

AMERICAN EMBASSY

1973 DEC 13 10 23

TEHRAN, IRAN

A handwritten routing slip is located on the right side of the document. It consists of a grid with several rows and columns. The numbers 3, 4, 5, and 6 are written in the grid. There are also handwritten initials and a checkmark on the right side of the grid.

Biographic Report

Asraf 'Abd al-Latif GHURBAL
Egyptian Ambassador-Designate
to the United States

NNNNM

X

5 MAY 79 03:25z

VV ESA423ERA648

OO RUQMRH

DE RUEHC #3943 1250250

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O R 042320Z MAY 79

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 9030

RUTABO/AMEMBASSY BAHAKO IMMEDIATE 2275

RUTADR/AMEMBASSY BANJUL IMMEDIATE 9783

RUTADR/AMEMBASSY BISSAU IMMEDIATE 3088

RUTAAX/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 1178

RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE 8888

RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 1561

RUSEQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 5167

RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 3152

RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 8188

RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIGHTVILLE IMMEDIATE 0720

RUFHNLJ/AMEMBASSY LIJERVILLE IMMEDIATE 0212

RUFHYC/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY IMMEDIATE 7035

RUFHOC/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0336

RUDXBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 1475

RUTADE/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE IMMEDIATE 8376

INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 3843

RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0674

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 8923

RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0916

RUEHBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 7825

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 9234

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 4839

RUEH DJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 2723

RUEHOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 9343

RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6915

RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 9168

RUEHLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 8398

RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 2791

RUEHKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 6980

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 4443

RUEHDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO 4596

RUEHMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 7790

RUEHOK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 7544

RUEHNS/AMEMBASSY SANA 3579

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3009

RUEHHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 2154

RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 8606

RUEHKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 2962

RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0155

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 113943

E.O. 12065 GDS 5/4/85 (HELMAN, GERALD B.)

TAGS: PORG

Pol
Econ
3 CHG
RF
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Chron

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
 NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR-CONSULTANTS



(U) EGYPT: SADAT'S MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND FUNDING PROBLEMS

BUREAU OF
 INTELLIGENCE
 AND RESEARCH

Summary

(C/NF) Arab sanctions imposed against Sadat since the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty have resulted in the withdrawal of considerable Arab funds heretofore available to Cairo for financing arms purchases from Western Europe and the US. Tentative and confirmed purchases since 1976 are estimated at about \$5.3 billion. The unavailability of Arab funds might affect 50 percent or more of this amount--including the F-5 deal with the US and a series of large contracts with France and the UK for major weapons systems.

(C/NF) Arab sanctions should not substantially degrade immediate Egyptian military capabilities. In the long term, however, Egypt's efforts to modernize its armed forces could be seriously affected.

(C/NF) Egypt could undertake a combination of measures to raise the funds necessary to fulfill existing contractual arrangements with the West:

- commercial borrowing, assuming that credit will be available without Arab backing;
- diversion of resources from civilian imports, a politically as well as economically dangerous task;
- cutbacks in the military modernization program which, if significant, could threaten Sadat's support within the armed forces; and
- requests to the US for additional aid.

SECRET

RDS-2 7/2/99 (multiple sources)

WARNING NOTICE
 SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
 AND METHODS INVOLVED

Report No. 1209
 July 2, 1979

NW 9 SA

7 Jun 75 02 36z

R E T 02111Z JUN 75 STAFF

DIRECTOR 452047.

PRIORITY TEHRAN.

WTEL RT AT SDVALID

FS, A. TEHRAN 53895
B. TEHRAN 53259
C. TEHRAN 53254
D. AM EMBASSY TEHRAN 85287

1. AS RESULT OF RAPIDLY UNFOLDING DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO SHARIAN-MADARI'S (SM) WILLINGNESS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT VIA SON HASSAN. MEETING WAS CONVENED AMONG INTERESTED HQS PARTIES ON 4 JUNE TO DETERMINE DIRECTION IN WHICH WE SHOULD MOVE. CONSENSUS WAS THAT WE STILL DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH INTELLIGENCE TO MAKE A PROPER JUDGMENT ON THE FUTURE COURSE OF POLITICAL ACTION IN IRAN AND THAT WE MAY BE MOVING TOWARD POLITICAL ACTION TOO QUICKLY BASED ON THE LIMITED INFORMATION AVAILABLE. IN ADDITION WE RISK LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE SITUATION TO OUR ASSETS WHO MAY HAVE THEIR OWN POLITICAL INTERESTS AND GOALS. ALTHOUGH OUR OWN INTERESTS GENERALLY COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF SDJANUS/18, SDVALID/1, AND DROTTER/4, THEIR VIEWS ON THE WAY TO ACHIEVE THESE GOALS AND THE SPEED WITH WHICH WE SHOULD MOVE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY AT VARIANCE WITH OURS.

2. CONCUR WITH STATION MEETING WITH SM'S SON HASSAN. HOWEVER, REQUEST GLEGOROFF LIMIT HIMSELF TO ACTING OUT ROLE OF POLITICAL OFFICER INTERESTED IN MEETING ONE OF IRAN'S LEADING PERSONALITIES, AND WHO, TO PROTECT SM'S REPUTATION AND POLITICAL FUTURE, INSISTS THAT CONTACT BE HANDLED DISCREETLY. NO SUPPORT OF ANY TYPE SHOULD BE IMPLIED OR DISCUSSED AT THIS POINT. ALTHOUGH IF THE SUBJECT IS RAISED BY HASSAN, NEITHER IS IT NECESSARY TO STATE THAT NONE IS POSSIBLE IN FUTURE. THE PURPOSE OF CONTACT TO ASSESS HASSAN AS POTENTIAL REPORTING ASSET, PUTTING RELATIONSHIP ON CLANDYSTINE BASIS, AND CREATING OPTION OF POSSIBLY SUPPORTING SM AT SOME FUTURE TIME. NO TRACES OF HASSAN. ALSO NOTE EMBASSY'S CONTACTS WITH SM SUPPORTER PER REF D. ASSUME STATION COORDINATE

E C R E T 100856Z JUN 79 STAFF

ITE TEHRAN 03395 (GLEGOROFF ACTING)

O: DIRECTOR.

MINTEL RYBAT

REF: TEHRAN 53376

1. IN A SCHEDULED PHONE CONVERSATION WITH SDJA U J/13 9 JUNE
GLEGOROFF EXPLAINED THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED AT THE TIME TO
GIVE SHARI THADARI (SM) AN ASSURANCE OF SUPPORT. GLEGOROFF SAID
IT OUR POSITION THAT MORE INFORMATION FIRST NEEDED ABOUT THE
POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAN AND FORCES AT WORK HERE. GLEGOROFF
ADDED THAT SINCE SM HAD WANTED TO KNOW SO QUICKLY
WHETHER WE WERE WILLING TO PROVIDE HIM MONEY, GLEGOROFF'S
TO RESPOND CATEGORICALLY IN THE NEGATIVE. FROM OUR VIEWPOINT,
KIND OF AN OPERATION COULD ONLY BE ENTERED INTO AFTER CAREFUL
PLANNING AND FULL AGREEMENT ON AIMS.

2. J/13 SAID HE WOULD GET THIS MESSAGE TO SA... IA MORTEZA
MOUSSAVI. HE SAID SM'S AIMS IN THIS WERE CLEAR, AND WE SHOULD
NOT NEED MORE TIME TO UNDERSTAND THEM. THE AIM IS TO BEGIN OR-
GANIZING IN EARNEST. ORGANIZING FOR WHAT, GLEGOROFF ASKED? IT
THERE ARE TO BE ELECTIONS THERE WOULD DOUBTLESS BE A NEED, BUT
WHO COULD SAY NOW THERE WILL BE ELECTIONS? J/13 SAID WE SHOULD
UNDERSTAND THAT AS AN IMPORTANT RELIGIOUS FIGURE, MANY
PEOPLE CAME TO SM WITH REQUESTS FOR GUIDANCE AND HELP. SM NEED
MONEY IN ORDER TO GATHER MORE FOLLOWERS (IN HIS VIEW THAT SM
MARJAS DERIVE THEIR POSITIONS AND IMPORTANCE BY AND FROM THE
NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS THEY HAVE). SM WOULD DOLE OUT THE FUNDS
WORTHY PEOPLE AND THEREBY OBTAIN THEIR LOYALTY. PART OF THE
WOULD OF COURSE ALSO BE USED TO COVER OVERHEAD EXPENSES OF THE
PARTY. J/13 AGAIN STRESSED THAT SM WANTED TO GET GOING SOON
IN AZERBAIJAN AND OTHER PROVINCES (SEE NIT-0,636 FOR FORMER
AZERBAIJAN GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S REMARKS ABOUT BRO-KHO... BEING COMMI
ORGANIZATIONAL WORK IN HIS PROVINCE). J/13 SAID SM DID NOT R
FEEL TIME IS ON HIS SIDE. J/13 CHIDED GLEGOROFF ABOUT OVER-C
AS HE SAW IT, FOR END USE EACH DOLLAR IS PUT TO... J/1 SAID W

COUNTRY: IRAN
SUBJECT: STATEMENTS OF AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI ABOUT HIS ULTIMATUM TO THE GOVERNMENT ON THE MAHABAD SEIGE, AN EMIGRE AND INTERNAL OPPOSITION POLITICS (DOB) DATE OCTOBER 1979

SOURCE: A LIBERAL POLITICIAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL CIRCLES. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION FROM SOURCE WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS.

1. AYATOLLAH KAZEM SHARIAT-MADARI SAID IN LATE OCTOBER 1979 THAT HE HAD INTERVENED TO BRING AN END TO THE GOVERNMENT SEIGE OF MAHABAD IN WEST AZARBAIJAN. HE SAID THAT HE HAD SENT AN EMISSARY TO INTERIOR MINISTER HASHEM SABRAGIAN, DEMANDING THAT THE SEIGE BE LIFTED. SHARIAT-MADARI SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE EMISSARY TO SAY THAT IF THE SEIGE CONTINUED, HE WOULD MOBILIZE AZARBAIJANI TURKS TO LIFT IT BY FORCE. (SOURCE COMMENT: SHARIAT-MADARI DID NOT SAY WHEN THE ULTIMATUM HAD BEEN DELIVERED.) (FIELD COMMENT: SABRAGIAN IS ONE OF THREE MEMBERS OF A GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE RECENTLY APPOINTED TO TRY TO DEVISE A SOLUTION TO THE KURDISH REBELLION. THE TEHRAN TIMES HAS REPORTED THAT THE SEIGE OF MAHABAD WAS CONTINUING ON 28 OCTOBER, BUT HAD BEEN PARTLY LIFTED ON 24 OCTOBER.)

2. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, SHARIAT-MADARI VIGOROUSLY DENIED ANY CONNECTION WITH EXILED FORMER PRIME MINISTER SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR. HE SAID THAT BAKHTIAR HAD MADE ONE INITIATIVE TO ESTABLISH CONTACT, BUT THAT THERE IS NO COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THEM. SHARIAT-MADARI EXPLICITLY DENIED THAT HE HAS MADE OR INTENDS TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT BAKHTIAR.

3. SHARIAT-MADARI SAID THAT HE IS ADVISING THE MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC PARTY (MPRP) TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND THE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP. (SOURCE COMMENT: SHARIAT-MADARI WAS SPEAKING IN THE CONTEXT OF KHOMEINI'S DENUNCIATION OF THE MRP'S PUBLIC MEETING OF 19 OCTOBER, AT WHICH THERE WERE CALLS FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY TO BE DECLINING. SHARIAT-MADARI SAID HE PERCEIVES KHOMEINI'S AUTHORITY TO BE DECLINING, AND THAT HE BELIEVES IT WILL BECOME POSSIBLE, PERHAPS WITHIN TWO OR THREE MONTHS, FOR OPPOSITION GROUPS TO VOICE THEIR CRITICISMS MORE FREELY.)



SD PROBE/1. MR. MOQADDAM - MARAGHEH,
FORMER GOVERNOR OF EAST AZERBAIJAN,
MEMBER OF ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS,
AGE: 55-60. ADDRESS: NORTH SIDE OF
MIR-E-DAMAD, NEAR NAFT. MARRIED,
ONE SON AT SCHOOL IN U.S. EUROPEAN
LANGUAGES: FRENCH, ENGLISH. INTRO-
DUCTION BY JAPANESE DIPLOMAT, MR.
HASEGAWA, AT MR. M'S HOME, IN AUGUST
MEETINGS AT SAME PLACE, WEEKLY
PURPOSE OF CONTACT: ① INFORMATION
ON PROGRESS OF ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS;
② INFORMATION ON ORGANIZATION AND
MEMBERSHIP OF IRANIAN POLITICAL
PARTIES; ③ INFORMATION ON PROGRESS AND
PROBLEMS OF THE REVOLUTION; ④ VIEWS
ON IRAN-U.S. RELATIONS.
RE ①: PRIMARY EMPHASIS WAS ON
QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, I.E., ROLE OF
CLERGY, ROLE OF PEOPLE, VELAYAT-E-
FAQIH, ETC. ALSO: DESCRIPTION OF
ASSEMBLY PROCEEDINGS, ESPECIALLY ON
ARTICLES 5 AND 15.
RE ②: INFORMAL STRUCTURE AND AZERBAI-
JANI ETHNIC BASE OF SHIRIAT-MADARI'S
PARTY; S-M'S AND MR. M'S PROGRAM
TO BROADEN THE BASE OF SUPPORT FOR
3 THE REVOLUTION VIA ELECTIONS TO THE

3 AUG 79

2-2

SECRET 081343Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 487419.

TO: IMMEDIATE LONDON, PARIS INFO TEHRAN.

MINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REFS: A. LONDON 16438
B. PARIS 11196

POA 1. CONCUR KILTIGER TO FRANCE TO MEET FATOLLAH. PROCESSING

2. IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH FATOLLAH, PLS TRY TO DETERMINE ANY AND ALL TRAVEL PLANS OF NAZIM (IDEN) IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. HQS WOULD LIKE TO REESTABLISH CONTACT OUTSIDE OF IRAN BETWEEN NAZIM AND HIS FORMER REACTION CONTACT, JOSEPH W. ADLESICK, AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.

3. FILE: 201-229725. RWV 1AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET

20 SEP 79 17 39Z

SECRET 192327Z SEP 79 STAFF
CITE DIRECTOR 516999.

TO: PRIORITY KHWAIT INFO TEHRAN.
WANTED SDCOSMO SDFUTTY

REF: KHWAIT 30020

1. THE NIOC OFFICIAL REFERRED TO IN PARA ONE RE. SDFUTTY/1, WITH WHOM WE WERE INTERESTED IN ARRANGING CO. OUTSIDE OF IRAN.

2. P/S PURSUE P/1 VISIT EDWAIT DISCREETLY WITH SDCOSMO/1 AND KEEP P/S AND TEHRAN INFORMED OF P/1'S ITINERARY, PROVIDING AS MUCH ADVANCE NOTICE AS POSSIBLE, SO EDT BY P/1 FORMER CASE OFFICERS CAN BE ARRANGED.

3. FOR TEHRAN; REQUEST ANY INPUT ON P/1 TRAVEL WHICH BE AVAILABLE TO YOU.

4. FILE: 201-229725. RW 10SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

TFWIRDB-315/19350-79

DIST: 02 NOVEMBER 1979

IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
OR CLASSIFIED UNLESS UNIFORM NOCONTRACT ORCON
DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED IN FINAL PARAGRAPH

RECEIVED DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY
IS AN IRANIAN UNDER PROTECTION OF AYATOLLAH SHAHJAT-
MADARI (DOB: EARLY OCTOBER 1939)
A FORMER SENIOR IRANIAN MILITARY OFFICER WHO IS AN
OFFICER OF UNDETERMINED RELIABILITY. HE IS BELIEVED
TO HAVE GOTTEN ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION CITED BELOW.

1. SOURCE HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE FORMER DIRECTOR
OF THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY HASSAN NAZEM SHAHRI
WAS IN THE TEHRAN HOME OF AYATOLLAH SEYED KAZEM SHARIATI
DURING HIS HIDEOUT FROM HIS JOB AS DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
IRANIAN OIL COMPANY IN A GOVERNMENT SHAKEUP IN EARLY OCTOBER
1979. NAZEM WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE TEHRAN
PROSECUTOR'S INVESTIGATION WHICH LED TO A WARRANT
FOR HIS ARREST. NAZEM APPARENTLY HAS BEEN ABLE TO USE THE
PROTECTION PROVIDED BY SHAHJAT-MADARI'S POSITION TO KEEP HIMSELF
FROM BEING BROUGHT TO TRIAL.

2. BAKHTIAR'S GROUPS ALSO BELIEVE THAT NAZEM HAS TAKEN
HIDDEN DOCUMENTS WHICH PROVE THAT SUBSTANTIAL IRANIAN
RESOURCES HAVE BEEN PASSED TO THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION (PLO). THESE GROUPS BELIEVE THAT THESE DOCUMENTS
WOULD ASSIST BAKHTIAR'S MOVEMENT IN
CONTRASTING THAT THE KHOMENI GOVERNMENT HAS ESTABLISHED MUCH
THAT THE PRO TEHRAN IS GENERALLY ASSUMED AND WOULD
BEAT THE TIME OF SEVERE ECONOMIC CRISIS IRANIAN MONEY IS
BEING RUN OUT OF THE COUNTRY.

3. (1 NOVEMBER 1979)
4. RE: DISSEM SENT TO TEHRAN, LONDON, PARIS, SEIRUT

4 AUG 79 13 23Z

SECRET 031634Z AUG 79 STAFF

ITE DIRECTOR 488389.

TO: IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN.

FACT STOCKHOLM.

NINTEL RYBAT AJAJA

REF: DIRECTOR 485969

1. ADLESICK WILL ACCOMPANY FSCMB. JOHN STEMPLE ON TRIP TO STOCKHOLM ARRIVING STOCKHOLM SUNDAY MORNING BY NORTHWEST AIRLINE FLIGHT 38.
2. REQUEST STATION MAKE HOTEL RESERVATIONS FOR ADLESICK (IDEN) AND LEAVE MESSAGE WITH NORTHWEST AT AIRPORT. WOULD PREFER RESERVATIONS IN SAME HOTEL EMBASSY MAKING RESERVATIONS FOR STEMPLE.
3. NO FILE. RVW 3 AUG 79. DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

SECRET
BT
#2684

REF ID: A614332 OCT 79 STAFF

3 Oct 79

STOCKHOLM 2024

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEBRA.

WALTEL BYAT FGA AJAJ SDPLD

REF ID: DIRECTOR 524472
BY DIRECTOR 520197

1. SDPLD/1 SAID ARRIVINGS STILL OK AND HE HAD NO INFO FROM
TEBRAN WHILE WOULD CHANGE THIS CONCLUSION. AS USUAL, RELIABLE
AND POSITIVE ON PHONE.

2. HE THOUGHT THERE NO PROBLEM GETTING VIGAS IN WASHINGTON
THROUGH THE OBVIOUSLY TRIPS WERE THROUGH HIM. IN ALEXISIC AND R.
S. ITS INTEND GET VIGAS HERE, WE MUST KNOW BY OPENING OF BUSI-
FRIDAY, 2 OCTOBER BECAUSE SDPLD/1 DEPARTING STOCKHOLM FOR PARIS 5
OCTOBER AND HE WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE INSTRUCTIONS RE VIGAS. HE HAD
NOT THINK IT NECESSARY FOR ALEXISIC TO COMFER WITH HIM BEFORE
BEFORE TEBRA MEETING.

3. SDPLD/1 TRAVELING PARIS FOR STOCKHOLM ON 8 AND 9 OCTOBER.
TEBRAN THEREFORE WANTS TEBRA MEETING TO BE HELD 10 OCTOBER AT
LATEST TO AVOID "WASTING HIS TIME" IN TEBRA.

4. HIS MATERIAL IN FM NO. 807786 (REF B) ARRIVED STOCKHOLM
WEDNESDAY 5 OCTOBER. SHOULD IT BESS IT? DEFER TO GDS FOR SECURITY
INSTRUCTIONS SINCE SDPLD/1 PRESUMABLY WILD EITHER LEAVE
SERIAL IN OFFICE OR CARRY IT WITH HIM TO PARIS. IF YOU PREFER
SAGS, SHOULD BE GIVE HIM INST SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS RE WINDLIN

WIDE: 201-282854. RWV 120CT98 RRV D9C.1

S E T
#625



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2

SECRET 04150Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54428

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL RYBAT (LSDURN)

REF: TEHRAN 54326

1. REACHED SDUPRN/1 (U/I) FROM P... NE EVENING 30
HE SAID:

A. HE CLOSING HIS BUSINESS AND... S RELATIONSHIP
THE PGOI. ASKED IF WE HAD ANY INFO ON... REPLY, NEGAT

B. HIS HOUSE WAS ACQUIRED AN UN... GUARD WHOSE
SPONSORSHIP UNKNOWN. THIS DEVELOPMENT... SIBLE FOR
U/I'S FAILURE TO CONTACT THE STATION...

C. HE MUST TRAVEL TO BALUCHI... UP AN UNSPEC
BUSINESS TRANSACTION, WILL TRY TO CAL... FROM AIRPORT
RETURN LATE NEXT WEEK.

2. IN VIEW OF SITUATION... G, WE WERE P
TANT TO PROLONG CONVERSATION OR ASK... C, BEST UNDER
STANDING IS THAT DECISION TO PUL... C
SDPUTTY/I AFFAIR, AND PRECEDED THE APP...
HIS GATE. U/I SOUNDED DEPRESSED AND... R GHTENED.

3. IN RECENT CALLS TO U/I HOUSE... E HEARD VOICES
SON AND FEMALE WHO IS PRESUMABLY WIFE... DAUGHTER. FAC
THAT FAMILY STILL HERE MAY IN... THIS WILL NOT
ANOTHER SDEAGLE/I CASE. NEVERTHELESS... REVOLUTIONARY
JUSTICE DOES NOT SEEM TO INCLUDE... AN
THOSE JUDGED DELINQUENT, AND IT POSSIBLE... AN
CONCLUSION HE MUST ATTEMPT SOLO SUR... PARTURE. Y RE
HQS ADVICE AS TO WHETHER WE SHOULD TRY... SUCH A DEPAR
AND IF SO WHAT CONTINGENCY PREPARAT... MAKE.



SECRET
Security Information
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Office of the Army Attache

Tehran, Iran
26 July 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Cuomo, American Embassy

Khosrow's remarks include the following:

Prince Ali Reza was in the disturbances Monday and personally shot and killed two Iranians.

The Committee of Inquiry will determine who was responsible for the civilian killings Monday and they will all hang.


I hate the Shah.

All of Army G-2 are guilty and will come before the Committee.

Use of the Army against Iranians is unconstitutional.

I just paid General Garzan 10,000 tomans last week (rest of sentence undistinguishable).

I am pro-American.


JOHN I. HINCKE
Colonel, GS
Army Attache

SECRET
Security Information

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Handwritten: Carded 1-15-68

20 DEC 1967

This document consists of 1 pages.
Copy 1 of 1 received. Series SY-A*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Fajich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Khosrow Khan QASHGAI

Handwritten: [Initials]

1. A reliable and sensitive source has reported that Khosrow Khan QASHGAI has received an invitation to visit the United States from his nephew, Amir Abdollah QASHGAI, a doctor residing at No. 1 Main Street, Chisholm, Idaho.

2. Khosrow Khan QASHGAI, an Iranian citizen was born circa 1920 in Shiraz, Iran. He is one of the exiled leaders of the Qashgai tribe in Iran. The Qashgai leaders were forced to flee Iran about 1954 due to their continued opposition which at times led to armed revolt against the present regime of Iran. Subject presently resides in Munich, Germany where he maintains contact with all of the anti-regime elements residing abroad.

3. Should Subject accept his nephew's invitation to visit the United States, this Agency would appreciate having Subject's activities monitored and ^{being} kept informed of his contacts.

4. In order to protect our source you are requested not to reveal the source of the above information in any conversations you may have with Subject.

CSCI/316/05542-67

cc: Immigration & Naturalization Service
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 3 1968

Intelligence Liaison Section

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 3 1968
OFFICE OF SECURITY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

This document consists of 1 page.
Number 2 of 2 copies, Series 26-B

Number of copies, Series 26-B
authorized by [Signature] on 1/1/68
to [Signature]

QASHGAI, Khosrow Khan

REPORT CLASS S E C E --WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF KHOSROW GASHQAI ON SENIOR IRANIAN OFFICIALS AND ON GASHQAI TRIBE POLITICAL ACTIVITY (OO: MID-OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A MEMBER OF THE GASHQAI TRIBE WHO IS A CONFIDANT OF A SENIOR GASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER WITH HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

1. GASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER KHOSROW G A S H Q A I SAID IN MID-OCTOBER 1979 THAT, OF THE FIVE MOST INFLUENTIAL LAYMEN IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAN (PGOI), HE REGARDS ONLY ONE AS BEING A CONVINCED REVOLUTIONARY. THIS IS MUSTAFA CHAMRAN, MINISTER OF DEFENSE. (SOURCE COMMENT: GASHQAI SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN CHAMRAN IN ABOUT TEN YEARS AND COULD NOT BE CERTAIN THAT HIS IDEOLOGICAL FERVOR HAD SURVIVED THROUGH THIS PERIOD.) GASHQAI SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM YAZDI, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SADEGH TABATABA'I AND NATIONAL IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION DIRECTOR SADEGH QOTBZADEH ARE ESSENTIALLY OPPORTUNISTS, MORE CONCERNED WITH THE ACQUISITION AND EXERCISE OF POWER THAN WITH THE TRANSFORMATION OF IRANIAN SOCIETY ON THE BASIS OF SOME COHERENT POLITICAL PROGRAM. GASHQAI EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONTEMPT FOR QOTBZADEH, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS FOR SALE TO ANYONE WHO PROVIDES HIM THE LUXURIES AND PERQUISITES HE CRAVES.

2. OF YAZDI, GASHQAI SAID THAT HE IS MORE COMPLICATED THAN QOTBZADEH, VERY AMBITIOUS AND DEFINITELY NOT A REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGUE. KHOSROW SAID THAT HE REGARDS TABATABA'I AS MOTIVATED BY SELF-INTEREST AS MUCH AS THE OTHERS; HE SAID THAT HE VIEWS INTERIOR MINISTER HAJM SAHAGHIAN AS THE OTHER MOST INFLUENTIAL LAYMAN IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THAT HE DOES NOT THINK HIM TO BE MORE REVOLUTIONARY THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, YAZDI. KHOSROW ADDED THAT HE REGARDS ALL FIVE OF THESE OFFICIALS AS TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMENI FOR THEIR POSITIONS OF INFLUENCE, SAYING THAT, AS LONG-TIME EXILES,



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SDROTTER/4. KHOSROW QASHQAI.
QASHQAI TRIBAL LEADER. RESIDES
SHIRAZ. MARITAL STATUS UNKNOWN.
AGE 50-55. RESIDED W. GERMANY AND
U.S. BEFORE REVOLUTION.

Met in Tehran approximately every three to four weeks, either in his hotel room or picked up by car. Used Sheraton and Inter-Continental hotels.

Purpose of Contact: 1) To acquire sources of information on Khuzestani Arabs, including organization, leadership, and any involvement with or support from Iraq; 2) Information on the security situation in Pars and Khuzestan Provinces; 3) Political plans of Admiral Madani.

Re 1): In October, Mr. Q said he had been informed about two Khuzestani Arabs, smugglers by trade, who might be able to provide the desired information. Mr. Q was to provide names and other pertinent data in November. Re 2): Mr. Q provided information on his efforts both to guard against threats to the Revolution and to avoid the stationing of Pasdaran and Komitehs among the Qashqai people. Described efforts to acquire friends for the Qashqai tribe among military officers and in the person of Adm. Madani. Re 3) Mr. Q described Madani's interest in seeking the Presidency of the Republic under the new constitution.

Mr. Q described the weekly newspaper he wanted to sponsor in cooperation with Admiral Madani. Most of the information involved the reasons for continued postponement of publication, primarily the absence from Iran of the proposed editor (name not known). Paper was to be published in Tehran in about 70,000 copies per edition. We were interested, in principle, in

November 29, 1971

SECRET
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Mr. James E. Akins
Office of Fuels & Energy
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Jim:

This is in reply to your letter of October 27 to John Washburn enclosing your draft paper on the future of the international petroleum industry. John feels, as I gather he has already written to you, that these comments may be a little more helpful to you bureaucratically if I sign them. I am not sure I entirely agree, but have let myself be persuaded since we both want to help as much as we can in your very important effort.

We have also received a copy of NEA's comments, so that I will begin with a couple of thoughts on these. We like the suggested new chapter on consumer government-company relationships. We strongly agree that the offer of a new relationship with some Gulf countries is not likely to work out. On the other hand, we agree with you and not with NEA on the question of whether or not we are in the last buyers' market. It seems to us that after the overwhelming proof you provide in the first section of your paper, the "almost certainly" on page 29, and the use of "likely" on that page and on page 30 constitute abundant caution in making a forecast with which we entirely agree.

On the effect of the Tehran Agreement, we do agree with NEA that its opening paragraph was not intended to preserve all aspects of existing concessionary contracts for the next 5 years, but rather to define and limit the amendatory effect on these contracts of the Tehran Agreement itself without barring future changes on subjects other than those specified in the Tehran Agreement, i.e., financial arrangements and government take. Our certainty on this point is supported by the explanations of the companies' representatives to us last February, and by the companies' own legal argument which

SECRET

III. Reserves, Production and Demand

A. Primary Reserves

Between two-thirds and three-fourths of the non-communist world's known reserves of oil are in the Arab countries of North Africa and the Middle East. The figures in the table below are generally accepted by the industry as reasonably accurate.

Reserves in billions of barrels:

| | |
|----------------------------------|------------|
| U. S. | 40 |
| Canada | 10 |
| Venezuela | 15 |
| Other Latin America | 15 |
| Total Western Hemisphere | 80 |
| Arab World * | 350 |
| Iran | 55 |
| Indonesia | 10 |
| Non-Arab Africa | 10 |
| Other | 5 |
| Total Eastern Hemisphere | 430 |
| Total Non-Communist World | 510 |

More than half of the Arab total is in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Trucial States and Oman). Some geologists maintain that the deGolyer and McNaughton estimate for Saudi Arabia of 130 billion barrels is underestimated; that the known reserves are considerably higher and that the probable recoverable reserves of that country are at least twice and possibly thrice this figure. The estimate used for Iraq of less than 30 billion barrels is also low; and the probable recoverable reserves are at least 100 billion barrels. There is a fairly widespread belief in the industry that by 1985 the production of all countries of OPEC except Saudi Arabia and Iraq will have "peaked-out" and will have started to decline, unless they have converted to secondary recovery methods.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 26, 1972

SECRET


John Washburn, Esq.
Petroleum Attaché
American Embassy
Tehran

Dear John:

Enclosed are seven pages representing our final corrections to the report recently sent to you on the "International Oil Industry Through 1980." It would be appreciated if you could have them substituted for the corresponding pages in our original study.

We have had our final meetings on the oil paper and Under Secretary Irwin and I are now in the process of starting implementation by calls on Lincoln, Morton, Laird, Schlesinger, Haldeman, Stein and others. Towards the end of the month, the Secretary will send a letter to the President telling him what we have done and what we think should be done. In the meantime, we would appreciate any comments or observations you may wish to offer. Needless to say, our report should not be shown to the Iranian Government.

Sincerely,


James E. Akins
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
for International Resources
and Food Policy

Enclosures:

Corrected copies of pages 2,3,28,
85,86,90 & 91 of the "International
Oil Industry Through 1980."

SECRET

The Oil Market Through 1985

Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center

August 1978

Summary

Scope and Limitations

This study analyzes the prospects for the international oil market during the next seven years.¹ It is designed to identify the circumstances under which demand pressure on available oil supply may push up oil prices and to evaluate how likely these circumstances are to occur, not to work out the ways in which a potential problem may be resolved.

The analysis is complex, because it depends on the interaction of projections of three key variables—economic growth in the industrialized countries, the effectiveness of energy conservation efforts, and oil production. Moreover, projections are inherently uncertain. They depend on historical data, which are subject to various interpretations, and on future events that are unpredictable.

Because of the critical role of the countries associated with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in supplying world oil needs, the analysis is organized in terms of the demand for OPEC oil and the willingness and ability of the OPEC countries to meet this demand. To simplify the problem, we have limited the analysis in three ways:

- OPEC prices are held constant in real terms.

¹ This study updates and extends the analysis in ER 77-10240, *The International Energy Situation: Outlook to 1985*, April 1977.

- We do not consider the impact of possible changes in the energy policies of the industrialized countries.
- We consider only the period through 1985—a period short enough so that leadtimes for planning and implementing major projects are important constraints on the expansion of oil production capacity.

In practice, of course, if energy demand began to put pressure on oil supply, real oil prices would increase and government policies probably would change. Price increases would lower the demand for oil both directly and through their depressing effect on economic growth. Governments probably would take increasingly vigorous steps to conserve energy and to increase supplies.

Within this analytical framework, we have established the following ranges as the probable parameters for the key variables:

- Real economic growth in the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development averaging from 3.7 percent to 4.2 percent annually during 1978-85.
- Energy conservation in response to past price increases and existing government policies holding the growth of OECD energy demand to between 70 percent and 80 percent of the rate of economic growth.

IV. NON-COMMUNIST DEMAND FOR OPEC OIL OUTSIDE THE OECD

As the next stage in our analysis, we estimated the expected demand for OPEC oil in the non-OPEC LDCs and in a few industrial countries not covered in the OECD section. To simplify the analysis and keep its focus on the policy tradeoffs in the developed countries, we chose to make only single, most likely estimates about future demand for OPEC oil among these countries. Because of data inadequacies, the remainder of the non-OPEC, non-Communist world could not be treated on exactly the same basis as the developed countries. Instead, we looked at the historical relationship between economic activity as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) and oil consumption individually for 11 large oil-consuming LDCs, the remaining non-OPEC LDCs, and four developed countries.

Net Oil Import Demand of the Non-OPEC LDCs

We expect that the non-OPEC LDCs as a group will require less imported oil in 1985 than they do today—2.3 million b/d compared with 3 million b/d in 1977. It is rapidly increasing Mexican oil output, however, that masks growing import dependence by most non-OPEC LDCs. Mexico's exports are expected to grow from some 250,000 b/d last year to about 2.7 million b/d in 1985 (see table 9).

We expect oil consumption in the non-OPEC LDCs to continue to grow rapidly in 1978-85. In many of these countries the share of industry in national output is rising, making reductions in oil usage difficult. Overall, we estimate non-OPEC LDC oil demand will rise from an estimated 7.2 million b/d last year to more than 11 million b/d in 1985. These demand estimates assume that the non-OPEC developing countries as a group achieve real GDP growth of 4.5 percent annually in 1977-85. This economic growth rate approximates four-fifths of the historical ones, although wide variations occur among individual LDCs. It

is consistent with a relatively sluggish growth rate in the developed countries.

Domestic oil production in the non-OPEC LDCs is projected to increase from 4.2 million b/d in 1977 to 6.3 million b/d in 1980 and 9 million b/d in 1985 (see figure 9). The largest gains will be in Mexico and Egypt, with smaller increases in India, Brazil, and Brunei-Malaysia. Production of oil and natural gas liquids in Mexico should rise from more than 1 million b/d last year to about 2.3 million b/d in 1980 and 3.9 million b/d in 1985. Egyptian oil output could reach 700,000 b/d in 1980 and 1 million b/d by 1983-84.

Discovery of vast oil reserves in Tabasco and Chiapas States of southeastern Mexico in 1972 turned around a rapidly deteriorating supply

Table 9
Non-OPEC LDCs: Net Oil Import Requirements

| | Million b/d | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------|------|------|------|
| | 1977* | 1980 | 1982 | 1985 |
| Total | | | | |
| Production ^a | 4.2 | 6.3 | 7.3 | 9.0 |
| Consumption | 7.2 | 8.4 | 9.5 | 11.3 |
| Net oil imports | 3.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| Of which: | | | | |
| Brazil | | | | |
| Production ^a | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.5 |
| Consumption | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.8 |
| Net oil imports | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.3 |
| Mexico | | | | |
| Production ^a | 1.1 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 3.9 |
| Consumption | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| Net oil imports | -0.3 | -1.3 | -1.8 | -2.7 |
| Egypt | | | | |
| Production ^a | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.0 |
| Consumption | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Net oil imports | -0.2 | -0.5 | -0.7 | -0.8 |

* Estimated

^a Including natural gas liquids.

VI. WORLD DEMAND FOR OPEC OIL THROUGH 1985

On the basis of the various projections described above, we project that world demand for OPEC oil could mount to 41.6 million to 45.0 million b/d, assuming that adequate oil supplies existed to support these levels of demand (see table 11). The lower demand would be consistent with a 3.7-percent average annual rate of growth in the OECD in 1978-85. The other end of the demand range reflects a 4.2-percent annual growth rate in the developed countries. Both scenarios take account of an approximate dou-

bling in OPEC demand for its own oil between 1977 and 1985, to 4 million b/d.

Oil Supply and Demand Balances: Implications

Although the range of uncertainty surrounding energy supply and demand is great, it is clear that the supply of oil in key OPEC and non-OPEC countries in the first half of the 1980s will not leave much margin to support potential demand other than in the most favorable circumstances. This does not necessarily mean that oil prices will

Table 11

World Demand for OPEC Oil

| | | Million b/d Oil Equivalent | | | |
|---------|---|----------------------------|------------------|------|------|
| | | 1977 ¹ | Projected | | |
| | | | 1980 | 1982 | 1985 |
| | OECD ² total energy demand: | | | | |
| | 3.7 percent OECD growth in real GNP, 1978-85 ³ | 75.4 | 82.6 | 87.4 | 94.6 |
| | 4.2 percent OECD growth in real GNP, 1978-85 ⁴ | 75.4 | 83.4 | 89.3 | 98.0 |
| Minus: | OECD energy production | 47.4 | 53.2 | 55.5 | 59.4 |
| | OECD net nonoil energy imports | 1.7 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.7 |
| Plus: | Oil requirements for strategic storage | | 0.8 ⁵ | | |
| | Statistical discrepancy | 0.5 | | | |
| Equals: | OECD net oil import demand: | | | | |
| | 3.7 percent OECD growth in real GNP, 1978-85 | 26.8 | 27.5 | 28.8 | 31.5 |
| | 4.2 percent OECD growth in real GNP, 1978-85 | 26.8 | 28.3 | 30.7 | 34.9 |
| Plus: | Net oil import demand of: | | | | |
| | Other developed countries ⁶ | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.3 |
| | Non-OPEC LDCs | 3.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.3 |
| | OPEC oil demand | 2.3 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 4.0 |
| Minus: | Net exports of Communist countries | 1.1 | 0.4 | -0.6 | -2.5 |
| Equals: | Required OPEC production ⁷ | | | | |
| | 3.7 percent OECD growth in real GNP, 1978-85 | 31.7 | 33.1 | 36.0 | 41.6 |
| | 4.2 percent OECD growth in real GNP, 1978-85 | 31.7 | 33.9 | 37.9 | 45.0 |

¹ Estimated.

² Excluding Australia and New Zealand.

³ The scenarios imply constant OECD unemployment assuming the historic relationship between employment and GNP growth (OECD average 4.2 percent) or, alternatively, constant unemployment assuming a decline in the historic relationship of productivity to GNP growth (OECD average 3.7 percent).

⁴ Including additions to strategic oil reserves of 600,000 b/d for the United States and 100,000 b/d each for Japan and Western Europe.

⁵ Including Australia, Israel, New Zealand, and South Africa.

⁶ Including natural gas liquids.

PARTICIPANTS: Domenico RAVERA - Honorary French Consul, Khorrasshahr
 Larry W. Semakia - Second Secretary of Embassy

PLACE : Ravera's Residence

DATE : February 20, 1968

DISTRIBUTION: POL/SP; POL/NS; [✓] HIG; CMI; Amcaoul KHORRASSHAH; CIRAN
 AIA/DCI

Khusistan

Significant progress has been made in Khusistan's development in recent years. There are more jobs for the ethnic Arab inhabitants, more hospitals, more schools and a general improvement in the economic lot of the Khusistanis. Ravera, who travels frequently in the hinterland to hunt, remarked that some years ago he was unable to communicate in Farsi with the ethnic Arabs living in Khusistan's villages. Today the ethnic Arab children are attending school and can communicate in Farsi. The Arabs of Khusistan, of course, identify with the Arab world to a degree, but this identification should not be overemphasized. Their loyalty is still centered around the local Sheikhs who by and large are faring well under Persian administration. Ravera described an interesting test he ran at the height of the June 1967 Arab-Israel war on some ethnic Arabs who had voiced deep sympathy for the Arab cause. Ravera told several of them that France, having sided with the Arabs, he, as French Honorary Consul ~~would~~ ^{was} to recruit and finance the travel of those who wished to join the Arab forces. He got no takers!

Domestic Politics

There is no real interest in political parties on the part of the public. The New Iran Party is viewed as an arm of the government bureaucracy. The Pan-Iranist Party has no real following and is generally looked upon as a "ridiculous organization". The Shah is liked, and is more popular now than ever before. Iranians are fickle, however, and the Shah's popularity is a "fair weather" variety.

Persian Gulf

Iran is destined to be the most important power in the Persian Gulf, and Saudi Arabia along with the Sheikdoms in the area would do well to cooperate with Iran. Having visited Bahrain, Ravera has come away with the opinion that Iranians make up the most important element in Bahrain's

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Department of State

INFO : ANKARA, BEIRUT, BUCHAREST, JIDDA, KUWAIT, KABUL,
LONDON, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, PRAGUE, RAWALPINDI,
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POL-6

CHARGE
A/DCM
ECON-3
SA
CR-2
USIS
DAO
MAAG
CONS
CRU-2

Ambassy TEHRAN

DATE: SEPTEMBER 04, 1969

Semi-Annual Assessment of the Political Situation in Iran

Tehran A-068 of February 20, 1969

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| KHOR | 2. The Shah |
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| ANKARA | 4. Iran-U.S. Relations |
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| NEW DELHI | |
| PRAGUE | |
| RAWALPINDI | |
| CINGSTRIKE | |

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
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Contributor: ECON:KPrin/w

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TO: Department of State

INFO: ANKARA, DHAHRAN, JIDDA, KABUL, KUWAIT, LONDON, RAWALPINDI

POL-4

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Ambassy TEHRAN

AUG 28, 69

Reform in Iran

Tehran A-630, May 22, 1967

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PS/JAA/vitago

(Contributors: EPPriest, ALRaphel, LMSexstie)

BRIEFING FOR TUI PERSONNEL

Slide #1
ARMISH-MAAG
Logo

● (U) GOOD (MORNING) (AFTERNOON) GENTLEMEN. I AM _____
SINCE YOUR STAY IN IRAN WILL BE BRIEF, WE HAVE DESIGNED A
BRIEFING WHICH WILL GIVE YOU A BROAD OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION
HERE, WITH THE HOPE THAT IT WILL ASSIST YOU IN PERFORMING YOUR
MISSION. ●

Slide #2
BRIEFING OUTLINE

(C) INTRODUCTION: THIS RESUME BEGINS WITH A CONSIDERATION
OF U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AT STAKE IN IRAN. IT CONTINUES WITH
A BIT OF STAGE SETTING BY WEIGHING THE IMPLICATIONS OF IRAN'S
GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND BY EXAMINING THE
PRINCIPAL PHYSICAL FEATURES OF THE COUNTRY, SINCE THEY HELP TO
EXPLAIN IRAN'S DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS AND DEFENSE POSTURE. WE
WILL ALSO TAKE A LOOK AT IRAN'S SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT,
ITS PEOPLE AND THEIR RELIGION, AND COMMENT BRIEFLY ON A FEW
IMPORTANT CULTURAL FACTORS. THIS SERVES AS A PRELUDE TO A
STATEMENT OF THE EXTERNAL THREAT AS IT IS PERCEIVED BY IRAN AND
THE STRATEGY THAT THE SHAH HAS DEvised TO COUNTERACT THIS THREAT.
AN ANALYSIS OF IRAN'S DEFENSE DECISION-MAKING APPARATUS IS THEN
INCLUDED AND FOLLOWED BY A SUMMARY OF THE STRENGTH, DISPOSITION,
AND EXPANSION PLANS OF THE THREE MILITARY SERVICES. NEXT, THE
REVIEW OUTLINES THE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM OPERATING
IN SUPPORT OF THE IRANIAN FORCES AND COVERS IN DETAIL ITS TWO
PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS: ARMISH-MAAG, THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE
ADVISORY GROUP, AND TAFT, THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FIELD TEAMS.

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 Department of State
TELEGRAM

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AMBASSY TEHRAN

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| POL/H | | | N.O. 11652: GDS | |
| INFO | | | TAGS: OREP (PERCY, Charles) | |
| TAB: | | | SUBJ: Senator Percy's Visit: Political Issues | |
| 15/11b | | | REF: Tehran 169 (NOVAL) | |
| | | | 1. In separate conversations, Senator Percy drew out Ministers Amousegar and Amery and Israeli Representative Labrani on following topics. This report is unclassified and subject to revision by Senator. | |
| | | | a. <u>GOI Attitude Towards Arab-Israeli Confrontation.</u> | |
| | | | All three agreed or assumed that Iranian position was basically unchanged, i.e., Iran would not help Arabs militarily | |

| | | | |
|-------------------|----------------|------------|----------------|
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Department of State

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DEPT PASS:
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JIDDA, KUWAIT, MANAMA, MUSCAT, NEW DELHI

E.O. : 11652: E/S
TAGS : ECON, ETRD, EINH, EFIN, PFOR, PIIT, IR August 4, 1975
End of Tour Report - The Outlook for Iran

POUCH
KHOR
TABR
16/r1b

This airgram transmits an end of tour assessment drafted by the financial/economic development officer at Embassy Tehran for the past two years. It attempts to combine both economic and political factors and concludes that, while the economic outlook for the country is very favorable, increasing U. S. involvement in the economy contains the seeds of potential, though probably not serious, bi-lateral conflict. The outlook for continued even and reasonably good bi-lateral political relations is bright. The conflict between rapid economic growth and modernization vis-a-vis a still autocratic rule, committed to more economic prosperity for the mass of the population and to social--but not political--change, is the greatest uncertainty marring an otherwise optimistic prognosis for Iran. If the country manages to maintain relative stability by somehow working out an evolutionary rather than revolutionary means of liberalizing its system of government, then the long range outlook for its continued prosperity probably is as encouraging as for any developing country in the world.

The U. S. and Iran both need things from each other. Only a radical change in the system of government or a breakdown in the world financial system would seem likely to disturb seriously the present mutually beneficial relationship. The U. S. probably will not exercise much influence over the course of developments in Iran.

Enclosure

HEHMS

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CON:DE:Westley

POL:HOH:lls/ktm

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AIRGRAM

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TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: AMCONSULS ISFAHAN AND TABRIZ (VIA INTERNAL POUCH)

FROM: AMCONSUL: SHIRAZ

DATE: 4/27/78

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF THE AMOUZEGAR GOVERNMENT

REF:

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| CIA | COM | DDG | DDI |
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| Navy | NBA | NBC | OPIC |
| STN | TAN | TRAV | USA |
| RMS | | | |

Over the last several months the post has attempted to sound out a number of individuals in southern Iran regarding their views of the Amouzegar government's performance since taking office last summer. Responses from many, particularly government officials and those with political ambitions, have been standard incantations about Iran's continuing march toward the Great Civilization. However, the franker comments have indicated a fairly widespread sense of disappointment. This disappointment seems to have resulted less from tangible mistakes the government has made than from a commonly held perception that it has not done much of anything.

Among possible reasons for this perception are:

For years the Iranian people have been conditioned by official rhetoric to look to the central government for answers to all manner of problems. Amouzegar himself has sometimes stressed that magic solutions do not exist in every instance, something most impartial observers would view as a healthy dose of realism. However, even the Prime Minister has not been completely free from the politician's passion for grandiose claims. The consequence has been that his audience has been receiving confusing signals; one day it is told to lower its expectations, and the next that it has never had it so good.

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FORM 88-883

3.

OVERVIEW

Iran will be of great importance to the United States for the foreseeable future. Its strategic location, its oil and gas resources and its political influence with other countries in the area, all taken together, mean that Iran's development and viability have a direct effect on certain vital interests of the US and our NATO allies.

Iran is the capstone of the buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the oil rich Arabian Peninsula. While the US takes only five percent of its oil, Iran is a major supplier for Japan and Western Europe and is an important element within OPEC in determining oil prices. It also plays an increasingly active regional role aimed at promotion of the peaceful development and independence of the Persian Gulf states and limiting Soviet influence in that crucial area. Finally, Iran is the site of some unique US intelligence facilities which would be extremely difficult and expensive to duplicate or locate elsewhere.

Relations between the US and Iran are good. For more than 30 years we have worked together on matters of high national interest to both countries, and during this time we have established working habits and ties - including those between the Shah and successive US presidents - which are productive and close. This condition has continued into the Carter Administration. The President has been personally involved in major decisions concerning policies towards Iran and has already exchanged visits with the Shah. In Tehran the Ambassador has regular and easy access to the Shah.

Nevertheless, there are several policy issues which create difficulties between the two countries. These revolve around human rights, arms sales, and our nuclear non-proliferation policies. Feelings have run high within the USG on how best to deal with the Shah on each of these issues, but our approach has generally been one of quiet pressure by the President, the Secretary and the Ambassador on down. We have not made aggressive

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITH IRAN (NEA/IRN)

INSPECTION MEMORANDUM

No. 8c

Post: Tabriz

July 1978

CONSTITUENT POSTS:
CONSULATE TABRIZ

Facts

The American Consulate at Tabriz, in northwestern Iran, is manned by one American officer and 12 local employees (five direct-hire and seven contract). It is situated on a large and attractive compound. It provides needed consular services, especially to the large American population, and does important regional reporting.

Evaluation and Conclusions

The Inspectors have decided to reverse the recommendation of the previous Inspection (1976) and recommend the retention of the Consulate at Tabriz. The value of the post to US interests does not lie only in its excellent reporting of political developments in a critical region of Iran but also in a complex series of inter-related psychological and prestige factors which are important at this stage of US-Iranian relations. It is simply not the time to abandon a highly visible and long-established symbol of American interest in this unstable and separatist region and thus contribute to the uneasiness over the future of the area. Such a move could be misinterpreted by the Government of Iran, which

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS WITH IRAN (NEA/IRN)

INSPECTION MEMORANDUM

No. 9c

Post: Tehran

July 1978

OTHER AGENCIES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE:
THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

Facts

The Drug Enforcement Agency is represented at Embassy Tehran by an experienced officer. His office is in the Consular building, a somewhat inadequate structure destined for relocation. He has one American Secretary. The DEA Officer in Tehran reports to the DCM and briefs him every two weeks on his activities. He also receives support from the Ambassador to whom he has access when necessary.

The Narcotics Coordinator is the second ranking officer in the Political Section. The Narcotics Committee, chaired by the DCM, has nine members drawn from such representative groups as the Agricultural Attache, MAAG, ICA, and, of course, DEA.

Evaluation and Conclusions

The DEA Officer is largely engaged in liaison with host country police authorities. He finds that relationship excellent. He is involved in institution-building, technical support and joint investigations on

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Cdr. Alain DE BEAUPUY, Assistant Military
Attache, French Embassy
Ambassador Panayotis ECONOMOU, Greek Embassy
George B. LAMBRAKIS, American Embassy, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: September 15, 1978, Lambrakis' Residence

SUBJECT: Internal Situation

DISTRUBUTION: AMB, DCM, POL, POLM, ECON, OR, ICA, DAO, BIO
NEA/IRN, IRN/RNA, INR/OIL/B

De Beaupuy has the distinction of being the only member of the Diplomatic Corps who predicted the severity of the religious challenge to the government and the Shah which we have just witnessed. Cassandra-like, he has been talking to all and sundry about the wrath building up in religious circles and the historic precedents of Islam acting as a sounding board for people's complaints. Historically, the mullahs have many more allies than they did in 1963.

De Beaupuy said we should not allow the temporary moderation of Shariatmadari's views blind us to the trend. Shariatmadari is not in control of the extremists and has to yield to them. Being a "holy man" he is not a politician and acts differently than a politician. In response to my invitation for a prediction, De Beaupuy said, if the Shah does not undertake extensive activity in the next two weeks, he would predict the Shah's departure by the end of October.

The scenario sketched out would be a million moslems marching out of the bazaar in South Tehran as a tide neither the army or police would dare to stop. He then could see Gen. OVEISI, accompanied by Majles Speaker RIAZI and perhaps even the American Ambassador (!), marching in to invite the Shah to take a plane and leave the country.

The only way to avoid this, in De Beaupuy's opinion, is for the Shah to take a more direct role vis-a-vis his people. He cannot hide his responsibility for governing over the past two decades by bringing subordinates to trial. People will no longer believe his promises except those given directly as public commitments perhaps over television. People would

SECRET

What Went Wrong in Iran?

Stanley T. Escudero

Throughout the post-war period and particularly since 1953, the United States maintained an extraordinarily intimate relationship with the Shah of Iran and his regime. We were instrumental in the overthrow of leftist/nationalist Premier Mossadegh and the return of the Shah from his brief European exile. We spent several billion dollars in various bilateral aid projects, many of which were well conceived and much appreciated. Based on our similar regional security interests and Iran's capacity to buy, we helped Iran build itself into the predominant Persian Gulf power. We had thousands of military and civilian advisers and technicians in the country. We were backing a strong autocrat who was far-sighted enough to perceive the need for national development and, apparently, courageous enough to take the lead in the kinds of national economic and social reforms which would lead Iran into the 20th Century. The list could go on but, in short, we had it made.

Yet when I returned to Tehran in November 1978, after an absence of 3-1/2 years, the Shah was on his last leg. American officials were travelling in armored vehicles with armed guards to protect them, not against isolated groups of terror-

Stan Escudero served two tours in Iran; the most recent a TDY assignment last November-January. He is currently in IO/UNP.



ists, but against mobs of ordinary Iranians. The Embassy and other U.S. and GOI installations were protected against similar threats by truckloads of Iranian soldiers with automatic weapons. Even so both the Embassy and our Consulate in Tabriz were attacked and the grounds of the latter were overrun. Later the Embassy itself was briefly captured. Virulent anti-American feelings were sweeping virtually every segment of Iranian society, and many of the strengths on which we had based our policy had become liabilities. The situation grew far worse after the Shah's departure in mid-January and the threat of renewed and heightened anarchy is very real.

Clearly our Iranian policy, which had served us well for over 30 years, had become irrelevant and in many ways harmful to our interests some time before the fall of the Shah. It is legitimate to ask what went wrong and why, with all our assets in Iran, we didn't see this coming.

5/18/75
O-SEVY ESA759BRA645
OO RUHR
DF RUEHC #1898 1448842
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 240316Z MAY 75 ZFFA
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AEMBASSY TEHRAN NIACI IMMEDIATE 2568

24 May 75 ✓ 352

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 131898

E.O. 12965 GDS, 5/23/85 (PRECHT, HENRY)

TACS: ASEC, IR

SUBJECT: SCHEDULED ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS

REF: TFHRAN 85378

Pol
CHG
1st
Rf
CH:ZOW
Sawit
/

1. (C. - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE COMMEND EMBASSY FOR ITS PREPARATIONS TO IMPROVE EMBASSY SECURITY AND ITS PLANS TO DISPERSE EMBASSY PERSONNEL TO EXTENT POSSIBLE ON DAY OF SCHEDULED DEMONSTRATIONS. WE ARE NOT SATISFIED, HOWEVER, WITH PGOI'S RESPONSE TO DATE TO YOUR REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL SECURITY. THEREFORE WOULD YOU PLEASE SEE PM BAZARGAN OR FONMIN YARDI ON URGENT BASIS TO MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. AS IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE NOTICED, THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN MAKING A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS, RESTORE OUR TIES TO A NORMAL COURSE, AND LIMIT TO EXTENT POSSIBLE EMOTIONAL OR MISINFORMED RESPONSES. WE HAVE NO ABILITY TO CONTROL STATEMENTS FROM THE AMERICAN PRESS OR U.S. CONGRESS.

B. WE HAVE DONE OUR BEST, HOWEVER, TO PRESENT A FACTUAL PICTURE OF EVENTS IN IRAN AND TO DESCRIBE TO ALL INTERESTED AMERICAN PARTIES THE MUTUAL INTERESTS AND CONCERNS WE SHARE WITH IRAN.

C. WE ARE DISTURBED BY THE PHENOMENON OF INCREASING ANTI-AMERICANISM IN IRAN, MUCH OF WHICH SEEMS TO BE BASED ON A POPULAR MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE ATTITUDE OF THIS ADMINISTRATION. WE REALIZE THAT THE PGOI FACES MANY CONSTRAINTS AND WE APPRECIATE THE EFFORTS TO DATE TO DEFUSE THE HIGHLY-CHARGED ATMOSPHERE.

BE BUQMER #6965/81 184 **

ZNY CCCCC

R #31426Z JUL 79

FM CARMISH/MAAG TEHRAN IRAN

TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC

RUEADWD/CSA WASH DC

RUEAANA/CNO WASH DC

RUEANQA/CSAF WASH DC

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN OE

RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC

RUEANOF/CARMISH/MAAG ALEX VA

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN IRAN #6965/1

CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

FOR: ASD: ISA/DSAA; NSA: IRN/PM-SAS; DJCS-J-4/5;
DACS-IRN; OP-6S; PAI-LETT; ECDC/ECJ-4/7, J-5-J-2

SUBJ: IRANIAN CONSTITUTION (U)

1. (U) THE TEHRAN TIMES, RECENTLY IN A SERIES OF REPORTS, PUBLISHED ITS TRANSLATION OF THE DRAFT OF THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION. THE REPORTS FURTHER STATED THAT THE MINISTER OF STATE, YADOLLAH SABABI HAD CONFIRMED THIS TRANSLATION AS SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT. THE DRAFT CONTAINS 151 ARTICLES ENCOMPASSING ALL FACETS BY WHICH THE NEW ISLAMIC REPUBLIC WILL BE GOVERNED, IF APPROVED. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS A SYNOPSIS OF ARTICLES, WHICH DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, WOULD AFFECT THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES AND DEFENSE POLICIES.

--A. ARTICLE 6 - CENSORSHIP WILL ONLY BE IMPOSED IN TIME OF WAR.

--B. ARTICLE 76 - THE PRESIDENT HAS TO BE OF IRANIAN ORIGIN AND HAS TO BE AN IRANIAN CITIZEN.

--C. ARTICLE 82 - "THE PRESIDENT'S OATH," INTER ALIA, REQUIRES THE PRESIDENT TO USE ALL HIS POWERS TO GUARD THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE COUNTRY.

--D. ARTICLE 93 - THE PRESIDENT IS THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE COUNTRY'S MILITARY FORCES. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC'S ARMED FORCES WILL BE SELECTED AT THE SUGGESTION OF THE CABINET MINISTERS AND APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT.

--E. ARTICLE 94 - ENDORSEMENT OF IRAN'S PACTS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT, FOLLOWING PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL OF SUCH PACTS AND TREATIES.

--F. ARTICLE 95 - DECLARATION OF WAR, TRUCE AND THE MAKING OF PEACE IS A POWER OF THE PRESIDENT FOLLOWING APPROVAL BY THE PARLIAMENT. IN CASES OF EMERGENCY,

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: A/M 7/3
APPRV: A/M:GAST
DFTB: A/M
CLEAR: CHG; POL:VLTOMS;
DAO:COL SCHAEFRI
DISTR: MAAG POL2 DAO
RF CHRON

relia

DE RUQMHK #0891/81 285 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZE
O 120952Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4217
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 81 OF TEHRAN 10891

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRG: STAT 10/12/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINCE
ERTFD: CHARGE:LBLAINCE
CLEAR: A/M:PCGAST; PO
WIFT; ECON:ADS
DISTR: CHARGE FILE COP
2/WEB

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 10/12/99 (LAINEN, L.B.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, IR
SUBJECT: YAZDI IN NEW YORK: WHERE NOW?

10/14
60 - Pages 5 & 9
have lines missing
Please ask
CRU what
we do about
this
(C.K. BC
will
Service)

REF: STATE 263952

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. YAZDI'S NEW YORK PERFORMANCE WAS AN ABRASIVE AND PUBLIC REMINDER THAT WE HAVE YET TO ACT IN WAYS THAT DEMONSTRATE CONVINCINGLY THAT WE HAVE ACCEPTED THE REVOLUTION. SOME OF THIS IS REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC BUT MORE OF IT IS GENUINE, REFLECTING AMONG OTHER THINGS A CONCERN FOR CONSOLIDATION OF POWER BY AN INNER PGOI CIRCLE. WE RECOMMEND ACTION IN SEVERAL AREAS THAT WE CAN AND SHOULD TAKE TO STRENGTHEN OUR POLICY HAND IN THIS ATMOSPHERE. END SUMMARY.

3. EMBASSY APPRECIATES EXCELLENT ANALYSIS IN REPTEL OF NEW YORK PERFORMANCE BY DR. YAZDI, A MAN INCREASINGLY INFLUENTIAL AS MEMBER OF A GROUP WITHIN THE PGOI CLOSE TO KHOMEINI AND LIKELY TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE EVOLUTION OF POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. (WE INCLUDE IN THAT INNER GROUP, IN ADDITION TO YAZDI, NEW DEFENSE MINISTER CHAMRAN, QOTBZADAH AT WIRT, PGOI SPOKESMAN TABATABAI, AND MINISTER OF INTERIOR SABAGHIAN.)

4. WE SHARE DEPARTMENT'S ANALYSIS OF YAZDI'S PURPOSES -- TO CREATE, FOR HIS OWN PSYCHIC AND PERSONAL POLITICAL PURPOSES THE IMPRESSION OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY AS A NEW BREED OF MAN DEMANDING TO BE HEARD ON THE WORLD STAGE. YAZDI HAD THAT OPPORTUNITY, BOTH AT HAVANA AND AT NEW YORK, AND HE CLEARLY WAS DETERMINED TO USE IT TO MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS.

5. MORE SPECIFICALLY, AS FAR AS THE USG IS CONCERNED, HIS PURPOSE WAS TO TELL US, BOTH PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY, THAT REVOLUTION. AND TO WARN US THAT UNTIL WE DO, THERE CAN BE NO PROGRESS IN BUILDING A NEW RELATIONSHIP. THE THEME WAS SOUNDED AGAIN, WITH SPECIFICS, IN A PRESS CONFERENCE ON HIS RETURN HERE FROM NEW YORK (SEPTEL). THE ICE, SAYS YAZDI, HAS NOT YET BEEN BROKEN. *|| ?*

6. THAT MAY SOUND A BIT EXTREME IN LIGHT OF USG ACTIONS TO DATE DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WE HAVE INDEED ACCEPTED THE REVOLUTION. BUT IT IS PERHAPS NOT ALL THAT SURPRISING, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS -- NOT ALL OF WHICH WE NEED ACCEPT BUT WHICH WE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978 - 501-848

TELEGRAM

OCT 25 AM 10:15

INDICATE
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

10408

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|---|----------------|--------------|
| FROM | AMEMBASSY TEHRAN | CLASSIFICATION | CONFIDENTIAL |
| O. 11652: TAGS: SUBJECT: | ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE | | |
| | INFO: AMEMBASSY LONDON | | |
| ACTION: | CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN <u>10408</u> | | |
| CON-1 | E.O. 11652: XGDS-1 | | |
| AMB | TAGS: ENRG, ELAB, IR | | |
| ICM | SUBJECT: MORE ON IRANIAN OIL SECTOR STRIKE | | |
| COL-2 | REF: TEHRAN 10383 | | |
| M | 1. THE LOCAL CONSORTIUM REPRESENTATIVE, JOHN ORANGE, CONFIRMED | | |
| CA | TO ME TODAY THE ESSENTIAL ACCURACY OF THE SHAH'S VIEW OF THE | | |
| JE | (REFTEL). | | |
| JAO | SERIOUSNESS OF THE OIL FIELD STRIKE/ ORANGE SAID THAT ABOUT | | |
| JGR | 700 MB/D WERE SHUT-IN, LARGELY IN GACHSARAN, AND THAT CRUDE | | |
| JHIR | EXPORTS OF OSCO-PRODUCED OIL THROUGH THE KHARG ISLAND WERE | | |
| JRU | RUNNING ABOUT 4 MMB/D, WHILE DEMAND WAS 4.7 MMB/D. WHILE THE | | |
| 16 | STRIKE MAY BE PRIMARILY PROMOTED AND LED BY CLERICAL STAFF, | | |
| | IT IS OBVIOUS THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF TECHNICAL STAFF ARE ALSO | | |
| | PARTICIPATING. | | |
| | 2. ORANGE, WHILE STOPPING SHORT OF PREDICTING A COMPLETE | | |
| | SHUT-DOWN, COULD NOT FORESEE HOW THE STRIKE COULD BE HALTED | | |

FSE 6-17

| | | | | |
|----------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------|--|
| RAFTED BY | <u>[Signature]</u> | DRAFTING DATE | TEL. EXT. | CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: |
| /C, RMBash:nbt | | 10/25/78 | 1129 | AMB:WHS: [Signature] |

| | | | |
|-------------|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|
| VARANCES: | | DCM: CWNaas | <u>[Signature]</u> |
| /C: JLMills | <u>[Signature]</u> | | |

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATIONOPTIONAL FORM 152(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H))
January 1975
Dept. of State

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

10668

FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN CLASSIFIED SECRET

E.O. 11652:
TACS:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT:

INFO: AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE

ACTION:

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JEDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW*John
-RB
DB-file*

10668

SECRET TEHRAN

DCM-2

EXDIS

EXDIS

AMB
POL
ECOM

E.O. 11652: CDS

CRU

TAGS: ENRG, ELAB, IR

SUBJECT: IRANIAN OIL SECTOR SITUATION

REF: TEHRAN 10560

1. I MET EVENING OCTOBER 31 WITH NIOC CHAIRMAN HUSHANG ANSARY TO DISCUSS RESULTS OF GOVT DECISION TO MOVE MARTIAL LAW FORCES INTO OIL INSTALLATIONS. I FOUND HIM CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC, BUT RATHER TENSE.
2. HE SAID MANY WORKERS WERE RETURNING TO THE FIELDS AND PRODUCTION WAS RISING. KHARG ISLAND WAS COMPLETELY OPERATIONAL. REFINERIES WERE RUNNING AT REDUCED CAPACITY.
3. HE REPORTED ONE CHANGE FROM STRATEGY OUTLINED RPTTEL.

CLASSIFIED BY

AMF/sts/Sullivan

DATE 06/18

DRAFTED DATE

11/1/78

TEL EXT

ROUTE

AMB

CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY BY

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

078 NOV -6 AM 10:25

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
CLASSIFICATION
CHANGE TO

10815

| | |
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| FROM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN | CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|

O. 11652;
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

ACTION:

CON-

MB
CM
GL-2
M
CA
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HIR
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17

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO: AMEMBASSY ARU DHABI
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
USLO PEKING PRIORITY
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

FSE 6-1 7

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10815

TOKYO PASS SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG. ELAB. IR

SUBJECT: IRANIAN OIL SECTOR STRIKE

1. PRODUCTION NOVEMBER 5 FROM THE KHUZESTAN FIELDS BY OSCO WAS 1,791,000 BBLs, 559,000 BBLs OF WHICH WAS DELIVERED TO DOMESTIC REFINERIES AND 1,232,000 BBLs WAS AVAILABLE FOR EXPORT AS CRUDE. IPAC AND LAPCO ARE BOTH STILL COMPLETELY SHUT-DOWN BY STRIKES, TOTAL PRODUCTION ON NOVEMBER 4 (INCLUDING OSCO, SIRIP, IMINOCO AND SOPIRAN) WAS ABOUT 1.9 MILLION BBLs.

| | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|--|
| APPROVED BY /C:IRMBash/nbt | DRAFTING DATE 11/6/78 | TEL. EXT. 1129 | CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY E/C:JLMills |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|--|

C

[Handwritten signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 10-64
Formerly PS 4130
January 1975
Dept. of State

50102 101
GPO : 1975 O - 501-002

271252Z DEC 78
 AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2457
 TO BUOMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1848
 RUECP/USINT BAGHDAD @PRQ
 SSR5/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0383
 ZMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 1953
 ZMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0688
 ZMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3915
 ZMXX/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4903
 ZTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4123
 ZMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1248
 ZMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 2876
 ZPKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2741

CDRGE: STATE 12/27/78
 APPRV: DCM: CWNAAS
 DRFTD: F/C: RMBASH: DD
 CLEAR: E/C: JLMILLS
 DISTR: ECOM 5 AMB DCM
 POL-2 FM ICA
 OR DAO AGR
 SHIR CHRON/16

FSE 6-1

) N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12649

). 12065: ODS 12/27/84 (BASH, R.M.) OR-E
 IS: ENRG, ELAN, IR, CASC
 SUBJECT: IRANIAN OIL SECTOR STRIKE - DEC. 27

OSCO WAS SCHEDULED TO PRODUCE 487,000 BBLs TODAY, DEC.
 OF WHICH 329,000 WILL BE DELIVERED TO ABADAN REFINERY
 AND 159,000 WERE TO BE DELIVERED TO THE TEHRAN REFINERY.
 HOWEVER, THE TEHRAN REFINERY WAS COMPLETELY CLOSED DOWN BY
 11:00 AFTERNOON SO CRUDE DELIVERIES TO TEHRAN AND HENCE
 PRODUCTION MAY HAVE BEEN LESS THAN TARGETED. WE HAVE BEEN
 TOLD BUT HAVE NOT CONFIRMED THAT THE TABRIZ REFINERY IS
 ALSO CLOSED DOWN.

ABADAN REFINERY IS APPARENTLY RELATIVELY UNAFFECTED BY
 RIKFS SO IT COULD PROBABLY REFINE CONSIDERABLY MORE THAN
 THE 329,000 BBLs WHICH IT WILL RECEIVE TODAY. HOWEVER,
 OSCO'S PRODUCTION IS NOW LIMITED TO AHWAZ AND MARUN FIELDS
 AND THERE ARE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS (BASICALLY THE SIZE AND
 CONFIGURATION OF CRUDE LINES) WHICH WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT
 PERHAPS EVEN IMPOSSIBLE TO SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE
 DELIVERIES TO ABADAN. UNLESS THIS BOTTLENECK CAN BE
 SOLVED, PRODUCTION BY OSCO DEC. 28, MAY ONLY BE ABOUT
 2,000 BBLs.

NIOC'S NEW MANAGING DIRECTOR, ABDULLAH ENTEZAM,
 ANNOUNCED ON THE RADIO TODAY AT 1400 THAT NIOC WAS ON
 STRIKE. HIS MESSAGE INCLUDED AN IMPLICIT REQUEST
 THAT STRIKERS NOT RESORT TO SABOTAGE. HE ALSO INVITED
 MODERATE LEADERS TO INTERVENE IN ORDER TO CORRECT A
 SITUATION WHICH WILL CAUSE THE PEOPLE GREAT INCONVENIENCE
 AND SUFFERING. ENTEZAM SAID THAT PETROLEUM PRODUCT
 SUPPLIES WOULD BE EXHAUSTED IN TWO DAYS.

THE SITUATION IS NOW CRITICAL. IT COULD (AND WILL)
 GET WORSE, BUT NOT MUCH. SULLIVAN

046

NN

| PAGE | DRAFTER OR RELEASEE TIME | PRECEDENCE | | LMP | CLASS | CIC | FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY | | | | |
|------------|-------------------------------|------------|------|-----|-------|-----|---|--------|-------|-----|----|
| | | ACT | INFO | | | | DATE | TIME | MONTH | YR | |
| 01 OF 02 | | PP | | | CCCC | | | 070552 | | JUL | 75 |
| BOOK NO | MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS | | | | | | 19-8-11 | | | | |

FROM: CARMISH MAAG, TEHRAN, IRAN //ARCG//

TO: DSAA WASH DC
USEUCOM VAHINGEN GER 113-4/31*Suitate wood v. HENNER**file center**Return to
PO/M*

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL FOR LTGEN FISH (DSAA); MG RYDER (USEUCOM), FROM MG BRETT
NBA TO MR MAAG

SUBJ: Status of Mr Abdolfath Mahvi (U)

- (C) General Toufanian, Vice Minister of War, called General Brett today, 6 July, and informed him that the Shah had placed Mr. Abdolfath Mahvi on the black list. General Toufanian requested in the strongest terms that Gen Brett inform DOD of the Shah's decision.
- (C) Based on past experience, this clearly means that Mr. Mahvi will not be acceptable as a representative and/or consultant of any foreign firms. We have ^{firm} no information at this end as to what US firms Mr. Mahvi represents in any capacity, however, indications are he has in the past represented certain US commercial firms.
- (C) Suggest this be given appropriate distribution. It is apparent from conversations with representatives of US contractors here that a most serious drive is on by the Shah and the GMI against the use of agents and/or individuals whose capacity can in any way be so construed. We see no letup in this effort, but

dis

DISTR:

ARCG FILE, ARCG CHRON, USEMBASSY (MR BRETT)

DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE, & DATE

MG DEVOL BRETT, ARCG, 2177, 7JUL75

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE

MG DEVOL BRETT, ARCG, 2177

SIGNATURE


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DATE TIME GROUP

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

By the Command of His Imperial Majesty, Shahanshah Aryamehr, the Supreme Commander, I am authorized to state that, due to the interference of Mr. Abolfath Mahvi in the procurement of defense systems and requirements for the Imperial Armed Forces from United States industries, his name should be put on the black list. I have been ordered to make all necessary arrangements to terminate his activities. He has no right and/or authority whatsoever to interfere, under any name or cover, with the defense procurement for the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces.

I would like United States companies and industries to be notified that the Ministry of War of the Imperial Government of Iran will not sign any contract if Mr. Abolfath Mahvi, under any name or arrangement whatsoever, is connected with such a contract.

APPROVED:



General H. Toufanian
Vice Minister of War

10 JULY 1975

DATE



از سازمان معاونت تسلیحاتی وزارت جنگ

وزارت جنگ

به جناب آقای نخست وزیر

موضوع: تحلیلی از فعالیت واسطه ها در امور معاونت تسلیحاتی
خریدهای وزارت جنگ

تاریخ

شماره

۱-۰۱-۲۹-۳۳

پیوست

پیرو شماره: ۱۴-۲۹-۰۱-۰۱-۴۰۱-۱۳۱۴

مریضه آقا و ابوالفتح محوی مبنی بر اینکه بهیچ عنوان در معاملات وزارت جنگ
و نهروهای مسلح شاهنشاهی دخالت ننمایند در تاریخ ۵۴/۱۳/۷ از شرف عرض
بهیچگاه مبارک اعلیحضرت همایون شاهنشاه آریامهر بزرگ ارتشتاران گذشت و -
تصویب فرموده اند که نامبرده بالا از لیست سپاه خارج شوند . بزم

جانشین وزیر جنگ . ارتشبد حسن طوفانیان

AmEmbassy TEHRAN
INCOMING TELEGRAM

CONTROL NO. 16556

DEC 12 1976

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION:

7/41
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INFO:

AMB 1
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R 102157Z DEC 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5277
BT
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 301024

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, IR, US

SUBJECT: GRUMMAN

REFS: (A) TEHRAN 12219; (B) STATE 300036


1. DEPTOFF CONVEYED INFO CONTAINED REF (A) TO NORMAN PAUL DECEMBER 10. PAUL WAS VERY INTERESTED, BUT FELT THAT LAVIS' SUIT WOULD PREVENT HIM FROM MAKING ANY SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE AT THIS TIME. HE HAS NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO VISIT IRAN.

2. PAUL SAID THAT LAVIS' COMPLAINT DOCUMENT, WHICH NEW YORK TIMES REPORTER DID NOT SEE, MAKES NUMBER OF ALLEGATIONS WHICH INVOLVE IRANIANS AND IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. HE FELT THAT WHEN DOCUMENT ENTERS PUBLIC DOMAIN, ANOTHER SERIES OF PRESS ARTICLES IS LIKELY TO FOLLOW. ROBINSON
BT

19/60
CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

| | | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|---|--|---|
| FROM Amembassy TEHRAN | | CLASSIFICATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 11028 19-8-1 | | |
| E.O. 11652: | ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC | | | 7 |
| TAGS: | LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 11028 | | | |
| SUBJECT: | | | | |
| ACTION: | E.O. 11652: N/A | | | |
| | TAGS: BDIS, IR | | | |
| | SUBJ: TRADE DISPUTE - GRUMMAN | | | |
| | REF: STATE 268454 | | | |
| PM 3 | WE HAVE FOUND ADDITIONAL MATERIALS ON SUBJECT IN 1976 | | | |
| AMB | POL/MIL FILE ON AGENTS. MOST OF THAT FILE HAS TO DO WITH | | | |
| DCM | GRUMMAN, LAVI BROTHERS AND F-14 SALE. INCLUDED ARE ORIGINAL | | | |
| POL | OR COPY OF SOME TOUFANIAN LETTERS ON LAVIS AND A. MAHVI. | | | |
| ECON 2 | | | | |
| CRU | | | | |
| | | | | SULLIVAN |
| | | | |  |
| DRAFTED BY: POL/MIL: NLGreene/bj | DRAFTING DATE | TEL. EXT. | CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: | |
| | 11/9 | | DCM:CNNaas | |
| REFERENCES: | | | | |
| 20MMx | | | | |
| E/C:DWestley (draft) | | | | |

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CLASSIFICATION

Among non-OPEC LDCs, Mexico has the brightest prospects for substantially increasing petroleum output. President Lopez Portillo and his chief advisers are convinced that increased petroleum and natural gas exports are necessary and have approved an ambitious investment program for Pemex, the state oil company. The reserve base itself is large and promises to increase sharply as new discoveries are made. Pemex is rapidly developing this potential; an even more rapid development is possible if financial constraints can be overcome and if Lopez Portillo undertakes an all-out effort.

Geological Prospects

In 1972 Mexico discovered the vast Reforma oil deposits in the southeastern states of Tabasco and Chiapas. Mexican officials now believe that these onshore fields link up with recent offshore oil discoveries at Chac 160 kilometers to the north, forming a vast producing area that could rival the largest Saudi Arabian fields in size. Using industry definitions, we currently estimate proved and probable onshore reserves in the Reforma area at 25 billion barrels. Potential petroleum reserves could prove to be many times this amount when fully evaluated by drilling. Reforma oil is a high-quality, medium-sulfur (1.6 percent by weight), 28° to 30° API gravity oil. Reforma Fields also contain vast amounts of associated natural gas, yielding an average of 1,300 cubic feet of gas per barrel of oil.

Historically, exploration efforts have been concentrated in the Gulf of Mexico coastal plains area. Oil was discovered well before 1900 in very shallow formations in the states of Tamaulipas and Veracruz. Mexico's extensive "Golden Lane" Fields, discovered in 1910, and the rich Poza Rica Fields, discovered in 1930, were among the most important oil finds of their time. In recent years

Pemex has greatly increased exploration in other regions, and officials claim only about 10 percent of the potential oil-bearing areas have been explored. Substantial gas deposits have been recently found in northern Mexico between Nuevo Laredo and Monclova, and some promising oil wells have been drilled in new areas of Veracruz state. Offshore Baja California also has substantial hydrocarbon potential.

Pemex has the technological know-how and trained personnel to handle all phases of oil industry operations. Its engineers are acknowledged experts in the completion of wells in carbonate deposits. Mexico is beginning to patent its inventions, especially in the refining area, and is supplying technical assistance to other countries. US firms continue to provide much of the equipment and technology used by Pemex, but Pemex personnel perform all tasks competently. Jorge Diaz Serrano, since his appointment by Lopez Portillo as Director General of Pemex, has further beefed up the company's efficiency.

At present it appears that Mexico will be able to obtain the funds necessary to carry out the Pemex development program. The six-year plan calls for doubling the average investment outlays of the past two years to \$2.5 billion per year. A gas pipeline from the Reforma area to the United States will cost an additional \$1.5 billion. The sharp rise in oil-related spending has already pushed the Pemex foreign debt to \$2.4 billion, up from \$1.25 billion last year. Although its commercial credit rating remains good, credit is getting tighter. Pemex estimates it will need to obtain half of its investment funds from foreign sources.

Pemex's \$15.1 billion development plan (1977-82) is well within the company's technical capabilities. It seeks to raise daily production by 1982

Despite spasmodic exploration since the 1930s, Brazil's oil potential remains largely unknown. Currently, the most promising areas appear to be offshore. Petrobras, the state oil company, has intensified offshore exploration since 1973, efforts that have led to important finds in the Campos Basin off the coast of Rio de Janeiro as well as a promising strike at the mouth of the Amazon. Despite these successes, Petrobras does not have the financial and technical capacity to rapidly increase exploration and production. The government is looking to foreign companies to accelerate the search for oil but so far has been reluctant to provide sufficiently attractive terms.

Geological Prospects

Most of Brazil's oil is produced in coastal fields in the northeast. The steady decline in onshore production has offset slowly expanding offshore output, causing Brazil's total oil production to stagnate since 1969 at about 175,000 b/d. Promising offshore seismic surveys and the discovery of the large Campos Basin—accounting for 90 percent of Brazil's 668-million-barrel proved and probable oil reserves—have prompted Petrobras to concentrate exploration on the 850,000-square kilometer continental shelf. The government's ambitious oil program calls for spending roughly \$730 million for exploration and development this year, nearly double 1976 expenditures. An average of 168 new exploratory wells, mainly offshore, are planned annually over the next three years; only 30 wells were sunk in 1973.

Except for the deep Campos deposits, Petrobras is focusing its offshore exploration in relatively shallow waters. In 1976, Petrobras made offshore oil and gas discoveries at the mouth of the Amazon River, which geologists believe to be among Brazil's most promising areas. Gas flow rates at four test wells were prolific, ranging

between 15 million and 25 million cubic feet per day. Small oil discoveries have been made near Sergipe, Alagoas, and Rio Grande do Norte in the northeast.

Over the past year, Petrobras concluded its initial round of risk contracts with four international oil companies—Exxon, British Petroleum, ELF/AGIP, and Shell—to undertake more difficult exploration in deep offshore formations. In mid-1977, Petrobras opened a second round of bids for risk contracts on 25 offshore blocs (compared with only 10 blocs offered in the first round) located at the mouth of the Amazon and in the Santos and Pelotas Basins in the south. Blocs were allocated based on seismic data indicating some potential although no commercial finds have been made. Contract negotiations should begin by yearend.

Capabilities and Constraints

Petrobras, although one of the world's more competent state oil companies, is among the most nationalistic and bureaucratically entrenched of Brazil's state enterprises. Despite a shortage of technical and financial resources, Petrobras officials have resisted and continue to resist foreign involvement in the oil industry. The company's unwillingness to call on foreign technical help to solve development problems at Campos exemplifies the seriousness of the problem. Petrobras lacks the expertise to extract oil from deep limestone reservoirs, among Campos' best sources. Consequently, most Campos wells are in shallower, lower quality zones.

Although mounting oil import bills and Petrobras' limited offshore exploration capability prompted the government in 1975 to invite foreign bids on lease areas, Brasilia is having difficulty attracting foreign companies. The compan-

Translation
LAW AUTHORIZING THE EMPLOYMENT OF A MISSION OF OFFICERS
AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS FROM THE
U. S. ARMY FOR THE MINISTRY
OF WAR

(Voted on October 24, 1943 (Aban 1, 1322))

Sole Article.- The National Consultative Assembly (Majlis) authorizes the Government to enter into an agreement with the Government of the United States of America and engage a mission of officers, non-commissioned officers and experts from the U.S. Army, the number of officers not to exceed thirty, for the purpose of reforming the administrative affairs of the Army in accordance with the law of Agrab 1301* and with the following terms:

(a) The first officers of this mission are as follows:

Major General C. S. Ridley, Colonel F. G. Dumont, Colonel Thomas E. Mahoney, Lieut. Col. Sogard, Major R.S. Conly, Captain R. Y. Gidwitz (spelling uncertain), Captain R. Y. Sanders. The senior officer of the mission will be the Chief of the Mission and as Military Adviser to the Ministry of War will advise and assist the Minister of War. Other elements of this mission will be engaged according to the provisions of this law as they may be needed by the Ministry of War and upon agreement of both Governments as to choosing them.

(b) The said mission will in principle be engaged for the duration of the war, but the Government will have the right before the expiration of the period, in case it deems it advisable, to cancel their contract and/or extend it for after the war also, upon reaching an agreement with the Government of the United States of America.

(c) The members of the mission will receive their annual salaries in American currency from the Iranian Government in the following amounts:

| | |
|--------------------------------|--------|
| The Chief of the Mission | \$4207 |
| Assistant Chief of the Mission | \$3907 |
| All other officers, each | \$3757 |
| Enlisted men and experts | \$2705 |

These salaries will be paid in twelve equal monthly instalments and any portion of the monthly salary of any member of the mission who may so request will be payable

in dollars



از

اداره

دائره

شماره

به

وزارت جنگ

موافقت نامه بین دولت شاهنشاهی ایران و دولت ایالات متحده آمریکا

در باره

بر حسب تقاضای دولت شاهنشاهی ایران از دولت ایالات متحده آمریکا رئیس جمهوری ایالات متحده آمریکا اجازه داده است که یکمده از اسران و رجه داران ارتش ایالات متحده و نیروی هوایی و دریایی ایالات متحده به منظور تشکیل یک هیئت نظامی در ایران طبق شرایط مدرج زیر گماشته شوند .

ماده ۱- هدف این هیئت همکاری با وزارت جنگ و ارتش شاهنشاهی ایران به منظور بالا بردن قدرت مسلح ارتش شاهنشاهی ایران است .

ماده ۲- این قرارداد از تاریخ انقضای قرارداد اولیه به تلقی اجراء داده خواهد شد و تا تاریخ انقضای آن بطوریکه در ماده ۲ مقرر گردیده بطور خود بخود باقی است .

ماده ۳- این قرارداد ممکن است به یکی از طرف ذیل پایان یابد :

الف - بوسیله هر یک از دولتین با اعلام کتبی سه ماهه قبلی به دولت دیگر .

ب - بوسیله هر یک از دولتین در صورتیکه آن دولت دچار مصاصات داخلی یا خارجی گردد و بدون - احتیاج رعایت شرایط این ماده .

ج - بوسیله ابلاغ رسمی از طرف هر یک از دولتین به دولت دیگر در صورتیکه صالح عمومی آن دولت در چنین امری و یا به جهت رعایت تشکیلات باشد . این ماده .

ماده ۴- هیئت مرکب خواهد بود از تعدادی اسرود رجه دار و متخصصان ارتش ایالات متحده آمریکا اعم از نیروی زمینی - هوایی و دریایی که از جهت مده و انتخاب آنها مورد موافقت وزارت جنگ ایران و وزارت دفاع ایالات متحده آمریکا قرار گیرد و بهر تقدیر تعداد اسران زائد بر سی (۳۰) نفر نخواهد بود .

ماده ۵- اعضای هیئت در اداره مستشاری که یکی از ادارات تابعه وزارت جنگ است مشغول خدمت خواهند شد .

ماده ۶- اداره مستشاری با موافقت رئیس هیئت و تصویب وزارت جنگ دولت شاهنشاهی ایران تعیین خواهد شد .

ماده ۷- کلیه درجه‌های سازمانی مربوطه در ارتش عمومی ارتشی درج خواهد شد .

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT SERIES 361

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

AUG 19 1948

TEHRAN

MILITARY MISSION

+

AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND IRAN

Signed at Tehran November 27, 1943



UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1944

MILITARY MISSION TO IRAN

Agreement Between the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
and IRAN

- Signed at Tehran October 6, 1947
- Entered into Force October 6, 1947



PLEASE RETURN TO THE SOURCE FILE NUMBER
EMBASSY MASTER FILE

شماره ۷۴۰۷

تاریخ ۱۳۲۸ / ۱۰ / ۲۰



وزارت امور خارجه

یادداشت

وزارت امور خارجه شاهنشاهی با اظهارتعارفات خود بسفارتکبیرای کشورهای متحدۀ آمریکا و عطف بیادداشت شماره (۱۳۹۶) مورخ ۲۸ نوامبر ۱۶۴۹ (هفتم آذرماه ۱۳۲۸) آنسفارتکبیرای راجع بتجدید قرارداد استخدا م هیئت مستشاران آمریکائی در وزارتجنگ شاهنشاهی محترما اشعار میدهد . بطوریکه شناسا باستحضار آنسفارتکبیرا رسیده است مقامات مسر بوطه دولت شاهنشاهی با تجدید قرارداد نامبرده برای مدت یکسال دیگر از تاریخ ۲۹ اسفندماه ۱۳۲۸ تا ۲۹ اسفندماه ۱۳۲۹ (۲۰ مارس ۱۹۵۰ تا ۲۰ مارس ۱۹۵۱) و درج عنوانین جدید مؤسسات مربوطه کشورهای متحدۀ آمریکا بجای عنوانین سابق بقسمی که در یادداشت فوق الذکر آنسفارتکبیرا ذکر گردیده است موافقت خودشان را اعلام میدارند وزارت امورخارجه شاهنشاهی از آنجا که موافقت خواهنمندان است مراتب را باستحضار مقامات مربوطه کشورهای متحدۀ برسانند .



سفارتکبیرای کشورهای متحدۀ آمریکا

تهران

Seal

The Foreign Service
of the
United States of America

American Embassy,
Tehran, Iran,
April 18, 1954.

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the following note from Your Excellency today:

"I have the honor to refer to the Agreement of November 27, 1943, as amended, between the Imperial Government of Iran and the Government of the United States of America regarding the United States Military Mission with the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie and to propose extension of the Agreement until Esfand 29, 1333 (March 20, 1955).

"The Imperial Government of Iran will consider this note, together with Your Excellency's reply, as constituting renewal of the Agreement."

I am authorized to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the United States of America is agreeable to the proposal contained in Your Excellency's note and considers the note, together with this reply, as constituting renewal of the Agreement.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

His Excellency
Abdollah Entezam,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Tehran.

Loy W. Henderson

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSION WITH THE IRANIAN ARMY
AND

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP
APO 205, c/o FM, NY, NY.

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 1

15 September 1954

Section I

AFMISH-MAAG Consolidation and Reorganization

Effective this date, Headquarters United States Military Mission with the Iranian Army and Headquarters United States Military Assistance Advisory Group to Iran are reorganized and consolidated as outlined in Staff Memorandum number 3, dated 26 August 1954. The consolidated headquarters is officially designated as Headquarters United States Military Mission with the Iranian Army and United States Military Assistance Advisory Group to Iran. It may be informally referred to as Headquarters AFMISH-MAAG.

Section II

Staff Announcements


The following principal staff assignments are announced:

| | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Acting Chief | Colonel Edwin A. Machen, Jr., 021284, GS |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 | Lt Col Matt C.C. Bristol Jr., 022027, GS |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 | Major Jacques M. L'Homme, 0267148, Inf |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 | Colonel Harold E. Hassenfelt, 022195, GS |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 | Colonel James E. Barber, 0373107, GS |
| Chief, Air Section | Colonel George G. Northrup, 480A, USAF |
| Chief, Navy Section | Commander Horace C. Laird, Jr., 75000, USN |

BY ORDER OF COLONEL MACHEN:

D. W. IVEY
Major, AGC
Adjutant General

OFFICIAL:


D. W. IVEY
Major, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

| | | | |
|---------------------------|---|-------------------------|---|
| TAG, Attn: AGAO-I | 4 | Attachés, Teheran | 3 |
| Hq USAREUR | 2 | Hospital | 1 |
| CG Dhahran AFB | 2 | Motor Pool | 1 |
| CINCNELM | 2 | Finance, Cairo | 2 |
| US Embassy, Teheran | 2 | File | 2 |

Note no. : 8296

Date : 11/17/63

Date Received : 11/18/63

From : Treaties & Legal Affairs

Div. of F.O.

Enclosure of the Note.

The Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America, and regarding the exemptions and immunities for the Military Advisory Missions of the United States Government in Iran, it has the honor to state that, considering the request made by the Embassy in the Note No. 423 dated March 19, 1962 where it was stated that the staff of the Advisory Missions should enjoy the privileges and immunities relating to the administrative staff and technical members "provided in the agreement annexed to the final act of the United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities concluded at Vienna and approved on April 18, 1961 and some senior members of these Missions may by agreement between the two governments be accorded the status for diplomatic agents so that they may enjoy the privileges and immunities that the said agreement has specified for this class and for the maintenance of administrative interests and maintenance of uniformity the above-mentioned principle be made applicable to any military and/or civilian employee of the United States Defense Department and members of the family accompanying him provided that their presence in Iran is authorized by the Imperial Iranian Government" necessary studies were made and the result was brought to the knowledge of the Embassy, i.e. the Vienna International Agreement after its approval by the Iranian Legislative Power shall not apply the members of the Military Advisory Missions of the United States Government in Iran who are under the employ of the Iranian Ministry of War, which requires a separate legal authority, and it, therefore, was decided that necessary statement be attached to the Vienna International Agreement when it is presented to both Houses so that the chief and members of the Military Advisory Missions in Iran may enjoy the privileges, immunities, and exemptions which are provided for "the administrative and technical employees" covered by paragraph F article one of the agreement under question and, of course, the extension of such privileges and exemptions will be subject to the approval of both Houses.

The Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs is pleased now to inform the Embassy that the Council of Ministers has agreed to this proposal in accordance with a Decree dated October 5, 1963 and it is decided that this Note and the Note which will be written as a reply

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING

Ambassy Tehran

Jarvis

POL-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

Charge:

Control: 153

Date: Oct 12, 1964
1400

WHS
DCA
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OR
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ARMA
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ALPMA
AN AIR-3
GEMISH
GULP
ADP-1
CRU-2
CR

ACTION: Secstate WASHINGTON 398

Ref Bab A-53 and Embtel 371.

Vienna Convention and bill on its application to U. S. military

personnel in Iran are both slated for early consideration in Majlis plenary, probably early next week after election of new Majlis bureau and organization of committees. Shah has sent down word that he does not want any trouble, and we expect passage both bills without much overt difficulty. However, there are signs of developing difficulties beneath the surface regarding bill applying Convention immunities to U. S. military personnel (hereafter called status bill), and in some cases such difficulties have also appeared above the surface.

21/wfu

Because Govt has until recently kept tight censorship on all information and discussion of status bill, and since bill was pushed through Senate under urgency procedure without any discussion (see refair), many rumors are circulating at present and there is some talk that bill involves "capitulations". Some of these misconceptions are inevitable and innocent and will be cleared up as soon as Govt provides the necessary public explanations. Some, however, are clearly malicious and involve latent opposition toward Govt and nationalist agitation with anti-American overtones.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 13, 1964

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear Jack:

I'm sorry to be so tardy with the supporting information about the Vienna Convention which you asked for so long ago, and only hope it is not too late to be of possible help in the situation described in Embtel 398.

The Convention itself entered into force on April 24, 1964, when the required 22 countries ratified it. As of now, 33 countries have ratified, with one more (Venezuela) very close to ratification. We ourselves are not doing so well: the bill was introduced into the Senate on May 14, 1963, and there is no prognosis of any kind as to when it might be enacted. As to application, there is no reason to believe that it is not being applied, at least as regards minimum standards, in all of the 33 countries which have ratified. In exoneration of our own position, it might be pointed out that our practice has always been more liberal than the minimum standards set forth in the Convention, so our leisurely legislative handling is not a reflection of any backwardness in meeting reasonable standards for treatment of diplomats.

The agreement covering our military advisers in India has not yet been signed; when it is, I shall see that you get a copy, even if this comes after Majlis ratification, so that the Iranians can compare notes.

Thank you for the information about the J.A. Jones problem; we will hold on to it in case there is a further inquiry from Senator Ervin.

I am also taking up your suggestion about the Afghan SAM's and hope we will be able to follow through on it in some fashion.

Meanwhile,

John A. Armitage, Esquire
Special Assistant to the Ambassador for MSP,
American Embassy,
TEHRAN.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

AMERICAN EMBASSY TEHRAN

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Control: 249

Recd: Dec 17, 1964
LDO

FROM: KHORRAMSHAHR

NO: 16, December 16, 4 PM

Reliable source reports pro Khomeini Mullahs in Abadan stepping up anti-American campaign. Literature being given oil workers both on and off job. Criticism mainly against Majlis Status Bill.

Source reports two Abadan Mullahs Jam and Sanavadi attended conference pro Khomeini leaders December 7 to 13 in Qom. Soviet oil experts in Abadan December 3 and 4 visited Agha Abdul Rasul leading religious figure this area. Details to follow.

GP-3.

FELDT

SECTION
OL-3

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relates to

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the status bill
(Vernon Commission
bill) - j.

1125

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Foreign Service of the
United States of America

OUTGOING

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45 g/b 2

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Classification

Control: 287

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OR
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ALUBA
ARFISH-3
GAMBIA
GULF
HAI-3
ADAM
GRU-2
CR

Date: Feb. 24, 1965
1330

ACTION: Secstate WASHINGTON 886

Request Dept inform us 1) whether sufficient number of nations (22) have deposited with UN instruments of ratification to bring Vienna Convention into effect and 2) what are prospects for Senate action on Convention.

25/pd

SA: J'Armitage/sp

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING AMERICAN EMBASSY TEHRAN

49 262

ACTION
POL-3

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Classification

Control: 304

INFO
AMB
DCM

FROM: DEPARTMENT

File 5/15
[Signature]

Recd: May 15, 1965
0600

FOON
SA

NO: 1031, MAY 14

OR
USIS

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UNDER ARTICLE 51, VIENNA CONVENTION IN FORCE ONLY BETWEEN STATES WHICH HAVE DEPOSITED RATIFICATIONS OR ACCESSIONS.

CR

IRAN DEPOSITED RATIFICATION FEB 5, 1965. CONVENTION NOT YET RATIFIED FOR US, BUT PENDING IN SENATE.

POUCH:

ASSUME YOUR INQUIRY RELATES TO STATUS US MILITARY PERSONNEL. FACT THAT CONVENTION AS SUCH NOT RPT NOT IN FORCE BETWEEN US AND IRAN DOES NOT RIT NOT DIMINISH SEPARATE OBLIGATION UNDERSTAKEN BY IRAN IN NOTE NO 9762 OF DEC 9, 1964 (TRANSMITTED BY A-313 OF DEC 15, 1964) TO ACCORD ARTICLE 37(2) IMMUNITIES AND EXEMPTIONS TO US MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY PERSONNEL AS PROVIDED SAID NOTE. USG CONSIDERS THAT EMBASSY'S NOTES NO 423 OF MARCH 19, 1962 AND NO 299 OF DEC 13, 1963 AND MINISTRY'S REPLY OF DEC 9, 1964 CONSTITUTE BINDING AGREEMENT BETWEEN TWO GOVERNMENTS.
BALL

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Classification

CLASSIFIED
3-14-65
Vol 1-17-2 Vienna Com. CLASSIFIED

NNNNF

.VV ESA852BRN322

PP RUQMHR

DE RUDOMKA 8306 1331901

ZNR UUUUU ZYN

P 131858Z MAY 79

FM FBIS LONDON UK

TO RHFRAAB/HQ USAF/IN RAMSTEIN AB GE

RUQLAKA/CDR 4TH PSYOPS GP FT BRAGG NC

RUDOMLA/FBIS CAVERSHAM/DW

RUDONBA/CINCUSNAVEUR N-2 LONDON UK

RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE BE

RUEAIJU/NPIC WASH DC

RUEBFGA/VOA WASH DC

RUEBHAA/STORAGE CENTER FBIS WASH DC

RUFDAAA/USAREUR DEP COF INT

RUFRBAA/COMIDEASTFOR

RULYQJQ/COMSIXTHFLT

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RUQMIF/FBIS AMMAN JO

RUQMQR/FBIS NICOSIA CY

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ATTN SHAPE: PASS TO SURVEY SECTION IMMEDIATELY

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IRAN ABOLISHES IMMUNITY FOR U.S. MILITARY ADVISERS

LD131858 REF NC131658 (PARIS AFP ENGLISH 131624--IRAN RESCINDS LAW ON DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY FOR U.S. MILITARY ADVISERS)

TEHRAN DOMESTIC SERVICE IN PERSIAN 1630 GMT 13 MAY 79 LD

((TEXT)) THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TODAY ANNOUNCED THAT THE CAPITULATIONS LAW HAS BEEN RESCINDED. THE TEXT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S STATEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

ON THE PROPOSAL OF THE CABINET COUNCIL OF THE PROVISIONAL ISLAMIC REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT AND APPROVAL OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION COUNCIL, THE LAW RATIFIED ON 13 OCTOBER 1964 PERMITTING AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISERS IN IRAN TO BENEFIT BY IMMUNITIES AND CONCESSIONS (OF THE) VIENNA AGREEMENT HAS BEEN ABOLISHED AS OF 13 MAY 1979. 131630 SHANK/MC 13/1905Z MAY

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FM USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GERMANY //ECDC//
TO RUMHR/CARMISH MAAG TEHRAN IRAN
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEADWD/OASD/ISA WASHDC //DSAA/NEA-IRN-PM-SAS//
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUMHR/AMEMB TEHRAN IRAN
RUEADWD/DA WASHDC //DAJA-IA//
RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC //JAG-INT LAW//
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHDC //JA-INT LAW//
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE //AEAGD-PO-I/AEAJA-IA//
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SUBJ: DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

A. CARMISH MAAG TEHRAN IRAN DTG 141318Z MAY 79

1. INFORMATION AVAILABLE THIS HQ INDICATES IRANIAN LAW OF 13 OCTOBER 1964 (DESCRIBED AND TRANSLATED IN 19 UST 7535, TIAS 6594) PURPORTED TO EMPOWER IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TO GRANT

PAGE 2 RUSNAAA1933 UNCLAS

MEMBERS OF US MILITARY MISSIONS IN IRAN PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES SPECIFIED BY 1961 VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (23 UST 3227, TIAS 7502). US AND IRANIAN GOVERNMENTS THEREAFTER EXCHANGED NOTES ON 9 DECEMBER 1964 (19 UST 7537, TIAS 6594) AGREEING THAT SUCH PERSONNEL WOULD HAVE STATUS OF MEMBERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL STAFF OF AMERICAN EMBASSY AND ENJOY PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 2, ARTICLE 37, OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION. THE AGREEMENT OF 9 DECEMBER 1964 HAS NOT BEEN MODIFIED OR ABROGATED TO OUR KNOWLEDGE AND WAS REFERRED TO IN THE 24 AND 30 MAY 1973 EXCHANGE OF NOTES (25 UST 3048, TIAS 7963) THAT EXTENDED SAME STATUS TO AMERICAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TECHNICIANS IN IRAN ASSISTING IN THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM OF IRANIAN ARMED FORCES.

2. IT IS VIEW OF THIS HEADQUARTERS THAT RECISSION OF 1964 IRANIAN LAW HAS NO EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL VALIDITY OF EXCHANGES OF NOTES AGREEING TO DIPLOMATIC STATUS FOR PERSONNEL IN QUESTION. THEREFORE, IT IS VIEW OF THIS HEADQUARTERS THAT US MILITARY REMAINING IN IRAN CONTINUE TO HAVE DIPLOMATIC STATUS THEY HAD BEFORE RECISSION OF 1964 IRANIAN LAW.

PAGE 3 RUSNAAA1933 UNCLAS

3. UNLESS AND UNTIL COORDINATED STATE/DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS DIRECT OTHERWISE, VIEW EXPRESSED ABOVE IS POSITION YOU SHOULD TAKE. SUBJECT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH IRANIANS ONLY IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH EMBASSY.

BT

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Note Delivered

NNNNVV ESA950BRA870
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHAD #1527 1980930
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 170834Z JUL 79
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHEC IMMEDIATE 8464
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 644
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 395
RUEHAM/WMEMBASSY AMMAN 1876
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1831
RUEHEG/WMEMBASSY CAIRO 1892
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1610
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 237
RUGMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 428
RUGMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1592
RUGMMI/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 221
RUGMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2110
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1198
RUGMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 462
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO 135
RUGMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 448
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 207
RUGMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA 269
RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 289
RUGMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 392
RUDKUR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 260T
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BAGHDAD 1527

E.O. 12065: NA
TAGS: PINT, IZ
SUBJ: HCABINET CHANGES IN IRAQ

RES: A) BAGHDAD 1522; B) BAGHDAD 1524

1. SUMMARY. THE RESHUFFLE ACCOMPANYING BAKR'S JULY 16 RESIGNATION AND SADDAM'S ASSUMPTION OF THE PRESIDENCY AND RCC CHAIRMANSHIP HAS BROUGHT SEVEN NEW FACES INTO THE CABINET WHILE FOUR HAVE BEEN DROPPED. SIX DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS HAVE BEEN NAMED. THERE HAS BEEN NO A NOUNCEMENT THUS FAR ON ANY CHANGES IN THE RCC, AND THE REGIME STILL LOOKS REMARKABLY UNIFIED.
END SUMMARY.

2. FOLLOWING MINISTERS HAVE BEEN RELIEVED OF THEIR POSTS:

IZZAT IBRAHIM-INTERIOR
ADNAN HUSSEIN-PLANNING
TAHA YASIN RAMAEHAN-PUBLIC WORKS AND HOUSING
LATIF NASIF JASSIM-AGRICULTURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM
MUHAMMAD AYISH-INDUSTRY AND MINERALS
SA'D QASIM HAMMUDI-INFORMATION MINISTER
KARIM MAHMUD SHINTAF2CULTURE AND ARTS
FAWZI ABDALLAH-FINANCE

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P R 191200Z JUL 79
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8478
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1612
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1880
RUGMDE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1833
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1894
RUGMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1594
RUGMKV/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2112
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1200
RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 291
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 541
RUGMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 395
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OFH3 BAGHDAD 1543

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E.O. 12812: GDS 7/79/85 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, IZ, XF
SUBJ: (U)CHANGING OF THE GUARD IN IRAQ: FIRST IMPRESSIONS

1. (C-INTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT. WITHIN HOURS AFTER ASSUMING POWER IN ONE OF THE MOST PEACEFUL TRANSITIONS IN IRAQI HISTORY, PRESIDENT SADDAM MUSSEIN HAS PROJECTED THE IMAGE OF A MAN IN A HURRY. WHILE MANY OBSERVERS EXPECTED HIM TO MOVE RELATIVELY CAUTIOUSLY ONCE PRESIDENT BAKR STEPPED DOWN, IN FACT SADDAM APPEARS TO BE DRIVING QUICKLY TOWARD A REDEFINITION AND, TO SOME EXTENT, A STREAMLINING OF THE WAY IRAQ IS GOVERNED. THE COMPLICATED STRUCTURE OF BEHIND-THE-SCENES "FOLLOW-UP" COMMITTEES, PREVIOUSLY CONTROLLED BY THE RCC VICE-CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE, APPEARS TO BE GIVING WAY TO A CABINET FORM OF GOVERNMENT, RUN ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS BY NEWLY-APPOINTED RCC VICE-CHAIRMAN IZZAT IBRAHIM. ONE EXPLANATION FOR THE SUDDEN RESTRUCTURING MAY BE THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT WISHES TO KEEP HIS SUBORDINATES OFF BALANCE WHILE HE FEELS HIS WAY TOWARD HIS OWN STYLE OF GOVERNING. PERHAPS A MORE LIKELY EXPLANATION IS THAT SADDAM IS ATTEMPTING TO BRING THE IRAQI SYSTEM SOMEWHAT INTO LINE WITH SYRIA'S MORE CABINET-STYLE SYSTEM, WHICH WOULD EXPLAIN THE MARKED SNUBS TO THE (IRAQI) BAA'ATH PARTY NATIONAL COMMAND DURING THE RECENT CELEBRATIONS AND THE GENERAL SELF-EFFACEMENT OF THE BPI DURING THE TRANSITION OF POWER. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
3. THE END OF THE PRESIDENCY OF AHMAD HASSAN AL-SAKR AND THE ASSUMPTION OF FULL POWER (OFFICIALLY) BY FORMER VICE-CHAIRMAN SADDAM MUSSEIN, ALTHOUGH LONG EXPECTED AND THE PERENNIAL SUBJECT OF INTENSE SPECULATION IN BAGHDAD, WAS UNEXPECTEDLY SWIFT WHEN IT FINALLY DID OCCUR. ON JULY 10, SAKR SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION TO THE BAA'ATH REGIONAL COMMAND, WHERE IT WAS RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED. ON JULY 11, THE RCC MET TO CONSIDER THE RESIGNATION AND ALSO ACCDED TO THE AGING PRESIDENT'S WISHES. ON JULY 12, THE RCC MET AGAIN TO ELECT SADDAM CHAIRMAN AND TO PROMOTE THEN MINIST IZZAT IBRAHIM TO THE VICE-CHAIRMANSHIP. THESE DECISIONS WERE EXTREMELY CLOSELY GUARDED, EVEN FOR SECRETIVE IRAQI THE ONLY HINT OF THINGS TO COME BEING THE NEW PROMINENCE ACCORDED TO IBRAHIM DURING THE RCC'S JULY 14 FORMAL PORTRAIT SESSION (BAGHDAD 1524).

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DE RUEBAG #1602 2081320

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O 271210Z JUL 79

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO RUEEC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8529

INFO RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 437

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1899

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1901

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1630

RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 1608

RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 2134

RUDTCA/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1210

RUQMCB/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 301

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 546

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 1602

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/27/85 (PECK, EDWARD L.) OR-M

TAGS: PINT, IZ

SUBJ: (C) RCC ARRESTS: THE PLOT AND THE SYRIAN CONNECTION

REF: A) BAGHDAD 1601 AND PREVIOUS (B) DAMASCUS 4953

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. IN AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION OF THE RCC-ARRESTS GIVEN TO A SELECTED GROUP OF PARTY MEMBERS, THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS TO HAVE UNRAVELED A CONSPIRACY, ORIGINALLY BACKED BY SYRIA, TO OVERTHROW THE REGIME USING ELECTIONS AS A PRETEXT TO SOW CONFUSION IN PARTY RANKS. BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ELEMENTS WERE INVOLVED, AND THE ARREST OF LESSER GOVERNMENT LIGHTS HAS TAKEN PLACE, INCLUDING A SON-IN-LAW-OF BAKR. ALTHOUGH THIS IS ALLEGEDLY THE REAL STORY BEHIND THE ARRESTS, IT IS PERHAPS MORE ACCURATE TO DESCRIBE IT AS THE STORY SADDAM WANTS THE PARTY, AND THROUGH IT, THE WORLD TO PERCEIVE AS REAL. IT CONVENIENTLY INCLUDES OUTSIDE AGITATION, INVOLVEMENT BY PROTEGES OTHER THAN SADDAM'S AND A PRETEXT FOR AVOIDING ELECTIONS, ALL FACTORS THAT IMPROVE THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION. END SUMMARY.

3. AFTER SEVERAL DAYS OF CONFUSION AND RUMORS, THE REGIME REPORTEDLY DELIVERED THE OFFICIAL STORY BEHIND THE ARRESTS OF ADNAN HUSSEIN ET AL, TO A JULY 25 MEETING OF SOME 1500 OF THE PARTY FAITHFUL. ACCORDING

TO THE REPORTS REACHING US, IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT A PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN UNCOVERED. THE CONSPIRACY BEGAN IN 1975 WITH SYRIAN BACKING INCLUDING A CASH CONTRIBUTION OF DLR805,000

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PP RUGMHR
DE RUFNPS #2746/01 1981042
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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17 Jul 79 11 14z

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2901
INFO RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0991
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1816
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3998
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1480
RUGMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2994
RUGMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1399
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3723
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 2367
RUGMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 4303
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3697
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 22746

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 1/16/90 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, IZ, FR
SUBJ: PRIME MINISTER BARRE'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD

REF: A) BAGHDAD (NOTAL) 1496 B) PARIS 22596

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY: IN BRIEFING US ON BARRE VISIT TO IRAQ FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL DESCRIBED IT AS A SUCCESS IN TERMS OF ADVANCING FRENCH-IRAQ DIALOGUE AND DOWNPLAYED ITS PETROLEUM AND COMMERCIAL ASPECTS (SEE HOWEVER PARIS 22596). IRAQI LEADERS GAVE IMPRESSION OF SELF-CONFIDENCE IN FACING INTERNAL PROBLEMS. BARRE DISCUSSED A BROAD RANGE OF WORLD ISSUES WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN. IRAQI POLICIES ARE CHARACTERIZED AS "MODERATE". PRINCIPAL IRAQI FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS ARE SITUATIONS IN IRAN, SYRIA AND LEBANON. ON ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE IRAQIS SAID ARAB WORLD UNITED AS RARELY BEFORE WITH EGYPT ISOLATED WITH THE US AND ISRAEL. IRAQIS SAY THEY INTEND TO ENFORCE BAGHDAD SANCTIONS RIGIDLY AND CLAIM THAT US-BACKED PEACE EFFORT DOOMED TO FAIL. IRAQI LEADERS SAY THEY DO NOT WANT WAR WITH ISRAEL BUT THAT TIME NOT PROPITIOUS FOR PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS SINCE ISRAEL IS MILITARILY SO STRONG ARABS WOULD BE NEGOTIATING FROM A DISADVANTAGE. END SUMMARY
3. ON JULY 13 WE RECEIVED A BRIEFING ON THE JULY 7-9 VISIT TO IRAQ OF FOREIGN MINISTER BARRE FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY DESK OFFICER FOR IRAQ AND IRAN (ENFOUX). ENFOUX GAVE THE VISIT A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FOCUS THAN AMBASSADOR MORIZET HAD IN BRIEFING USINT BANGHDAD (REF A) BUT HIS REMARKS WERE BASICALLY CONSISTENT. ENFOUX HIMSELF DID NOT ACCOMPANY BARRE AND NOTED THAT BARRE HAD TRAVELLED WITH A SMALL ENTOURAGE.

International
Marketing Information
Series



Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States

78-012

IRAQ

January 1978
Frequency: Annual
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Prepared By
U.S. Interests Section
Belgian Embassy



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U.S. Department of Commerce

Industry and Trade Administration

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