

**NATO STANDARD**

**AJP-3.24**

**ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE  
FOR THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION  
TO PEACE SUPPORT**

**Edition A, Version 1**

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**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION**

**ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION**

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1. The enclosed Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.24, Edition A, Version 1, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE SUPPORT, which has been approved by the nations in the Military Committee Joint Standardization Board (MCJSB), is promulgated herewith. The agreement of NATO nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2181.
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### Record of specific reservations

[nation]	[detail of reservation]
<p><small>Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document Database for the complete list of existing reservations.</small></p>	

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## Summary of changes

<b>Record of summary of changes for Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.24(A)</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Introduces peace support operations as part of a comprehensive approach.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Describes the relationship between peace support operations, stabilization and humanitarian assistance.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Introduces the behaviour-centric approach and narrative-led execution in relation to peace support operations.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Describes audiences and the various actors that operate within the peace support environment.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revised guidance on the employment of specific military capabilities on peace support operations, including the cyberspace domain, the electromagnetic spectrum and the space domain.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Includes new guidance on cultural property protection.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Includes a new section on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) in relation to peace support operations.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Includes and expands on the cross-cutting topics, which comprise: protection of civilians; children and armed conflict; cultural property protection; women, peace and security; conflict-related sexual violence; sexual exploitation and abuse; combating trafficking in human beings; and building integrity. Further, it introduces the notion of human security.</li> </ul>

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## Related documents

### Policy and Military Committee documents

PO(2022)0429	<i>Human Security- Approach and Guiding Principles</i> (24 June 2022)
PO(2015)0165	<i>Final Approval of “The Protection of Children in Armed Conflicts – Way Forward”</i> (20 March 2015)
PO(2016)0407	<i>Final Approval of the NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians</i> (13 June 2016)
PO(2016)0310	<i>Building Integrity Policy</i> (18 May 2016)
MC 0681	<i>Military Committee Policy on Contractor Support to Operations</i> (23 January 2020)
MC 0603/1	<i>NATO Comprehensive Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Concept</i> (11 June 2014)
MC 0166/2019	<i>NATO Intelligence Warning Systems</i>
MC 0457/3	<i>NATO Military Policy on Public Affairs</i> (28 May 2019)
MC 0668	<i>Concept for the Protection of Civilians</i> (4 July 2018)
Bi-SC Directive 086-005	<i>Implementing Cultural Property Protection in NATO Operations and Missions</i> (1 April 2019)
Bi-SC Directive 040-001	<i>Integrating Gender Perspective in the NATO Command Structure</i> (20 October 2021)

### Allied joint publications

AJP-01	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine</i>
AJP-2	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security</i>
AJP-3	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations</i>
AJP-5	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations</i>
AJP-2.1	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Procedures</i>
AJP-3.1	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Maritime Operations</i>
AJP-3.2	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations</i>
AJP-3.3	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations</i>
AJP-3.4.2	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations</i>
AJP-3.5	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations</i>
AJP-3.8	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Comprehensive Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence</i>
AJP-3.10.1	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations</i>
AJP-3.14	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection</i>
AJP-3.15	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices</i>
AJP-3.16	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA)</i>

AJP-3.18	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support to Operations</i>
AJP-3.19	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation</i>
AJP-3.20	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations</i>
AJP-3.21	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police</i>
AJP-3.22	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing</i>
AJP-3.26	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance</i>
AJP-3.27	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-insurgency (COIN)</i>
AJP-3.28	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization</i>
AJP-4.10	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support</i>
AJMedP-6	<i>Allied Joint Civil-Military Medical Interface Doctrine</i>
AJP-10	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Strategic Communications</i>
AJP-10.1	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations<sup>1</sup></i>
AJP-10.3	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Public Affairs<sup>2</sup></i>

### **Allied administrative publications**

AAP-47	<i>Allied Joint Doctrine Development</i>
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### **Additional NATO publications**

*Allied Tactical Publication-3.2.1.1, Conduct of Land Tactical Activities*  
*Allied Command Operations (ACO) Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive*  
*NATO Policy on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*  
 (2 June 2021)  
*NATO Policy on Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse*  
 (20 November 2019)  
*NATO Operations Assessment Handbook*  
*Protection of Civilians, ACO Handbook* (2021)  
*Building Integrity in Operations, ACO Handbook* (February 2020)  
*The NATO Lessons Learned Handbook, Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre,*  
 Fourth Edition (June 2022)  
*Joint Analysis Handbook, Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre, 4th Edition*  
 (February 2016)

### **Other relevant publications**

*United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (2008)  
 United Nations Human Security Unit, *Human Security Handbook* (2016)

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<sup>1</sup> Scheduled for publication in 2023.

<sup>2</sup> Scheduled for publication in 2023.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets*  
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2427, *Children and Armed Conflict* (2018)

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## Preface

### Scope

1. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.24, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support* is the NATO doctrine for the military planning, execution and assessment of the military contribution to peace support in the context of Allied joint operations. AJP-3.24 is subordinate to, and refers to: AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*; AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*; and AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations*.

### Purpose

2. Although all operations are unique, their planning and conduct can be approached in a similar manner. AJP-3.24 presents a framework for the planning and conduct of peace support operations, which includes conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. It describes how the military contribution to an impartial implementation of a political strategy is the fundamental difference separating peace support from other types of crisis response operations.

### Application

3. AJP-3.24 is intended as guidance for NATO commanders and staff, primarily at the operational level. It describes the strategic context and provides guidance on how Alliance forces operate. It also provides a reference for NATO non-military and non-NATO non-military actors operating with the Alliance.

### Linkages

4. AJP-3.24 complements, rather than duplicates, the detail that is common across all military operations and that is covered appropriately elsewhere in Allied joint doctrine. Specific AJP's that provide context for AJP-3.24 include: AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*; AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*; AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations*; AJP-3.4.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*; AJP-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction*; AJP-3.26, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance*; AJP-3.27, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-insurgency*; AJP-3.15, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices*; AJP-3.16, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance*; AJP-3.18, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support to Operations*; AJP-3.19, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation*; AJP-3.22, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing*; and AJP-3.20, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations*. Finally, planners may wish to read this in conjunction with the Allied Command Operations, *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive*.

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## Chapter 1 – Types of peace support efforts

### Section 1 – Introduction

1.1 NATO's North Atlantic Council may decide to intervene in crises beyond NATO borders to help strengthen, uphold or restore peace and security. The decision to employ NATO forces is likely to be part of a wider response from the international community using all the recognised instruments of power,<sup>3</sup> and will include other governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). NATO's part within this response may be to actively engage in the conflict<sup>4</sup> by supporting one actor over another or, alternatively, to deploy as an impartial enforcer or facilitator of a peace process. The military contribution to peace support reflects the latter approach.

1.2 Peace support can take place in the context of both international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. Peace support requires military activity to be considered in tandem with non-military activity; military and non-military actors should work together on activities which address the underlying causes of conflict to secure a sustainable peace. NATO contributes to a wider comprehensive approach combining political, military and civilian capabilities in an integrated effort to attain the desired end state. However, it should be recognized that not all actors share the same objectives or will be able to coordinate their efforts with the mandated mission. For instance, among non-military actors, humanitarian organizations are obliged to strictly follow the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, with the sole objective of alleviating human suffering and safeguarding human dignity, independently from other mandates. Peace support incorporates a spectrum of efforts that aim to:

- prevent conflict from taking place;
- restore peace and order between actors primarily through diplomatic action;
- enforce coercive measures to end hostilities following the outbreak of conflict;
- keep the peace while a ceasefire or peace settlement is implemented; and
- help extend state authority where capacity is weak, to help build a society where disputes in the future are less likely to escalate to conflict.

1.3 Peace support operations (PSOs) are instrumental in the defence of the Euro-Atlantic area by contributing to NATO's out of area response to crisis. By projecting stability through activities such as peace support, NATO can influence the environment to make it more secure and less threatening.

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<sup>3</sup> The instruments of power (diplomatic, information, military and economic) are described in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, Edition F, paragraph 1.23.

<sup>4</sup> For the purpose of this publication only, the term 'conflict' refers to violent conflict unless stated otherwise.


## Section 2 – Types of peace support efforts

1.4 Peace support is defined as: ‘efforts conducted impartially to restore or maintain peace. Note: peace support efforts can include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.’<sup>5</sup> Peace operations, including peace enforcement, peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations, often occur pursuant to a United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution or at the invitation of a legitimate governmental authority or the actors within a conflict.

1.5 Peace support encompasses a series of efforts that support international peace and security. The different types of peace support efforts do not represent a sequential process where one necessarily leads to the next; for example, peacekeeping will not necessarily be preceded by peace enforcement. However, commanders and their staff should understand how the different types of efforts relate to, complement or overlap so that their actions support, rather than undermine, an ongoing political process. Figure 1.1 is based on a figure in the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* and provides a basic conceptual framework to visualize when these types of efforts take place in and around conflict.

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<sup>5</sup> NATOTerm.



**Figure 1.1 – Basic conceptual framework for peace support highlighting how the various peace support efforts have become increasingly blurred across the continuum of conflict<sup>6</sup>**

1.6 Other actors might use peace support-related terms in a different way to NATO. Such differences should be identified early in the planning process to avoid confusion between different military and non-military actors.<sup>7</sup>

### Conflict prevention

1.7 Conflict prevention is defined as: ‘a peace support effort to identify and monitor the potential causes of conflict and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.’<sup>8</sup> The purpose of conflict prevention is to keep interstate and intra-state disputes from escalating into armed conflict. Measures taken by the international community to prevent conflict can be adopted as a crisis emerges or during periods of relative peace; the first aims to prevent imminent conflict while the other seeks to build capable, legitimate and accountable institutions that allow disputes to be managed and arbitrated without resorting to violence.

<sup>6</sup> Based upon *The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 2008, Part I, Chapter 2, page 19.

<sup>7</sup> *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 2008, provide the United Nation’s interpretation of peace operations, much of which has informed this Allied joint publication.

<sup>8</sup> NATOTerm.

1.8 Conflict prevention in the context of peace support aims to prevent imminent conflict. Specific military tasks could include: providing strategic early warning systems;<sup>9</sup> providing a comprehensive understanding of the human environment and analytical support to help identify those states most at risk of entering into conflict; or the rapid projection of Allied forces to prevent an escalation of hostilities. Where applicable, gender perspectives should be included in this early warning as it supports the identification of potential emerging crises or changes in stability. By doing so, staff will be able to recognize trends and issues that might reflect a deteriorating security situation and manifest through different behaviours of men and women, and thus contribute to developing a broad understanding of the environment. The rapid projection of Allied forces is likely to be appropriate only when other military and civilian measures are assessed to be insufficient to prevent an escalation to conflict.

1.9 Employing short-term prevention measures in isolation of a long-term political strategy is unlikely to provide sustainable peace, even though they may succeed in averting conflict. Sustainable peace is much more likely to take hold once the underlying causes of conflict have been addressed and resolved. Long-term prevention measures are likely to be incorporated into the peacebuilding process.

### **Peacemaking**

1.10 Peacemaking is defined as: ‘a peace support effort conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement, involving primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets.’<sup>10</sup> Peacemakers may represent an international organization such as the UN, a state, group of states or a regional organization. Military forces can support the peacemaking process by providing military advice to other actors and by the threat and the use of coercive force to deter malign actors from continuing to pursue conflict rather than engaging in negotiations.<sup>11</sup>

### **Peace enforcement**

1.11 Peace enforcement is defined as: ‘a peace support effort designed to end hostilities through the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Note: peace enforcement is likely to be conducted without the strategic consent of some, if not all, of the major conflicting parties.’<sup>12</sup> The purpose of peace enforcement is to restore peace and security in situations where, for example, the UN Security Council has authorized coercive action on the basis of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. Coercive action will be used to impose a compromise settlement on hostile actors. A political vision of how the proposed settlement should look will provide the basis of any intervening strategy.

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<sup>9</sup> Military Committee (MC) 0166/2019, *NATO Intelligence Warning System*.

<sup>10</sup> NATOTerm.

<sup>11</sup> Deterrence is covered in more detail in Chapter 3.

<sup>12</sup> NATOTerm.



1.12 Peace enforcement operations may require a wide range of military capabilities to coerce hostile actors to negotiate an end to hostilities. The peace support force (PSF) should be prepared to use force to physically separate these actors or to stop atrocities; the PSF should also expect to inflict and suffer casualties in the process of doing so.

1.13 Although the distinction between using military force for peace enforcement and war can be blurred at times, two important differences exist. First, the political aim in peace enforcement is to compel the actors to reach a settlement. Second, the military aim in peace enforcement is not to ensure the military victory of any one side, but to use force impartially to stop hostilities. Maintaining a perception of impartiality during the early stages of a peace enforcement operation may be difficult. This is because military force may be directed against a single actor, whose actions are the main cause of international concern and reason for intervention, for example, an actor deliberately taking actions which have adverse effects upon the civilian population.

1.14 The use of military force in peace enforcement does not resolve the causes of conflict, it can only stop hostilities. Making further progress and sustaining a peace is often the role of peacekeepers. The transition between the two types of military forces involved in these types of operations must be conditions-based rather than adhering to a pre-determined timeline. The degree of security achieved by a PSF could easily be undone by a follow-on military force with less capacity. Military planners should continually inform and influence this transition process to ensure follow-on military forces understand the operating environment and are able to support the peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes.

## **Peacekeeping**

1.15 Peacekeeping is defined as: 'a peace support effort designed to assist the implementation of a ceasefire or peace settlement and to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace. Note: peacekeeping is conducted with the strategic consent of all major conflicting parties.'<sup>13</sup> The purpose of peacekeeping is to prevent the recurrence of conflict, mitigate humanitarian crises and help to develop state authority<sup>14</sup> where state capacity and legitimacy is weak or contested. The PSF should be prepared to use force to implement the mandate.

1.16 Peacekeeping can be conducted by the UN, a regional organization or members thereof, and is likely to involve a mixture of military, police and non-military actors. The commander must plan and execute activities to ensure the PSF, alongside other peacekeeping actors, actively support the peace process.

1.17 Peacekeeping is used as part of a broader international response to provide a safe and secure environment and to assist in implementing agreements made between conflicting actors as the peace process evolves. Since peacebuilding encompasses

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<sup>13</sup> NATO Term.

<sup>14</sup> State authority is developed through the peace process.

peacekeeping, both military and non-military peacekeepers may conduct peacebuilding activities, in part, to build confidence among the local population and those conflicting actors involved in the peace process. Early peacebuilding activities may:

- assist the political process by promoting dialogue and supporting local governance;
- support disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes and the initial phases of security sector reform, policing, rule of law and justice programmes; and
- help enable a framework for longer-term development.

The overlap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities highlights the complex nature of contemporary peace support.<sup>15</sup>

### **The centrality of the peace process during peacekeeping**

1.18 Ceasefires and peace settlements are important milestones as conflicting actors agree to pursue a peaceful resolution to conflict. However, an agreement sometimes only acts as a framework from which to continue formal negotiations. During negotiations, the actors will formulate their positions based on their expectations of the post-conflict environment. Negotiations are unlikely to support the interests of all parties all of the time, which can lead to a breakdown in the peace process. This is due, in part, to the nature of the peace process as the struggle for post-conflict power ensues. Hostile actors, or splinter groups, may revert to using violence for the following reasons:

- if they feel the peace process is not serving their interests;
- to gain more leverage in the negotiation process; or
- agreements are not being implemented in a correct or timely manner.

The PSF may know little about the details as peacemaking discussions take place but should be aware that the process will be accompanied by continued violence, mistrust, fear, hope and danger.

### **Peacebuilding**

1.19 Peacebuilding is defined as: ‘a peace support effort designed to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict by addressing the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. Note: peacebuilding requires a long-term commitment and may run concurrently with other types of peace support efforts.’<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Refer to UN Security Council Resolution 2086 (2013) to learn more about the relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

<sup>16</sup> NATOTerm.

1.20 Peacebuilding, perhaps more than any other type of peace support effort, should not be viewed in isolation since its activities often overlap other efforts such as conflict prevention and peacekeeping. Peacebuilding strategies should be tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, aimed at building the capacity and legitimacy of the state and civil society to a point where the need for external assistance is diminished. Peacebuilding includes mechanisms to identify and support structures that will consolidate peace, foster a sense of confidence and well-being, and support long-term reconstruction.

1.21 Although predominantly a civilian-led and delivered endeavour, military support may be required to help build the capacity of specific security-related processes, such as security sector reform. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.28, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization* provides a detailed overview of the types of reconstruction activities that help to develop a state or region to a point where it is less likely to relapse into conflict. Whilst gender perspectives are relevant to all operations, the effective representation and participation of men and women in peacebuilding is critical to success. Women, men, girls and boys all have an influence on, and are impacted differently by, armed conflict due to their gender. Applicable gender-based considerations should be addressed in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding to ensure equitable and successful PSOs.

### **Section 3 – Relationships between peace support operations, stabilization and humanitarian assistance**

1.22 NATO conducts operations to compel certain actors to behave in a particular way and provide other actors the time and space to resolve contradictions and ameliorate attitudes. Projecting stability includes a range of crisis response operations that predominantly occur as part of peace support, security or warfighting campaign themes.<sup>17</sup> Within the continuum of competition, a wide range of operations may be undertaken according to Alliance purposes. NATO operations may be categorized with reference to specific characteristics that differentiate from one another. Operations with specific characteristics include crisis response operations such as the military assistance to peace support, humanitarian assistance,<sup>18</sup> and stabilization<sup>19</sup> among others.<sup>20</sup>

1.23 Crisis response operations contribute to conflict prevention and resolution, humanitarian efforts, or crisis management in the pursuit of declared Alliance political-strategic objectives. In crisis response operations, the military contribution represents an effort, balanced with the other instruments of power, to support the long-term solution of a crisis.

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<sup>17</sup> The campaign themes of peacetime military engagement, peace support, security and warfighting are described in AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, Edition F.

<sup>18</sup> See AJP-3.26, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance* for detail.

<sup>19</sup> See AJP-3.28, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization* for detail.


<sup>20</sup> NATO distinguishes between six types of military contributions to crisis response operations: security forces assistance; countering weapons of mass destruction; peace support; humanitarian assistance; counter-insurgency; and stabilization.

**1.24 Peace support operations.** Peace support refers to a set of different efforts, legitimated by an international mandate, that are undertaken to restore or maintain peace in accordance with the UN Charter principles. The military contributes to peace support when NATO has an impartial interest in resolving a crisis. In most cases, the military are deployed with the consent of the actors to the conflict. Impartially implementing a political strategy aimed at upholding the purposes and principles set out in the UN Charter is the fundamental difference separating peace support from other types of crisis response operations.

**1.25 Humanitarian assistance.** Humanitarian assistance is defined: ‘as part of an operation, the use of available military resources to assist or complement the efforts of responsible civil actors in the operational area or specialized civil humanitarian organizations in fulfilling their primary responsibility to alleviate human suffering.’<sup>21</sup> Humanitarian assistance is conducted in response to both natural and human-made disasters, including as a consequence of conflict or flight from political, religious or ethnic persecution. The military contribution to humanitarian assistance is limited in scope and duration and is intended to support the efforts of the host nation civil authorities, international organizations and NGOs that have the primary responsibility to provide assistance. Humanitarian assistance is conducted at the request of the host nation or the agency leading humanitarian efforts; it may be either in the context of an ongoing operation or as an independent task. The primary objective of humanitarian assistance is to save lives, alleviate suffering, provide immediate relief and urgent aid, and maintain human dignity during and after disaster and crises. It may therefore be distinguished from stabilization and from peace support efforts, which both seek to address the underlying socio-economic, political and security factors that may have led to a crisis or emergency. Given the primacy of the political process in peace support, it is important to understand that military contributions to humanitarian assistance may be perceived as controversial and, in some cases, undesirable. Therefore, the position of the humanitarian international organizations and NGOs must be well understood by the PSF and any second order consequences considered before executing any military support to humanitarian assistance. Figure 1.2 builds upon the UN’s conceptual framework presented in Figure 1.1 to illustrate how humanitarian assistance can overlap various peace support efforts. Further detailed information on the military contribution to humanitarian assistance can be found in AJP-3.26, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance*.

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<sup>21</sup> NATOTerm.




**Figure 1.2 – The linkages between different peace support efforts and humanitarian assistance**

1.26 **Stabilization.** Stabilization is normally a civilian-led process that commonly takes place during or after crisis in fragile states that have lost the capacity to govern themselves effectively. It is best undertaken by those actors and organizations that have the relevant expertise, mandate and competences required. The military contribution to stabilization will generally focus on providing a safe and secure environment to allow reconstruction efforts to take place. While many aspects of stabilization are intended to be undertaken by non-military actors and organizations, there may be situations where the military is obliged to assume temporary responsibility for areas of this activity. Stabilization activities include support to establishing long-term stability and strengthened governance, local capacity building and re-establishment of the rule of law. Stabilization contributes to establishing the basis for economic, human, health and social development. The long-term goal is to promote those processes that will lead to lasting stability and self-sustaining peace.

1.27 **Stabilization and peace support operations.** In many crises consent of the actors toward the PSO will be questionable. Forces will have to contribute to PSOs in scenarios where other actors are openly hostile to their presence. In some cases, there will be armed actors who are not part of the original peace agreement, whilst in others there will be no peace agreement in place. In such instances a military stabilization intervention to support the host nation's legitimate government may be required. The military contribution to stabilization seeks to address instability by providing a safe and secure environment from which the core state functions can be reformed and developed. This activity will foster the

host nation's governance capacity to manage a stable, sustainable and functioning state. Thus, although stabilization and PSOs aim to re-establish/maintain a stable and sustainable peace (including social and economic development), PSOs are more focused toward supporting conflict resolution and are characterized by the principle of impartiality, which is not an element of stabilization. Therefore, much of the information contained in AJP-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction*<sup>22</sup> reflects outcomes similar to those sought during certain PSOs, and it should be read in conjunction with this publication. Figure 1.3 provides a conceptual framework to visualize the relationship between peace support efforts and stabilization.



**Figure 1.3 – Relationship between peace support efforts and stabilization**

<sup>22</sup> AJP-3.4.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction* will be reissued as AJP-3.28, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization*.

## Chapter 2 – The nature and principles of peace support

### Section 1 – The nature of peace support

#### Peace support as part of an overarching political strategy

2.1 An impartial response by the international community to manage conflict should be based on an overarching political strategy that combines a mixture of peace and security tools. For example, a strategy that not only aims to stop hostilities but also aims to resolve disputes so that future conflict is less likely. The success of a single peace support effort used in isolation of a wider strategy is likely to be short-lived, possibly leading to the stagnation or breakdown of any peace process it serves. Peace support operations (PSOs) may be geographically and time bound; short-lived endeavours projected out of area to address an imminent crisis. Conversely, PSOs can be conducted within Supreme Allied Commander Europe's area of responsibility and could be conducted on an enduring basis where the contradiction at the heart of the conflict is immutable.<sup>23</sup>

#### Peace support as a comprehensive approach

2.2 A purely military-resourced peace support effort is unlikely to achieve sustainable peace. Peace support requires the combined efforts of military and non-military actors operating in a coordinated and, where possible, collaborative way to achieve commonly agreed strategic objectives; NATO refers to this concept as a comprehensive approach.<sup>24</sup> It should be noted that some actors (such as organizations applying the humanitarian principles and other impartial organizations) may not want or be able to be part of the comprehensive approach, nevertheless they are key in ensuring a response to the basic needs of the population and are often willing to engage in constructive dialogue with NATO and the contested authorities.

2.3 The North Atlantic Council (NAC) will determine the requirement and extent of the military contribution, as well as the strategic military objectives in peace support. For example, the disarmament of, or halting hostilities between, actors as part of an agreed peace process. While the proportion of military support varies according to the nature of the peace support effort being conducted, the military focus remains on the security aspects of the mission.

#### Peace support and deterrence

2.4 Adopting a military approach that is based on deterrence works well in peace support because it is more easily presented as legitimate and impartial, especially to an external audience. The use of force in peace support should only be pursued as a last resort. The military role in support of deterrence is essential and complements a strategy

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<sup>23</sup> Contradiction describes an issue over which conflicting beliefs and aims exist and there might be disagreement. See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*.

<sup>24</sup> NATOTerm.

that also includes diplomatic, information and economic measures. Such measures should be tailored to a specific context and include both incentive and disincentive measures to achieve strategic objectives. Considerations regarding the application of deterrence measures are addressed in Chapter 3.

### **Peace support and the behaviour-centric approach**

2.5 The behaviour-centric approach is the primary tenet that guides commanders on the selection and maintenance of their objectives. This approach focuses planning and execution of activity from all levels of operations to influence the attitudes and behaviour of targeted audiences to attain the end state. Those involved in planning PSOs must consider an especially broad set of audiences, which will include unsupportive and hostile actors, their respective allies, influential diaspora and the wider international community, who must all be assured of the peace support force's (PSF's) impartiality.

### **Behaviour-centric approach and gender perspective**

2.6 It must be recognised that women, men, girls and boys have influence on, and are impacted by, armed conflict differently due to their gender. As part of a behaviour-centric approach, gender perspectives (i.e., considering gender-based differences between women and men as reflected in their social roles and interactions, in the distribution of power and access to resources) must be integrated throughout the planning and execution of a PSO, from initial indicators and warnings through to transition.

### **The narrative-led execution and peace support operations**

2.7 Every action creates an effect in the information environment that will influence multiple audiences, be they global, national or within a theatre of operations. The information that audiences receive is often cluttered, so they use narratives to give meaning to actions and facts. One narrative will often compete with other narratives. If the facts are not irrefutable, it is often the credibility of the narrative that is decisive in influencing the perception of different audiences.

2.8 The narrative of a PSO will be determined by the respective mandate; military activity will be a supporting narrative because a PSO can only provide the time and space for a peaceful solution, as in itself it cannot resolve the contradiction at the heart of the conflict. The narrative is a key element that distinguishes peace enforcement and peacemaking from other security tasks, as the PSO narrative is one of maintaining stability, underpinned by legitimacy and impartiality. A PSO's narrative can, and will, be manipulated by actors in the conflict, as well as more general adversaries who may perceive an opportunity to discredit NATO. A perception (real or imagined) that a PSF favours a particular belligerent will be ripe for exploitation. Narrative-led execution is key to ensuring that operational and tactical actions support the desired end state. Therefore, military activities must be conducted within the context of the narrative, rather than in ignorance and subsequently being forced to manage the consequences. Protecting the perception of impartiality may require the military to forego tactical opportunities to ensure integrity of the



narrative. The Alliance must demonstrate consistency in actions, images and words, ensuring they always reflect the strategic and micro narratives, and thus pre-empting any attempts to exploit gaps between what NATO does, shows and says.

### **Manoeuvrist approach**

2.9 The manoeuvrist approach provides the mindset to achieve behaviour-centric outcomes by exploiting the inherent friction, uncertainty and human fallibilities found within the nature of competition. It represents an indirect approach that seeks to out-think and out-manoeuvre unsupportive or hostile actors (rivals, adversaries and enemies), and discourage stakeholders from becoming unsupportive or hostile actors; it focuses on degrading their will to contest. The manoeuvrist approach is as relevant to PSOs as any other military operation. Degrading the actor's will to fight and encouraging their compliance and participation in the peace process will be key to a successful military outcome and this is unlikely to be achieved, or indeed allowed within the mandate, by more attritional or destructive approaches.

### **Peace support within the wider operational context of campaign themes**

2.10 Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP)-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine* (Edition F) maintains the concept of campaign themes, which includes peace support. These campaign themes (peacetime military engagement, peace support, security and warfighting) can be linked to the continuum of competition. The campaign themes reflect the political context and strategic narrative that guides the ends, ways and means requirements. There is the possibility that the nature of an operation may change over time. For example, an operation may start as peace support but the theme would no longer be peace support if NATO decides to support one party over another. Such a change would require a decision by the NAC, including its guidance for changing the operation plan. Strategic and operational military planners should develop and monitor likely indicators and warnings that would alert the PSF commander to such changes in the operation.

### **End state**

2.11 The end state is the NAC statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation for NATO's involvement. An end state is reached though the attainment of objectives.<sup>25</sup> The specific end state for the different types of peace support efforts will vary and reflect the purpose of the operation. However, the overarching end state represents a sustainable peace, enabled by a political strategy. For the military, overall success may be measured by the achievement of objectives that relate to improvements in the security environment that enable a political resolution to the conflict. However, success will often relate to how the local population perceives their security; the aim may be to achieve a situation where violence is reduced to levels that are manageable for legitimate authorities and acceptable to the society or region of crisis. The desired NATO end state must be clearly articulated before an operation commences.

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<sup>25</sup> See AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, Edition F, paragraph 4.25, page 91.

## Security transition

2.12 The creation of a sustainable secure environment will ultimately rest with the individual state. Without locally delivered security and justice, the reconciliation, reconstruction and development programmes necessary to create and sustain peace are unlikely to be effective. A successful security transition will help support peacebuilding activities in a society that will need to function without a large international military presence. Security transition planning should reflect a politically led country transition strategy and help inform the early stages of any security sector reform programmes. The planning for the transition of security functions should start from the earliest stages of NATO's operations planning process. Security transition is considered further in Chapter 3.

## The duration of peace support

2.13 Each peace support effort will be unique, based on the context of the particular crisis, the mandate and the declared NATO end state. The duration of any NATO commitment is likely to be outcome-based and can last for a long period of time: endurance and strategic patience are often required. However, a peace support effort may be terminated before conflict resolution is achieved due to a lack of international will and determination, or the unwillingness of local actors to resolve their issues.

## The relationship between the peace support force and the state

2.14 All peace support efforts require a legal basis. In some cases, this will be the consent of the territorial state that is party to a conflict. In cases where consent is required, the state is in the unique position of being able to demand the departure of international forces from its sovereign area. Therefore, maintaining this consent relies on the intervening forces having a good, or at least working, relationship with the state. Managing this relationship, while continuing to implement the mandate impartially, will be a continual challenge for both military and non-military leadership.<sup>26</sup> This is especially difficult if the state is seen to be unrepresentative or non-inclusive of its society and/or disrespectful of human rights and international humanitarian law. This relationship will invariably differ for each crisis and is likely to change over time as the state acquires greater influence and legitimacy.

2.15 The extent and character of NATO's interaction at all levels with the state should reflect the political strategy, be informed by the United Nations (UN) mandate or other respective legal basis and be directed by NAC directives. NATO's PSF commanders need to understand how they are expected to interact with the state, especially its security forces, during the different types of peace support efforts and how this relationship can either support or possibly undermine the peace process. In this sense, understanding the civil environment is essential: understanding and being sensitive to local customs, traditions,

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<sup>26</sup> This is especially true if the Peace Support Force (PSF) has been given a mandate to protect civilians from imminent violence.

culture and ways of life is crucial for mission success. In a politically sensitive environment, a violation of a local law or custom can seriously undermine the mission.

2.16 A NATO PSF should have mechanisms to determine how PSF commanders will respond to abuses and violations of international law allegedly committed by local security forces. Such mechanisms should include:

- mandatory reporting to the NATO chain of command of abuses/violations of the law by local security forces when witnessed by a NATO PSF or when confronted with credible allegations of such behaviour; and
- maintaining a database of alleged abuses by local security forces.

### Host-nation support

2.17 Host-nation support (HNS) is defined as: ‘civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organizations that are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation’s territory.’<sup>27</sup> HNS varies depending on the context of the peace support effort, whether the state has given its consent to an intervention, and the impact such support would have on the intervening actors’ impartial status. For example, the amount of HNS sought by intervening actors during conflict prevention is likely to be greater than that received during a peace enforcement operation. The degree of HNS is likely to be commensurate with the host nation’s capacity to provide support and the genuine desire of the state to enter into a peace process; it will also need to be compliant with the content of any existing status of forces agreement (SOFA). HNS might be arranged through the host nation, which acts as an agent on behalf of the deploying force. The NATO commander may be able to use local markets directly through respective contracting. In both cases it is important to avoid a competition for scarce resources between military and non-military actors and the local population. As one of the UN’s cross-cutting themes adopted by the Alliance, the PSF commander should also ensure that all activities are conducted in accordance with the principles of NATO’s *Military Concept of Building Integrity in Operations* to reduce the risk of corruption and to promote good governance, transparency and accountability.

2.18 HNS from other countries, possibly located in the immediate region of the crisis, could include consent for overflight and/or transit arrangements of their sovereign territories. For further guidance on HNS see AJP-4.3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Host-Nation Support*.

### Legal framework

2.19 Each military contribution to peace support requires a legal basis due to the restrictions of international law. This legal basis is primarily an authorising UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) in accordance with Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter.

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<sup>27</sup> NATOTerm.

Furthermore, the consent of the territorial state actors to the conflict is a legally recognised reason to act on the territory of another nation. Military contribution to peace support must comply with international law (international humanitarian law, international human rights law, international criminal law, etc.), the domestic law of contributing nations and the law of the host nation. Additionally, the PSF commander is bound by further frameworks providing other legal, political and operational requirements. These are, for example, the operation plan, concept of operations, rules of engagement, national caveats, orders and agreements with the territorial states party to the conflict.

2.20 A UNSCR is likely to be valid for a limited duration, after which a new resolution will be required. The renewal will be based on the situation and will require NATO (if involved) to keep the UN Security Council (UNSC) regularly informed on the implementation of its mandate. The UNSC may also adopt a number of cross-cutting thematic resolutions, such as the support and protection of individuals *hors de combat*, wounded and sick detainees, as well as the elderly, women and children. The Alliance adopts several of the UN's cross-cutting themes and cross-cutting topics into NATO policy and doctrine. The cross-cutting topics are:

- protection of civilians;
- children and armed conflict;
- cultural property protection;
- women, peace and security;
- conflict-related sexual violence;
- combating trafficking in human beings;
- sexual exploitation and abuse; and
- building integrity.

### **Understanding a United Nations mandate**

2.21 In international law, a mandate may include binding obligations issued from an international intergovernmental organization (such as the UN) to member states who that are bound to follow the instructions of the organization. A UN mandate may also call upon or authorize intervening actors to perform certain tasks on behalf of the UNSC. Although mandates will be shaped by the UNSC, they will also reflect the concerns and interests of the states or organizations involved in resolving the crisis and usually the government of the country in which the conflict is taking place. Understanding the importance of the mandate and the military's role therein is a critical aspect of the planning process.

2.22 Military operations must be planned and executed in accordance with applicable international laws and account for individual NATO members' national laws and caveats. The legal framework for military intervention in certain types of peace support efforts, for example, peacekeeping operations, may also include a combination of other arrangements

and laws. These usually include a SOFA or applicable host nation's government's laws. Legal personnel will advise the commander and their staff on all legal issues. NATO intervention will be based on the use of minimum force dictated by crisis-specific rules of engagement as authorized by the NAC and in observance of international law, including international human rights law as applicable.

## **Section 2 – Audiences in the peace support environment**


### **Audiences**

2.23 People are grouped into audiences according to their attitude and behaviour towards the attainment of the end state. There are many types of state and non-state audiences; examples include, but are not restricted to, (host) nations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, transnational organizations, interest groups, irregular groups and individual people. Audiences' objectives will vary, they may be shared but often they will be different and complex.

2.24 Audiences should be segmented to enable more focused understanding and subsequent targeting of capabilities to achieve the desired behavioural changes.<sup>28</sup> NATO segments audiences into three general categories – public, stakeholder and actor – depending on their ability to affect the politically agreed end state as depicted in Figure 2.1. Although a PSO will have to consider audiences more widely (for example, a PSO will probably have stakeholder groups such as interested diaspora in many countries), for the purposes of this document, only actors are considered in detail here. Further information on public and stakeholder audiences can be found in AJP-10.1, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*.

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<sup>28</sup> For more information see AJP-10.1, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, Edition A, paragraph 4.13.



**Figure 2.1 – Audiences in the operating environment**

2.25 **Actor.** An actor is defined as: ‘an individual, group or entity whose actions are affecting the attainment of the end state.’<sup>29</sup> NATO recognizes six subdivisions of actors that operate across the continuum of conflict as shown in Figure 2.1.<sup>30</sup> A detailed analysis of the actors should be conducted as part of a pre-deployment strategic assessment to determine how the PSF should interact with others in pursuit of a comprehensive approach to resolve conflict. Factors for consideration could include organizational mandates, aims, goals, resources, interests and capacity. Some actors will have local, regional and international footprints which can depend on a variety of factors, such as the interests at stake, while other actors, particularly those in the commercial sector, can rapidly traverse from being local to international (for example, social media companies). For further guidance on the interaction with non-military actors see AJP-3.19, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation*.

### International organizations

2.26 An international organization is defined as: ‘an intergovernmental, regional or global organization governed by international law and established by a group of states, with international juridical personality given by international agreement, however characterized, creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of fulfilling a given function and pursuing common aims.’<sup>31</sup> The most prominent international organization is the UN, but

<sup>29</sup> NATOTerm.

<sup>30</sup> See AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, Edition F, Chapter 4, for further detail.

<sup>31</sup> NATOTerm.

there are many others that, context dependent, may be vital to the implementation of a PSO mandate such as the African Union and the European Union. International organizations are established by treaties, which provide their legal status. They are subject to international law and can enter into agreements between themselves and with member states.

**2.27 United Nations.** The UN is an international organization committed to maintaining international peace and security. Due to its unique international character, and the powers vested in its founding Charter, the organization can take action on a wide range of issues, including authorizing military intervention. UN authorization for military intervention in peace support can be provided without the consent of the state, for example, in the case of peace enforcement. However, gaining the consent of the state remains paramount in other types of peace support efforts. In a PSO environment, the PSF may interact with the UN in three key areas.

a. **United Nations missions.** A UN mission is the UNSCR mandated body implemented to conduct UN peace operations. Headed by a Special Representative to the Secretary-General of the UN, modern UN missions are generally comprised of a civilian component, a police component and a military component (the UN force). A UN mission's military force is always composed of military forces provided by different troop-contributing nations. In mission areas where a UN mission with a force component is established, a NATO PSO may support or complement the UN force's efforts.

b. **United Nations Country Team.** A UN country team (UNCT) is comprised of representatives from UN agencies, funds and programmes and may be present in a crisis area before the deployment of a PSF. The appointed resident coordinator of the UNCT ensures UN interagency coordination and decision-making at the country level and supports peacebuilding and long-term development activities. Some of the members that constitute a UNCT may come from: United Nations Development Programme, United Nations High Commissioner's Office for Refugees, United Nations Children's Fund, World Health Organization, and the World Food Programme. Interaction with the UNCT should be made through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), especially in instances where military action may cause humanitarian impact or is required to support humanitarian operations. Activity should be coordinated through established fora or clusters; PSF J9/civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) will facilitate interaction where appropriate and possible.

c. **United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.** The PSF may interact with the UN through OCHA, should this forum be established to deal with a concurrent humanitarian crisis. The mission of OCHA is to: mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies; advocate for the rights of people in need; promote preparedness and prevention;

and facilitate sustainable solutions. As the UN focal point for civil-military coordination of humanitarian affairs activities, within OCHA, the Civil Military Coordination section ensures the effective use of military and civil defence assets, establishes civil-military coordination mechanisms to facilitate interaction and cooperation and to meet OCHA's mandate. OCHA can quickly deploy specialized humanitarian personnel to support efforts on the ground. OCHA's core functions are coordination, policy, advocacy, information management and humanitarian financing. OCHA implements a gender-responsive approach into all these core functions.

## Humanitarian organizations

2.28 Humanitarian actors are civilians, whether national or international, UN or non-UN, governmental or non-governmental, who are engaged in humanitarian action. The humanitarian community is not a constituted system with a defined membership. It comprises many humanitarian organizations that differ considerably depending on their individual role and *raison d'être*. Humanitarian action comprises assistance, protection of basic rights and advocacy activities in response to humanitarian needs resulting from armed conflicts, complex emergencies and/or natural disasters. The primary objective of humanitarian action is to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity. Humanitarian agencies must work towards a set of core principles, at the very least the principles of humanity and impartiality; this requires humanitarian aid be undertaken on needs alone and not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint. In addition, some humanitarian organizations (such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)) respect the principles of neutrality and independence. For these organizations, adhering to humanitarian principles and being perceived as doing so, both by the people they seek to help and by all parties to the conflict, is critical to ensure access to affected people in times of armed conflict. It can also make a significant difference to the security of both humanitarian personnel and the people they assist. Humanitarian actors will have to constantly preserve their legitimacy based on the perception of the local population. Further information on humanitarian assistance is provided in AJP-3.26, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance*.

2.29 **International Committee of the Red Cross.** Based on the mandate entrusted by the states that are party to the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent humanitarian organization established under Swiss law and whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC also endeavours to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening international humanitarian law. To achieve this, the ICRC engages with state authorities, international organizations, the diplomatic community, academics and armed actors on ways to improve the acceptance, respect and national compliance with international humanitarian law, and on critical humanitarian issues. The ICRC is a member of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.



**2.30 Non-governmental organizations.** An NGO is defined as: ‘a private, not-for-profit, voluntary organization with no governmental or intergovernmental affiliation, established for the purpose of fulfilling a range of activities, in particular development-related projects or the promotion of a specific cause, and organized at local, national, regional or international level.’<sup>32</sup> Examples include: meeting humanitarian needs; promoting education; health care; economic development; environmental protection; human rights; conflict resolution; and encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. NGOs are essential actors in the international response to crises, humanitarian emergencies, natural disasters and violent conflicts, but it is important to note not all will necessarily have an official status or a mandate for its existence or its activities. A proportion of the NGO community will most likely avoid direct interaction with any military force, regardless of nationality, to pursue their own objectives and to preserve their impartiality and neutrality. The PSF must understand and accept this premise; however, they may have to, as a last resort and in accordance with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's guidelines,<sup>33</sup> assist humanitarian efforts if the need should arise.

### **Governmental organizations**

**2.31** Many states choose to contribute to PSOs by providing foreign aid, administrated through governmental organizations (such as the United States Agency for International Development). The degree to which these organizations wish to integrate with the PSF will vary depending upon nature of their objectives and how they wish to be perceived by various audiences.

### **Non-NATO international armed military forces**

**2.32** Other non-NATO countries may contribute military forces to a conflict or post-conflict environment in which NATO forces are operating. Conversely, non-NATO military forces may already be operating in the crisis area before the arrival of NATO forces. For example, military forces assigned to a UN peacekeeping mission or military forces supporting bilateral capacity-building programmes such as security sector reform.

### **Regional organizations**

**2.33** Regional organizations are international organizations that are composed of member states whose membership is characterized by common interests in a given region. Examples of regional organizations include NATO, the European Union, the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of American States, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. These organizations: are established by treaties among their members; enjoy international legal status; and can enter into agreements. Under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the UN may decide to

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<sup>32</sup> NATO Term.

<sup>33</sup> The Inter-Agency Standing Committee is a humanitarian coordination forum created by the UN General Assembly. Details of its guidelines can be found at: [interagencystandingcommittee.org](http://interagencystandingcommittee.org)

authorize a regional organization to conduct peace support on its behalf, for example, peace enforcement or peacekeeping.

### **States acting with a standalone mission/operation**

2.34 States can intervene and contribute on a bilateral basis with the consent of the host nation. As such, NATO forces may be operating in an environment where other states (some of whom could be NATO) and the host nation may be conducting activities on a bilateral basis.

### **Local security actors**

2.35 The establishment of a sustainable peace is dependent on the will of the conflicting actors to implement a negotiated settlement. This settlement should result in the authority, legitimacy and capability of local security forces to provide security in accordance with international law. Such forces should be used where appropriate, thereby allowing international armed forces to focus their efforts on the most vulnerable areas that present the greatest risk to the peace process. The impact on the legitimacy and impartial status of the PSF should always be considered before the host nation's government's security forces are included in any security plan. Such circumstances are likely only in certain types of peace support efforts, for example, peacebuilding or the later stages of peacekeeping.

2.36 **Law enforcement agencies.** Restoring the rule of law is fundamental to establishing peace and stability. The rule of law includes three interrelated fields: law enforcement, judicial and penal. All three must be addressed concurrently, with a viable body of law, if the rule of law is to be established. The state is primarily responsible for all law enforcement, including law enforcement toward the civilian population. However, the PSF might need to provide support early in the crisis if other international law enforcement actors are not present, local capacity is exceeded or the state is unwilling to perform such tasks.<sup>34</sup> Responsibility for non-military activities should be handed over to the appropriate authorities as soon as the security conditions allow.

2.37 **Militia.** The term militia is widely used to describe local forces that are usually associated with an ethnic group, tribe, region or individual leader. Such forces can have views ranging from being sympathetic to the aims of the PSF, to being neutral or to being overtly hostile; these views can vary internally within a militia and vary over time.

2.38 **Private military and security companies.** Increasingly, private military and security companies (PMSCs) are being employed by a wide range of actors to provide services ranging through direct combat,<sup>35</sup> area security, close protection, intelligence,

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<sup>34</sup> The PSF may include stability policing units (SPU). For more details see AJP-3.22, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing*.

<sup>35</sup> In accordance with Military Committee (MC) Policy 0681, *Military Committee Policy on Contractor Support to Operations*, 23 January 2020, Private Military Security Company (PMSC) personnel will not be employed by NATO to take a direct part in hostilities when accompanying NATO forces on operations.

training and logistic support. The activities of PMSCs may complement or hinder peace support efforts both through their direct activity and through the impact that such activity has on the PSF's legitimacy. A risk exists that the mission's legitimacy will be diminished if PMSCs act inappropriately and the assumption is made by the local population or conflicting actors that they are part of, or the responsibility of, the PSF. Conversely, positive engagement with PMSCs may influence both their behaviour and their activities, and may also offer other advantages, including access to intelligence. If NATO is to work alongside PMSCs it is imperative the legal status, rules of engagement and accountability of PMSCs are clearly established. Further detail can be found in Military Committee (MC) Policy 0681, *NATO Military Committee Policy on Contractor Support to Operations*.

## **Malign actors**

**2.39 Criminals and organized crime.** Criminal actors will be prevalent in areas of instability, where the absence or lack of the rule of law provides significant opportunity for financial gain. These criminal actors may be agnostic to conflict (simply exploiting an opportunity) or can be inextricably linked to a particular belligerent, in effect a proxy fundraising organization. Organized crime is a category of transnational, national or local groupings of highly centralized enterprises run by criminals who intend to engage in illegal activity, most commonly for money and profit. Governmental organizations can be involved in organized crime. Such groups can be used as proxies in a conflict between two states or non-state actors where neither entity directly engages the other. While this can encompass a breadth of armed confrontation, its core definition hinges on two separate powers using external strife to somehow attack the interests or territorial holdings of the other. Organized crime could enhance the capabilities of terrorists, some of whom could turn to criminals for cyberspace activities, weapons, the trafficking of people, human organs and, false documents, hard currency and other contraband (for example, historic artifacts, energy resources smuggling). Similarly, radicalized groups may support organized crime, terrorism or violent extremism. A commander is unlikely to function effectively without a credible level of understanding of the mission's mandate, its purpose and the environment in which the mission is taking place. This should include the information environment assessment, which identifies audiences and their cultural narratives, existing perceptions and beliefs, and the linguistic nuances they use to communicate with each other.<sup>36</sup>

**2.40 Terrorism.** Terrorism is defined as: 'the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.'<sup>37</sup> Terrorists may be present during a PSO seeking a variety of outcomes, be that political change in support of one side of the conflict or another, or objectives explicitly linked to the PSF, rather than the wider conflict (for

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<sup>36</sup> For further information refer to AJP-2, *Allied Joint Doctrine Publication for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security*, Edition B, page 1-5.

<sup>37</sup> NATOTerm.

example, they could be state-sponsored adversaries of NATO seeking to exploit an opportunity where they see NATO as vulnerable).

### **Section 3 – Principles of peace support**

2.41 The principles for the military contribution to peace support supplement the principles of projecting stability highlighted in AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine* (Edition F): clear political guidance; develop effective statehood; cooperative effort; and sustainability. An acute comprehension of the wider context of the crisis is vital to ensuring these principles are applied appropriately by the PSF.

#### **Political primacy**

2.42 Achieving an enduring peaceful settlement between actors requires a political solution. Military commanders and staff must endeavour to understand the political environment in which they operate and ensure their advice, decisions and actions support, rather than undermine, the political imperative. This may be a challenge as the political process moves in a very dynamic and unpredictable way. NATO forces should retain planning processes that are flexible enough to support and reflect the political strategy and can be readjusted to exploit political opportunities as the peace process develops, for example, helping to implement agreements made during peace negotiations.

#### **The rule of law**

2.43 The rule of law (based on three pillars of law enforcement, judicial and penal) must all be addressed concurrently, as they are fundamental to legitimate governance. These may be institutionalized in varying forms depending on the social, cultural and political characteristics of the given society. The military can, and should where appropriate, support the development of the rule of law. Notwithstanding this, development of the judicial and penal pillars will largely depend on non-military judicial partners and the military should expect to be in a supporting role. Development of the rule of law should be considered with a gender perspective to ensure that due consideration is given to everyone and that women are ensured equal and meaningful participation in conflict resolution.

#### **Consent**

2.44 The level of consent given by the actors' leadership reflects the degree of acceptance of external intervention in what is effectively an internal or regional dispute. The type of peace support effort is partly determined by the level of consent given by the actors to an intervening force; for example, peacekeeping requires the consent of the actors within a conflict, whereas peace enforcement does not. However, without the consent and cooperation of the actors there cannot be a constructive political process. Therefore, once given, the promotion and nurturing of consent is paramount. A lack of consent from any one actor may result in non-compliance to UNSCRs or peace settlements, possibly leading to conflict and a breakdown in the peace process.

2.45 Judgements concerning the degree of consent should be made with reference to its durability and reliability with respect to the actors. While consent may be given at the strategic level,<sup>38</sup> this may not be reflected at the tactical level where local groups might disagree with their leadership and adopt a stance that is hostile or obstructive to the implementation of the mandate. Consent cannot be imposed upon the actors but must form the basis of a desire and a will to enter into a peace process. The peace process is likely to be a dynamic process in which consent invariably changes by varying degrees over time and will have to be constantly negotiated between the peacemakers and hostile and unsupportive actors. Nurturing the consent of all actors is a role conducted primarily through diplomatic means, but also at all levels of command across the PSF. The PSF should support this function by considering the possible impact its actions could have on the consent of the actors and apply mitigation measures as necessary.<sup>39</sup>

## Impartiality

2.46 The impartial approach adopted by a PSF distinguishes peace support from other types of campaign themes and plays an important role in maintaining consent of the actors. If the use of force is necessary against a particular actor, it should only be because of what that actor is doing (or not doing) in relation to the mandate, rather than seeking to defeat a specific enemy. Convincing the different conflicting actors that an impartial approach is being applied can be difficult as each will view PSF activity from their own perspective; for example, a PSF may be tasked to protect civilians in an area that also includes the state's security forces. Whatever the intentions of the PSF, even if mandated, such collaboration or collocation may be perceived as partial by other conflicting parties.

a. **Managing the perception of impartiality.** Accusations of bias should be refuted by the PSF to convey and promote their impartial status. Finding ways to manage and measure perceptions will be a constant struggle, albeit a necessary function for all commanders. Failing to maintain impartiality at the tactical level could affect not only the legitimacy of the PSF but also inadvertently and unfairly empower one actor over another.

b. **Transparency.** A PSF should, where appropriate, be transparent in its actions to aid the perception of impartiality. Challenging the impartial status of a mission is more difficult if the actors involved are aware of the operational mandate, mission, intentions and likely techniques to be used by the PSF. Such communication must be tailored in a way that is understood by the local population to reinforce the PSF's narrative. A failure to communicate intent will foster suspicion and may prevent the development of the trust and confidence upon which the long-term success of peace support depends. Implementing an active information strategy, reinforced by CIMIC and an effective liaison system reinforced with a gender perspective will help demonstrate transparency. However, force protection requirements, especially in

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<sup>38</sup> Consent at the strategic level reflects an actor's commitment to a peace settlement.

<sup>39</sup> For example, by wargaming, which uses a scenario-based warfare model to assist decision-making, improve understanding, explore the art of the possible and highlight weaknesses in plans or assumptions.

the conduct of peace enforcement, is likely to render complete transparency inappropriate.

c. **Impartiality, not neutrality.** Impartiality must not be confused with neutrality. Impartiality requires a degree of judgement against the principles outlined above to implement the mandate. Neutrality, on the other hand, promotes a passive approach and consequently could limit the contribution made by the PSF. The conduct of the PSF during peace support should be impartial in relation to the actors but should never be neutral in the execution of the mission.

### The use of force in peace support

2.47 The use of force should be restricted to self-defence and defence of the mandate only, such as the protection of civilians under the imminent threat of violence. The authority to use force in peace support will be provided by the legal basis, reflected in the mission's rules of engagement and communicated clearly within the agreed narrative. The political and military will of the Alliance to use force may help provide credible deterrence to persuade all actors to negotiate a ceasefire or peace settlement, or to deter them and other actors from adopting spoiling behaviour towards the peace process.<sup>40</sup>

2.48 Military force should be applied prudently, judiciously, with discipline and as a last resort when all lesser means have failed to curtail the use of violence by the parties involved. A single act could have significant military and political consequences. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balancing of the need for security, achieving military objectives and attaining the end state. When used, force should be necessary and proportionate and designed to resolve and defuse a crisis and prevent further escalation.<sup>41</sup> Intermediate force capabilities – such as non-lethal weapons – provide means to take effective action while reducing risks of undesired collateral damage, including civilian casualties, and provide additional means to manage escalation/de-escalation. Other capabilities can also deter escalation (for example, non-lethal directed energy, cyberspace operations, information activities or electromagnetic warfare). In all cases, the decision to use force should include precautions to avoid, minimize and mitigate the negative effects on the civilian population that might arise from NATO and NATO-led military operations and, when applicable, to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats of physical violence by other actors. Options other than the use of force should be considered and used where possible and appropriate. Clear communication to explain actions taken should be made as soon as possible with a view to maintaining consent.

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<sup>40</sup> Placing actors into categories such as 'spoiler' or 'non-compliant actor' may detrimentally label them as irreversibly opposed to peace and could adversely affect the way they are dealt with by the PSF. For the purpose of this publication, the term 'spoiling behaviour' refers to leaders who believe the peace process could threaten their power and interests, and hence use violence to undermine or influence it.

<sup>41</sup> Commanders should consider the use of non-lethal weapons in instances where the use of lethal force may not be necessary or desired.

2.49 The use of force in peacekeeping operations is predominantly reactive rather than pre-emptive, such as for the protection of civilians under actual or imminent threat of violence. Despite this, the use of pre-emptive offensive action against a persistent violator of the mandate may be unavoidable. However, where a pre-emptive attack occurs during an armed conflict against a non-state conflicting actor, it should:

- be authorized by the mandate and in accordance with applicable legal framework (law of armed conflict or international law);
- be of a limited time frame to avoid a prolonged engagement;
- not result in negative humanitarian impact;
- most likely require the consent of the state;
- be conducted according to the principles of military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity (prohibition of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering) and honour; and
- be communicated clearly to all audiences in a timely manner.

Such factors may constrain the PSF commander's freedom of action but will ensure that alternative measures are considered first before resorting to the pre-emptive use of force, which may have a damaging effect on the peace process.

2.50 Failure of the PSF to respond to clear violations and abuses of international law, human rights and international criminal law, or violations of the legal basis (for the use of force in peacekeeping), may reduce the PSF's credibility and legitimacy. The necessary use of force could reduce local consent, but if this can be isolated through clear communication, wider national and regional consent may be promoted.

### **Legitimacy**

2.51 Legitimacy can be viewed in two parts. First, the legitimacy required to mount a peace support effort and, second, the legitimacy achieved by implementing the mandate in a manner that reflects the other principles of peace support. Establishing and maintaining legitimacy is an ongoing task requiring constant monitoring and assessment. The legitimacy of a peace support effort will be a crucial factor for drawing support within the international community, contributing nations, the conflicting parties and local population. However, the perception of legitimacy will vary between the different audiences. Perceptions of legitimacy will inevitably change over time, depending on:

- local conditions;
- political activity;
- the performance of the PSF, especially regarding the protection of the population;

- the performance of the host nation's security forces, especially regarding the protection of civilians;
- the expectations of the population and conflicting parties being met; and
- how effective the PSF (and other actors) are in the information environment.

2.52 The expectations of the population and conflicting parties should be identified, and any risks mitigated through key leader engagement and the PSF's presence, posture and profile. The PSF should not expect to hear just one voice speaking on behalf of stakeholders and must take time to identify the legitimate representatives of the various communities, using the knowledge of other in-place military and non-military actors, including those with knowledge of how conflict affects women, men, girls and boys differently. The integration of gender perspectives in operational planning enables the PSF at all levels to better understand the political, societal, cultural and structural processes and context and effects of military activities.

### **Perseverance and long-term view**

2.53 NATO forces should adopt an approach that continually considers the long-term objectives that support the attainment of the end state. Thinking short-term cannot be a viable option for the PSF operating in a multi-agency mission, where the focus is naturally towards building long-term capacity to support an enduring and sustainable peace settlement. Jeopardizing the mission through inappropriate and misguided actions must be avoided at all costs. Lessons learned from previous enduring operations should be considered from the outset of a peace support effort.<sup>42</sup> For example, identifying any senior command or key decision-making posts that may benefit from a degree of continuity either through prior experience of the region or through proven expertise in a particular area.

### **Promotion of state and local ownership**

2.54 Every effort should be made to foster and promote local ownership through continual engagement with the state and its national programmes, civil society and the creation of a climate of trust and cooperation between all parties. Programmes that have local ownership are more likely to be sustainable than those programmes without it. In some situations, the state's national and local capacity may be so weak that the NAC might decide to direct the PSF to temporarily assume certain functions, such as security and justice, either directly or in support of the state.

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<sup>42</sup> The NATO Lessons Learned Portal is hosted by the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) at <https://www.jallc.nato.int>. *The NATO Lessons Learned Handbook*, 4th Edition, June 2022, produced by the JALLC is a useful starting point to understand the lessons learned process.



## Chapter 3 – Planning considerations

3.1 Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations* provides the approach adopted by NATO forces during all types of military operations.<sup>43</sup> The following sections complement the NATO planning processes by highlighting issues that should be considered by commanders and their staff during peace support.

### Section 1 – Understanding

3.2 Understanding is the perception and interpretation of a particular situation to provide the context, insight and foresight required for commanders to make effective decisions. Intelligence and information gained from various sources will provide the bedrock from which understanding can be developed. Further analysis and judgement, concisely delivered to the commander, will provide the foresight necessary for effective decision-making. Intelligence contributes to a continuous and coordinated understanding of the operating environment to: identify conditions required to achieve desired objectives; avoid undesired effects; and assess the impact of adversary, friendly and neutral actors on the commander's concept of operations. Understanding flows from developing the most inclusive perspective of an actor, group, environment or situation. Building understanding takes time; rarely will understanding of an area of intelligence interest be available at the outset of a potential crisis. The approach should be sufficiently inclusive, flexible and adaptive to accommodate a wide range of experts, both within and external to the formal NATO structure. Such experts may hold the key to understanding the operating environment. The comprehensive understanding of the operating environment (CUOE) is the primary and continuous process through which the joint task force staff manages the analysis and development of products that help the commander and key staff understand the operating environment.<sup>44</sup> CUOE's methodology fuses operational assessments from across the functions, for example, joint intelligence preparation of the operating environment (JIPOE) and information environment assessments (IEAs). A commander is unlikely to function effectively without a credible level of understanding of the mission's mandate, its purpose and the environment in which the mission is taking place. This should include IEAs, which identify audiences and their cultural narratives, existing perceptions and beliefs, and the linguistic nuances used to communicate with each other. Further information on the tools and processes used to facilitate understanding can be found in Allied Command Operations, *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive* (COPD) and AJP-2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security*.

3.3 Peace support planning and decision-making should ideally be based on shared understanding among the key stakeholders from the international and national organizations.<sup>45</sup> Establishing a common understanding of the causes of conflict, the actors,

<sup>43</sup> Additional guidance on operations planning can be found in the Allied Command Operations, *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive* (COPD).

<sup>44</sup> AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, Edition F, paragraph 4.41.

<sup>45</sup> A shared understanding is one of the guiding principles of the comprehensive approach. AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*.

their aims and motivations, and any operational constraints will help facilitate a comprehensive approach. Early planning sessions should, where possible, incorporate a diverse set of military and civilian stakeholders to ensure military action complements the overarching political strategy.

**3.4 The political environment.** Planning and conducting activity as part of a comprehensive approach will rely largely on the peace support force (PSF) understanding the political environment, ranging from the politics of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to regional actors, local politicians and powerful elites, including potential adversarial actors. PSF commanders who study the dynamics of formal and informal power structures will be better placed to understand why specific actors behave in the way they do as they compete for power in the post-conflict environment. The commander must consider how the actions of the PSF, and their desired or undesired effects, will impact the peace process. Commanders should monitor the effect political actions can have on the security situation and offer military advice to inform the political decision-making process.

**3.5 Actors.** Commanders must seek to understand the full spectrum of actors within a conflict, including marginalized and excluded groups. Understanding the motivations and intent of each group of actors, as well as the harm they may cause to civilians (in particular, why and how they may harm civilians) might be difficult to achieve, especially since these may change as the peace process develops. Gaining this understanding requires a great deal of interaction with other organizations (both internationally and in-country) to ensure a diverse perspective on the culture, history and politics of the region in question. Understanding rivals across the full spectrum<sup>46</sup> is paramount to adopting effective deterrence measures that have the best chance of influencing those decision-makers that opt to contravene a mandate or disrupt the peace process. The PSF should be sufficiently adaptable to accommodate new ideas about rivals and adversaries gained from in-place actors. Choosing to ignore local understanding could have an adverse effect on planning assumptions. At the operational level, the commander should consider the actors' centres of gravity. By affecting an actor's operational-level centre of gravity, NATO can influence the actor's ability to achieve its objectives.

**3.6 The local population.** Understanding the human factors of the operating environment is crucial and will allow military operations to be designed to achieve the desired influence and help prevent negative unintended consequences. NATO forces must, therefore, be sensitive to the population by understanding its sociocultural factors, politics and history, strengths and vulnerabilities, and main concerns related to the protection of civilians. They must also seek to identify the existing and potential threats to civilians, including from our own actions, and integrate them into the planning and conduct of their operations. They should also consider the environment from a gender perspective as some activities will affect men, women, boys and girls differently. The collection of

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<sup>46</sup> In accordance with AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, Edition F, Chapter 4, paragraph 4.6, actors exist on spectrum from 'friendly' (such as nations within the Alliance), to 'hostile' (such as the PSF's adversaries and enemies).

sex-disaggregated data will assist in this understanding. Awareness of local cultural norms will be an important step to assess the possible hostility of local individuals when facing normal but unfamiliar behaviours. This allows effective engagement with the whole population. The local population will have certain expectations of the PSF and the international response to resolve the crisis. A PSF deployed with a mandate to help keep the peace and protect the civilian population is expected to do just that, even though it may not always be possible. Communicating with the local population will be a vital function to ensure that expectations are managed and that communities are aware of what the PSF can and cannot do. Promising deliverables without the necessary resources and resolve could damage the PSF's credibility.

**3.7 Security actors.** Certain types of peace support efforts may incorporate international military and police operating outside the command and control of NATO, for example, the military force and the police component of a United Nations (UN) mission. Early reconnaissance of a mission area by the PSF will enhance awareness of in-place military and police capabilities to highlight any capacity or command and control issues. The output from this analysis will help develop an exit strategy according to the established end state as part of the initial planning of the operation and will provide planners with the necessary information to start planning for transition. Failure to recognize these issues early could lead to a situation where security and safety deteriorate once an Allied force withdraws and the remaining military security forces are unable or unwilling to enforce a safe and secure environment.

**3.8 Non-military actors.** The PSF is likely to operate in the same space as many other actors, including local actors, international organizations, other national governments, law enforcement agencies, private military and security companies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The broad and diverse range of actors involved in resolving and managing conflict will have different mandates, resources, agendas, perspectives, capabilities and motivations. The behaviour of non-military actors may range from actively supporting, through neutral, to passively opposing or actively opposing. Within a behaviour-centric approach, the PSF will interact with neutral to friendly actors through civil-military interaction (CMI). Opposing non-military actors may be subject to non-lethal targeting (for example, using information operations (Info Ops) and/or psychological operations (PsyOps)). Understanding the influence and importance of non-military actors and the dynamic nature of the relationships between them and NATO military forces should help identify where coordination and cooperation is likely to be achieved, and where relationships should be developed to pursue common objectives. The need for some actors (in particular, neutral and independent humanitarian organizations) to not be associated with or perceived to be supporting a broader political/military goal must be respected.

**3.9 Civil-military cooperation.** The joint function of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) integrates the understanding of the civil factors in the operating environment. CMI of all NATO military bodies enables the necessary engagement and coordination process required to create, build and maintain relationships between relevant military and non-military actors. The level of interaction between military and friendly to neutral

non-military actors varies, from coexistence, consultation, deconfliction and coordination up to integration. For further guidance on CIMIC see AJP-3.19, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation*.

**3.10 Stakeholder analysis.** Stakeholder analysis will help the PSF commander gain a better understanding of the most influential actors. For example, it can help:

- identify those organizations that need to be engaged by the PSF to facilitate a shared understanding of the situation and promote collaborative planning;
- map the intentions and capabilities of the conflicting parties, and therefore prioritize deterrence activity; and
- develop a communication strategy aimed at influencing local or regional perspectives.

Where possible, analysis should be a collaborative effort with other military and non-military stakeholders. This will enable a diverse perspective and the outcome could help influence the engagement strategies and plans of other agencies.

## **Section 2 – Command and control**

3.11 AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations* provides guidance on the NATO command and force structures to be used on operations. Most types of peace support operations (PSOs) will require NATO to work closely with other military and non-military organizations to attain the end state. The commander should, as part of their estimate, consider the relationships that must be developed between the PSF and other key stakeholders to promote a comprehensive approach. This is particularly important during peacekeeping where the UN has an established mission in the conflict area and as such has its own operating structure. Understanding how these organizations and agencies can work together and establishing the appropriate coordination mechanisms will aid coherence between the various stakeholders. Key staff members, including the political advisor, legal advisor, cultural advisor and CIMIC staff, will all have important supporting roles to help understand how these key stakeholders interact. Generally, the PSF and non-military actors will inform and provide mutual support to each other. Consequently, given the multitude of key stakeholders and varied organizations, PSOs are likely to have complex, and potentially convoluted, command and control structures.

## **Section 3 – Inter-agency planning**

3.12 Uncoordinated actions can lead to duplication of effort, a breakdown in trust between actors, and can undermine the actions of all vested stakeholders. Conversely, over-centralization can lead to bureaucratic inertia and a decrease in operational tempo, leading to missed opportunities. Such outcomes can have a detrimental effect on the peace process, or parts thereof. Measures to mitigate these outcomes should be identified at every opportunity to achieve better integration and collaborative working between the key

stakeholders.<sup>47</sup> Therefore, inter-agency planning should only include those military and non-military stakeholders that are relevant to the specific planning activity. Participants in planning teams will change depending on the nature of the problem; inter-agency planning teams must be organized for the task at hand.

3.13 Areas of common interest should be exploited by organizations to bring together different skill sets as well as to prioritize and coordinate activity to achieve commonly agreed objectives. Areas where consensus cannot be achieved will exist; in these cases, different organizations must learn to coexist, respecting each other's mandates and working modalities. The process of establishing dialogue may be fraught with friction and frustrations. However, military commanders should persevere since these working relationships are critical to achieving unity of purpose and creating the conditions for sustainable peace. CIMIC staff will play a key role in this process by ensuring that the commander and their staff have the proper scope of interaction and collaboration with the appropriate stakeholders.

3.14 Making use of in-place inter-agency establishments, organizations and planning groups will help facilitate inter-agency coordination, which over time could lead to collaboration.<sup>48</sup> If such an organization or group does not exist, the PSF should support and foster the establishment of one that is inclusive of key stakeholders. The leadership and management of the organization or group should be context specific and reside with the non-military community. Where possible, the development of strategy should be non-military led and must support the mandate. Formal, structured planning groups with wide representation from different actors will help foster the implementation of an integrated approach.

3.15 Planning staff should expect that military and civilian agencies are likely to use different processes, terms and phrases, and the understanding thereof may be different. Establishing a common understanding as early as possible will aid the planning process. Additionally, the PSF must understand that the means of communication will vary greatly between non-military (unclassified) and military agencies (classified).

## Section 4 – Achieving deterrence

3.16 Some actors may willfully seek to influence or disrupt the peace process. Several reasons may explain such behaviour, including:

- despair of a conflicting party over the failure to implement a peace agreement;
- the exclusion of a particular actor from the peace process;

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<sup>47</sup> Collaborative working is one of the guiding principles of the comprehensive approach. AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*.

<sup>48</sup> The UN has adopted the Integrated Mission Planning Process to facilitate the planning of peacekeeping operations.

- the process no longer serves an actor's interests; or
- an actor is irreconcilable to the peace process.

Conflicting parties may need to be deterred from adopting this disruptive behaviour to establish and maintain a secure environment. The purpose of deterrence in peace support is to discourage decision-makers from the conflicting parties and disruptive groups from pursuing a particular course of action, due to the consequences such action would have on the perpetrator.<sup>49</sup> The credible threat of force can change an adversary's decision-making process. Deterrence may also be achieved by denying the benefits of an act, for example, by increasing the resilience of the civil sector to recover from a disruptive event. Alternatively, the use of reassurance mechanisms, such as incentives, can also be used to shape behaviour.

3.17 Successful deterrence should be based on a politically led strategy that aims to integrate the various instruments of power to attain a specific end state. Deterrence must be tailored to a particular conflicting party or actor, and therefore no standard solution can be applied to all situations. The threat of military force should only be used in the final stages of a process of escalation that has seen other measures fail, such as political incentives, economic sanctions or diplomacy. The military contribution to deterrence should be based on five factors: credibility, cognition, capability, competition and communication.

a. **Credibility.** The PSF must be perceived by audiences as having the credibility to use force. The stance adopted by the PSF should be one of active impartiality that sees the PSF adopt a posture that overtly demonstrates the willingness, capability and capacity to respond appropriately to acts of violence, whilst being conscious not to provoke a violent response. The PSF must be prepared for its credibility to be tested by conflicting parties or other belligerent actors throughout all phases of a mission. It is important that the PSF demonstrates resolve and maintains credibility. The use of appropriate force can supplement future deterrence by removing any ambiguity regarding the intent, capability and willingness of the PSF to enforce the mandate.

b. **Cognition.** The PSF needs to understand the intent, behavioural drivers and points of influence of those audiences it seeks to deter. These audiences may extend well beyond the conflicting parties, including some stakeholders, especially where they may be disruptive or uncooperative. Cognition affords precision in deterrence, allowing the PSF to threaten to impose meaningful costs and to deny benefit to actors who do not comply with the mandate.

c. **Capability.** The PSF must possess the capability to deter disruptive behaviour and, if necessary, enact the threat of military force should other deterrent measures fail. This may require the PSF to concentrate force rather than spread across the

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<sup>49</sup> Deterrence is introduced in AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, Edition F.

joint operations area (noting that this must be balanced against the attendant loss of situational awareness). Capabilities should include assets that:

- communicate the threat effectively to the targeted audience;
- detect or identify the circumstances that trigger a requirement to use coercive force; and
- apply appropriate force in a timely manner.

Examples could include: sufficient interpreters that allow liaison teams to engage continually with conflicting parties and the population; effective intelligence; and reserve forces at notice to move.

d. **Competition.** Deterrence is a dynamic and competitive interaction. Actors will continually seek advantage against each other, and this will inevitably require the PSF to adjust its posture and capabilities to ensure it deters the most destabilizing actors. Identifying the appropriate level of force used to create the desired effect is important. Too little force could undermine the perceived credibility of the PSF, whereas too much may result in retaliatory attacks against the PSF and/or the local population. Effective command and control, based on clear guidelines, will enable force commanders to apply appropriate force in a timely and responsive manner that is coherent with an overarching strategy.

e. **Communication.** Conflicting parties must be made aware of the possible incentives or consequences of acting in ways that either comply with or contravene the mandate. A deterrence strategy must include measures to communicate a bespoke message that takes account of each specific actor or the wider audience, using the most appropriate channels and expressed in a way that is unambiguous. This should be achieved through a coordinated information activities strategy and a strategic communications (StratCom) framework based on political direction. The information strategy may also serve to rationalize PSF actions and refute accusations of partiality.

## Section 5 – Intelligence

3.18 All actors within a conflict, both international and national, including NGOs, are likely to be sensitive to all intelligence collection activities conducted by the PSF. Judgements will have to be made by senior political and military leaders on whom and how information is to be collected depending on the type of peace support effort. For example, collecting information on a state could be more acceptable during a peace enforcement operation, compared with a peacekeeping operation. Collecting information on any of the actors during peacekeeping operations, especially the state, could have a detrimental effect on the perception of the impartiality and legitimacy of the PSF. This in turn could affect the consent of the actors and ultimately the peace process and therefore commander's and military staff should be mindful of such sensitivities when developing a CUOE.

3.19 An effective operation requires continuous support with timely, actionable intelligence concerning the actors and the environment. Support could include the requirement to:

- monitor the movements of actors;
- assess how the environment is shaping the actions and tactics, techniques and procedures for actors;
- report potential violations to human rights and international law violations; or
- support deterrence measures.

Further detail on intelligence can be found in the AJP-2 series, starting with AJP-2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security*.

3.20 Like other campaign themes, peace support has seen an increasing presence of non-military actors in the joint operations area. While achieving absolute consistency between military and non-military activities is unlikely, commanders should promote the sharing of information between the appropriate military and non-military actors, as part of a comprehensive approach to operations, in accordance with the 'need to know' and 'need to share' principles and NATO interoperability policies. In this regard, the PSF through its stability policing units might contribute to the comprehensive approach by sharing with the other actors involved in peace efforts relevant information deriving from law enforcement intelligence. However, NATO planning staff must be aware that certain actors will be reluctant to share information with military actors, whilst others will be limited by their working practices.

## **Section 6 – Force protection**

3.21 The principles and guidance laid out in AJP-3.14, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection* apply to peace support. In addition, the commander should consider the associated risk that accompanies an impartial force posture, as the PSF may have to demonstrate a degree of transparency that may leave them vulnerable. Where possible, and without compromising the security of the force, force protection measures must reflect the strategic narrative because a PSF that is overtly risk averse may be at odds with a message of continuing improvement and a developing peace process. There is an important balance to be struck between maintaining high survivability through appropriate force protection and ensuring these measures are in-step with the overarching strategic narrative. Force protection measures must be threat-informed and able to deny a belligerent actor any benefit from a hostile act.



## Section 7 – Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence

3.22 PSOs may require the PSF to operate in a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) environment. This condition may be a result from the use of specific weapons or could be an issue arising from an industrial accident. Irrespective of the cause, the PSF will need to consider CBRN in the force generation, planning and execution of their mission. The CBRN defence comprehensive approach is described as coordinated political, military and civilian actions taken to support CBRN defence in accordance with MC 0603/1, *NATO Comprehensive CBRN Defence Concept*.

3.23 It is essential that CBRN defence staff engage early in the planning process and incorporate CBRN-related intelligence requirements into the intelligence collection plan. The staff must contribute to a CBRN-related JIPOE analytical process to ascertain the threat. The full JIPOE, of which CBRN is an important part, supports the estimate process and helps to both identify and satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements.

3.24 Plans must include options for countering CBRN threats. The CBRN defence planning staff plans and coordinates the activities to prevent, protect and recover from weapon of mass destruction attacks or CBRN incidents on operations.

3.25 Specific planning tools for CBRN are one of the key elements for CBRN to support the operations planning process.<sup>50</sup> CBRN defence staff must be integrated into the operations planning process from the start so they can provide:

- scientific-based CBRN defence advice, including CBRN threat assessment;
- an overview of relevant host nation's capabilities;
- an overview of Allied CBRN defence capabilities; and
- CBRN risk management and course of action development.

3.26 The continuing process of global industrialization increases the possibility of the accidental release or deliberate misuse of toxic industrial material (TIM). There is a clear distinction between a threat posed by a CBRN weapon and TIM release. While both pose a hazard, the level and flexibility of employment may vary resulting in different planning and operational considerations. Considerations for determining TIM vulnerability include the following:

- targeting of possible industrial plants, storage sites, shipment depots, research establishments and medical facilities;
- identifying what forces are conducting operations in vicinity of sites;

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<sup>50</sup> For more information, refer to the related Allied Tactical Publication-3.8.1, Volume I, *CBRN Defence on Operations*.

- identifying chemicals, biological and radiological material routinely produced, used or processed in the area;
- identifying the industrial processes used to produce chemicals;
- assessing the probability of a deliberate release of TIM for a given situation; and
- determining probable friendly response actions.

3.27 Local civilian authorities retain prime responsibility for dealing with CBRN incidents within their jurisdiction but, if their own resources are inadequate, they may request military assistance from the PSF. For NATO, the Resilience Committee will be involved and CIMIC should facilitate coordination between the PSF and the Resilience Committee. Similarly, the PSF commander may request support from the civil authorities through CIMIC in the event of a CBRN incident. Further detail can be found in the AJP-3 series of publications, namely, AJP-3.8, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Comprehensive Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence* and AJP-3.19, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation*.

3.28 NATO CBRN reachback capability provides a single point of contact through which additional staff capacity can be delivered, specialist staff and organizations can be accessed, and CBRN assessments and advice provided. CBRN reachback was developed to address a number of gaps in NATO's CBRN capability. CBRN reachback outputs are:

- **standing request for information responses** – intended to be the most dynamic means of providing initial reachback assessments to reachback's direct liaison authorized organizations, without the need for triggering action from those organizations;
- **assessment and analysis** – carried out in response to request for information/request for support or internally generated; and
- **request for information/request for support responses** – which support rapid decision-making and should contain the scientific detail necessary for CBRN staff to fully understand the underpinning issues.

## Section 8 – NATO strategic communications

3.29 StratCom is defined as: 'in the NATO military context, the integration of communication capabilities and information staff function with other military activities, in order to understand and shape the information environment, in support of NATO strategic aims and objectives.'<sup>51</sup> StratCom combines the Info Ops staff function and the communication capabilities PsyOps and military public affairs (Mil PA). It thereby ensures the vertical coordination of all communication activities across all levels of command. Communication activities are information activities conducted by either PsyOps or Mil PA. Information activities are all planned activities aimed to create a cognitive effect.

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<sup>51</sup> NATOTerm.

3.30 NATO StratCom is the command group function that seeks to inform and influence audience's attitudes and behaviours in pursuit of the desired end state in two ways. It:

- supports the PSF to implement a narrative-led execution through all levels of command; and
- uses Info Ops to analyze and understand the information environment, and to create the desired effects in the information environment through planned and coordinated information activities.

3.31 A comprehensive approach to StratCom is essential for success. Military activities must be coherent and integrated with other political and civilian efforts. Military commanders must therefore seek and promote comprehension of the information environment and the audiences relevant to a PSO – not only the actors, but also wider stakeholders and public, whose perception and attitude to the PSF will shape the behaviours of conflicting actors.

3.32 Analysis of factors such as the information infrastructure, the cultural dimension, potential audiences, and the objectives and agendas of the key decision-makers and opinion formers will shape both the nature of the StratCom effort and the operation. The development and adoption of a strategic narrative is an essential component of this process. The PSF's messaging and actions must reflect the mission's objectives, particularly where the level of consent is low and belligerents are attempting to undermine the peace process. NATO StratCom needs to be coherent, coordinated and synchronized amongst the PSF, and where possible with that of the UN, local actors or other key international organizations.

3.33 The North Atlantic Council (NAC) will provide overall guidance and direction for NATO StratCom approach, as well as mission-specific strategic and political guidance for NATO military information activities. NAC guidance will continue to be adjusted as the situation evolves, necessitating a communications strategy that can develop accordingly.

### **Information advantage**

3.34 Information advantage underpins the comprehensive approach and efforts across all five operational domains, the electromagnetic spectrum and levels of operations to achieve comprehensive understanding, decision-making, execution, assessment, resilience and, ultimately, superior tempo to achieve and maintain the initiative. Information advantage is not a static state but a relative position that must be maintained; it is often local and temporal.

## Section 9 – Information operations, psychological operations and military public affairs

**3.35 Information operations.** Info Ops is defined as: ‘a staff function to analyze, plan, assess and integrate information activities to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and audiences in support of mission objectives.’<sup>52</sup> Info Ops, as part of StratCom, ensures the horizontal integration of all information activities within the respective headquarters. Information activities are an integral part of the PSF commander’s operational plan and can be used in conjunction with other military activities to support the peace process. For example: PsyOps might be employed to help promote the role played by the PSF in protecting civilians; commanders might conduct key leader engagement (KLE) to bring conflicting parties together and help to build or manage consent; and military deception may be employed to deter hostility or protect the PSF. Of particular note, information activities:

- take time to develop and for results to be evident;
- require the commitment of specialized troops (for activities such as PsyOps and electromagnetic operations) or special staff elements to analyze the environment and plan activities (for activities such as KLE); and
- often require special support contracts to produce and disseminate products.

Specialized forces must be requested and generated early in the planning process to enable effective employment at the start of a peace support effort. Further detail on Info Ops can be found in AJP-10.1, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*.

**3.36 Psychological operations.** PsyOps are defined as: ‘planned activities using methods of communication and other means directed at approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives.’<sup>53</sup> PsyOps forces are specially trained to communicate with audiences from different cultures and they are enabled to disseminate information to large audiences within the area of operations. PsyOps have a major role in minimizing misunderstandings and fostering understanding to create an environment supportive of the PSF mission. Further detail on PsyOps can be found in AJP-3.10.1, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations*.

**3.37 Military public affairs.** Mil PA is defined as: ‘the strategic communications capability responsible for promoting military aims and objectives by communicating accurate and truthful information to internal and external audiences in a timely manner.’<sup>54</sup> Mil PA is critical to communicate Alliance unity, combined with promoting NATO’s military capabilities as part of the core task of deterrence and defence. Mil PA strives to: avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations; maintain Alliance credibility; build trust where

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<sup>52</sup> NATOTerm.

<sup>53</sup> NATOTerm.

<sup>54</sup> NATOTerm.

possible; and keep communication channels open to contribute to transparency and risk reduction. Truthful, accurate and timely communication of Mil PA actively fosters the reputation, credibility and legitimacy of NATO and trust in NATO. Mil PA contributes to peace support narrative-led and behaviour-centric activities (where the local population is a key audience) to communicate Alliance impartiality (a fundamental theme) while no opponent is designated. Deployed Mil PA capabilities integrate themselves in operational command structures and conduct their functions within the joint information function. Hostile information activities and communication crises, triggered by rival actors, are expected and can be addressed by Mil PA. It is therefore crucial for Mil PA to be perceived as a trustworthy, credible and timely source of information, to pre-emptively moderate the effect of manipulation through operating from the 'higher ground'. Although Mil PA is primarily focused on the requirement to inform and educate audiences with a view to maintaining NATO public support (at home and abroad) for PSF activities, and hence freedom of action, its impact can be much wider. Importantly, Mil PA is distinct from other information/communication disciplines in that it has the potential ability to reach any audiences (both internal and external) and can be conducted across the full continuum of competition.

3.38 It is essential that Mil PA activities are integrated, coordinated and deconflicted with other communication activities to maintain the integrity and consistency of Alliance narratives and messages. Coordination between Mil PA, PsyOps and Info Ops within StratCom must be assured at all times and across all levels of command to ensure consistency in the message released by the military to external audiences and to promote overall effectiveness and credibility of the PSF and the overarching mission. Director of communications (or similar title) and Chief Public Affairs Officer ensure that Mil PA does not play any role in the planning and conduct of PsyOps or deception operations.

3.39 Mil PA capabilities are organic to NATO military headquarters and can conduct (plan and execute) activities across the continuum of competition. Mil PA is a command responsibility at strategic, operational and tactical levels, grouped within StratCom staff elements, but not subordinated to other staff functions. Mil PA is the lead function responsible for the external and internal communication as defined in NATO policy.<sup>55</sup> Further detail on Mil PA can be found in AJP-10.3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Public Affairs*.<sup>56</sup>

## Section 10 – Cross-cutting topics

3.40 Part of NATO's institutional narrative is its commitment to ensure that the entire population is minimally impacted by conflict and disaster; in particular, military personnel have the responsibility to recognize, report and respond to violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as to know who to refer survivors of such violations to. Understanding the prominence of these topics will allow the PSF to integrate them into

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<sup>55</sup> MC 0457/3, *NATO Military Policy on Public Affairs*, 28 May 2019, paragraph 7.

<sup>56</sup> AJP-10.3 is currently scheduled for release in 2023.

the planning and execution of the operation. It will also provide the context for certain PSF-mandated tasks and help military commanders understand why other actors place such importance on these topics.

### The protection of civilians

3.41 NATO is committed to the protection of civilians (PoC)<sup>57</sup> in the planning and conduct of operations, missions and other NAC-mandated activities. NATO's approach to PoC is based on legal, moral and political imperatives and is consistent with applicable legal frameworks. NATO recognizes that all feasible measures must be taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate harm to civilians. Civilians are often the victims of conflict because of deliberate, or inadvertent, targeting. In addition, civilians are vulnerable to systematic violence and the aftermath of conflict during a hiatus in activity or a transition to peace. Civilians are also victims of second and third order effects of violence that may include:

- direct attacks against the civilian population leading to injury and loss of life;
- the use of rape and other sexual and gender-based violence as a weapon of war;
- large-scale loss of life such as genocide or ethnic cleansing;
- attacks causing damages or destruction to essential infrastructures (water, energy, health care) with long-term implications for human welfare, ecosystems and livelihoods;
- attacks causing long-lasting psychological trauma;
- various forms of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading and humiliating treatment;
- opportunist criminals exploiting the lack of law and order; and/or
- the effects of legacy munitions and the rubbish of conflict (such as mines and improvised explosive devices).

3.42 States, and parties to a conflict, have a responsibility to protect civilians in the territory under their control. However, when states and parties to a conflict are unable or unwilling to do so due to a lack of political will, capacity, governance mechanisms or they are the perpetrators or supporters of violence, a PSF may be tasked with protecting civilians during certain types of peace support efforts.<sup>58</sup> In such cases, applicable international law and the rules of engagement will provide clear guidance on the PSF's right to use all necessary means, including use of force, to achieve the task.

<sup>57</sup> PO(2016)0407, *NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians*, 10 June 2016.

<sup>58</sup> Protection of Civilians (PoC) differs from the 'Responsibility to protect' agenda. Responsibility to protect is more focused on the mandate for intervention (*jus ad bellum*) while PoC addresses the issue in conflict (*jus in bello*) and there is a clear distinction between the two concepts. Responsibility to protect relates to four specific threats (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity), whereas the PoC can address a far wider array of threats of violence against civilians, for example, rape or isolated attacks.

3.43 The *Concept for the Protection of Civilians* sets out a framework<sup>59</sup> designed to facilitate this protection. The framework comprises four sections:

- understanding the human environment;
- mitigate harm;
- facilitate access to basic needs; and
- contribute to a safe and secure environment.

3.44 The PSF will most likely assist in the physical PoC through deterrence and, when appropriate and authorized to do so, the use of force, as well as through avoiding causing harm to civilians by their own actions.<sup>60</sup> Understanding the motivations and intent of likely perpetrators, as well as the tactics, capabilities and means used against civilians, in addition to the coping mechanisms and strategies of civilians, will be central to the design of deterrence measures to ensure the PoC, with specific attention to the most vulnerable.

3.45 Other organizations that have been mandated by the international community in the field of PoC and in respect of human rights include: the International Committee of the Red Cross; the UN High Commissioner for Refugees; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; and a number of NGOs. As well as military forces, non-military actors such as law enforcement agencies have a crucial role to play and have a legitimate stake in protecting civilians; planning in isolation of each other is ineffective and could be counterproductive. However, integration may be difficult to achieve due to cultural differences, conflicting mandates or the fact that the environment is too hostile for non-military agencies to operate, for instance, during peace enforcement operations. In addition, integration will encounter resistance of principled humanitarian organizations seeking to preserve the perception of their neutrality and independence by the parties to the conflict and the victims themselves.

3.46 Although the long-term solution of protecting civilians requires a multi-agency response, domestic and global audiences are likely to have a greater expectation that the PSF, working under a Chapter VII mandate, will provide the necessary protection for civilians under threat of violence. PSF commanders should be aware of their obligations, the challenges of conducting such tasks with a finite set of resources, and the strategic implications of failing to protect civilians. Managing the expectations of the local population and other non-military actors is an important task; the appropriate audiences should be made aware of what the PSF can and cannot do. The failure to protect civilians from violence can result in the loss of credibility and legitimacy of the PSF in the eyes of both the local population and international community. Ultimately, this could have a detrimental effect on force protection, operational effectiveness and mission success. Any risk to either

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<sup>59</sup> MC 0668, *Concept for the Protection of Civilians*, 25 April 2018. See also <https://shape.nato.int/resources/3/website/ACO-Protection-of-Civilians-Handbook.pdf>

<sup>60</sup> Protection-related tasks are included in Chapter 4 of this publication.

the safety of the civilian population, or to the overarching narrative, should be identified and mitigated.

### **Children and armed conflict**

3.47 The pattern of armed conflict has led to an increased risk for civilians, and especially children.<sup>61</sup> The involvement of children in today's conflicts has long-term destabilizing implications for society; patterns of violence rooted in communities are passed on to younger generations, thereby threatening long-term stability and increasing the chance of renewed violence. In 2015, the NAC agreed to the implementation of the *Protection of Children in Armed Conflict – the Way Forward*, which contains a number of priorities for NATO-led operations or missions. Consequently, it is important for the PSF to integrate children and armed conflict considerations into the planning and conduct of its operations, as well as training, monitoring and reporting.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, the PSF should monitor and accurately record any breaches of the six grave violations against children identified by the UNSC, as deterring these crimes will contribute to the overall chance of a peaceful outcome. The six grave violations are:

- the killing and maiming of children;
- attacks on schools or hospitals;
- abduction of children;
- sexual violence against children;
- recruitment or use of children as soldiers; and
- denial of humanitarian access.

### **Cultural property protection**

3.48 Cultural property can be destroyed or damaged unintentionally or deliberately, particularly by opposing forces, even if bound by a peace agreement. Furthermore, attacks against cultural property can be indicators of severe violations, including genocide, ethnic cleansing, radical religious beliefs or malign ideological motivations that often seek to eradicate important aspects of a particular culture.

3.49 NATO recognizes cultural property protection (CPP) as an essential consideration in the military environment and a critical indicator of community security, cohesion and identity. NATO forces are required<sup>63</sup> to integrate CPP in the preparation, planning and

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<sup>61</sup> In United Nations Security Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, the UNSC expressed concern that civilians, particularly women and children, are increasingly targeted by combatants and armed elements. For a specific focus on children and armed conflict, see UNSCR 2427.

<sup>62</sup> PO(2015)0165, *Final Approval of "The Protection of Children in Armed Conflicts – Way Forward"*, 20 March 2015.

<sup>63</sup> Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) Directive 086-005, *Implementing Cultural Property Protection in NATO Operations and Missions*, 1 April 2019.



conduct of NATO operations and missions at all stages. CPP should be considered across the continuum of conflict, including in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction, PSOs and humanitarian assistance, as well as in all phases of military operations and across all branches. CIMIC staff are responsible for developing a CIMIC estimate describing in-theatre cultural property and an analysis of the importance of this to the mission. Targeting guidance describes how to deal with potential targets in the proximity of cultural property, while environmental protection, as a specialist area for military engineering, addresses cultural resources. In this view, a full environmental picture should recognize both natural and cultural resources. SPUs contribute to the preservation of culturally sensitive sites and items by countering any violation of cultural property in accordance with NATO mandates and applicable national and international law. SPUs can be granted executive police powers and replace indigenous police forces to prevent, deter and investigate cultural property related crimes. When executive powers are retained by the indigenous police, SPUs can be tasked with reinforcement activities (monitoring, mentoring, advising, reforming, training and partnering) to enhance host nation law enforcement capability to protect cultural property. If a dedicated SPU is not deployed, these activities and tasks can be carried out by military police, provided they have been trained and equipped to fulfill the specific mission requirements. StratCom should promote NATO's compliance with CPP to enhance NATO's legitimacy, secure popular support and contribute to the overall success of the mission.

### **Women, peace and security**

3.50 The integration of gender perspectives and the women, peace and security mandate is an essential component of NATO's common values of human rights, individual liberty, democracy and obligations under the UN Charter. It is also key to the execution of the Alliance's three core tasks<sup>64</sup> and contributes to a resilient and ready NATO.

3.51 Women, men, girls and boys are affected differently<sup>65</sup> by unequal gendered social structures. These relationships affect the trajectories of crisis and conflict. Different experiences of security give rise to specific needs but also to unique capacities and contributions to peace and security. The integration of gender perspectives enables a holistic and inclusive understanding of social dynamics, particularly of underlying gender inequalities. Gender inequalities are exacerbated during periods of crisis and conflict and, if not addressed, may prolong conflict and prevent (sustainable) peace.

3.52 Gender norms<sup>66</sup> and roles<sup>67</sup> often change in times of crisis and conflict and affect the conduct of a mission.<sup>68</sup> How the mission is conducted may also impact on gender

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<sup>64</sup> Collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.

<sup>65</sup> Women and children are disproportionately affected by conflict.

<sup>66</sup> Gender norms are societal standards, expectations, attitudes and beliefs (formal and informal) that dictate the types of behaviour considered acceptable, appropriate and desirable, according to notions of gender and perceptions about masculinities and femininities.

relations and structures. Important gender-related objectives for a PSF could include building a comprehensive understanding of the social dynamics within an area of operations to prevent the exacerbation of existing gender inequalities while seeking opportunities for advancing gender equality in reconstruction and recovery. The latter should be performed with a focus on local ownership and empowerment, particularly on women peacebuilders. The PSF should support local women's peace initiatives and local processes to ensure women's perspectives are recognized as part of an inclusive response to conflict resolution. Trained gender advisors and gender focal points<sup>69</sup> should be deployed to the command group and across branches to support the integration of gender perspectives.

3.53 The inclusion of female soldiers in the PSF adds an important dimension to deployments because they have the potential to act as role models, inspiring local men, boys, women and girls to improve women's rights and participation in the peace process. The PSF should also take measures, when appropriate, to ensure women's perspectives are captured during planning activities.

3.54 **The role of women in conflict resolution.** Armed conflict can disrupt traditional gender roles. For example, women may take on male-associated roles as men engage in conflict. However, women may also participate in conflict as combatants. Therefore, it is important to challenge unconscious bias and assumptions about gender roles in society. Women's equal and meaningful participation in the peace process must be actively supported and facilitated. Ignoring the experiences of women risks overlooking their abilities to contribute to peace processes and the legitimate needs they may have in new institutions and settlements. During conflict resolution, women can contribute in many ways, including:

- becoming the local decision-makers;
- taking on the roles of community leaders and heads of households;
- caring for orphans and survivors; and
- taking on predominantly male roles.

Once conflict ends, women can easily return to pre-conflict roles with no voice in the peace process. Incorporating women into the peacebuilding process can build on societal changes that may be occurring naturally as a result of the cultural turmoil that ensues from conflict.

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<sup>67</sup> Gender roles determine traditional responsibilities and tasks assigned to different genders. Gender roles are conditioned by household structures and access to resources and are reinforced and exacerbated by various systems in societies, including political, educational and other social structures, as well as gender norms.

<sup>68</sup> Gender norms and roles shape access to and control over resources, including power. In a crisis/conflict setting, girls and women may have to take on gender roles associated in peacetime with boys and men, and vice versa, which could strain capacities but also provide opportunities for transformative change.

<sup>69</sup> For a detailed description of the role and responsibilities of trained gender advisors and gender focal points, see Bi-SC Directive 040-001, *Integrating Gender Perspective in the NATO Command Structure*, 20 October 2021.

## Conflict-related sexual violence

3.55 NATO is committed to preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV)<sup>70</sup> in all NATO missions, operations and NAC-mandated activities within its remit in accordance with international law and internationally recognized human rights. CRSV is a violation of human rights and is rooted in gender inequality and discrimination and, as such, women and girls are more often affected than men and boys. CRSV is prohibited under international law and international humanitarian law. CRSV is frequently, deliberately and strategically used to inflict long-term physical and psychological trauma on individuals and families; it destroys the social fabric of communities, triggers displacement, fuels armed actors' activities and fosters prolonged conflict and instability.

3.56 CRSV considerations apply to all phases of NATO missions, operations and NAC-mandated activities. Objectives, tasks and related assessment tools to prevent and respond to CRSV (informed by a gender analysis that includes the use of sex-disaggregated data) and risks of CRSV in relation to NATO missions, operations and NAC-mandated activities should be identified. Any CRSV incidents should be reported by all personnel in NATO missions, operations and NAC-mandated activities in accordance with established reporting mechanisms and through the NATO chain of command.

3.57 CMI, in line with relevant policies, is essential to preventing CRSV. NATO will engage with relevant international organizations, NGOs, partners, civil society (including women's rights organizations and women-led civil society), at-risk populations and other appropriate actors, including coordinating with host nations as appropriate.<sup>71</sup>

## Sexual exploitation and abuse

3.58 Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) is counter to NATO's principles and core values; it undermines the effectiveness and credibility of the Alliance and risks mission success. Within a zero-tolerance approach to all acts of SEA, the *NATO Policy on Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse*<sup>72</sup> provides a framework for personnel serving in NATO bodies or within NATO facilities. Commanders and heads of NATO bodies are responsible for creating an environment conducive to the prevention of SEA. Risk factors and possible mitigation strategies should be considered in the planning and conduct of NATO and NATO-led operations, missions and other NAC-approved activities. Mandatory training must be provided to all personnel. Nations (pre-deployment) and heads of NATO bodies are both responsible for providing this training to their personnel.

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<sup>70</sup> NATO describes conflict-related sexual violence as rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, forced sterilization, forced marriage and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict. See *NATO Policy on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*, 2 June 2021.

<sup>71</sup> See *NATO Policy on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*, 2 June 2021.

<sup>72</sup> See *NATO Policy on Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse*, 20 November 2019.

## Combating trafficking in human beings

3.59 Conflict, post-conflict, disaster and other crises increase the vulnerability, particularly for women and children, of being trafficked. Human trafficking, and its attendant criminal network, should be considered as part of the environmental assessment. NATO recognizes that human trafficking is a transnational problem and that combatting it requires a comprehensive and multinational approach.

## Building integrity

3.60 Building integrity is a key element of Alliance activities. The importance of implementing measures to improve integrity building, anti-corruption and good governance applies to NATO, allies and partners alike.<sup>73</sup> NATO's more recent *Military Concept of Building Integrity in Operations*<sup>74</sup> seeks to ensure the military lines of effort account for, and mitigate, the risks posed by corruption throughout all stages of the planning and conduct of NATO-led operations and missions. Dealing with corruption requires inter-agency cooperation and coordination as part of a comprehensive approach. Corruption is a common foe for all actors and offers an opportunity for developing a commonly agreed approach among the international community. Accountability is an important element of building integrity. The PSF must inculcate in their own forces, and those that they seek to influence, accountability for their actions. This accountability cannot be delegated, whereas responsibility for a task can be. The PSF must communicate and reinforce to all actors that violations of international law and the law of armed conflict will be brought to justice. Personal accountability sits alongside and complements institutional accountability. The comprehensive *Building Integrity in Operations Handbook* (2020) produced by Allied Command Operations provides a useful guide for military planners and commanders.

## Human security

3.61 NATO's approach to human security is drawn from the UN, which conceptualizes human security as a multi-sectoral approach to security that identifies and addresses widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of the people.<sup>75</sup> The notion of human security directly links NATO's common values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law to NATO practice. For NATO, adopting a human security approach means embedding considerations for the comprehensive safety and security of the population into all stages and levels of the Alliance's operations, missions and activities, with the objective of preventing and responding to risks and threats

<sup>73</sup> See PO(2016)0310, *NATO Building Integrity Policy*, 2016.

<sup>74</sup> Approved in February 2021. This is essentially a revision to the original *NATO Building Integrity Policy* that was adopted at the NATO 2016 Warsaw Summit. The revised 2021 *Military Concept of Building Integrity in Operations* proposes a new Action Plan for the period 2021–2025.

<sup>75</sup> The UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290, 25 October 2012, saw the General Assembly agree that the human security approach identifies and addresses widespread and interrelated challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people.

to all people, especially in conflict or crisis situations. The principles guiding NATO's human security approach are to:<sup>76</sup>

- be people-centred;
- be prevention and protection oriented;
- be sensitive to local cultural norms;
- be consistent with international law;
- be respectful towards humanitarian space;
- respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states; and
- be prepared to engage with relevant non-military actors as appropriate.

3.62 The *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept* stresses the importance of human security as a central element to crisis prevention and management. It commits NATO to working with other non-military actors to address the broader conditions fueling crisis and pervasive instability, and to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction. It also highlights the importance of integrating human security principles into NATO's core tasks.

3.63 NATO's human security work currently focuses on five areas where the Alliance can be most effective: PoC; preventing and responding to CRSV; combating trafficking in human beings; children and armed conflict; and CPP. Allied Command Operations uses the term 'human security in operations' to refer specifically to the military implications of NATO's approach to human security. The specific terminology highlights the different roles and responsibilities (political/military) within the human security portfolio and therefore supports the differentiation between what is, and what is not, within the military remit. In addition to the above-mentioned topics, human security in operations includes the work conducted under building integrity in operations.

## **Section 11 – Security transitions**

3.64 Security transitions occur in the context of a broader political transition, of which conflict is only a symptom. The success of a security transition will depend on the extent to which the new security profile reflects, and is coordinated with, other peacebuilding processes such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes and security sector reform. A security transition implies transferring responsibility for security to the state, even if the responsibility for security temporarily passes between the PSF and other international security actors.

3.65 Transitions are often a period of high risk and uncertainty in which gains made by the PSF and other international and national military and non-military actors (including in terms of protecting the civilian population) can be reversed if the correct structures are not

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<sup>76</sup> Additional detail can be found in NATO's *Human Security – Approach and Guiding Principles*, 20 October 2022.

in place to underpin a long-term sustainable solution and ensure a safe and secure environment. Progress can be impeded by activities that undermine the peace process, for example, by failing to deliver adequate security or empowering illegitimate armed actors. The following considerations regarding transitions should be incorporated into strategic- and operational-level planning processes from the outset of an operation.

a. **A multinational and inter-agency process.** Durable security transitions will require participation of both military and non-military actors within a multinational and inter-agency framework. There will be unavoidable dependencies between actors and no one actor will have the freedom to plan and execute a security transition alone. Planning should be conducted by delegates from participating organizations (incorporating those who will be involved in implementation) and should include the state and key national and multinational stakeholders.

b. **Negotiated process.** Security transition implies that one actor alone cannot control every stage of the evolving process. The interests, motivations and leverage of the conflicting parties involved will change, requiring a negotiated approach based on sound political understanding. Negotiating the shape of this future security environment is therefore more important than solely focusing on technical capability building. Influence will play a critical part in any security transition. All actors in a security transition will seek to influence other actors, using leverage that addresses motivations, interests and resources. As the transition continues, the nature and levels of such influence will change and are likely to diminish for international actors. Retaining as many options as possible, in terms of transition partners and objectives, is advisable to retain flexibility and cater for the uncertainty of the political environment.

c. **Political focus.** Security transitions are intrinsically political. Plans and operations must therefore be reviewed in relation to the emerging political settlement. As transitions progress, the ability of external actors to influence state decisions will gradually decline. For this reason, strengthening systems within the state for accountability, including governmental checks and balances and the rule of law, should be prioritized at the outset of transition planning as they will contribute significantly to the long-term sustainability of the transition.

d. **Legitimacy and accountability.** Without legitimacy, the transition of responsibility to local security forces will lack popular support and the broader political process could be undermined. If the security transition is perceived as illegitimate, it is likely to fail. Likewise, accountability of local security forces is essential to fight impunity, avoid violations of international law and prevent recurrence of conflict. Those engaged in transferring security to local actors should consider the implications of any choices they make on the legitimacy of the state and support the development of their legitimacy and accountability wherever possible.

e. **Building comprehensive capacity.** The capacity to support a security transition goes beyond recruiting, training and equipping security personnel and forces. It requires the creation of a systemic capacity to plan, manage, oversee and sustain an acceptable level of security on a cross-government level. Developing state management systems (budgeting systems, human resources, training) can take significantly longer than establishing a security force unit and should therefore be considered at the outset of any security sector reform programme.

f. **Sustainability.** Long-term success will rely on the development of sustainable models and institutions that can deliver effective day-to-day security. Sustainability should therefore be examined with regards to politics, organizations, processes and resources, and in particular the capability and capacity of security actors relative to remaining levels of threat and insecurity.

## Section 12 – Assessment

3.66 Careful consideration must be given to assessment from the outset of any type of peace support effort. Assessment is the process of estimating the capabilities and performance of organizations, individuals, materiel or systems. Assessment of PSOs will need to be reconciled with political progress toward peace, as military success in a PSO without progress in the political sphere will result in a status quo at best. Assessment of a PSO requires a diverse set of expertise to gather and analyze data so that opportunities can be exploited and future requirements predicted. Assessment should be incorporated into a coherent and comprehensive planning process from the outset and not treated as a standalone military activity. Given different metrics will be used for operations assessment at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, the PSF commander must clearly understand what metrics are to be used (probably at the tactical and/or operational levels), and how they complement and inform those at the strategic level. Given the central importance of political progress within PSOs, tactical-level operations assessment must be linked to operational and strategic operations assessment that link military-strategic objectives to wider political-strategic objectives as part of a comprehensive approach. Further detail on operations assessment can be found in AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*.

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## Chapter 4 – Military tasks and capabilities

4.1 Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations* provides overarching guidance on the conduct of operations at the operational level. The following sections complement AJP-3 by highlighting certain issues and their relationship to peace support.

### Section 1 – Military activities relevant to peace support

4.2 The range of military activities relevant to peace support operations (PSOs) can be divided into offensive, defensive, stability and enabling tactical activities.<sup>77</sup> Together, these activities offer the commander and their staff a framework in which to consider military options. Defensive and stability activities are likely to be predominant during peace support, although the peace support force (PSF) should be prepared and capable of conducting offensive activities as required.

4.3 **Offensive activities.** The main purpose of offensive activities in peace support is to use force to stop an actor from pursuing a course of action that contravenes international law or the mandate. Offensive activities are more likely to be conducted during peace enforcement operations, although limited offensive action may be required during peacekeeping operations. Offensive activities should cease once the desired effect has been created so that the impartial status of the PSF is not compromised.

4.4 **Defensive activities.** The main purpose of defensive activities in peace support is to deter conflicting parties from conducting activities that contravene international law or the mandate. Defensive activities should provide a suitable posture, based on a PSF's capacity, to deter and, if necessary, launch offensive activities to repel aggression.

4.5 **Stability activities.** The main purpose of stability activities in peace support is to provide security and control, and to assist in providing non-traditional military activities to develop local capacity. The PSF may have to assume initial responsibility for those activities that are best provided by other actors, especially in a hostile or uncertain environment. Stability activities feature strongly in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Military stability activities that may be required to help stabilize the situation include the following.

- a. Support to the provision of human security, including the protection of civilians and key infrastructure. Tasks include framework patrolling, control of movement, search and crowd dispersal, as well as engaging with local communities and leaders, understanding their concerns and views and providing feedback.

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<sup>77</sup> See AJP-3.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations* for further information.

- b. An early assessment for security sector reform (SSR), including assessing the local security forces' capacity to operate in accordance with international law and protect the population.
- c. The initial restoration of services and ensuring safe access to these services for all.
- d. Supporting interim governance tasks.

It is essential for such contingencies to be planned in advance with input from the appropriate civilian agencies so that military activities are complementary, rather than detrimental, to longer-term development aims.<sup>78</sup> The PSF should plan to hand over responsibility for the array of civilian tasks it has been involved in to the appropriate local, national and international agencies as soon as possible. Further detail on tactical-level stability tasks can be found in Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-3.2.1.1, *Conduct of Land Tactical Activities*.

**4.6 Enabling activities.** Enabling activities are those that are never conducted in isolation; their purpose is to enable offensive, defensive and stability activities. Enabling activities in peace support could include reconnaissance, security and link-up activities.

## Section 2 – Missions and tasks on peace support

**4.7** This section covers several possible missions and tasks that are relevant to peace support. Some missions and tasks are related to specific operations, whereas others span different types of peace support efforts. It is not intended to be prescriptive, exhaustive or in order of priority. Peace support-related mandates are likely to include many missions and tasks that relate directly to the PSF. Tasking may exceed the capacity of the PSF and therefore tasks may have to be prioritized or resources spread thinly to cover all commitments. Military commanders should consider the implications of both approaches and adopt the most appropriate approach to support the overarching mission.

**4.8 Early warning.** Rapid action by the international community can be crucial to prevent the outbreak or escalation of conflict. Early warning of a threat of an outbreak of violence helps to predict a crisis in time to deploy diplomatic, economic or military means to contain or prevent conflict. Therefore, by developing tailored indicators and warnings focused on the specific problem set of the PSO, member states are likely to focus their strategic information gathering assets on any potential crisis within their areas of interest, and the systematic collection and trend analysis of relevant data will help to facilitate early warning. Surveillance can also provide the means for attribution of culpability, for example, in cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. It may involve using specific joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (JISR) capabilities and employing forces as observers.

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<sup>78</sup> For further details on stability activities AJP-3.28, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Support to Stabilization*).

4.9 **Conflict containment.** The aim of conflict containment is to prevent the spread of the conflict to neighbouring areas and states. Consequently, actions should be designed to stabilize the situation and create an environment in which means such as negotiation will be used to resolve differences. Conflict containment may require the forcible separation of belligerent parties and is most likely in peace enforcement operations.

4.10 **The forcible separation of hostile actors.** International intervention against the consent of hostile (and unsupportive) actors may be perceived by some as overbearing and inappropriate. However, the separation of these actors by external forces is often a requirement, especially when there is a significant humanitarian impact. In non-international armed conflict, the forcible separation of hostile actors who are determined to continue fighting may require the employment of overwhelming force as part of a peace enforcement operation. Commanders should ensure the tempo of activity of the PSF permits hostile actors to disengage and withdraw in accordance with the demands of the international community. Diplomatic activities should be integrated with military activity and every operational pause should be viewed as an opportunity for further diplomatic initiatives.

4.11 **Freedom and denial of movement.** Tasks that support the freedom and denial of movement may not be credible if success is reliant on the consent of any hostile actors within the conflict. Examples include:

- the enforcement of a maritime exclusion zone;
- a no-fly zone to prevent the harassment of an unprotected population; and/or
- the creation of a safe corridor to allow for the free and unmolested movement of aid and refugees.

The decision to declare restricted or exclusion zones will be made at the strategic level and should rely on legal advice. Planning to provide freedom of movement for the PSF, specified international and local actors, and the civilian population is as important at the tactical level as it is at the strategic level. For example, denial of freedom of movement at the local level by elements of hostile and/or unsupportive actors, often accompanied by hostage taking, can cause strategic paralysis.

4.12 **Enforcement of sanctions and embargoes activity.** The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) may attempt to pressure conflicting parties to reduce the level of hostilities in a conflict by authorising economic or other (including military) sanctions and embargoes. Such measures will be part of a wider deterrence strategy aimed at influencing conflicting parties to cease hostilities. NATO air and maritime assets are capable and trained to execute and support these operations. Ground forces also have capabilities that may be employed in this role, for example, through border surveillance.

4.13 **Enforcing no-fly zones.** A no-fly zone is defined as: 'a zone of airspace of defined dimensions set aside for specific purpose in which no air operations are permitted, except

those authorized by the enforcing authority.<sup>79</sup> Authorized offensive counter-air operations may be required to suppress belligerent air defences, even though the enforcement of a no-fly zone is primarily a defensive counter-air mission. Enforcing a no-fly zone can also support deterrence measures on the ground, especially against belligerents whose aim is to attack civilians. However, policing the skies while atrocities on the ground are ongoing could have a detrimental effect on the legitimacy and credibility of the PSF. Therefore, a no-fly zone should only be adopted as part of a wider strategy.

**4.14 Supervision of ceasefires and peace agreements.** A PSF could be deployed to supervise and/or verify any commitments agreed to by the conflicting actors as part of a truce, ceasefire or other peace agreement. Tasks will complement a wider peacekeeping effort and are likely to involve a diverse set of military and non-military actors. The delineation of tasks will be agreed among the various peace support actors and may include participation in:

- the separation, containment, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of forces;
- the execution of a peace agreement, such as the exchange of prisoners and bodies, and arms control agreements;
- liaison between the parties and all elements of the PSF, both military and civilian;
- negotiation and mediation on behalf of all parties to the dispute;
- the investigation of complaints and violations of the agreement or treaty;
- the movement and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; and
- assistance to the United Nations (UN) and other civilian police in those areas with mixed populations that may be located outside buffer zones and in areas of potential hostile territory.

**4.15 Interposition.** A PSF can deploy as an interpositional force, as a form of tripwire either when consent exists or when consent is fragile, if supported by a credible external deterrent power or stand-off force. Troops involved in interposition operations are generally deployed in a prevention role to pre-empt conflict. As such, these operations take place in areas of recent or potential (rather than actual) conflict, either between states or within a state where tension is rising between parties. Although there would be consent to the operation, at least from the state, a peace settlement or formal ceasefire may not have been agreed, and the situation may be characterized by sporadic outbreaks of violence. Interposition operations will generally take the form of establishing a buffer zone or, where the communities are intermingled, establishing areas of separation wherever the communities are physically mixed.

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<sup>79</sup> NATOTerm.

**4.16 Support to the protection of civilians.** In addition to its obligations under the law of armed conflict and the implementation of the NATO protection of civilians policy and concept, the PSF may have in its mission mandate a primary task to protect the civilian population, especially in peace enforcement and peacekeeping.<sup>80</sup> The PSF should plan in consultation with the relevant international and local security forces and non-military actors to establish how protection will be delivered to the local population. Planning will include the following.

- a. How the PSF will complement any overarching civilian-led protection strategy.
- b. How robust military activity should be – in other words, adopting offensive or defensive activities. The likely consequences of military activity should not be worse than the likely consequences of inaction, in particular on the civilian population.
- c. Whether the state or local security forces can contribute to protection tasks and, if so, the degree and scope of responsibilities these forces should retain and, if not, whether NATO should consider the possibility of supporting the development of local security forces' capability to protect civilians. In certain cases, the state's security forces may be the perpetrators of violence against the civilian population.
- d. Whether protection should be provided through a dispersed or concentrated PSF footprint. The most appropriate solution is likely to be the one that provides deterrence, bearing in mind that physical protection often requires presence.

**4.17 Establishing and supervising protected or safe areas.** Preventing a conventional force from attacking civilians in a defined area could be relatively simple, but resource heavy. However, preventing asymmetric attacks, long-range rocket or ballistic missile attacks requires a different force configuration. Understanding the level of protection expected by the affected civilian population, regional actors and global audiences will shape the composition of the PSF. Managing these expectations will be a critical factor to successfully complete the task. Areas to be protected or made safe may contain residents, refugees, displaced persons and substantial numbers of one or more of the belligerent forces. The first stage in any peace support effort designed to protect or make an area safe is to demilitarize that area, which may require coercive action. Having accomplished that, and taken all necessary measures to defend the area, other specific military tasks may include:

- establishing, monitoring and enforcing weapon exclusion zones;
- holding ground, dominating approaches, conducting patrols and searches, or operating checkpoints;
- developing plans to deter external attack;

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<sup>80</sup> More information can be found in Chapter 3, Section 10.

- establishing a communications plan that can support deterrence, the impartial status of the PSF and manage expectations; and
- facilitating access to humanitarian organizations to respond to the needs of affected populations.

**4.18 Observation and monitoring.** The genuine intent of hostile actors to pursue a peaceful solution to resolve conflict should be sufficient to maintain a ceasefire. However, violations may take place as negotiations stall or breakdown, or local disputes lead to violent clashes. Providing an observation and monitoring function allows the PSF to focus resources on those areas that are most vulnerable to outbreaks of violence either between hostile actors or against the civilian population. In peace support, strategic- and operational-level observation and monitoring activities may be conducted by maritime and air assets. However, at the tactical level it may have a greater reliance on the human factor, for instance, the observations of troops in the crisis area. Traditionally in UN operations, individual observer teams have acted as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the UNSC and their presence has often been sufficient to deter breaches of ceasefires, peace agreements or international law. Their up-to-date reports provide useful evidence to counter claims put forward by partisan interests at UNSC discussions. Observers may be employed individually or as multinational or multi-agency teams to observe, monitor, verify and, where possible, defuse situations of potential violent activity. Specific tasks may include:

- monitoring a ceasefire;
- observing a military withdrawal from a specific area; or
- monitoring the movement of refugees and other displaced persons.

Observers can be employed by the UN as military observers and are usually unarmed to demonstrate impartiality. They usually operate from small outposts with the consent of the population and conflicting parties. The function can also be performed by a PSF.

**4.19 Humanitarian assistance.** The use of available military resources may be requested or assessed as being necessary to assist or complement the efforts of humanitarian actors in situations where the environment is hostile or uncertain, or where humanitarian agencies lack the resources to deliver humanitarian aid. The PSF must be cognisant of the humanitarian principles and therefore the relationship that is likely to exist between the two sets of actors during humanitarian assistance tasks. Guidance from the joint force commander will determine the PSF’s involvement in humanitarian assistance; tasks will vary but could include providing security escorts and transportation support. Further detail on humanitarian assistance can be found in AJP-3.4.3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance*.

**4.20 Support to the electoral process.** The re-establishment of law and order and the creation of a secure environment are essential prerequisites to the successful conduct of elections. Without some guarantee of protection and security, individuals may not have the

confidence to vote and the electoral process will lack credibility. Military support for the electoral process can take many forms but will generally consist of the:

- establishment and protection of voting centres;
- secure transportation of ballot boxes and electoral staff; and
- protection of the voting population.

Such tasks are likely to take place during peacekeeping or peacebuilding.

**4.21 Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.** DDR<sup>81</sup> is a political tool used to mitigate the recurrence of conflict in a given area. DDR achieves this by disarming and demobilising armed actors and reintegrating them into civil society, setting the conditions for the security sector to be reformed to reflect a single legitimate armed force. DDR should be a civilian-led programme. The DDR process addresses the post-conflict security problem that arises when combatants (some of whom may be children), and those associated with the fighting forces, are left without livelihoods following a cessation of conflict.<sup>82</sup> DDR will be only one activity of a wider and longer-term transition designed to reform the local security sector. Persuading armed groups to disarm and demobilise will be a difficult task for the peacemakers. A non-state warring party is unlikely to disarm without sufficient security-related guarantees by the international community and the state. Forcible disarmament could be considered, but over a wide area would be very labour force intensive and in certain cultures impossible to accomplish. If the PSF conducts disarmament without a coordinated and fully resourced reintegration process, the DDR process is likely to fail, the results of which could have a detrimental effect on the security environment and peace process. Furthermore, a PSF should consider the psychological needs of child soldiers before being reintegrated into society. Further detail on DDR and its relationship with SSR can be found in AJP-3.28, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization*.

**4.22 Early stages of security sector reform.** SSR is a sensitive political process because it seeks to reform the existing institutions in conflict-affected countries so they can enforce the law and provide security and justice for their citizens. This makes the process difficult to implement in practice. Notwithstanding, it is likely that military and non-military actors will have to address the early stages of SSR to capitalize on agreements made following a cessation of conflict between hostile actors. Early successes in reforming elements of the security and justice sector could help set the conditions for further development and give hostile and unsupportive actors and the population confidence in the peace process. The PSF is likely to get involved in early development initiatives aimed at

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<sup>81</sup> Disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement (DDRRR) is the same type of programme as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) designed for foreign combatants that include the repatriation and resettlement in their home country.

<sup>82</sup> Women and children often have many varied roles within a conflict and may be armed. If they are left out of DDR programmes due to oversight or unachievable entry requirements, an entire group may remain armed and disenfranchised from the peace process.

the local security forces. Care must be taken to ensure that any programme aimed at the armed forces is coordinated into a central programme that considers the security and justice sector as a whole, for example, alongside the judiciary and penal sector. Advancing the reform programme for one part of the sector in isolation of the others is unlikely to succeed and could have a destabilizing effect later in the peace process. Planners should be careful not to empower one local actor over another without considering the full implications such a decision will have on the peace process; for instance, the power gained by the local actor through empowerment may give them a disproportionate amount of influence in future negotiations. SSR is an essential programme to enable the transition of the security function from the PSF to a local force. For further detail on SSR and DDR, see AJP-3.28, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization*.

**4.23 Law enforcement.** Host nation law enforcement agencies should have primary responsibility for all law enforcement issues pertaining to civilians. Where this is not possible, the PSF is likely to be tasked to assist in providing capabilities. Within this context, the PSF's policing capability is a highly valuable resource, which can meet different public order and security requirements and perform police executive and/or non-executive missions. Specific military units with policing capabilities contribute to the protection of the local population from violence, particularly from threats of a criminal nature as follows.

- a. Conducting policing executive activities through replacement activities, such as public order management, public security management, criminal investigation, border management and law enforcement intelligence, to help restore a safe and secure environment and confidence in the peace process.
- b. Supporting police capacity building and contributing to the development of law enforcement agencies through reinforcement missions and non-executive activities, such as monitoring, training, advising, mentoring, etc., in conjunction with other international agencies as part of the peacebuilding process, including their capacity to protect the human rights of the population.
- c. Contributing to the protection of civilians.
- d. Providing liaison with international and host nation law enforcement agencies to harmonize activities and tasks pertaining to law enforcement.

**4.24 Border security and control.** A state needs to control its territory, and access to it, to maintain its authority. The control of border areas will be necessary to prevent any movement of disruptive actors and associated resources, and to prevent smuggling and/or trafficking that may undermine state authority. Border control will likely require a combination of immigration, customs and excise control measures. While these may not be tasks for the PSF, they may well be involved in developing an integrated border management strategy. However, while local capability is being developed, the PSF may need to assist in providing border control, as well as mentors, advisors, monitors and trainers to help build capacity. Providing border control will require extensive resources and



could be one of many tasks given to the PSF. Priorities will likely dictate where assistance is possible and likely to be most effective. Border control may include managing land borders, airspace, coastal waters, territorial waters and exclusive economic zones.

**4.25 Explosive ordnance and mine clearance.** Explosive ordnance and mines pose a significant threat to all people and equipment during and after the termination of a conflict, both at sea and on land. Unexploded ordnance and minefields in combat zones are primarily the responsibility of the conflicting parties. In theory, should the PSF withdraw, the minefields belong to the hostile actors' obstacle plan. If the PSF wishes to retain its impartial status, it is obliged not to reveal the location of one party's minefields to the other, although it should make every effort to ensure that they are adequately marked in accordance with international law. Unless the mandate specifies otherwise, a PSF is not permitted to lift a party's unexploded ordnance or minefields, except when those munitions prevent the PSF from carrying out its mission or are a hazard along tracks and sea lines of communication in use by international shipping or other non-combatant parties. The PSF will generally seek to identify areas of hazard to support force protection and also the safety of the international community. Within the UN, the UN Mine Action Service, often with assistance from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), is the focus for all mine-related tasks. NATO forces do not conduct humanitarian demining tasks. However, they may support others in clearing mines through support to activities such as training, planning, command and control, monitoring, mapping, quality control and reporting. Further detail on explosive ordnance can be found in ATP-3.18.1, *Allied Tactical Publication for Explosive Ordnance Disposal*, AJP-3.15, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices* and *The Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War*.<sup>83</sup>

### **Section 3 – Military capabilities on peace support**

4.26 NATO's success in peace support relies on a joint effort, usually involving all military components, brought together under a unified PSF command structure. The PSF will be generated for the operation from those components on the basis of national capabilities, availability and political agreement.

#### **Maritime component**

**4.27 Roles and capabilities of maritime forces on peace support.** Maritime operations include any actions performed by forces on, under or over the sea to gain or exploit, sea control or sea denial, and/or to project power from the sea. In a joint environment, maritime forces do more than pursue maritime objectives. Maritime forces, remaining at sea, can:

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<sup>83</sup> Protocol V of the *Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons*, UN Document CCW/MSP/2003/2, 28 November 2003.

- act as a coercive force in support of deterrence;
- reduce the need for external support;
- enable access to an area of operations;
- project power ashore;
- provide militarily logistics;
- support humanitarian assistance; and
- conduct and/or assist non-combatant evacuation operations.

For more details on the employment of maritime forces, see AJP-3.1, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Maritime Operations*. The major maritime capabilities used on peace support are detailed below.

**4.28 Coastal defence and protection of shipping.** Maritime forces can be tasked to provide protection of coastal facilities and shipping for a joint operations area with, or dependent upon, access to and over the sea. Protection can be provided through control of the sea or widespread sea-control operations, potentially enhanced by distant (in the vicinity) or close (accompanying selected ships) escort.

**4.29 Maritime interdiction operations.** Maritime interdiction operations encompass seaborne peace enforcement measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items or persons into or out of a national or other specific area. These measures may involve enforcing economic sanctions via a maritime embargo of a particular country's seaborne or airborne trade. Maritime interdiction operations against commercial shipping can be used to reduce reinforcement and resupply of designated conflicting parties or belligerents, and to reduce illegal activity such as smuggling and human trafficking that can often undermine the overall objectives of the peace support effort. It can also be used to enforce legal agreements related to the crisis, for example, agreements on fishery, seabed exploitation and international borders.

**4.30 Maritime force projection and support.** Maritime forces can contribute to air power, to special forces' operations and to indirect fire through naval fire support, the capabilities of which are all covered elsewhere in this section. It also includes the following elements that can make a significant contribution to peace support.

- a. **Safe platform.** Maritime platforms can provide a secure, capable platform for command and control of land operations, particularly in the early stages of a peace enforcement or peacekeeping operation. They can also provide a safe and impartial venue for negotiations between the various conflicting parties.
- b. **Amphibious forces.** Amphibious forces can respond rapidly with a joint capability by deploying ashore, posturing at sea, or using air forces to provide presence without commitment to influence political discussion, for example, during peace negotiations. Amphibious forces are often able to provide theatre entry

capability and are not reliant upon well founded ports. They are often able to sustain themselves and others for a number of days or weeks without recourse to external provisions, depending upon their maritime logistic support. Therefore, they offer commanders and politicians a wide range of landing options.

c. **Logistic support.** The ability of maritime forces to self-sustain increases their flexibility by reducing dependence on external resources. They can provide a scalable, mission-tailored response that has a theatre-entry capability. Sea-based logistic support to land forces can assist where using local resources would otherwise distort the local economy, delay sustained reconstruction and potentially result in dependence of the local population on international intervention. The provision of maritime or littoral medical support may be useful on PSOs. Finally, sea-based maintenance facilities can prolong the availability of equipment operating in harsh environments.

d. **Humanitarian assistance.** The mobility, flexibility and self-sustainment of maritime forces give them great utility in responding to humanitarian needs. They are particularly useful in supporting humanitarian assistance when there is insufficient civilian capacity to deal with the crisis, for example, by providing support helicopters and hospital ships.

e. **Naval ordnance disposal.** Naval mine warfare forces' capabilities are to detect, nullify or dispose of explosive ordnance hazards, including sea mines and waterborne improvised explosive devices. Such devices not only impair the flexibility of manoeuvre of combat units, disrupt sea lines of communications, degrade morale or paralyse key coastal infrastructure or population centres, but also cause heavy casualties among the civilian mariners. Naval mine warfare forces can play an important role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Cooperation between naval mine warfare forces and the merchant shipping community will be essential to minimize the threat. Naval mine warfare forces can help build up local capacity and, where no indigenous capability exists, assist in counter-mining activities.

## Land component

4.31 **Roles and capabilities of land force elements on peace support.** The complexity of peace support requires an approach that emphasizes centralized intent with decentralized execution, freedom of action, tempo and initiative to contend with the multitude of activities and rapidly changing situations. Employed properly, land forces can:

- support deterrence activity;
- protect the civilian population and infrastructure;
- interact with other military and non-military organizations in the crisis area;

- provide coercive action against conflicting actors; and
- support humanitarian assistance.

For more details on the employment of land forces see AJP-3.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*. The major land capabilities used on peace support are detailed below.

**4.32 Infantry.** Infantry will normally represent the predominant component of the PSF. Typical infantry tasks include: force protection; domination of the ground through a network of vehicle and foot patrols; protection of civilians; protection of key infrastructure; check points; observation posts; cordon and search operations; imposition of curfews; convoy protection; dispersing crowds and riots; gathering information and assisting in civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) activities. Armoured personnel vehicles will enhance protection and employability for high-risk tasks such as interposition. The combat skills of the infantry will be essential when conducting peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations.

**4.33 Aviation.** The use of assault support aviation is a critical capability in countries where the terrain makes it difficult to move quickly over distance. They enable a quick reaction force and reserve capability over a large area of operations where the protection of civilians is often a primary objective. Aviation also provides the capability to conduct medical and casualty evacuation, provide logistic resupply, and perform reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. Armed and attack rotary and fixed-wing aircraft are a flexible combat force that often have a significant deterrent effect and provide the PSF commander with agility and reactivity. However, low flying rotary wing and tilt-rotor aircraft are vulnerable and can operate safely only in lower threat levels; self-protection measures enhance their survivability to a degree but their use in peace support must be a balance between need and risk. Aviation assets will normally be a scarce resource and their tasking should always be centrally directed (by the most suitable component commander on behalf of the PSF commander) to promote high effectiveness and efficiency. An exception to this rule is the command and control and tasking of specialist platforms, such as the attack helicopter used in direct support of land forces, which will normally be delegated to a lower formation, for example, a brigade headquarters.

**4.34 Armour.** The surveillance capabilities, firepower, mobility, protection and communications of armoured reconnaissance vehicles and the training of reconnaissance troops make them suitable for such tasks as monitoring large areas, liaison, overseeing control points, convoy security, quick reaction tasks and clearing routes. The deployment of main battle tanks when conducting peace enforcement or peacekeeping will depend on the scale of opposition and the level of threat posed to the PSF. Main battle tanks can provide an effective show of force and aid deterrence, but they can degrade legitimacy of the PSF by providing an overly aggressive stance as well as damaging roads and infrastructure.

**4.35 Artillery.** Indirect fire of artillery and mortars may provide a deterrent function as well as a contingency capability to respond rapidly to escalations of violence, demonstrate resolve to deter further hostile acts and enforce compliance. The increased availability of precision-guided munitions significantly reduces the probability and degree of collateral

damage, a factor that has previously constrained the use of artillery. Mortar-locating radars and other artillery locating assets may also help the force document and apportion responsibility for indirect attacks conducted by hostile actors. An integrated air missile defence capability may also offer additional protection of the environment and deter hostile groups from aggression.

## **Air component**

4.36 **Roles and capabilities of air forces on peace support.** The core air power attributes of height, speed and reach, combined with its agility and ubiquity means air power can be employed as a powerful deterrent during peace enforcement operations, while providing a PSF commander flexible options to concentrate force using precision weapons should deterrence fail. Air assets can deploy, relocate, resupply and extract a PSF – even in high threat environments if required. They can also monitor the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) across large geographical areas to provide information that can be processed to deliver intelligence. This, when combined with the human environment, can substantially aid situational awareness and understanding. For more details on the employment of air forces see AJP-3.3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations*. The major air capabilities used on peace support operations are detailed below.

4.37 **Counter-air.** All operations, including PSOs, require the necessary degree of control of the air to succeed. Without it, Allied and partner forces are held at constant threat, greatly impacting their freedom of action. Air power can protect a PSF from such threats using a mixture of defensive and offensive counter-air missions designed to deter hostile air action or to detect and target air threats should they appear.

4.38 **Attack.** Air power can often support deterrence without the requirement to deploy weapons, however, air power can also deliver flexible attack options should the use of force become necessary. Modern air-launched weapons are increasingly precise and strikes will be planned to minimize any collateral damage, but planners should guard against an unrealistically high expectation of zero collateral damage and be cognizant that perceived excesses could undermine the mission.

4.39 **Air mobility.** Air power's speed and reach allows rapid movement of forces while avoiding direct and indirect dangers on the ground. In addition, tactical mobility assets, including helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft, can provide access to otherwise inaccessible or hostile terrain. Air mobility support can be subdivided as follows.

- a. **Air transport.** Inter-theatre air transport provides an air bridge to home bases or other theatres and normally uses strategic air transport or civilian aircraft chartered on the commercial market. Intra-theatre air transport provides air movement within a specific theatre or joint operations area and normally uses tactical assets.

b. **Air logistic support.** Air logistic support includes tasks (other than airborne missions) conducted to deploy, sustain, distribute and recover personnel, equipment and supplies.

c. **Airborne operations.** Airborne operations provide air-delivered combat power to seize ground or installations through the airdrop or air-landing of land forces directly onto an objective. They can be high risk but can have use in certain types of peace support efforts for: securing vital ground, for example, an airport of debarkation at the start of a peace enforcement operation; rapid, focused application of force; demonstrating intent and/or capability; and conducting an initial entry operation.

d. **Aeromedical evacuation.** Aeromedical evacuation is a specialized form of airlift for transporting patients under medical supervision to appropriate medical treatment facilities. Aeromedical evacuation encompasses forward, tactical and strategic evacuation and is an essential element of the medical support system.

e. **Humanitarian assistance.** Airlift is often the only means to get aid to remote or isolated regions. These regions may be cut off from resupply due to natural hazards or as a result of conflict.

f. **Joint personnel recovery.** The speed, reach and responsiveness of air assets make them ideally suited to joint personnel recovery missions which could extract or rescue PSF personnel, even in high threat environments, should the situation warrant it.

g. **Air-to-air refueling.** Air-to-air refuelling (AAR) is an air support operation consisting of the in-flight transfer of fuel between a tanker and suitable receiver aircraft. AAR is an essential capability that increases the range, endurance, payload and flexibility of all capable receiver aircraft and is especially important when forward basing is limited or unavailable. AAR requirements may not be readily apparent to a PSF commander but are often a critical requirement for air power assets and they should be factored into the planning process by suitable subject matter experts.

4.40 **Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.** The height and reach of air power assets make them ideally suited to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. Air-based ISR assets can be used strategically to build an early understanding of potential crisis points and enhance the quality of political and high-level military decision-making prior to the deployment of a PSF. Once deployed, airborne ISR assets allow the observation of an adversary's actions and dispositions thereby enabling commanders to make better operational and tactical decisions as well as providing timely threat warning to deployed and supported personnel.

## Joint capabilities with specific relevance to peace support

4.41 Joint capabilities exist that have particular relevance to a number of peace support efforts including: special operations forces (SOF); cyber; space; electromagnetic environment; logistic support; CIMIC; military engineering (MILENG); explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); military police; stability policing; and medical and veterinary services.

4.42 **Special operations forces.** Special operations are defined as: ‘military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained and equipped forces using distinct, techniques and modes of employment.’<sup>84</sup> NATO SOF are strategic assets to be employed to help achieve strategic and specified operational-level objectives. However, their overt deployment in a politically charged environment can be politically sensitive. Special operations missions in peace support may include some or all of the principal tasks of military assistance, special reconnaissance or direct action, depending on the circumstances of each operation. Further detail on SOF can be found in AJP-3.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*. The principal SOF tasks within peace support are detailed below.

a. **Military assistance.** Military assistance is a broad category of measures and activities conducted by SOF that support, enable and influence critical friendly assets through training, advising, mentoring, partnering or the conduct of combined and other operations. Military assistance operations are often executed to increase the level of technical abilities and proficiencies of a partner to help them achieve a certain goal.

b. **Special reconnaissance.** Special reconnaissance and surveillance activities conducted as a special operation in, but not limited to, hostile, denied, diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, led by SOF using distinct techniques and modes of employment. Special reconnaissance can be conducted to support the PSF’s theatre intelligence collection process in hostile, denied or politically sensitive territory. SOF may conduct these tasks separately, supported by, in conjunction with, or in support of other component commands.

c. **Direct action.** Direct action is a short duration strike or other small-scale offensive action by SOF to seize, destroy, capture, recover or inflict damage to achieve specific, well-defined and often time sensitive results. Direct action is likely to be limited to peace enforcement; however, it may have applicability in other peace support efforts too. The implications of conducting direct action on the perceived impartiality and legitimacy of the PSF should always be considered before conducting these types of activities.

4.43 **Cyberspace.** Cyberspace capabilities can contribute to PSOs by creating a mix of cognitive, virtual and physical effects. Cyber capabilities are an enabler and integrator of

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<sup>84</sup> NATOTerm.

the other operational domains; they are vital to ensuring the Alliance and its partners' freedom of action but are also a capability in their own right. Cyberspace capabilities present opportunities and challenges for PSO planning, as some of the capabilities cannot be exposed without compromising their effectiveness, moreover many will be nationally owned and require a long 'lead in time' to design. Many information-related activities are enabled by the domain (for example, media operations) and are important in creating and reinforcing the perception of impartiality and legitimacy in the minds of conflicting actors and wider audiences.

4.44 **Space domain.** NATO has recognized space as an operational domain since 2019. While NATO does not currently field space assets of its own, space and space-based capabilities are essential for both military operations and the functioning of most civil societies. A PSF will therefore almost certainly have a requirement for space support that will need to be provided by the PSF nation, partner nations or another source (for example, purchased commercially). Such support could take the form of satellite communications, environmental monitoring or the necessary timing signals required for navigation, datalink synchronization or weapons optimization. Space is also the ultimate high ground and is ideally suited to ISR operations. NATO's requirements for space support are well known and it is therefore entirely reasonable to expect a capable adversary to take steps to target NATO's use of space. Even for a relatively low technology adversary, systems such as navigation signal jammers are inexpensive and readily available. This should be factored into the planning process and mitigations sought.

4.45 **Electromagnetic spectrum.** Although not an operational domain, the EMS transcends all operational domains and operations and is a key enabler for military operations, including information activities. Achieving EMS superiority is key to success in all operational domains. EMS operations' capabilities can contribute to PSOs by enabling situational awareness, decision-making, execution, assessment and a tempo that achieves and maintains the initiative. Additionally, EMS operations can, for example, provide intelligence, build joint intelligence preparation of the operating environment, define/characterize the EMS, conduct targeting and enhance protection. EMS are necessary to achieve near-real time situational awareness of the EMS operational environment to successfully conduct operations.

4.46 **Joint logistic support.** Logistics is a key enabling function for PSOs. Logistics must be integrated as early as possible in the planning stage to support the operation through the deployment, sustainment and redeployment of the forces. The establishment of a joint logistic support group (JLSG) will enable effective and efficient theatre support. The JLSG with its JLSG Headquarters is the primary logistic command and control organization at theatre level for the joint force commander. The JLSG is responsible for the coordination and execution of third line logistic support. When there is no requirement to deploy a complete JLSG Headquarters, the joint force commander (or single service commander for a single service Alliance operations and missions) will tailor the required logistics command and control for the operation using the resources available. Further detail on logistic support can be found in AJP-4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics*.



a. **Operational contract support.** Operational contract support is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations. Operational contract support provides tools and processes to manage the variety of services that may be required to support peace operations (including, but not limited to: base operational support, transportation and security). Planning for commercial support to peace operations is a complex and challenging process requiring joint force command, national and NATO organizational involvement, including commanders and the primary and specialist staffs at the command-and-control organizations. Additionally, numerous contracting organizations from inside and outside the joint operations area play a vital role in contracting support and contractor management planning and execution. Finally, developing contracting support plans and conducting the associated contractor integration planning crosses most joint force and national support element primary and specialist staff lanes, yet many of these staffs are unfamiliar with the contracting process and associated contractor integration challenges. Contracting support may be obtained from within or outside the affected country. To avoid competition for scarce or similar support and to promote economy of contracting effort, contracts for logistics support should be coordinated through the designated JLSG J4 or lead agent for logistics. At a minimum, logistician planners should be thoroughly familiar with national civil augmentation programmes, NATO Support and Procurement Agency's Rapidly Useable Execution Contracts and Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements. All three of these options are designed to be flexible and address emergent requirements worldwide which can help the economy of the affected country and facilitate the subsequent transfer of responsibility to the affected country, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or international organizations.

b. **Contracting.** Contracting is commonly used to augment organic military capabilities with other sources of support (for example, multinational logistic support and host-nation support) and to provide support where no organic capability exists. Under most circumstances, other government organizations and NGOs will contract for support to the populace. If time permits, operational contracts should be coordinated among relevant agencies (for example, state departments), international organizations (for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross), NGOs, and the private sector to minimize risk, inefficiencies, duplication and excessive competition between consumers.

c. **Contractors.** Commanders should be aware that private contractors are employed by a wide range of organizations, inside and outside the joint operations area. They are often employed to provide security, training, technical expertise and logistical support. Commanders should be cognizant that contractor personnel are often viewed by the local population as NATO representatives and any negative behaviour or interaction with the local population on the part of contractors can have an adverse impact on peace support efforts. Commanders should consider developing guidance for contractor personnel (for example, identification on

clothing) and consider the need to develop communication and public affairs guidance that takes into account potential issues with private contractors. Further detail on common concerns and issues with contracted personnel can be found in AJP-4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics*.

**4.47 Joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.** JISR is defined as: ‘an integrated intelligence and operations set of capabilities, which synchronises and integrates the planning and operations of all collection capabilities with the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of the resulting information in direct support of the planning, preparation, and execution of operations.’<sup>85</sup> JISR is designed to support commanders, their staff and forces with situational awareness, development of comprehensive understanding of the operating environment, targeting, damage assessment and other information relevant for decision-making. JISR consists of coherent joint, multinational and multidiscipline activities in the space, air, land and maritime domains. JISR assets can also be employed to support the missions of other actors involved in the peace support effort, for example, monitoring the flow of refugees or displaced persons in support of humanitarian actors. Further detail on intelligence can be found in AJP-2 series starting with AJP-2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security*.

**4.48 Military engineering.** MILENG is an inherent aspect of each joint function at all levels of command, in any land mission, campaign or operation, and in all phases. It achieves the desired objectives by: understanding the environment through detailed infrastructure assessments; enabling or preventing manoeuvre or mobility; and developing, maintaining and improving infrastructure. MILENG incorporates areas of expertise such as engineering, EOD, environmental protection, military search, and management of infrastructure, including contracted civil expertise. MILENG also makes a significant contribution to countering improvised explosive devices, protecting the force and providing life support. Because PSOs are dealing mainly with mobility and infrastructure, a sufficient MILENG staff element should be employed to provide subject matter expert advice in all areas of expertise.

**4.49 Explosive ordnance disposal.** The command status of all EOD forces, coordinating authorities and tasking authorities should be established early in the planning process because the affiliation of EOD to MILENG differs between different NATO member states. A combined joint explosive ordnance disposal cell (CJEODC) is to be established in the joint theatre headquarters as the focal point for all EOD matters. The Joint Engineer Division at the operational level contains the core of the CJEODC; the chief of MILENG remains the primary advisor to the joint force commander on all mobility support issues. EOD operational capabilities are to detect, nullify or dispose of explosive ordnance hazards, including improvised explosive devices and landmines. These not only impair the flexibility of manoeuvre of combat units, disrupt lines of communications, degrade morale or paralyze key infrastructure or population centres, but also cause heavy casualties among the civilian population. EOD assets can play an important role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding

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<sup>85</sup> NATOTerm.

operations. Cooperation between military EOD units and national military and non-military agencies will be essential to identify the threat, help build local capacity and, where no indigenous capability exists, assist in demining activities.

**4.50 Civil-military interaction.** The joint function CIMIC encompasses the core activities of civil factor integration and civil-military interaction (CMI). Civil-factor integration contributes to the comprehensive understanding of the operating environment and decision-making process. Through CMI, the PSF coordinate their planning and activities with relevant non-military actors. A dedicated CIMIC J9 staff provides CIMIC analysis, assessment and advice and coordinates the civil-factor integration with the other functional areas. CIMIC J9 staff and CIMIC assets conduct CIMIC liaison and enable and facilitate the CMI of other functional areas.

**4.51 Military police activities.** Military police activities are enabling functions that are conducted by specially designated military personnel who are organized, equipped and trained in using police techniques.<sup>86</sup> These enabling functions are police, mobility support, security, detention and stability policing, all of which can be conducted across the full spectrum of peace support efforts. Military police forces serve as combat support force multipliers, which use the five military police functions to provide police support to the force and the public, enabling commanders to perform both combat and crisis response operations.

**4.52 Stability policing.** Stability policing is defined as: 'police related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace the indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights'.<sup>87</sup> Stability policing activities are conducted with the aim of establishing a safe and secure environment (SASE), restoring public order and security, and establishing the conditions for meeting longer term needs with respect to governance and development (in particular, through security sector reform). This can include both the re-establishment of law and order and reinforcing the rule of law (police, courts, corrections, etc.). Under a comprehensive approach, a combination of military and non-military actors, such as indigenous and international police forces, could be employed to achieve this goal. Stability policing should be conducted by specialised assets, which are police trained and equipped. Stability policing assets are specialized in the field of maintaining public order, public safety and law enforcement. This may be accomplished by replacing or reinforcing indigenous police forces. The natural providers of resources devoted to stability policing activities are Military Police inclusive of Gendarmerie-type forces when operating in a non-permissive environment. These forces are well suited to perform stability policing activities due to their inherent policing skills and their experience to operate in high threat environments.

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<sup>86</sup> AJP-3.21, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police* provides a comprehensive overview of military police functions and activities. NATO military police may contribute to and perform stability policing activities, but not exclusively.

<sup>87</sup> NATOTerm.

4.53 Stability policing fills a void in establishing and maintaining a SASE post conflict and during peace support. Stability policing assets perform police activities in the mission area, with the aim of tackling possible threat sources and providing security to the local population by replacing and/or reinforcing indigenous police forces. Stability policing conducted throughout the full spectrum of conflict requires a specific police approach and set of capabilities that significantly differs from the support and training of other types of security forces. While stability policing benefits greatly from a comprehensive approach, given its specialized nature, it must rely on police expertise and as such it should be directed by enablers with police expertise from within the NATO force. It may be necessary for conventional forces to conduct policing functions in the initial stages, however, the transition to police forces should occur as soon as possible. In any case, planners must seek the advice of the Provost Marshal in planning and coordinating stability policing activities on behalf of the commander. Further detailed information can be found in AJP-3.22, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing*.

4.54 **Medical support.** The commander and troop-contributing nations share the responsibility for the health of NATO forces. Military medical services are designed principally to provide medical support to the PSF and not the local population. Planners should conduct a rigorous assessment of operational and environmental risks and an estimation of the population at risk to ensure that medical support is appropriate. This should include sending an advance medical intelligence and information team to conduct a pre-deployment health risk assessment as soon as possible before establishing the base. Poor hygiene conditions, poverty or damage to industrial plants can cause an increased health risk for both the local population and PSF due to infectious disease and environmental health threats.

4.55 **Liaison.** Liaison with civilian health care providers is important to plan a coordinated and, where required, collaborative response. Medical rules of eligibility define the possibility of access to the military medical system for population at risk by categories (NATO military or non-military, non-NATO military, host nation non-military, contracted non-military, other non-military). In areas where the health infrastructure has been damaged or is non-existent, the commander may need to consider providing medical support as a last resource to the local population. This must be done in close coordination with local authorities or health care organizations, and in line with OCHA guidelines, as military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military or civil defence assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. PSF medical forces should only lead on civilian health provision when no civilian alternative is available and for as short a time as possible, until the appropriate civilian authority can take over (host nation health organization, World Health Organization or an international humanitarian organization). Where medical support is provided to the civilian population, it must be as close as possible to the peacetime standards of the receiving nation, and acceptable – at least for the outcome – for the providing nation. It is crucial the receiving nation can sustain the provided standard for the long-term. Further detail on medical support can be found in AJP-4.10, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support* and Allied Joint Medical Publication (AJMedP)-6, *Allied Joint Civil-Military Medical Interface Doctrine*.

## Lexicon

### Part 1 – List of abbreviations

AAR	air-to-air refuelling
AJP	Allied joint publication
AJMedP	Allied joint medical publication
ATP	Allied tactical publication
Bi-SC	of the two Strategic Commands
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CIMIC	civil-military cooperation
CJEODC	combined joint explosive ordnance disposal cell
CMI	civil-military interaction
COPD	Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
CPP	cultural property protection
CRSV	conflict-related sexual violence
CUOE	comprehensive understanding of the operating environment
DDR	disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement
EMS	electromagnetic spectrum
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
HNS	host-nation support
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IEA	information environment assessment
Info Ops	information operations
ISR	intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
JALLC	Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operating environment
JISR	joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
JLSG	joint logistic support group
KLE	key leader engagement
MC	Military Committee
MILENG	military engineering
Mil PA	military public affairs

NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCS	operational contract support
PMSC	private military and security company
PoC	protection of civilians
PSF	peace support force
PSO	peace support operation
PsyOps	psychological operation
SEA	sexual exploitation and abuse
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status of forces agreement
SPU	stability policing unit
SSR	security sector reform
StratCom	strategic communications
TIM	toxic industrial material
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations country team
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council resolution
US	United States

## Part 2 – Terms and definitions

### **actor**

An individual, group or entity whose actions are affecting the attainment of the end state.  
(NATO Agreed)

### **chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence**

The plans, procedures and activities intended to contribute to the prevention of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents, to protect forces, territories and populations against, and to assist in recovering from, such incidents and their effects.  
(NATO Agreed)

### **chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incident**

An occurrence due to the suspected or confirmed presence of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear substances, either arising from the intention to use them by an aggressor, or following their intentional or accidental release.  
(NATO Agreed)

### **civil-military cooperation**

A military joint function that integrates the understanding of the civil factors of the operating environment and that enables, facilitates and conducts civil-military interaction to support the accomplishment of missions and military strategic objectives in peacetime, crisis and conflict.  
(NATO Agreed)

### **civil-military interaction**

Activities between NATO military bodies and non-military actors to foster mutual understanding that enhances effectiveness and efficiency in crisis management and conflict prevention and resolution.  
(NATO Agreed)

### **conflict prevention**

A peace support effort to identify and monitor the potential causes of conflict and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.  
(NATO Agreed)

### **gendarmerie-type force**

An armed force established for enforcing the laws and that, on its national territory, permanently and primarily conducts its activities for the benefit of the civilian population.  
(NATO Agreed)

**host nation**

A country that, by agreement:

- a. receives forces and materiel of NATO member states or other countries operating on/from or transiting through its territory;
  - b. allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or
  - c. provides support for these purposes.
- (NATO Agreed)

**host-nation support**

Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organizations that are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation's territory.

(NATO Agreed)

**humanitarian assistance**

As part of an operation, the use of available military resources to assist or complement the efforts of responsible civil actors in the operational area or specialized civil humanitarian organizations in fulfilling their primary responsibility to alleviate human suffering.

(NATO Agreed)

**information activities**

Activities performed by any capability or means, focused on creating cognitive effects.

(NATO Agreed)

**information operations**

A staff function to analyze, plan, assess and integrate information activities to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and audiences in support of mission objectives.

(NATO Agreed)

**international organization**

An intergovernmental, regional or global organization governed by international law and established by a group of states, with international juridical personality given by international agreement, however characterized, creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of fulfilling a given function and pursuing common aims.

Note: Exceptionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross, although a non-governmental organization formed under the Swiss Civil Code, is mandated by the international community of states and is founded on international law, specifically the Geneva Conventions, has an international legal personality or status on its own, and enjoys some immunities and privileges for the fulfilment of its humanitarian mandate.

(NATO Agreed)



**joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance**

An integrated intelligence and operations set of capabilities, which synchronises and integrates the planning and operations of all collection capabilities with the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of the resulting information in direct support of the planning, preparation, and execution of operations.

(NATO Agreed)

**military engineering**

A function in support of operations to shape the physical operating environment.

(NATO Agreed)

**military public affairs capability**

The strategic communications capability responsible for promoting military aims and objectives by communicating accurate and truthful information to internal and external audiences in a timely manner.

(NATO Agreed)

**no-fly zone**

A zone of airspace of defined dimensions set aside for specific purpose in which no air operations are permitted, except those authorized by the enforcing authority.

(NATO Agreed)

**peacebuilding**

A peace support effort designed to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict by addressing the underlying causes of the conflict and the longer-term needs of the people.

Note: Peacebuilding requires a long-term commitment and may run concurrently with other types of peace support efforts.

(NATO Agreed)

**peace enforcement**

A peace support effort designed to end hostilities through the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force.

Note: Peace enforcement is likely to be conducted without the strategic consent of some, if not all, of the major conflicting parties.

(NATO Agreed)

**peacekeeping**

A peace support effort designed to assist the implementation of a ceasefire or peace settlement and to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.

Note: Peacekeeping is conducted with the strategic consent of all major conflicting parties.

(NATO Agreed)

**peacemaking**

A peace support effort conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement, involving primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets.

(NATO Agreed)

**peace support**

Efforts conducted impartially to restore or maintain peace.

Note: Peace support efforts can include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

(NATO Agreed)

**peace support force**

A military force assigned to a peace support operation.

(NATO Agreed)

**protection of civilians**

All efforts taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate the negative effects that might arise from military operations on the civilian population and, when applicable, to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats of physical violence by other actors, including through the establishment of a safe and secure environment.

(NATO Agreed)

**psychological operation**

Planned activities using methods of communication and other means directed at approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives.

(NATO Agreed)

**stability policing**

Police-related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace the indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights.

(NATO Agreed)

**special operations**

Military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained and equipped forces using distinct techniques and modes of employment.

(NATO Agreed)

**terrorism**

The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.

(NATO Agreed)

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**AJP-3.24(A)(1)**