, OTTAWA, PER PDSATISPT, IGOR CARRIED AS KNOWN KOB. SUBJECT IS CARRIED AS SUSPECT RIS, PROBABLY GRU, DUE TO CAREER ASSIGNMENTS AND PAST ASSOCIATIONS WITH KNOWN RIS OFFICERS. FYI, PER PDSORAG: A I.F. VARTANIAN WAS CAPTAIN, THIRD RANK, GRU, AND PROBABLY IDENTICAL TO SUBJECT.

5. SUBJECT WAS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO TEHRAN SUMMER OF 74 AS PAVDA REP (LATER CHANGED TO TASS REP). VISA DENIED BY GRU BASED ON LIAISON/STATION TRACES INDICATING SUBJECT SUS

19 Oct 79 03 32z

DRO

*Hold till
7 Nov*

UNCLAS
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
TOP SECRET

030799Z ALBC

2715 29201 22

TO: DIA, WASH DC

FROM: JC/USDAO TEHRAN

INFO: JC/USDAO TEHRAN

INFO: JC/USDAO TEHRAN

T SPOBT

THESE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

WILL BE KEPT UNDER STRICT CONTROL AND NOT DISCLOSED TO ANY OTHER AGENCIES

OR PERSONS UNLESS AUTHORIZED BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER

OR THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

OR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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OR THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

OR THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

OR THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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OR THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY RECONSTRUCTION

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U.S.S.R. Eastern Europe



WEAPONS STORAGE CAPACITY INCREASED AT SEVEROMORSK (U)

(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN) The Severomorsk Weapons Storage Facility was constructed between 1970 and late 1972 and became operational about mid-1973. On the eastern shore of Kolskiy Zaliv, or Kola Inlet, 0.5 nautical miles east of the finger pier at Severomorsk Naval Base, this facility, which is served by roads, has the mission of supporting the naval surface combatants at Severomorsk Naval Base. SS-N-14 surface-to-surface missile crates, canisters, and other associated equipment, have been observed here since early 1975; this missile system is believed to be the primary weapon handled at the Severomorsk installation. These ship-launched antisubmarine cruise missiles are carried on KRESTA II guided missile cruisers and KRIVAK I and II guided missile frigates, which constitute the major portion of the naval complement based at Severomorsk. The missiles are also antisubmarine warfare acoustic homing torpedoes with a 90-kilogram warhead.

(S/WNINTEL/NOFORN) The Severomorsk Weapons Storage Facility is an almost rectangular installation, occupying approximately 4 hectares and secured with perimeter fence and four guard towers, one at each of the four corners. Some of the main buildings include a weapons assembly and outfit building, a weapons handling and clearance building, and several support buildings. In April 1978, an expansion of the storage capacity at the facility was undertaken. One large arched-roof bunker appearing in 8 Jul 79 photography reflects the



current status of the expansion. This bunker, now almost completed, measures approximately 45 meters x 12 meters and will probably be used to store SS-N-14 missiles. A second, similar bunker is in the early stages of construction in the southeast corner of the facility, where the ground is being leveled in preparation for laying the foundation.

SECRET

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DISTRICT 72
APO NEW YORK 09205



TO: HQD227-582

22 Aug 76


FROM: LARRY GIEL (U)

SUBJECT: SRP, Tehran

1. (S) Per our previous discussions, the above file and cover name has been established to record results of an operation initiated to direct SUBJECT's activities in controlled social relationships with various personalities in Iran.
2. (S) Initial activity will be directed toward further developing already established relationships with ANATOLIY SAZANOV and Lt Col LEONID DOVENIA for the purpose of acquiring detailed biographical data and establishing a basis for the introduction of other controlled assets to these personalities.
3. (U) Your office will be advised of significant operational developments, as they occur, and written reports as they are prepared.

(SIGNED)

FRANK M. HUEY, Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander



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CONFIDENTIAL

1, 1001-1, 2

NO 1

24 Aug 76

Title: LUCKY GIL (U)

1. Date and Time of Contact: Sunday/23 Aug 76/0900.
2. Location of Contact Sites: U.S. Army Hospital, Tehran, Iran.
3. Location of Hi Site: SUBJECT's office, U.S. Army Hospital, Tehran, Iran.
4. Duration of Meeting: 0900 - 0950
5. Persons Involved in Meet: SUBJECT and the CO.
6. Vehicles Used: The CO utilized an official vehicle assigned to AFOSI Dist 72, a 1973 Plymouth Fury, white in color, registration #73B03498, Tehran license #95239, for travel to the U.S. Army Hospital. The vehicle was left parked in the hospital parking lot, as the CO was also conducting other official business.
7. Purpose of Contact/Meet: Further assessment and to maintain rapport and CO control.
8. Identification of Collateral Reportings: AR (DEPARTING WITH ASSET).
10. Future Meet Arrangements: SUBJECT was told he would be telephonically contacted within the next 10 days to arrange a future meeting.
14. RC Prepared by: SA RONALD H. PILLIPS
15. Distribution: IN AFOSI/IVOE - 1
 ✓District 72 - 1

CLASSIFIED BY: Comdr AFOSI, per AFOSI 205-3, 12 Apr 74 Exempt from GDS of E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY <u>II</u> DECLASSIFY ON <u>31 Dec 2006</u>

SEVEN DOORS

CONFIDENTIAL

IVOE ~~1111~~
CC ~~2111~~

FILE

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

1. (S) Of necessity, concentration of efforts at this time must be directed toward further establishing SUBJECT in his relationships with SAZANOV prior to the latter's departure for home leave in November. Specifically, SUBJECT will be directed to exploit and take any opportunity to meet with SAZANOV and, where possible, insure the meetings are on a one-to-one basis. During these meetings, SUBJECT will, playing on SAZANOV's natural desire to discuss his medical problems and empathizing with SAZANOV's stated dislike of Iran, establish his sincere interest in and offer to assist in promoting SAZANOV's well being. While possible, it is not probable SAZANOV's feelings about attempting to have his tour curtailed will be drastically altered prior to his departure. It is believed, however, SAZANOV may be more receptive to overtures of friendship by SUBJECT upon his return to Tehran should his bid to be curtailed be unsuccessful. Further, the possibility exists SUBJECT may persuade SAZANOV to submit to a complete physical examination which may resolve many questions for AFOSI and SAZANOV. SUBJECT is planning to invite SAZANOV to his home for dinner during the week of 16 - 22 Oct 76 and will follow through from that point in accepting a reciprocal invitation or, if appropriate and without being too obvious, will suggest another get together prior to SAZANOV's departure.

2. (S) Simultaneously, SUBJECT will be directed to maintain/further establish his relationships with DOVENIA, ASHURKO and WANG through attendance at the various official and non-official social functions. As appropriate, based on his success with these contacts, consideration will be given to directing SUBJECT into one-on-one meetings with one or more of these personalities. As a result of these meetings, biographic data will be acquired and personality assessment made with a view toward introduction of selected, additional assets as the situation dictates.

3. (S) To provide for more indepth reporting, it is planned to have SUBJECT's wife debriefed concerning her contacts and observations of the target personalities. Initially, she will be provided a limited briefing on AFR 205-57, AFOSI's interest in the targets and SUBJECT's cooperation with AFOSI. The briefings will stress the acquisition of biographic and personality data. As additional contacts transpire and are reported, she will be assessed for potential in fulfilling an operational role directed toward the respective targets' wives, when and if such a situation warrants and is approved by AFOSI/IVOE.

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SEVEN DOORS

CLASSIFIED BY: AFOSI Center PER AFOSI R 205-3 ON 12 Aug 74
Exempt from GDS of E. O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY I and DECLASSIFY ON 31 Dec 2004

OFFICE OF THE AIR FORCE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10005
MILITARY REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: APOSI District 72
PREPARED BY: SA O'DEAN L. HAMMETT JR.

FILE NO: 72HQ0345-32
DATE: 13 May 1978

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:
(COORDINATION)


(S) On 8 May 78, during a coordination meeting with SRF/Dolan, the following biographic data on DMITRIY SYRAK was provided. SRF/Tehran advised that SYRAK was the new director of the Soviet Hospital, Tehran, who replaced Dr. PETR ASHESKO.

Name: DMITRIY IZONTIYEVICH SYRAK
DOB: 1924, V-nitskiy Oblast
Number & Type of Passport: #702538, Regular, issued 23 Nov 77 in Moscow.
Nationality: Soviet
Position: Director, Soviet Hospital, Villa Ave., Tehran, Iran
Date of Arrival: 6 Apr 78
Spouse: YEVGENIYA LUDYANOVNA SYRAK (also a practicing physician)

SRF/Tehran further advised that SYRAK is supposedly a close relative of a man named BALTISKY, who is the Chief of the Soviet Red Cross.

DISTRIBUTION: HQ APOSI/IW/E - 1; District 72 - 1; District 70 - 1

APPROVED


FRANK M. HUEY, Lt Col USAF
Commander

CLASSIFIED BY COMMANDER, APOSI
Per APOSI 213 10 Apr 77
Exempt from GDS of E. O. 11652
Exemption Category Two
Declassify On: 31 Dec 2008



SECRET

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

District 72 (AFOSI)
APO New York 09205
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: District 72
PREPARED BY: SA O'DEAN L. HAMMETT, JR.

FILE NO: 77HQD345-32
DATE: 5 March 1978

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:
(COORDINATION)

(S) On 28 Feb 78, recent details of this operation were coordinated with FRANK JOHNSON, Chief, Operations Division, SRF/Tehran. JOHNSON was advised that HQ AFOSI concurred to the utilization of SUBJECT for the purpose of introducing an SRF Case Officer to Dr ANATOLI RAMKOV in an attempt to effect an in-place defection on the part of RAMKOV. JOHNSON advised that a cable had already been sent to HQ SRF, outlining the proposed plan and requesting an SRF Case Officer fluent in the German language to be sent to Tehran to assist in the defection approach. JOHNSON further advised that the final scenario had not been worked out, but it would be in the near future and AFOSI would be kept apprised. JOHNSON was of the opinion that the approach to RAMKOV should be made prior to 22 Mar 78, the reported date of departure from Iran on the part of RAMKOV's supervisor, Dr PETR ASHURKO. Essentially, SRF feels that the mere presence of ASHURKO in a supervisory position over RAMKOV creates a definite psychological advantage in favor of the defection approach, based on RAMKOV's intense dislike for ASHURKO; hence, the approach prior to 22 Mar 78 is favored. JOHNSON agreed to further discuss SRF rationale regarding the contemplated in-place defection approach on 1 Mar 78, in the company of the Assistant Chief of Station, SRF, and DO 72 supervisory staff.

At the conclusion of the above discussion, JOHNSON noted that certain information has come to the attention of SRF, which they felt constituted a breach of security on the part of SUBJECT. JOHNSON then identified Mr FRED JENNY, a Swiss Embassy officer, who was also in contact with RAMKOV and who was providing SRF/Tehran additional insight into the personality assessment of RAMKOV. JOHNSON explained that the security breach consisted of SUBJECT approaching JENNY on the evening of 27 Feb 78, and verbally inferring to JENNY that SUBJECT was aware that JENNY and RAMKOV had been seeing each other. JOHNSON remarked that the harm done was not insurmountable, however, he feared that any additional breach of security on the part of SUBJECT could very well abort attempts to effect an in-place defection with RAMKOV.

At this point, JOHNSON was advised that AFOSI wholeheartedly agreed that SUBJECT's action was a serious breach of security and that AFOSI in no way

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Per AFOSIR 205-3, 19 Apr 77
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REVOLUTION BY
SEVEN DOORS
1978-1978

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
District 72 (AFOSI)
APO New York 09205
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: District 72
PREPARED BY: SA O'DEAN L. HAMMETT, JR.
REFERENCE: AR (COORDINATION), 7 March 1978

FILE NO: 77HQD345-32
DATE: 9 March 1978

TITLE: LARRY GIEL (U)

DETAILS:
(COORDINATION)

(S) On 9 Mar 78, this operation was coordinated with SRF/Tehran. Individuals in attendance were SAs FRANK M. HUEY, CURTIS S. MORRIS, JR., and O'DEAN L. HAMMETT, JR. SRF/Tehran was represented by JAMES HIGHAM, Assistant Chief of Station and FRANK JOHNSON, Chief, Operations Division. SRF/Tehran advised that through a source of information independent of LARRY GIEL (FRED JENNY of the Swiss Embassy, Tehran), they were gathering additional information on Dr ANATOLI RAMKOV. To date they had learned that on 4 Mar 78, the Soviet Ambassador to Iran, VLADIMIR VINOGRADOV had persuaded Dr PETR ASHURKO, Director of the Soviet Hospital, Tehran, to sign the necessary paperwork that would extend RAMKOV's tour in Iran for one more year. It was also determined that RAMKOV's desires are to spend one more year in Iran, then return to Moscow and work for one year at the No. 26 Clinic (not further identified). After completing this year in Moscow, RAMKOV hopes to obtain a position with the World Health Organization in Geneva, Switzerland.

SRF/Tehran's suspicions that RAMKOV is an intelligence cooptee for the GRU has been more or less confirmed by a blunder committed by RAMKOV. Recently, RAMKOV was asked by JENNY why he was always trying to gather military/medical information, since he was a civilian doctor. Without thinking, RAMKOV replied, "Oh, that's for DOVBENIA" (Lt Colonel LEONID DOVBENIA, Assistant Military Attache and a known GRU agent). After making the statement, RAMKOV realized the mistake he had made and he immediately changed the subject of conversation.

SRF/Tehran further advised they feel that now is the most opportune time to make an in-place defection approach to RAMKOV. They have been advised by SRF Hq that the German speaking SRF Case Officer that was requested to assist in the defection approach will arrive in Tehran during the week of 19 Mar 78. After the SRF Case Officer is briefed on the operation and has met with AFOSI and LARRY GIEL, SRF/Tehran would like to see the introduction of the SRF Case Officer to RAMKOV made on or about 24 Mar 78. SRF/Tehran concluded by stating that as soon as the requested SRF Case Officer arrives



CLASSIFIED BY COMMANDER, AFOSI
Per AFOSIR 205-3, 19 Apr 77
Exemp. from GDS of E. O. 11652
Exemption Category Two
Declassify On: 31 Dec 2008

SECRET

4 JUL 79 03 00

REF ID: A660232 JUL 79 RESTRICTED HANDLING

HEADQUARTERS 2D16.

PRIORITY TEHRAN (EYES ONLY YAQIN).

TEL SECURE ATOMY CECOM

- A. HEADQUARTERS 1245
- B. TEHRAN 55447
- C. TEHRAN 55584

1. SAFE COMBINATIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS GIVEN REF A ARE CORRECT WIS./I.E. COMBINATION FOR SAFE CONTAINING LNEASE MATERIAL ON ECOME OPERATION IS 3-18-48 VICE 13-28-58 (AS INCORRECTLY GIVEN W. PARA 3A REF B). COMBINATION FOR SAFE ACROSS THE HALL IS CORRECT S. GIVEN IN PARA 3A REF B. YOU MAY DRAW ON INFO CONCERNING DET 72 REA PROVIDED IN PARA 1 REF A IN RESPONSE TO GEN EAST'S QUERIES. TELINT WILL BE SENDING COMMAND CHANNEL MESSAGE IN RESPONSE TO REF C PROVIDING DEFENSIVE DESCRIPTION OF ENTIRE DET 72 AREA FOR ARMEDSH/MAG'S BENEFIT.

2. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED, IT WOULD SEEM JUST AS WELL THAT THE ARMEDSH/MAG REPS WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL IN OPENING ANY OF THE SAFES. ALTHOUGH REF B DESCRIPTION OF DET 72 LAYOUT IS SOMEWHAT DMPUSED, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT OPENED SAFES IN AREA TEXT DESCRIBE END OF PARA 1 BELONGED TO CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION UNIT AND NOT CI UNIT OF DET 72, I.E., THE 4-DRAWER AND TOP SECRET SAFES DESCRIBED IN REF A ARE STILL SECURE AND INTACT. WE RECOMMEND THAT THESE TWO SAFES NOT BE OPENED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS MATERIAL REMAINING THERE CAN BE RETRIEVED WITHOUT IRANIAN'S KNOWLEDGE.

3. ASY OUK KNOW, CECOME WAS IDENTIFIED BY SDPRET/IT'S SOURCE W/CD STAFF OFFICER. AND IF THIS IS TRUE, HE COULD WELL HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING LNEASE ACCESS AGENT LARRY GILL FOR HIS PURPOSES. CONSEQUENTLY STEERING THE LNEASE MATERIAL ON THEIR OPERATION AGAINST HIM IS NOT CRITICAL. THE AGENT WE ARE MOST ANXIOUS TO PROTECT IS ASSE/L, WHO IS IDENTIFIED IN TRUE NAME IN AN LNEASE COORDINATION MEMO IN THE 'LARRY GILL' FILE. THIS MEMO IS DATED 9 MARCH 79

SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
District 72 (AFOSI)
APO New York 09205
AGENT REPORT



PREPARING OFFICE: District 72
PREPARED BY: SA JIMMY L. STOUT

FILE NO: 78u-2343 136
DATE: 20 December 1978

TITLE: BILL CRAIN (U)

DETAILS:
(COORDINATION)

1. (S) On 16 Dec 78, a coordination meeting was held with SRF/Tehran to discuss the status of this operation. It was noted that SUBJECT's last contact with a member of the Soviet Intelligence Service (SIS) was on 21 Aug 78, that the scheduled meeting during the month of Oct 78 did not materialize, and that the SIS has taken no further initiative to recontact SUBJECT since Aug 78. It was also noted that the current civil unrest situation in Iran, and the imposed martial law curfew hours of 2100 until 0500, was more than likely the reason for the lack of initiative on the part of the SIS. SRF agreed and suggested that initiative on the part of SUBJECT to reestablish contact was not particularly warranted at this time. It was mutually agreed that if recontact was not initiated by the SIS by the scheduled meeting dates in Jan 79, future planning regarding this operation should be discussed.

2. (S) Following the above, SRF provided several photographs of known/suspected members of the SIS, requesting that SUBJECT review the photos in an attempt to identify "GEORGE," the individual whom SUBJECT met on 21 Aug 78. SRF noted that from the description furnished by SUBJECT, "GEORGE" was probably identifiable as YURIY M. DENISOV, 2nd Secretary, Soviet Embassy, and a known KGB 'American Targets Officer.'

DISTRIBUTION: HQ AFOSI/IVOB - 3; DISTRICT 72 - 1; DISTRICT 70 - 1

APPROVED


FRANK M. HUEY, Lt Col, USAF
Commander.

CLASSIFIED BY COMMANDER, AFOSI
Per AFOSIR 205-3, 19 Apr 77
Exempt from GDS of E. O. 11652
Exemption Category Two
Declassify On: 31 Dec 2008



SEVEN DOORS

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION

1029

SECRET

(Security Classification)

FOR DC USE ONLY

NO: CA-3252, October 14, 1959,

SUBJECT: DCID No. 4/2

*Do not retire
Keep in current file*

TO: ACCRA, ADDIS ABABA, ALEXANDRIA, ALOIERS, AMMAN, ANKARA, ASUNCION, ATHENS, BAGHDAD, BANGKOK, BEIRUT, BELGRADE, BENGHAZI, BERLIN, BERN, BOMBAY, BONN, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, CAIRO, CALCUTTA, CANBERRA, CARACAS, CASABLANCA, COLOMBO, CONAKRY, COPENHAGEN, DACCA, DAKAR, DAMASCUS, DJAKARTA, FRANKFURT, GENEVA, GUATEMALA, HABANA, THE HAGUE, HELSINKI, HONG KONG, ISFAHAN, ISTANBUL, KABUL, KARACHEE, KUALA LUMPUR, LAGOS, LAHORE, LA PAZ, LEOPOLDVILLE, LIMA, LISBON, LONDON, MADRAS, MADRID, MANAGUA, MANILA, MELBOURNE, MESHED, MEXICO, D. F., MONTEVIDEO, NAIROBI, NEW DELHI, OSLO, OTTAWA, PANAMA, PARIS, PHINOM PENH, PRETORIA, QUITO, RABAT, RANGOON, REYKJAVIK, RIO DE JANEIRO, ROME, SAIGON, SALZBURG, SAN JOSE, SAN SALVADOR, SAO TIAGO, SEOUL, SINGAPORE, STOCKHOLM, TABRIZ, TAIPEI, TANGIER, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, TOKYO, TRIESTE, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, USUN, VIENNA, VIENTIANE, WELLINGTON

With reference to CA-1694 of August 19, 1958, a revision of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) No. 4/2, "The Defector Program Abroad," is enclosed.

The revised Directive, effective 26 June 1959, reflects the change in the name of the Intelligence Advisory Committee to the United States Intelligence Board.

HERTER

Enclosure:

DCID No. 4/2
(See attached
distribution list.)

WHEN THE ENCLOSURE IS DETACHED,
THIS DOCUMENT AND THE DISTRIBUTION
LIST MAY BE DOWNGRADED TO:
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RM/R
16

SECRET

(Security Classification)

DRAFTED BY: DC/ICD/CIA/DSI/END
CLEARANCES:

S.D. 7
10/13/59

APPROVED BY:

ICD:LMoodman

Operational--No Clearance Necessary

B/S-CR

OCT 14 1959

790.00/10-1455

760.00/10-1459
CLASSIFIED FILE

DISPATCH

		CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION	
		SECRET RYBAT		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO	Chiefs of Station and Base		X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO				ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief, SB Division			MICROFILM
SUBJECT	RYBAT REDTOP Turning Around REDTOP Walk-ins			
ACTION REQUIRED (REQUIRED)				
ACTION: Read and Retain for Reference				
<p>1. In recent months a number of REDTOP nationals have walked into LNBUEZ installations seeking political asylum. Most have eventually been processed as refugees or defectors and many of the latter have provided useful information. A substantial number have been persuaded to return to their homelands to work on our behalf and most of these are now of very great value as long-term in-place agents. In some cases, Stations have handled REDTOP walk-ins well; in others, extremely valuable opportunities have been lost. These losses have generally resulted from misunderstandings in field Stations about WOMACH goals, priorities and capabilities and from difficulty in communicating with the walk-in. This dispatch and its attachments are designed to clarify our aims, to acquaint field Stations with BKHERALD abilities to exploit REDTOP walk-ins, and to enable officers to obtain essential information from REDTOP nationals with whom they have no common language.</p> <p>2. Putting aside the question of LNBUEZ responsibilities for asylum seekers and for assistance to refugees, which have been covered elsewhere in dispatches and airgrams, we are here concerned only with individuals of intelligence interest. While defectors can and do provide critical information, there are very few cases in which the same individual would not have been of greater value if he had returned to his post and remained in place, at least for a reasonable period. "Turn-around" therefore should remain the first goal in handling a well-placed walk-in. In addition, normally with Headquarters guidance, an attempt should sometimes be made to turn around an individual who appears to be promising</p>				
E2 IMPDET CL BY 054581				
(Con't)				
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE		
	Book Dispatch 8737	9 January 1973		
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER		

WALK-IN CHECK LIST

1. Determine full name, including patronymic (Note: If Walk-In is initially reluctant to give name, come back to it after establishing some rapport).
2. Date, place of birth; immediate family - names, DPOB.
3. His exact position.
4. Local address and telephone number.
5. Address and telephone number in native country.
6. Obtain any documents or identification papers he might have with him in order to determine bona fides (photograph if possible).
7. How long can he remain before he will be missed.
8. Determine if he is an Intelligence Officer. If so, determine his alias, basic information on the residency, knowledge of operations against American target in area and elsewhere, other Intelligence Officers and Agents in the area and elsewhere.
9. Debrief him for indications intelligence: early warning information on imminent hostilities against the U.S., its installations, and Allies.
10. Determine membership in Communist Party.

Hello. I am an official at this American Embassy. I regret that neither I nor anyone presently in this Embassy speaks Chinese, but we have anticipated this problem and will try to communicate with you using these cards, written in your language.

Next: 2

您好！
我是本使馆的职员，很对不起，
馆内现在没有能讲中国话的。
可是，为了解决这个问题，我们
特地预备了一套中文卡片，来跟您
笔谈。

EGYPT

Labor force: 13 million; 45 to 50% agriculture, 10% industry, 10% trade and finance, 30% services and other; shortage of skilled labor

Organized labor: 1 to 3 million

GOVERNMENT

Legal name: Arab Republic of Egypt

Type: republic; under presidential rule since June 1956

Capital: Cairo

Political subdivisions: 26 governorates

Legal system: based on English common law, Islamic law, and Napoleonic codes; permanent constitution written in 1971; judicial review of limited nature in Supreme Court, also in Council of State which oversees validity of administrative decisions; legal education at Cairo University; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations

National holiday: National Day, 23 July

Branches executive power vested in President, who appoints cabinet; People's Assembly gradually gaining power as political liberalization program is implemented; independent judiciary administered by Minister of Justice

Government leader: President Anwar al-Sadat

Suffrage: universal over age 18

Elections: regular elections to People's Assembly every 5 years (most recent June 1979); presidential elections every 6 years (most recent September 1976)

Political parties and leaders: formation of political parties must be approved by government; National Democratic Party, formed in mid-1978 by President Sadat, is the major party; various small opposition parties

Communists: approximately 500, party members

Member of: AAPSO, AFDB, FAO, G-77, GATT, IAEA, IBRD, ICAC, ICAO, IDA, IFC, IHO, ILO, IMCO, IMF, IOOC, IPU, ITU, IWC—International Wheat Council, NAM, OAU, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WPC, WSG, WTO; Egypt suspended from Arab League and OAUPEC in April 1979

ECONOMY

GNP: \$11.7 billion (1978), \$290 per capita; average annual growth rate of 9% in 1978

Agriculture: main cash crop—cotton; other crops—rice, onions, beans, citrus fruit, wheat, corn, barley; not self-sufficient in food, but agriculture a net earner of foreign exchange

Major industries: textiles, food processing, chemicals, petroleum, construction, cement

Electric power: 5,000,000 kW capacity (1978); 14 billion kWh produced (1978); 350 kWh per capita

Exports: \$2,725 million (f.o.b., 1978 est.); raw cotton, cotton yarn and fabric, crude petroleum, rice, onions, potatoes, chemicals, cement (C)

Imports: \$4,900 million (c.i.f., 1978 est.); foodstuffs, machinery and equipment, fertilizers, woods (C)

EGYPT



See also map 11

LAND

1,000,258 km² (including 48,931 km² occupied by Israel as of 26 June 1979); 2.8% cultivated (of which about 70% multiple cropped); 96.5% desert, waste, or urban; 0.7% inland water

Land boundaries: 2,527 km (1967); approximately 2,580 km including border of occupied Sinai area (since September 1975)

WATER

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 12 nm (plus 6 n. "necessary supervision zone")

Coastline: 2,450 km (1967); includes approximately 500 km within occupied Sinai area (since September 1975)

PEOPLE

Population: 40,958,000 (July 1979), average annual growth rate 2.7% (current)

Nationality: noun—Egyptian(s); adjective—Egyptian or Arab Republic of Egypt

Ethnic divisions: 90% Eastern Hamitic stock; 10% Greek, Italian, Syro-Lebanese

Religion: (official estimate) 94% Muslim, 6% Copt and other

Language: Arabic official, English and French widely understood by educated classes

Literacy: around 40%