NATO STANDARD

AEODP-08

INTERSERVICE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL OPERATIONS (CBRN EOD) ON MULTINATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS

Edition C, Version 1

JUNE 2021

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

ALLIED EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DEVICE PUBLICATION

Published by the
NATO STANDARDISATION OFFICE (NSO)

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION (NATO)

NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

16 June 2021

1. The enclosed Allied Explosive Ordnance Disposal Publication AEODP-08, Edition C, Version 1, INTERSERVICE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL OPERATIONS (CBRN EOD) ON MULTINATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS, which has been approved by the nations in the Military Committee Land Standardization Board (MCLSB), is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2609.

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

Zoltán GULYÁS
Brigadier General, HUNAF
Director, NATO Standardization Office

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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

CHAPTER	RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS
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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

[nation]	[detail of reservation]
LVA	LNAF is planning to develop CBRN EOD capability in future. Until CBRN EOD capability is fully developed, LNAF EOD is not conducting CBRN EOD operations.
Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document Database for the complete list of existing reservations.	

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CHAPTER 1 PREFACE

101. Object

1. The purpose of this publication is to define principles for structuring and conducting multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) operations across the spectrum of multi-national operations and for any size of force. This document provides information on command and control (C2) principles, concepts, procedures, responsibilities and safety principles in addition to those set out in AJP-3.18 and ATP-3.18.1.

2. The information provided in this document enables efficient, effective, and safe employment of available CBRN EOD forces to support the multinational task force. Observance by all nations involved is an essential precondition for the conduct of CBRN EOD operations in an effective and safe way and, at the same time, an essential condition for improving the protection of multinational deployed forces, the civil population and the environment.

102. Background and scope

1. Because individual nations will provide different capabilities in the fields of CBRN defence, EOD and other supporting assets, these must be coordinated and harmonized. Supporting capabilities must be adapted to the specialized requirement of a CBRN EOD operation. This is of importance when non-military assets are involved.

2. The elimination or minimization of a hazard or threat caused by CBRN explosive ordnance (EO) requires a clear and common understanding from each participating nation on how to control and conduct CBRN EOD tasks. As a rule, CBRN EOD activities are of a complex nature and require very high levels of co-ordination by all parties involved, including special assignment and safety regulations, additional education, training, exercises and equipment. Therefore, it is necessary to publish and issue clear, simple and effective regulations for a multinational deployment of all parties involved, in particular for the CBRN and EOD elements.

3. Disposal of Nuclear Weapons. This document does not address standardization in the field of the disposal of nuclear weapons. However, NATO EOD Forces should agree to exchange necessary information within the limits of national security policies in time of emergency.

103. Applicability

1. In conjunction with other NATO reference documents, this document is to be used by commanders, staff and CBRN EOD operators who are involved in or influence the organization, planning and conduct of CBRN EOD operations.

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CHAPTER 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) ORGANIZATION

201. Principles

1. **Safety**. The safe and successful completion of CBRN EOD operations may require capabilities beyond those of a typical CBRN EOD team. Therefore, additional capabilities could be provided by other military or civilian agencies such as emergency services. Possible domains of support are risk assessment, hazard management (including decontamination), detection, identification, monitoring and medical countermeasures. As a result, CBRN EOD operations are likely to be highly multidisciplinary, requiring a thorough synchronization of all assets but still allowing a flexible response to every unique incident.

2. **Command and Control Compatibility**. The conduct of CBRN EOD operations typically involves several nations supporting the same operation at different levels, providing similar capabilities, and usually using different manpower and equipment. Therefore, it is not sufficient to focus only on capabilities and resources. Embedded CBRN EOD operations also require a clearly defined and effective C2 organization. Each operation may require different command, control and communication structures, but basic guiding principles can be applied to each operation.

3. **Interoperability**: Interoperability between CBRN EOD assets and other involved capabilities (e.g. civilian emergency services) is essential to the successful conduct of CBRN EOD operations.

202. Allocation of Responsibilities

1. CBRN EOD tasks are seldom completed autonomously due to the high risk during these types of operations and the need to establish large danger areas to account for the possibility of negative effects on the mission, population, infrastructure and environment. It is imperative to work as a team. Therefore, it is necessary to:

   a. Determine who are the participants at command level and who are the participants at execution level.
   b. Separate execution level from command level.
   c. Allocate responsibilities to command level.
   d. Allocate responsibilities to execution level.
   e. Check and practice procedures and essential capabilities.
   f. Establish effective and practicable cooperation and communication between all staff elements involved including civil-military relations.
   g. Establish effective and practicable cooperation and communication between command and execution levels.

2. Regarding CBRN EOD tasks, Annex A gives an overview of C2 functions/elements with allocated tasks and responsibilities.

203. General Structures

1. Since EOD and CBRN defence resources are limited, these national resources should be centrally tasked and coordinated, to the maximum extent possible, to optimize effectiveness and in order to concentrate effort where it is most needed.

2. The minimum required C2 elements are organizationally located at different levels and are assigned different command authority. Some of these elements are necessary in all cases, while some are necessary only for specific tasks (if available). Dual functions are possible:

a. C2 at the staff level:

(1) Essential Tasking and Coordinating Authorities required in every case:

(a) Multinational Joint Operations Centre (MNJOC);
(b) Multinational EOD Coordination Cell (MNEODCC);
(c) Multinational CBRN Collection Centre (MN CBRN CC);
(d) National Point of Contact EOD (NPOCEOD);
(e) National Point of Contact CBRN (NPOC CBRN);
(f) National Operations Centre (NOC);

(2) If necessary and available:

(a) Civil Defence Agencies;
(b) Civil Local Authorities.

b. C2 at the execution level:

(1) Essential Coordinating and Execution Authorities on site:

(a) Incident Commander (IC);
(b) CBRN EOD Team Leader on site; [1]
(c) CBRN elements Team Leader on site;
(d) EOD elements Team Leader on site;

(2) If necessary and available:

(a) Liaison Officer Civil Defence Agencies;
(b) Liaison Officer Civil Local Authorities.

[1] Remark: the CBRN EOD Team Leader (TL) must be suitably qualified in both CBRN and EOD. In some nations, IC are specially trained to fulfil the role of CBRN EOD TL

204. Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Analysis

1. To be prepared to take appropriate action and to enhance safety, it is of fundamental importance to undertake a realistic threat and vulnerability analysis followed by the preparation of a clear risk management plan. Threat analysis should include the evaluation of all hazards including those caused by meteorological conditions, explosive ordnance (EO), enemy forces and irregular parties including their capabilities and tactics, environmental, industrial and other hazards to personnel and materiel. An important precondition is the establishment of a fully functional information management system. Accurate threat analysis is key to enable adequate pre-incident precautions and if necessary, pre-positioning of assets or reduction of readiness category.

2. The rendering safe of a CBRN EO is an inherently dangerous task. Due to the multitude of hazards, the CBRN EOD Operator is responsible for providing input (EOD technical) to the overall multidisciplinary threat, vulnerability and risk analysis in order to determine the course of action. The final decisions are to be based upon an accurate overall threat assessment, understanding of EOD and CBRN actions and effective and relevant training.



Figure 2-1 Threat Vulnerability Risk Analysis Process

205. Planning

1. Proper planning prevents poor performance. To avoid unacceptable delays and confusion it is imperative to establish a CBRN EOD response plan. Therefore, the best and most effective approach is to establish a CBRN EOD response package. Depending on the situation and the risk analysis, an appropriate arrangement of participating teams, capabilities, notice to move (NTM) regulations and alert procedures must be established. In this context the MNEODCC and MNCBRNCC have a crucial role.

2. Therefore, special CBRN EOD-relevant SOPs must be issued for each operation. ATP-3.18.1 contains a proposed list of headings for the minimum contents of such SOPs. Close co-operation between multinational and national staff elements, including their legal advisers, is of essential importance in the preparation of these SOPs.

206. Tasking, Coordinating and Prioritization

1. The MNJOC acts as the command authority with permission to launch CBRN EOD assets, especially CBRN EOD Immediate Response Team (IRT), if available. The MNJOC is the POC for the on-site IC. If necessary, the MNJOC acts as a liaison cell to equivalent local civil authorities.

2. The MNEODCC is the central point of contact for operational and tactical requests regarding matters relevant to CBRN EOD and for all other EOD issues. The main responsibilities of the MNEODCC, among others, is the:

a. Co-ordination of allocated CBRN EOD forces within the AOR.
b. Co-ordination with MNCBRNCC with regard for the employment of CBRN EOD assets and the respective advice elements.
c. Close co-operation with national POCs (NPOCs) and MN staff elements.
d. Collection of relevant information on (CBRN) EO threat.

3. The MNCBRNCC is the central point of contact for operational and tactical requests regarding CBRN relevant matters and issues. The main responsibilities of the MN CBRN CC, among others, is the:

a. Co-ordination of allocated CBRN defence forces within the AOR.
b. Allocation of CBRN tasks to national Los.
c. Co-ordination and determination of required support.
d. Establishment of a flexible and practicable CBRN defense 24h stand-by system in support of IRT Package in close co-ordination with the MNEODCC.
e. Close co-operation with NPOCs and MN staff elements.
f. Assessment and advice element in CBRN related matters.
g. Collection of relevant CBRN information.

4. The IC acts as the overall on-site authority. The main tasks of the IC are:

a. C2 element on site.
b. Command, control and co-ordination of all assets and activities on site.
c. Confirmation and co-ordination of all required safety measures on site.
d. Decision about the start of the action against the CBRN EO after permission to start from the MNJOC.
e. Decision on measures in light of CBRN and EOD advice.
f. The IC is responsible for the overall multidisciplinary Threat Vulnerability Risk Analysis (TVRA). He has to supervise the Transfer of Authority (time and situ) between the different agencies (actors).
g. Since a render safe procedure (RSP) could cause a functioning of the device and due to the wider implications of a CBRN release, the IC must be briefed on the intended actions of the EOD operator before the implementation of any RSP. A command structure must be present to support the IC by additional directives (possibility to refer up). If the IC is not suitably qualified (see Par 203.2.b.(1)), he must be assisted by a qualified CBRN EOD Team Leader who will coordinate the actions of the CBRN and EOD elements.
h. Hand over scene to civil or military authorities.
i. Establishment of reach back capability if needed.

5. Each nation participating in multinational CBRN EOD must appoint a NPOC for CBRN, EOD and Support measures. The NPOC, independent of its role as an EOD, CBRN or Support POC is the nation's central co-ordination and tasking authority. The NPOCs are responsible for the accomplishment of allocated tasks in the area of EOD, CBRN and support measures, in accordance with national regulations and agreed multinational procedures. To facilitate proper coordination, nations must ensure via their NPOCs that the MNEODCC and MNCBRNCC are advised of national capabilities, restrictions and limitations.

207. Responsibilities and General Relationships on Site

1. It is of crucial importance to allocate specific responsibilities before starting activities on site. Therefore, it is essential to identify and coordinate specific roles on site.

2. For a clearer understanding it is important that this chapter focuses on the description of essential and possible elements involved on site. This publication does not describe which forces, units and personnel of a particular nation are responsible for which function. Dual roles are possible, depending on national policy. For example, it is possible that one individual has the role of consultation, command and control CBRN function and at the same time the role of CBRN reconnaissance team leader. Therefore, the number of roles may not equate to the number of individuals involved.

3. The essential on-site roles required during the execution of a CBRN EOD task (possible parts of an CBRN EOD IRT) are:

a. Overall C2 POC (Incident Commander).
b. CBRN EOD Team Leader: The dedicated CBRN EOD Team Leader groups all information originating from the CBRN team and the EOD team. He provides all necessary information to the IC (who will most often not be a CBRN or EOD specialist) and passes all necessary information from the IC to the specialist teams.
c. EOD related elements (coordinating and Executing EOD Authorities on site):
   (1) C2 EOD (coordinating Authority EOD);
   (2) EOD (CBRN EOD qualified operators) team or teams (Executing Authority EOD).
d. CBRN related elements (Coordinating and Executing CBRN Authorities on site):
   (1) C2 CBRN (Coordinating Authority CBRN);
   (2) CBRN reconnaissance asset (Executing Authority CBRN);
   (3) CBRN decontamination asset (Executing Authority CBRN).
e. Elements in specific fields of support (Executing Authorities on site):
   (1) Military Medical Assistance Team;
   (2) Cordon and evacuation elements (e.g. Military Police, Civil Police).
f. Additional elements
   (1) CBRN Sampling asset (Executing Authority according applicable regulation);
   (2) Fire Service elements.

4. Annex A gives an overview of listed elements with regard to their allocated tasks and responsibilities.

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CHAPTER 3 CAPABILITIES AND TASK AREAS OF MULTINATIONAL CBRN EOD

301. Multinational Operations Spectrum

1. CBRN EOD operations are not autonomous operations. CBRN EOD operations are always a part of a larger mission in a multinational environment.

2. The aim of conducting CBRN EOD operations is to protect personnel, materiel, infrastructure and environment and to maintain, restore or improve operational capabilities before, during and after a mission. CBRN EOD is a vital operational task from the point of view of survivability, force protection, freedom of movement, protection of lines of communication, intelligence, technical exploitation and civil-military cooperation support.

302. CBRN EOD Task Spectrum

1. CBRN EOD force elements are employed to counter confirmed or suspected EO threats associated with the presence of CBRN threat(s). These threats are presented by a wide range of devices and manufactured weapons in combination with environmental conditions at the scene:

   a. Munitions and devices, which are the subject of CBRN EOD activities, include combinations of suspected and confirmed explosive or non-explosive devices, either manufactured or improvised or in a combination of both. These may be used in conjunction with CBRN substances. [2]

   b. These munitions and devices may be encountered in a 'clean' or CBRN contaminated environment, which may include the hazard from a CBRN substances.

2. These factors should also be considered when CBRN EOD teams are confronted by non-explosive CBRN devices e.g. non-explosive Improvised Spraying Device (ISD) or non-explosive Improvised Dispersal Device (IDD).

3. It is important to consider CBRN in the widest sense possible and not to limit its meaning to e.g. chemical agents. The availability and possibly the accessibility of toxic industrial material (TIM) in the operational environment, obliges us to take due consideration of this threat.

303. Support Missions

CBRN EOD operators will participate in the following activities only as a support element and will not operate autonomously:

1. **Search Operations**: These operations are usually conducted by Search specialists. However, the CBRN EOD Operator may be given responsibility for specific search tasks such as a suspect vehicle (naval, ground or air) or the immediate area of a **CBRN EO**. Other

[2] CBRN Substance : A chemical or biological agent, a toxic industrial material or a radioactive material, in any physical state or form (Ref NATO Term database)

areas may be searched at the Operator's discretion, based upon the TVRA and the specific circumstances. Search teams must be reinforced by CBRN EOD elements in circumstances where EO threat associated with the presence of CBRN substances is confirmed or suspected.

2. **Sampling and Identification of Biological, Chemical and Radiological Agents (SIBCRA):** This is a function of SIBCRA specialists as described in AEP-66.

3. **Final disposal of CBRN substances**: Although the treatment of the CBRN substances is not the function of a CBRN EOD team, they may be requested to use an EOD technique to dispose of CBRN substances, e.g. high order detonation. The application of these techniques needs to be in accordance with the rules of engagement (ROE) and CBRN hazard management. Due attention is to be given to international laws and conventions.

4. **Hazard management**. Decontamination of personnel, equipment and of the incident site is usually the role of support agencies, either military or civil. Decontaminants, however, may be used during RSP.

5. **Technical exploitation:** CBRN EOD force elements support technical exploitation as described in AIntP-10.

CHAPTER 4 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING SYSTEM

401. Communication and Information Systems

1. Communication and information systems (CIS) are essential for all elements employed at the EOD incident site involving CBRN substances. It is vital that the IC be able to communicate with the following as a minimum:

a. Commanders of the safety and security cordons.
b. CBRN survey teams.
c. Critical functional commanders such as fire service, police or security and medical.

2. The senior medical officer must also maintain reliable radio or telephone communications with local medical treatment facilities in order to warn them of the CBRN agent or TIM employed and to ensure the efficient intake of casualties.

3. While military radio is desirable, the existing telephone system in buildings can and should be used. Additionally, private cellular telephones may also be used as an expedient means of communication. In some situations, electronic mail and facsimile may also be used.

402. Reporting

1. The following represents potential reports that the IC may have to use during CBRN EOD operations.

Table 4-1 Report Submission

Report	Submission	Comments
Operations Report	As soon as possible after arrival at the incident site	Suggested content provided at Annex D, Appendix 1
Situation Report	Every 12 hours after submission of the Operations Report	Suggested content provided at Annex D, Appendix 2
Request for Support	As required	Suggested content provided at Annex D, Appendix 4
Final Situation Report	At the end of the operation	Suggested content provided at Annex D, Appendix 3
Request for Information or Intelligence	As required	Suggested content provided at Annex D, Appendix 5

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CHAPTER 5 SAFETY PRINCIPLES AND CONSIDERATIONS

501. General Safety Principles and Considerations

1. The basic principles governing EOD operations are described in ATP-3.18.1 Chapter 8. Specific considerations due to the CBRN hazards are listed hereunder.

2. The spectrum of CBRN EO, worldwide, is not covered by specific safety regulations; instead general safety regulations should always be applied. CBRN EOD tasks are hazardous, by their nature, and always involve a certain element of risk to personnel and the environment. No CBRN EOD action is absolutely safe, but CBRN EOD procedures are designed to minimize that risk.

3. Specific national safety regulations vary widely across NATO. For multinational CBRN EOD operations, the most stringent safety regulation amongst nations involved in a specific task should apply. Stricter regulations can be directed by orders for a specific task or by SOPs.

4. Relaxation of safety regulations of individual nations is prohibited.

5. Minimum Exposure Time Principle: A general principle is to avoid the exposure of personnel and environment to such hazards or, if it is unavoidable, to keep exposure as low as reasonable achievable (ALARA)[3].

6. Worst-Case Principle: Concerning risk assessment, selected procedures and techniques, suspected payload, CBRN EO condition, ignition system etc., the operators should always consider the impact of the worst-case unintentional scenario by implementation of suitable countermeasures (hazard areas, level of physical protection, etc.).

7. One Team – One Nation Principle: The multinationality level of the agencies intervening during the incident must not compromise safety standards. In order to permit the different agencies to operate in their “usual” modus operandi, the multinationality of assets involved in a single incident should be kept to a minimum.

8. Unity-of-Command Principle: The chain of command for a CBRN EOD task is to be clearly defined. A single IC must be allocated and will have overall responsibility for conduct of the task. The IC will require support and technical advice from the EOD and CBRN Team Leaders. The IC could be assisted by the CBRN EOD Team Leader who will coordinate the actions of CBRN and EOD elements. Responsibilities of the IC are detailed in the ATP-3.18.1.

9. The ROE for CBRN EOD force elements, describing the acceptable risk, need to be established during the force contribution process. Since each troop-contributing

[3] As low as reasonably achievable (ALARA): A Risk Management principle that mandates the minimum exposure of personnel to NBC hazards, subject only to the overriding demands of the operational mission (TTF: 2016-0176).

nation (TCN) will have set its own standards there is a need to study the impact on the combined and/or multi-agency operations and harmonize before tasking. For example, exposure limits to TIMs, which include ionising radiation, could influence the time-on-target and safety distances thus influencing the conduct of the mission. These regulations need to be deconflicted between nations and also between different populations (public, military, law enforcement).

10. The statutory provisions of the country where the CBRN incident occurs, will determine the limits for public exposure.

11. Containment is key to the CBRN EOD philosophy. A successful containment will be an important contribution to minimizing loss of life and damage to property. It will allow a more rapid return of the scene to normal. Therefore, the IC must consider containment as a part of the solution.

12. Use of High Value Assets. The potential for an IED to be combined with a CBRN agent may require the use of remote means (i.e. remote operated vehicle) to interrogate the device and to conduct the render safe procedure so that the CBRN component can be safely disposed. The likelihood that high value assets such as Remote Operated Vehicles (ROVs) will be contaminated suggests the need to carefully evaluate the impact on the future operational capability of the team or e.g. to include spare equipment (e.g. ROV).

13. The mitigation and/or elimination and removal of CBRN threats present after the RSP, is not the responsibility of the CBRN EOD team. If appropriate an agency should be assigned to sanitize the incident site. Their mission also includes the management of the waste produced during the CBRN EOD operations, e.g. disposable protective clothing.

14. A CBRN EOD team is to be self-sustaining for emergency decontamination. This is a significant task that may require the team and its equipment composition to be adjusted.

15. The main task of an EOD team is to minimize EO threats and/or to neutralize the release system of a CBRN EO. All elements should be ready for sealing and transportation in appropriate containers. Therefore, before further actions are conducted by the CBRN elements, the EOD Team Leader must brief the CBRN Team Leader on the condition of the EO.

502. Support Measures

1. One of the most important support measures is adequate medical support. This should be provided in accordance with national policy, regulations and SOPs and should take into account the fact that CBRN EOD tasks require specific medical capabilities (e.g. casualty decontamination).

2. CBRN EOD Team Leader (or the CBRN and EOD Teams leader) should advise the IC on the necessary support capabilities.

3. CBRN Forces capable of thorough decontamination should be available on site.

503. Disposal

1. Disposal of CBRN EO may be a multinational issue.

2. Disposal of CBRN EO is not advised if there is no suitable Central Demolition Site (CDS) or dismantling facility available. Therefore, disposal should be considered as a last resort.

3. As a general rule, CDS are established and used during operations for the disposal of conventional EO by means of high-order disposal techniques.

4. Due to specific hazards associated with the CBRN payload additional requirements and regulations (hazard area, environmental and weather conditions, host nation directives, CBRN consequences management) are to be observed before using disposal areas.

5. If it is possible to establish a suitable CDS for the disposal of CBRN EO, appropriate multinational regulations and procedures must be prepared. National directives, in accordance with considerations, regulations and procedures relevant to multinational CDS, are to be observed by the executing nations and, in cases with a highly political dimension, by the United Nations.

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ANNEX A CBRN EOD RELATED EXECUTING FUNCTIONS/ELEMENTS

This table offers a non-exhaustive overview of executing functions/elements which are important to counter CBRN EO threats. The table does not describe which forces/units of a nation are responsible for which function. Double-head functions are to be avoided if possible.

EXECUTING Function Element	Tasks/Responsibilities (non-exhaustive)	Military Authority	Civil Authority
Incident Commander (IC) (Military or civilian, depending on the operation, ROE, specific task, etc.)	1. C3 element on-site 2. overall on site responsibility 3. to assume control of the incident on site 4. to establish an ICP (Incident Command Post) 5. to co-ordinate all assets and activities required on site 6. to establish the communication lines on-site 7. to determine signals in case of emergencies 8. to fully brief all required actors on their role (clear designation), responsibilities and what the IC expects of them 9. to confirm and co-ordinate all required safety measures (overall hazard area, evacuation, cordoning-off) 10. to decide the minimum dress state for all subordinate assets on site according to the advice of the CBRN EOD Team leader and for CBRN and tactical matters but Not for EOD aspects 11. to authorize the start of the action against the CBRN EO (permission to start) after he/she requested the permission to start from the MNJOC 12. to establish direct communications link to MNJOC 13. to establish communications to all subordinate assets on site 14. to oversee the collection and distribution of information and intelligence regarding ongoing CBRN EOD operations 15. to decide on measures in light of the sequence of priorities 16. to make arrangements about the course of action	X	(X)

EXECUTING Function Element	Tasks/Responsibilities (non-exhaustive)	Military Authority	Civil Authority
	17. to hand over scene (in accordance with the CBRN and EOD side) to civil or military authorities (depends on the situation) 18. to liaise with the media on site		
CBRN-EOD Team Leader (TL)	1. C3 element on-site for CBRN-EOD Team 2. Hot and Warm Zones responsibility 3. to establish a CBRN EOD CP (Control Point) (Could be co-located with the ICP according to the situation) 4. to co-ordinate all assets and activities 5. to determine signals in case of emergencies 6. to fully brief all required actors on their role (clear designation), responsibilities and what the IC expects of them 7. to co-ordinate all required safety measures with the team (overall hazard area, evacuation, cordoning-off) and to propose them to the IC 8. to propose to IC the minimum dress state for the team on site based on the advices of the CBRN and EOD elements Team Leaders. 9. to inform the IC about the state of preparation of the team 10. to maintain direct communications link to MNEODCC and MNCBRNCC 11. to establish communications to all subordinate assets on site 12. to inform IC about ongoing CBRN EOD operations 13. to advice IC on the CBRN EOD risk assessment and on measures in light of the sequence of priorities 14. to make arrangements about the course of action 15. to declare the site SAFE for CBRN and/or EO matters 16. to coordinate the payload packaging and transport	X	
CBRN Element on-site C2 (CBRN Team Leader) Coordinating Authority, CBRN	1. responsible for the CBRN action on-site 2. C3 CBRN assets on site 3. to advise the CBRN-EOD TL on all CBRN related matters 4. to co-ordinate CBRN action on site with the CBRN EOD TL 5. to liaise with EOD TL	X	

EXECUTING Function Element	Tasks/Responsibilities (non-exhaustive)	Military Authority	Civil Authority
	6. to determine CBRN CP (Control Point) (Could be co-located with the CBRN EOD CP according to the situation) 7. to establish direct communications link to IC, CBRN EOD TL, EOD TL and CBRN teams 8. to determine/predict CBRN hazard area 9. to determine "clean-dirty line" and Contamination Control Point (CCP) 10. to establish local weather observation 11. to establish detection, identification and monitoring activities 12. to determine site for hazard management activities 13. to determine the CBRN dress state in its AOR		
CBRN Reconnaissance Team Part of Executing Authority CBRN	1. to report to CBRN Team Leader all information gathered 2. to establish CBRN detection systems in downwind direction 3. to establish CBRN monitoring in the CCP 4. to evaluate the extent of contamination 5. to determine and mark the contaminated area 6. to conduct the final check for CBRN contamination before leaving the scene	X	
CBRN Decontamination Team Part of Executing Authority CBRN	1. to conduct, control and co-ordinate both operational and thorough decontamination 2. to mark access and exit routes 3. to collect contaminated and decontamination waste in accordance with national and host nation regulations 4. to report to CBRN Team Leader	X	
CBRN Sampling Team Part of Executing Authority CBRN	1. to collect specific samples 2. to prepare samples for analysis 3. to collect, seal and pack forensic evidence (if necessary and possible) 4. to seal and pack the device (if possible) 5. to report to CBRN Team Leader	X	

EXECUTING Function Element	Tasks/Responsibilities (non-exhaustive)	Military Authority	Civil Authority
EOD Element on site C2 (EOD Team Leader) Coordinating Authority EOD	1. responsible for the EOD action on site 2. C3 EOD assets on site 3. to advise the CBRN-EOD TL on all EOD related matters 4. to determine ECP (EOD Control Point) (Could be co-located with the CBRN EOD CP according to the situation) 5. to co-ordinate the EOD action on site with the CBRN EOD TL 6. to establish communications with MNEODCC 7. to establish direct communications link to IC, CBRN EOD TL, CBRN Team Leader and EOD teams 8. to determine hazard area caused by EO 9. to determine the level of EOD Protection in its AOR 10. to question witnesses (together with the CBRN EOD TL and CBRN TL)	X	
EOD Team Part of Executing Authority EOD	1. to execute the EOD action against the CBRN EO under national responsibility (methods, Render Safe Procedures (RSPs), dress state) 2. to provide safe access to the CBRN device/munitions 3. to declare “area free from explosive hazards” (if possible) to EOD TL 4. to establish transportability of CBRN EO (if possible)	X	
EOD Back-up Team[4] Part of Executing Authority EOD	1. to replace the first EOD team in action, in case of necessity	X	
CBRN Sampling Team	1. to collect specific samples 2. to prepare samples for analysis 3. to collect, seal and pack forensic evidence (if necessary and possible)	X	

[4] Back up may be required for all functional areas as part of operational sustainability, not just EOD.

EXECUTING Function Element	Tasks/Responsibilities (non-exhaustive)	Military Authority	Civil Authority
	4. to seal and pack the device (if possible) 5. to report to CBRN Team Leader		
Medical Team	1. to establish mobile medical assistance on site with priority for the military teams in action (see main body Par 502)	X	
Military Police	1. to establish communication to IC 2. to support by cordoning and evacuation measures	X	
Site Security Cordon Troops	1. to establish communications with IC and in accordance with their relations 2. to support cordon and evacuation measures 3. to protect the military assets in action, on site	X	
CBRN Payload Transport Team	1. to transport the CBRN EO or the separated CBRN payload to a temporary storage facility, dismantling facility, or to the final disposal area 2. to transport samples to a designated exploitation facility (if in theatre) in accordance with applicable regulations. 3. not responsible for establishing the transportability of the CBRN EO	X	(X)
Interpreter	1. to translate into the local language and back 2. to assist the IC and other actors (e.g. questioning of witnesses, translation of orders, etc.)	X	(X)
Civil Police (depends on the operation, ROE, the specific task)	1. to establish communications with IC 2. to support by cordoning and evacuation measures		X
Fire Service	1. to establish communications with IC 2. to provide support in emergencies	X	X

EXECUTING Function Element	Tasks/Responsibilities (non-exhaustive)	Military Authority	Civil Authority
(from military or civil side or both, depending on the operation, ROE, the specific task, availability)			
Civil Medical Assistance	1. to establish communications with IC 2. to provide support in case of emergency		X

ANNEX B MAIN PHASES AND STEPS FOR THE CONDUCT OF CBRN EOD TASKS



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ANNEX C CBRN EOD TRAINING PRINCIPLES

1. GENERAL

a. Introduction

Because individual nations will provide different capabilities in the fields of CBRN defence, EOD and other supporting assets, these must be coordinated and harmonized. Supporting capabilities must be adapted to the specialized requirement of a CBRN EOD operation. This is of particular importance when non-military assets are involved since TTP's are often different.

The elimination or minimization of a hazard or threat caused by CBRN Devices and CBRN Weapons requires a clear and common understanding from each participating nation on how to control and conduct CBRN EOD tasks. As a rule, specialist CBRN EOD activities are of a complex nature and require very high levels of coordination by all parties involved, including special assignment and safety regulations, additional education, training and equipment. Therefore it is necessary to publish and issue clear, simple and effective training guidelines for a multinational deployment of all parties involved, in particular for the CBRN and EOD elements. A continuous and realistic training facilitates the path for the successful conduct of specialist CBRN EOD interventions within military operations.

Because of the principle "train as you fight", this document will often refer to existing NATO documents describing operational CBRN EOD engagements and principles. Furthermore, it will provide several scenarios that can be used both on a national, international and/or an inter-service level easily permitting benchmarking.

b. Aim

The aim of CBRN EOD Training Principle is as follows

(1) To train trainers in the principles and fundamentals to be applied by all ON SCENE parties involved in CBRN EOD operations;
(2) To provide generic CBRN EOD scenarios for training, discussion and benchmarking;
(3) To train our troops in accordance with these principles will lead to a better interaction between EOD specialists, CBRN specialists, supported and supporting units and will enhance CBRN EOD training within nations and their training facilities.

c. Scope

These principles are intended for all trainers in preparation of CBRN EOD operations. The understanding of this concept will enable them to realize the principles and fundamentals of CBRN EOD operations and thereby ensure the optimum training for CBRN and EOD units in CBRN EOD operations.

d. Limitations

These principles exclude considerations of offensive actions to prevent or reduce the likelihood of the use of CBRN EO by an adversary. The specialist CBRN EOD capabilities as described in this document are solely oriented to deter and defend against the use of CBRN EO. ATP-3.12.1.1 (Allied Tactical Doctrine for Military Search) deals with offensive search capabilities and techniques. Specialist CBRN EOD capabilities can be used during such search operations. Dealing/training with fully developed nuclear weapons is not part of this document.

Although many capabilities are required when dealing with CBRN EOD incidents, this document will only emphasize on CBRN and EOD personnel.

Other activities beyond the render safe such as sampling and identification, which fall under the responsibility of the SIBCRA Team or the Weapon Intelligence Team (WIT) (with CBRN capabilities), are not covered by this document.

2. FRAMEWORK CONSIDERATIONS

a. Basic considerations

(1) CBRN EOD incidents require an enormous spectrum of TTP which cannot be found in only ONE person, not even in ONE team. Therefore several “capabilities” must be trained, not only in doing their core function, but even so in dealing with the other capabilities present on the incident scene.

(2) The training of CBRN-EOD specialists, originating from CBRN capability and EOD capability is time consuming.

(3) Each specialist must be trained according to own national procedures and standards before being able to participate in multinational or even in national capability crossing training events. To ensure an adequate skill level, specialists should preferably be nationally certified before they train together on an international scene.

(4) Additionally, prior to participating in a live agent training (LAT), training within a “safe” (clean) environment must be performed up to national standards/safety prescriptions of the LAT installation.

(5) Training on an international and/or multiservice level implies that each specialist is aware of the “other ones” procedures. Therefore, an information lesson on the “other ones” TTP must be given before starting common training.

(6) Make all training as realistic as possible. Every abnormality, as small as it might seem, or every “time jump” within the training incident will force the “trainee” to adapt TTPs accordingly. This adaptation will settle into his mind and might lead to confusion/misunderstandings during a next event (which might as well be a real engagement).

b. Legal framework

Each country has to train according to its own safety prescriptions/regulations. Those regulations might cause caveats. Staff advisors must know those regulations in order to advise on the use of national assets.

Preparing a multinational LAT, each participating nation has to agree with the Technical Agreement related to this LAT/SOP of the country who provides the site (even if the security rules are more constraining).

c. Operational Requirements

(1) Military Search[5]

The engagement of a specialist CBRN EOD team is only part of fulfilling the task. Prior to their engagement, a possible target must have been identified. A suspected or confirmed target will lead to the decision of sending a specialized CBRN EOD team (or more in general an incident response group) in order to deal with the target.

The initial finding of such target, as a consequence of applying systematic procedures and appropriate equipment by basic searchers or intermediate searchers, is covered by ATP-3.12.1. Advanced Search teams must be reinforced by CBRN EOD elements in circumstances where EO hazards associated with the presence of CBRN substances is confirmed or suspected.

Military Search principles and TTP are applicable.

(2) On scene command

CBRN EOD operations are not autonomous operations. They're always a part of a larger mission (in a multinational environment). Moreover, the CBRN EOD team will most certainly not be leading the operation. In almost every case, this team will be a supporting asset, not the supported one. Overall organization on scene (GREEN circle) is thus not the CBRN EOD team's responsibility.
However the control of all operations within the CBRN EOD incident hazard area (HOT zone[6], RED circle) is a matter for the CBRN and the EOD team leaders coordinated by the CBRN EOD team leader, regardless of the rank. The decision of the type of render safe procedures is a matter for the EOD team leader, regardless of rank.

[5] ATP-3.12.1
[6] See definition in 6.b.(3)



(3) Incident commander

The commander of the tactical unit[7] (IC) organizes all activities on scene and provides a secure environment for the specialists working within the hot zone. All interference, in both directions, between inner and outer perimeter pass through the IC on scene.

In most cases the IC will not be a specialist CBRN or EOD operator, thus requiring him/her to take advice from the specialists on scene. In order to aid the IC in decision making the advice must be comprehensive clear and unambiguous.

(4) To ensure a comprehensive approach, dealing with all aspects of a CBRN EOD incident, one must consider several “key functions” grouped into the CBRN EOD “dome”. Every key function will need one or more capabilities:

(a) **EOD advice and risk assessment**

(b) **CBRN advice and risk assessment**

(c) **Detection**: by manoeuvre units, civilians… (basic search principles)

[7] Or the local (Civ) authority on scene, e.g. police forces.

(d) **Pre–Identification**: Intermediate search teams, CBRN Reconnaissance teams (provisional identification)…

(e) **Safety perimeters**: determined by EOD and CBRN Pers, fine-tuned and guarded

(f) Choice of **Individual Protective Equipment** (IPE). Based upon CBRN EOD advice.



(g) **Decontamination** of Personnel and Equipment

(h) **Waste Management, sample taking, unambiguous identification, forensic**: Often not by CBRN nor by EOD Pers.

(5) A CBRN EOD team should consist of three parts:

(a) **CBRN specialist team**, capable of giving comprehensive CBRN advice on site, assisting the EOD team together with other CBRN specific tasks, familiarized with EOD procedures.

(b) **EOD specialist team**, capable of giving advice on EO related aspects to the CBRN team, together with other EOD related tasks, familiarized with CBRN procedures and equipment and able to work in a CBRN environment (as mentioned in Ann D).

(c) The designation of a **CBRN EOD Team Leader** is essential for practical reasons.

The dedicated CBRN EOD Team Leader collects all information originating from the CBRN team and the EOD team and then gives all necessary information to the IC (who will most often not be a CBRN or EOD specialist) and passes all necessary information from the IC to the specialist teams.

This person has to be educated and trained in both CBRN and EOD capabilities. He/she is to be capable of analysing complex situations, proposing adequate solutions, of taking decisions and commands at all times. At no time is he/she to enter the hot zone.

It is highly recommendable that the Team Leader does not belong to one of the specialist teams as this might influence his/her decisions. The team leader must concentrate on dealing with every aspect of the ongoing operation, included liaising with the IC. This facilitates the difficult job of the CBRN team leader and the EOD team leader, and the former can also act as POC CBRN EOD.

A team leader engaged within the hot zone might lose overview and the capability to communicate with the CBRN EOD Team Leader. He/she will not be able to command the operations on-going in the hot zone.

Approaching the explosive ordnance/device, either the EOD or the CBRN specialist should have the lead depending of the scenario. This lead may change during the procedure. The main task will be to advise how to proceed at the explosive ordnance or device (step by step coordination). In any case, both specialists assist each other.

(d) Remark: Both teams must be well trained in cooperating with each other.

d. C2 Structure

(1) C2 at staff level:

(a) Multinational Joint Operations Centre (MNJOC);

(b) Multinational EOD Coordination Centre (MNEODCC);

(c) Multinational CBRN Collection Centre (MNCBRNCC);

(d) National Point of contact EOD (NPOCEOD);

(e) National Point of contact CBRN (NPOCCBRN);

(f) National Operations Centre (NOC);

(g) Civil Defence agencies and civilian local authorities (if necessary and available);

(2) C2 at the execution level:

(a) IC (Tactical commander if MIL lead OPS or civilian if civil lead OPS): sole and unique liaison between the hot/warm zone, the cold zone and HQ (exempt for technical reach back needed by specialists). All tactically related information passes through his ICP;

(b) The CBRN Team Leader and the EOD Team Leader on scene and the CBRN-EOD Team Leader coordinate all CBRN and all EOD activities in the hot spot (without entering it), and are the technical advisors for the IC. The CBRN EOD Team Leader analyses in close cooperation with the different CBRN specialists and EOD specialists the possible risks and consequences related to the device (target) and provides unique, clear and tactically useful (actionable) guidelines to the IC. The CBRN EOD Team Leader is the only person to be able to declare, after having coordinated with his CBRN and EOD specialists, the hot zone “safe” for further interventions by other supporting assets.
The CBRN Team Leader and the EOD Team Leader (or the CBRN-EOD Team Leader if appointed) are to be located close to the ICP;

(c) All Liaison Officers (Civil Defence agencies, Civil Local authorities (if necessary and available)) coordinate through the IC;

(d) IC, CBRN Team Leader and EOD Team Leader (or the CBRN-EOD Team Leader if appointed) must guarantee a safe environment in which the specialists can accomplish their tasks.

3. PRINCIPLES

a. General principles

(1) Safety first

(a) CBRN EOD Operations are often multidisciplinary. Therefore a thorough synchronization of all involved assets is required. The responsibilities and allocated tasks of each asset are listed in Annex A of this AEODP. The coordination will allow a flexible response to every unique incident in order to seek to minimize risk at all times not only to the general public but also to all personnel contributing to the mission;

(b) The general EOD principles mentioned in AJP-3.18, Par 1.5 are applicable;

(c) Where regulations of nations involved differ, the most stringent will be applied (even if no HN rules exists);

(d) A general principle is to avoid exposure of personnel and the environment to hazards or, if it is unavoidable, to keep exposure “As low as reasonably achievable” (ALARA);

(2) Command and Control Compatibility

Working with several nations or civilian agencies supporting the same operation at different levels requires a defined and effective C2 organization. The compatibility of all communication means must be effective;

(3) Interoperability is essential to the successful conduct of such operations.

It is very unlikely that only ONE nation will be able to provide all operational capabilities required (key functions) to solve a particular problem. Indeed the complete spectrum of operational requirements will be of multinational origin. Interoperability, all capabilities being able to work together, is key to success.

However, there is a lower limit to interoperability. Every CBRN EOD team should be composed by military/specialists originating from the same nation and familiar with national TTPs (ONE team, ONE nation principle[8]).

It is allowed, for training purposes only (e.g. exchanging TTP), to compose a multinational team. Anyway, before dealing with the training incident itself, a thorough exchange of information, permitting a full understanding of the TTP to be trained, is necessary.

b. Multinational and multi-agency principles

(1) Attention points:

(a) CBRN EOD tasks are hazardous by nature and always pose a certain risk to personnel and environment. No CBRN EOD action is absolutely safe, but CBRN EOD procedures are designed to minimize that risk. General safety regulations should always be applied;

[8] ATP-3.18.1, Pg 8-2

(b) The tasking authority, or any other authority present on scene, cannot in any case compel the operator to apply TTP that are contradictory to his education;

(c) The level of multinational or multi-agency of emergency services intervening during the incident, may never compromise safety standards;

(2) The safety principles must be defined before all intervention and must be clear to all participants prior to their engagement;

(3) Basic safety principles governing EOD operations are given in ATP-3.18.1, chapter 8;

(4) Specific considerations due to CBRN hazards are given in this AEODP, chapter 5;

(5) Special considerations for LAT:

(a) Remote means might be contaminated during a training session. The likelihood that a high value asset such as Remote Operating Vehicle (ROV) will be contaminated suggests the need to carefully evaluate the impact on future operational capability of the team;

(b) During training, an evaluation team must continuously observe correct application of TTP;

(c) Adequate medical support should be provided in accordance with national policy and regulations. Emergency decontamination assets must be present.

c. National principles

Specific national safety regulations vary widely across NATO. For multinational CBRN EOD operations, the most stringent safety regulation amongst nations involved in a specific task and in a given environment is to apply. Stricter regulations can be directed by orders for a specific task or by SOP's.

Relaxation of safety regulations of individual nations is prohibited.

4. PARTIES INVOLVED AND RESPONSIBILITIES

a. On scene parties (conducting the exercise)

Respect principles mentioned in AEODP-8 chapter 2 and 3:

(1) Incident Commander

(a) The Incident Commander (IC) will be the tactical commander on scene (Can also be a Civ authority or police CDR on scene) responsible for the outer perimeter.

(b) The IC's orders are made following the advice of the CBRN Team Leader, the EOD Team Leader (or the CBRN-EOD Team Leader if appointed), or Liaison Officers, respectively.

(c) The IC may not interfere with the TTP of the specialists within the inner perimeter. Conversely specialists have to follow orders from the IC concerning safety of the outer perimeter. E.g. if the safety of the outer

perimeter cannot be guaranteed, the specialists have to stop working immediately and evacuate.

(2) Cordon and evacuation elements (Civil or Mil)

Their main task is to clear, cordon and control the perimeter established around the hot spot (target). After confirmation of the target and the clearance of the zone, they should prevent any intended or accidental entry (e.g. a dog). Even so indirect threats coming from a further distance must be dealt with (e.g. indirect fire).

(3) CBRN team and EOD team can only operate if the security of the surroundings is assured.

(a) EOD team must advise the CBRN EOD Team Leader (or the IC if no designated Team Leader) and the CBRN specialists approaching or working close to the explosive ordnance or device on the dangers related to the explosive parts. Their main task is complete when the explosive (or dispersion) elements of the device have been rendered safe, separated and/or sealed in appropriate bags/containers for forensic examination by designated laboratory.[9]

(b) CBRN team (capabilities) must advise the CBRN EOD Team Leader and the EOD specialists approaching and working close to the explosive ordnance or device, confirm the CBRN danger (CBRN Recon).

(c) Note that additional CBRN force elements may be necessary which cannot be provided by the CBRN EOD team (e.g. monitoring hazardous substance around the cordon, final decontamination,…).

(4) Elements in specific fields of support (Mil or civilian)

(a) Other CBRN capabilities (CBRN monitoring, warning and reporting structure, packaging and transport of the payload, …).

(b) Medical assistance Team

(c) Fire Dept

(d) Scientists

(e) Civilian protection

(f) Civilian authorities

b. Other parties

(1) To organise the exercise

In addition to several role players taking part in the incident, the organizational (DIREX) structure must send a spokesman to the scene during the CBRN EOD team intervention in order to provide additional comments or explanations permitting the specialists to execute their tasks. The spokesman eliminates all confusion and/or misunderstandings, thus avoiding that the aim of the exercise wouldn't be achieved. The spokesman must be fully aware of the aim, purpose, framework, design, target audience of the entire incident

[9] EU NBC policy, p. 5

(CBRN part, EOD part, tactical part). He must be able to answer the questions the CBRN and EOD specialists ask during their analysis of the incident (trying to achieve situational awareness);

(2) To evaluate the exercise

Establish a structure of evaluation for each capability involved in the exercise. Evaluators shall conduct debriefings and contribute to a critique of the incident in order to extract any lessons identified from the exercise. The debriefing shouldn't only deal with specialist TTPs, it must also address the Threat Vulnerability Risk Analysis (TVRA) performed by the CBRN EOD team (was their analysis in line with the original story of the scenario/incident?) and their advice given to the IC.

Since every nation will offer its own nationally (well) trained capability, the most likely misunderstandings/faults will happen during information exchange, counselling, handover procedure. So particular attention must be given to the interoperability evaluation and debriefing;

(3) Warning and reporting structure (Information Management)

Consider putting in place a warning & reporting structure if the training of reporting is part of the overall training aim.

c. CBRN and EOD coordination

(1) The CBRN Team Leader coordinates with the EOD Team Leader and they both propose to the IC or to the CBRN EOD Team Leader the initial safety measures and an initial approach of the target. The CBRN EOD Team Leader decides whenever necessary (if no agreement or whenever there's a contradiction between CBRN and EOD). The IC or the CBRN EOD Team Leader may never impose TTPs. If no dedicated team leader has been appointed, both Team Leaders liaise directly with the IC (taking into account the considerations of 3.c. above);

(2) It's not possible to give a universal solution on who should go in first. All depends on information obtained through the Threat Vulnerability Risk Analysis (TVRA). Depending on the information available (or unavailable) and the target, a CBRN specialist and an EOD specialist should perform the initial entry together;

(3) In any case, if one specialized team enters without a representative of the other specialty, the entering specialist must be able to provide information to the other specialty. EOD team members thus must be able to use basic CBRN Detection, Identification and Monitoring DIM equipment and communicate the readings to a CBRN specialist. On the other hand, a CBRN specialist must be able to look for trip wires or any other indication of EO present (aware of the danger).

d. Annex B of the AEODP-8 gives the main phases and steps for the conduct of CBRN EOD Tasks.

e. Appendix 1 of these Training principles gives a diagram of the zones of responsibilities.

5. SCENARIO BASED TRAINING

a. General scenario considerations

(1) Keep as close to reality as possible. Do not set up confusing elements. E.g.:

(a) No sensitive detonators in a crashed aircraft or vehicle;

(b) No civilians (or third parties) wandering around in the hot/warm zone during intervention (and if not intended);

(2) Provide “simulation” assets (IED and CBRN) as realistic as possible.

The specialist will look for every clue when solving problems. Clues should not lead to confusion (e.g. a real IED has no sound alarm. If the training IED has a sound alarm, then it should not go off when “the correct IED wire has been cut”);

(3) Simulation assets (from IED to a complete laboratory) must be prepared by specialists. It is advised that the “creator” evaluates the intervention and intervenes whenever he feels necessary;

(4) An “incident simulation coordinator”, who is aware of the entire incident, should be present on scene and be prepared to provide information during the intervention on the simulation whenever something is not clear to the trainee. The coordinator must debrief the training audience afterwards. The coordinator should stay in the background;

(5) NO time jumps, unless clearly briefed to ALL participants. E.g. an IEDD intervention on a suspected vehicle takes several hours and at the end all openings (doors, trunk, glove compartment…) of the vehicle are open indicating for the follow-on team that it’s safe to go into the vehicle (or the open compartment). Whenever the incident coordinator decides to end the IEDD intervention at an earlier stage, he should brief the next team on this decision and ask the EOD team to clearly mark the vehicle.

b. Scenarios

(1) The most important part of a training scenario is the “story”. The start of any CBRN EOD operation is the TVRA performed by the specialists, since this TVRA will determine how they will approach the target and which advice they give to the CBRN EOD Team Leader (or the IC when no dedicated CBRN EOD TL). The TVRA is based upon the story. A good and coherent story provides 50% of a successful intervention;

(2) Annex D gives some potential scenarios for CBRN EOD training purposes. Every scenario has some variations. Each variation gives the scenario a different degree of difficulty (easy – medium – difficult). Those scenarios can be used to start the training of a new CBRN EOD team, up to a fully capable team. The scenarios permit interoperability training between the different parties involved (on a national or international level);

(3) In order to provide identified lessons to the trainees, a continuous evaluation must take place. See also 4.b above“Other parties”;

(4) Do not provide a “standard” IED/ISD/IDD to a scenario as this increase “routine” behaviour patterns. Moreover technological evolutions (and the

insurgents creativity) will render those standard devices obsolete within short notice. Instead have a specialist create a device that's in line with the story of the scenario as well as the desired outcome. One's imagination is the limit. Be aware that the device should be in line with the teams capabilities. A beginning team mustn't be confronted with a very difficult device, whilst the device for a team that's full operational capable might be more challenging;

(5) Remark: Adapt the stories of the scenarios to the "hardware" available. E.g. if there are no windows in the building, do not say that security forces (SF) have observed people wearing IPE in the house.

6. TACTICS TECHNICS AND PROCEDURES (TTP) CONSIDERATIONS

a. Special Considerations

Following the AEODP-10, EOD incidents are categorized by command decisions according to their potential threat. Potential targets should be pre-categorized whenever possible.

b. Basic TTP and definitions

(1) Deployment TTP – TVRA

See question lists at Ann C Appendix 3;

(2) Deployment TTP – Outer Perimeter

Advice is based on specialist knowledge as instructed during national/international courses.

EOD senior Team Leader only gives advice on IED, IDD, ISP, EO risks. They don't give advice on the CBRN aspect. CBRN specialists give advice on CBRN related risks. Both specialists accept the advice of the other.

The CBRN Team Leader and the EOD Team Leader (or the CBRN-EOD Team Leader if appointed) hand over the coordinated EOD – CBRN advice to the IC, permitting the IC to set up the safety perimeter (Cordon and Control);

(3) Deployment TTP – Inner Perimeter[10]

(a) HOT zone[11]

The HOT zone is an area immediately surrounding the hazardous materials incident which extends far enough to prevent adverse effects linked to the hazards emanating from the CBRN-EO to personnel outside that zone. It is judged to be the most affected by the CBRN-EO incident. This CBRN-EOD safety perimeter is a syncretism of the EO hazard area (blast and fragmentation area) and the CBRN safety perimeter. At the edge of the HOT zone contamination reduction begins. Representative functions that can occur within the hot zone include: performing mitigation measures, conducting search and rescue operations, conducting CBRN and/or EOD operations, conducting assessment activities. Appropriate PPE with regard to CBRN and EOD threat are required to

[10] Areas of responsibilities within the zones are given in figure of Ann C Appendix 1
[11] Definition based on FM 3-11.21, Apr 2008, p. IV-13

enter the hot zone;

(b) WARM zone[11]

The WARM zone is the area between the HOT and the COLD zone where personnel and equipment decontamination and hot zone support take place. It includes control point for the access corridor and thus assists in reducing the spread of contamination.

It serves as a lock for personal and equipment between the HOT zone (HOT Line (HL)) and the COLD zone (CONTAMINATION CONTROL LINE (CCL)) and thus avoids the accidental spread of contamination by persons that are dealing with the device.

Entering warm zone requires donning of appropriate PPE;

(c) COLD zone[11]

The COLD zone is the area where the ICP and support functions that are necessary to control the incident are located. It is an area that is readily accessible and provides a location for support operations. It must be large enough to accommodate all parties involved;



Location: Function of wind direction, EO hazard area, CBRN safety perimeter, CBRN EOD TL proposes exact location to IC.



Conditions: The actual operation on the suspected/confirmed device can only start if the WARM zone is fully set up (equipment ready, lines clearly marked), Decon and Evac assets are available and operational, a working scheme is drafted, a waste disposal (evacuation) plan exists and the personnel is in the appropriate IPE.
Remark: In order to facilitate work, a FORWARD HOT LINE may be proposed.

(d) Personnel concerned

HOT person: Full IPE. Responsible for RSP procedures on the device, works in the zone between the device and the HL. He coordinates with the others.

WARM person: Full IPE. Responsible within WARM zone, acts as a service hatch and stays clean all the time. Gives indications to dirty man whilst doffing IPE at the end of mission. Cleans up WARM zone. First MEDEVAC/intervention when accident with dirty man. He coordinates with the others.

COLD person: IPE, mask at hand (not worn). Responsible for passing of Equipment over CCL. Prepares Equipment entering the WARM zone. Assists in MEDEVAC when accident with HOT person.

c. TTP CBRN-EOD:

(1) Notes

(a) According to the threat assessment and under the control of the CBRN EOD Team Leader, the EOD and CBRN Team Leaders will agree on the most suitable manner to conduct the initial reconnaissance

keeping in mind the need to minimize the number of persons exposed to danger.

(b) The threat will continuously be assessed. Any information that might lead to a modification of ongoing procedures must immediately be passed to the CBRN EOD TL who, on his/her turn, will inform the IC.

(2) Main steps:

(a) Order or Info given by the IC or the CBRN EOD Team Leader if appointed

(1) Information to be known by CBRN Team Leader: See Appendix 3;

(2) Information to be known by EOD Team Leader : See Appendix 3;

(b) Preliminary coordination EOD-CBRN

(1) Mission assessment, identification and prioritization of the different tasks to be performed.

(2) Security Distance from:

(a) the EOD advice;

(b) the CBRN advice;

Note: The CBRN Team Leader and the EOD Team Leader (or the CBRN-EOD Team Leader if appointed) will decide and advise the IC concerning the security distance applicable for people in the vicinity of the zones.

(3) Determine composition of the Initial Entry Party;

(4) Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) to be used (worn);

(5) Procedure to enter the Hot zone;

Note:

CBRN Specialists have to make sure the EOD operators are well protected against the CBRN threat. An initial CBRN detection/analysis may lead to a particular advice for EOD operators on how they can make their approach as safe as possible, respecting the ALARA principle for exposure to CBRN dangers.

EOD Specialists have to make sure the CBRN soldiers are protected against EOD Threats. The EOD assessment must lead to an advice on how CBRN soldiers can approach the zone.

(6) Communication assets to be used, communication scheme to be followed;

(7) Pinpoint the “person” who, once into the hot zone, will lead the Initial Entry Party (in function of the main threat, the lead can be changed);

(c) Preparation of Mat and Pers to execute the mission (non-exhaustive list)

(1) Individual Protective Equipment (IPE);

(2) Equipment for detection and provisional identification;

(3) Mat for sampling, especially designed to avoid a release of hazardous substances, Mat for leak sealing;

(4) Mat EOD/IEDD;

(5) Transmission test;

(d) Initial Entry Party (IEP)

(1) Aim: confirm (or not) the Info obtained during TVRA. At the end, CBRN and EOD specialist will determine the exact proceedings (to be applied by the working party) – if the situation permits;

(2) Installation of the Forward Hot Line (FHL) – if applicable;

(3) The initial reconnaissance could be conducted by a Combined EOD – CBRN team, permitting immediate detection of any CBRN hazard, might avoid overexposure of EOD operators to the CBRN danger. The EOD must minimize the EO risk for all participants;

(4) Post Blast Investigation (to collect all EOD/IEDD evidences; after an explosion or a release);

(5) In function of the situation on the Hot spot adaptation of the initial entry procedure;

(6) Permanent assessment in order to accomplish the mission without taking unnecessary risk;

(e) Working party (WP)

(1) Render Safe Procedure;

(2) Leak sealing;

(3) Sampling

Complicated settings might require the presence of a scientist to determine the priorities for sampling/ to understand the modus operandi of the “enemy”;

(4) Marking of the contaminated area;

(f) Cleaning up Party

(1) Prepare own waste for removal. Note that in most cases CBRN EOD teams will not remove their waste after action;

(2) Prepare forensic evidence for removal. Leftovers remain on site for removal by a third party;

(3) On order, disposal of explosive materials;

(g) Exit through DECONTAMINATION Line (see 1.b(3) above);

(h) Sending of the CBRN sample(s) to Field Recuperation Laboratories/Reach Back Laboratories and /or Legal Reference Laboratory;

(i) Sending of the EOD/IEDD evidence to an accredited Laboratory;

(j) Continuously assess the situation, advise the IC or the CBRN-EOD TL if appointed and keep him/her informed of any changes in the situation that might lead to an adaptation of the procedures;

(k) Report and Lessons Learned

(3) Note: Pending the situation on the hot spot and the assessment done in the hot zone, RSP and sampling may occur alternately. Sampling might be executed once the EOD threat is under control and that does not always imply a RSP. If a RSP is not executed prior to sampling, the EO danger must be under control permitting a safe approach for the sample taker. E.g. an IED located at the side and not hampering the sampling, might be left in place (once the EOD operator declares the path towards the sample open and if the sample taker knows the exact location of the IED).

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX C TO
AEODP-08

APPENDIX 1: ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITIES



Security elements (cordon)
Medical
Police
Fire Dept
Civilian Protection
…

1 CBRN EOD CP (Could be co-located with the ICP according to the situation)

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX C TO
AEODP-08

APPENDIX 2[12]: ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF SCENARIOS (NON-EXHAUSTIVE) AND PARTIES INVOLVED

Areas of responsibilities for CBRN EOD assets
within the multi-stranded framework of devices, munitions and environment

Legend:

1. Improvised Explosive Device
2. Manufactured Munitions
3. Combined Devices including Booby Traps
4. CBRN IED
5. CBRN Manufactured Munitions
6. EO with CBRN payload
7. IED in CBRN Environment
8. Improvised device in CBRN Environment
9. CBRN Manufactured Munitions in CBRN Environment
10. Manufactured CBRN devices without explosive in CBRN Environment
11. Combined Devices in CBRN Environment
12. Improvised CBRN devices without Explosive (ISD/IDD) in CBRN environment
13. CBRN payload without explosive hazard (ISD/IDD)
14. CBRN environment without explosive hazards.



Types of EOD tasks/areas potentially affected	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
IEDD	x		x	x		x	x	x			x	x	x	x
CBRN EOD				x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
CMD		x	x		x	x			x	x	x	x		
Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance (EOR)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Other Tasks (Support to search)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

[12] Adapted from EU NBC EOD Policy of 2006, Annex A

APPENDIX 3: QUESTION LISTS THREAT VULNERABILITY RISK ANALYSIS

INFORMATION TO BE KNOWN BY CBRN TEAM LEADER (NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST)

a. Particular situation
b. EIGHT GRID coordinates
c. Type of CBRN incident
d. Type of detected agent
e. Contamination
f. IED threats
g. RV (rendezvous point) EOD POC
h. Local weather
i. Place of Force Protection
j. Work that has already been done on the spot
k. Need to take legal samples to be used as evidences
l. Imposed Itinerary
m. Timing
n. Point of Contact on place
o. Tr (Frequencies, Call Signs)
p. Number of Reference Laboratories
q. Place of those laboratories
r. Itinerary an d POC to those laboratories
s. Medical support
t. Other useful information:
    (1) DTG of the contamination
    (2) No of contaminated Pers, WIA, KIA
    (3) Plan of the zone
    (4) CBRN past of the region
    (5) Ground description in general and particular
    (6) Waste management
    (7) Witnesses on place
    (8) Plan of the zone/Marking
    (9) Operational Dose of Exposition (ODE)

APPENDIX 4: SCENARIOS

G0 - Recommendations
G1 - Training scenario ONE
G2 - Training scenario TWO
G3 - Training scenario THREE

G0 – Recommendations

1. Exercise Control should ensure that:
   a. Every setting is as realistic as possible.
   b. Every element told in the “story” is present on scene. E.g. casualties on scene, jammers, and witnesses (three witnesses = three role players).
   c. Simulants are used.
   d. Time jumps are avoided.
   e. Scenario details must match the capabilities of the trainees.
   f. Enough evaluators are provided for every specialty and a person is present who is aware of the entire story. An excessive number of evaluators should be avoided and they may not interfere with activity, nor hamper the execution of tasks.
   g. Scenarios are matched to the training level of trainees. Training must be progressive.
2. CBRN EOD teams are to:
   a. Treat tasks as if they are real as opposed to training.
   b. Report in accordance with current CBRN and/or EOD publications (E.g. AEODP-8).
   c. Train with the same equipment as used on operations.
   d. Have had a LAT in order to be declared fully operational capable.
3. Military Search

   The Advanced Search Team leader should be instructed (and trained) in the capabilities of the EOD-CBRN, CBRN related elements such as SIBCRA Teams, evacuation elements, scientist elements.
   The members of the advanced search teams have to train together. Each specialist has to know how to work with the other one.

G1-Training Scenario 1

1. What can be trained
   a. TVRA: questioning techniques, handover SF-CBRN EOD.
   b. IEP composition and work, coordination amongst CBRN and EOD operators. Coordination between CBRN EOD TL and IC.
   c. Actions on IDD target (both EOD and CBRN).
2. Scenario settings
   a. Orientation

      General idea: discovery of IDD factory, contaminated environment (App 2 to Annex C setting N° 14).

      Few environmental requirements for training this scenario – just a room where components are put together.

      Lots of variations possible about environment.

   b. Situation > the story (what happened before?)
      (1) General (weeks prior to the incident)

      A major peacekeeping conference (high visibility event) is planned in a hotel at the outskirts of a big city. Several authorities (both civilian and military) will attend this conference.

      A terrorist group wants to boycott this conference. During last seven days, they spread threats via the internet and flyers. The terrorist group is capable of composing HME and is known to dispose of chemical capabilities (capable of producing Nerve Agent). Recently the group tried to develop more sophisticated dispersal devices (IDD) with overpressure systems, thus avoiding destruction of the chemical substance during the explosion of a classical IED with HME.

      (2) Particular (days, hours prior to the incident)

      (a) SF (security forces) observed for several days a normal house, suspected to belong to a member of the terrorist group. The SF operation is ongoing.

      (b) Several identified terrorists have been spotted entering and leaving the house during the observation. They enter and leave the house on a normal way, through the door(s) locked with keys. There are no signs indicating the use of booby traps on those doors. Windows of the house however remain closed and are very dirty (avoiding observation through them). Some people were seeing wearing IPE and taking of a gas mask just before leaving the house.

(c) On a regular base, small trucks deliver specific equipment:

(1) Airbrush material.

(2) Bulk chemicals (deduction after reading the markings on the truck “and” or “or” bulk).

(3) Material for air locks/primitive COLPRO (collect and protect)/wood + plastic.

(d) ONE hour ago, an assumed terrorist ran out of the house, still wearing is IPE and gas mask. He was clearly in a panic. Since then, the house seems to be empty. The assumed terrorist wasn’t arrested.

(e) A small team of SF, wearing IPE, entered the house to check it. They found three rooms of which ONE was isolated on a primitive manner (plastic and wood). Both the other rooms are clear. No one entered the “isolated” room. There seems to be a kind of an “airlock” (plastic sheet). The SF observed through this plastic sheet some bulk chemicals and something what appears to be an IDD (or components of it). The SF didn’t enter the room but confirmed a chemical detection.

(f) DIREX considerations:

(1) The SF role player must be able to answer the questions asked by the CBRN EOD team.

(2) The EOD operator that constructed the IDD must provide sufficient information to the SF role player (digital picture, sketch).

(3) The story must be confirmed by assets available on the spot (e.g. construction of primitive airlock). If necessary, adapt the story to the assets available (e.g. if SF doesn’t dispose of Chemical detector, adapt the storybook).

(4) Not all information should automatically be released to CBRN EOD team. Decent questioning by CBRN EOD team should reveal additional Info about the IDD: leaking (chemical) substances on the IDD, fully assembled IDD overpressure with airbrush).

c. Mission

The CBRN EOD team, in support the incident Cdr, will perform RSP on target and take samples for forensics.

d. Particular directives for the exercise

(1) What/Who’s on the scene:

(a) Role players

(1) IC (Cdr Incident Response Group).

(2) SF.

(b) Executing: CBRN EOD team.

(c) Additional: CBRN Decontamination assets, CBRN Reconnaissance assets, Force Protection, waste disposal, Medical Personnel - all belonging to immediate response group (IRG).

(2) Cordon in place? Where?

(a) Rendezvous (RV) of immediate response group (IRG) with SF: at appropriate distance to the incident site (permitting decent approach by CBRN EOD team).

(b) At the arrival of the Incident Response Group, there's NO cordon in place. IC should discuss with witness (SF) and CBRN EOD TL the appropriate initial safety distance.

(c) According to CBRN safety distances *(no explosive material => CBRN advise more significant)* and meteorology (wind direction).

(3) ICP: TBD (To be decided) by IC following initial advice of CBRN EOD TL.

(4) Liaison: NA.

(5) Laboratories: Samples must be prepared according to the guidelines (SOP) of laboratories present within the AOR.

(6) Waste management: Host nation, CBRN EOD team should mark waste according to STANAG 2521 (ATP-3.8.1 Vol. I, Annex 10 A and B).

(7) Reporting: Confirm with NATO standards (AEODP-8, ATP-45).

(8) ….

e. Particular directives to the « IDD target »

(1) Type: IDD (provide picture/sketch for SF witness)

(2) Payload? Nerve agent (can be replaced by insecticide-type stimulant, realistic!).

(3) Possible effects: HOT zone should be limited to 3rd room (or Max the building in which the Ex is settled).

(4) Adapt the device to the capabilities and the level of the trainees! Don't give unsolvable problem cases.

3. Alternative settings

a. Add booby traps.

b. Lab, self-production of agent (chemical agent in production, not yet terminated).

c. Lab, self-production of agent (biological agent in production, not yet terminated).

d. Incident during RSP.

e. EOD: anti-intrusion screens, anti-tamper or anti-lift.

f. Package ready to act on the spot (change setting from factory to the real conference room and device placed in heating ventilation of air conditioning.

G2-Training Scenario 2

1. What can be trained?
   a. TVRA
      (1) Questioning techniques.
      (2) Ability of a single capacity (CBRN or EOD) to link to the other capability. CBRN unit should be able to find out that there is possible IED threat.
      (3) Tests the CBRN EOD TL's capability to take control of situation which has started with one capability. The task can also measure the EOD and CBRN units' capability to co-operate in hasty situation.
   b. Actions on target (both CBRN and EOD)
2. Scenario settings:
   a. Orientation

      The basic idea is tasking of one capability in a scenario where both capabilities are needed.
      Scenario takes place on a road away from villages. No local population is on the scene. Flat terrain with limited vegetation. Normal temperature (+ 20^{O}C) and dry conditions, low wind speed. Plenty of daylight time available.
   b. Situation (the story, what happened before?)
      (1) General (weeks prior to the incident)

      Coalition forces have been deployed to the target land for years. On the recent months the frequency of IED attacks has increased. Intelligence reports have shown that insurgents are able to use CBRN IED attacks. The coalition forces have found an insurgent storage of chlorine gas 2 weeks ago.

      (2) Particular

      Local police are informed about a road traffic accident on small (remote) road. When attending the scene the police found two vehicles which had collided with each other. Police observed that people on the scene have irritated eyes and have trouble breathing. Police also noted a distinctive smell on the scene. The police notified the multinational headquarter (MNHQ) who immediately dispatched a CBRN unit with force protection on the scene. On recommendation of MNHQ, Police set up their ICP 1 km away from the target opposite of wind direction.
      Police should be able to provide following information to the force protection Cdr who arrives on scene:

      (a) It seems to be a normal traffic accident. In one of the vehicles they saw TWO leaking barrels (approx. 200 litres).

(b) When Police arrived at scene they saw two men (belonging to the vehicle with the leaking barrels) trying to flee from the scene. Police arrested those men and they are at the moment under police custody on the scene. The people from the other vehicle are also in the vicinity. Policemen have checked the cars briefly but didn't found out anything suspicious. They did not check the cargo space of the vehicles (since they focussed on the victims and awaited the specialist CBRN unit tasked by MNHQ).

(c) The detained victims are able to tell - after interrogation - that they are from a nearby village. They were ordered to drive this car (with the leaking barrels) to a nearby city local police HQ and blow it up. They confirm that the IED in their vehicle has not been armed, it is still in a "safe" position (since they should only activate it in front of the target police station).

(d) Victims from the other car are local family travelling back to a nearby village, coming back from a market (no liaison with the IED suspected vehicle).

c. Mission

The CBRN team, initially tasked by MNHQ, was to execute a reconnaissance on the accident scene in order to identify a possible CBR agent.

d. Particular directives for the exercise

(1) What/Who on the scene?

(a) Role players:

(1) Local police patrol (2 police officers), first arrival on the scene.

(2) Force Protection commander.

(3) TWO drivers of the VBIED (Vehicle born improvised explosive device).

(4) ONE drivers of the other vehicle.

(b) Executing CBRN team (initially tasked).

(c) EOD team, CBRN EOD team leader (called upon by initial CBRN team after having received additional information).

(2) Cordon

When CBRN arrives at the scene there is no actual cordon in place. Police role players should have installed an ICP as described above.
CBRN team leader should advise FP Cdr on initial safety perimeter.

(3) Laboratories

It must be possible to identify the suspected CBRN agent or at least to have a sample send to a field laboratory.

(4) Waste management

Responsibility of the local authorities, we will let our waste on the site with the NATO marking (STANAG 2521).

(5) Reporting

Conform to NATO standards (AEOD-P 8, ATP-45D).

e. Particular directives regarding the “target”

(1) Description of threat/Incident

(a) Payload (barrels) is chlorine gas.

(b) IED: attached to the barrels. NO car filled with explosives!

(2) IED detonation should have provoked a spread over 500 m radius from the target. Chlorine gas creates approx. 500 m downwind hazard.

(3) Adapt the device to the capabilities and level of the trainees. Don’t give unsolvable problem cases.

f. Alternative settings

(1) Replace chlorine by CWA (Chemical Warfare Agent).

(2) Make the accessibility of the containers of chemical product more difficult.

(3) 600 Kg of HME in a culvert under the road where the car accident took place.

(4) There is a village in vicinity of the scene inside the hazardous area of the chlorine gas.

(5) The CBRN IED in the truck is armed.

(6) The incident happens at night-time.

(7) Car is deserted in the centre of a big city (e.g. in front of high visibility target). The perpetrator is not available on the scene. There is some information from the movement of the vehicle obtainable from security cameras. Firing mechanism is command and/or time.

G3-Training Scenario 3

1. What can be trained?
   a. Coordination amongst all Cdr's (IC, CBRN TL, EOD TL and CBRN EOD TL).
   b. Actions on IDD target (both CBRN and EOD).
2. Scenario settings
   a. Orientation
      (1) General idea: complex action on the unique main supply road[13] (MSR) between two important military installations, making thorough coordination necessary.
      (2) Expeditionary (Type AFG) and complex environment combining MSR, urban environment, open fields and civilian interaction.
      (3) For general overview see Ann A. It's important to mention MSR as the ONLY possible route between the two military installations.
      (4) The trainees are part of an Incident Response Group tasked to support a convoy that recently discovered a CBRN IED long the MSR.
         (a) Convoy consists of:
            (1) Force Protection (FP) platoon.
            (2) Logistic convoy.
            (3) Intermediate search element (attached to FP platoon).
         (b) IRG consists of:
            (1) FP Element (TBD).
            (2) CBRN EOD TL commanding:
               (a) CBRN team.
               (b) EOD team.
               (c) Medical Element.
               (d) WIT.
               (e) … (TBD).
         (c) Field Deployable Laboratory (within the compound).
   b. Situation > the story (what happened before?)
      (1) General (weeks prior to the incident)
         (a) Intelligences coming from our Intelligence Services:
            (1) The main group of OMF in our AOR are the YAGMAN (terrorist group). They aim to take over government authority in our AOR.
            (2) The YAGMAN have links with the famous training centres of well-known terrorist organisations. Some YAGMAN have been trained is those

[13] Or: Line of communication (LOC)

centres and know pass their skills to their homeland colleagues (train the trainer principle).

(3) YAGMAN also have connections with scientists, providing them access to knowledge and laboratories. Some of those scientists have a university degree in chemical sciences.

(4) They are deemed capable of building radiological IED and IED with a CWA payload.

(5) IED attacks in the recent past aimed both civilians and coalition forces. Although, due to some successful coalition operations, their main targets seems to have shifted toward coalition forces.

(b) Some equipment that could be used in producing a CBRN IED has recently been stolen from several hospitals: Lab equipment, Radioactive Material/Equipment, Rad Sources e.g. Caesium 137, Vaccines, Chemical products and disinfectants.

(c) Within the population there are TWO important families (ALGAZY and ABOUDI). ABOUDI is in favour of the CF, whilst ALGAZY opposes the coalition.

(1) ALGAZY are suspected to have connections with YAGMAN members and are suspected to be involved in organised crime and corruption.

(2) Both families are very powerful and rich and have connections with governmental authorities. Members of both families have joined the local police.

(d) Last week, several IED incidents occurred on our MSRs. In order to guarantee the FOM of our convoys, CF execute on a regular base Search Operations (route search, area search, caches search...). Every convoy now integrates a force protection platoon, as well as an intermediate search capability.

(2) Particular (days, hours prior to the incident)

(a) Executed search Operations revealed in our AOR caches with several explosives and CBRN Mat. List of found Equipment and Mat is to be made by DIREX according to the scenario (and in accordance with the stolen Mat).

(b) SF observed and arrested a well-known member of the YAGMAN organization. His information lead CF to a bomb factory where he was trying to assembly a CBRN IED using a part of the stolen Mat, confirming our suspicion that they’re capable of producing CBRN IED.

(c) During a search Operation IOT conduct FOM, search elements in a logistic convoy (mentioned in paragraph 2.a(4)(b) above) find a suspected car along the MSR between the villages of AL GROYN and TARIN-KOWT:

(1) On the back seat of the car, search Elm saw explosives attached to CBRN related Mat (e.g. marked with Rad stickers).

(2) On the passenger seat they found a drawing of what seems to be the military installation at the end of MSR (B in the sketch).

(3) The Search Advisor reported this incident to his chain Command and asked the intervention of the IRG.

(4) The Tac Cdr of the Log convoy (Cdr FP platoon):

(a) has established a first cordon around the suspected vehicle at a distance about 200m. He blocked the road so nobody can pass long the suspicious vehicle. He's waiting for further instructions.

(b) has installed his ICP at GRID *12341234* and waits for the IRG. The Tac Cdr coordinated with the Search Advisor the installation of the Cordon and the first reactions to be taken.

c. Mission (IRG)

To support the IC (initially FP Cdr of convoy, later on probably IRG Cdr) in order to solve the incident (Incl rendering safe the CBRN IED) and re-establish our FOM and in order to collect forensic evidences to prosecute the OMF.

d. Particular directives for the exercise

(1) What/Who's on the scene:

(a) Role players (all present at the ICP)

(1) FP Cdr: with marked map of surroundings, indicating villages, roads, traffic control posts, cordon, whereabouts of his logistic convoy.

(2) Log Convoy Cdr.

(3) Search Elm; search advisor being able to explain what his team discovered during the search operation (e.g. photos).

(b) Suspicious vehicle with a IED on the back seat with a payload CBRN (e.g. Rad Stickers => must match the photographs of the Search Advisor).

(c) ECM are available (Log Convoy, FP and Search Elm work with ECM).

(d) ICP on GRID 12341234 (see Annex A).

(2) Timing: no constraint about time. Sufficient daylight available.

(3) Cordon in place, at 200m around the suspicious vehicle (see Annex A).

(4) Liaison:

(a) IC.

(b) SA.

(c) IRG:

(1) IRG Cdr.

(2) CBRN EOD TL.

(3) WIT TL.

(4) Medical Elm.

(5) Laboratories: in the compound, NATO certified (reference laboratory), CBRN capabilities.

(6) Waste management: responsibility of the local authorities; we will let our waste on the site with the NATO marking (STANAG 2521).

(7) Reporting: confirm with NATO standards (AEOD-P 8, ATP-45D).

(8) MEDEVAC available (standby at MOB).

e. Particular directives to the « IED target »

(1) Description of threat/incident (without going into detail)

(a) IED/ISP/IDD:

(1) IED components on the back seat of the vehicle.

(2) Wires connected to the cylinder and gone to the trunk compartment of the car.

(3) Wires going through the passenger compartment in direction of the motor compartment.

(4) HME in a container with twisted wires going inside.

(5) Something looking like a battery Pack.

(6) The search advisor (SA) ordered to let the man pack jammer next to the suspicious vehicle.

(b) Payload:

(1) Some Sealed Cylinders/barrels with e.g. Rad stickers (CBRN threat should be clear looking through the windows).

(2) The alarm of the personal dosimeter wasn’t activated.

(3) No CBRN detection was performed (meaning the cylinders aren’t leaking).

(c) Possible effects:

(1) In case of an explosion CBRN Mat will be spread in the immediate surroundings. People in the area could be exposed to a potential CBRN threat.

(2) The road will be out of use for a longer period.

(2) POC: Tactical Cdr of the Log Convoy and SA at the ICP.

f. Alternative settings

(1) Reduce the operation time e.g. TWO hours before night (forcing EOD TL to prioritise).

(2) A lot of civilian traffic.

(3) Make the IED more complex (more sensitive switches e.g. glass break switch, the more hidden and closed vehicle compartments).

(4) Place the suspicious vehicle closer to an urban area.

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ANNEX D POTENTIAL OPERATIONS REPORTS

Potential operations reports and their suggested contents (see also paragraph 402) are described in the following appendix:

Report	Appendix
Operations Report	Annex D, Appendix 1
Situation Report	Annex D, Appendix 2
Final Situation Report	Annex D, Appendix 3
Request for Support	Annex D, Appendix 4
Request for Information or Intelligence	Annex D, Appendix 5

APPENDIX 1, ANNEX D - OPERATIONS REPORT – SUGGESTED CONTENT

1. The IC may use the operations report to describe the situation at a CBRN EOD incident site to the MNJOC as soon as possible after his arrival on site. The MNJOC will forward this information up the appropriate chain of command.

2. Suggested reporting elements

   a. *Describe the incident and include references to any previous reports by voice or email.*

   b. *Describe the results of the incident.*

   c. *State the number of casualties arising from the incident (if any).*

   d. *Provide any intelligence regarding the incident.*

   e. *Provide position and status of organizations.*

   f. *Describe any immediate support required.*

APPENDIX 2, ANNEX D - SITUATION REPORT – SUGGESTED CONTENT

1. The IC may use the Situation report to describe the situation at an incident site to the MNJOC every 12 hours after submission of the Operations report. The MNJOC will forward this information up the appropriate chain of command.

2. Suggested reporting elements

a. *Situation.*

b. *Intelligence.*

c. *Operations.*

d. *Logistics.*

e. *Communications.*

f. *Provide information on connectivity and POCs/Los.*

g. *Personnel.*

h. *Detail service, location, mission and numbers.*

i. *Health Services.*

j. *List hospitalized or injured military personnel, reasons for hospitalization or injury.*

k. *Interagency Coordination.*

l. *Domestic Support Activities.*

m. *Commander's Comments to include as a minimum:*

(1) Activities of last 12 hours.

(2) Activities of next 12 hours.

APPENDIX 3, ANNEX D - FINAL SITUATION REPORT – SUGGESTED CONTENT

1. The IC may use the Situation report to describe the final situation at a CBRN incident site to the MNJOC just before the force redeploys. The MNJOC will forward this information up the appropriate chain of command.

2. Suggested reporting elements

a. *Situation.*

Discuss circumstances leading to redeployment, authority that deploys the force, final recapitulation of extent of incident (include casualty estimates and/or property damage).

b. *Intelligence.*

c. *Operations.*

Provide summary of operational activity for next 24 hours to recovery.

d. *Logistics.*

Detail current locations, date and time of redeployment of advance party of force, main body of force and any stay behind elements.

e. *Communications.*

Provide information on connectivity and POCs/LOs and times for After Action Reports (AAR).

f. *Personnel.*

Detail service, location, mission and numbers.

g. Health *Services.*

List hospitalized or injured military personnel, reasons for hospitalization or injury.

h. *Interagency Coordination.*

i. *Domestic Support Activities.*

j. *Commande*r's Comments to include as a minimum:

(1) Activities of last 12 hours.

(2) *Activities of next 24 hours*

APPENDIX 4, ANNEX D - REQUEST FOR SUPPORT – SUGGESTED CONTENT

1. The IC may use the Request for support to request support from the MNJOC or the appropriate chain of command. The MNJOC will forward this information up the appropriate chain of command as required.

2. Suggested content

a. *General.*
   (1) Force or sub-unit to be supported.
   (2) When support is required.
   (3) Location of supported force or sub-unit when support is required.
   (4) Force or sub-unit POCs/Los.
   (5) Number of personnel to be supported.

b. *Concept of Operations.*
   Provide a general summary of the unit's operational activity over the past 24 hours to include response and assessment operations, interagency coordination and anticipated activities based on validated requests for assistance.

c. *Location of MNJOC.*

d. *Urgency of Support.*

e. *Details of Support.*

f. *Coordin*ating *Instructions or Remarks*.
   Indicate where to link up for receipt of supplies, services, maintenance, repairs and exchange of information to validate shipper and receiver. List primary, alternate, contingency and emergency coordinating instructions

APPENDIX 5, ANNEX D - REQUEST FOR INFORMATION OR INTELLIGENCE – SUGGESTED CONTENT

1. The IC may use the Request for information or intelligence to request information or intelligence from the MNJOC or the appropriate chain of command. The MNJOC will forward this information up the appropriate chain of command as required.

2. Suggested requesting elements

a. *Situation.*
General summary of the unit's operational activity over the past 24 hours and the next 24 hours to include response and assessment operations, interagency coordination and anticipated activities based on validated requests for assistance.

b. Information Required.
List of questions that need to be addressed, with possible sources and when information is required.

c. *POC.*

ANNEX E REFERENCES

AAP-06	NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
AAP-15	NATO GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN NATO DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS
STANAG 2451	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COMPREHENSIVE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE – AJP-3.8
STANAG 2521	CBRN DEFENCE ON OPERATIONS - ATP-3.8.1, Vol. I
STANAG 2522	SPECIALIST CBRN DEFENCE CAPABILITIES - ATP-3.8.1, Vol. II
STANAG 2103	WARNING AND REPORTING AND HAZARD PREDICTION OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR INCIDENTS (OPERATORS MANUAL) - ATP-45
STANAG 2143	EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) PRINCIPLES AND MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY – AEODP-10
STANAG 2221	EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) REPORTS AND MESSAGES – AEODP-06
STANAG 2282	ALLIED TACTICAL PUBLICATION FOR EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL – ATP-3.18.1
STANAG 2283	ALLIED TACTICAL DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY SEARCH – ATP-3.12.1.1
STANAG 2370	INTER-SERVICE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DISPOSAL OPERATIONS ON MULTINATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS – A GUIDE FOR STAFF OFFICERS / OPERATORS - AEODP-03
STANAG 2377	EOD ROLES RESPONSIBILITIES, CAPABILITIES AND INCIDENT PROCEDURES WHEN OPERATING WITH NON EOD TRAINED AGENCIES AND PERSONNEL – AEODP-13
STANAG 2391	EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL RECOVERY OPERATIONS ON FIXED INSTALLATIONS – AEODP-05
STANAG 2485	COUNTERMINE OPERATIONS IN LAND WARFARE
STANAG 2628	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS – AJP 3.18
STANAG 2897	EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AND EQUIPMENT – AEODP-07

STANAG 4701	NATO HANDBOOK FOR SAMPLING AND IDENTIFICATION OF BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL AGENTS (SIBCRA) – AEP-66
STANAG 6502	TECHNICAL EXPLOITATION – AIntP-10

ANNEX F ACRONYMS LIST

ALARA	As low as reasonably achievable
AOR	Area of Responsibilities
DSCC	Deployable Sub Collection Centre
CBRN	Chemical biological radiological and nuclear
CBRN CP	CBRN Control Point
CBRN EOD CP	CBRN EOD Control Point
CCA	Contamination Control Area
CCL	Contamination Control Line
CCP	Contamination Control Point
CF	Coalition Forces
COE	Centre of Excellence
CREVAL	Combat Readiness Evaluation
DIM	Detection, Identification and Monitoring
ECP	EOD Control Point
EIHH	Environmental and Industrial Health Hazards
EO	Explosive Ordnance
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EOR	Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance
FHL	Forward Hot Line
FOM	Freedom of Movement
FP	Force Protection
HL	Hot Line
HME	Home Made Explosive
IC	Incident Commander
ICP	Incident Command Post
IDD	Improvised Dispersal Device
IDF	Identification
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IEDD	Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
IEP	Initial Entry Party
IPE	Individual Protective Equipment
ISD	Improvised Spraying Device
ISP	Identification Safety Point
LAT	Live Agent Training
LL	Lessons Learned
MNCBRNCC	Multinational CBRN Coordination Cell
MNEODCC	Multinational EOD Collection Cell
NOC	National Operations Centre
NPOCCBRN	National Point Of contact CBRN
NPOCEOD	National Point Of contact EOD
ODE	Operational Dose of Exposition
OMF	Opposition Militia Forces
POC	Point of Contact
ROV	Remote Operating Vehicle

RSP	Render Safe Procedures
SIBCRA	Sampling and Identification of Biological, Chemical and Radiological Agents
TIM	Toxic Industrial Material
TIH	Toxic Industrial Hazard
TL	Team Leader
TTP	Tactics Techniques and Procedures
TVRA	Threat Vulnerability Risk Analysis
WIT	Weapons Intelligence Team
WP	Working Party
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction

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