

**NATO STANDARD**

**AJP-3.13**

**ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE  
FOR THE DEPLOYMENT  
AND REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES**

**Edition A, Version 1**

**MAY 2021**



**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION**

**ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION**


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17 May 2021

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## RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

CHAPTER	RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS

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## RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

[nation]	[detail of reservation]
USA	<p>Reservation 1. The United States rejects glossary/lexicon terms and definitions and shortened word forms (abbreviations, acronyms, initialisms) that are neither NATO Agreed, quoted verbatim from NATOTerm, correctly cited IAW AAP-47 Allied Joint Doctrine Development, correctly introduced/revise IAW AAP-77 NATO Terminology Manual, nor have terminology tracking forms submitted. This reservation will be lifted when the relevant terms, definitions, and shortened word forms are corrected (see matrix for any specificity with terms).</p> <p>Reservation 2. The United States rejects content that is not harmonized with capstone and operations keystone AJP. United States personnel are directed to use national joint doctrine to overcome variances. This reservation will be lifted when relevant frameworks and constructs are corrected [see matrix for specifics (ex. creation of joint operation areas or domains)].</p> <p>Reservation 3. The United States rejects the incorrect usage of certain terms, frameworks, or constructs [see matrix for specifics (ex. LOGCON)]. The US position is that LOGCON is not a command relationship and only coordinating authority. This reservation will be lifted when the relevant term usage is corrected or removed (see matrix for any specificity with terms).</p> <p>Reservation as well as other details are provided in the upload for consideration/future revisions.</p>


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## Related documents

MC 0055	<i>NATO Logistic Readiness and Sustainability [NR]</i>
MC 0133	<i>NATO's Operations Planning [NR]</i>
MC 0319/3	<i>NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics</i>
MC 0326	<i>NATO Principles and Policies of Medical Support</i>
MC 0327	<i>NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Responses Operations [NR]</i>
MC 0334	<i>NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support</i>
MC 0336/2	<i>NATO Principles and Policies for Movement and Transportation (M&amp;T)</i>
MC 0343	<i>NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations (IDRO)</i>
MC 0411/2	<i>NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)</i>
MC 0469	<i>NATO Military Principles and Policies for Environmental Protection (EP)</i>
MC 0586	<i>Military Committee Policy for Allied Forces and their Use for Operations [NR]</i>
MC 0551	<i>Medical Support Concept for NATO Response Force (NRF) Operations [NR]</i>
MC 0560/2	<i>Military Committee Policy for Military Engineering</i>
MCM-0041-2010	<i>MC Position on the Use of Effects in Operations, dated 20 July 2010</i>
MCM-0043-2013	<i>BI-SC Conceptual Framework for Allied Operations, 26 July 2013 [NR]</i>
EAPC(SNLC)D(2006)0006-Rev1	<i>NATO policy on Contractor Support to Operations</i>
AAP-03	<i>Production, Maintenance and Management of NATO Standardization Document</i>
AAP-06	<i>NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions</i>
AAP-15	<i>NATO Glossary of Abbreviations used in NATO Documents and Publications</i>
AAP-47	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine Development</i>
AJP-01	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine</i>
AJP-2	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security</i>
AJP-3	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations</i>
AJP-4	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics</i>
AJP-5	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations</i>
AJP-6	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems</i>
AJP-3.19	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation</i>
AJP-3.12	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Engineering</i>
AJP-3.14	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection</i>
AJP-3.21	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police</i>
AJP-3.22	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing</i>
AJP-4.4	<i>Allied Joint Movement and Transportation Doctrine</i>
AJP-4.3	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Host-Nation Support</i>
AJP-4.6	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for the Joint Logistic Support Group</i>

## **AJP-3.13**

AJP-4.10	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support</i>
AJP-4.11	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for NATO Asset Visibility</i>
AJEPP-4	<i>Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection During NATO-led Military Activities</i>
AJEPP-6	<i>NATO Environmental File during NATO-Led Operations</i>
ALP-4.1	<i>Multinational Maritime Force Logistics</i>
ALP-4.2	<i>Land Forces Logistic Doctrine</i>
ALP-4.3	<i>Allied Air Forces Doctrine for Logistics</i>
AMovP-1	<i>Road Movements and Movement Control</i>
AMovP-2	<i>Procedures for Surface Movements across National Frontiers</i>
AMovP-3	<i>Movement and Transport Documents and Glossary of Terms and Definitions</i>
AMovP-4	<i>Technical Aspects of the Transport of Military Materials by Railroad</i>
AMovP-5	<i>Multimodal Transport Issues</i>
AMovP-6	<i>Allied Multinational Transportation of Dangerous Goods Directive</i>
Bi-SC 80-3	<i>Reporting Directive, Volume V, Logistics Reports</i>



## Preface

### Scope

1. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.13(A), *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Deployment and Redeployment of Forces* provides NATO doctrine for the conduct of deployment and redeployment operations. AJP-3.13(A) builds on the principles described by AJP-3(C), *Allied Joint Doctrine for the conduct of Operations*.

### Purpose

2. Although every operation is unique their conduct can be approached in the same manner. AJP-3.13(A) provides joint commanders and staffs with a common framework to command, coordinate and synchronize Alliance deployment and redeployment operations.

### Application

3. AJP-3.13(A) is intended primarily as guidance for joint NATO commanders and staffs. However, the doctrine is instructive and provides detail on deployment and redeployment operations conducted by a coalition of NATO members, partners and non-NATO nations. It also provides a reference for non-military actors<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Non-military actors include international organizations, non-governmental organizations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, governments and governmental organizations, local actors/population and private sector actors. For more information about non-military actors see AJP-3.19.

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## Chapter 1 – Overview

### Section 1 – Introduction

1.1 The Alliance must be able to rapidly deploy robust and mobile military forces for the full range of the Alliance operations and missions where and when required by the North Atlantic Council. The Alliance must be able to sustain such forces for prolonged operations, at strategic distance and in austere environments, and redeploy those forces.

1.2 The availability of mission ready forces and an ability to deliver them at the right time, to the right place and in the right order is essential. This in turn requires structures, systems and procedures for the effective deployment of forces. Also, after an operation has come to an end the adequate structures, systems and procedures are required to conduct the redeployment are equally as critical.

1.3 Deployment and redeployment are separate stages of every joint operation.<sup>2</sup> They are delivered through the joint core activity of sustain<sup>3</sup> and are enabled through the joint function of sustainment.<sup>4</sup>

1.4 These activities are planned and executed by both the supported and supporting commanders, recognizing that troop-contributing nations (TCNs) have ultimate responsibility to move their personnel and materiel to and from theatre and to sustain them.<sup>5</sup>

1.5 The capability to deploy forces rapidly to the joint operations area (JOA) and subsequently integrate them into the joint force as directed by the commander joint task force (COM JTF) is essential. Forces may not need to be redeployed with the same urgency but the requirement to synchronize redeployment activities and ongoing operations is just as important as during deployment and will also be directed by COM JTF in coordination with TCNs.

1.6 Deployment/redeployment planning is an integral element of the operations planning process (OPP) and should be conducted from the outset of an operation. The mission requirements define the scope, duration, and scale of deployment/redeployment operations. These operations involve the efforts of nations, commands, agencies, staff functions, and processes.

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<sup>2</sup> AJP-01(E), *Allied Joint Doctrine*, para. 4.3; and AJP-3(C), *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations* para. 1.65.

<sup>3</sup> AJP-01(E), *Allied Joint Doctrine*, para. 4.21

<sup>4</sup> AJP-3(C), *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*, para. 1.88

<sup>5</sup> MC 0319/3, *NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics*, para 13 and MC 0133, *NATO's Operations Planning*, Annex C, para 22

## Section 2 – Policy and principles

1.7 Deployment/redeployment operations depend on cooperation, coordination, effective planning and liaison to achieve the objective through most effective use of resources. NATO commanders and nations should consider policy and two overarching principles that apply to deployment/redeployment: collective responsibility and unity of effort.

### Collective responsibility<sup>6</sup>

1.8 Although nations are ultimately responsible for deploying/redeploying their forces, they and NATO also have a collective responsibility for deployment/redeployment. This should encourage the cooperative provision and use of NATO and national capabilities and resources to support the force effectively and efficiently. Standardization and multinational cooperation in deployment/redeployment build together the base for flexible and efficient use of resources.

### Unity of effort

1.9 As with other phases of operations, unity of effort in deployment/redeployment is critical for effective and efficient mission accomplishment. Unity of effort is derived from both applying a comprehensive approach and unity of purpose. It emphasizes the need to ensure all means are directed to a common goal or aim. Cooperation between military and non-military actors requires continual interaction to ensure strategic coherence, a comprehensive understanding of the environment and mutual respect, trust and transparency.

1.10 The following principles should also be considered when planning for deployment/redeployment operations. They are not exhaustive; the operational situation may demand greater emphasis on some.

### Definition of objectives

1.11 Deployment/redeployment must be focused towards clearly defined and commonly understood objectives. When an objective has been identified as the main effort, all joint activities should be directed towards its achievement. During an operation deployment/redeployment may become the main effort.

### Economy of effort

1.12 Resources should be employed efficiently while still effectively achieving the commander's objectives for deployment/redeployment. Decisive strength is to be applied in

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<sup>6</sup> MC 0319/3, *NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics*, para 13 and MC 0133, *NATO's Operations Planning*, Annex C, para 22.

the areas where it will have most effect. Achievement of objectives should not be compromised by applying effort to lower priority areas. It is essential to maintain a balance between: available resources; acceptable risk; and commander's priorities.

### **Security**

1.13 Security enhances freedom of action during deployment/redeployment by limiting vulnerability to hostile activities and threats through active and passive security measures.

### **Comprehensive understanding of the environment**

1.14 In order to achieve the strategic outcome, commanders at all levels must build and foster a shared, comprehensive understanding of the environment. This common understanding should be promoted continuously during planning and execution of deployment/redeployment operations. The common understanding should also allow reinforcing NATO resilience through cyber defence.

### **Simplicity and flexibility**

1.15 Simple, flexible plans and clear, concise orders and procedures minimize misunderstanding and confusion. These are particularly important during deployment/redeployment phases, which include frequent changes in scale and structure.

### **Visibility**

1.16 Commanders require timely, accurate and relevant information to make effective decisions and to plan and coordinate operations in the JOA<sup>7</sup>. Visibility of nations' support arrangements (e.g. lines of communications and transit areas) will assist NATO COMs in planning and execution of deployment/redeployment. The key to this information is visibility on logistic requirements, resources, capabilities and processes. This visibility must extend across the multiple levels of management and command for NATO, nations and other actors and must provide the information required at each level.

## **Section 3 – Operational considerations**

1.17 The principles outlined above are supported by the following operational considerations. The operational considerations are always relevant; however, their relative importance depends on the nature of the campaign or operation.

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<sup>7</sup> It should be taken into consideration that cyberspace domain is not linked to geographical boundaries as the other operations domains (Air, Land, Sea). It might be necessary to have a specific and wider Cyber JOA

## Freedom of movement

1.18 Freedom of movement is essential for any operation. The mandate, Status of Forces Agreement and rules of engagement should allow NATO forces to remain free to perform their duties throughout the area of operations (AOO), minimizing interference from other actors. It is essential that the lines of communications (LOC) are secured and maintained when necessary to ensure freedom of movement for deployment/redeployment. However, the relevant legal framework is defined on a case-by-case basis and may include particular applicable provisions.

## Strategic communications

1.19 Strategic communications should be at the heart of all planning processes to ensure that NATO's conduct of military operations and what is communicated thereof by words, images and actions is consistent and leads to an overall understanding and support of the mission. Irrespective of how well the operation is conducted, a poor deployment/redeployment contradicting the NATO narrative, observed by media or exploited by others, may well become the image of the operation and NATO as organisation. There has to be considerable sensitivity and understanding about effects that an operation creates in the information environment. Synchronizing words, actions and images therefore significantly increases the potential of actual and perceived success of an operation.

## Environmental protection

1.20 Environmental protection is the application and integration of all aspects of environmental considerations as they apply to operations. Effective environmental protection enhances force health protection, supports operations by building positive relationships with the host and transit nations. Factors to be considered in deployment/redeployment planning and execution include pollution prevention, waste management, cultural property protection and protection of flora and fauna.

## Section 4 – Deployability

1.21 Deployed operations occur both within and outside the NATO area. From NATO or an individual member nation's perspective, a deployment to the periphery of NATO is not different to a deployment outside. The fact remains that its forces are deployed and require logistic support. Therefore the ability of its forces to deploy, 'deployability', is an important characteristic.

1.22 The deployability of NATO-owned headquarters and national forces is a significant factor in determining the effectiveness of deployment/redeployment operations. The Alliance seeks to improve deployability through initiatives, guidance and directives.

## Section 5 – Strategic mobility

1.23 Strategic mobility is the capability to deploy, redeploy and sustain military forces worldwide. In Alliance operations and missions, national strategic mobility capabilities may be augmented through multinational cooperation and agreements, support from multinational military agencies and commercial contracts.

1.24 Successful response across the range of military operations depends on sufficient port of debarkation/embarkation (POD/POE) capacity in the AOO coupled with the availability of sufficient mobility assets. Deployment/redeployment operations normally involve a combination of surface (road, rail and inland waterway), sea, and air movement augmented, as necessary by pre-positioned assets.

## Section 6 – Definitions

1.25 This section contains the adjusted definitions of key terms related to deployment/redeployment of forces which are listed here to facilitate common understanding. The complete list of definitions remains in the lexicon. The definitions are listed in an alphabetic order. The status codes used to describe the current status of NATO Term definitions are in accordance with AAP-47.

Term	Definition	Status
<b>Deployment</b>	The relocation of forces from a national location to an assigned area of operations.	NATO Agreed - this definition modified previously existing NATO Agreed definition
<b>Disengagement</b>	The process of ceasing units' operational tasks, preparing their infrastructure for handover or remediation, and their personnel and materiel for rearward movement.	This term and definition only applies to this publication.
<b>Dispatch</b>	The set of activity, including moving, marshalling, assigning, loading and recording of personnel and/or materiel, involved in the transition from an operational movement to a strategic movement between the staging area and the port of embarkation.	NATO Agreed - this is a new term and definition

<b>Integration</b>	The process of conducting the synchronized transfer of combat-ready units into a multinational joint force.	NATO Agreed - this definition revalidated previously existing NATO Agreed definition
<b>Movement</b>	The set of activities involved in the physical transfer of personnel and/or materiel as part of a military operation.	NATO Agreed - this definition modified previously existing NATO Agreed definition
<b>National movement</b>	The movement of personnel and/or materiel from a national location to a port of embarkation or from a port of debarkation to a national location.	This term and definition only applies to this publication and AJP-4.4
<b>Onward movement</b>	The movement of personnel and/or materiel from a staging area to their assigned area of operations.	NATO Agreed - this definition modified previously existing NATO Agreed definition
<b>Operational movement</b>	The movement of personnel and/or materiel from a port of debarkation to an assigned area of operations or from an assigned area of operations to a port of embarkation.	This term and definition only applies to this publication and AJP-4.4
<b>Rearward movement</b>	The movement of personnel and/or materiel from an assigned area of operations to a staging area.	NATO Agreed - this is a new term and definition



<b>Reception</b>	The set of activities, including receiving, offloading, recording, marshalling and moving of personnel and/or materiel, involved in the transition from a strategic movement to an operational movement between a port of debarkation and a staging area.	NATO Agreed - this definition modified previously existing NATO Agreed definition
<b>Redeployment</b>	The relocation of forces from an area of operations to a national location.	NATO Agreed - this definition modified previously existing NATO Agreed definition
<b>Staging</b>	The process of temporarily holding and organizing personnel and materiel to prepare for movement.	NATO Agreed - this definition modified previously existing NATO Agreed definition
<b>Strategic deployment</b>	The relocation of forces from a national location to a joint operations area, consisting of both national and strategic movements.	NATO Agreed - this is a new term and definition
<b>Strategic movement</b>	The movement of personnel and/or materiel from an assigned port of embarkation to a port of debarkation.	This term and definition only applies to this publication and AJP-4.4
<b>Strategic redeployment</b>	The relocation of forces from a joint operations area to a national location, consisting of both strategic and national movements.	NATO Agreed - this is a new term and definition

**Table 1.1 - Definitions of key terms related to deployment and redeployment of forces**

## Section 7 – Processes

1.26 This section describes the main processes in deployment/redeployment operations. Figure 1.1 depicts the main processes from national locations to the designated AOO for deployment, and from the designated AOO to national locations for redeployment.

### Deployment

1.27 The process of deployment relocates forces from a national location<sup>8</sup> to an assigned AOO within a JOA, based on the commander's required date (CRD).

1.28 Distinction is made between deployment from the national location to the JOA (strategic deployment) and deployment within the JOA (reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOM&I)).<sup>9</sup> Deployment consists of five elements; strategic deployment and a four stage RSOM&I process; within which elements of integration may occur at any stage.

1.29 RSOM&I should preferably, where possible, be conducted in a permissive environment, established after analysis of the operating environment and adequate force protection (FP) measures are in place.

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<sup>8</sup> A national location is a location under national control. In the case of deployment, this could also be considered as a location in another operation

<sup>9</sup> Some nations use RSOM&I as acronym for reception, staging, onward movement and integration, and is currently an Admitted NATO initialization.




Figure 1.1 – Generic view of deployment/redeployment processes

1.30 **Strategic deployment.** Strategic deployment is a projection of national or NATO forces to a JOA and consists of national and strategic movement. Movement itself requires enabling capabilities of mobility, transportation, infrastructure, movement control and supporting functions. National movement is the responsibility of the respective nation and conducted under national control. While nations remain ultimately responsible for moving their forces to theatre, strategic movement is coordinated by NATO.

1.31 **Reception.** Following strategic deployment, personnel and materiel will be received, offloaded, marshalled and transported from strategic lift assets in PODs through handling areas to staging areas (SAs)<sup>10</sup> by administrative movements. Personnel and materiel’s entry in the JOA is recorded during this stage immediately after the strategic deployment.

<sup>10</sup> If the arriving unit is ready to move onward to the designated area of operations and therefore does not require staging it may move onward from the port of debarkation.

1.32 **Staging during deployment.** Following reception, staging is the temporary holding of a force in a designated location, while not involved in or actually conducting operations. Staging is used for assembling, organizing and preparing the force for onward movement and further activities.

1.33 **Onward movement.** Is the process of moving units, personnel and associated materiel from SAs to their assigned AOO. During onward movement, units should be self-sustaining, including organic FP.

1.34 RSOM is conducted under control of the COM JTF, through a designated RSOM commander (usually Commander Joint Logistic Support Group (COM JLSG) or, otherwise, a component commander), and in close cooperation with TCNs and host nations (HNs).

1.35 **Integration.** Under the operational control of COM JTF, through J3, integration is the process of conducting the synchronized transfer of deploying and combat ready units into the higher echelon within the multinational joint force in order to be capable of meeting COM JTF's operational requirements. Some elements of integration could occur at any stage during deployment. Integration completes deployment and may include acclimatization, training and situational awareness. Integration is complete when the receiving commander establishes command and control over the arriving unit.

## Redeployment

1.36 Redeployment disengages and relocates forces from an assigned AOO within the JOA to national locations.<sup>11</sup>

1.37 Distinction is made between redeployment within the JOA (disengagement and rearward movement, staging and dispatch (D&RMSD)) and from the JOA to the national location (strategic redeployment). Redeployment consists of five elements; the four stages D&RMSD and strategic redeployment.

1.38 Rearward movement, staging and dispatch (RMSD) is conducted under control of the COM JTF, through a designated RMSD commander (usually COM JLSG), and in close cooperation with TCNs and HNs. D&RMSD should preferably be conducted in a permissive environment, with FP measures in place.

1.39 **Disengagement.** Under the operational control of COM JTF, through J3, disengagement is the first stage of redeployment, in which a unit ceases or hands over responsibility of operations, prepares its infrastructure for handover or remediation and prepares its personnel and materiel for rearward movement.

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<sup>11</sup> Deployment and redeployment does not include relocation of units between AOOs within the JOA after the deployment process for that unit has completed or before its redeployment phase starts.

1.40 **Rearward movement.** Following disengagement, rearward movement is the process of moving units, personnel and associated materiel from their assigned AOO to the allocated SA.<sup>12</sup> During rearward movement, units should remain self-sustaining; including organic FP.

1.41 **Staging during redeployment.** Following rearward movement, staging is the temporary holding of units in a designated area, while not involved in or actually conducting operations. Staging is used for disassembling, and organizing personnel and materiel into administrative movement<sup>13</sup> components and preparing them for dispatch from the JOA.

1.42 **Dispatch.** Dispatch is the stage in which administrative movement components are transported from SAs to POEs and embarked on to strategic lift assets. Dispatch records personnel and materiel's exit from the JOA and immediately precedes strategic redeployment.

1.43 **Strategic redeployment.** Returns national, or NATO, forces from a JOA, and consists of strategic and national movement.

1.44 While nations remain ultimately responsible for moving their forces from theatre, strategic movement needs to be coordinated by NATO to ensure a synchronized flow of troops out of theatre. National movement is the responsibility of the respective nation and conducted under national control.

1.45 If a force is relocated from one NATO operation to another, this will be treated as a new deployment in accordance with procedures laid down in chapter 4 and some considerations addressed in Chapter 5.

### Related Processes

1.46 Reinforcement and force reduction are conducted as deployment/redeployment.

1.47 Rotation of units or individual personnel and routine logistic sustainment flows may use deployment/redeployment processes and facilities, but will not be further described in this publication, as they are not a part of the deployment/redeployment.

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<sup>12</sup> If a departing unit is ready to move rearward directly to a port of embarkation it does not need transit through a staging area.


<sup>13</sup> A movement in which troops and vehicles are arranged to expedite their movement and conserve time and energy when no enemy interference, except by air, is anticipated.

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## Chapter 2 – Operating fundamentals

### Section 1 – General overview

2.1 This chapter identifies command and control (C2) relationships and identifies the roles and responsibilities of the commands and agencies involved in deployment/redeployment operations. Clearly articulating relationships is the first step in fully synchronized and coordinated operations supporting the range of military operations. This chapter describes some generic C2 relationships between supporting and supported commanders, followed by an overview of general and specific roles and responsibilities for relevant entities.<sup>14</sup>



**Figure 2.1 – Relationships diagram for deployment/redeployment**

2.2 Figure 2.1 reflects the command, control and coordinating relationships between stakeholders during planning and execution of the deployment/redeployment. Directed by

<sup>14</sup> For more details see AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*.

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), a joint force command (JFC) will initially conduct the planning process. Once the joint task force (JTF) is activated, Commander JTF (COM JTF) will be under the operational command (OPCOM) of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) with the JFC in a supporting role. During deployment/redeployment direct liaison may be authorized between the joint logistic support group (JLSG) and Standing Joint Logistic Support (SJLSG) HQ/Allied Movement Coordination Centre (AMCC) for the exchange of strategic deployment/redeployment information.

## Section 2 – Command and control relationships

2.3 Command relationships, by which commanders exercise the authority over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission, will be determined when a JTF HQ is established. Regardless of the mission a C2 relationship will be laid down in the operation plan (OPLAN).

2.4 The OPLAN will also describe the supported and supporting roles of the various components during every phase of the operation. The supported commander will receive support from the supporting commander(s) required to accomplish the mission.

2.5 COM JTF will provide detailed phase, mission, mission priority and force tracking information for force visibility.

2.6 Nations control their own capabilities, until released to NATO, through the transfer of authority (TOA) mechanism. Unless there are specific restricted agreements, TOA will assign forces to the OPCOM of SACEUR and should take place as early as possible during the deployment process. SACEUR will normally delegate operational control of all NATO or attached forces within a joint operations area (JOA) to COM JTF.

2.7 For high readiness forces<sup>15</sup> TOA through SACEUR to the COM JTF should occur at the port of embarkation (POE), in order to allow the COM JTF proper control of the rate and order of arriving forces into the JOA.

2.8 During redeployment COM JTF will retain the established command relationship of all assigned forces until operational control is returned to SACEUR. TOA will then assign OPCOM of forces from SACEUR back to troop-contributing nations (TCNs) and should take place as late as possible before strategic redeployment.

2.9 The designated reception, staging and onward movement/rearward movement, staging and dispatch (RSOM/RMSD) commander is responsible to COM JLSG for the entire RSOM and RMSD processes. The RSOM/RMSD COM will execute these processes in close coordination with JTF HQ. Therefore, the RSOM/RMSD COM must have sufficient control to

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<sup>15</sup> MC 0133/4, *NATO's Operations Planning*, Annex C, para. 11.



effectively conduct those processes. The RSOM/RMSD COM should have tactical control over all deploying and redeploying forces/units while they are conducting RSOM/RMSD. In addition, the RSOM/RMSD COM should also have visibility over national capabilities that enable RSOM and RMSD, subject to TOA.

### Section 3 - Coordination

2.10 In order to conduct RSOM effectively, JLSCG must have the ability to coordinate efforts with the national support elements (NSEs). As part of the transfer of authority, it is vital to enable COM JLSCG to collaborate effectively and efficiently with (NSEs). COM JLSCG should support the RSOM COM in order to enable the rapid deployment of the assigned Joint Forces into the JOA. LOGCON over specific national resources would enhance visibility, transparency and cooperation.

### Section 4 – Roles and responsibilities

2.11 This section describes the roles and responsibilities of NATO command structure (NCS), NATO force structure (NFS) and nations in the planning and execution of the deployment/redeployment process. The basic responsibilities for the deployment/redeployment of forces are outlined in Allied joint publications (AJPs); in particular AJP-3, (*Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*); AJP-4, (*Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics*); AJP-5, (*Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations*); AJP-4.4, (*Allied Joint Movement and Transportation Doctrine*); AJP-4.3, (*Allied Joint Doctrine for Host-nation Support*) and AJP-4.6 (*Allied Joint Doctrine for the Joint Logistic Support Group*). The entities outlined in this section are major participants in the planning and execution of the deployment/redeployment process.

2.12. **NATO Headquarters.** NATO HQ consists of International Staff, International Military Staff, Budget Committee and the Investment Committee. Its deployment/redeployment roles and responsibilities are to provide political-military policy and guidance on deployment/redeployment and monitor the political-military aspects of deployment/redeployment; to conclude Status of Forces Agreements as well as to negotiate, in close coordination with SHAPE J4 and SJLSCG HQ/AMCC, strategic support and transit agreements and arrangements with relevant nations, as required to facilitate the deployment/redeployment and to approve deletion from inventory/future use of NATO funded property/assets in the relevant committees and resource boards.

2.13 **Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.** At the strategic level, SACEUR is responsible for deployment/redeployment synchronization, assumes overall command of the operation, issues strategic military guidance and direction to subordinate commanders and coordinates national support. SHAPE fulfils its role and responsibility by:

- a. Developing and providing to subordinate commands, strategic policies consistent with NATO HQ, as well as direction and guidance on deployment/redeployment and accepting the desired order of arrival (DOA), commander's required date (CRD) and area of operations (AOO) for forces proposed by COM JTF.
- b. Conducting force generation based on operational-level requirements for deployment and later for redeployment and designates the theatre of operations, JOA and LOCs, ports of debarkation (PODs) for deployment and POEs for redeployment.
- c. Providing consistent direction and guidance to TCNs and all other relevant agencies and entities on the coordination, synchronization and de-confliction of national deployment/redeployment planning. SHAPE J4, will manage (supervise) and monitor the strategic movements based on COM JTF requirement coordinating with TCNs and SJLSG HQ.
- d. Liaising with NATO HQ staff on political-military strategic issues, SHAPE conduct negotiations with transit nations to put in place transit agreements including establishing host-nation support framework/arrangements with HNs/transit nations. It also facilitates and encourages the use of multinational solutions and utilizing multinational and NATO organizations and agencies (e.g. interacting with other agencies for planning multi-modal strategic lift).

**2.14 Standing Joint Logistic Support Group Headquarters.** On behalf of SACEUR the SJLSG/AMCC will plan, coordinate, prioritize and de-conflict all strategic movements and relevant movement resources based on COM JTF requirement for the deployment/redeployment of forces and compile, coordinate, de-conflict and promulgate to TCNs, the multinational detailed deployment/redeployment plan (MN DDP/MN DRP) developed from national DDP and DRP. It will monitor and coordinate the use of strategic lift assets with the TCNs through their national movement coordination centres (NMCC).

**2.15 Joint Force Command.** In preparation for an operation, SACEUR will appoint a COM JTF. COM JTF will then form the JTF HQ from staff of NCS and NFS headquarters. Until the JTF HQ has been established, the responsibilities of the JTF HQ will be taken by one of the two JFCs. During the operation, the JFC supports the JTF HQ with all operational-level deployment/redeployment planning and execution.

**2.16 NATO force integration unit.** While having a much wider area of responsibility, the NATO force integration units are also to support the HN at their locations to facilitate the deployment of Alliance forces within national borders. Its movement and deployment-related tasks are as follows:

- a. facilitate reception, staging, and onward movement (RSOM) and rearward movement, staging and dispatch (RMSD);

- b. facilitate TCN actions with regards to preparing and supporting sustainment of forces; and
- c. assist in planning and capability assessments to enable and prepare movement solutions to meet operations and collective training demand.

**2.17 Joint task force headquarters.** At the operational-level, COM JTF is responsible to SACEUR for deployment/redeployment planning and execution in the JOA, directing and coordinating subordinate commanders and, in accordance with individual TOAs, national contingents. COM JTF is responsible for: establishing, or closing down, the JOA, including its operations infrastructure; all movements (including during RSOM/RMSD) and sustainment within it; and integration/disengagement of the allied joint force. This requires coordination with component commands (CCs), SJLSG HQ, JLSG HQ, TCNs, HNs, contractors, international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other in-theatre organizations. COM JTF determines the order of arrival/departure into/from theatre, priorities and required dates which are then incorporated into the strategic movement planning process and reflected in the MN DDP/MN DRP. These broad responsibilities include the following activities:

- a. Determining, with SACEUR endorsement, the standards to be met by forces before deploying and redeploying. The commander conducts operational-level reconnaissance and liaison in the JOA, by deploying the operational liaison and reconnaissance team.
- b. Planning, synchronizing and executing multinational deployment/redeployment related activities in the JOA, using assigned national and commercial resources. It also includes identifying resources and funding requirements for deployment/redeployment, for SACEUR approval where necessary and avoiding resource hoarding and competition for resources across the JOA.
- c. Coordinating entry and exit requirements with HNs, including visa, customs and diplomatic clearance support.
- d. Planning, initiating and coordinating deployment/redeployment of NATO HQ elements.
- e. Approving CCs' deployment/redeployment concept of operations (CONOPS) and OPLAN, including force requirements, desired order of arrival/departure, use of intra-theatre LOC and integration/disengagement plans. Further, the commander directs deployed CCs in conducting integration and disengagement.
- f. Coordinating, synchronizing and prioritizing intra-theatre movement in accordance with MN DDP/MN DRP intent. In addition to it, the commander is also responsible for sustaining the JTF during deployment/redeployment and leading the integration and disengagement processes.

- g. Planning, establishing and managing force protection across the JOA.
- h. Through the theatre infrastructure plan, planning, designating and coordinating the establishment and remediation of deployment/redeployment infrastructure, e.g. PODs/POEs, staging areas and main supply routes.
- i. Developing the operational-level section of the deployment/redeployment strategic communications plan together with deployment/redeployment concept of operations (CONOPS) and OPLAN to inform each other and ensure consistency with the overall NATO narrative for this operation.
- j. Designating a commander to be responsible for coordinating and executing RSOM/RMSD (as the RSOM/RMSD Commander). It includes all aspects of force protection and liaison with HNs, IOs, NGOs, contractors and other agencies, in accordance with NATO policy and procedure.
- k. Assessing, monitoring and reporting the deployment/redeployment status of all NATO forces to SHAPE.
- l. Developing and maintaining an up to date common operational picture (COP), including in-theatre and deployment/redeployment operations in order to:
  - inform the NATO chain of command;
  - provide theatre-wide guidance and influence policy;
  - recommend, to SJLSG HQ/AMCC, changes in deployment, sustainment and redeployment flows of personnel and materiel across the strategic LOC;
  - provide theatre-wide operational deployment/redeployment assessments, trends and risks; and
  - assess the nature and quantity of additional resources needed to enable deployment/redeployment.

2.18 JTF HQ in close liaison with agencies and NSEs, coordinates the use of contractors supporting deployment/redeployment, to optimize consumption of finite commercial resources for the benefit of the TCNs and other entities while minimizing adverse effects on the local economy and population. Normally, host-nation support (HNS) will be considered before using contractor support. Where HNS resources are constrained, employing contractors may provide niche capabilities, ease pressure on the strategic LOC and reduce the quantity of military personnel in the JOA. COM JTF should ensure early deployment of contracting,

financial and legal personnel to enable contract management, during both deployment/redeployment, unless there is sufficient reach back capability.

2.19 It also coordinates activation and closure of TCN-sponsored contracts in accordance with NATO and national policy and guidance and facilitates, in close coordination with TCNs and NATO entities, the sale, transfer and/or donation of infrastructure and equipment (including disposal and demilitarization) to HN(s) government and/or other national agencies.

2.20 Accounting for and managing NATO funded equipment including during redeployment, validating COM JLSG or COM RSOM/RMSD recommendations for disposal, recovery, remediation or further use of surplus NATO funded equipment, in accordance with SHAPE direction and guidance and NATO principles and policies.

2.21 **Component commands.** During deployment the CCs are primarily responsible, under COM JTF's direction, for integrating their assigned forces to meet COM JTF's required dates. Similarly, during redeployment, CCs should disengage their forces to meet TCN and COM JTF's redeployment timelines. CCs are required to support the commander RSOM/RMSD. In the absence of a JLSG, a CC may be designated as commander RSOM/RMSD and would then assume the responsibilities listed in para 2.23.

2.22 Component commands integration responsibilities include: planning and executing theatre and operation specific training of their component forces from the unit through formation, to component level and establishing liaison with higher, adjacent and other HQs.

2.23 **Joint logistic support group headquarters.** The JLSG HQ enables RSOM and RMSD and contributes to establish logistic C2 structures. The JLSG HQ will contribute to JTF HQ in planning and executing RSOM/RMSD of the joint force and will coordinate national intra-theatre deployment/redeployment activities on behalf of COM JTF. JLSG HQ will also execute the deployment/redeployment of NATO-owned forces and equipment and will be responsible for the deployment/redeployment of its assigned units.

2.24 COM JLSG will, when designated RSOM/RMSD commander, be responsible for coordinating and executing deployment, relief-in-place and redeployment. These activities will be undertaken in close cooperation with the TCNs, framework nations (FN), and HNs. COM JLSG as COM RSOM/RMSD will also be responsible for the inter-theatre aspects of the MN DPP/MN DRP and the RSOM/RMSD.

2.25 **Commander reception, staging, onward movement and integration/rearward movement, staging and dispatch.** The COM promulgates the RSOM plan identifying RSOM enabling units and capabilities and articulating CRDs and priorities for those forces as well as; promulgates the RMSD plan identifying RMSD enabling units and capabilities and articulating required dates and priorities for those forces. COM also execute liaising with the national support elements on issues of RSOM/RMSD and with appropriate HN authorities and agencies conducting RSOM/RMSD to include the identification of related

transit agreements, acquisition and cross servicing agreements and joint implementation agreements.

2.26 In addition to the tasks mentioned above, the RSOM/RMSD commander will be responsible for integrating/disengaging forces assigned to conduct RSOM/RMSD and supporting CCs' integration and disengagement activity.

2.27 **Troop-contributing nations.** TCNs are to ensure that their forces meet NATO readiness criteria<sup>16</sup>, NATO forces standards, readiness and sustainability parameters and other relevant requirements. TCNs are responsible for deploying and redeploying national forces but are to apply the principles of collective responsibility and efficiency in their planning and execution, and therefore should strive for multinational solutions. TCNs act upon direction and guidance released by SACEUR and national chains of command, and must be prepared to conduct the following tasks in close coordination with the JTF HQ:

- In close coordination with SHAPE and SJLSG HQ and, through their NSE, with the RSOM/RMSD commander planning and executing deployment/redeployment activities of all force elements (according to the MN DDP/MN DRP);
- providing deployment/redeployment enabling capabilities in accordance with the SACEUR's requirements;
- providing and maintaining national DDP/DRP to SJLSG HQ/AMCC (and later coordinating detailed planning) using logistic functional area services (LOGFAS);<sup>17</sup>
- obtaining, if required, diplomatic clearances and waivers such as over-flight clearances to support the strategic deployment/redeployment of their forces to/from the JOA;
- planning, coordinating, controlling and executing movements of national forces in close coordination with SJLSG HQ/AMCC in accordance with the COM JTF OPLAN;
- managing activation and closure of TCN-sponsored contracts in accordance with NATO guidance and when operating a common funded infrastructure or equipment, submitting disposal requests to JTF HQ, through NSEs, for validation, assessment of future use and further staffing; and

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<sup>16</sup> HIGH readiness criteria, depending on materials availability and stand-by period.

<sup>17</sup> Logistic functional area services (LOGFAS) is due to be replaced by systems currently known as logistic functional services (LOG FS). In this AJP LOGFAS should also be read to mean the in-service form of LOG FS.

- establishing strategic aeromedical evacuation plans for own national forces, in close coordination with SJLSG HQ/AMCC in accordance with the COM JTF OPLAN.<sup>18</sup>

**2.28 Framework nation.** A framework nation (FN) takes the lead in performing specific tasks related to deployment/redeployment as identified and agreed by the FN and involved TCNs. The FN will coordinate the MN DDP/MN DRP with SJLSG HQ/AMCC and may host deployment/redeployment conferences. The spectrum of FN tasks can include organizing, coordinating and providing special capabilities.

**2.29 Host nation.** A host nation (HN) is a nation which, by agreement: receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory; allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or provides support for these purposes.<sup>19</sup> If an agreement with NATO or TCNs is established, that HN can contribute to the deployment/redeployment process by:

- negotiating with SHAPE/SJLSG/JFC/CC, supported by TCNs, related technical arrangements (TAs) and multinational implementation arrangements;
- providing HN capabilities, enabling infrastructure and capacities to support the planning and execution of RSOM/RMSD;
- establishing liaison with COM JTF, CCs and RSOM/RMSD COM;
- providing logistic support;<sup>20</sup>
- providing security if required; and
- identifying other support and services available in the HN.

**2.30 NATO Support and Procurement Agency.** NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) is a customer funded agency and may support deployment and redeployment, and should therefore be integrated into the planning from the outset. The contractor integration capability within ACO and the Operational Logistics Support Partnership may provide the planning capability which links back to NSPA for execution. Working together, the most appropriate contractual tools will be applied to meet the requirement of the Alliance operations and missions. NSPA can also provide commercially contracted support solutions for nationally funded support requirements under bilateral and/or multilateral contractual agreements with nations. When operating NATO-common

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<sup>18</sup> Includes national and contracted strategic aeromedical evacuation and evacuation using bi-lateral agreements with other nations.

<sup>19</sup> For more details see AJP-4.3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Host-Nation Support*.

<sup>20</sup> See AJP-4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics*.

funded property, NSPA should submit disposal requests to the JTF HQ for validation, assessment of future use and further staffing specifically during the redeployment phase.

**2.31 NATO Communications and Information Agency.** The NCIA acts as NATO's principal consultation, command and control deliverer, communication and information systems (CIS) provider. It also provides information technology (IT) support to NATO HQs, the NCS and NATO agencies. In particular, NCIA is responsible for training, operation and maintenance service provision for the tool for operations planning functional area service (TOPFAS)/LOGFAS) and for the acquisition of logistic functional services capability package (LOG FS). NCIA support will be funded through either a service level agreement or tasked under SACEUR's C2 relationship through a CIS support plan CISSUPPLAN which is linked to the OPLAN.

**2.32 NATO Communication and Information Systems Group.** The NCISG mission is to provide deployable CIS support in order to allow SACEUR to command and control Alliance operations and missions. COM NCISG is responsible for movement and transportation of NCISG units by utilizing an appropriate mix of organic transportation assets, strategic lift capabilities provided by the nations and commercial service providers based on the outcome of the force generation process. However, NCISG units have very limited organic transportation capabilities and usually deploy in the early phases of execution as C2 enablers. The responsibilities of COM NCISG are fulfilled by:

- providing a deployable communication and information systems (DCIS) in accordance with approved support plan for that operation;
- providing SJLSG HQ/AMCC with DDP regarding DCIS, previously approved by SHAPE J4 and based on the NCISG HQ warning order containing guidelines provided by SHAPE; and
- providing COM JTF with signal support group managing DCIS and DCIS force to maintain provided equipment and services.



## Chapter 3 – Common aspects of deployment and redeployment

### Section 1 – Deployment and redeployment within NATO operations

#### Planning

3.1 The aim of this section is to consider those aspects that are common to both deployment and redeployment when planning<sup>21</sup> NATO operations at the operational level. This section should be read alongside Allied Joint Publication-5.

3.2 As part of overall operations planning, deployment/redeployment is planned in a sequence of activities within a mutual planning process between political, strategic, operational and tactical levels to enhance a maximum exchange of information, to maintain operational tempo and flexibility and contribute to unity of effort.

3.3 NATO operations are usually conducted under dynamic conditions in a demanding environment. Throughout the conduct of operations, the plans for deployment/redeployment must be assessed and refined to take into account any evolution of the overall situation. For a given plan, deployment/redeployment planning decisions are based on the operating environment (OE), which may be permissive, uncertain or hostile. The OE influences the manner of entering the JOA,<sup>22</sup> deployment/redeployment concept, mobility options, pre-deployment training, force integration, and disengagement requirements.

#### Initiation

3.4 Following the initiating directive and higher commander's planning directive, commander JTF (COM JTF) and staff will analyse the operating environment and mission. COM JTF will issue initial planning guidance and warning orders which will include: coordination and cooperation requirements; liaison and planning team requirements (in and out) and key timings, related to deployment and redeployment.

#### Mission analysis

3.5 This activity is to understand the strategic situation and nature of deployment/redeployment in relation to the strategic intent, the outcomes sought and the related strategic objectives. Identifying key factors to enhance the common understanding of the operating environment, the analysis should consider the freedoms, limitations and

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<sup>21</sup> For more details see AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Planning Operations*.

<sup>22</sup> For example, when the OE is permissive the JTF may deploy directly into the JOA whereas, when the OE is hostile the JTF may deploy to a forward mounting base from which subsequent operations are projected. Considering cyberspace domain, it is not linked to geographical boundaries as the other operational domains (Air, Land, Sea). Then, it might be necessary to have a specific and wider Cyber JOA.

assumptions that could influence deployment/redeployment of the force. These should be identified by studying friendly and adversary centres of gravity to develop ways of reducing those limiting factors.

3.6 To frame the deployment/redeployment challenges, the following should be addressed: coordination and liaison requirements; time critical requirements; deployment of an operational liaison and reconnaissance team; task analysis; estimated capability requirements; expected size and task organization of the force and preparation of enabling forces.

3.7 Particular attention should be given to available lines of communication (LOC) and enabling and operational infrastructure. The outcome of this activity should be integrated in the commander joint task force's initial operations design, and included in the commander's planning guidance from which the staff will develop courses of action (COAs).

### **Courses of action development**

3.8 After analysing the critical operational challenges and identifying key factors a set of tentative operational COAs will be developed to achieve the mission in accordance with the commander's intent. In parallel the staff will develop specific deployment/redeployment options to support these operational COAs. Specific deployment and redeployment considerations include:

- any critical deployment/redeployment shortfalls and capabilities, and their effect on deployment/redeployment options and associated timelines;
- HNS and contractor support to operations (CSO) for each option;
- multinational solutions for deployment/redeployment operations for each option;
- the adequacy of LOC, and enabling forces and infrastructure;
- time imperatives for the deployment/redeployment of forces as well as operational risks and mitigation measures;
- initial synchronization and de-confliction of stakeholder activity within each deployment/redeployment option;
- troop-to-task analysis when developing the combined joint statement of requirements (CJSOR) and theatre capability statement of requirements;
- when necessary, develop a deception plan in support of the deployment/redeployment to distract the adversary; and

- the impact of the deployment/redeployment options on the COAs in COM JTF's developing OPLAN.

### **Courses of action analysis, validation, comparison and commander's courses of action decision**

3.9 In accordance with the guidance in AJP-5, the deployment and redeployment options will be analysed, validated and compared against each other in developing operational COAs. For the COA comparison, deployment/redeployment aspects are crucial. The aspects such as time, space, risks and cost are to be considered and taken into account by COM JTF. The output from these activities will support the commander to decide on the chosen COA and the associated deployment and redeployment options.

### **Plan development**

3.10 This activity has two distinct outputs: the concept of operations (CONOPS) and the deduced operation plan. JTF HQ develops a CONOPS including the deployment/redeployment concept; COM JTF establishes the overall design and structure.

3.11 CONOPS must be developed in parallel with the Statement of Requirements (SOR) and CJSOR<sup>23</sup>, balancing the ends and means to ensure the viability of the OPLAN. In order to do so, the following deployment/redeployment critical information is required:

- commander's required date (CRD) for deployment and theatre closure date for redeployment;
- priorities for arrival/departure of forces (desired order of arrival/departure (DOA/DOD));
- force flow;
- destinations;
- details on transfer of authority (TOA); and
- national detailed deployment/redeployment plans (DDP/DRP).

3.12 The following products are milestones for deployment/redeployment planning:

- illustrative (notional) CJSOR;

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<sup>23</sup> Once the national responses to meet CJSOR are received they are taken into consideration during OPLAN development

- provisional CJSOR;
- draft CJSOR;
- allied force list;
- allied disposition list; and
- multinational detailed deployment/redeployment plan (MN DDP/MN DRP).

3.13 After the force generation conference, Standing Joint Logistic Support (SJLSG) HQ and national deployment/redeployment planners (SHAPE in coordination) will review and coordinate deployment/redeployment plans based on the provisional CJSOR. This will include:

- analysis of the CRD for deployment and DOD for redeployment;
- identification of stakeholders and their tasks and responsibilities (C2);
- designation of ports of debarkation/embarkation (PODs/POEs);
- estimation of strategic lift requirements;
- identification of reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOM&I) and disengagement and rearward movement, staging and dispatch (D&RMSD) infrastructure;
- sustainment arrangements for deployment/redeployment; and
- information exchange on legal arrangements for deployment/redeployment.

## **Section 2 - Operational requirements**

3.14 While conducting deployment/redeployment planning the following operational requirements should be considered:

### **Force visibility**

3.15 The ability to know the identity, location, quantity and status of mission-essential units, personnel and materiel throughout a deployment/redeployment operation is essential. For deployment/redeployment this is particularly important to maintain an accurate picture of the ability to deploy/redeploy the force within politically and/or militarily driven deadlines, and enable commanders at all levels to plan accordingly. TCNs are requested to update on a

frequent basis their national plans and enabler dispositions to achieve an efficient and effective redeployment.

3.16 JTF HQ needs to employ force visibility to maintain an up to date understanding, within the common operational picture (COP), of the deployment/redeployment progress. Force visibility can be achieved using different information systems and should track both personnel and materiel.

### **Protection**

3.17 Deployment/redeployment planners assess the impact of the operating environment and threats in relationship to the mission. Joint intelligence preparation of the operating environment must address to what degree a potential threat can interdict, disrupt or block deployment/redeployment operations. Consequently, force and facility protection is planned and resourced.

3.18 With limited available resources the staff cannot plan to provide the same level of protection to every capability, but will need to identify critical deployment/redeployment capabilities and prioritize resources for their protection, as appropriate to the phase of the operation.

3.19 Deploying and redeploying forces may reveal operational information beneficial to adversaries. It is therefore crucial that deployment/redeployment planners in close coordination with their command's operations security personnel develop and include appropriate counter-measures to mitigate the potential risks.

3.20 Force health protection (FHP) measures are an essential element of every operation plan to ensure the mitigation of health threats with potential operational impact. To protect the health of the force, medical support plans must address: the establishment of preventive medicine and prophylactic measures to prevent transmission or provide adaptive immunity to pathogens; promote food and water safety; enforce proper field hygiene and sanitation; and ensure that all equipment is properly cleaned and disinfected. Development and execution of the medical annex to the OPLAN requires: close collaboration of preventive medicine; veterinary; environmental health; and other force health protection programs.

### **Infrastructure assessment**

3.21 Understanding the capabilities of the theatre infrastructure is vital for developing successful deployment/redeployment operations. An assessment of the infrastructure in JOA provides a thorough understanding of the capabilities and limitations in support of deployment/redeployment operations. The assessment serves as a basis to determine the requirements to enhance the infrastructure to facilitate the deployment/redeployment. Infrastructure consists of the physical network and the resource network. Collection and maintenance of infrastructure information is a task common to each element of the staff.

<b>Main Elements for Infrastructure Assessment</b>	
<b>Physical Network</b>	<b>Resources Network</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>airports;</b></li> <li>• <b>seaports;</b></li> <li>• <b>roads;</b></li> <li>• <b>railways;</b></li> <li>• <b>bridges;</b></li> <li>• <b>tunnels;</b></li> <li>• <b>terminals;</b></li> <li>• <b>inland waterways;</b></li> <li>• <b>storage facilities;</b></li> <li>• <b>pipelines;</b></li> <li>• <b>communication systems.</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• aircraft;</li> <li>• vessels;</li> <li>• road and rail transportation assets;</li> <li>• barges;</li> <li>• host-nation support;</li> <li>• contractors;</li> <li>• materiel handling;</li> <li>• equipment and cargo;</li> <li>• handling equipment;</li> <li>• civilian, government, law enforcement and military personnel;</li> <li>• automation.</li> </ul>

**Figure 3.1 – Main elements for infrastructure assessment**

**Environmental assessment**

3.22 HN environmental laws are to be complied with when planning and executing deployment/redeployment. International environmental agreements, conventions and protocols are to be applied. National standards may be used if they are more stringent than HN or international standards. NATO and nations have a collective responsibility for the protection of the environment. Nations should plan ahead and take the correct precautions (including maintaining environmental files) prior to, and during, their occupation of a site and prior to their eventual deployment/redeployment.

**Section 3 - Capability requirements**

**Communication and information systems**

3.23 COM JTF, in cooperation with NATO communications and information agency (NCIA) and NATO communication and information systems group (NCISG), should identify the requirements and provide adequate communication and information systems (CIS) support for tentative COAs. The estimate should also address the adequacy and security of networks used to manage, store, manipulate and transmit operational and logistic data.

3.24 CIS may be a limited resource, which will require detailed planning to ensure the appropriate level of communications resource allocations are made available to maintain visibility. Initial phases of a deployment may not have the robust communications network required for extensive use of information systems. Deploying CIS early provides a system that enables COM JTF to develop visibility of the force.

3.25 Throughout the process of deployment/redeployment, the role of cyber defence should be considered in order to allow reinforcing NATO resilience through detect, defend, respond and restore activities to secure deployment/redeployment operations against possible cyberspace incidents. Cyberspace domain is not linked to geographical boundaries. Possible cyber threats have to be taken into account when planning and executing deployment/redeployment. Protection against cyber threats is included into force protection.

### Force protection

3.26 FP is as important during deployment/redeployment as any other stage of a joint operation. COM JTF should closely evaluate requirements for FP. This should include capabilities to:

- protect coastal, harbour and inland waterway infrastructure (if applicable);
- provide military police (MP) (mobility support, police, security, detention and stability policing) in coordination with HNs' law enforcement and border agencies;
- protect deployment/redeployment infrastructure;
- prepare for the effects of non-combatant evacuation operations;
- provide protection against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats;
- maintain appropriate medical support and implement force health protection (FHP) measures;
- provide theatre air and missile defence; and
- provide protection against cyber threats.

Commanders should ensure that the above capabilities also support attached contractors.

### Medical support

3.27 Medical support is provided starting at the point of injury and continuing through medical treatment facilities (MTFs) and evacuation assets to treat and evacuate casualties within stated medical time lines.<sup>24</sup> All deploying personnel should have first aid and emergency care in combat situations training.

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<sup>24</sup> See AJP-4.10, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support*

3.28 The use of HN medical support should be carefully considered in order to ensure that it meets NATO and TCN medical standards. Particular attention should be paid to standards of emergency, surgical, pharmaceutical and blood product provision. The involvement of medical personnel in HN health sector development activities should be prepared well in advance and continued throughout the deployment/redeployment as long as possible. Although not directly a part of deployment/redeployment operations in general or RSOM/RMSD in particular, these activities may indirectly support the deployment/redeployment by raising the capabilities and capacities of the HN health service, thus easing the transfer of indigenous patients and leading to an increased medical support to allied forces by the HN.

3.29 Medical capabilities and capacities also play a vital role in preventing disease transfer. Preventive medicine, health surveillance and veterinary experts should be consulted during deployment/redeployment planning to ensure that effective measures are in place to prevent the transmission of human, animal and agricultural diseases by pathogens.

### **Military engineering**

3.30 MILENG<sup>25</sup> is a function in support of operations to shape the physical environment. Throughout all stages of an operation and particularly when conducting tasks associated with RSOM it is considered to be an essential enabler. During the build-up of forces, there can be significant demands for MILENG support in order to establish the required infrastructure, e.g. for PODs or LOC. The range of MILENG support available within a theatre will depend on the mission type, terrain and the prioritization of allocated resources.

### **Host-nation support**

3.31 When available, HN assists in executing deployment/redeployment operations. Provisions in an HNS agreement can potentially overcome capability shortfalls and decrease the amount of materiel that has to be deploy/redeployed. Elements of the agreement could include:

- basing;
- support;
- customs;
- border and/or diplomatic clearance procedures;
- construction and engineering;

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<sup>25</sup> See AJP 3.12, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Engineering*.



- labour force;
- transit authority;
- port of debarkation services;
- transportation assets;
- security measures; and
- infrastructure.

3.32 To avoid excessive claims, occupying units should conduct surveys when taking over and returning infrastructure to the HN.

3.33 Transit agreements may be required for both HNs and transit nations, and this may require the engagement of NATO HQ on behalf of TCNs as early as possible in the planning phase.

#### **Contractor support to operations**

3.34 When using contracted solutions, nations need to coordinate own requirements with other NATO nations supported by the NATO command structure to ensure a coherent use of limited resources and to resolve instances where different nations seek to obtain access to the same resources at the same time.

### **Section 4 - Communication and information systems tools**

3.35 Deployment/redeployment planning and execution require sophisticated information technology (IT) support – service and infrastructures that enables data-sharing, a common understanding and perception of the deployment/redeployment process and early awareness of disruption.

3.36 CIS must be secure and available, simple to use and responsive. These systems must be operational at an early stage to support deployment/redeployment planning and execution.

3.37 In addition to the military systems, civilian communication and information systems may be available in theatre. Most civilian systems are not secure and additional security precautions may be necessary for military use.

3.38 NATO and nations are to use the tool for operations planning functional area service (TOPFAS) and logistic functional area services (LOGFAS) tools to facilitate

multinational deployment/redeployment planning, execution, monitoring and transfer of information.

### Planning tools

**3.39 Tool for operations planning functional area service.** TOPFAS is an integrated applications suite with multiple capabilities to support the operations planning process (OPP). It consists of interfaces able to exchange data with external capabilities such as LOGFAS. The core applications are the system analysis tool, the operations planning tool and the campaign assessment tool. An important TOPFAS delivery is the CJSOR, which will be exported to LOGFAS. The CJSOR lists the required forces composition and their national locations, the final destination in the JOA and the CRD.

**3.40 Logistic functional area services.** LOGFAS is an integrated applications suite with multiple capabilities to support deployment/redeployment planning and execution. LOGFAS is connected with TOPFAS and is able to exchange data with external capabilities. LOGFAS core applications are: geographical manager, logistics data manager and the logistics database. For deployment/redeployment planning the two relevant applications are:

- a. **Allied deployment and movement system (ADAMS).** ADAMS is a tool to plan the strategic deployment, developing multinational detailed deployment/redeployment plan (MN DDP/MN DRP) from the national DDPs/DRPs, and de-conflicting them as required.
- b. **Coalition reception staging and onward movement (CORSOM).** CORSOM is a tool to support the planning and execution of RSOM/RMSD operations. By importing the MN DDP/MN DRP from ADAMS, CORSOM will assist the planning for the locations of RSOM/RMSD installations and the onward/rearward movement of forces in accordance with the CRD/DOD.

### Reporting and visibility tools

3.41 LOGFAS and automated identification technology are used to achieve movement visibility. There are various reporting means, such as effective visible execution (EVE), CORSOM and written reports (movement situation report, logistic assessment report)<sup>26</sup> available. Other tracking and tracing information (e.g. by global positioning system and radio frequency identification) can also be used. LOGFAS interacts with other NATO systems for logistic event/incident management and provides movement visibility overlays to NATO COP.

3.42 In addition to CORSOM, effective visible execution (EVE) as another LOGFAS application contributes to visibility and reporting on deployment/redeployment activities. EVE is the movement and transportation execution tool for managing and monitoring all (multi-)national strategic and in-theatre movement.

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<sup>26</sup> See Bi-SC Directive 80-3, *Reporting Directive*, Volume V, Logistics.

## Section 5 - Training

### General

3.43 To ensure effective deployment/redeployment it is essential that all elements of the deployment/redeployment organization are properly educated and trained to perform their deployment/redeployment duties. The training requirements for deployment/redeployment can be divided into individual and collective training. In general the individual training is a national responsibility and the collective training is both a national and a NATO responsibility. The deployment/redeployment organizations should be trained regularly in NATO and national deployment/redeployment exercises.

### Responsibilities

3.44 **National training responsibilities.** Nations are responsible for basic deployment/redeployment training. National training should be in line with national and international regulations and NATO standards. National training should focus on operational planning, tactics, techniques and procedures. The nature of an operation may create specific demands, particularly on logistic and equipment preparation. Mission-specific training within the JOA may be required. To improve interoperability nations should take advantage of multinational training opportunities.

3.45 **NATO training responsibilities.** NATO focuses on collective deployment/redeployment training for the joint operational level; NATO conducts exercises to train deployment/redeployment in a multinational environment.

### Training requirements

3.46 Basic training for deployment/redeployment personnel must at least include:

- characteristics of deployment/redeployment;
- deployment/redeployment planning within the operations planning process;
- conducting reconnaissance of terminals, ports, LOC and other facilities;
- arranging transport services;
- ensuring the efficient utilization of transport resources;
- arranging and conducting terminal operations;

- rules and regulations concerning import and export control, customs and immigration;
- applying regulations concerning dangerous goods and any material requiring special handling;
- procedures for establishing liaison with depots, transport units, civilian agencies and HN; and
- deployment/redeployment planning and reporting, using TOPFAS/LOGFAS and other reporting methods.

## Chapter 4 – Deployment

### Section 1 – Introduction

4.1 This chapter covers the three stages of the deployment process which are: planning, preparatory activities and execution. These stages are iterative and may occur simultaneously throughout an operation.

4.2 The deployment planning process fits within the operations planning process (OPP) and should be a consideration throughout all phases of the operational-level planning process.

4.3 Deployment requires that a number of preparatory activities are conducted in order to prepare: the force; the deployment enablers; lines of communications (LOC); theatre infrastructure; and host-nation support (HNS).

4.4 To enable future redeployment planning and execution, joint task force (JTF) HQ staff and troop-contributing nations (TCNs) should ensure the build-up of inventory and infrastructure is recorded from the outset.

4.5 Deployment is the phase of an operation, within which units will move to the joint operations area (JOA), conduct reception, staging and onward movement (RSOM) and be integrated into the joint force. The deployment process is summarized in the Figure 4-1.

4.6 NATO requires the capability to effectively deploy forces to the areas of operations (AOO) within the JOA. Successful deployment requires efficient support and development of reliable LOC. The LOC to the theatre may include air, sea and inland surface routes. The climatic conditions, terrain, border crossings, civil regulations and quality of infrastructure of potential areas for deployment are major factors affecting movements along these LOC.

4.7 Nations are encouraged to offer their military/civilian transport capabilities for shared use and to enter into contracts with civilian lift providers. When considering commercial lift, nations may wish to enter into multi-lateral options through NSPA in order to maximize the use of contracted lift.

## DEPLOYMENT




Figure 4.1 – Deployment processes

## Section 2 – Strategic deployment

4.8 Strategic deployment is the relocation of national or NATO capabilities to a JOA in support of NATO operations in accordance with the operational commander's requirements and priorities. It consists of national movement and strategic movement.<sup>27</sup>




Figure 4.2 – Strategic deployment

### National movement

4.9 It is the nations' responsibility to plan, prepare and move their forces to the port of embarkation (POE). The requirement to have a coordinated multinational detailed deployment plan (MN DDP) should be met by employing existing bi-lateral/multinational arrangements, if applicable.

<sup>27</sup> A force moved from an operation directly to another operation must be considered initially as conducting a redeployment, and once in the POE as conducting a deployment. See figure 1.1

4.10 Preparatory activities have unique elements including but not limited to:

- preparing the force that needs to deploy, including enabling forces as a priority;
- allocating and preparing transportation assets;
- activating national movement coordination centres (NMCCs); and
- activating the POEs.

4.11 Nations prepare for the deployment of their units by matching their readiness to the required level and by planning/providing the necessary strategic lift assets at the required readiness.

4.12 When NATO-owned equipment is deployed, NATO has to ensure the appropriate arrangements are in place. This can be accomplished, for example, by using shared military/civilian assets, by pre-arrangements and/or new contracts.

### **Strategic movement**

4.13 Nations and NATO organizations submit detailed deployment plans (DDPs) to Standing Joint Logistic Support (SJLSG) HQ/Allied Movement Coordination Centre (AMCC). The DDPs should include national resources and multinational solutions. These plans are de-conflicted by SJLSG HQ/AMCC to produce the MNDDP as the direct liaison authority for functional activities, in coherence between NATO commands and nations, coordinating and guiding logistics activity in order to achieve effectiveness, coherence, optimisation and unity of effort.

4.14 During the de-confliction process the overriding factor is the commander's required date (CRD). The de-confliction process must involve NATO and national planning staffs including movement and transportation planners at both the strategic and operational levels.

### **Preparatory activities**

4.15 Preparatory activities during this stage include but are not limited to:

- establish Status of Forces Agreements;
- prepare and deploy operational liaison and reconnaissance team and joint logistic reconnaissance team to consider deployment factors in JOA and gather the information required to complete the prioritized collection requirements;
- organize and prepare the force for strategic movement;



- allocate and prepare strategic lift resources;
- activate the ports of debarkation (PODs);
- establish LOC (including diplomatic clearances, transit agreements, customs, identify border crossing points (BXPs), holding area, waivers);
- protect the LOC;
- facilitate strategic lift of NATO command structure (NCS) elements (SHAPE);
- de-conflict strategic deployment with non-military actors; and
- prepare to monitor the strategic deployment and the logistic sustainment to enable a common operational picture (COP) and force visibility.

4.16 Strategic lift must be identified and procured in a timely manner and can be provided through:

- national strategic lift assets;
- strategic lift offered against the combined joint statement of requirements;
- shared-use agreements;
- strategic lift assets provided under cooperative use arrangements; and
- commercially chartered assets require a central coordination of procurement activities at the strategic level avoids a competition for transport assets between nations that could generate an inflation of prices.

## Execution

4.17 The early deployment of enablers to PODs is essential to mission success.

4.18 Operate LOC (diplomatic clearances, transit agreements, BXPs, waivers are in place). LOC and PODs requirements may include the use of:

- intermediate staging bases for strategic air transport and/or air-to-air refuelling assets;
- holding area locations and required logistic support in transit nations for surface movements;

- hub and spoke operations when the PODs have limited reception capabilities; and
- a forward mounting base, either land or sea based, when the operational situation requires a firm base for logistic support and/or force integration prior to deploying the force into the JOA.

### Section 3 – Reception, staging and onward movement

4.19 **Reception process.** The conduct of reception operations begins with the arrival of deploying forces, equipment and sustainment into a POD and concludes with the movement of forces to the staging area under the control of the operational commander, or RSOM commander. The main effort of reception is on land force elements and those air and maritime force elements that do not self-deploy; self-deploying force elements are processed by reception as single entities.

4.20 **Staging process.** It is the process of assembling, temporary holding, and organizing of arriving personnel and materiel into formed units, as they prepare for onward movement and further activities. The staging process starts with the arrival of personnel, equipment and logistic sustainment capabilities in the staging area (SA). It focuses on achieving initial operational capability and concludes with the onward movement.

4.21 **Onward movement process.** The onward movement process encompasses logistic support and involves HNS. The seamless flows of forces and near real time in-transit visibility (ITV) information are key enablers of the onward movement process.




Figure 4.3 – RSOM

## Planning

4.22 Close cooperation between the SJLSG HQ, JTF HQ, Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG) HQ, HNs, TCNs and component commands (CCs) at all the stages of the planning process is vital to prepare a uninterrupted flow of forces in the JOA.

4.23 RSOM planning should consider at least the following:

- the de-conflicted MN DDP and deployment of non-military actors;
- joint logistic support network<sup>28</sup> to support RSOM;
- RSOM force package capacities and capabilities;

<sup>28</sup> For more details on joint logistic support network see AJP-4.6, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Logistic Support Group*.

- HNS arrangements and contracts;
- area and regional security;
- local economic situation;
- other roles and responsibilities of CCs;
- command and control relationship;
- force protection (FP);
- visibility and force tracking;
- logistic support;
- military engineering support;
- medical support;
- environmental protection;
- resource considerations;
- contractor support to operations (CSO); and
- monitoring of RSOM process and the logistic sustainment to contribute to the COP.

4.24 Commanders should tailor their RSOM operations to provide the most effective support for the rapid build-up of forces. This is facilitated by recognizing the need to promote efficiency in the longer term and by eliminating duplication of limited resources between TCNs. Planning should focus on building multinational solutions in advance of the operations in order to ensure that RSOM operations are both effective and efficient.

4.25 CSO, HNS, NATO agencies and other entities/organizations are force multipliers. Their support must be planned and coordinated in advance of a deployment. Operations planners must consider HNS before a decision is made to contract local support.

4.26 Forces may require different levels of support depending on the duration of the staging process. The identification of support requirements is therefore a vital element in the planning process. Multinational support should be pre-planned, and coordinated with national support elements (NSEs), to optimize the logistic and medical footprint and associated security requirements.

4.27 COM JTF may designate locations for staging in order to provide space whilst also focusing resources to support the operation. Staging areas are specific locations along LOCs. For the selection of the staging areas during the operations planning, the following aspects have to be considered:

- geographic and environmental constraints;
- FP aspects;
- availability of national and HN assets;
- HN approval for location;
- anticipated flow of forces;
- transportation infrastructure; and
- distance to the ports.

4.28 The coordination and validation of multinational support solutions for RSOM execution will be examined during the OPP, in concert with nations. If multinational support is to be effective it must be implemented prior to the deployment of the force.

4.29 The operating environment can vary widely depending on a multitude of factors. As a result, RSOM capabilities and planning must be adaptable. Some of the potential influencing factors in the JOA include:

- the threat environment;
- degree of available HNS and CSO;
- condition of LOC;
- available infrastructure;
- terrain; and
- weather.

4.30 In order to be responsive to changing circumstances, logistic functional area services (LOGFAS)<sup>29</sup> as NATO primary logistic tool for automated planning, tracking and execution should be used during all phases.

### Preparatory activities

4.31 Preparatory activities for RSOM include but are not limited to:

- establish POD;
- establish reception facilities;
- establish SAs;
- activate intra-theatre route network, main supply routes, intra-theatre airlift system (ITAS) and sealift system (ITSS); and
- activate theatre enabling including coordination with HNS and in-country resources.

### Execution

4.32 The intensity of the RSOM activities may change when the operation shifts to another phase. This requires the ability and flexibility to step up quickly providing the RSOM additional forces or downscale if permitted. Therefore it should be recognized that the force requirements to conduct RSOM may vary throughout the phases of an operation.

4.33 COM JTF will provide oversight and linkage between theatre HQs, the military strategic level HQ, and HN and international/non-governmental organizations (IOs/NGOs) in theatre. The RSOM process itself will usually be planned, coordinated and executed by the JLSG HQ using assigned national, HN and/or commercial support resources.

4.34 For the conduct of RSOM operations the RSOM COM requires command, control, communications, computer & intelligence (C4I) capabilities for situational awareness, COP and ITV. These capabilities should be in place at all RSOM nodes.

### Reception

4.35 Throughput capacities at PODs influence the speed, time and order of arrival, and the types of units that can be deployed.

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<sup>29</sup> LOGFAS is due to be replaced by systems currently known as Logistic Functional Services (LOG FS). In this AJP LOGFAS should also be read to mean the in-service form of LOG FS.

4.36 Military and non-military activities may take place at the same time in a port and compete for limited port capacities. Units manning the reception nodes should therefore adopt an active posture to organize and coordinate the military activities alongside the other stakeholders in the ports. Arrangements may include:

- **management.** The RSOM COM is responsible for executing RSOM and will employ assigned national, HN and commercial support resources to do so;
- **airports of debarkation.** APODs are the primary reception nodes for receiving personnel;
- **seaports of debarkation.** SPODs are the primary reception nodes for materiel; and
- **rail ports of debarkation.** RPODs can receive personnel and materiel.

### Staging

4.37 SAs provide the necessary facilities, sustainment and other services to support units as they prepare for onward movement. The number of PODs, their throughput and relative location to the other RSOM facilities will dictate the required SA capacity.

4.38 Staging includes:

- arrival of personnel and materiel from the PODs;
- provision of sustainment and FP;
- distribution of materiel according to national and force logistic guidance;
- assembly, maintenance and functional checks of equipment to prepare for onward movement; and
- unit training and force preparation.

4.39 Staging ends after the commander has declared the unit is ready and the unit is ordered to onward move.

### Onward movement

4.40 Onward movement to its designated AOO starts when the unit has completed staging.

4.41 The following capabilities are necessary to ensure successful onward movement:

- a. **Movement control.** MOVCON is the planning, routing, scheduling and control of personnel and cargo movements over LOC. For onward movement, MOVCON is executed along intra-theatre route network (main supply routes, ITAS, ITSS) under the control of the RSOM COM.
- b. **Information systems.** MOVCON must be supported by LOGFAS to provide real-time information during the onward movement.
- c. **Sustainment.** Along the route, when distances require, convoy support centres (CSC) will provide sustainment, including medical support<sup>30</sup> and on site FP.
- d. **Force protection.** The operational commander determines FP requirements and responsibilities along LOC during the operational-level planning process.

4.42 As deploying forces pass through the RSOM process their command and control (C2) relationships may change; this offers a challenge for both the deploying units and RSOM enabling units. Therefore, to be able to direct RSOM activities, including MOVCON and FP, the RSOM Commander must have clear C2 relationships.

4.43 FP is integral to the RSOM process. Concentrations of personnel and materiel are targets vulnerable to attack, particularly when units are not fully operational. Active and passive security measures in accordance with NATO FP guidelines are to be implemented. FP measures should cover HN and CSO providers supporting the RSOM process.

4.44 Force tracking is the process of to know the identity, location, quantity of units, personnel and materiel. This will enable the planning and coordination of support and integration efforts units require. The medical support element is responsible to develop a concept, with HNS if possible, that covers the requirement during RSOM.

4.45 Environmental protection can be described as the integration and application of environmental considerations to prevent or mitigate environmental impacts resulting from military activities. The impact of RSOM activities on the environment must be anticipated and assessed prior to operations, and included in RSOM plans.

## Section 4 – Integration

4.46 During the deployment of forces, integration is the process of conducting the synchronized transfer of combat ready units to a multinational joint force. The complexity and time required for integration depends on size, contingency conditions and level of coordination and planning.

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<sup>30</sup> See AJP 4.10, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support*.



4.47 Elements of integration can occur at any stage during the deployment process following transfer of authority (TOA) to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).<sup>31</sup> TOA will be specified in the operation plan (OPLAN). Integration is complete when COM JTF has established C2 over the integrating unit and after having achieved full operational capability.




Figure 4.4 – Integration

## Planning

4.48 Integration planning should consider at least the following:

- C4I;
- situational awareness;

<sup>31</sup> See MC 0586, *Policy for Allied Forces and their use for Operations*.

- cultural awareness;
- interoperability;
- legal framework (memorandum of understanding (MOU), rules of engagement, national caveats, including HN and international law);
- identify the requirement for additional training/exercise;
- identify logistic support requirements;
- identify battlefield management requirements; and
- define combat readiness requirements.

### **Preparatory activities**

4.49 Preparatory activities for integration include but are not limited to:

- establish liaison with other units and HQs;
- confirm C4I interoperability;
- develop situational awareness;
- identify and resolve interoperability gaps;
- examine and understand the legal framework;
- prepare and plan identified additional training/exercise;
- establish logistic relationships; and
- develop battlefield management.

### **Execution**

4.50 The RSOM COM's responsibilities will be limited to the integration of assigned forces and to enabling elements of integration for the whole force, such as the provision of ranges in reception and staging areas.

4.51 Force elements may require additional training to enhance interoperability. Commanders at each level may determine the need to practice selected individuals or units to assess combat readiness. Force integration is successful when:

- effective liaison is established that enhances the commander's confidence in planning, coordinating and executing integration;
- C2 systems are completely integrated with the receiving command, adjacent commands and supporting commands, in accordance with the OPLAN (the receiving commander must establish C2 over arriving units in the JOA);
- battlespace is allocated and synchronized;
- situational awareness is shared and updated;
- aspects of legal frameworks are communicated and commonly understood; and
- the unit has established direct support relationships with various combat service support elements.

4.52 The deployment process ends when the unit commander reports that the unit is ready for operations and integrated with its higher echelon

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## Chapter 5 - Redeployment

### Section 1 - Introduction

5.1 A fundamental difference between deployment and redeployment is that redeployment needs to return troops, materiel and infrastructure that have been built up over the course of an entire operation, and therefore is not simply a case of reversing the deployment plan. Priority during the redeployment shifts from effectiveness to efficiency. COM JTF must assess the C2 structure in order to be capable of conducting also redeployment.

5.2 This chapter covers the three stages of the redeployment process which are: planning, preparatory activities and execution. These stages are iterative and may occur simultaneously throughout an operation. While redeployment is conducted during the transition and termination phase<sup>32</sup> of an operation, redeployment planning, as an integral part of the overall operations planning process (OPP), should be considered from the outset of the operation.

5.3 The authority to de-activate and redeploy forces, and to execute the operation plan (OPLAN), is retained by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and delegated through the Military Committee to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Commander joint task force (COM JTF) is responsible for redeployment planning and execution.

5.4 Redeployment planners assess the impact of the operating environment and threats related to the mission. Joint intelligence preparation of the operating environment must address to what degree a potential threat can interdict, disrupt, or block redeployment operations. Consequently, force and facility protection will be planned and resourced.

5.5 Redeployment of individual national contingents and NATO command structure (NCS) elements requires timely and detailed planning, aligned to the COM JTF OPLAN and ongoing operations. Nations planning for redeploying units must closely liaise with JTF HQ and SHAPE. To enable coherent planning consistent with the principles listed in Chapter 1, nations will be required to input their data to the JTF through Standing Joint Logistic Support (SJLSG) HQ/Allied Movement Coordination Centre (AMCC).

5.6 Political considerations and decisions will determine military planning and conduct of redeployment. These considerations and decisions, in concert with operational conditions and national requirements require continuous adjustment and refinement of the redeployment plan, which may affect the desired order of departure (DOD).

5.7 JTF HQ undertakes preparatory activities to enable redeployment. Therefore, COM JTF must assess the C2 structure in order to be capable of conducting also

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<sup>32</sup> More details in AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*.

redeployment. The Commander Joint Logistic Support Group (COM JLSG) is usually (but not necessarily) assigned also as commander rearward movement, staging and dispatch (RMSD).

5.8 Redeployment preparatory activities have unique elements including but not limited to completion of theatre-specific legal activities, environmental clean-up considerations, disposals, donations and bio security considerations ahead of departure. These activities require a detailed planning effort.

5.9 Execution of a redeployment operation includes disengagement from operations, closure of locations and physical relocation of the force out of the joint operations area (JOA) to national locations.

5.10 Redeployment is a distinct phase of an operation, within which units will disengage, military installations will close and the physical movement of units and formations will take place. The redeployment process is summarized in the Figure 5.1 below and consists of disengagement and rearward movement, staging and dispatch (D&RMSD) and strategic redeployment:

### REDEPLOYMENT




Figure 5.1 – Redeployment processes

5.11 Redeployment must align with ongoing operations including the associated sustainment and force movement. Redeployment plans and activities must therefore provide the supported commander with the flexibility to redeploy forces as required to achieve the transition criteria and simultaneously conduct those ongoing operations.

5.12 The redeployment will reduce forces and resources available to COM JTF, though there may be an initial increase in force levels when redeployment enabling units deploy to the JOA. The range and scale of the combat dimension of the operation will be increasingly constrained. There will be a tipping point when focus moves towards redeployment operations which then become the mission priority.

5.13 Following the NATO narrative, taking the operations security considerations into account and being coherent with higher echelons, develop a strategic communications plan to explain:

- the reason for redeployment to local, regional and troop-contributing nations (TCN) audiences;
- the consequences for groups affected by the redeployment (the population in general, government, organizations, contractors and other groups);
- mitigation of security challenges and consequences for the population;
- special logistic challenges, increases in traffic and other issues affecting the population or particular groups; and
- force protection.

5.14 Logistic functional area services (LOGFAS)<sup>33</sup> as NATO's primary logistic tool for planning, tracking, execution and reporting should continue to be used throughout redeployment.

## Section 2 - Disengagement

5.15 During disengagement, units close their operational activities, preparing their infrastructure for handover or remediation and their personnel and materiel for rearward movement. All activities are to be synchronized with the COM JTF OPLAN.

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<sup>33</sup> LOGFAS is due to be replaced by systems currently known as Logistic Functional Services (LOG FS). In this AJP LOGFAS should also be read to mean the in-service form of LOG FS.

5.16 There may be a requirement for a residual commitment of specialist capabilities<sup>34</sup> after the force has completed redeployment to assist with remediation.




Figure 5.2 – Disengagement

## Planning

5.17 Disengagement planning should consider at least the following:

- objectives to attain the end state, including infrastructure, environment, legal issues and security of the host nation (HN) after redeployment;
- identification of all relevant stakeholders;
- understanding of the interdependencies involving NATO forces in-theatre;
- the sequence and synchronization of the force draw-down;

<sup>34</sup> For example: force protection, logistic, medical or engineering capabilities.



- timelines, speed of force reduction and intended scale of activity;
- critical requirements such as strategic lift capabilities, logistic services and medical evacuation assets and medical treatment facilities;
- revision of contracted solutions to harmonize the redeployment process;
- mitigations to the risks and undesired effects resulting from the disengagement of NATO troops;
- force protection (FP) requirements against threat assessment; and
- remediation requirements.

5.18 COM JTF must develop a balance that provides protection, adequate support and a range of response options to adversary activity, while reducing force levels and logistic footprint. Planning the proper balance between disengaging the force and maintaining the appropriate mix and scale of sustainable combat power is crucial to an effective redeployment.

5.19 Additional capabilities required to support disengagement activities, such as logistics,<sup>35</sup> MILENG, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, countering-improvised explosive devices should be determined.

5.20 Protection resource limitations will probably mean that the staff cannot plan to protect every capability, but rather will look at prioritizing protection for critical capabilities and developing overlapping protection techniques.

5.21 COM JTF should plan the disposal process in close coordination with SJLSG HQ/AMCC, TCNs and HNs. The planning should include options for demilitarization; destruction; donations and the sale of materiel and infrastructure from TCNs to HNs, when not returned to national location or another operation. Donating materiel brings legal, strategic and support issues that must be addressed, while destruction of property requires specialist skills.

5.22 A base closure plan should be prepared based upon political decisions, COM JTF's intentions, climatic limitations, the security situation, available resources and the redeployment timeline.

5.23 NATO has extant policies for transfer and site remediation to which nations should adhere. COM JTF should conduct assessments with TCNs and HNs in order to jointly develop a detailed plan for infrastructure transfer and disposal.

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<sup>35</sup> See MC 0319/3, *NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics*.

5.24 During planning, identify required tasks to prepare financial accounts for closure. Identify costs associated with theatre closing and all outstanding invoices should be settled prior to final departure. The responsibility for paying those costs should be agreed before the costs are incurred (e.g. NATO, TCN or shared by a mix of authorities).

5.25 Accounting will attract close scrutiny from the audit authorities. As contracts with the HN will involve national contingents as well as the JTF, it is essential that accounting procedures are followed and implemented by JTF and national specialists, as appropriate. Accounting should occur throughout the operation, and there will be a final reconciliation. National contingents should close all financial obligations or make arrangements to close them as expeditiously as possible.

5.26 Proper liaison and coordination must be implemented to enable all relevant actors to inform and contribute wherever appropriate to the strategic and operational level planning for transition.

### **Preparatory activities**

5.27 The pace of preparatory activities for disengagement will be determined by a number of factors that will likely include political, threat assessment, national needs for force reconstitution, HN requirements and legal status for NATO forces. The activities identified below however will be required and usually preceded by a surge of enablers for the redeployment.

5.28 Preparatory activities for disengagement include but are not limited to:

- release orders and communicate intentions with local stakeholders;
- adjust liaison network;
- integrate additional force required for conducting disengagement;
- record current inventory;
- apply the legal framework;
- realign contract framework to support disengagement;
- prepare materiel and infrastructure for disposal;
- adjust logistic sustainment flow; and

- prepare documentation related to environmental protection (EP), including force health protection (FHP) and waste management.

5.29 While some contracts will drawdown and closeout during the preparation stage, others, such as washing operations will be created. There is a major coordination task in ensuring the most cost-effective and operationally efficient use of contracts across the force. TCNs are encouraged to utilize common contracting through COM JTF or COM JLSC if delegated as far as practicable and ensure that contracts are terminated prior to final departure.

5.30 Throughout this stage, and with the continual refinement of requirements, required stocks and standard days of supply should have been calculated and be in the process of draw-down, to ensure stock levels and equipment holdings are reduced to the minimum necessary to support ongoing operations.

5.31 Materiel preparation requires the identifying, accounting, cleaning, refurbishing (if necessary), disposal and shipping intention of all vehicles, equipment and stocks. TCNs and NCS' materiel compendia should list materiel holding quantities and expected dispositions, and identify items that are to be handled with appropriate references to legal and security regulations.<sup>36</sup>

5.32 Full lists of in-theatre disposals are to be presented to the HN/international organizations (IO). COM JTF should ensure that all possible measures have been taken by nations to repatriate equipment that has limited utility to HN/IO having taken account of HN, international, NATO and disposing-nation legal and policy constraints or is not appropriate to handover.

5.33 Hostile activities may require the unscheduled, untimely abandonment of buildings or equipment. When property or materiel has to be abandoned a written memorandum signed by COM JTF or designated representative must be forwarded to the TCNs recognizing such abandonment. Such a memorandum should include a record of the assets condition (in case they have to be abandoned); liaison activities conducted with HN; and responsibility for subsequent recovery action if threat reduces.

5.34 Several EP tasks, documents and reports are required to be completed before compounds are vacated as part of a planned redeployment. Noting that forces may often generate, store, recycle, and dispose of various hazardous wastes, which may contaminate soil and groundwater, contribute to serious illness or death or pose a hazard to the environment, clean-up activities are essential provided the threat of hostile activity is considered low enough.

5.35 Legal advisors should cooperate with local government officials, contractors, real estate personnel and environmental subject matter experts (SMEs). The legal advisors

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<sup>36</sup> Such as international traffic in arms regulations, missile technology control regime or controlled technology access transfer.

prepare official documents for signature by the representatives of NATO forces, HN and other stakeholders. Examples include:

- revisions on memorandum of understanding/technical arrangement (MOU/TA);
- legal requirements for the handover of real estate, based on in and out surveys documented;
- finalization of investigations (e.g. civil, criminal or claims);
- status, transfer and transition of captured persons;<sup>37</sup> and
- HN patients in medical treatment facilities (MTFs).

5.36 Medical advisor should liaise with HN authorities to transfer any remaining HN patients from allied MTFs into the care of HN medical facilities.

### Execution

5.37 Disengaging units cease combat operations within area of operations (AOO) as directed by COM JTF. Units prepare their base closure or handover and subsequent rearward movement. Units should retain sufficient integrity and capability to meet emerging operational tasks. Units will in particular complete inventory draw-down.

5.38 Base closure requires the cooperation of all parties and relies heavily on the logistic and engineer components. Base closure includes, but is not limited to:

- materiel disposal, including donation, de-militarization, destruction or return to national location or another operation;<sup>38</sup>
- real estate /infrastructure management;
- termination of all support contracts;
- TCNs will need to return their bases to the state agreed with HNs or local stakeholders; and
- legal documents should be signed between the redeployed forces, HN and other stakeholders, ensuring coherence with existing Status of Forces Agreement and MOU/TA.

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<sup>37</sup> See more details in AJP-2.5, *Captured Persons, Material and Documents* and ATP-3.7.2, *NATO Military Police Guidance and Procedures*, Ch4: Detention operations.

<sup>38</sup> Materiel for return should be prepared to enable tracking and delivery.

5.39 EP activities related to the base closure depend upon the clean-up standards, exposure potential, affected population, and nature and extent of contamination. Clean up efforts are generally carried out by contractors and should be considered under a coordinated NATO effort.

5.40 Disengagement ends when the unit is ready for and ordered to move rearward.

### **Section 3 – Rearward movement, staging and dispatch**

5.41 **Rearward movement process.** It is the process of moving disengaged units from their assigned AOO to staging areas. The rearward movement process encompasses logistic support and involves HNs. Comprehensive planning is key and near real time in-transit visibility (ITV) information is essential during execution.

5.42 **Staging process.** During redeployment, staging is the process of disassembling, temporary holding and organizing redeploying personnel and materiel into administrative movement components as they prepare for dispatch. Personnel are generally separated from their operational equipment and each prepared for dispatch.

5.43 **Dispatch process.** The dispatch process begins with the call forward of redeploying administrative movement components into a port of embarkation (POE) where they are assigned and loaded to strategic lift assets for strategic movement; it records the personnel and materiel's exit from the JOA. The main effort of dispatch is on land force elements and those air and maritime force elements that do not self-redeploy; self-redeploying force elements are processed by dispatch as single entities.




Figure 5.3 – RMSD

## Planning

5.44 Close cooperation between the SJLSG HQ/AMCC, JTF HQ, HNs, TCNs and component commands (CCs) at all the stages of the planning process is vital to prepare a smooth flow of forces out of the JOA.

5.45 RMSD planning should consider at least the following:

- the de-conflicted multinational detailed redeployment plan (MN DRP);
- adjusting joint logistic support network<sup>39</sup> to support RMSD;
- RMSD infrastructure;

<sup>39</sup> For more details on joint logistic support network see AJP 4.6, *Joint Logistic Support Group Doctrine*.

- RMSD force package capacities and capabilities;
- intra-theatre route network (main supply routes, intra-theatre airlift system, intra-theatre sealift system);
- host-nation support (HNS) arrangements and contracts;
- area and regional security;
- force protection;
- visibility and force tracking;
- logistic support;
- resilience of redeployment lines of communications (LOC);
- medical support;
- environmental protection;
- resource considerations; and
- contract support to operations (CSO).

5.46 Commanders should tailor their RMSD operations to provide the most effective support for the efficient draw-down of forces. Planning should focus on building multinational solutions in order to ensure that RMSD operations are both effective and efficient.

5.47 Use of HNS, NATO agencies, CSO and other entities/organizations to support RMSD must be considered during planning and may reduce the need for surge of specialist capabilities. HNS is usually considered before a decision is made to contract for required support.

5.48 Redeploying forces will continue to require sustainment during RMSD. Multinational support should be pre-planned, and coordinated with national support elements (NSEs), to optimize the draw-down of logistic and medical capabilities and associated security requirements.

5.49 Considerations for staging are similar to those during reception, staging and onward movement (RSOM):

- geographic and environmental constraints;
- FP aspects;
- availability of national and HN assets;
- HN approval for location;
- anticipated flow of forces;
- transportation infrastructure; and
- distance to the ports.

### **Preparatory activities**

5.50 Preparatory activities for RMSD include, but are not limited to:

- release orders and communicate intentions with local stakeholders;
- establish redeployment capability in staging areas;
- establish dispatch facilities and capabilities;
- integrate additional force required for conducting RMSD;
- prioritize intra-theatre air and surface transportation assets between RMSD and ongoing operations;
- realign contract framework to support RMSD;
- adjust ITV capability; and
- prepare transportation documentation (especially HN requirements).

5.51 Consideration by COM JTF in close coordination with TCNs should be given whether, where and how, preparation of materiel for use by TCNs for future operations should be conducted in the JOA or in nationally assigned locations.



## Execution

5.52 Execution activities include:

- conduct RMSD employing prioritized intra-theatre air and surface transportation assets and utilizing LOC, staging areas (SAs) and dispatch facilities and capabilities;
- communicate and coordinate RMSD activities with stakeholders; and
- utilize ITV capability.

5.53 For the conduct of RMSD operations COM JLSG requires command, control, communications, computer & intelligence capabilities for situational awareness, common operational picture (COP), and ITV. These capabilities should be in place at all RMSD nodes.

## Rearward movement

5.54 Rearward movement starts after completion of disengagement with a movement to a designated staging area. The security situation in the JOA will dictate the force protection measures during the movement. Rearward movement ends upon arrival in the SA.

5.55 In a similar way as described for RSOM, successful rearward movement requires movement control, logistic sustainment, FP, medical support and environmental protection support. For C2, visibility and force tracking purposes rearward movement must be supported by logistic information systems.

5.56 Rearward movement will involve:

- units moving on order in accordance with the priorities of the MN DRP;
- maintaining a level of combat readiness consistent with the operating environment through which the unit transits;
- activation of convoy support centres (CSC) if required;
- TCNs executing the principle of collective responsibility coordinated through COM JTF, while retaining responsibility for the movement of their units; and
- the battle space owners, COM JLSG and the moving unit, closely coordinating throughout the whole rearward movement.

## Staging

5.57 SAs provide the necessary facilities, sustainment and other services to support units as they prepare for dispatch. The quantity of forces being redeployed and the location of the POEs may require multiple staging areas.

5.58 In a designated SA, personnel and materiel will be separated and organized into administrative loads. Materiel will be prepared for strategic movement, which may for example include washing operations.

5.59 COM JTF, in consultation with TCNs and HNs, is to ensure that redeploying personnel and materiel comply with customs, agricultural and biological requirements of the transit and host nations.

5.60 COM JTF, advised by the joint medical branch, is to ensure that appropriate measures are taken to prevent the transmission of human, animal, and agricultural diseases by redeploying personnel and materiel.

5.61 Staging ends when the personnel and materiel leave the SA and head to the POEs for dispatch.

## Dispatch


5.62 Following completion of staging, personnel and materiel will move to the POEs (via holding areas, if required) for embarking/loading on assigned strategic lift assets. COM JLSCG is responsible for executing RMSD and will employ assigned national, HN and commercial support resources to do so.

5.63 The dispatch considerations and nodes will be similar to those mentioned for reception stage. Airports of debarkation (APODs) are the primary nodes for receiving personnel. Seaports of debarkation (SPODs) are the primary nodes for materiel and rail ports of debarkation (RPODs) can receive both personnel and materiel.

5.64 Dispatch ends once the exit of personnel and materiel from the JOA has been recorded.

## Section 4 – Strategic redeployment

5.65 During this stage national or NATO forces are returned from a JOA to a national location. The stage consists of strategic and national movement.



**Figure 5.4 – Strategic redeployment**

### Strategic movement

5.66 **Planning.** Nations and NATO submit detailed redeployment plan (DRP) to SJLSG HQ/AMCC. DRPs should include national resources and multinational solutions. SJLSG HQ/AMCC in close coordination with the TCNs will de-conflict the detailed redeployment plans and produce a de-conflicted MN DRP. It is a national responsibility to update unit movement data to maintain the plan.

5.67 The main factors of de-confliction during the strategic movement planning are:

- mission closure date;
- national decisions;

- collective responsibility;
- MN solutions; and
- economy of effort.

5.68 These factors are reflected in the DOD, which should be updated during redeployment preparation and refined throughout execution of an operation.

5.69 The nature and availability of strategic land LOC and strategic lift are significant factors for strategic movement and will therefore influence the development of the MN DRP. Strategic lift must be identified and procured in a timely manner and can be provided through:

- national strategic lift assets;
- strategic lift offered against the combined joint statement of requirements as revised for redeployment;
- shared-use agreements;
- strategic lift assets provided under cooperative use arrangements; and
- commercially chartered assets should be centrally coordination of procurement activities at the strategic level avoids a competition for transport assets between nations that could generate an inflation of prices.

5.70 **Preparatory activities.** Preparatory activities during this stage include but are not limited to:

- organize and prepare the force for strategic movement;
- allocate and prepare strategic lift resources;
- adjust the POEs for strategic redeployment;
- establish LOC (diplomatic clearances, transit agreements, identify border crossing points, remain overnight);
- enable the LOC; and
- facilitate strategic lift of NCS elements (SJLSG HQ).

5.71 **Execution.** Operate LOC, which may require the use of intermediate staging bases for strategic air transport and holding areas for surface movements in transit nations, providing logistic support.

5.72 COM JTF should enable in-theatre activity supporting the execution of strategic movement in order to maximize collective effort and efficiency.

### **National Movement**

5.73 It is a national responsibility to plan, prepare, conduct and control the movement of their forces from the ports of debarkation (PODs) to their national location.

5.74 Preparatory activities have unique elements including but not limited to:

- prepare reception capabilities at PODs; and
- activate national POCs or national movement coordination centres (NMCCs).

5.75 When NATO-owned equipment is redeployed, NATO has to ensure that the appropriate arrangements are in place.

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## Lexicon

### PART I – Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADAMS	Allied deployment and movement system
AOO	area of operations
BXP	border crossing point
C2	command and control
C4I	command, control, communications, computer and intelligence
CC	component command
CIMIC	civil-military cooperation;
CMI	civil-military interaction
CIS	communication and information systems
CJSOR	combined joint statement of requirements
COA	course of action
COM JLSG	commander joint logistic support group
COM JTF	commander joint task force
CONOPS	concept of operations
COP	common operational picture
CORSOM	coalition reception staging and onward movement
CRD	commander's required date
CSC	convoy support centre
CSO	contractor support to operations
D&RMSD	disengagement & rearward movement, staging and dispatch
DCIS	deployable communication and information systems
DDP	detailed deployment plan
DOA	desired order of arrival
DOD	desired order of departure
DRP	detailed redeployment plan
EP	environmental protection
EVE	effective visible execution
FHP	force health protection
FN	framework nation
FP	force protection
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
IO	international organization
IT	information technology
ITAS	intra-theatre airlift system
ITSS	intra-theatre sealift system
ITV	in-transit visibility
JFC	Joint force command
JLSG	Joint logistic support group
JOA	Joint operations area
JTF	Joint task force
LOC	lines of communication
LOGFAS	logistic functional area services
LOG FS	logistic functional services
MC	Military Committee

MILENG	military engineering
MN	multinational
MN DDP	multinational detailed deployment plan
MN DRP	multinational detailed redeployment plan
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MOVCON	movement control
MP	military police
MTF	medical treatment facility
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCIA	NATO Communications and Information Agency
NCISG	NATO Communication and Information Systems Group
NCS	NATO command structure
NFS	NATO force structure
NGO	non-governmental organization
NMCC	national movement coordination centre
NSE	national support element
NSPA	NATO Support and Procurement Agency
OE	operating environment
OPCOM	operational command
OPLAN	operation plan
OPP	operations planning process
POD	port of debarkation
POE	port of embarkation
RMSD	rearward movement, staging and dispatch
RSOM	reception, staging and onward movement
RSOM&I	reception, staging, onward movement and integration
SA	staging area
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SJLSG	Standing Joint Logistic Support Group
SJLSG HQ/AMCC	Standing Joint Logistic Support Group Headquarters/ Allied Movement Coordination Centre
SME	subject matter expert
STANAG	NATO standardization agreement
TA	technical arrangement
TCN	troop-contributing nation
TOA	transfer of authority
TOPFAS	tool for operations planning functional area service



## **PART II – Terms and Definitions**

### **area of operations**

An area within a joint operations area defined by the joint force commander for conducting tactical level operations.  
(NATO Agreed)

### **command**

1. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.
2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action.
3. A unit, group of units, organization or area under the authority of a single individual.
4. To dominate an area or situation.
5. To exercise a command.

(NATO Agreed)

### **communication and information systems**

Collective term for communication systems and information systems  
(NATO Agreed)

### **concept of operations**

A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his given mission.  
(NATO Agreed)

### **control**

The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, which that encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.  
(NATO Agreed)

### **deployment**

The relocation of forces from a national location to an assigned area of operations.  
(NATO Agreed; this definition modified previously existing NATO Agreed definition - terminology tracking file [2018-0134])

### **disengagement**

The process of ceasing units' operational tasks, preparing their infrastructure for handover or remediation, and their personnel and materiel for rearward movement.  
(This term and definition only applies to this publication)

### **dispatch**

The set of activity, including moving, marshalling, assigning, loading and recording of personnel and/or materiel, involved in the transition from an operational movement to a strategic movement between the staging area and the port of embarkation.  
(NATO Agreed; this is a new term and definition - terminology tracking file [2018-0135])

**environmental protection**

The prevention or mitigation of adverse environmental impacts.  
(NATO Agreed)

**force protection**

All measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force.  
(NATO Agreed)

**host nation**

A nation which, by agreement:

- receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory;
- allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or
- provides support for these purposes.

(NATO Agreed)

**host-nation support**

Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organizations that are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation's territory.  
(NATO Agreed)

**infrastructure**

Static buildings, facilities and other permanent installations required to support military capabilities.  
(This definition is only applicable in this publication)

**integration**

The process of conducting the synchronized transfer of combat-ready units into a multinational joint force.  
(NATO Agreed; this definition revalidated previously existing NATO Agreed definition - terminology tracking file [2010-1031])

**joint logistic support network**

A system of interconnecting logistic nodes, organizations, activities and sites, and their multimodal links in a joint operations area.  
(NATO Agreed)

**joint operations area**

A temporary area within a theatre of operations defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint force commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level.  
(NATO Agreed)

**lines of communication**

All the land, water, and air routes that connect an operating military force with one or more bases of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcements move.

(NATO Agreed)

**logistics**

The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

- design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposal of materiel;
- transport of personnel;
- acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities;
- acquisition or furnishing of services; and
- medical and health service support.<sup>40</sup>

(NATO Agreed)

**logistic control**

That authority granted to a NATO Commander over assigned logistics units and organizations in the joint operations area, including national support elements, that empowers them to synchronize, prioritize, and integrate their logistics functions and activities to accomplish the joint operations mission.

Notes: It does not confer authority over nationally-owned resources held by a national support element, except as agreed in the transfer of authority or in accordance with NATO principles and policies for logistics.

(NATO Agreed)

**logistic sustainment**

The process and mechanism by which sustainability is achieved and which consist of supplying a force with consumables and replacing combat losses and non-combat attrition of equipment in order to maintain the force's combat power for the duration required to meet its objectives.

(NATO Agreed)

**maintenance**

1. All actions taken to retain equipment in or to restore it to specified conditions until the end of its use, including inspection, testing, servicing, modification(s), classification as to serviceability, repair, recovery, rebuilding, reclamation, salvage and cannibalization.
2. All supply and repair action taken to keep a force in condition to carry out its mission.
3. The routine recurring work required to keep a facility (plant, building, structure, ground facility, utility system, or other real property) in such condition that it may be continuously utilized, at its original or designed capacity and efficiency, for its intended purpose.

(NATO Agreed)

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<sup>40</sup> See MC 0319/3, *NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics*.

Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Slovakia and the United States do not consider medical support to be a logistic function.

**marshalling**

The process of assembling, holding and organizing supplies and/or equipment, especially vehicles of transportation, for onward movement.

(NATO Agreed)

**military engineering**

A function in support of operations to shape the physical operating environment.

(This is a new definition and modifies an existing NATO Agreed definition and will be processed for NATO Agreed status)

**mission statement**

A clear, concise statement of the task(s) to be performed and the purpose of the mission.

(NATO Agreed)

**mobility**

A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfil their primary mission.

(NATO Agreed)

**mounting**

All preparations made in areas designated for the purpose, in anticipation of an operation. It includes the assembly in the mounting area, preparation, and maintenance within the mounting area, movement to loading points, and subsequent embarkation into ships, craft, or aircraft if applicable.

(NATO Agreed)

**movement**

The set of activities involved in the physical transfer of personnel and/or materiel as part of a military operation.

(NATO Agreed; this definition modified previously existing NATO Agreed definition - terminology tracking file [1976-0037])

**movement control**

The planning, routing, scheduling and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications.

(NATO Agreed)

**multinational**

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations, in which elements of more than one nation participate.

(NATO Agreed)

**national movement**

The movement of personnel and/or materiel from a national location to a port of embarkation or from a port of debarkation to a national location.

(This term and definition only applies to this publication and AJP-4.4)

**national support element**

Any national organization or activity that primarily supports national forces that are part of a NATO force.

Notes: A national support element is under the operational control of its national authorities and not formally part of a NATO force.

(NATO Agreed)

**onward movement**

The movement of personnel and/or materiel from a staging area to their assigned area of operations.

(NATO Agreed; this definition modified previously existing NATO Agreed - terminology tracking file [2010-1018])

**operational command**

The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary.

Notes: It does not include responsibility for administration.

(NATO Agreed)

**operational control**

The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative nor logistic control.

(NATO Agreed)

**operational movement**

The movement of personnel and/or materiel from a port of debarkation to an assigned area of operations or from an assigned area of operations to a port of embarkation.

(This term and definition only applies to this publication and AJP-4.4)

**operation order**

A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of coordinating the execution of an operation.

(NATO Agreed)

**operation plan**

A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession.

Notes:

1. It is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders.

2. The designation 'plan' is usually used instead of 'order' in preparing for operations well in advance.

3. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order.

(NATO Agreed)

**rearward movement**

The movement of personnel and/or materiel from an assigned area of operations to a staging area.

(NATO Agreed; this is a new term and - terminology tracking file [2018-0140])

**reception**

The set of activities, including receiving, offloading, recording, marshalling and moving of personnel and/or materiel, involved in the transition from a strategic movement to an operational movement between a port of debarkation and a staging area.

(NATO Agreed; this definition modified previously existing NATO Agreed - terminology tracking file [2010-1020])

**redeployment**

The relocation of forces from an area of operations to a national location.

(NATO Agreed; this definition modified previously existing not NATO Agreed - terminology tracking file [2018-0141])

**staging**

The process of temporarily holding and organizing personnel and materiel to prepare for movement.

(NATO Agreed; this definition modified previously existing NATO Agreed - terminology tracking file [2010-1023])

**strategic communications**

In the NATO military context, the integration of communication capabilities and information staff function with other military activities, in order to understand and shape the information environment, in support of NATO strategic aims and objectives.

(NATO Agreed)

**strategic deployment**

The relocation of forces from a national location to a joint operations area, consisting of both national and strategic movement.

(NATO Agreed; this is a new term and definition - terminology tracking file [2018-0142])

**strategic movement**

The movement of personnel and/or materiel from an assigned port of embarkation to a port of debarkation.

(This term and definition only applies to this publication and AJP-4.4)

**strategic redeployment**

The relocation of forces from a joint operations area to a national location, consisting of both strategic and national movements.

(NATO Agreed; this is a new term and definition - terminology tracking file [2018-0144])

**supported commander**

A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher NATO military authority and who receives forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders.

(NATO Agreed)

**supporting commander**

A commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan.

(NATO Agreed)

**sustainability**

The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives.

(NATO Agreed)

**tactical control**

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

(NATO Agreed)

**transfer of authority**

Within NATO, an action by which operational command or operational control of designated forces and/or resources, if applicable, is passed between national and NATO commands or between commanders in the NATO chain of command.

(NATO Agreed)

**transportation**

The physical transfer of people and/or materiel from one location to another.

(NATO Agreed; this definition modified previously existing NATO Agreed definition - terminology tracking file [2010-1033])

**AJP-3.13(A)(1)**