NATO STANDARD

AJP-3.28

ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO STABILIZATION

Edition A, Version 1

JANUARY 2023

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION

Published by the
NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)

Intentionally blank

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

25 January 2023

1. The enclosed Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.28, Edition A, Version 1, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO STABILIZATION, which has been approved by the nations in the Military Committee Joint Standardization Board, is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2590.

2. AJP-3.28, Edition A, Version 1, is effective upon receipt and supersedes AJP-3.4.5, Edition A, Version 1, which shall be destroyed in accordance with the local procedure for the destruction of documents.

3. This NATO standardization document is issued by NATO. In case of reproduction, NATO is to be acknowledged. NATO does not charge any fee for its standardization documents at any stage, which are not intended to be sold. They can be retrieved from the NATO Standardization Document Database (https://nso.nato.int/nso/) or through your national standardization authorities.

4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

Dimitrios SIGOULAKIS
Major General, GRC (A)
Director, NATO Standardization Office

Intentionally blank

Reserved for national promulgation letter

Intentionally blank

RECORD OF NATIONAL RESERVATIONS

Chapter	Record of reservation by nations
Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document Database for the complete list of existing reservations.	

Intentionally blank

Record of specific reservations

[nation]	[detail of reservation]
GRC	Army: GRC land forces cannot execute tasks normally incumbent on civilian agencies and organizations, due to caveat deriving from national legislation.
USA	The United States does not support glossary/lexicon terms and definitions and shortened word forms (abbreviations, acronyms, initialisms) that are neither NATO Agreed, quoted verbatim from NATOTerm, correctly cited IAW AAP-47 Allied Joint Doctrine Development, correctly introduced/revised IAW AAP-77 NATO Terminology Manual, nor have terminology tracking forms submitted. Department of Defense (DoD) terminology views regarding terms and definitions applicable to the United States can be found in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. The United States uses the term “law of war” to describe that part of international law that regulates the resort to armed force; the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims in international and non-international armed conflict; belligerent occupation; and the relationships between belligerent, neutral, and non-belligerent States. Sometimes also called the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law, the law of war is specifically intended to address the circumstances of armed conflict. The legal views of the Department of Defense (DoD) regarding the law of war applicable to the United States can be found in the DoD Law of War Manual. The United States supports doctrinal content that is harmonized with NATO’s capstone and operations keystone doctrine publications as well as within and between other NATO Allied Joint Doctrine publications. United States personnel are directed to use national joint doctrine to overcome variances between U.S. joint doctrine and Allied Joint Doctrine publications [ex. command relationships, joint operations principles, physical domain and other domain categorization, subject matter expertise language usage and other related terminology].
Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document Database for the complete list of existing reservations.	

Intentionally blank

Summary of Changes

Renumbered from AJP-3.4.5 to AJP-3.28
‘Stabilization and Reconstruction’ was changed to ‘Stabilization’ in order to emphasise that stabilization happens across the spectrum
Section headings have been updated to reflect current doctrine terms and practices
Annexes have been reduced from five to two and information has been incorporated through the AJP or linked to in appropriate manual. New Annexes are ‘Cross-Cutting Topics’ and ‘Security Sector Reform’.
Added the ‘Spiral of Instability’ concept and figure
Elements of a ‘Stable State’ changed to be Cross-Cutting principles; table from Guiding Principles publication
Added a stability process that gives a framework to integrate with the conflict continuum

Intentionally blank

Table of contents

Table of contents ix

References xi

Preface xiii

Chapter 1 – Overview and Fundamentals

Section 1 – Introduction to Stabilization 1

Section 2 – The Fundamentals of Stabilization 5

Section 3 - The Stable State 8

Cross-Cutting Principles
Rule of Law
Safe and Secure Environment
Sustainable Economy
Stable Governance
Social Well-Being

Section 4 – Instability Dynamics 10

The Stages of Instability

Section 5 – Contributing to a Comprehensive Approach by the International Community 11

Chapter 2 – The Military Contribution to Stabilization

Section 1 – Introduction 14

Section 2 – Establish a Safe and Secure Environment and Freedom of Movement 14

Introduction
Essential Elements
Military Contribution

Section 3 - Help Restore Public Security 16

Introduction
Essential Elements
Military Contribution

Section 4 - Help Restore Basic Services and Infrastructure 18
Introduction
Essential Elements
Risk and Mitigation
Military Contribution

Section 5 - Support Humanitarian Assistance 21

Section 6 - Help Establish Conditions for Meeting Longer-Term Governance Requirements 22
Introduction
Essential Elements
Military Contribution

Chapter 3 – Planning

Section 1 - Introduction 25

Section 2 - Strategic Communication 25

Section 3 - Comprehensive Understanding of the Operational Environment 26

Section 4 - Planning Considerations 28

Section 5 - Transitions 30

Section 6 - Assessments 30

Section 7 - Training, Education, and Exercises 32

Annexes

A Cross Cutting Topics (CCT) 33

B Security Sector Reform 39

Lexicon

Part I – Acronyms and abbreviations 59

Part II – Terms and definitions 62

REFERENCES

PO(2010)0140-Final	*Political Guidance on Ways to Improve NATO's Involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction, 14 Oct 2010*
PO(2010)0143-Final	*Report to the Heads of State and Government on the Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and NATO's Ability to Improve the Delivery of Stabilization and Reconstruction Efforts, 12 Nov 2010*
PO(2011)0045	*Updated List of Tasks for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the Lisbon Summit Decisions on the Comprehensive Approach, 07 Mar 2011*
PR/CP(2010)0155	*Lisbon Summit Declaration, 20 Nov 2010*
C-M(2011)0022	*Political Guidance, 14 Mar 11*
MCM-0007-2015	*Stock-Taking Report on Building Integrity Activities, 10 Feb 15*
MCM-0034-2014	*NATO Security Force Assistance Concept*
MCM-0054-2007	*MC Position on Military Support to Stabilization Activities and Reconstruction Efforts, 13 Nov 2007*
MC 0560/1	*MC Policy for Military Engineering*
MC 0578	*MC Concept for Military Support to Defence Reform, 23 Feb 2009*
MC 0133/4	*NATO's Operations Planning*
MC 0628	NATO Military Policy on Strategic Communications, 14 Aug 2017
AAP-15	*NATO Glossary of Abbreviations Used in NATO Documents and Publications*
AJP-01	*Allied Joint Doctrine*
AJP-2	*Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-intelligence and Security*
AJP-2.1	*Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Procedures*
AJP-3	*Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*
AJP-3.2	*Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*
AJP-3.8	*Allied Joint Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence*
AJP-3.12	*Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Engineering*
AJP-3.19	*Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation*
AJP-3.21	*Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police*
AJP-3.22	Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing
AJP-3.24	*Allied Joint Doctrine for Peace Support*
AJP-3.26	*Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance*
AJP-3.27	*Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency*
AJP-5	*Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations*
ATP-3.2.1.1	*Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks*

NATO Operations Assessment Handbook
Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive, Version 2.0
Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 Security and Stabilization: The Military Contribution (GBR)
Joint Publication 3-07 Stability Operations (USA)
Joint Concept-3.4.9 Concept on the Contribution of the Armed Forces to Stabilization (STAB) (FRA)
UNSCR 1325 -- Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, 31 October 2000
UNSCR 1820 -- Adopted by the Security Council at its 5916th meeting, 19 Jun 2008
UNSCR 1960 -- Adopted by the Security Council at its 6453rd meeting, 16 December 2010
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (7 March 2008), Civil Military-Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies.
OSLO GUIDELINES (Revision 1, 01 November 2007), Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) In Disaster Relief.
The Military Contribution to Stabilization Operations (Stabilization Handbook) Version 1.0, Multinational Interoperability Working Group, November 30, 2009

Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), 2007, CERF Life-Saving Criteria and Sectoral Activities

OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development

Preface

Scope

Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.28, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization is the NATO doctrine for the military planning, execution and assessment of military support to stabilization in the context of Allied joint operations. AJP-3.28 is subordinated and refers to AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine, and AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations. AJP-3.28 is a part of the Allied joint doctrine architecture.

Purpose

AJP-3.28 provides joint force commanders (JFCs) and staffs at the operational and higher tactical level with the principles and general guidance necessary to plan and conduct military support to stabilization in Allied joint operations. It does not restrict the authority of commanders; they will be expected to organize assigned forces and to plan and execute appropriate operations to accomplish the mission.

Application

AJP-3.28 is intended primarily as guidance for NATO commanders and staffs. However, the doctrine is instructive to, and provides a useful framework for, operations conducted by a coalition of NATO members, partners and non-NATO nations. It also provides a reference for NATO civilian and non-NATO actors.

Structure

This publication consists of three chapters and three supporting annexes. Chapter 1 introduces stabilization, including the fundamentals and principles of the military contribution and the key elements of a stable state, to aid understanding and approach. It also explains NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach. Chapter 2 describes the main areas of the military contribution to stabilization and outlines tasks that a NATO military force may conduct. Chapter 3 describes how stabilization activities must be incorporated into the planning process from the outset of an operation.

Linkages

Although stabilization is categorized as crisis response, it can also be conducted as a result of an Article 5 operation, major combat operations, or concurrently in support of another crisis response. Other publications with linkages include:

a. AJP-1 *Allied Joint Doctrine*
b. AJP-2 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Security*
c. AJP-3 *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*
d. AJP-4 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics*
e. AJP-10 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Strategic Communications*

f. AJP-3.16, *Allied Joint Publication for Security Force Assistance*
g. AJP-3.19 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation*
h. AJP-3.21 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police*.
i. AJP-3.22 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing*
j. AJP-3.24 *Allied Joint Doctrine Peace Support*.
k. AJP-3.25 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations*.
l. AJP-3.26 *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance*.
m. AJP-3.27 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN)*.
n. AJP-4.10 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support*.

Chapter 1 – OVERVIEW AND FUNDAMENTALS

Section 1 – Introduction to Stabilization

1.0. Stabilization is an approach used to mitigate crisis, promote legitimate political authority, and set the conditions for long-term stability by using comprehensive civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security, re-establish Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), and rule of law, and end social, economic, and political turmoil. These activities should be focused on mitigating the immediate sources of instability and should help establish the foundation for long-term stability. This requires supporting local and regional actors to reduce violence, ensure basic security and facilitate peaceful political deal-making. Large-scale, military-led, externally driven, international stabilization interventions have clear limitations and the importance of supporting locally led political processes should be recognised. The use of military force should be linked to achieving the desired political end state, and military planning should be conducted through this lens. As part of the comprehensive, integrated civil-military response, the military contribution will primarily be to help create conditions in which other civilian actors (international and local) can conduct their activity.

1.1. Stabilization attempts to mitigate complex problems in unstable states and regions before, during and after crises. Stabilization should be part of a comprehensive and integrated international response. Stabilization activities run the spectrum from providing security to fostering justice and facilitating livelihoods. Whenever possible, these activities should be led by the host nation (HN). The goal is to maintain, foster, or restore stability to provide the foundation for long-term peace. Stabilization activities should be, and normally are, civilian led and ideally implemented by legitimate local authorities. However, when civilian actors or local governments cannot operate because of an insecure environment, the COM JFC may be tasked to provide security to facilitate the activities of other actors. Additionally, there may be situations where military support, other than security, will be necessary. When civilian state actors are unable or unwilling to provide support, the military may be tasked to temporarily assume the operational lead for other stabilization activities.

1.2. The military should engage carefully in stabilization activities and always assess possible implications. Indeed, the militarization of functions normally performed by civilians can cause long-term harm and risk delegitimizing the activity, the intervention, and the HN. Initially the military might be the only organization capable of operating within an area due to the nature of the environment. In a hostile and non-permissive environment, the military may be required to temporarily assume initial responsibility for leading the international response to stabilization activities that would normally be undertaken by civilian organizations. In such instances these activities must be planned and coordinated in conjunction with other actors. This will assist in ensuring that military activities do not undermine and are complementary to longer-term goals. Concurrently, the military must work to quickly set the conditions to allow the appropriate civilian organizations to focus on their core roles. In addition, and consistent with international law, NATO might take the lead in some stabilization activities or fill in programming gaps if the HN or international

community lacks the necessary capability or capacity. Stabilization activities conducted by NATO-led forces should only be temporary until conditions allow them to transition to national or international authorities.

1.3. Stabilization interventions will impact the context they take place in, both in positive and sometimes negative ways. An adoption of a 'conflict-sensitive' approach is therefore vital. This entails understanding conflict dynamics in any given context, how our interventions might impact on these dynamics – either purposefully or inadvertently - and then taking deliberate actions to minimise the potentially negative effects and maximise the positives. Failure to adopt such an approach in a deliberate and honest fashion risks our interventions inadvertently fuelling or exacerbating conflict or sowing the seeds for future conflict. Adopting a 'gender-sensitive' approach is of equal importance, considering how gender norms and roles shape the effects, causes and drivers of conflict. Planning and conduct of military stabilization support to other agencies should complement their efforts. The hand-over process between the military and civilian agencies must be defined from the outset. As the security environment improves, the military involvement and support should decrease commensurately.

1.4. **Stabilization in the Context of Other Operations**. Stabilization is likely to take place in the same physical or temporal space as other operational responses to conflict and instability. But whilst there are often similarities to the approaches taken, it is essential to understand that their different approaches and objectives mean they will not always be mutually supportive and can – in the worst cases – undermine each other. For example, the hard-nosed political compromises required of stabilization may be directly undermined by too strong a simultaneous COIN or counter terrorist or counter narcotics engagement. Military stabilization operations may well exacerbate an already fragile humanitarian situation, and there will often be tensions between short-term stabilization demands and longer-term peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives. At times, such contradictions will be unavoidable.

a. **Peace Support**. Peace support is defined as the efforts conducted impartially to restore or maintain peace. Peace support efforts can include conflict prevention, peace-making, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The military contribution to peace support reflects an approach where NATO forces operate with no designated opponent. Impartiality is the fundamental difference separating peace support from other types of operational-level themes. Peacebuilding objectives are subtly different to those of Stabilization. Peacebuilding involves long-term activities, aimed at creating the conditions in which violence will not recur by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and improving state capacity through transformative change processes (including SSR). However, if these transformative processes are used in stabilization contexts, where the division of power and resources is still being violently contested, they can risk being highly destabilising. Peace support may sit within the framework of stabilization where NATO does not intend to take sides in the conflict but has an interest in resolving the crisis. Consequently, there are many overlaps between stabilization and peace

support. For more on peace support, see AJP-3.24, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Peace Support*.

b. **Humanitarian Assistance**. Stabilization is distinct from humanitarian assistance (HA), and although the two may be conducted concurrently they have a different purpose, which often may result in tensions. Humanitarian operations are conducted to relieve human suffering, especially in circumstances where responsible authorities in the area are unwilling or unable to provide adequate service support to the population. They aim to save life, relieve suffering, and maintain human dignity. Equally, it is important to note that although stabilization may overlap with development activities, the latter also help to establish the conditions for meeting longer-term governance and development requirements. HA is defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee as "aid provided to a crisis-affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. HA must be provided in accordance with the basic principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence." For more details, see AJP-3.26, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance*.

c. **Counterinsurgency.** COIN is a comprehensive civilian and military effort made to defeat an insurgency and to address core grievances. There are many overlaps between COIN and stabilization, COIN puts emphasis on supporting a state and its government against insurgents. Stabilization focuses on reducing violence, ensuring basic security and facilitating peaceful political deal-making which may conflict with a COIN approach, aimed purely at undermining and defeating an insurgency, in support of the state. COIN puts emphasis on supporting a state and its government against insurgents. But they can also be conducted separately. Both approaches include strengthening the ability of the HN to provide the elements of a stable state while fostering legitimacy. This publication complements AJP-3.27, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN)*, by describing the elements of a stable state and supports the JFC in assessing and countering drivers of instability.

d. **Counter Terrorism, Counter Criminality** Stabilization interventions increasingly take place in contexts where NATO, its member states or its partners are also seeking to address cross-border threats, transnational crime, and violent extremism. In some circumstances, the overriding political priorities of a stabilization intervention may generate the requirement for trade-offs with these other threats. Organised crime and terrorist groups may provide local population with security, justice, services, and livelihoods. Strategies and interventions which aim to isolate and undermine these groups must be aware of this and the risk of destabilising impact in pursuing such policy objectives.

e. **Major Combat Operations**. Major combat operations usually involve conventional force-on-force combat of varying scale, frequency, and intensity between opposing states' armed forces. They tend to be characterized by a series of major engagements with intense combat activity and large-scale manoeuvre by complex

multi-faceted forces. Stabilization can be conducted alongside, or as a result of, major combat operations. The transition from major combat operations to conducting military support to stabilization is a critical period. The planning and execution of stabilization activities must be carefully balanced with Force Protection, especially when it is to be conducted alongside combat operations. Stabilization activities following major combat operations need to be planned to use a comprehensive approach in order to understand the relationships between elites[1], includes local and national leaders, and populations. The mix of actors, and their respective motivations, is also likely to be complex and constantly changing. Conventional opponents, even once defeated, may re-appear, or be reinforced by irregular forces. They must be countered often while legitimate HN governance and authority are being re-established to address the underlying causes of instability.

1.5. **The Military Contribution to Stabilization**. The military can play a crucial role in stabilization because they possess unique capabilities and capacities. PO (2010)0140-Final, *Political Guidance on Ways to Improve NATO's Involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction*, outlines NATO's involvement in stabilization. It provides the basis for further work by NATO staffs and military authorities to improve NATO's contribution to stabilization as part of the international community's efforts and NATO's contribution to a civil-military approach. Depending on the sources of instability, military support to stabilization may include:

a. Establishing a SASE and freedom of movement.

b. Helping to restore public security and order.

c. Restoring the Rule of Law.

d. Helping initial restoration of basic services and infrastructure.

e. Supporting humanitarian assistance.

f. Helping to establish the conditions for meeting longer term governance requirements and growth of national institutions.

g. Supporting political institutions and civil and economic infrastructure.

1.6. There are other military tasks and activities conducted as part of stabilization which are discussed in other publications. AJP-3. *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations* and AJP-3.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations* describe the four categories of tasks that can be conducted during all operations (offensive, defensive, stability and enabling). Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-3.2.1.1 provides a detailed explanation and guidance on the subordinate tactical stability activities and tasks that could support operational-level

[1] Elites consist of both national and local political leaders, key persons who can influence political choices and leaders of local communities, religious or large industrial and financial groups

stabilization efforts.[2] Another valuable reference for stabilization is the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) *Military Contribution to Stabilization Operations (Stabilization Handbook)*.[3] This publication addresses the tasks normally performed by military forces to support stabilization when a HN is unable to provide the basic needs of its citizens. It describes the tasks that will be accomplished by military forces when undertaking a wide range of activities to help set the conditions or framework for facilitating reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establishing political, legal, social, cultural and economic institutions; and setting the environment for transitioning responsibility to legitimate civil authority operating under the rule of law.

Section 2 The Fundamentals of Stabilization.

1.7. **Fundamentals**. The characteristics, principles, and operational considerations of Allied joint and multinational operations are introduced in AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine;* the principles and considerations are discussed in detail in AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.* All of them apply to military support to stabilization; however, some characteristic such as the legitimacy, and operational considerations credibility, transparency, and consent have a more prevalent role. Therefore, they must be carefully considered by the JFC during the planning and execution of stabilization. Principles of Operations apply to stabilization and can be linked back to AJP1 *Allied Joint Doctrine* as well as AJP-3 *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*. As an example of the critical importance of the principles it is important to note the Unity of Effort and the role it plays in Stabilization. Effective collaboration with the numerous and diverse actors involved in stabilization ensures unity of purpose or even unity of effort, which is a foundation for successful operations, integrating all the abilities of a nation's governmental agencies and departments with those of other nations, IGOs, NGOs, IOs, Civil Society and the private sector. Some NGOs base their activities on humanitarian principles that embrace goals different from those of nations, coalitions and/or the international community, which will challenge the unity of effort intended by these collaborative activities.

a. **Primacy of Politics**. Political aims dictate the desired outcome and drive the planning and conduct of operations. The purpose of NATO participation in stabilization is the attainment of the desired NATO end state. This should be at the forefront of the commander's planning, implementation, and assessment efforts and may require adaptation when political aims change. To be successful, stabilization activities should support the achievement of an enduring political settlement between the HN government, competing elites and the wider population.

[2] ATP-3.2.1.1, discusses stability tasks in four major stability activity areas which align with the areas from the political guidance in PO (2010)0140. Security and control = establish a safe and secure environment; support to security sector reform = help to restore public security and order; initial restoration of services = help to restore basic utilities and infrastructure; and interim governance tasks = help establish conditions for meeting longer-term governance.

[3] The MIC provides a joint, multinational forum for identifying and addressing interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment to enable more effective coalition operations. Member nations include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

b. **Focus on the Population**. The needs of the population, whose expectations will vary from one situation to another, must be met to promote human security and build support for the political settlement. People's needs will of course also include a wider set of factors such as their ability to feed their families, make a living and access essential services.

c. **Understand Context**. In most cases, the knowledge of the terrain, people, social structures, and historical background is not sufficient. There is a need to clearly understand the sources of any instability, who benefits from them, the resiliencies which can help mitigate them, and relationships between the different local, regional, national and international actors. Regional issues and interests should also be considered as should troop contributing nations' national caveats and interests. Seeking contextual understanding will be a continuous effort, it will require time and resources while the results may be limited in scope and depth. Commanders should recognise the limitations of their understanding and be prepared to adapt as it evolves; information may come quickly but understanding may take longer.

d. **Challenges.** In stabilization can stem from both a lack of understanding of the context and of our own capacity to influence it. This can lead to unrealistic expectations about what will work, the setting of unrealistic objectives, and an increased potential for doing harm. Objectives should be based on the clearest understanding of what is necessary to achieve limited stabilization objectives and should be informed by proper consultation with HN authorities, local populations, and other international actors. A realistic approach should also take into account the limits of our influence and the willingness of our partners to accept our interventions. Equally we should be realistic about their motivations and incentives, and also about their individual and institutional capacities.

e. **Local actor primacy and Host Nation capacity.** The host nation has the overall responsibility for stabilization but may not have the authority and capability for effective governance. Therefore, NATO actions should foster HN authority and capacity to promote stability. In contested stabilization contexts, the state may be a source of instability and violence, and have limited capability to undertake basic governance and service delivery functions. In these cases it may be necessary to engage with local actors to address key short-to-medium term problems, those which are potential obstacles to the emergence of a stabilising political deal.

f. **Window of Opportunity / Manage Efforts Over Time**. Since deadlines usually work against external actors during stabilization, NATO-led forces must both maintain their ability to act or respond in an emergency and work towards long-term objectives. It is important to take advantage of the initial response period when they are viewed favourably to identify and meet the requirements of the area. It is also essential to adapt and contribute to providing lasting security to key areas, while being able to carry out emergency actions in response to unexpected threats or short-notice opportunities.

1.8. **Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations**. In addition to the principles discussed above, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has developed common principles for engagement in fragile states (see Figure 1.2 below). These provide a set of guidelines for actors involved in development, peacebuilding, state-building, and security in fragile and conflict-affected states. They were established because fragile states require different responses compared to other states. The goal is to foster constructive engagement between national and international stakeholders in unstable countries. They are designed to support existing dialogue and coordination processes, not to generate new ones. The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to help national reformers build effective, legitimate, and resilient state institutions, capable of engaging productively with their people to foster stability and promote sustained development.

Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations	
• Take context as the starting point • Ensure all activities do no harm • Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies • Recognize the links between political, security, and development objectives • Act fast … but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.	• Focus on State-building as the central objective • Prioritize prevention • Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts • Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors • Avoid creating pockets of exclusion

Figure 1.1 – The OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations

Section 3 – The Stable State

1.20 **Cross-Cutting Principles**. It is important to examine the functionalities and norms that underpin a stable state, because it is the breakdown in these principles and the linkages between them that generate instability.[4] Figure 1-2 depicts the core elements of a stable state: Safe and Secure Enviroment, Sustainable Economy, Stable Governance, Social Well-being, Rule of Law. While these elements can each be analysed individually, they should be viewed as interdependent rather than separate. The stability of a state depends upon the manner in which the elements interact and are mutually supporting. These main elements, underpinned by Cross cutting principles: Host Nation Ownership and Capcity, Political Primacy, Legitimacy, Unity of Effort, Security, Conflict Tranasformation, Regional Rngagement. A stable state is supported by mutually beneficial interaction between the Cross-Cutting Principles.



Figure 1.2 – Elements of a Stable State

[4] The annual *Fragile State Index*, published by The Fund for Peace, provides an overview of every states vulnerability to failure. However, this Index has limitations. It is a useful source but is not definitive in its methodology.

1.21 **Rule of Law.** The extent to which a state functions in a stable fashion is determined by the Rule of Law and the degree to which competing elites and the populace they represent have access to the justice process. Rule of law can be an expression of a common understanding, usually forged between elites, about how power (economic, coercive, and political) and resources are organized and shared between competing groups. Settlements are constantly changing and being renegotiated so that over time they may develop from narrow, exclusionary 'bargains' between powerbrokers, to include more members of society. Empirically, settlements that have been inclusive and incorporated members of the losing side(s) and their security apparatus have tended to endure. A weak Rule of Law is often a symptom that an underlying source of instability has not been mitigated. For example, if a previously marginalized group was not given the government protection or positions promised to them, they have an incentive to undermine the settlement. Research has demonstrated that both settlement quality and provision implementation rates emerge as the strongest predictors of peace durability; women's direct inclusion with a voice in negotiations improves both quality and provision implementation rates. Therefore, stabilization should also support inclusive political settlements and Rule of Law implementation.

1.22 **Safe and Secure Environment**. States which lack the capability or will to protect their own population from violence, harm, intimidation, and reprisals equitably and without violating human rights risk becoming unstable. A lack of rudimentary security provided by the state allows opportunists or adversaries to gain support through providing security in place of the authorities. Therefore, providing security is a crucial component of stability.

1.23 **Sustainable Economy.** Equitable economic institutions, access to fair and reliable financial services, widely accessible income-generating opportunities, administrative transparency, inclusive stewardship of natural resources, and a developed supporting physical infrastructure all help to foster stability.

1.24 **Stable Governance**. A stable state has a sustainable political structure that permits the peaceful resolution of internal disputes. Long-term stability only occurs when a population views the government as broadly legitimate. Stable governance has strong linkages to the Rule of Law, which is fundamental to legitimate governance and may be institutionalized in varying forms dependent upon the social, cultural, and political characteristics of the society. Legitimacy is ultimately defined by the local population rather than by any externally imposed criteria.

1.25 **Social Well-Being.** Cross-Cutting Principles, Rule of Law, Safe and Secure Environment, Sustainable Economy, and Stable Governance encompass the substantive functionalities and competencies of the state. However, the context is also determined by the Social Well-being that underpin them and are interwoven within these elements. Relationships and culture shape the nature of a stable government and determine how the main actors interact. In a stable state, the social, cultural, and ideological factors that bind society are broadly consistent with the way state institutions discharge their responsibilities and gain consent from the population.

Section 4 – Instability Dynamics

1.26 **The Stages of Instability**. The distinction between stages is rarely clear and there is often overlap between categories. However, understanding what stage a state is in and identifying the circumstances or sources of instability which put it there are important, because all activities must be appropriate to both the stage and the corresponding sources of instability. The desired goal is to move the state toward stability, despite the ongoing presence of destabilizing factors that may continue to foster instability. The more unstable the state, the more likely that military action will be required to provide security. However, if NATO-led forces do not understand the root sources of instability, they will not be effective in mitigating it. For example, if a police force is corrupt or predatory, working with it to improve its capability may only foster more instability as it improves their ability to extract resources from the population. The descriptions provided below attempt to highlight some of the key indicators that may be present in each stage.



Figure 1.3 – Spiral of instability

1.27 **Vulnerable**. States unwilling or unable to provide security and basic services to a significant portion of the population. These states are characterized by limited state capacity or legitimacy which would leave citizens vulnerable to internal and external shocks and conflict. They may also be facing challenge or opposition from internal or external sources.

1.28 **Failing**. States with a declining ability to protect and govern the population. Based on the situation and sources of instability, a failing state may be moving either towards vulnerability or failure.

1.29 **Failed State**. States which have ineffective and illegitimate governments, limited control over their territory, lack a monopoly on the use of force, cannot provide adequate public services, have widespread corruption and criminality, are in sharp economic decline, and have large involuntary population movements.

1.30 **Post-Crisis**. States in the process of implementing a political settlement and addressing the sources of instability which fostered the crisis or conflict. This phase is usually characterized by limited government legitimacy, improving levels of security, damaged infrastructure, limited provision of basic services, and demands for justice or retribution.

1.31 **Recovering**. States moving toward normality but with some unresolved sources of instability. These states are increasingly able to protect and govern their populations. A key consideration is whether the population considers the level of security and governance to be acceptable and legitimate.

Section 5 – Contributing to a Comprehensive Approach by the International Community

1.32 Stabilization usually requires active involvement from diverse actors with widely disparate experiences, resources, mandates, and capabilities. Because of their unique capabilities and capacity, military forces will often contribute to stabilization. However, military action must be part of a comprehensive approach by the international community. Where NATO is involved, this requires the coordination of NATO's military contributions with non-NATO military forces and civilian organizations, both international and – most importantly – from the host nation concerned. All civilian actors do not necessarily share the same objective, nor will they share NATO's 'Unity of Purpose'. These humanitarian actors may not wish to be part of the NATO 'Comprehensive Approach'; their independence and modalities of work should be respected.

1.33 Stabilization is primarily a civilian-lead process, therefore, many of the key actors are not under NATO's military command and control. They cannot be compelled by military forces to work within a coalition construct to a military plan. While establishing agreement among these different actors can be difficult to achieve, proactive engagement by NATO with international actors prior to a crisis may contribute to a broadly shared vision or unity of purpose. Planning stabilization activities within a comprehensive approach requires the identification of sources of instability, the establishment of commonly desired outcomes and an effort to harmonize the roles of relevant actors. This requires an extensive

information exchange with non-military actors and civil society starting at the earliest possible stage.

1.34 The role of military forces should be carefully considered and clearly understood by those planning military operations. Because stabilization is primarily the responsibility of non-military actors, the military contribution will generally enable or support other groups' end-states. Leadership, cohesion, and coherence are required to ensure NATO-led forces communicate and act in concert with other actors. Therefore, a comprehensive approach requires an effective civil-military interaction (CMI)[5] through an adequate civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)[6] capability.

1.35 In the framework of a comprehensive approach, and given the operational level in which the topic of stabilization sits, it is crucial to understand the interaction between stabilization and reconstruction as two sibling functions within an overall process toward stability.



Figure 1.4 – The stability process

[5] Civil-Military Interaction (CMI). As defined in MC 0411/2, CMI is a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, which mutually increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises.

[6] AJP-3.19: Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation

1.36 Figure 1.4 shows the ideal distribution of the intensity of efforts for stabilization (blue line) and reconstruction (yellow line). It is a linear graph useful to visualize the interaction between stabilization and reconstruction. Stabilization efforts reach their peak in the early phases of the intervention, whilst reconstruction is already in place. During this timeframe, the permissiveness of the environment influences the possibility of starting the physical reconstruction, however some work on the legitimacy of the government and on the requisites for a democratic reform can be set out anyway. Similarly, stabilization does not end at the point where reconstruction becomes prevalent, even if security is certainly improved, the process toward a complete stability may require much longer; moreover, the outcomes of stabilization efforts can not only attain to an improvement of security, but also to a contribution to other dimensions namely governance, rule of law, economic development, and infrastructure. The most crucial points in the process are “transitions”, which are indicated in the graph with “T1”, “TS” and “T2” which describe respectively:

a. T1 is the point in which reconstruction efforts overtake the stabilization ones becoming the major effort in the process.

b. TS (transition of security) is the moment in which local security forces are able enough to take over the responsibility of providing security for their people. This point is crucial because it marks a change in the kind of support the intervening forces can provide: the focus will smoothly shift from directly providing security to mainly train, advice, and assist local forces;

c. T2 represents the moment (conditioned based) in which the HN has reached an acceptable point of resilience and therefore is able to take over the overall responsibility of the process toward stability. T2 likely marks the end of mission for intervening forces, unless HN still requires their presence under a different legal framework.

1.37 Figure 1.4 does not represent a time schedule, instead it emphasizes the importance of identifying the right moments (condition-based) for shifting the main effort, and giving the primacy to the right actor (i.e. from military to civilian or from international community to the host nation).

Chapter 2 – THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO STABILIZATION

Section 1 – Introduction

2.0 This chapter describes the main areas of stabilization and provides examples of activities in each area. It outlines tasks that NATO military forces may conduct in support of stabilization when the North Atlantic Council (NAC) has assigned specific tasks to the JFC. The intent is to improve NATO military support to other actors involved in stabilization.

2.1 Stabilization activities often take place in states with damaged or inadequate infrastructure and support services. This places greater demand on the JFC as logistics will often be both a major planning factor and a limitation on the JFC's freedom of action. Issues such as over-flight clearance, basing, access to port facilities and supply of basic materiel, will require considerable cross government and IO effort to resolve and may further be complicated by HN factors.

Section 2 – Establish a Safe and Secure Environment and Freedom of Movement

2.2 **Introduction**.

a. Establishing a SASE is an essential element of stabilization. It is crucial to protect citizens, creating a safe and secure environment in which they have freedom of movement to pursue livelihoods and access essential services, and in which political processes can be undertaken. Supporting the creation of a SASE is the primary role of NATO military forces in stabilization missions, either directly, or through regional or indigenous forces.

b. In a SASE, the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of violence. Such an environment is characterized by a local norm of public order, physical security, territorial security, a state monopoly on violence, protection of civilians, and Human Rights . A SASE allows other stabilization activities to proceed.

c. In a SASE, political actors from all sides have the confidence to engage in the political process, be that early negotiations between warring parties or competing elites, or formal campaigning related to local or national elections.

d. Establishing a SASE for the local population is the key to obtaining their support for the overall stabilization effort. Such an environment enables civilian agencies and organizations whose efforts will be vital to ensure long-term success and stability. When the local population is informed and has confidence in the security provided, they are more likely to cooperate. Military forces assist the HN with controlling crime and subversive behavior, defeat insurgents, and limit the effects of adversary actions. If required, military units may be given duties normally performed by the police immediately following the crisis. If a situation arises, the NATO Stability Policing (SP) capability is the perfectly suitable asset are available to the JFC to support safety and

public order through augmentation of HN security forces. SP element can be specifically tasked to provide a temporary police capability in the absence of local police. However, where possible these tasks should be performed jointly with HN security forces, and transferred to them as soon as they are capable of assuming duties on their own. Although SSR is primarily used to establish the conditions for long-term governance this may also contribute to establishing a SASE during the initial stages. Further detail on SSR is included at Annex B.

2.3 Essential Elements

a. **State monopoly for the legitimate use of force** is established when illegal armed groups have been identified, disarmed, demobilized, and, where possible, reintegrated into society. If necessary, the local security forces have been vetted, retrained, and operate lawfully.

b. **Public order** is established when criminal and politically motivated violence has been reduced to levels in accordance with local norms.

c. **Physical Security** is established when political leaders, ex-combatants, and the general population do not fear for their physical safety; Dislocated civilians [7] can return home without fear of violence; women, men, girls and boys are protected, including from the threat, risk and incidence of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA); Human Rights are granted; and key historical or cultural sites and critical infrastructure[8] are protected.

d. **Territorial Security**. Territorial security is established when the country is protected from invasion and its borders are secure from infiltration by insurgent or terrorist elements and the illicit trafficking of goods and people.

e. **Freedom of movement** occurs when people, goods, and information can move freely throughout the country and across borders.

2.4 **Military Contribution**. The key priority for the military is to provide security for the local populace, political actors, and civilian organizations in order to facilitate stabilization activities. The long-term goal is to foster stability by enabling an inclusive political process and increasing government legitimacy. Depending on the sources of instability, NATO-led forces may conduct a myriad of tasks to help achieve a SASE. Security activities are intended to reduce civil disorder and violence from uncontrolled groups. Other goals are to enforce ceasefires and facilitate peace agreements to ensure long-term security. A secure

[7] Dislocated civilians include internally displaced persons and refugees, as well as evacuees, migrants, stateless persons, etc. For more on dislocated civilians, see AJP-3.26, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance*.

[8] As defined in ACO Directive 084-002, pg 4

situation is normally required prior to starting the reconstruction of a country or region after a crisis.

a. **Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP)**. PPP conveys a message to local audiences directly and global ones through modern communications technology. The presence or threat of deploying a force will have an impact on perceptions. Force posture must be deliberately considered and feature in prevailing cultural and threat factors. The public profile of commanders at all levels will be of significant interest to many audiences and their public role must be carefully analysed and opportunities used to transmit key messages.

b. **Freedom of Movement**. One of the first priorities of NATO-led forces should be to establish the security conditions that will enable the entry and unimpeded movement of and communications for HN, NATO, and other actors in the area of responsibility. Freedom of movement allows them to perform activities in support of the economic, political and social development that is necessary to promote enduring stability (SSR, DDR and other non-military efforts, etc.). In a non-permissive environment, military escorts may also provide freedom of movement.

c. **Protection of Civilians**. The protection of civilians is vital to the success of Stabilization. The NATO policy states that protection of civilians (persons, objects, and services) includes all efforts taken to avoid, minimize, and mitigate the negative effects on men, women, boys and girls arising from NATO and Alliance Operations and Missions (AOM) on the civilian population and, when applicable, to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats of violence including the protection from the threat of CRSV in accordance with the NATO Military Guidelines on the Prevention of and Response to CRSV by other actors, including through the establishment of a safe and secure environment. The NATO Military Protection of Civilians Concept provides an overarching frame of reference for NATO cross-cutting topics such as Protection of Civilians (PoC), Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Cultural Property Protection (CPP), Woman Peace and Security (WPS), Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (CTHB), and Building Integrity (BI) and how they relate to protection of civilians. A description of the cross-cutting topics and how they contribute to stabilization is provided in Annex A.

Section 3 – Help Restore Public Security

2.5 **Introduction**.

a. Public security includes the establishment of law and order, the rule of law and a basic legal infrastructure. A stable state has a justice system that promulgates laws, provides equal access to the judicial system, holds all people accountable, respects protect and promotes human rights, ensures safety and security, and is perceived as

fair and impartial. All individuals, institutions, and the state are accountable to national and international laws.

b. Legitimate mechanisms for civil dispute resolution and criminal justice are essential to a stable society. Without access to conflict resolution mechanisms and redress against real or perceived injustices, instability can occur. The rule of law in the HN should normally be based on the existing legal framework. A weak judiciary system fosters instability by allowing crime and corruption, as well as political, ethnic, sexual and domestic violence to flourish. However, the existing legal framework could itself be a source of instability if it is unjust and repressive and a cause of grievances among the population.

c. **Traditional, Customary, or Informal Justice**. These are the broad range of ways that some communities resolve their disputes using non-governmental mechanisms. In many parts of the world, traditional and informal justice systems play an important role in adjudicating disputes and providing social order. They can function in parallel with formal justice systems or compete with them. In many cases, they can contribute to stability by providing legitimate dispute resolution or reconciliation mechanisms. However, sometimes these systems may be inconsistent with internationally recognized human rights standards or, themselves, may cause conflict.

2.6 Essential Elements

a. **Legal Framework**. Adapted as necessary to the local norms, the legal framework should be consistent with international human rights standards; legally certain; drafted with procedural transparency; equitable, and applicable to all groups in society.

b. **Law Enforcement**. Public security is facilitated by laws that are enforced equitably, and occurs when the lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals are protected.

c. **Judiciary**. Access to justice exists when people can seek and obtain a remedy for grievances through formal or informal institutions of justice that generally conform with international human rights standards. Another key element is the equal, effective and where provided for, equitable, application of law, procedural fairness, and transparency.

d. **Accountability**. Accountability occurs when the population and public officials are held legally accountable for their actions. The judiciary should be independent and free from political influence.

e. **Corrections.** A variety of functions typically carried out by government agencies for persons who have been convicted for crimes. Their functions are:

(1) **Proportional Justice.** The punishing of a criminal with a punishment proportionate to the crime.

(2) **Deterrence.** Discourage possible offenders from committing crimes and reduce the probability or level of offending in society.

(3) **Rehabilitation.** The process of restoring criminals to a useful and constructive place in society.

(4) **Social protection**. A way to control deviance and protect society by constraining offenders temporarily in a prison.

2.7 **Military Contribution**

a. A key aspect of public security and long-term stability may be the reformation of the various elements of a nation's security sector. The military may have a key role in reforming and restoring the nation's military capabilities but could also support other aspects of SSR.

b. SSR requires a comprehensive approach with other government and international agencies dealing with judiciary and law enforcement agencies. SSR will seek to address two broad areas: the effectiveness of the security and justice services and their accountability. In any case, they participate/take part in public security only in the case where the civilian security forces (whether local or intervention) are non-existent, insufficient, unavailable, or unsuitable. The transfer of this type of mission must be performed as soon as possible because armies have limited competence/skills and lose their legitimacy to exercise such long-term responsibilities. Military forces (particularly Stability Policing) may have a key role in facilitating the process.

c. **Legal Advisor Review of Rule of Law Programmes**. Rule of law activities must be governed by the applicable laws. An advisor authorized to give legal advice to JFCs should ensure compliance with UN or other international mandates governing the intervention, applicable provisions of national laws of intervening forces, international law, and host country law.

d. A more detailed description of SSR and how it contributes to the restoration of public security is provided in Annex B.

Section 4 – Help Restore Basic Services and Infrastructure

2.8 **Introduction**. Assuring the operation of basic services and infrastructure, based on local norms, is integral to stabilization efforts. They facilitate stability by improving government legitimacy, enabling the return of dislocated civilians, and fostering a return to normality, thereby gaining popular support. A lack of access to basic services and infrastructure that are essential for daily living can lead to instability.

a. Ideally, the restoration of services will fall to agencies other than the military. The military should normally not take more than a supporting role. In the early stages, the

military may have to fill the void until the security situation improves and other agencies can conduct these activities. In specific cases, the military may wish, or need, to conduct some of these tasks, particularly at the tactical level, in order to gain and maintain support from the local population. However, such actions must be carefully considered in coordination with the other stabilization stakeholders and should be strictly limited with regard to scale and duration to prevent the population from becoming dependent on military support.

b. The provision of services and the establishment of a SASE are heavily interdependent. On the one hand, security is needed to enable the provision of services; conversely, visible progress on reconstruction is necessary to help sustain enduring security.

2.9 Essential Elements

a. Stability planning should consider essential services and infrastructure priorities, including the identification of critical infrastructure.

b. Beyond certain obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL)/Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) relating to the conduct of hostilities, the preservation of critical infrastructure is important to gaining the confidence and support of the population. In particular, essential civilian services in populated areas, which include the provision of electricity, water, communication media outreach and sanitation services, as well as solid waste collection and disposal are for the most part interdependent: damage to any one component of a service may trigger humanitarian consequences far beyond the immediate geographic and temporal point of attack. Efforts to preserve infrastructure during conflict are important to support rapid post-conflict recovery.

c. Assessments must be done to determine if the lack of service(s) is fostering instability, and if so, take rapid action to counteract the service failure. Restoration of services supports life-saving activities and essential services for a limited period. Life-saving activities are those actions that within a short time span mitigate or avert direct loss of life, physical harm or threats to a population or major part thereof.[9] Essential services are those that satisfy basic human needs and provide the necessary infrastructure for initial recovery and future development. They include sewage, water, electricity, refuse, medical, communication, media outreach and security.

2.10 Risks and Mitigation

When military forces are tasked to restore essential services and/or key infrastructure, there is a risk of doing harm and undermining the legitimacy of the force or HN government. Key risks include: the division of communities and enabling corruption; misunderstanding local expectations and the effects of new services; disrupting existing mechanisms or emerging structures; creating services that are

[9] CERF LIFE-SAVING CRITERIA AND SECTORAL ACTIVITIES; Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), 2007

unsustainable. In order to mitigate these risks it is essential that activities are conducted based on political analysis, be led by Conflict Sensitivity principles, seek to booster linkages between the HN government and the local population and should focussed on small-scale and highly localised projects.

2.11 Military Contribution

a. **Responsibility of the Military Force**. The restoration of services is primarily a civilian responsibility, and this encompasses legal, financial and infrastructure issues. The role of security actors in this arena is primarily to deliver a SASE, ensuring freedom of movement and protection of key actors, locations and infrastructure to allow others to deliver basic services/Humanitarian Assistance and to restore essential infrastructure. In emergencies, high threat situations, or remote areas, military forces may be the only assets available to initiate the restoration of essential services and set the conditions for other agencies to resume their responsibilities. In such instances, military units should undertake such tasks with the clear intention of transferring them to local, regional and national (governmental) organizations and institutions as soon as possible.

b. Military capabilities that may contribute to the initial restoration of services include:

(1) Military Engineering.[10] At operational level the MILENG staff contributes to the CIE and coordinates the employment of military and non-military engineering assets. At tactical level it manages engineering activities that may include: stability to damaged cultural property (CP) (specialist military Engineering for heritage structures required), assessment of damage and assistance for engineering repair, water storage and purification; well drilling, restoration and repair of utilities; camp construction for displaced civilians; airport/port/railway/road maintenance and repair; generator power; construction of landing strips and civil facilities; debris clearance; explosive ordnance disposal; and mine clearance.

(2) Medical. NATO medical elements may assist the local authorities with the reestablishment and improvement of local health services and in extremis, temporarily obviate gaps in health service provision until services are restored. Medical support should be carefully planned against local standards and in accordance with the "Oslo Guidelines" and can range from direct healthcare provision to public health activities.

(3) Other Logistics. Various additional support tasks may be provided including: water and fuel distribution; support to airports and seaports; transportation and the provision of building supplies.

[10] For more information on military engineering, see AJP-3.12, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Engineering*

(4) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence. This support could include Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM), CBRN Knowledge Management (KM), Physical Protection (PP), Hazard Management (HM), and Medical Countermeasures (MEDCM) and Casualty Care.[11]

(5) Strategic Communication. Support includes communication activities and media outreach to assist partners and the HN with informing the population and international audiences to help alleviate concerns and rumours while promoting support and public cooperation with the mission.

(6) Stability Policing (SP). Reinforcing and/or temporarily replacing Host Nation Law Enforcement Agencies (HNLEAs).

Section 5 – Support Humanitarian Assistance

2.12 The extent of the assistance that can be provided by NATO is guided by the *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief* – "*Oslo Guidelines*", and the *Civil Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies*[12]. Military involvement in humanitarian assistance (HA) should be limited to emergency situations, as a last resort, and be conducted in accordance with the humanitarian principles.[13] Once implemented, military activity should primarily enable humanitarian stakeholders through infrastructure support, or if this is not sufficient, by indirect assistance. Only in extreme cases should NATO-led forces provide direct assistance. This type of mission, which must remain limited over time, requires largely upstream preparation.

2.13 The efficiency and effectiveness with which NATO-led forces can deliver HA can have the unintended consequence of decreasing the population's confidence in the HN's ability to provide basic care. Over reliance on NATO HA may delay and undermine the reconstitution of existing medical and other basic infrastructure. To mitigate these possibilities, primary consideration should be given to supporting and supplementing existing infrastructure while promoting the HN as the lead.

2.14 A potential risk in the military delivery of humanitarian assistance in a stabilization context is the 'militarising the humanitarian space' and the associated negative implications for civilian agencies. In non-conflict natural disasters, acceptance of military provision of humanitarian assistance has become the norm. However, in a stabilization environment,

[11] For more information on CBRN Defence, see AJP-3.8, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Comprehensive Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Defence*

[12] Further elaboration on the military's role in humanitarian assistance principles and guidelines may be found in *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief-"Oslo Guideline*" as well as the *Civil Military Guideline and Reference for Complex Emergencies to Support United Nation Humanitarian Activities "MCDA Guidelines*". Also, please review *AJP-3.26 Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance.*

[13] In accordance with *Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship*. Endorsed in Stockholm, 17 June 2003, the humanitarian principles are humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence.

military provision of humanitarian assistance is often contested by civilian agencies. Civilian agencies rely on their work being seen by all sides to the conflict as impartial, neutral, and independent, in order to avoid being targeted and to gain access to those in need of assistance. The independence of the humanitarian sector can become eroded by association with military force. This can lead to a reduction or cessation of humanitarian access to populations in need, and the potential targeting of humanitarian actors. This can lead to humanitarian agencies being reluctant to engage in a fully comprehensive approach.

2.15 Typical supporting roles include providing military airlift support of disaster victims; making available, preparing, and transporting humanitarian and relief supplies; transferring on-hand military stocks to respond to unforeseen emergencies; conducting limited humanitarian demining assistance activities; conducting consequence management; and supporting media and public communication to build understanding and public cooperation.

Section 6 – Help Establish Conditions for Meeting Longer-Term Governance Requirements

2.16 Introduction

a. Governance involves a unique set of public management tasks and competencies that do not normally reside within a conventional military organization. They require blending interagency capabilities through integrated civil-military planning, supported by comprehensive social information. The introduction of competent civilian agencies to assume governance tasks should be done as early as possible.

b. A stable state has a legitimate government with the capability and capacity to govern, manage state resources, which benefit all of society, and allow the population to share, access, and compete for power through non-violent political processes.

c. Without legitimate governance, non-state actors may fill this vacuum and their quest to gain power can further destabilize the state and foster violence.

2.17 Essential Elements

a. Effective, enduring, and legitimate governance can only be established by the HN. NATO activities to support governance must encourage HN ownership of these processes and be aligned with international norms.

b. The local population must be encouraged to take the lead in building their own government. NATO-led forces should facilitate the inclusion of all societal groups in governance activities.

c. Developing governance can require improvements in all sectors of government and at all levels, local through national. With limited resources, NATO should identify and prioritize their efforts on the sources of greatest instability.

d. Establishing legitimate HN government generally occurs in graduated, but not necessarily sequential, stages. Initially, a SASE should be established. Other activities, which support civil society, include supporting independent media; communicating to build public trust; training professional administrators; reorganizing and training security forces; and holding elections.

e. Since a goal of stabilization is to return the control of the territory to a legitimate government, activities should be implemented in such a way as to empower legitimate government agencies. Not all local governing bodies are legitimate and therefore care must be taken not to empower illegitimate groups.

2.18 **Military Contribution**

a. In the early stages, the military may have to fill the void until the security situation improves. For example, this may require the military to support election security. Such activities will facilitate a return to normality and foster support from the local population.

b. Military expertise may be sought to support various governance activities. This type of stabilization activity is difficult to categorize and will depend on the situation and requirements. In the early stages, the military may be the only organization with sufficient workforce to assist in the planning, management, and to provide communications and other support. Planning and conduct of governance related tasks should be led by those organizations with expertise in those areas. Rather than the military leading efforts outside its scope and expertise, the preferred method for the military to support civilian organizations is through on-order missions. If the military finds itself in the lead of civilian efforts, it must consider the long-term impacts of its activities. Stability Policing (in its spectrum of non-executive/supporting activities) and Security Force Assistance, contribute to longer-terms governance requirements by providing amongst other activities, institutional advice and/or training at ministerial level. This kind of support can take place later in the process, when the contribution of the military components may be progressively less focused on providing security

c. It is essential to develop and implement a viable administrative capability so that non-state actors, such as criminals and extremist groups, are prevented from establishing their own shadow government in opposition to legitimate government institutions.

d. Governance involves a unique set of public management tasks and competencies that do not normally reside within a conventional military organization. They require blending interagency capabilities through integrated civil-military planning, supported

by effective societal information. The introduction of competent civilian agencies to assume governance tasks should be done as early as possible.

e. The use of existing government institutions may produce quicker results than building new ones from scratch. In order to provide an initial degree of governance, there may be a requirement to permit some elements that were previously regarded as undesirable to remain in post (under close supervision) until they can be replaced by suitable alternatives. If they become spoilers, the international intervention authority should consider removing them as quickly as possible.

f. There are no fixed rules for this type of activity, however, when a commander must assume responsibilities normally performed by civil authorities, the following framework should be considered:

(1) Strategic Communication. Establish a dialogue with key community figures through key leader engagement to increase awareness and manage local expectations. Assist with developing HN communication with the population through media and public engagements to build public trust and cooperation[14].

(2) Identify and Prioritize Local Requirements. Establish committees of local representatives to advocate and prioritize the needs of the civil population.

(3) Provide Administration and Essential Services. Meet the needs of the civilian population and encourage local ownership.

(4) Set Conditions for a Handover of Responsibility. Responsibility for governance should be handed over to the HN authorities, or an appropriate international civil organization, at the earliest practicable opportunity.

g. Although civilian agencies and organizations guide the election process, military forces may be required to provide the support that enables broad participation by the local populace. This could include both security and logistic support.

[14] See AJP-3.10(A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations for more detail on Key Leader Engagement.

CHAPTER 3 – PLANNING

Section 1 – Introduction

3.1. Stabilization activities must be incorporated into the planning process from the outset of an operation. As discussed in chapter 1, this should be accomplished through a comprehensive approach to planning for stabilization. Whenever possible, national and local authorities should also be included in the planning process to promote not only legitimacy, but also HN and local ownership. The goal is to foster long-term stability by providing a framework for integrating the activities of various actors.

Section 2 - Strategic Communications

3.2. The importance of the information environment to the current character of competition has resulted in the Alliance creating a new keystone doctrine publication, AJP-10, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Strategic Communications*. Strategic Communications (StratCom) seeks to influence audiences' attitudes and behaviours in pursuit of the desired end state through a narrative-led audience-centric effects based approach at all levels of command and planned activities and exploits of other domain actions to target the cognitive dimension of the battlespace. NATO's approach to StratCom consists of three main elements.

a. **Understanding**. The process of understanding audiences is derived from the Information Environment Assessment (IEA) and fused in a HQ along with the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (JIPOE) and an assessment of the missions and tasks assigned as part of the Comprehensive Understanding of the Operational Environment (CUOE). The CUOE enables the Commander to understand the physical, virtual and cognitive elements of the system within the battlespace that can be targeted to create effects in the effect dimensions.

b. **Narrative led execution**. The Alliance must demonstrate consistency in activities, images and words, ensuring they always reflect the strategic and micro narratives, and thus pre-empting any attempts to exploit gaps between what NATO does, shows and says. The narrative-led approach uses the narrative as an overarching expression of the strategy to influence audiences, and gives context to the campaign, operation or situation. The narrative binds the Alliance vertically through the levels of operations, and horizontality across the instruments of power and with partners.

3.3. **Narratives**. There are three types of narratives; institutional, strategic and micro that are mutually supporting and form the basis for planning and execution of NATO's activities.

a. **Institutional narrative.** NATO's institutional narrative is rooted in the Washington Treaty: 'A democratic, multinational alliance uniting across borders to guard, with courage and competence, against threats to our home'. This is elaborated in the communication strategy focused on the three communications pillars of *NATO*

Protects, NATO Unites, and *NATO Strengthens* as well as providing direction on how to understand and engage to counter adversary information activities.

b. **Strategic narrative.** Strategic narratives drive the operations themes and provide the political-military guidance for the activity. For an operation they will be developed by NATO HQ, in conjunction with the joint force commander, as an essential component of the planning process seeking to establish and sustain the moral authority for NATO's actions and undermine support for its adversaries. It should include the previously described strategic attributes, state why and how NATO forces are engaged, towards what objectives, and what success looks like. As missions most often include the participation of non-Alliance partner nations and other related organizations as part of the comprehensive approach, a mission-specific strategic narrative must be crafted to meet the expectations of the entire coalition as well as the host nation.

c. **Micro narrative.** Micro narratives act as local narratives to support short-term objectives and activities. Micro narratives should be included in the course of action decision criteria when planning.

3.4. **Information Operations**. The staff function to execute StratCom is Information Operations (Info Ops) which comprises of 4 components which are Analyse, Plan, Integrate and Assess and is articulated in AJP-3.10 *Information Operations*. This function leads in the audience understanding, through the IEA, to identify the effects dimensions to target information activities which will be planned and submitted for approval and resourcing through the Joint Targeting process which is articulated in AJP-3.9 *Joint Targeting*. Info Ops is conducted across the HQ either planning and integrating Information Activities, whose primary purpose is for cognitive effect, or supporting activities more broadly which are designed for physical and or virtual effect but will have a resultant cognitive effect. As part of the behaviour centric approach to operations, continual assessment of audiences is a key component in determining whether campaign objectives have been achieved.

Section 3 – Comprehensive Understanding of the Operational Environment

3.5. An essential part of planning stabilization activities is the identification of sources of instability through a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment (OE). Because the factors that foster a stable state are diverse and complex, it is imperative that a stability assessment is conducted at the outset. Without identifying the sources of instability, activities will be ineffective, at best, and, at worse, may foster further instability and fuel a downward spiral that could ultimately lead to state failure. Instability is the result of the interaction of a variety of factors; therefore, it is important to have a holistic approach to stability assessments aided by subject matter experts in their respective fields rather than a narrowly focused sector view. To provide the information required to develop this broad situational understanding, entities separate from NATO (i.e. diplomatic missions, development organizations, the HN government, IOs, NGOs) should be invited at the

earliest opportunity to contribute to the development of a comprehensive understanding of the OE.

3.6. To aid in understanding of the OE, a Comprehensive Understanding of the Operational Environment (CUOE)[15] is conducted by the staff. CUOE products enable a JFC and the staff to understand the complexity of the situation and help to frame the problem. To aid in planning and execution by the entire enterprise, it is critical that the CUOE and OE be unclassified/without classification whenever feasible to allow all partners, HN and NGO to share in the exchange. The scope of analysis for stabilization activities will focus on sources of instability and generally includes, but is not restricted to, the following areas

a. **Crisis Circumstances and Surroundings**

(1) Circumstances. History of the conflict, geo-strategic position, physical environment (climate, geography, hydrography and oceanography), national and regional infrastructure.

(2) Population and Culture. Populace (ethnicity, language, class, demography, distribution, health conditions), culture (religion, religious divides, fundamentalism, cultural divides, cultural property, gender considerations, distinctive cultures), political, economic and social issues (government, media, economy, medical factors, organized crime), legal issues (HN law, national and international law), and the information environment (Media, public engagements, influence).

(3) Catalysts. Geographical, functional or socio-cultural aspects have, or may have the potential to act as catalysts for conflict: natural resources, borders and boundaries, critical infrastructure and lines of communications (LOC), and socially marginalized or excluded populations.

b. **Actors and Influences**

(1) Those actively participating in a crisis, as well as those with the potential or inclination to do so.

(2) Categorization of Actors. Belligerents, adversaries, other opposing actors, criminals making use of an unstable situation, neutrals, friendly.

(3) Leading Actors. Key leaders (formal and informal leaders, power structure, power base), other leaders (power brokers, popular forces, private

[15] The CUOE is a crisis-specific cross-headquarters process, led by the intelligence/knowledge staff, to develop a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment. It covers the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) model areas and includes associated potential threats and risks, in support of planning and the conduct of a campaign or operation (COPDv2).

sector/business with associated trade unions, extra-territorial interests, IOs, governmental organizations, and NGOs), and other agencies.

(4) Analysis of Actors. Actors, as described above, impact upon a situation to varying degrees depending upon their aims, motivation, positions, intentions, sub-culture, relationships, networks, capacity and critical vulnerabilities.

c. **Causes of Crises**. Understanding why states or other groups resort to the use of force is essential to the planning and conduct of operations.

(1) Elemental Causes. These include fears concerning personal security and survival, self-interest, ideology, and values.

(2) Structural Causes. Illegitimate government, formal/informal leaders, poor governance, lack of political participation, inequality and social exclusion, corruption and lack of integrity within institutions, inequitable access to natural resources, and restricted freedom of religion or ideology.

(3) Immediate Causes. Uncontrolled security sector, weapons proliferation, human rights abuses, destabilizing role of neighbouring countries, role of diasporas.

(4) Triggers. Elections, arrest/assassination of key figure, military coup, environmental disaster, increased price/scarcity of basic commodities, economic crisis, and capital flight.

(5) Crisis-generated causes include material and emotional causes.

d. **Implications**. Interaction between the various components of, and actors involved in, a given situation may result in various outcomes from worst case to most likely to best case future outcomes. Each has different implications, different probabilities for occurrence, and different second-order effects. These implications may be defined in terms of current trends, shocks, risks, and opportunities.

3.7. These areas require continual monitoring and analysis. The sources of instability identified during the CUOE will likely become the focus of military and civilian efforts. They will need to be included in operations assessments once stabilization activities begin.

Section 4 – Planning Considerations

3.8. **Consult with other international actors and relevant national authorities**. These consultations should identify which stabilization activities other actors will perform, which activities NATO should undertake to support and complement other actors, and which stabilization activities NATO may need to temporarily fulfil. Whatever the gap, NATO

should encourage civilian actors to assume those roles as soon as possible. Effective civilian and military coordination is required to ensure short-term actions do not undermine longer-term stability goals.

3.9. **Regional engagement can be critical to success**. Engagement among the HN, neighbouring countries and regional organizations in common international initiatives can foster regional stabilization and successful stabilization. Neighbouring countries play a major role in the HN's stabilization process. Regional interests, issues, and unresolved conflicts can continue to influence and affect the HN throughout a stabilization mission. The HN may be at risk from its neighbours' domestic instabilities or foreign policies. The flow of refugees and arms trafficking from neighbouring countries can seriously hamper the stabilization process.

3.10. **Develop metrics for assessment**. When feasible, develop and monitor metrics and benchmarks in coordination with other relevant actors in the OE to assess effectiveness of activities in stabilizing the area. By closely monitoring changing conditions in the area of operations and in coordination with other actors, NATO-led forces will be able to plan and prepare for the transfer of responsibility to appropriate authorities.

3.11. **Take into account cultural and gender related aspects**. This requires a thorough understanding of the local culture and cultural property. Mission mandates should specifically address gender dynamics, allocating resources for gender mainstreaming work, and establish accountability and monitoring mechanisms. See Annex A, Crosscutting Topics, for further details on the role of women in peace and security.

3.12. **Understanding of root causes**. Identification and prioritization of root sources of instability will facilitate a common understanding of the environment within which stabilization is conducted. A stable state may be the overarching objective of stabilization, but the JFC must be careful to avoid focusing too heavily on strengthening government as a panacea for stabilizing the state. Although capacity building at the national level is important, societal strength and stability is ultimately rooted at the community level.

3.13. **Strategic, operational, and tactical levels are interrelated**. Because the strategic, operational, and tactical levels are closely interconnected during stabilization, commanders must understand how their actions contribute to the operational and strategic end states. Strategic commanders, JFCs, and staffs should be informed by relevant actions at the tactical level from those units that encounter the local population and local security forces in order to gain situational awareness and develop operational insights.

3.14. **Logistics.** Planning must include the necessary logistic support to facilitate long-term and sustainable activities. The logistic footprint can be reduced by outsourcing certain services locally. Outsourcing also has the advantage of encouraging acceptance of the military effort but great care must be taken not to destabilize the local economy and contribute to local corruption. However, it should be noted that outsourcing can also stimulate the black

market, provide huge opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking, and inadvertently strengthen our adversary.

Section 5 – Transitions

3.15. Successful stabilization efforts require extensive planning and coordination and thresholds to ensure a successful transition. Poorly timed and ill-conceived transitions will generally foster and perpetuate instability. Transition planning should begin as soon as stabilization mission starts to set conditions for a successful transition. Planners should be prepared to hand over to civilian agencies, HN or follow-on forces under less-than-ideal conditions, capitalizing on existing strengths and minimizing weakness as much as possible.

3.16. NATO should transition responsibilities to appropriate civilian agencies of the international community as soon as practical, and to the HN when the HN observes human rights and has the capability and capacity to maintain security, provide essential services, and execute the normal functions of governance. This applies to the full spectrum of HN civic institutions from utilities to cultural activities and sites. Different regions or institutions may be ready to transition at different times. This dynamic should be incorporated into an overall transition plan to facilitate successful, conditions-based transitions.

3.17. The criteria for successful transition should be coordinated between military and civilian organizations, the HN authorities, and the local population. The transition plan should be based on a realistic, accurate and shared understanding of the capabilities, responsibilities, and resources of all participants. Ultimately, however, the definition of what constitutes ‘acceptable’ conditions for a conditions-based transition, and the associated timing of that transition, will always be a political decision. Host nation capabilities may not be as strong as originally hoped for, but this needs to be weighed up against the negative impacts of a long term and large-scale external military presence. Domestic politics within NATO’s troop contributing nations will frequently have an impact on transition timelines.

Section 6 – Assessments

3.18. **Introduction**. The purpose of operations assessment is to inform the commander if the operation is being executed as planned and if the operation is achieving the desired results. Operations assessments provides evidence for adjustment to the plan, decision-making and to provide formal feedback on the progress and result of the operation. Assessment should be conducted regularly to review progress and adjust plans as required. Because of the numerous actors and agencies, with different priorities and timelines, assessment in stabilization can be challenging. These challenges can be mitigated by ensuring assessment is incorporated into the planning process from the outset and is not treated as a stand-alone activity. Assessment provides an important input to the knowledge development process, which builds upon and maintains a holistic understanding of the situation and OE. Significant resources are required, such as data collection and analysts, to provide timely and useful advice to support decision-making.

3.19. **Key Factors**

a. An assessment framework should be nested with the plan. This means there is a comprehensive and enduring methodology, which can be applied consistently from the strategic to the tactical level. As well as the factors below, the planning staff must include the host nation and gender into the assessment, selection, and implementation of activity. A comprehensive assessment framework also includes:

(1) Realistic coalition objectives and effects.

(2) Milestones to assess short-term progress against long-term goals.

(3) Stability, so there are not wholesale changes to assessment-particularly during changes in command-as this precludes the ability to conduct accurate trend analysis.

(4) Ensuring the assessment process is incorporated into the planning process.

(5) Baseline indicators to measure the effectiveness of activities in fostering stability.

(6) Local perceptions.

b. While every operation is unique and thus there cannot be a “standard assessment”, there are some general principles and frameworks to support assessment.

3.20. **Assessment Principles**. Assessments require a consistent and enduring approach. Key principles include:

a. **Objectives Led**. The assessment should be derived from the operation or campaign objectives (end-state); achieving the intended Effect(s). Otherwise, it will be irrelevant.

b. **Useable**. Assessment is not an end in itself; therefore, the analysis it produces must be useable. In other words, it must measure stability and enable decision-making by focusing on Decisive Operations in the Campaign Plan and therefore be fully integrated into the Operational Plan.

c. **Achievable**. Assessment must be designed so it can be easily executed. The easier the method, the more consistent and reliable the analysis.

d. **Valid**. Assessments must ensure both the data and analysis are accurate. Qualitative and quantitative data should both be used as appropriate.

3.21. Planning and Assessment Tools - The District Stability Framework. There are numerous tools to support assessments. However, most of them are sector specific (health, justice,

governance, etc.) and do not take a holistic approach to identifying sources of instability. An assessment framework, which provides a more holistic approach, is the District Stability Framework DSF (for more information on DSF, refer to http://www.usaid.gov).

3.22. The DSF used successfully in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, South Sudan and elsewhere, is an analytical, planning, and programming tool specifically created to guide and support stabilization. The DSF helps military and civilian personnel identify sources of Instability (SOIs), design programmes and activities to mitigate them, and measure their effect in fostering stability. In contrast with other frameworks, the DSF is a holistic analytical, programming, and assessment tool. It reflects lessons learned and best practices by focusing on “understanding” and integrating the local population’s perspectives into planning and assessment. The four step DSF process is nested within the AJP-5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations, and the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) joint planning process. To maximize its effectiveness, relevant actors and organizations in the area should be involved in the entire process, participating through an inclusive stability working group.

Section 7 - Training, Education, and Exercises

3.23. In addition to individual NATO member nation training requirements, pre-deployment training should enhance regional, political, cultural, and economic awareness, and facilitate coordination and understanding between civil and military personnel. This training should include instruction and practical exercises in identifying and mitigating sources of instability. Whenever possible, IOs, NGOs, and other relevant governmental and civilian actors should be invited to participate in education and training exercises to improve coordination in the planning and execution of stabilization efforts.

Annex A – Cross-cutting topics (CCT)

A.1. The purpose of this annex is to summarize NATO's cross-cutting topics and their relationship to the military contribution to stabilization.

A.2. **General**. Cross-cutting topics (CCTs) are a range of different topics which could affect the mission in a number of ways, but which, with the exception of protection of civilians from own actions, fall outside the military' primary responsibilities.. They have relevance across all NATO military operations, missions and activities. These CCTs need to be considered in a coherent and integrated manner during the planning and execution of operations, as they are interdependent.

A.3. **Protection of Civilians (PoC)**[16]. Protection of Civilians (persons, objects and services) includes all efforts taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate the negative effects that might arise from NATO and Alliance Operations and Missions (AOM) on the civilian population and, when applicable, to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats of physical violence by other actors, including through the establishment of a safe and secure environment. The PoC Framework[17] is comprised of four elements:

a. Understanding the Human Environment (UHE), focused on recognizing the complexity and dynamic nature of the human domain.

b. Mitigate Harm (MH), focused on Perpetrators of Violence and their victims.

c. Facilitate Access to Basic Needs (FABN), focused on Civilians, Civil Society and Aid Providers.

d. Contribute to a Safe and Secure Environment (C-SASE), focused on the Local Government and Institutions.

Enabled by an Understanding of the Human Environment, NATO-led forces achieve success across the MH, FABN and C-SASE lines of effort which in turn enhances stability.

A.4. **Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC)**.[18] Armed conflict in modern warfare disproportionally affects children. NATO must apply special attention to the "Six Grave Violations," which should be reported immediately if the adversary commits any of them. They are killing and maiming of children; recruitment or use of children as soldiers; sexual violence against children; abduction of children; attacks against schools and hospitals; and

[16] PO(2016)0407 (INV), *NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians*, dated June 2016
[17] *Protection of Civilians ACO Handbook*, dated May 2020
[18] Bi-SC Directive 086-004, *Children and Armed Conflict*, dated 10 June 2016.

blockage of food, water and medicine. NATO forces should try to prevent the adversary from committing any of the "Six Grave Violations" wherever possible. NATO developed a policy paper entitled, “Protection of Children in Armed Conflict – the Way Forward.”[19] The main priorities of the paper include:

a. Supporting UN efforts to monitor instances of grave violations committed against children affected by armed conflict[20];

b. When participating in AOM, military leadership and personnel are trained to recognise and respond to possible grave violations identified by the UN Secretary General;

c. When training local forces, NATO ensures that the protection of children affected by armed conflict is given the right attention; NATO also promotes adequate reporting and monitoring mechanisms focusing on the six grave violations;

d. The development of standard operating procedures for reporting violations.

The protection of children in armed conflict is essential to breaking the cycle of violence. By breaking this cycle, peaceful conflict resolution becomes an acceptable alternative to violence and armed conflict. Societies then achieve long-term stability.

A.5. **Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)**. NATO defines CRSV as rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, forced sterilization, forced marriage and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict.[21] In contemporary conflict, sexual and gender-based violence is a tactic that inflicts both physical and psychological harm. CRSV serves to victimize individuals, families, and entire communities. Key elements of NATO’s Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence policy include:

a. NATO will include specific guidance on preventing and responding to CRSV during the development of North Atlantic Council Initiating Directives for any future missions and operations, unless justified as irrelevant, and, as appropriate, in the development of exercises.

[19] PO(2015)0165, *The Protection of Children in Armed Conflict – the Way Forward*,” dated 23 March 2015

[20] The six violations are described in United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1261, 1314, 1379, 1460, 1539, 1612, 1882, 1998, 2068, 2143 and 225. These violations are also prohibited by IHL and by the *Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol*.

[21] PO(2021)0190, *NATO Policy on Preventing and Responding to Conflict Related Sexual Violence*, dated 01 June 2021.

b. All personnel in NATO missions, operations and Council-mandated activities will receive mandatory pre-deployment and in-mission training on identifying, preventing, and responding to CRSV.

c. As part of NATO missions, operations, and North Atlantic Council (NAC) -mandated activities, NATO will respond to incidences of conflict-related sexual violence, consistent with International Law, as mandated by the Council, and within the approved rules of engagement up to and including the use of force.

d. All personnel in NATO missions, operations and Council-mandated activities should report any incidents of conflict-related sexual violence that they observe, or that a victim/survivor reports to them, in accordance with established reporting mechanisms, through the NATO chain of command.

CRSV serves to inflict suffering and destroy the dignity of its victims. In environments where CRSV persists, populations cannot attain physical security. Physical security is essential to securing the safe and secure environment needed for stability.

A.6. **Cultural Property Protection (CPP)**.[22] In conflict, armed groups often target an adversary's culture heritage. Physical items, such as buildings, books and documents, artwork, and museum artefacts, are forms of cultural heritage. These tangible manifestations are termed cultural property. Cultural property is a characteristic of the operational environment and is therefore included in NATO's tactical, operational, and strategic considerations. Two key aspects of CPP in NATO operations are:

a. During AOM, NATO member states are committed to taking approrpriote measures to avoid any kind of harm or damage to objects of cultural value, those linked to the values and cultural identity of a population.

b. Military commanders bear operational responsibility for ensuring that military forces abide by the rules of IHL/LOAC and adopt best practices in protecting cultural property in armed conflict.

Culture influences people's attitudes and behaviours and is integral to the identity of a society. The destruction of cultural property diminishes this identity, generates negative effects on social relationships, and creates societal instability. CPP considerations in planning and execution serve to reverse these negative outcomes.[23]

A.7. **Building Integrity (BI)**. BI across government institutions is an aim in NATO missions, operations, and activities. Corruption and poor governance are security challenges that

[22] Bi-SC Directive 086-005, *Implementing Cultural Property Protection in NATO Operations and Missions*, dated 01 April 2019

[23] See the *1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict*.

undermine democracy. The following principles guide NATO's BI policy in operations[24,25,26]:

a. Integrity. NATO will act with integrity, both as individual staff and as an organisation. NATO will adhere to international law, practices and norms and uphold the highest standards. NATO will continue to champion a culture of integrity and will set the standards for partners.

b. Transparency. NATO will strive to be transparent in its activities. It will address corruption internally and externally through comprehensive risk management, built upon internal awareness of BI and a comprehensive understanding of specific conditions relating to an operation. Transparency in operations, however, needs to be carefully balanced with the need for Operations Security (OPSEC).

c. Accountability. NATO will hold itself and partners accountable for its actions. When working with the private sector, lOs, NGOs and Civil Society, NATO will seek organisations that are transparent and accountable and meet NATO's BI policy in NATO-led operations and missions.

Transparent and accountable defence institutions under democratic control are fundamental to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.

A.8. **Women Peace & Security Agenda (WPS)**. NATO pledges to implement UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and related resolutions.[27] Therefore, NATO defines the WPS agenda as a global policy architecture supporting gender equality and today a significant reference point in the management and resolution of, as well as recovery from, violent conflict.[28] NATO and its partners recognise the adoption of the WPS agenda and support the advancement of gender equality through the following guiding principles[29]:

a. Integration: gender equality must be considered as an integral part of NATO policies, programmes and projects guided by effective gender mainstreaming practices.

b. Inclusiveness: representation of women across NATO and in national forces is necessary to enhance operational effectiveness and success. NATO will seek to

[24] PO(2016)0331, *NATO Building Integrity Policy*, dated 19 May 2016

[25] PO(2016)0709 (INV)m, *NATO Building Integrity Action Plan: Taking Forward the Implementation of the building Integrity Policy*, dated 01 Dec 2016

[26] MC 06597, *Military Concept for Building Integrity in Operations*, dated 20 January 2021.

[27] Including UNSCRs 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, 2242, 2467 and 2493.

[28] Office of NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, *Concepts and Definitions Women, Peace and Security in NATO*, dated 09 July 2019

[29] *NATO/EAPC Women, Peace and Security Policy and Action Plan 2018,* dated 20 September 2018

increase the participation of women in all tasks throughout the International Military Staff and International Staff at all levels.

c. Integrity: systemic inequalities are addressed to ensure fair and equal treatment of women and men Alliance-wide. Accountability on all efforts to increase awareness and implementation of the WPS agenda will be made a priority in accordance with international frameworks.

To operationalize the WPS agenda in stabilization, it is essential to apply a gender perspective to understand how gender norms, roles and drivers of conflict impact the planning, execution, and evaluation of military operations. Violent conflict is experienced differently by women, men, boys, and girls. Applying a gender perspective allows the consideration of how men and women, boys, and girls, are being affected differently by a situation or action. Gender impacts roles undertaken in armed groups and insurgencies. Gender advisors are responsible for promoting the overall implementation of a gender perspective into the planning, execution, and evaluation of military operations.

A.9 **Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA)**.[30] NATO defines sexual exploitation as the act of abusing or attempting to abuse a situation of vulnerability, a position of power or a relationship of trust for sexual purposes, but not exclusively with a view to extracting pecuniary, social, or political advantage. Acts of sexual exploitation include, but are not limited to, the exchange of money, goods, products or services or the granting of employment or assistance due to the local population for sexual activities, including sexual favours or other forms of demeaning, degrading or servile behaviour. All these forms of transactional sex, including the exploitation of the prostitution of others, constitute acts of sexual exploitation. Sexual relationships that are based on inherently unequal power dynamics are a form of sexual exploitation.

NATO defines sexual abuse as any physical harm of a sexual nature committed with force, coercion or through an unequal relationship, the threat of an act of this nature also constituting sexual abuse. Sexual abuse includes, but is not limited to, any act or behaviour of a sexual nature that causes a person to be coerced, threatened, or compelled to engage in sexual activity, and any unlawful sexual activity with a person under the age of 18.

SEA goes against NATO's core principles and values, undermines the Alliance's effectiveness and credibility, and undermines the success of missions. All personnel are prohibited from engaging in any form of SEA or facilitating their accomplishment. All staff must work to prevent and respond to sexual exploitation and abuse within the limits of the powers and authority vested in them. NATO will ensure that complaints mechanisms are in place so that suspected cases of SEA can be properly referred to the competent authorities by complainants and dealt with in accordance with the NATO Policy on Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.

[30] The *NATO Policy on Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse*, dated 20 November 2019

Intentionally blank

Annex B - Security Sector Reform

B.1. Introduction

a. NATO Forces may be able to help reform the HN security sector and build partner capacity to make it an enabler of long-term stability. Security sector reform (SSR) involves reforming security institutions so that, under the control of a legitimate authority, they can play an effective and accountable role in providing internal and external security. It encompasses HN defence ministry and ministry of interior as well as armed and HN Law Enforcement Agencies reform; monitoring, mentoring, advising, and training; education; and support for the enhancement of the justice sector and its institutions: judiciary, law enforcement and corrections. The security sector comprises both military and civilian individuals and institutions responsible for the safety and security of the HN and the population from national to local levels. This includes state security providers, governmental security management and oversight bodies, civil society, and can include non-state providers of justice and security.

b. Development assistance benefits from being part of a comprehensive approach in which it is fully coordinated with security-related assistance, as development is at risk without basic security. With that understanding, NATO, along with like-minded bilateral and multilateral donors, must employ a comprehensive approach to SSR by better integrating defence and other security-related programmes with longer term development, as well as diplomatic tools and resources, to properly assist partner governments to provide effective, legitimate, and accountable security for their citizens. SSR refers to a comprehensive set of programmes and activities undertaken to improve the way a HN provides safety, security, and justice. Through SSR, NATO may assist the HN to respond appropriately to threats within and outside its borders. SSR programmes require integrated activities in many sectors, including defence, justice (to include law enforcement, border forces, the courts, and prisons), intelligence, governance (to include civil society, civilian oversight, and financial management), and DDR. SSR is a holistic concept that includes all these various disciplines and covers many different sectors. To be successful, it must be treated as such.

B.2. SSR is the restoration or the transformation of a country's security institutions which includes all participants, their roles, responsibilities, and actions, so that it is managed and operated effectively, legitimately and accountably in a manner that is more consistent with sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.

The SSR line of effort can, and often will, take place when the supporting force is still a party to the conflict – for example, in COIN where international actors support a HN with capturing and holding territory. In these circumstances, the responsibility to respect IHL/LOAC, human rights, and HN law as applicable and to ensure respect in the actions

of partners, highlights the importance of safeguards and principles of SSR – management and oversight. Carelessly implemented SSR, or SSR irresponsibly supported by international actors, carries significant risks for the civilian population to which the security sector is meant to serve. Supporting nations are also at reputational risk if they support or are seen to be supporting illegitimate regimes or unprofessional, corrupt, or rogue HN security forces.

B.3. **Support the Development of a Host Nation Strategic Plan for Security Sector Reform.** The military contribution to an SSR programme should be incorporated within an overall HN strategic reform plan, which should be developed and owned by the HN with support from all the stakeholders, including the intervention force where applicable, IOs, and NGOs. SSR has an explicitly political objective to ensure that security is provided in a manner consistent with internationally accepted norms, human rights principles, and the rule of law. Security can be provided and governed by state and non-state institutions in many ways and ultimately is driven by a country's balance of power. Therefore, SSR is best approached as a comprehensive governance issue and not simply as a technical and military activity. All SSR programmes must be coordinated during preparatory, implementation and consolidation phases which must be always under a continuous monitoring and evaluation.



Figure B.1 - SSR key actors

B.4. Security Sector Components. The activities of military forces are generally focused on reforming the HN military forces, but those actions are only part of a broader, wide-ranging effort to reform the entire security sector, which is composed of individuals and institutions that provide safety, security, and justice for the people of a state. Figure B.1 illustrates key elements of the security sector, which includes the core security actors and related organizations. Execution of comprehensive SSR unites the following elements of the security sector.

a. State security and justice providers could include military forces, law enforcement agencies, constabulary or gendarmerie-type forces, intelligence, and security services (both military and civilian), coast guards, border forces, customs authorities, cybersecurity national agencies, reserve, or local security units (i.e., civil defence forces, national guards,), and others.

b. State Governance and oversight mechanisms such as the executive and national security advisory bodies, legislative and parliamentary selected committees, ministries of defence, interior and foreign affairs, and justice, financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers, financial audit, and financial planning units), human rights institutions, anti-corruption bodies, and others.

c. Non-state security and justice providers like - armed groups (i.e., militias, armed factions), self-defence groups, private military, and security companies (PMSC), liberation armies, customary security providers, legal aid, customary and traditional justice systems, and others.

d. Non-state and oversight mechanisms to include human rights NGOs, women's associations, media, victims' groups, academic institutions, village elders, research institutes, think tank, and others.

B.5. It is important to identify who is providing security and justice on the ground and the implications of that for the underlying division of power and resources. It is therefore essential to undertake as much analysis as possible right from the start, recognising that there are likely to be practical and time constraints.
External actors often start by looking at key institutions within the "formal" state security sector and assessing their capacity. This view assumes that the main reason that there is conflict is that the state has been unable to prevent it, and so if external actors help to strengthen state security institutions it will be possible to end the conflict. Not only does this ignore the many other factors which will be driving conflict, but it also tends to overlook the degree to which state security institutions are parties to the conflict. Furthermore, it pays little attention to the institutions that should hold the security sector to account. In this context, it may be useful to consider:
- Who plays a role in providing, or undermining, security, and justice?

- What are the main threats and issues regarding security and justice?

- What do these communities think about existing security and justice providers? Are they effective? Do they trust them?

In stabilization contexts, there is unlikely to be a neat distinction between the roles of the military and civilian policing, and nor is there likely to be a clear state monopoly over the legitimated use of physical force. The provision of security is likely to be highly militarised. It may involve armed forces, paramilitary groups, multiple 'policing' actors, and a mix of non-state actors, some of which are sympathetic to or maintain links with the state and others which are in direct conflict with the state. Security actors are also likely to play a quasi-judicial role in many circumstances.
Therefore, it is important to look beyond the state. For citizens, security and justice may also be provided by family, religious, ethnic and group networks (such as traditional or customary justice systems, elders, and community security groups). These are often more accessible and have greater legitimacy than the formal security and justice system, as they are seen to be rooted in communities and are more reflective of their values. State and non-state systems are not necessarily in opposition. They can sit alongside each other and interact in various ways, particularly since the state will usually lack the resources to deliver everything through formal systems alone. It should be noted, however, that while non-state institutions, particularly traditional justice mechanisms, may be quicker to deliver and hold greater local legitimacy, they also have weaknesses. Non-state mechanisms are at least as likely to reinforce discriminatory norms which enable impunity and undermine the transition away from violence.

B.6. Responsibility for implementing the non-military elements of SSR will normally reside with the appropriate civilian agencies and civil law enforcement organizations, either the HN, intervening external stakeholders, or a combination of both. The military role consists of assisting and facilitating the operations of these agencies. In some instances, where HN civilian agencies are not functioning or external civilian partners are not present, military dedicated assets, specifically stability policing elements, may take on a role in SSR implementation for non-military areas.

B.7. **Objectives**

a. There are three primary goals which SSR seeks to achieve:

(1) Improve the democratic oversight of the security and justice system and its components.

(2) Improve the effective management of the security and justice system.

(3) Strengthen the development of efficient, effective, and affordable security and justice services that meet the society's needs, respecting international law (including IHL/LOAC) and humanitarian principles.

b. To achieve these goals, an SSR programme must develop a legal and/or constitutional framework that provides for the legitimate and accountable use of

force that is in accordance with universally accepted human rights norms and standards. It must also institutionalize a system of governance and management that provides mechanisms for oversight of security and intelligence provided by security institutions. Both should include mechanisms for interaction among the security actors, detailing their respective constitutional and legal roles and responsibilities, as well as how they are to cooperate and coordinate their actions.

B.8. **Sustainability**. From the outset, SSR programmes should support the HN's national structures that will manage the implementation of SSR, since national ownership and leadership are essential for effective security sector development. The design of these programmes must focus on the organizational structures and management processes within security sector organizations. Merely training and equipping judges, prosecutors, soldiers, and law enforcement officers would be ineffective and unsustainable. Managerial systems and planning capacities need to be developed and supported in coordination with training and equipping programmes at the various levels of government – from national to local - and need to correspond closely to local capabilities. They must also be integrated with governance reform programmes.

B.9. **Support Host Nation Ownership to Foster Transparency and Strengthen Legitimacy.** The principles, policies, laws, and structures that form SSR programmes must respect the HN's history, culture, legal framework, and institutions. The needs, priorities, and circumstances driving SSR programmes will differ substantially from one country to the next. Accounting for the basic security concerns of the HN population is essential for attaining legitimacy and is essential to the success of SSR programs. To ensure the sustainability of reforms, assistance should be designed to meet the needs of the HN population and to support HN security sector participants, processes, and priorities. To accomplish this, SSR programmes should be developed to serve long-term objectives. They should strengthen HN security forces' legitimacy and authority. Military law and a code of conduct should be developed to define the binding rules and regulations for military forces, and similar legal frameworks are needed for the other security services. Programme design should include a robust communications component to foster awareness of reform efforts among HN officials and the population, neighbouring countries, the donor community, and other actors with a potential stake in programme outcomes.

B.10. **Incorporate Principles of Good Governance and Respect for Human Rights**. Accountability, transparency, public participation, respect for human rights, and legitimacy must be included in security force development. Security forces must carry out their core functions in accordance with these principles. This is particularly important in countries where the legacy of abuse by security personnel may have eroded public confidence in the sector overall. SSR programmes should include accountability and oversight mechanisms to prevent abuses of power and corruption and to build public confidence. They must incorporate an explicit focus on security sector governance. Strengthening the overall legal, policy, and budgetary frameworks should be an important component of the SSR agenda.

NATO as a supporting force will consider, as a function of planning, how best to prevent or respond to alleged abuses of power, or alleged violations of the law (to include IHL/LOAC), which implicate the supported local forces, and which may have been witnessed by NATO forces. Mechanisms for responding to such allegations may include:

a. mandatory reporting to the local authorities for investigation, as well as up the NATO and national chains of command,

b. establishing a database of alleged abuses of power, or violations of the law.

c. considering the suspension or termination of support activities with the implicated forces, pending a resolution of the allegation and implementation of measures which will prevent future abuses or violations.

B.11. **Link Security and Justice**. SSR should ensure that all security forces operate within domestic and international law and support comprehensive efforts to enforce and promote the rule of law. Police forces and organizations with law enforcement authorities should operate as an integral part of the justice system and directly support other parts of the justice sector, including the courts and corrections institutions. Assistance to law enforcement and other state security providers should be complemented with other efforts to strengthen justice institutions. This will assist in avoiding unintended consequences and ensure that security forces operate according to the law.

B.12. **Public Trust and Confidence**. In supporting the reconstruction of the institutions of a failed state, commanders must engender trust and confidence between the local population and the security forces. As SSR proceeds, these security forces carry a progressively greater burden in ensuring public safety. Frequently, they do so in an environment characterized by crime and violence, particularly in areas recovering from violent, predatory forces. Recovery requires a community-based response that uses the unique capabilities of the security forces and law enforcement agencies. Activities conducted in accordance with HN law will contribute to the building of trust and confidence within the local community. Furthermore, increased public confidence engenders greater desire among the people to support the efforts of the security forces.

B.13. **Leadership Capacity Building**. Challenges associated with developing capable, legitimate, and accountable security forces require capable leadership in the host-nation security sector at all levels. To establish the conditions for long-term success, SSR may help the HN identify and begin training, mentoring and advising security force leaders as early as possible. Such efforts must avoid undermining host-nation legitimacy while recognizing that assistance, advice, and education may be needed. Programmes focused on developing senior leaders may prove helpful. Advisors, mentors, monitors, trainers, and liaison staff should be carefully selected to deal with the frustration in working with possibly immature security forces. Tour length of advisors should be long enough for relationships to be forged and a deep understanding of how best to develop the indigenous forces to emerge.

B.14. **Host-Nation Dependency**. During reform, the risk of building a culture of dependency is mitigated by adopting a training process. This process sequentially provides training and equipment to security forces, a dedicated advising capability, and an advisory presence. After initial training efforts, this reform helps host-nation security forces progress toward the transition of security responsibility. A robust transition plan supports the gradual and coherent easing of host-nation dependency, typically in the form of increased responsibility and accountability. Depending on the security environment, NATO-led forces, and external actors in SSR may need to protect new HN security forces from many direct and immediate threats during their development. While this requirement usually applies only during initial training, security forces remain at risk throughout their development during SSR; these threats may contribute to problems with discipline, dependability, and desertion. In extreme circumstances, protecting host-nation security forces may necessitate training outside the physical boundaries of the state.

B.15. **Balance Operational Support with Institutional Reform to Ensure Coherent Delivery and Unity of Effort**. Sufficient incentives, processes, resources, and structures must be put in place so that reforms, resources, and capacities are sustained after assistance ends. An equal emphasis must be placed on the financing, management, monitoring, deployment, and support of the security forces and institutions that international agencies are reforming. Training and materiel assistance must be coordinated with efforts to develop HN infrastructure, personnel and administrative support systems, logistical and planning procedures, and an adequate and sustainable resource base. Given the high levels of interdependency within the security sector, coherent delivery of SSR will require dedicated SSR command, control, and cooperation arrangements that are integrated with both military and civilian command structures of any intervening elements. In a hostile environment where civilian agencies are unable to operate freely or otherwise request support, a single military headquarters that coordinates local SSR activities for the reform of the HN military forces and possibly some police functions may, out of necessity, be given broader responsibility to help generate development across the whole sector. This should not be a permanent arrangement. The following coordination areas may be the most important and of special significance in post-intervention and hostile environments.

a. Ensuring that non-military activity like police training, which may be conducted by civilian organizations, private military companies (PMCs), private security companies (PSCs) provided by contributing nations, is coordinated through the military headquarters dealing locally with SSR.

b. Ensuring that the military headquarters dealing locally with SSR synchronizes its activities with adjacent and higher headquarters also dealing with SSR. Any disparity between these activities may affect the success of the transition back to the HN.

c. Delivering coherence between the activities of various partners, agencies, and donors, when lead-agency or -nation responsibilities for aspects of SSR are allocated without an overall coordinating body.

B.16. **Host Nation Capacity**. Developing capacity in the security sector is a complex challenge. Capacity development refers to the ability of Alliance forces to train and advise HN individuals and institutions. It focuses on security strategies, priorities, and security problems. Successful capacity development efforts achieve results with the resources available at the international level, considering those resources that will be available in the future in the HN to ensure sustainability. It is a broader concept than the training and technical assistance approaches that are usually employed to address capacity shortfalls. Capacity development requires a comprehensive approach from all participating agencies in coordination with IOs, such as the United Nations, and NGOs, which addresses capacity gaps tailored to the OE. Strengthening capacity in partner governments to develop, manage, and implement SSR should be a central aspect of all reform programmes. Capacity needs are present throughout the security sector, and not just within state institutions. In the past, capacity development programmes have failed because wider governance issues (e.g., systematic corruption) were not properly addressed. For this reason, a thorough assessment must be done to inform the SSR planning process.

B.17. In addition to the capability to conduct operations, military capacity building must include the administrative support and development of a functioning HN defence ministry and chain of command. A coherent SSR programme directed at defence forces should focus on the provision of training and advisory teams, simultaneous delivery of equipment and infrastructure, operational support through provision of fires and logistic support and delivering financial and managerial support for the security forces.

B.18. Establishing civilian oversight and control of the security sector is a critical element of any SSR programme. Oversight and control mechanisms and processes assure that the various elements of the security sector are accountable to elected and politically appointed civilian leadership, both in the executive and legislative branches. Civilian oversight bodies are those institutions authorized by the state to manage and oversee the activities and governance of security forces and agencies. They can be formal or informal and may include (but are not limited to) the executive branch and ministries, civilian review boards and compliance commissions, and local government structures. Accountability is essential to establishing a sound foundation for defence/security budget planning and programme implementation. Capacity building in these critical areas of governance should be a central element of SSR in which the military may only have a limited supporting role or expertise.

B.19. A clear understanding of the relationship and responsibilities between Alliance and HN forces is critical to the successful transition of authority. Advisors and trainers provide the essential link between both HN and Alliance forces and have a significant role within the transition process. Headquarters elements on the ground should have a dedicated staff branch dealing with SSR that maintain a close link with any superior headquarters.

B.20. **Host Nation Defence**. States develop military forces to counter threats to their security. In unstable states, such threats often include armed groups and other challenges to governance. States requiring NATO assistance with stability and reconstruction may employ their own military forces to counter internal threats, facilitate governance and

development, and provide humanitarian assistance. Defence reform should be structured by the constraints of relevant HN executive and legislative branch directives, legislation and policy documents. HN national security strategies, policies, acts and budgets are examples of documents that should inform the design and implementation of defence reform and SSR programmes as a whole. Assisting the HN to construct them, if they are absent or outdated, becomes an essential feature of the reform process.

B.21. **Rule of Law**. The HN justice system may encompass an array of formal and informal institutions and actors. These institutions can include the ministry of justice, law enforcement organizations, law schools and bar associations, and legal advocacy organizations. The legal framework includes the constitution, laws, rules, and regulations. Peace agreements may also constitute part of the legal framework in post-conflict countries. HN executive branch directives and relevant legislation should play a central role in the formulation and implementation of SSR initiatives and programmes. These can include national security strategies, policies, acts, or national criminal justice codes. Also important are HN structures charged with specific responsibilities for elements of SSR, such as governance reform agencies, national reconciliation commissions, and national DDR bodies. SSR planners must avoid imposing their concepts of law, justice, and security on the HN. The HN's systems and values are central to its development of justice system reform.

B.22. **Legal System**. An effective legal and judicial system is vital to the rule of law. The lack of clear, widely accepted, and enforceable laws, and easy access to justice, are significant barriers to sustainable national and economic development. Consequently, legal, and judicial reform has traditionally formed an important part of SSR, with the focus on national laws, the court system and judges. A formal justice system may be complemented by the informal customary or traditional justice systems that are unique to areas, cultures, or regions. Sometimes referred to as "non-state justice systems," traditional justice systems frequently provide important alternatives to formal, codified systems and provide greater access to justice to remote or underserved populations. Conversely, non-state systems may not adhere to international law. At the very least, SSR planners should gain a thorough knowledge of any alternative systems that may be operating in a particular HN and how they will fit into the overall SSR programme.

B.23. Any transitional justice scheme is likely to be part of a wider reconciliation process and handling of unresolved justice concerns from past or ongoing conflicts, including war crimes. In such cases, special venues and processes for conflict-related justice and reconciliation may be necessary. Such processes sometimes are incorporated in the comprehensive peace agreements that form the foundation of conflict transformation. Issues to be addressed in the initial development of a legal and judicial system include:

a. Fair and impartial laws and effective enforcement mechanisms.

b. Independent, impartial, and competent courts and judges.

c. Accountability and transparency in the judicial system.

d. Timely access to justice.

e. Transparent cooperation between state and traditional institutions.

f. An integrated approach with other components of the criminal justice system including police and prison/penal reform bodies.

B.24. A typical NATO nation's criminal justice system consists of several interrelated steps: investigation, arrest, detention, charge, prosecution, verdict, sentence, appeal, and parole or rehabilitation. As discussed earlier, functionality requires that all actors work together as a system. Law enforcement reform that outpaces the rest of the justice sector may result in more arrests with inadequate detention facilities and no means of adjudication.

B.25. Law Enforcement. Law enforcement (especially police) authorities supporting an effective and accountable justice system are central to an efficient security sector. Military forces could be initially involved in redeveloping the criminal justice system, with the view of facilitating the training of their personnel. As such, NATO stability policing element should be involved at the onset of mission planning. In this context, SP assets can have a key role focusing on police capacity building. Most Gendarmerie-type forces, and some military police forces, possess the skills required to cover the full spectrum of needs in local police force strengthening. Although military forces initially may be involved in re-developing the justice and law enforcement systems, this task should be assumed by other agencies as soon as possible. Qualified, professional justice sector and police trainers support an improved advising process and ensure sustainable development with appropriate civilian oversight. Their expertise ensures an appropriate delineation of roles and responsibilities between security forces and law enforcement agencies[31]. Police services are a necessary component of a functioning society. Ultimately, a police reform effort aims to build a professional police force that earns the trust and confidence of the local population while reinforcing the legitimacy of the HN government.

B.26. Correction System. The justice system contributes to a secure, just, peaceful and safe society through the use of appropriate and reasonable sanctions. As part of the justice system, prisons contribute to the protection of society by actively encouraging offenders to take advantage of opportunities that will assist them in becoming law-abiding citizens, while exercising only the degree of control necessary to provide for the safety of society. In the context of failing and failed states, overcrowded and poorly managed prisons are often characterized by abuse and torture and often present major health risks to the whole community. In these cases, specific SSR action is needed to reform and develop prison systems quickly, often placing immediate demands on military participation. Prison reform is necessary to support developments in police and justice systems and needs to be reformed simultaneously. Gendarmerie-type forces and military police could be called to

[31] HN Law enforcement agencies may comprise forces and services which have a military status

take part in the related activities, on a case-by-case basis. Issues that should be considered in the initial development of a prison system are:

a. Ensuring respect for the human rights of detainees.

b. Reducing pre-trial detention.

c. Improving health and social services in prisons.

d. Increasing civilian and Alliance oversight of prisons.

e. Promoting rehabilitation and reintegration.

f. Developing an integrated approach with the judicial system.

B.27. Border Security. The control of border areas by legitimate border force will be necessary to prevent any movement of irregular actors into a failed state. Border forces are often involved in detecting and preventing crime in border areas, including illegal trafficking and entry. These forces can include border guards, coast guard, and immigration and customs personnel. In many states, ineffective border management systems frustrate efforts to detect and prevent organized crime and other irregular activity. Border forces can also be associated with corruption, which reduces state revenues, erodes confidence, and discourages trade and economic activity. Issues to be considered in the initial development of a border control force are:

a. Facilitating the efficient and regulated movement of people and goods, thereby achieving an appropriate balance between security, commerce, and social normalization.

b. Building capacity to detect and combat illicit trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, and other factors leading to insecurity.

c. Strengthening revenue generating capacity, promoting integrity and tackling corruption.[32]

d. Establishing a border guard under central government control.

e. Harmonizing border control and customs regulations regionally and enhancing cross-border cooperation.

f. Establishing cross-border protocols with adjoining states.

[32] Promoting integrity and tackling corruption already are the key elements of NATO's Building Integrity (BI) Initiative. BI is mainly conducted by civilian actors and does not only apply to border areas. To achieve unity of effort, the JFC should coordinate respective activities with other actors engaged in BI.

B.28. Non-State Security Forces. Local militias, neighbourhood watches, and tribal forces are a frequent response when the state is unable to provide effective security to local communities and may be significant employers within local communities. SSR programmes must acknowledge the presence of these non-state actors and determine how best to deal with them. Indeed, intervening forces may quickly achieve a measure of local legitimacy by partnering with local non-state security actors in such situations. Local militias and other non-state security forces are less legitimate and functional at the district and provincial levels, though their activities may undermine state authority at those levels due to the disconnects between local actors and the district and provincial government bodies that are charged with formal responsibility for public safety. Because non-state security actors lack accountability mechanisms and oversight systems, over time they - may become major abusers of human rights and predators in their own and other communities. The DDR of non-state security forces is essential to reforming a HN's security sector. Where bearing weapons is a socially accepted feature of adulthood, disarmament will be problematic at best. Disarmament processes may require a nuanced approach that differentiates between personal weapons and heavy or crew-served weapons. The perception that former combatants are receiving benefits that are not universally available to civilians may generate resentment, if not open hostility, among those civilians.

B.29. Private Military and Security Companies. The private security industry comprises those individuals and institutions that provide security for people and property under contract and for profit. The activities of an uncontrolled or poorly regulated private security industry can present unique governance problems and act as an obstacle to SSR programmes directed at both military and law enforcement forces. Increased security provision by non-state actors is prevalent in all regions of the world. SSR planners therefore must consider the potentially serious implications of the private security industry in the HN, as well as the effects of limited regulation and accountability of a market, which continues to grow in both size and importance. There are many types of organizations that compose the private security industry, including:

a. Service providers that conduct mine clearance, logistics and supply and risk consulting.

b. PSCs that protect industrial and commercial sites, humanitarian aid missions, embassies, VIPs, and conduct surveillance and investigation, and risk assessment and analysis.

c. PMCs that support military training, military intelligence, and offensive combat.

B.30. SSR planners need to develop a comprehensive system providing effective regulation and oversight of the private security industry. Untrained staff with questionable backgrounds may use force in an illegitimate way. More importantly to an effective SSR programme, the introduction of armed PSCs/PMCs weakens the state's monopoly over the use of force and, where unregulated, hinders rather than helps law enforcement. A comprehensive

licensing system, clearly defining the type of services that PSCs/PMCs may be allowed to provide, and providing for the revocation of licenses, counters those tendencies.

B.31. Intelligence and Security Services. Intelligence and security services are normally located within central government, typically reporting directly to senior decision-makers. They should provide warnings and insights about threats and trends, which affect the security and economic well-being of a state and allow decision makers to shape policy. Intelligence services can make a significant contribution to the process of building a nationally owned and led vision of security through the provision of tactical or strategic intelligence assessments on the range of threats faced by the state. Domestic and foreign intelligence activities increasingly overlap, particularly in the realm of activities such as counter terrorism, which can encompass threats to domestic targets, overseas embassies, armed forces, or commercial interests in foreign countries.

B.32. In addition to assisting the overall SSR process, intelligence services themselves frequently require reform. Intelligence services of the state may have been involved in human rights abuses, and other international law violations (to include IHL/LOAC) or colluded in the rule of a corrupt or tyrannical regime. Thus, there may be a requirement to reform the intelligence services and structures of a state as a part of the comprehensive SSR programme.

B.33. In reforming and training intelligence organizations, as with the rule of law, the military is not the ideal lead, though military intelligence personnel may need to be factored into the development of the HN military capacity. Traditionally, civilian intelligence agencies have taken the lead in building intelligence capacity in countries where reconstruction efforts are ongoing. It is no less important to maintain effective and transparent civilian and political oversight of these efforts and ensure that they are effective, accountable, and integrated into broader security sector and government development goals than it is in other aspects of the SSR programme.

Figure B.2 - Stabilization and SSR Nexus

B.34. Promoting security through cooperation remains a core task of NATO. Figure B.2 illustrates the Stabilization-SSR nexus highlighting military contributions to both the processes; those related to SSR are described in the following paragraphs.

B.35. **Security Force Assistance**. SSR requires stabilization and reconstruction to provide a stable environment. Security Force Assistance (SFA) may form, or be part of, NATO's contribution to SSR, which is led by the HN with the support of the international community.

SFA is a key subset of Defence Reform and includes all NATO activities that develop and improve, or directly support, the development of local forces and their associated institutions in crisis zones. Local forces comprise indigenous, non-NATO military security forces and will be defined by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).[33]

SFA activities support the overall mission and objectives as detailed by the NAC and can be provided across the entire spectrum of crisis response scenarios and threat levels. SFA

[33] For more information on Security Force Assistance, see MCM 0034-2014 NATO *Security Force Assistance Concept* and NATO AJP-3.16 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance* (SFA) Edition A, Version 1, May 2016, pg. 1-1.

could range from improving the local forces of a HN that is facing a threat, to advising against an immediate threat.

To ensure comparative advantages are leveraged, SFA activities must be planned and coordinated at all levels with the other SSR-involved actors. SFA directly contributes to defence reform which is the: transformation or development of defence organizations and institutions, including the appropriate oversight and management bodies, so that they play an effective, legitimate and legally accountable role within the security sector.

SFA enables a host nation (HN) to develop a sustainable capacity and capability that will allow it to defend itself against threats to stability and security.

a. SFA activities can be provided during any phase of an operation and across the full range of military operations.

b. SFA activities, require a political, financial, and long-term commitment to develop and improve the HN's capacity and capabilities through generate, organize, train, enable, advise and mentor (GOTEAM) activities.[34]

c. SFA transition, which is the progressive transfer of security responsibilities and functions to HN is an essential part of SFA and must be planned from the very beginning of a SFA mission/operation.

The effects of SFA must be sustainable beyond NATO forces (and other contributing actors) departing the HN. In line with the HN resources that are going to be available in the future to ensure sustainability, planning for SFA activities must consider HN capabilities in the long-term.

Any sustainable SFA solution may be part of a larger security sector reform process (where this exists) considering the whole security sector and based on political, social and economic structures and processes.

SFA can be a key enabler in NATO operations by generating, employing, and sustaining local forces in support of a legitimate authority. NATO may not be the only organization providing assistance to develop local forces or otherwise contributing to stabilization and reconstruction in the region. Therefore, commanders must ensure that coordination measures are in place to synchronize activities, mitigate gaps and reduce redundancies.

[34] See AJP-3.16. The SFA framework is the non-linear, collective application of SFA planning, SFA activities, SFA assessment and SFA transition by NATO forces to assist with the development of competent, capable and sustainable, committed, confident and accountable local forces. NATO forces conducting SFA may be required to develop local forces along a single line of operation, multiple lines of effort, or across a combination of SFA activities.

B.36. **Stability Policing**[35]. While SFA activity is developed to address the need to train and develop indigenous military security forces, the need to address local law enforcement agencies is filled by Stability Policing (SP) activity in circumstances that preclude relevant national or international organizations from immediately undertaking that responsibility. SP is a set of police related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace indigenous police to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights.

a. SP activities are conducted with the aim of establishing a SASE, restoring public security, and establishing the conditions for meeting longer-term needs with respect to governance and development, in particular through SSR. This can include (re)establishing law and order and reinforcing the rule of law.

b. SP should be conducted by specialized assets, which are police trained and equipped. SP assets are specialized in the field of maintaining public order, public safety and law enforcement. This may be accomplished by the replacement or reinforcing of indigenous police forces.[36] In some situations the SP forces can be tailored to their environment. In many theatres there have been, for example, constabularies for the guarding of cultural sites, contributing to general C-SASE.

c. The natural providers of resources devoted to SP activities are gendarmerie-type forces and military police when operating in a hostile or uncertain environment. Due to the police and military nature of these forces, they share the general mind-set and operational procedures of the military force they are part of and can easily be integrated in the military missions. Others who may be involved in SP include combat and support component of coalition forces. Gendarmerie-type forces and military police forces are not the only forces who can conduct these tasks. Most of these tasks can also be conducted by conventional forces in the initial stage but should transition to SP elements as soon as possible. During the transition, there may be a combination of conventional and SP elements forces in doing these tasks.

B.37. **Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration**. While DDR is often a long process which may stretch well beyond the stabilization phase, it is likely to begin during stabilization. There is a risk, however, that enacting DDR prematurely in the absence of a political agreement may prove highly destabilising. It is essential to establish, from the onset, a comprehensive transition plan, that provides for:

- Plans for DDR of members of armed groups.

[35] See AJP-3.22 Stability Policing

[36] Under the police perspective, SP is conducted under two main mission types: the replacement or the reinforcing of indigenous police forces. Replacement is essential when the indigenous police or a recognized government are non-existent. Reinforcing is required when the indigenous police are existing and reliable, but their effectiveness is limited.

- Withdrawing support to armed groups slowly and, in parallel, ensuring the DDR plan is being implemented.

- Ensuring that most weapons and other means of warfare are fully accounted for.

- Assessing the risk to members of armed groups and their families or communities, once the conflict ends or support is finished or withdrawn and taking all feasible measures to mitigate this risk.

a. Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of former combatants, belligerents, and the local population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes. Ideally, disarmament is a voluntary process carried out as part of a broader peace process. Disarmament functions best with high levels of trust between those being disarmed and the forces overseeing disarmament. Some groups may hesitate to offer trust and cooperation or even refuse to participate in disarmament efforts. In these circumstances, disarmament may occur in two stages: a voluntary disarmament process followed by more coercive measures. The latter will address individuals or small groups refusing to participate voluntarily. In this second stage, disarmament of combatant factions can become a contentious and potentially very destabilizing step of DDR. Military forces should manage disarmament carefully to avoid renewed violence. Women and girls must have equal access to secure disarmament sites to ensure that gendered stereotypes of weapons ownership are not reinforced. Prominent inclusion of women in disarmament activities can strengthen women's profile and leadership roles in the public sphere. Women's knowledge and awareness of disarmament should also be linked to the promotion of their broader political participation and involvement in community development.

b. Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). Cantonment sites should implement gender segregation where needed (e.g.: reception centre allows women to register separately, separate facilities) as well as offer gender-specific services (e.g., reproductive, and psychosocial health services tailored for women, education for women and girls about their rights). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion. In many societies, women and children are active participants in violent conflict. During demobilization, separate facilities are necessary for adults and children, if children should, to all extent feasible, be maintained with their families.[37] Additionally, child soldiers require specific services including health, education, food, assistance with livelihood development, and reintegration into communities. SSR programmes must adequately address demobilization to avoid re-emerging violence from combatant groups

[37] UN Convention on the Right of the Child, Art. 9 and 10

or organized criminals. Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment, and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs and can last up to one year.

c. Reintegration is the process whereby former combatants or belligerents receive amnesty and they, together with refugees and internally displaced persons, re-enter civil society. Reintegration is a recovery process focused on the social and economic areas of the local community; it complements other community-based programmes that create job training, employment, and general economic recovery. Reintegration cannot be separated from justice and reconciliation programmes that are part of the broader reform process. Successful reintegration programmes are typically long term and costly, requiring the participation of multiple external and host-nation SSR actors. It is part of the general development of a country and national responsibility.

B.38. Military forces are likely to be involved following an intervention, leading to the eventual transition of security responsibilities to the HN. A role military forces may play in an intervention is to support the process of DDR, but while the military may be involved in supporting disarmament and demobilisation, they will rarely be involved with reintegration as it is almost an entirely civilian activity. DDR usually forms part of a peace agreement and is conducted within the wider post-conflict recovery process. DDR seeks to increase the stability of the post-conflict security environment by ensuring that combatants, and their weapons, are taken out of the conflict and provided with at least a minimal transition package so that they can return to their civilian life and forego returning to arms. The complex DDR process has dimensions that include culture, politics, security, humanity, and socioeconomics. Consideration in DDR must also be given to women and children both combatants and those associated with armed groups. These people along with their adult male colleagues must also be offered alternative livelihoods.

B.39. While the process is focused on the ex-combatants, the wider community will also feel the benefits of a successful DDR programme that enhances security and is a clear sign of progress to peace. However, communities will require assistance to successfully absorb such ex-combatants. If combatants are disarmed too quickly then this may create a security vacuum, if they are detained for too long in encampments this may create unrest. Without a fully funded re-integration programme, militia leaders may simply re-form their groups for criminal purposes, creating a new security problem. Gender perspective, child-soldier, and ethnic and minority issues should also be considered in the design of DDR programmes. Beyond the immediate goal of reducing the number of weapons and combatants, DDR should be coordinated with SSR to appropriately scope the armed forces to the security requirements of the HN. Typically, a DDR programme transitions from disarmament and demobilization to reintegration.

B.40. Effective DDR planning relies on the analysis of possible DDR beneficiaries, power dynamics, and local society as well as the nature of the conflict and ongoing peace processes. DDR planners must have a clear understanding of the legal, political, economic and social context of the DDR programme and how it affects women and girls, both in the armed groups and in the receiving communities. This includes assessment of gendered needs as well as how those needs will be addressed in site design, services provided, transportation, and personnel resources (e.g., women translators and field staff). External and host-nation military forces and police working together in a peace support role may facilitate DDR. Former combatants must develop confidence in DDR and the organizations charged with implementing it. To build this confidence, the DDR programme focuses on restoring the society, the government, and the economy at all levels. This leads to the HN taking responsibility for DDR processes. Some former combatants will be incorporated into the HN security forces, while others may not.

B.41. The military should not lead the planning and execution of the DDR programme. However, military forces should be integrated in the planning of DDR from its inception and may be involved more directly in the disarmament and demobilization stages. Military forces and police, whether from external sources or the HN, are fundamental to the broad success of the programme by providing security for DDR processes. Successful DDR programmes use many approaches designed for specific security environments. Each programme reflects the unique aspects of the situation, culture, and character of the state. International DDR approaches should comply with “The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups”, also known as The Paris Principles. The staff legal advisor provides advice to commanders on the legal implications of dealing with children who are associated with armed groups. Distribution of benefits should enable women and girls to have the same economic choices as men and boys. This requires knowledge of women’s rights (e.g., regarding property ownership) as well as social attitudes relating to women’s access to economic resources. Support must take address women’s and girls’ substantive and logistical training needs as well as broader gender roles and identities, ensuring that transitional support packages do not reinforce negative gender stereotypes or provoke CR-SGBV.

B.42. **Reconciliation**. Stability activities are often conducted in situations where there have been human rights abuses and social trauma to include the misappropriation of lands, property and cultural property. Reconciliation is led by the HN and supported by the international community. The tasks of promoting justice, psychological relief, and reconciliation are challenging and time consuming, but the objective of achieving reconciliation is key to establishing a sustainable peace. In the reconciliation process itself, the military commander normally has no tasks. Reconciliation can include the restitution and/or repatriation of cultural property looted from the HN which NATO forces may have recovered from within or without the HN country.

B.43. Institutional capacities in relation to structures, personnel, equipment and resources to provide effective security, should be able to be maintained and sustained by the HN government.

B.44. A critical issue is the relationship of the military and law enforcement in providing internal security to the state. In most post-conflict situations, appropriate distinctions between military and law enforcement roles and missions may have eroded or disappeared entirely. A fundamental task of defence reform may be to restore that distinction and to provide robust mechanisms to sustain their separation.

B.45. **Transfer of Authority**. Transferring security responsibility from intervening to HN security forces should be done according to the tactical, operational, and strategic conditions identified during SSR planning. As forces establish suitable conditions, responsibility for security gradually transitions to the local, provincial, and national government. The transition of authority should include an evaluation process that confirms the performance and capabilities of each respective HN security force before authority is transferred. These capabilities can be gauged through exercises similar to those used to validate the readiness of Alliance forces for contingency operations. This prevents a premature transition of authority which can lead to a loss of confidence and cause the population to seek alternative means of security, damaging the overall SSR programme.

B.46. Once Alliance and HN military forces have stabilized the security environment other participating agencies, organizations, and institutions can safely begin activities in the theatre of operations. Military forces gradually transfer the responsibilities they have retained during combat operations to other participants in the SSR effort, either from one military force to another, or to civilian groups or agencies. Transitions allow the military force to focus their efforts on their primary tasks of securing the HN and building up HN security forces. The HN may wish to build up a broad and long-term relationship with the Alliance with the aim to develop a programme of cooperation. This will help the HN to take full responsibility of its own security. The programme may include specially tailored activities for HN participants and NATO or other Allied teams to provide expert advice on specific issues related to SSR.

Lexicon

Part I – Acronyms and abbreviations

AAP	Allied Administrative Publication
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
BI	building integrity
C2	command and control
CIE	collaborative information environment
CIMIC	civil-military cooperation
CMI	civil-military interaction
COIN	counterinsurgency
COPD	Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive
CUOE	Comprehensive Understanding of the Operational Environment
CP	cultural property
CPP	cultural property protection
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DSF	district stability framework
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
EU	European Union
GTF	Gendarmerie Type Forces
HA	humanitarian assistance
HN	host nation
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross

IO	international organization
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
JFC	Joint Force Command
LOAC	law of armed conflict
LOC	line of communication
MC	Military Committee
MIC	Multinational Interoperability Council
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NGO	non-governmental organization
NOAH	NATO Operations Assessment Handbook
OE	operational environment
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PMC	private military company
PMESII	political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information
PMSC	private military security company
PSC	private security company
QIP	quick impact project
SASE	safe and secure environment
SFA	security force assistance
SOFA	status of forces agreement
SOI	sources of instability
SP	stability policing
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSR	security sector reform

STANAG	NATO standardization agreement
StratCom	strategic communications
TCN	troop-contributing nation
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

Part II – Terms and Definitions

allied joint publication

An Allied publication containing doctrine applicable to NATO and NATO-led operations involving more than one service.
(NATO Agreed)

assessment

The process of estimating the capabilities and performance of organizations, individuals, materiel or systems.
(NATO Agreed)
Note: In the context of military forces, the hierarchical relationship in logical sequence is assessment, analysis, evaluation, validation and certification.

civil-military cooperation

A military joint function that integrates the understanding of the civil factors of the operating environment and that enables, facilitates and conducts civil-military interaction to support the accomplishment of missions and military strategic objectives in peacetime, crisis and conflict.
(NATO Agreed)

civil-military interaction

Activities between NATO military bodies and non-military actors to foster mutual understanding that enhances effectiveness and efficiency in crisis management and conflict prevention and resolution.
(NATO Agreed)

conflict prevention

A peace support effort to identify and monitor the potential causes of conflict and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.
(NATO Agreed)

counter-insurgency

A comprehensive civilian and military effort to isolate and defeat an insurgency, create a safe and secure environment, address core grievances, and to enable the promotion of legitimate governance and rule of law.
(NATO Agreed)

cultural property

Cultural property includes monuments, fine arts, archives, buildings, archaeology and more.
(Article 1 of the Hague Convention 1954)
(Not NATO Agreed)

cultural property protection

Armed Forces have the legal obligation to respect and protect cultural property during the conduct of military operations. CPP impacts on reputation, influence, force protection, threat finance, cultural understanding and post-conflict recovery as well as the prevention of damage, destruction and looting to CP.
(Not NATO Agreed)

gendarmerie-type force

An armed force established for enforcing the laws and that, on its national territory, permanently and primarily conducts its activities for the benefit of the civilian population.
(NATO Agreed)

host nation

A country that, by agreement:
a. receives forces and materiel of NATO member states or other countries operating on/from or transiting through its territory;
b. allows materiel and/or NATO and other organizations to be located on its territory; and/or
c. provides support for these purposes.
(NATO Agreed)

humanitarian aid

The resources needed to directly alleviate human suffering.
(NATO Agreed)

information environment

An environment comprised of the information itself, the individuals, organizations and systems that receive, process and convey the information, and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs.
(NATO Agreed)

internally displaced person

A person who, as part of a mass movement, has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or place of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violation of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognized State border.
(NATO Agreed)

international organization

An intergovernmental, regional, or global organization governed by international law and established by a group of states, with international juridical personality given by international agreement, however characterized, creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of fulfilling a given function and pursuing common aims.
(NATO Agreed)
Note: Exceptionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross, although a non-governmental organization formed under the Swiss Civil Code, is mandated by the international community of states and is founded on international law, specifically the Geneva Conventions, has an international legal personality or status on its own, and enjoys some immunities and privileges for the fulfilment of its humanitarian mandate.

law enforcement officer

Public sector employee or agent whose duties involve the enforcement of laws. Examples include police officers, corrections officers, customs officers, special agents, immigration officers, and court bailiffs.
(Not NATO Agreed)

military engineering

A function in support of operations to shape the physical operation environment.
(NATO Agreed).
Note: It is an inherent aspect of each joint function at all levels of command, in any mission, campaign or operation, and in all phases. It achieves the desired objectives by enabling or preventing manoeuvre or mobility and developing, maintaining and improving infrastructure. MILENG incorporates areas of expertise such as engineering, EOD, Environmental Protection, military search and management of infrastructure including contracted civil engineering. MILENG also makes a significant contribution to C-IED, protecting the force and providing life support. (MC 0560)

military police

Designated military forces with the responsibility and authorization for the enforcement of the law and maintaining order, as well as the provision of operational assistance through assigned doctrinal functions. (NATO Agreed)

non-governmental organization

A private, not for profit, voluntary organization with no governmental or intergovernmental affiliation, established for the purpose of fulfilling a range of activities in particular development-related projects or the promotion of a specific cause, and organized at local, national, regional or international level.
(NATO Agreed)
Notes:
1. A non-governmental organization does not necessarily have an official status or mandate for its existence or activities.
2. NATO may or may not support or cooperate with a given non-governmental organization.

operation

A sequence of coordinated actions with a defined purpose.
(NATO Agreed)

operational level

The level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.
(NATO Agreed)

refugee

Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
(NATO Agreed)

security force assistance

All activities that develop and improve, or directly support, local forces and their associated institutions.
(NATO Agreed)

stability policing

Police-related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace the indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights.
(NATO agreed)

strategic level

The level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them.
(NATO Agreed)

AJP-3.28(A)(1)