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AEODP-10

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) PRINCIPLES AND MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY

Edition C Version 1

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL PUBLICATION

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

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NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

7 February 2020

1. The enclosed Allied Explosive Ordnance Disposal Publication AEODP-10, Edition C, Version 1, EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) PRINCIPLES AND MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY, which has been approved by the nations in the Military Committee Land Standardization Board, is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2143.

2. AEODP-10, Edition C, Version 1, is effective upon receipt and supersedes AEODP-10, Edition B, Version 1, which shall be destroyed in accordance with the local procedure for the destruction of documents.

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4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60

Zoltán GULYÁS
Brigadier General, HUNAF
Director, NATO Standardization Office

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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

CHAPTER	RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS

Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document Database for the complete list of existing reservations.

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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

[nation]	[detail of reservation]
CZE	Reservations regarding AEODP-10(C): a) CZE will defer implementation of paragraph 2.3.2.b. until equipment is procured and expertise is acquired concerning EOC procedures; b) CZE will not implement paragraph 2.4.1., concerning underwater EOD procedures; c) CZE will not implement Annex E, concerning unterwater EOD procedures; d) CZE will not implement paragraph 6.c., Annex F, concerning unterwater EOD procedures.
GBR	(1) GBR recognises the standards of proficiency for an IEDD operator described at Annex C as comparable to those of operators conducting the UK Advanced EOD Operator Course (AEOC). GBR also trains IEDD operators to a more elementary standard through the Defence EOD Operator Course (DEOC) for employment where the threat,operational tempo and commanders' risk appetite has been subject to careful evaluation. Declaration of DEOCqualified operators to a multinational mission is to use the EOD Capability Planning Matrix within ATP-3.18.1 to articulate their limitations and caveats on employment.
LVA	1. Latvian Armed Forces will use this STANAG as basic reference document for EOD matters but cannot guarantee that the equipment will always and in every respect be in conformity with the STANAG. 2. Latvian Armed Forces has limited CBRN EOD capabilities. Annex D. Latvian Armed forces don't train CBRN EOD.
NLD	Notwithstanding paragraph 2.4, subparagraph 1b, in which is stated for Underwater EOC 'EOR personnel further qualified for underwater and onboard EO clearance tasks within NATO missions are to meet the minimum standards of proficiency at Annex E. EOC personnel are qualified to emplace charges for disposal or over-pressurisation of EO under supervision of a CMD diver'. 1. NLD underwater EOC personnel is only qualified for underwater EO clearance tasks. 2. NLD underwater EOC personnel are qualified to emplace charges for disposal or over-pressurisation of EO without supervision of a CMD diver.
Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document Database for the complete list of existing reservations.	

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PREFACE

1. The aim of this agreement is to define principles for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) activities and minimum standards of proficiency for the full spectrum of EOD support to NATO operations.

2. Countering the Explosive Ordnance (C-EO) Threat remains a vital role to be performed by EOD specialists, most likely operating within a Combined, Joint task force for collective defence or crisis management. It is therefore of increasing importance that principles for EOD activities and EOD standards of proficiency among practitioners are unified and coherent. Where deltas exist between the optimum desired level of proficiency and the reality of forces available to commanders, such shortfalls must be readily measurable in order to fully understand and quantify the level of operational risk. The standards articulated within this document inform such risk analysis.

3. Expanded C-EO Threat policy is likely to see an increasing partnership between Allied military forces and third sector or industry entities. This Whole Force Approach may see NATO standards adopted as a benchmark for humanitarian demining activity, often under a UN umbrella. While NATO minimum standards of EOD proficiency should not be directly driven by this likelihood of them informing such activity, they should be cognisant of potential adoption for such a purpose.

4. Participating nations agree to:

   a. Establish and maintain the capabilities to conduct EOD activities in order that NATO Armed Forces can operate together in the most effective manner.

   b. Accept the requisite elements of EOD operational capability as described in Chapter 2.

   c. Adopt the general organization and doctrine specified in this standard to satisfy the capabilities of conducting EOD activities set out in ATP-3.18.1[1] (STANAG 2282).

   d. Establish procedures, which will provide a standard capacity for dealing with Unexploded Explosive Ordnance (UXO) and Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO) in accordance with ATP-3.18.1 and AEODPs.

   e. Adopt a program of EOD training in some or all EOD capability areas proficiency sets to the minimum standards of proficiency set out in this publication within their respective EOD organizations. Nothing in this

[1] Allied Tactical Publication for Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

agreement should discourage nations from exceeding the agreed standards where this is feasible. Minimum standards of proficiency for assistants to trained operators are not given as it is a national responsibility to provide EOD operators with their intimate support.

f. Personnel shall be assigned only to those technical EOD activities for which they, during and after training, have proved that they have reached a satisfactory state of skill.

Note: Nuclear Weapon Disposal, Improvised Nuclear Device Disposal and other specialist[2] / sensitive EOD training are not included in this standard but may be the subject of bi- or multi-lateral agreements between the nations concerned.

5. The terms, definitions and abbreviations used in this publication are listed in the NATOTerm database[3].

6. This standard is intended to provide the basis for national EOD organization and planning. This should be congruent with NATO and national operational planning. This standard does not grant any additional powers to the NATO Armed Forces with respect to civilian authorities nor to civilian responsibilities.

[2] Examples of some specialist EOD competencies are at Para 2.5.
[3] Accessible via NSO website at https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/content/nato/pages/home.html?lg=en.

CHAPTER 1 EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE THREAT

1.1 THE THREAT

1. The EO threat may impair the flexibility of manoeuvre of combat units, disrupt lines of communications, degrade morale or paralyse industrial complexes, ports, vessels, waterways, air bases or population centres. EO can therefore pose a threat to NATO operations and forces across the spectrum of conflict. The EO threat in general is detailed within ATP-3.18.1.

2. To enable freedom of action in any operational area the NATO commander will require an EOD capability in accordance with ATP-3.18.1. While EOD activities extend throughout the rear areas and forward combat areas the existence of EO incidents in civilian areas within the NATO Operating Area will often have significant repercussions on the military situation particularly in stabilization or peace support operations. In such cases cooperation between NATO EOD units and national military and civilian agencies will be essential and will be accomplished through the Combined Joint EOD Cell (CJEODC) and the Multinational EOD Coordinating Cell (MNEODCC). For further details see AEODP-13[4] (STANAG 2377).

1.2 SPECIFIC THREATS

1. The threat can include munitions used by NATO, enemy forces or former belligerents and munitions or IEDs used by insurgents, dissidents or criminals. The full spectrum of EO types which could affect NATO Forces is listed within Chapter 3 of AEODP-06[5] (STANAG 2221). This primarily includes land service ammunition, air-dropped, guided and naval weapons but must also consider improvised and other forms of EO.

2. Some EO may not function as intended and be classified as UXO by malfunction. The percentage of UXO will vary by type; for example submunitions (which could also be fitted with delayed action fuzes) may have a relatively high malfunction rate, particularly if falling on soft ground.

3. The presence of UXO may also be due to deliberate fuzing, which could include:

a. Short delay for penetration and cratering.
b. Long delay for harassment and interdiction.
c. Random delay for area denial and interdiction.
d. Target activation for specific target such as vehicles/aircraft/ships or general harassment.
e. Booby trap switches.
f. Improvised fuzing or initiation systems.
g. Influence firing devices (acoustic, magnetic, pressure, seismic)

[4] EOD Roles, Responsibilities, Capabilities and Incident Procedures when Operating with non-EOD Trained Agencies and Personnel.
[5] EOD Reports and Messages.

4. AXO may or may not have been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use and may also include EO which has become hazardous by damage or deterioration. EO which might initially appear to be potential UXO or AXO may, as a result of deliberate manipulation, form a component of an IED.

5. It is difficult to assess the detailed exact risk from UXO and AXO as it will vary with location, target type and enemy priorities. When considered alongside potential instability of EO through degradation, these complex factors make EOD operator experience invaluable. Furthermore if the conflict is on a large scale then there may also be a correspondingly large number of false reports of UXO and AXO that also have to be investigated.

CHAPTER 2 EOD CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

2.1. GENERAL

1. The capabilities described and agreed herein are required for effective EOD activities. The focus of this chapter is on personnel, mindful of variations among NATO Forces with respect to their specific EOD responsibilities and organizations. Since there are different relationships between military EOD organizations and Civil Defence authorities of NATO nations with respect to EOD, the measures taken to attain these capabilities may vary and are to be decided by the nation concerned (See ATP-3.18.1 and AEODP-13).

2.2 EO AWARENESS SKILLS

1. As described in ATP-3.18.1, EO awareness skills include the ability at a tactical level to detect, mark and report EO, as well as to carry out a threat analysis. Basic EO awareness should be included in all-arms packages, notably pre-deployment and specific to theatre collective and individual training.

2.3 JOINT EOD CAPABILITIES AND MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY

1. The completion of EOD tasks requires various EOD capabilities, depending on threat, environment and task.

2. The following joint EOD capability subsets[6] are applicable in most environments and by all Services, using different procedures and equipment. The personnel of the tasked NATO EOD force and NATO staff elements are to be qualified in accordance with the appropriate minimum standards of proficiency[7]. National policies require compliance with special procedural and safety principles, as detailed within ATP-3.18.1.

a. **Explosive ordnance reconnaissance (EOR):** Personnel provided for EOR tasks within NATO missions are to meet the minimum standards of proficiency at Annex A.

b. **Explosive ordnance clearance (EOC):** The execution of EOC missions varies considerably from nation to nation. Some nations assign the EOC mission exclusively to EOD forces; whereas other nations assign the EOC mission to units with varying levels of EO knowledge and expertise. Therefore, nations must clearly state and identify their EOC capability for each specific operational scenario. Often EOC will be considered an engineering function relating to the removal of mines through destruction in situ.

c. **Conventional munition disposal (CMD):** Personnel provided for CMD tasks within NATO missions are to meet the minimum standards of proficiency at Annex B.

[6] The EOD capability subsets are explained in ATP-3.18.1.
[7] Supporting personnel are not required to meet these minimum standards of proficiency.

d. **Improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD):** The disposal of an IED requires specific training and equipment with the level of threat influenced not only by the sophistication of the device but also to the operating environment. Annex C describes the minimum requirements for an IEDD operator. Principles of IEDD operations can be found in AEODP-03[8] (STANAG 2370). Competence as a CMD operator is to be considered a prerequisite for qualification as an IEDD operator.

e. **Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear explosive ordnance disposal (CBRN EOD):** CBRN EO may be conventionally manufactured or improvised. The disposal of conventionally manufactured CBRN EO is to be conducted by personnel who meet the minimum standards of proficiency of a biological and chemical munition disposal (BCMD) operator (Annex D). Competence as a CMD operator is to be considered a prerequisite for qualification as a BCMD operator. CBRN EO of an improvised nature requires a very specialized degree of IEDD proficiency and coordination with other specialist forces (Annex D). The IEDD operator competency is a prerequisite for this proficiency.

2.4 MINIMUM PROFICIENCIES FOR SPECIFIC EOD ACTIVITIES

1. **Underwater EOD**: Countering the EO Threat in a maritime environment and inland waters, especially underwater requires graduated skills for EOR, EOC, CMD and IEDD. Maritime operations can be performed in oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, waterways, coastal regions and ports. EOD FE provide the full range of EOD for maritime operations.

a. **Underwater EOR:** Personnel provided for underwater and onboard EOR tasks within NATO missions are to meet the minimum standards of proficiency at Annex E.

b. **Underwater EOC:** EOR personnel further qualified for underwater and onboard EO clearance tasks within NATO missions are to meet the minimum standards of proficiency at Annex E. EOC personnel are qualified to emplace charges for disposal or over-pressurisation of EO under supervision of a CMD diver.

c. **Underwater CMD:** Personnel qualified for underwater and onboard CMD tasks for mine/ordnance search, investigation, recovery and removal within NATO missions are to meet the minimum standards of proficiency at Annex E.

d. **Underwater IEDD:** Personnel previously qualified in underwater CMD and trained in IEDD underwater, onboard and in the disposal of WBIED within NATO missions are to meet the minimum standards of proficiency at Annex E.

[8] Inter-Service IEDD Operations on Multinational Deployments – A Guide for Staff Officers/Operators.

2. **EOD Command, Control and Advice:** EOD Command, Control and Advice require specific proficiencies, especially for personnel employed within NATO EOD staff elements. The tasks are detailed in ATP-3.18.1. Personnel are to meet the minimum standards of proficiency for an EOD Staff Officer (Annex F).

2.5 SPECIALIST EOD OPERATOR QUALIFICATIONS

1. It is recognised that niche EOD skillsets exist to address discrete threats, support operations with specialist force elements or to maximise technical exploitation of EO. Minimum standards for these proficiencies are determined by individual nations and are outside the scope of this publication. Examples of such specialist qualifications include:

a. **Manual Neutralization Techniques (MNT):** The most advanced IEDD proficiency. This enables experienced and specially trained operators to gain access to and carry out diagnostics as well as manual disposal procedures on IEDs with components hindering render safe procedures and/or targeting the EOD operator. MNT operators are employed in situations where the operational environment makes the risk of exploding a device unacceptable and the use of regular EOD procedures and energetic weapons inappropriate. Such situations may include those where:

(1) A direct threat to human life exists.

(2) A direct threat to critical military and civil infrastructure exists.

(3) A critical effect on the mission may be caused.

(4) The recovery of an intact device is of supreme interest for exploitation.

(5) A combination with CBRN payload/Homemade explosives (HME) or dual precursors exists.

b. **Assault EOD (AEOD):** Assault EOD comprises all EOD actions conducted during support to either law enforcement or military forces involved in non-permissive operations. The aim of assault EOD is to provide suitable supporting assets to maintain the momentum of an assaulting force, either in land or maritime environments. The IEDD operator competency is likely to a prerequisite for this proficiency.

2.6 STANDARDS FOR EOD CAPACITY BUILDING

1. While it is acknowledged that NATO EOD forces are likely to be involved in missions to develop EOD capacity among non-NATO nations, this document is not currently considered the appropriate vehicle to ascribe levels of non-NATO training.

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CHAPTER 3 PRINCIPLES FOR EOD ACTIVITIES

3.1 THREAT ENVIRONMENTS

1. In any operational environment the hazard or threat from EO must be considered in planning assumptions. In contrast to conventional munitions, IEDs present a more dynamic and unpredictable threat with higher degrees of risk to EOD operators and other friendly forces. The dynamic nature of today's threat and its potential to evolve markedly both temporally and geographically makes allocation of a blanket EOD threat state to an operational theatre impractical. Commanders must be in possession of a scalable EOD response, based on the capability, intent and opportunity of the adversary. The Threat Environments described in AJP-3.14[9] (STANAG 2528) consider prevalence of the IED when ascribing one of five generic environments.

2. **Capability of the IEDD operator**. As fully described at Annex C a single level of IEDD operator is recognised by NATO. This is necessarily a comprehensively trained individual in order to give the highest level of confidence to commanders. An IEDD operator must be able to resolve complex tasks without formal referral to a more experienced or highly trained operator.

   a. **Operational employment**. The IEDD operator may be employed across the spectrum of operations. This ranges from a permissive environment involving an unsophisticated threat to one where operators are being targeted by the adversary using IEDs. At this end of the scale the incidence of command devices (in particular RCIEDs with novel use of the EM spectrum) is at a level that affects freedom of action. The deployment of complex devices, secondary/tertiary devices and the use of 'come-on' tactics demonstrate that the adversary possesses the capability, intent and opportunity to target EOD teams and follow-on forces. The IEDD operator therefore has utility in a non-permissive environment and can expect to be intimately involved in the conduct of planned operations by a manoeuvre unit anticipating an EOD requirement.

   b. **Training**. As detailed at Annex C, IEDD operators are to be trained in advanced Threat Assessment such that they may defeat complex devices involving multiple switches. The presence of secondary/tertiary devices must be assumed as must the observation and deliberate targeting of the operator.

3. **Risk based decision making**. Employment of different categories of EOD operator requires risk based decision-making founded on an effective threat assessment, understanding of risk appetite, and availability of assets. The decision-making framework needs to be simple and intuitive in order to empower agile and effective action to counter EO threats. Threat versus tempo are likely to be the key determinants of risk appetite and, where an operational decision is made which sees the optimal EOD response compromised in favour of tempo, commanders must be fully appraised of the level of attendant risk.

[9] Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection.

3.2 FORCE ELEMENT COMPOSITION

1. Full detail of types of EOD Force Elements (FE) is described within AJP-3.18, AJP-3.12[10] (STANAG 2238) and ATP-3.18.1.

2. Despite standardisation of standards of proficiency, the structure of EOD FE amongst nations will vary requiring multinational EOD FE to be employed by the CJEODC to fulfil the required capability spectrum. The assignment of areas of operation and/or specific EOD tasks will be derived from the declared EOD capabilities of each troop contributing nation, articulated through their NPOC EOD[11]. The EOD capability planning matrix at Annex B to ATP-3.18.1 is a crucial tool in declaring the capabilities and limitations of national EOD FE.

3.3 INTEROPERABILITY

1. In order to achieve the maximum interoperability between EOD Forces, it is essential that there be a continuing exchange of current information among NATO Forces as to the organizations, responsibilities and operating procedures established to provide these EOD operational capabilities (see AEODP-09[12] (STANAG 2834)). The safeguarding of that information is to be taken into account when conducting exchanges (see AEODP-12[13] (STANAG 2186)).

3.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Command and control of EOD activities in multinational deployments consists of operational command and control plus planning and administrative services related to mission operations of EOD units for assigned geographical areas of responsibilities (see ATP-3.18.1). In multinational operations only EOD Staff or nominated EOD units plan and conduct EOD activities. The following functions are included in the command and control capability:

a. Receiving the EO incident reports (EOINCREP) (see AEODP-06) from units requiring assistance, EOD assets or other sources and, according to their threat and the Commander's operational priorities, assigning a Category and Priority (Annex G) to each individual EOD incident.

b. Allocation of EOD resources to the task as determined by the estimate process. EODCC staff must clearly understand the capabilities, limitations or national reservations for all the available EOD forces and should include the following factors:

(1) The Operational Commander's Intent.

(2) The time available to complete the task.

[10] Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Engineering.
[11] National Point of Contact EOD within an EOD Cell.
[12] The Operation of the EOD Technical Information Centre (EODTIC).
[13] EOD Information Security Standards.

(3) The acceptability of risk, either casualties or collateral damage.

(4) The value of the potential targets in terms of strategic, tactical and financial importance.

(5) The technical complexity of the task as a whole.

(6) The number and type of individual hazards.

(7) The environment in which the hazard or hazards exist.

(8) The numbers, technical capabilities, limitations and any national reservations of EOD units available.

(9) The quantity and type of equipment available, including transport assets (maritime, ground or air).

(10) The type, capacity and availability of supporting units and their transport assets, noting that in some cases this may include civil authorities, such as Police or Coast Guard.

(11) The requirement to recover materiel of intelligence or forensic value for exploitation by other agencies.

c. Temporary assignment of EOD elements to subordinate commands (including fixed installations). The installation commander will exercise tactical control (TACON) over assigned EOD teams (See AEODP-05[14] (STANAG 2391)).

d. Evaluating activities of EOD units and recommending distribution of personnel and equipment to balance workloads.

e. Authorizing the movement of EOD personnel and equipment including suspending or delaying a previous task, to meet higher priority operations.

f. Conducting liaison with subordinate units.

g. Conducting liaison with governmental or non-governmental organizations through appropriate channels.

h. Coordinating with Allied Forces' EOD related organizations.

[14] EOD Recovery Operations on Fixed Installations.

3.5 OPERATE IN A CONTAMINATED ENVIRONMENT

1. In order to perform EOD procedures in an environment which has been contaminated by CBRN material, EOD and certain support personnel must have protective clothing and associated equipment, enabling them to:

a. Work for extended periods with maximum personal safety.

b. Work effectively in all weather conditions.

c. Have maximum possible visual acuity, aural acuity, manual dexterity and freedom of body movement.

d. Communicate effectively with other EOD personnel both at the scene of the EOD incident and at the safely remote EOD control point.

e. Decontaminate personnel and equipment post task to allow the situation to return to normal in accordance with the Render Safe Procedures (RSPs).

2. Operations in polluted or contaminated water or for dealing underwater with CRBN EO must be performed in accordance with ADivP-01[15] (STANAG 1372) and by a specialized diving team.

3.6 RECOVER AND EVALUATE ENEMY EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE

1. It is essential that first-seen enemy EO is rendered safe non-destructively, recovered and evaluated. From the EOD standpoint the task is to ensure an item is explosively safe before it enters the intelligence cycle for further exploitation. This capability is particularly important for IEDs when information may be used as part of the *Attack the Network* line in C-IED operations (AJP-3.15[16] (STANAG 2295)).

2. In the maritime environment and underwater specialized diving teams are tasked for investigation and exploitation of novel EO using specialist TTPs, tools and equipment.

3. If an item of ordnance is unsafe to move or the tactical situation will not permit immediate exploitation then comprehensive records, including imagery and details of all markings must be taken for future identification of the item prior to destruction in situ.

3.7 INTERCHANGE OF INFORMATION

1. There must be a two-way flow of information regarding EO between technical intelligence units and EOD control and operating elements. Procedures and communications channels must be established to provide for this interchange of intelligence (see AEODP-09).

[15] Allied Guide to Diving Operations.
[16] Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED).

3.8 DEVELOP NEW EOD PROCEDURES, TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

1. Many types of first-seen enemy ordnance will pose no new EOD problems and will be dealt with using existing procedures and equipment. However, many other items will require research and development of new procedures, tools and equipment.

2. There must be a quick reaction capability to deal with these items, consisting of specially qualified personnel, the necessary development, testing, equipment and facilities for the preparation of dissemination of instructional or operational publications to national and Allied EOD units. This should include manufacture and supply of newly developed EOD tools and equipment as well as means of training EOD personnel in new and emergent EOD procedures, tools and equipment.

3.9 INSPECT AND EVALUATE EOD UNITS

1. To assure maximum proficiency of EOD units a system of inspection and evaluation of EOD units' abilities to perform their functions including those of coordination external elements.

3.10 REPORT EOD INCIDENTS

1. Reporting requirements are as outlined in AEODP-05 and AEODP-06.

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CHAPTER 4 EOD EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING

4.1 EOD EQUIPMENT

1. EOD includes those particular courses or modes of action taken by personnel for detection, accessing, uncovering, identification, mitigation, rendering safe, recovery, exploitation and final disposal of EO, regardless of condition. The equipment required for effective EOD activities is to be decided by the nations concerned in accordance with the requirements as set out in AEODP-07[17] (STANAG 2897).

4.2 EOD TRAINING

1. EOD Operators must have training, qualifications and experience in the full spectrum of potential EOD activity and tasks. National EOD Staff need to review regularly overall EOD developments and evolution of the EO threat in order to ensure training courses meet the standards agreed in this AEODP.

2. **Method of Training**. Training is to be given using as many as possible of the following means:

a. Books or printed instructional material.
b. Lectures by qualified personnel.
c. Practical exercises, including exercises in the field.
d. Demonstrations, training films, etc.
e. Computer aided programmes.
f. Realistic training aids.

3. **Tests**. All training is to provide for the application of oral or written tests and practical test where appropriate.

4. **Training Standards**. EOD personnel are to be trained such that they achieve the minimum standards of proficiency specified in this standard.

5. **Exchange of Information**. Nations are invited to exchange information on present and future techniques issued in their training programs to increase the benefit of standardization in this subject (see AEODP-09).

6. **Manoeuvres and Exercises.** Manoeuvres and other exercises are, when practicable, to include problems requiring the participation of EOD personnel and units. Activities of EOD staff and field elements should be exercised, preferably in multinational cooperation.

[17] EOD Equipment Requirements and Equipment.

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ANNEX A MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE RECONNAISSANCE (EOR)

A.1. MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR AN EOR OPERATOR.

1. Understand own role and tasks within national and (where required) NATO EOD frameworks.

2. Be able to distinguish explosive objects from non-explosive objects.

3. Be aware of the effects of explosives.

4. Identify EO generically by type, origin and principal components and state hazards.

5. Be able to describe systematically an item of unknown EO.

6. Be able to formulate basic threat assessment from immediate sources of information (including troops in the vicinity/witnesses where available).

7. Be able to liaise with and brief any relevant agencies (E.g. Incident Commander, EOD Operator).

8. Be able to safely undertake an accurate search to locate surface and subsurface EO.

9. Be able to recognize the signs that may indicate the presence of surface and subsurface EO (E.g. entry holes, camouflets, building damage, disturbance, tail fins etc).

10. Be able to mark the location of EO and associated initial danger areas.

11. Be able to give basic advice on initial safety distances for known EO and estimate for unknown EO.

12. Be able to give basic advice on evacuation and protective measures for an EO incident and on the initial evacuation and protective measures for CB incidents.

13. Be able to recognize suspect IED and advise on immediate actions.

14. Be aware of and understand the categories of EOD incidents in order to advise on initial incident category.

15. Be aware of and understand EOD reporting procedures and be able to raise an initial report in accordance with AEODP-06 and own national SOPs.

16. Be aware of own national and NATO EOD publications and understand those areas relating to EOR.

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ANNEX B MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS DISPOSAL (CMD)

B.1. MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR A CMD OPERATOR.

GENERAL

1. Possess the minimum standards of proficiency for an EOR Operator as laid down in Annex A.

2. Be familiar with own national and NATO EOD publications in particular AJP 3-18 (STANAG 2628), ATP-3.18.1 (STANAG 2282), AEODP-14 (STANAG 2369), AEODP-05 (STANAG 2391), AEODP-06 (STANAG 2221), AEODP-07 (STANAG 2897), AEODP-13 (STANAG 2377). Be aware of the existence of ACIEDP-01[18] (STANAG 2294), ACIEDP-02[19] (STANAG 2298), ATP-3.12.1.1[20] (STANAG 2283), AJP-3.15[21] (STANAG 2295), AJP 3.14[22] (STANAG 2528) and AEODP-03 (STANAG 2370).

3. Be familiar with the tasks and working methods of a national and Multinational EOD Coordination Cell (MNEODCC)/EOD Cell (EODC). Understand the prevailing EOD C2 structure and states of command (OPCOM, OPCON, TACOM, TACON).

4. Understand in depth the capabilities and limitations of own national CMD forces, including responsibilities, competencies, equipment, support requirements, tactics, techniques and procedures. Be aware of the capabilities of own national IEDD forces and the EOD forces of other nations when operating as part of a multinational force.

5. In accordance with Annex F, be able to provide specialist CMD technical advice on CMD tactics, techniques and procedures (including EOR), protective works, mitigation and evacuation and final disposal of large stockpiles of EO.

6. Be able to advise on the sustainment and readiness of a CMD team.

7. Be able to identify CMD capability gaps and advise on requirements.

8. Be able to advise and assist in determining EOD requirements and priorities.

9. Be aware of the current EOD threat assessment, including threat weapons (conventional and CBRN) and methods of IED attack.

10. Be able to advise on the local impact of conventional munitions on operations.

[18] CIED Training Requirements.
[19] NATO WIT Capabilities.
[20] Allied Tactical Doctrine for Military Search.
[21] Allied Doctrine for C-IED.
[22] Allied Joint Doctrine Force Protection.

11. Be able to gather and interpret CMD related intelligence.

12. Be familiar with and able to operate national, in-service EOD information management systems.

RECONNAISSANCE

13. Be able to collate and evaluate all available information in order to formulate an accurate threat assessment and RSP.

14. Be able to determine damage radii and safety distances for known munitions and estimate for unknown munitions.

15. Be able to advise on risks of EO to personnel and property.

16. Be able to advise on evacuation and protective measures for an EO incident and on the initial evacuation and protective measures for CB incidents, including Downwind Vapour Hazard Area (when needed), decontamination area and 'hotline' procedures.

17. Advise on the type and positioning of protective works, site remediation and EO recovery.

18. Be able to estimate the size and position of subsurface munitions.

ACCESS AND UNCOVERING

18. Advise on and supervise the uncovering and access to subsurface munitions including advice on mechanical excavation where appropriate.

19. Be able to effectively use (and identify defects in) own nation in-service remotely controlled vehicles and their associated equipment.

IDENTIFICATION

20. Be able to identify military explosives and accessories.

21. Be able to identify generic commercial demolition stores and explosives.

22. Using relevant reference sources positively identify conventional EO (including BC munitions, pyrotechnics and insensitive munitions), fuses and other components, determine their method of operation and state their hazards.

23. Be able to identify liquid propellants and depleted uranium munitions.

24. Mindful of radiation hazards, be able to operate and interpret the results of own national in-service EOD through barrier detection (E.g. radiographic) equipment.

RENDER SAFE AND/OR DISPOSAL PROCEDURES

25. Be able to effectively use and direct maintenance of own national in-service CMD tools and equipment.

26. Be able to effectively use (and identify defects in) own national in-service CMD personal protective equipment (PPE).

27. Be able to select and use EOD equipment to neutralize, disrupt or remove a fuse.

28. Be able to disrupt conventional munitions using deflagration techniques.

29. Be able to dispose of conventional munitions, including pyrotechnics and insensitive munitions, by detonation or burning.

30. Be able to identify a suitable disposal area and exercise range safety procedures during disposal operations.

31. Be able to gain access to and remove the main explosive filling of conventional munitions.

32. Be able to conduct bulk disposal of multi-item conventional munitions.

33. Following identification of liquid propellants, know their hazards and disposal procedures.

34. Following identification of depleted uranium munitions, know their hazards and disposal procedures.

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ANNEX C MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DISPOSAL (IEDD)

C.1. MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR AN IEDD OPERATOR

General

1. Possess the minimum standards of proficiency for an EOR and CMD operator as laid down in Annexes A and B.

2. Conform to the following proficiencies:

Knowledge Base

3. Understand in depth the following IEDD generic theory:

a. IEDD Philosophy, Principles and Mandatory Actions.
b. IEDD Operator's responsibilities.
c. IEDD safe waiting periods (soak times).
d. Forensic (component gathering and recording) protocols.
e. Rural and urban IED environments.
f. Understanding threat actors.
g. Applicable laws and rules (AO-specific, national, international).

4. Understand in depth the following IEDD design theory (in line with US Technical Exploitation Lexicon v5):

a. IED components.
b. Electronic circuits.
c. IED categories – Time, Command, Victim Operated (VO), Projected.
d. IED method of employment – (including Vehicle Borne (VB) IEDD Operations).
e. IED method of emplacement and indicators (including ground sign awareness).
f. IED events (explosion, attack, attempted attack, find, hoax, false, turn-in).
g. Vehicle search and clearance principles.

5. Understand in depth the following Radio Frequency (RF) Threat Theory:

a. RF Spectrums.
b. ECM Principles.

6. Understand in depth the following IEDD tools and equipment theory:

   a. Preparation/employment of IEDD Protective Equipment.
   b. Preparation/employment of IEDD Disruptors.
   c. Preparation/employment of demolitions charges and equipment for manual deployment.
   d. Preparation/employment of access and manipulation equipment (Hook and Line etc).
   e. Preparation/employment of detection and identification equipment.
   f. Preparation/employment of ECM equipment.
   g. Preparation/employment of Through Barrier Detection Equipment.

7. Understand in detail ROV Employment Theory:

   a. Use and limitations of ROVs with regard to IED design and emplacement.

8. Understand Home Made Explosives (HME) Theory:

   a. HME types and precursors.
   b. HME handling and de-sensitizing.
   c. HME storage and transport (small quantities).
   d. HME personal protective equipment (PPE) requirements.
   e. HME disposal (small quantities).

9. Understand in depth the following IEDD Task Conduct theory:

   a. IEDD task conduct chronology.
   b. ICP setup and safety considerations.
   c. Advanced questioning techniques, interpreting IED-related intelligence and conduct of Threat Assessment.
   d. Cordon placement (including security considerations) and evacuation distances with regard to assessed IED size and emplacement.
   e. Disruption tool or demolition accessory selection with regard to IED size, construction, emplacement and desired effect.
   f. Employment of associated capabilities including dedicated ISR, MWD, search teams and WTI assets.
   g. Detailed understanding of enemy TTPs and advanced ground appreciation.
   h. The role of the IEDD operator embedded within a manoeuvre unit in support of planned operations.

10. Understand in depth the following IED Component Gathering and Recording Theory:

   a. Scene/information preservation and collection.
   b. IED component gathering procedures.
   c. Incident photography/videography.
   d. Safety considerations.

Practical Skills – Equipment

11. Demonstrate practical competence in preparation and employment of IEDD detection equipment:

a. Understand the capabilities, limitations and employment of detection equipment in use, including local and environmental effects on equipment performance.
b. Conduct effective inspection, testing and preparation of detection equipment.
c. Understand the characteristics and hazards of detection equipment in use.
d. Understand correct operation of detection equipment and potential consequences of failure to do so.
e. Optimise detection equipment through necessary adjustment.

12. Demonstrate practical competence in maintenance and management of IEDD equipment and stores:

a. Understand operational implications of degradation of equipment performance.
b. Oversee diagnosis and reporting requirements for defective equipment.
c. Direct regular routine maintenance of IEDD equipment.
d. Manage the consumption and order of consumables through the organisation's logistic system.
e. Carry out regular inspections of the servicing log for all equipment in use.

Practical Skills – Pre Task

13. Demonstrate practical competence in the conduct of pre task activities:

a. Conduct pre-task planning and briefing including intelligence analysis.
b. Plan the movement phase to task location.
c. Determine requirement for deployment of EOD ECM and consider second order and possible legal implications.

Practical Skills – Arrival Drills

14. Demonstrate practical competence in the conduct of Arrival Drills:

a. Justify reasoning in defining location and type of ICP setup.
b. Define size, location and special requirements of cordon and evacuation area.
c. Coordinate cordon employment and specifications with the Incident Commander (IC).

Practical Skills – Threat Assessment

15. Demonstrate practical competence in conducting Threat Assessment:

a. Identify and gather relevant information (employing advanced questioning technique) from IC and witnesses.

b. Use information that is complete, valid, accurate and reliable.
c. Use advanced analysis tools to conduct Threat Assessment including detailed ground appreciation and be prepared to adjust cordon and evacuation.
d. Direct associated capabilities including dedicated ISR, MWD and search teams.

Practical Skills – Task Conduct

16. Demonstrate practical competence in the generic conduct of an IEDD Task:

a. Integrate effectively into a manoeuvre unit conducting planned operations.
b. Follow and adjust where necessary Primary safe waiting periods (primary soak times).
c. Employ ROVs IAW assessed threat.
d. Conduct remote disruption/neutralization tool/technique selection and emplacement.
e. Anticipate the expected results of selected disruption/neutralization including coordination with IC to ensure cordon safety when taking positive EOD action.
f. Remotely disrupt/neutralise the IED in a safe and adequate manner including remote confirmation of disruption.
g. Be prepared to employ semi-remote techniques (hook and line) to gain access.
h. Be prepared to follow and adjust Secondary safe waiting periods (secondary soak times) after taking positive actions on the IED.
i. Plan tasks for manual approaches.
j. Execute planned tasks during manual approaches, including advanced operator search skills focusing on secondary or tertiary devices.
k. Manually place disruptors/tools in a safe and adequate manner.
l. Manually confirm disruption/neutralisation.
m. Make the scene explosively safe through explosive component separation and segregation as well as a manual secondary device search.
n. Safely and efficiently conduct and analyse through barrier detection (radiography) of IED components.
o. Oversee disposal of explosive components not retained for analysis.
p. Conduct final declaration to IC that area cleared of all detected IEDs.

17. Demonstrate practical competence in the conduct of a Time IEDD Task:

a. Understand Time IED considerations.
b. Maintain cordon safety until Time threat has been neutralized.

18. Demonstrate practical competence in the conduct of a Command IEDD Task:

a. Understand Command IED considerations.
b. Coordinate deployment of the cordon to be effective.
c. Employ ECM in a safe and efficient manner.

19. Demonstrate practical competence in the conduct of a VO IEDD Task:

    a. Understand VO IED considerations.
    b. Employ ROVs in a VO IED environment.
    c. Search for, identify and neutralize VO IEDs.
    d. Employ semi-remote (hook and line) methods to access VO IEDs.

20. Demonstrate practical competence in the conduct of a Postal IEDD Task:

    a. Understand Postal IED considerations.
    b. Determine the proper threat level and appropriate course of action.

21. Demonstrate practical competence in the conduct of an IEDD Task involving HME:

    a. Identify HME and precursors.
    b. Determine HME fabrication techniques.
    c. De-sensitize and handle HME.
    d. Package and transport small HME quantities.
    e. Dispose of small HME quantities.

22. Demonstrate practical competence in the conduct of a Suicide Initiated IEDD Task:

    a. Understand Suicide Initiated IEDD considerations.
    b. Conduct RSP of suicide initiated VB IEDs.
    c. Conduct RSP of suicide initiated PB IEDs.

23. Demonstrate practical competence in the conduct of a Projected IEDD Task:

    a. Understand Projected IED considerations.
    b. Understand Projected IED cordon and evacuation considerations.
    c. Disrupt/neutralise the IED without exposing the cordon/civilians to undue risk.

24. Demonstrate practical competence in the conduct of a VB IEDD Task:

    a. Understand VB IED considerations.
    b. Understand VB IED safety distances.
    c. Employ ROVs in searching for, accessing and disrupting/neutralising VB IEDs.
    d. Employ semi-remote (hook and line) methods to access VB IEDs.
    e. Manually search for and place disruptors/explosive tools to VB IEDs.
    f. Prove the vehicle to be completely explosively safe.

25. Demonstrate practical competence in component gathering and recording:

    a. Perform and control the preservation and collection of components and information.
    b. Direct specialist WTI capabilities for recovery and analysis of components.

26. Demonstrate practical competence in conduct of task recovery:

    a. Understand task recovery planning considerations.
    b. Plan, coordinate and conduct the recovery with supporting agencies.

Practical Skills – Post Task

27. Demonstrate practical competence in conduct of post task activities:

    a. Conduct/direct post-task equipment maintenance and replenishment.
    b. Ensure personnel, equipment and stores are ready to deploy for the next task.

28. Demonstrate practical competence in conduct of post task reporting:

    a. Complete and submit IEDD reports IAW AEODP-06 (STANAG 2221).
    b. Debrief Chain of Command on novel IED devices, components, use/placement, adversary TTPs.

ANNEX D MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) EOD[23]

D.1. MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR A BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL MUNITION DISPOSAL OPERATOR

1. Possess the minimum standards of proficiency for a CMD operator as laid down in Annex B.

2. Be familiar with the chemical and toxic properties of biological and chemical agents.

3. Be familiar with the CBRN warning and reporting System.

4. Be able to carry out a biological and chemical munition reconnaissance.

5. Be able to identify biological and chemical munitions.

6. Be able to use national equipment to detect free chemical agents.

7. Be able to define chemical agent identity by generic type, volatility and duration of effectiveness.

8. Be familiar with the effects of chemical agents.

9. Be able to carry out personal chemical and biological protection.

10. Understand the influence of weather conditions and terrain upon chemical agents.

11. Be able to define the extent of initial and down wind chemical or vapour hazard areas.

12. Be able to define and mark an initial biological hazard area.

13. Understand the theory of decontamination and apply selected decontamination procedures (e.g. immediate decontamination of EOD personnel and equipment or eventually provide an isolation of suspected contaminated assets).

14. Be able to advise on the setting up and supervision of an Emergency Personal Decontamination Station (EPDS).

15. Be able to conduct all biological and chemical munitions disposal procedures while wearing specialist protective clothing.

16. Be able to carry out leak sealing and packaging procedures.

[23] The Nuclear Weapon Disposal and Improvised Nuclear Device Disposal elements of CBRN EOD are outwith the scope of this standard.

17. Be able to provide specialist advice for the transportation and storage of rendered safe biological and chemical munitions.

15. Be able to identify a chemical munitions disposal area and prepare a disposal site.

18. Be able to safely dispose of limited quantities of chemical munitions, with remote scientific support if needed, by venting, neutralization, burning or detonation, acting within the "Chemical Weapons Convention" (Geneva 1992), prevailing environmental regulations and theatre SOPs. (This does not refer to bulk disposal of large quantities of chemical munitions).

20. Be able to provide specialist BCMD technical advice for incident commanders, military leaders and EOD staff elements.

D.2. MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR A CBRN EOD OPERATOR

1. Possess the minimum standards of proficiency for a BCMD operator as laid down in Paragraph D.1.

2. Possess the minimum standards of proficiency for an IEDD operator as laid down in Annex C.

3. Be familiar with the properties and effects of basic radioactive elements and isotopes.

4. Be aware of the current CBRN EOD threat assessment.

5. Be familiar with the CBRN warning and reporting System

6. Be able to carry out a chemical, biological and radiological explosive ordnance reconnaissance.

7. Be able to carry out chemical, biological and radiological detection employing available equipment as user.

8. Be familiar with the components, methods of construction and operation of chemical, biological and radiological IED.

9 Be able to identify chemical, biological and radiological IED.

10. Be familiar with the risk caused by various radioactive sources.

12. Be familiar with methods of handling of radioactive sources.

13. Be able to define and mark an initial radioactive hazard area.

14. Be able to carry out personal radiological protection.

15. Be able to conduct chemical, biological and radiological IED disposal procedures while wearing specialist protective clothing.

16. Be able to collect evidence from CBRN IED incidents.

17. Possess a basic knowledge of CBRN defence specialist methods of work.

18. Coordinate with CBRN defence specialists in a CBRN EOD incident.

19. Be able to provide specialist advice for the transportation and storage of rendered safe chemical, biological and radiological IED.

20. Be able to provide specialist CBRN EOD technical advice for incident commanders, military leaders and EOD staff elements and to advise on the local impact of CBRN EO on operations.

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ANNEX E MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR UNDERWATER EOD

E.1. MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR AN UNDERWATER EOR OPERATOR

GENERAL

1. Possess the minimum standards of proficiency for an EOR operator as laid down in Annex A.

2. Possess the minimum standards of proficiency to recognize naval EO (including but not limited to: anti-submarine weapons, counter measures, limpets, naval mines, pyrotechnics, torpedoes), underwater, onboard and ashore.

3. Be able to carry out reconnaissance for EO underwater to the maximum operating depth of respective national diving equipment where the Threat Assessment does not indicate the presence of naval influence ordnance.

RECONNAISSANCE

4. Be able to undertake localized basic military search to locate underwater EO (excluding naval influence ordnance) using basic visual/manual means, considering appropriate precautions. This includes EO attached to jetties, ships' hulls and other underwater structures and EO on or tethered to the bottom.

5. Be able to give basic advice on initial safety distances for known EO and estimate for unknown EO, underwater, onboard and ashore.

6. Be able to prepare, use (and recognise defects in) specialist tools and equipment for EOR underwater.

DISPOSAL PROCEDURES

7. An Underwater EOR Operator is not trained to conduct disposal procedures.

E.2. MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR AN UNDERWATER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CLEARANCE (EOC) OPERATOR

GENERAL

1. Possess the minimum standards of proficiency for an Underwater EOR Operator as laid down in E1.

2. Be able to carry out identification and (under direction of an Underwater CMD Operator) movement of EO underwater, onboard and ashore plus emplacement of disposal charges to the maximum operating depth of respective national diving equipment.

RECONNAISSANCE

3. Be able to undertake the full range of military search to locate underwater EO (including naval influence ordnance), by visual, manual, acoustic and/or magnetic means, considering appropriate influence precautions. This includes EO attached to jetties, ships' hulls and other underwater structures and EO on or tethered to the bottom.

ACCESS

4. Be able to prepare, use (and identify defects in) specialist equipment for moving and recovery of underwater EO.

DISPOSAL PROCEDURES

5. Be able to prepare and emplace over-pressure or disposal charges under the supervision of an Underwater CMD Operator. This includes subsequent reconnaissance of the results of such EOD action in order that its effects can be quantified.

E.3. MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR AN UNDERWATER CMD OPERATOR

GENERAL

1. Possess the minimum standards of proficiency for a CMD Operator as laid down in Annex B and of an Underwater EOC Operator as laid down in E.2.

2. Possess the minimum standards of proficiency and knowledge to conduct disposal underwater, on board and ashore, of naval EO (anti-submarine weapons, counter measures, limpets, naval mines, pyrotechnics, torpedoes).

3. Be able to supervise and direct all EOR and CMD diving tasks.

4. Be fully conversant with the operation of national EOD diving and remote reconnaissance equipment and associated procedures.

RECONNAISSANCE

5. Be able to supervise and direct the full range of military search to locate underwater EO (including naval influence ordnance), by visual, manual, acoustic and/or magnetic means, considering appropriate influence precautions. This includes EO attached to jetties, ships' hulls and other underwater structures and EO on or tethered to the bottom.

6. Be able to assess damage radii underwater, on board or ashore for known munitions and estimate for unknown munitions. Be able to determine safety ranges accordingly.

ACCESS

7. Be fully conversant of the risks associated with moving and recovery of underwater EO and apply appropriate mitigation measures.

8. Be able to supervise and direct the use of specialist equipment for moving and recovery of underwater EO.

IDENTIFICATION

9. Be able to operate and analyse the results of national through barrier detection equipment to aid identification of underwater EO components where such capabilities exist.

RENDER SAFE AND/OR DISPOSAL PROCEDURES

10. Be able to prepare, use and direct maintenance of specialist tools and equipment for underwater CMD.

11. Be able to neutralize and render safe UXO or AXO underwater, using appropriate techniques.

12. Be able to neutralize sabotage charges, limpets or similar explosive devices attached to jetties, ships or other structures, especially underwater using appropriate techniques.

E.4. MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR AN UNDERWATER IEDD OPERATOR

GENERAL

1. Possess the minimum standards of proficiency for an IEDD operator as laid down in Annex C and for an Underwater CMD Operator as laid down in E.3.

2. Possess the minimum standards of proficiency and knowledges to dispose of onboard or underwater IEDs and Water Borne IEDs (WBIEDs).

3. Be able to supervise and direct all onboard or underwater IEDD diving tasks.

RECONNAISSANCE

4. Be able to supervise and direct the search of jetties, ships and underwater structures in the event of an ashore, onboard or underwater IED or WBIED threat, using specialist techniques and equipment.

5. Be able to advise on the damage radii and risks of an onboard or underwater IED or WBIED threat.

IDENTIFICATION

6. Be familiar with national and partner nation IED-related intelligence products.

RENDER SAFE AND/OR DISPOSAL PROCEDURES

7. Be able to prepare, use and direct maintenance of specialist tools and equipment for underwater IEDD.

8. Be able to neutralize and render safe underwater IEDs and WBIEDs, using appropriate techniques.

9. Be familiar with and able to advise on current national tactics, techniques and procedures for underwater force protection (UWFP).

10. Be able to assess the risk and direct recovery of underwater IEDs, WBIEDs or novel CM for technical investigation and exploitation.

11. Possess forensic awareness skills to assist in preservation and collection of IED-related evidence.

ANNEX F STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR AN EOD STAFF OFFICER

F.1. STANDARDS OF PROFICIENCY FOR AN EOD STAFF OFFICER

1. This Annex details the standards of proficiency required of a staff officer working as part of a Headquarters EOD staff element, responsible for providing EOD advice to the Commander and tasking and supporting EOD assets. The Annex covers only those skills specific to EOD; it is assumed that the staff officer will have basic staff skills[24] and an understanding of how a HQ is organized and functions and their own national policies.

2. Those competencies labelled "essential" are considered achievable for a general staff officer with suitable EOD familiarization training – such as the NATO EOD Staff Officers' course – and the minimum standard that nations should aim for. Ideally, EOD Staff Officers should also be proficient in the "desirable" skills. Those competencies labelled as specialized would normally be provided by a subject matter expert qualified as an operator in accordance with Annexes A-E of this publication.

3. The Commander should ensure all competencies are represented somewhere within the EOD organization. In an ideal situation, all the skills would be found at each staff level (Higher, Intermediate and Lower) but this may not be possible or necessary. However, sufficient expertise should be contained within each staff element (i.e. cell) to ensure that at each level all the tasks in the principal Staff Functions J1-J9 (Annex A of ATP-3.18.1 (STANAG 2282)) can be achieved. In most cases it is unlikely that a single person will have all the skills necessary; several staff officers will generally be needed to ensure all competencies are covered.

Essential

4. As a minimum, the NATO EOD Staff Officer should:

a. Be familiar with and understand AJP-3.18 (STANAG 2628) and ATP-3.18.1 (STANAG 2282). Have a working knowledge of AJP 3.12 (STANAG 2238) and AJP 3.15 (STANAG 2295).

b. Be familiar with and understand the tasks of an EOD Staff Element across the principal Staff Functions J1-J9 (Annex A of ATP-3.18.1 (STANAG 2282)).

c. As detailed in AEODPs, be familiar with and understand the capabilities of EOD forces, including responsibilities, competencies, equipment, interoperability and support requirements. Be familiar with where to source the specialized advice detailed at Paragraph 6 below.

[24] Such as the ability to draft orders, to conduct an estimate, to plan, to brief, to coordinate etc.

d. Understand the states of command (OPCOM, OPCON, TACOM, TACON) and specifically how they are applied in an EOD C2 structure.

e. Be familiar with current NATO and own National EOD publications.

f. Understand in detail, and contribute to compilation of, the current EO Threat assessment, including threat weapons (conventional, IED and CBRN).

g. Be able, if necessary with specialist advice, to conduct a threat analysis and advise on the impact of EO Threat on operations.

h. Be able to prioritize and plan, if necessary with Subject Matter Expert advice, EOD activities.

i. Be familiar with EOD tasking procedures (ATP-3.18.1 (STANAG 2282) and AEODP-06 (STANAG 2221)).

j. Have a generic understanding of EO by type (family) and the hazards they pose to EOD and non-EOD forces and civilians.

k. Understand the types of EOD incidents and be able to task appropriate EOD assets to them.

l. Understand and be able to advise on the ethos that drives EOD; that is, the need to balance risk against operational imperative across the spectrum of conflict.

m. Understand and advise on the application of EOD Categories and Priorities (Annex G).

n. Be familiar with the sequence of events of an EOD task (AEODP-13 (STANAG 2377)).

o. Understand and be able to apply the NATO EOD Message and Reporting System (AEODP-06 (STANAG 2221)).

p. Be familiar with EOD terminology (AJP 3.18 (STANAG 2628) (Lexicon), ATP-3.18.1 (STANAG 2282) (Lexicon), AJP-3.15 (STANAG 2295) (Lexicon) and NATO TermDatabase[25].

q. Understand the requirement to gather relevant intelligence and preserve forensic evidence, considering the threat to forces involved.

r. Be able to collate and disseminate EOD related intelligence.

[25] Accessible via NSO website at https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/content/nato/pages/home.html?lg=en.

s. Be able to advise on EOD Rules of Engagement.

t. Be familiar with and able to operate national, in-service EOD information management system.

u. Contribute to writing and staffing of EOD Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

v. Understand capabilities and limitations of multinational EOD Force Elements including specific national caveats.

w. Be able to advise on the sustainment and readiness of friendly EOD forces.

x. Be able to advise on capability gaps and requirements.

y. Have a minimum proficiency in English language proficiency to Standard Language Profile (SLP) 3332 in accordance with STANAG 6001, supplemented by EOD terminology (AAP-06).

Desirable

5. It is desirable that the EOD Staff Officer should also:

a. Be a qualified EOD Operator (IEDD highly desirable).

b. Be able to interpret EOD related intelligence.

c. Be familiar with the tasking procedures for specialist assets in support of EOD operations.

d. Be aware of the EODTIC, IMSMA, national and international databases and the service they provide.

e. Be aware of the existence and understand the roles of UN, national and non-governmental organizations (e.g. humanitarian demining organizations) and their relation to military EOD forces.

Specialized

3. A NATO EOD Staff Officer should be aware of the following specialist competencies and where to call on them in order to provide appropriate advice to the Commander. The expertise in these specialized areas would normally be provided by subject matter experts qualified as operators in accordance with Annexes A-E of this publication:

a. Military Search tactics, techniques and procedures (ATP-3.12.1.1 (STANAG 2283)).

b. CMD tactics, techniques and procedures, including EOR (Annexes A & B).

c. Underwater munitions disposal and the tactics, techniques and procedures for EOD in the maritime environment (Annex E).

d. IEDD tactics, techniques and procedures (Annex C).

e. IED trends and their impact (Annex C).

f. Special IEDD equipment.

g. The preservation and collection of forensic evidence.

h. Protective works, mitigation and evacuation.

i. Final Disposal of large stockpiles of EO.

j. Biological and Chemical EO Disposal.

k. Radiological and Nuclear EO Disposal.

l. CBRN IED matters.

m. Conduct and management of a technical investigation team.

n. Production of a technical investigation report.

ANNEX G EOD INCIDENTS CATEGORIES AND PRIORITIES

G.1. CATEGORIES

EOD incidents are categorized on command decisions according to their potential threat. Potential targets should be pre-categorized whenever possible. Categories are shown below:

Incident Category	Definition
A	Assigned to EOD incidents that constitute a **grave and immediate threat to life.** Category A incidents are to be given priority over all other incidents and disposal operations are to be started immediately, regardless of personal risk.
B	Assigned to EOD incidents that constitute a **threat to equipment, facilities, infrastructure or property but only an indirect threat to life**. Before beginning operations, a safe waiting period may be observed to reduce the hazard to EOD personnel.
C	Assigned to EOD incidents that constitute **little threat**. These incidents will normally be dealt with by EOD personnel after Category A and B incidents, as the situation permits. They should be conducted in a manner that minimizes risk to the EOD Operator, personnel, equipment and facilities.
D	Incidents which constitute no immediate threat.

G.2. PRIORITIES

Priority	Definition	Example
1	EOD Teams are to go to the incident at the fastest possible speed. Priority Traffic Equipment (PTE) may be used in accordance with host nation / national driving regulations.	Category A Tasks CBRN EOD UXO, especially IEDs, with a suspected time threat.
2	EOD Teams are to go to the incident immediately. PTE may be used at the discretion of the EOD Operator where serious delays are encountered.	UXO without a suspected time threat.
3	The task is to be cleared within 24 hours of receipt of the tasking message.	Usually downgraded from Priority 2 due to light or tidal considerations.
4	The task is to be completed within 7 days of receipt.	UXO in uninhabited, remote locations.

AEODP-10(C)(1)