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ATP-3.7.2

**NATO MILITARY POLICE GUIDANCE
AND PROCEDURES**

Edition A Version 1

JUNE 14



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED TACTICAL PUBLICATION

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
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

25 June 2014

1. The enclosed Allied Tactical Publication ATP-3.7.2, Edition A, Version 1 NATO Military Police Guidance and Procedures, which has been approved by the nations in the MCLSB, is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2226.
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Director NATO Standardization Agency

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Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Database for the complete list of existing reservations.

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PREFACE

01. AIM OF THE PUBLICATION

a. This publication is intended to provide procedural guidance to the commanders and staffs of multinational Military Police (MP) organizations employed in a NATO coalition environment. The publication also provides a framework for cooperation between national MP organizations operating within a NATO coalition environment. Finally this publication provides information to the commanders and staffs of multinational NATO formations on the tasks and capabilities of MP.

b. This will encompass the full spectrum of activities from peacetime engagement to major combat operations.

c. This document is intended to complement AJP 3.2.3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police.

02. REFERENCES

a. STANAG 2296 (AJP-3.2.3.3.): Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Police.

b. STANAG 2085: NATO Combined Military Police (NCMP).

c. ACO Handbook on Treatment and Handling of Captured Persons.

d. STANAG 2195 (AJP-2.5) Allied Joint Doctrine for Captured Persons, Materiel and Documents.

e. STANAG 2454, 2455, 2456 - AMovP 1, 2, 3: Mobility Support Issues.

f. AAP-6 – NATO Glossary for Terms and Definitions of Military Significance.

g. NATO MP KEY SKILLS STANDARDS and NATO NATIONS MP CAPABILITIES MATRICES: as a standalone document they will be reviewed independently every year by the NATO MP Chiefs Conference but are directly linked to this publication.

03. AGREEMENT

a. Participating nations agree to consider that the term NATO Military Police may include forces composed of both NATO nations and non-NATO nations that are contributing to a NATO-led operation.

b. The custodian for this publication is Allied Command of Operations (ACO) Provost Marshal

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NATO MILITARY POLICE GUIDANCE AND PROCEDURES

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CHAPTER 1

ORGANIZATION AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES

101. AIM

a. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the Military Police (MP) as an organization within NATO and provide some guiding principles that will help focus their employment within NATO under joint or combined operations. For the purpose of this publication, NATO MP will refer to both NCMP and TCN MP.

b. This chapter will also set the doctrinal framework for the follow-on chapters of this publication by providing the parameters for which MP forces under NATO are to be employed within the following operations:

- (1) Mobility Support Operations;
- (2) Security Operations;
- (3) Detention Operations;
- (4) Police Operations; and
- (5) Stability Police Operations.

102. APPLICATION

Participating nations agree to use STANAG 2226 – NATO MP Guidance and Procedures as being the NATO authority given to all MP assigned to NATO as part of a NATO Combined MP (NCMP) Unit or as a Troop Contributing Nation (TCN) MP Unit.

103. AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION

a. **National Powers and Authorities.** NATO MP retain national powers of arrest, apprehension or detention and authority over those members of the Force who are subject to their national law.

b. **Technical Arrangement.** A technical arrangement for the enforcement of discipline and investigative procedures by MP on NATO operations is required to detail the procedures for dealing with, and investigating, breaches in discipline and incidents of interest where it is not possible to deal with them solely on a national basis. Further information on the matter is covered throughout chapter 5 – Police Operations.

c. **Jurisdiction.** The authority and powers of NCMP acting on behalf of a commander appointed within NATO differ when:

- (1) Formations of one or more NATO forces are stationed or moving on the territory of a member state; or

(2) Formations of several NATO forces are conducting multinational operations outside the territorial jurisdiction of NATO member states.

d. NATO MP personnel have jurisdiction over all members and vehicles/equipment of the Force within the designated theatre of operations for the mission. This jurisdiction extends to, but is not limited to, all installations and infrastructures under the authority of NATO. In addition to NATO operations, MP have jurisdiction within their own national territory as prescribed by their national law, and outside their own territory, MP may exercise their authority in accordance with an agreed Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) or other binding agreement conferred by the Host Nation (HN).

e. **NATO Combined MP Chief Authority.** The NCMP Chief will be given sufficient authority, by the NATO Force Commander, to execute operational command and control over all MP allocated resources. The NCMP Chief could be double hatted as the Force Provost Marshal. He is responsible for establishing MP requirements and coordinating MP planning support within his area of responsibility.

f. **Authority during NATO Led Exercises.** NATO conducts combined joint exercises within NATO countries. As such, a NCMP Commander or Force Provost Marshal should be appointed from the receiving state on behalf of the Force. This will allow for proper coordination with civilian and military authorities of the state in addition to the planning and coordination of all NATO MP missions.

g. **Authority for NATO HQ.** NATO HQ located within a NATO State, a Provost Marshal shall be appointed and should be generated by the HN MP.

104. LIAISON

a. NATO MP will be expected to conduct liaison between the Force and HN/Receiving State at each level of command. Coordination for liaison with HN/Receiving State will be the responsibility of the Force Provost Marshal or of the NCMP Commander. The primary purpose for liaison is to resolve problems that may develop and to ensure open lines of communication between the Force and the HN/Receiving State. When conducting liaison with local, UN mandated, or international legislative bodies on immediate matters, MP must ensure that the matters affecting policy have been authorized by NATO.

b. As part of liaison with HN/Receiving State, if there is no SOFA in place, there should be discussions on what is expected from both parties should a member of the Force be taken into civilian custody and handover agreements. This liaison should lead to the implementation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that both parties are to respect in such cases.

c. To properly conduct effective liaison, language qualifications, knowledge of MP doctrine and HN/Receiving State culture will be extremely important. As such, the use of interpreters and Local Cultural Advisors (LCA) must be considered.


105. PRINCIPLES

- a. When deploying forces with NATO, TCN should issue appropriate directives that recognize NATO or other TCN MP as an authoritative body and direct their personnel with the following:
 - (1) All members of the Force/TCN, to include civilian component deployed, are to obey the orders of the NATO MP;
 - (2) All members of the Force are, at the request of the NATO MP in uniform or with proper identification, to stop and produce their formal identification card; and
 - (3) NATO MP have the authority to stop and direct Force members driving motor vehicles.
- b. A Force Provost Marshal shall be nominated for each operation and have the authority over those MP assigned to that operation.
- c. On all NATO operations sufficient MP forces should be allocated by each TCN to be allocated at all levels of command to accomplish assigned missions.
- d. MP assets while on NATO missions may be structured by a lead nation, framework nation or role specialist nation.
- e. NCMP Commanders or Force Provost Marshals will have or receive sufficient assets to accomplish operational and staff functions.

106. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

- a. **General.** NATO MP Organizations will be required at all levels of command to provide the requisite specialist advice to commanders and their staffs. In general, an Office of the Provost Marshal or a MP Staff will be located within each of the following levels of command:
 - (1) Strategic Level – This level will have a dedicated Office of the Provost Marshal providing specialist advice to the commander and staff;
 - (2) Operational Level – This level will have a dedicated Office of the Provost Marshal providing specialist advice to the commander and staff while coordinating MP effects as part of NATO-led coalition operations; and
 - (3) Tactical Level – Depending on the complexity of MP operations or the number of nationalities providing MP assets to the Force, this level may or may not have an Office of the Provost Marshal coordinating tactical MP activities. At the tactical level, the NCMP Chief and their staff should be double hatted to also act as the Force Provost Marshal.
- b. **Organization.** MP Organizations are categorized into two main organizations:


- (1) Office of the Provost Marshal. The Provost Marshal is responsible to the commander as a specialist advisor on matters involving the MP, the rule of law, and act as a coordination centre. His Office should be configured as follows:



- (2) NCMP Unit. It will be tasked tailored to the mission and vary in size and composition to cover one or more MP operational functions. It should be staffed with sufficient personnel and resources to accomplish the operational and staff functions:

c. **Functions.** NCMP Chiefs and Force Provost Marshals will be responsible for the following:

- (1) Advise the Force Commander and other staff about MP capabilities. This involves having direct access to the commander and have representation within the NATO Staff HQ;
- (2) Coordinate all MP activities and operations;



- (3) Assist and supervise interaction of supported and supporting units;
- (4) Review current MP operations;
- (5) Perform liaison; and
- (6) Plan and supervise:
 - (a) Mobility Support Operations,
 - (b) Security Operations,
 - (c) Detention Operations,
 - (d) Police Operations, and
 - (e) Stability Police Operations.

107. SKILLS AND CAPABILITIES

- a. **Individual Skills.** NATO MP deployed within a coalition will be expected to be interoperable in a multinational environment. One of these expectations will be to have all MP possess a minimum set of individual police skills as identified in the yearly **NATO MP Key Skills Standards** approved by the NATO MP Chiefs Conference. Specific standards in achieving the set of individual police skills will be set by each TCN in accordance with national expectations. Understanding that specific standards will differ inevitably by TCN, the NCMP Commander or Force Provost Marshal may direct in-theatre training to bridge skills that may require a common standard (e.g. hand signals while conducting traffic control).
- b. **Capabilities.** NATO MP as a whole can provide a wide range of capabilities to the Force. Each TCN MP may or may not possess the full spectrum of capabilities. When generating a NCMP Unit, it will be critical to understand what each TCN MP can bring as a capability. As such, the NATO MP Chiefs Conference will issue on a yearly basis **NATO Nations MP Capabilities Matrices**, separate to this publication, identifying the MP capabilities of each NATO nation as identified to the conference.

108. MILITARY POLICE IDENTIFIERS

- a. NATO MP personnel while on duty will wear visible appropriate MP identifiers as part of their national uniform. Annex A provides the accepted standards for uniform identifiers. Only visibly identified MP have the authorities prescribed herein.
- b. NCMP Unit vehicles will be visibly marked with appropriate MP identifiers, and equipped with emergency lights and sirens. Annex A provides the accepted standards for MP vehicle/equipment identifiers.

CHAPTER 2

MOBILITY SUPPORT OPERATIONS

201. AIM

The aim of Mobility Support Operations (MSO) is to ensure effective and controlled movement of military traffic, as ordered by the Force Commander and executed by the NATO Military Police (MP). MP facilitate movement along lines of communication to ensure the freedom of manoeuvre throughout NATO areas of operation (AOO).

202. INTRODUCTION

a. NATO MP should be empowered to carry out MSO in any AOO assigned to them. These powers could apply to civilians (if authorised by technical agreements with HN)

b. The drivers of military vehicles will be ordered by their respective national superiors to comply with the directives of the NATO MP involved in MSO.

c. The activities of the MP consist of planning, monitoring, traffic and personnel control to include:

- (1) Traffic control, road reconnaissance and observation as well as advising in matters related to troops and personnel movement;
- (2) Collection and analysis of reconnaissance information together with its dissemination to commanders, cooperation with other authorities responsible for law enforcement and public order in the AOO;
- (3) Organising entries and exits from/to AOO; and
- (4) Carrying out tasks aimed at determining persons responsible for causing accidents and traffic hold ups.

203. FUNCTIONS

a. **Movement Planning.** MP assist the commander during the production of movement plans. This planning involves the preparation for execution of tactical marches and administrative movement of military forces, as well as population movements on military routes. MP support movement planning through the performance of the following tasks:

- (1) Route reconnaissance in cooperation with engineers and logisticians;
- (2) Advise on the requirement for traffic control; and
- (3) Liaise with local authorities and allied MP to assist the movement function.

b. **Movement Control.** The purpose of movement control is to maintain a free flow of traffic by:

- (1) Regulating movement on prescribed routes;
- (2) Preventing unauthorized military, civilian and refugee traffic from interfering with scheduled movement;
- (3) Finding suitable detours and directing traffic if the principle route becomes blocked; and
- (4) Monitoring current movement progress and reporting as required to the responsible commander.

204. PRINCIPLES

a. During peace time the responsibility of MSO lays with the receiving state and its road traffic and police authorities. Changes in competencies are to be settled by agreements and contracts on an individual basis in a close relationship with local civilian and military authorities of the receiving state.

b. The NATO MP Commander employs his MP forces independently or in co-operation with the military movement control organisation. Further details are provided in AmovP-1 to 3.

c. NATO MP representatives should be provided at:

- (1) The Joint Transport Co-ordination Centre (JTCC), the agency of the respective superior NATO command authority, which, if required, is responsible for planning and regulating specific movements in a certain theatre; and
- (2) The National Movement Control Centre (NMCC), the agency which coordinates and de-conflicts road movements, problems on Lines of Communication and interfaces with Host Nation (HN) police.

d. NATO MP take measures to support area damage control before, during and after hostile actions or natural and manmade disasters. MP provide support that includes, but is not limited to, circulation control, refugee control, straggler control, NBC detecting and reporting.

e. NATO MP support the manoeuvre and mobility functions by expediting forward and lateral movement of combat resources and by conducting security missions to include:

- (1) Route Reconnaissance and Surveillance. This includes continually monitoring the condition of Main Supply Routes (MSR)– identifying restricting terrain, effects of weather on routes, damage to routes, NBC contamination and the

presence of the enemy. It also includes identifying ASRs (Alternate Supply Routes) when required. Report observations, maintain surveillance, and develop the enemy situation. Identify possible routes and alternates, monitor the condition of roads and keep routes clear for vital military movements;

- (2) Circulation Control and MSR Regulation Enforcement and Security. This includes enforcing the command's highway regulation and traffic circulation plans to keep MSRs free for resupply operations. NATO MP expedite traffic in MSRs through the following activities: Traffic Control Points (TCP), roadblocks, checkpoints, holding areas, defiles at critical points and placement of temporary route signs and gather information on friendly and enemy activity by use of mobile teams;
- (3) Dislocated Civilian and Straggler Control. Dislocated civilian control operations are the responsibility of Civilian Military Co-operation (CIMIC) and HN authorities. They assist, direct or deny the movement of civilians whose location, direction of movement or actions may hinder operations. When encountering stragglers, NATO MP performing circulation control (mobile patrols, TCPs, and checkpoints) return stragglers to military control. If there is no effective national government, NATO MP should be empowered to enforce law toward civilians; and
- (4) Area Damage Control Operations (ADCO). NATO MP conduct ADCO before, during and after hostile actions or natural and manmade disasters. NATO MP planning and support considerations include but are not limited to:
 - (a) Traffic control, refugee and straggler control, and reporting,
 - (b) Supporting the manoeuvre and mobility functions by expediting forward and lateral movement of combat resources and by conducting security missions,
 - (c) Continually monitoring the condition of MSRs – identifying restricting terrain, effects of weather on routes, damage to routes, NBC contamination and presence of the enemy,
 - (d) Identifying ASRs and other routes as required and monitoring the condition of roads,
 - (e) Enforcing the command's highway regulation and traffic circulation plans to keep MSRs free for resupply operations, and
 - (f) Conducting TCP, roadblocks, checkpoints, holding areas, defiles at critical points and placement of temporary route signs in order to expedite traffic;
- (5) Traffic Control. Traffic control consists of regulating and limiting traffic flow through TCP, roadblocks, radar checks, etc. or of reconnaissance and road

control, refugee control, cooperation with local Police, conveying, escorting of heavy equipment and carrying out cases related to traffic events.

205. OTHER TASKS HAVING INFLUENCE ON MSO

- a. Enforcement of the military discipline.
- b. Security operations.
- c. Protection of the public order on areas and military installations and in public places as well as military routes.
- d. Preventing committing crimes and offences – road traffic safety, drug and alcohol prophylaxis.
- e. Cooperation with local appropriate services in matters of the safety.
- f. Carrying out the control of the road traffic, piloting military columns.
- g. Escorting and/or protecting vehicles, persons, documents and military possessions.

CHAPTER 3

SECURITY OPERATIONS

301. AIM

The aim of this chapter is to provide a common understanding of the tasks, which NATO Military Police (MP) may be required to conduct during NATO Security Operations under joint or combined security conditions.

302. INTRODUCTION

a. NATO MP conduct Security Operations in order to protect the Force, secure identified critical sites and enable themselves and other forces to manoeuvre. The synchronization of NATO MP into security efforts and defence planning must be considered prior to and throughout every phase of any operation in order to ensure that support, sustainment, and Security Operations are not interrupted. NATO MP operations such as Area Security, Physical Security, Personnel Security, Close Protection and Information Security allow the MP to continually enforce and impose order for commanders at every level.

b. NATO MP are well trained and suited to conduct Security Operations due to their extensive mobility and communications capability. While security remains a command responsibility, NATO MP contribute to the overall security environment by supervising, guiding, assessing, and leading security functions in order to support commanders throughout the duration of any operation.

303. AREA SECURITY

a. NATO MP perform Area Security Operations throughout an area of responsibility to protect critical functions and obtain detailed information concerning terrain and threat activity. NATO MP's significant mobility and training enables them to provide one of the best means to conduct area security throughout an area of operation (AOO). Types of Area Security Operations are: Area Reconnaissance, Zone Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Screening Operations, Counter Incursion Operations (Rear Operations), and Counter-Reconnaissance.

b. **Area Reconnaissance.** Area reconnaissance is performed to obtain detailed information concerning the terrain or threat activity within a prescribed area, or any terrain critical to the operations. NATO MP conduct area reconnaissance to help guard against unexpected threats to the Force in the AOO. Area reconnaissance is vital to maintaining security and contributes to the commander's intelligence collection plan. NATO MP area reconnaissance is a composition of actions. It is initiated from observations and reports gathered over time by NATO MP patrols and information gained through coordination with Host Nation (HN) police and other friendly forces:

(1) Area Reconnaissance efforts should focus on, but are not limited to:

(a) Known high-crime rate areas,

- (b) Smuggling/Trafficking routes,
- (c) Identified or named areas of interest,
- (d) Critical terrain features, and
- (e) High-value assets.

(2) Area Reconnaissance considerations include but are not limited to:

- (a) Commander's critical information requirements,
- (b) Size and number of reconnaissance objectives,
- (c) Requirements to secure objectives (if any),
- (d) Time and personnel allocated for mission, and
- (e) HN police patrol plans.

c. **Zone Reconnaissance.** Zone reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning all routes, obstacles (to include chemical or radiological contamination), terrain, and threats within a zone defined by boundaries. A zone reconnaissance is normally assigned when the threat situation is vague or information concerning cross-country manoeuvre is desired. Zone reconnaissance techniques include the use of moving elements, stationary teams, or a series of area reconnaissance actions.

d. **Surveillance operations.** NATO MP conduct surveillance operations in support of the commander's intelligence collection plan. Static teams, mobile patrols or a combined effort are used to maintain visibility on critical terrain, avenues of approach or high threat activity areas. Although the capability for NATO MP to conduct surveillance is available, other alternatives during initial phases of combat operations are better suited for static position surveillance (unmanned aerial vehicles or other reconnaissance forces). Ideally, the NATO MP conduct surveillance operations in close coordination with HN police to detect and eliminate criminal activity throughout the AOO in order to promote stability and reinforce HN authority.

e. **Screening Operations.** NATO MP conduct screening operations for friendly forces in the rear area (linear or contiguous battle field) to provide early warning of enemy approach and to provide real-time information and reaction time for stationary units. NATO MP can also conduct screening operations as part of a mobility clearance package (Engineer or EOD assets) by determining threat activities or gathering intelligence in and around a particular area or designated route.

f. **Counter Incursion Operations (Rear Operations).** NATO MP support Counter Incursion Operations in order to support the Command and Control (C2) and logistic requirements to sustain the battle as well as actions conducted during stability and

support operations. Rear operations assure freedom of manoeuvre and continuity of operations. The forward movement of units and sustainment (both essential parts of rear operations) are critical if units are to maintain the initiative necessary for successful offensive operations. The enemy looks for opportunities to strike deep into rear areas in an attempt to rob the Force Commander of initiative, flexibility and agility.

- (1) Threat Level. Threat activity in the rear area may be divided into three levels. The specific levels are defined by a unit's capability to defeat the threat against it. Rear operations plans anticipate contending with all levels of threat. With organic firepower, the NATO MP are capable of engaging in decisive operations against a Level II threat and delaying (shaping) a Level III threat until commitment of the TCF.

| <u>THREAT LEVEL</u> | <u>TYPICAL THREAT</u> | <u>RESPONSE NEEDED</u> |
|---------------------|---|---|
| I | Agents, saboteurs, criminals, sympathisers, and terrorists | Unit, base, base cluster, self-defence measures |
| II | Small tactical units, unconventional warfare Forces, guerrillas | Self-defence measures and response forces with supporting fires |
| III | Large tactical force operation, including airborne, heliborne, amphibious, and infiltration | Timely commitment TCF |

g. **Counter-reconnaissance.** NATO MP conduct operations to reduce the enemy/criminal's ability to gather information and conduct activities. It contains both active and passive elements and includes combat action to destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance units and police action to deter or apprehend criminals. While not a distinct mission, the NATO MP activities that support Counter-reconnaissance include:

- (1) Area Reconnaissance;
- (2) Zone Reconnaissance;
- (3) Route Reconnaissance;
- (4) Surveillance;
- (5) Screening Operations;
- (6) Physical Security;
- (7) Critical Site Security; and

(8) Operational Security.

304. PHYSICAL SECURITY

a. Physical security concerns those measures designed to safeguard personnel, equipment, installations, materiel, and documents against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. NATO MP contribute to physical security through the conduct of threat risk analysis, vulnerability assessments and the provision of recommendations to the commander on mitigation strategies. NATO MP can also focus security capabilities on designated (by the Commander) critical sites and/or assets that if compromised, would likely lead to severe mission degradation. NATO MP conduct critical site/asset security operations such as Base & Installation, Convoy, Port, Rail, and Pipeline Security Operations in order to safeguard and prevent unauthorized access to installations, equipment, materiel, and documents.

b. **NATO Base & Installation Security.** NATO MP conduct Base and Installation security by providing multi-functional capabilities in order to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of threats on, or sabotage of, an installation or base to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facility is available to friendly forces. NATO MP apply those measures needed and as directed, throughout all phases of the defence (before, during, and after hostile actions or natural disasters). Mitigation, response and recovery operations are included in the planned phased implementation of NATO MP support to the defence.

(1) Pre-incident support to NATO Base & Installation Security (Mitigation and preparedness) includes:

- (a) Active and passive physical security measures that deter enemy activities,
- (b) Designate Commander critical sites and/or assets
- (c) Biometric capabilities that provide detection and defence capabilities,
- (d) Law and Order operations that enforce prescribed NATO regulations,
- (e) Military Working Dogs (MWD) for detection and deterrence measures. MWD teams are employed with security forces and integrated with other sensors to identify threats, and provide early warning,
- (f) Vulnerability assessments that reinforce current security procedures,
- (g) NATO MP Intelligence Operations (MPIO) that provide real-time situational understanding and awareness, and
- (h) Reconnaissance Operations.

(2) Incident support to NATO Base & Installation Security (Response) includes:

- (a) Response force capabilities that are planned and integrated with larger TCF,
 - (b) Escalated physical security measures,
 - (c) Checkpoint and Roadblock capabilities to secure affected areas,
 - (d) Integrate MWD at checkpoints and for traffic or access control points to detect, deter, and prevent the illicit movement of people or materials,
 - (e) Conduct traffic circulation in and around areas to ensure the needed resources are prioritized for manoeuvre,
 - (f) Continued Police operations (sustainment),
 - (g) Continued NATO MPIO for the Commanders situational awareness,
 - (h) Dislocated civilian and straggler control (Manoeuvre and Mobility Support), and
 - (i) Crowd and Riot control capabilities.
- (3) Post-Incident support to NATO Base & Installation Security (Recovery) includes:
- (a) Assistance and security for the restoration of essential services,
 - (b) Law Enforcement and Biometric support to investigations,
 - (c) Reassessment of enhanced physical security measures,
 - (d) Force protection and threat assessments review,
 - (e) Re-establishing counter-reconnaissance operations,
 - (f) Crowd and Riot control capabilities to control personnel recovery or humanitarian relief operations, and
 - (g) NATO MP assets may also be requested to support VIP visits by conducting traffic control and area security efforts in support of the Close Protection Teams mission.

c. **Convoy Security.** NATO MP conduct convoy security operations in a variety of different methods depending on the threat and materials to be transported. Critical convoys that have mission essential materials without the appropriate defence are viable and high-valued targets for the enemy and therefore become a priority for NATO MP. Whether providing convoy escorts for these types of movements or by maintaining security in the area that a convoy will pass through, NATO MP are well suited to enhance the freedom of movement for the commander. NATO MP may also conduct route security on a specific route for a designated period during which multiple convoys

move unimpeded. Convoy Security planning considerations should include but are not limited to:

- (1) Enemy threats throughout the march. While Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and complex ambushes have proven to be the most popular enemy course of actions (ECOAs); sniper, artillery & mortar fires, aircraft and numerous other threats exist and have to be considered;
- (2) Friendly forces throughout the line of march including NATO aide stations, refuelling points and response forces that cover the routes being travelled;
- (3) Emergency actions in the event of enemy contact must be clarified, explained in depth and rehearsed;
- (4) Recovery operations for damaged or inoperable vehicles throughout the march;
- (5) Convoy speeds and intervals must be identified and rehearsed while considering the loads that each of the vehicles will be carrying;
- (6) Primary and alternate routes that can support convoy size, height, weight and manoeuvrability must be planned even when it may not be the most direct route;
- (7) Special considerations must be given to convoys being escorted that are carrying Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (AA&E). Compliance with HN laws must be met and in the event that no rules are in place safety of the populace should be considered; and
- (8) Release or transfer points when the convoy has reached a secured area or when crossing battle spaces and a transfer to another security force is appropriate or required.

d. **Port Security (Air and Sea).** NATO MP conduct Port Security Operations in support of Area Security missions or in conjunction with other forces. A threat that may distract port operations are likely because of the important logistical advantage a secured port provides to NATO Forces. The primary responsibility to ensure successful port operations do not fall primarily on the NATO MP because of the vast physical security measures that are required, however NATO MP can support Port Security with capabilities that may not be available solely to Port Security forces. In conjunction with Area Security efforts NATO MP provide perimeter security and Cargo Transport Security to Air and Sea Port Operations in a variety of efforts:

- (1) Establishing access control and identification methods in the absence of previously existing or degraded control measures;
- (2) Reinforcing existing access control and identification methods with Check Point and Road Block Operations;

- (3) Using Sensor Systems to protect an important site, base or facility
 - (4) Conducting NATO MPIO that develops information into viable intelligence about the threats operating in and around the port area;
 - (5) Reconnaissance patrols around the perimeter to detect and/or provide early warning of threat activities;
 - (6) MWD presences to deter and detect threat activities around access and perimeter control measures;
 - (7) Traffic control forces around the perimeter enforcing the prioritised and controlled movements in and around the port;
 - (8) Response force capabilities that provide immediate support to threatened areas within or around the perimeter;
 - (9) Thorough inspections (in conjunction with checkpoint operations) of cargo being transported in and out of port areas in order to protect against criminal import/export activity; and
 - (10) Once the transport process begins NATO MP restrict access to sensitive areas by previously listed methods such as access control and roadblocks. Access will be determined by the proper port authority.
- e. **Rail Security.** NATO MP conduct Rail Security Operations in order to secure high value or sensitive military equipment. Rail security is the responsibility of the train commander or shipper but NATO MP integrate into Rail Security Operations when a viable threat has been identified or the sensitivity of the cargo requires additional trained security. Rail Security is not always troop intensive but the outside factors that influence the mission are extensive and must be carefully analysed prior to execution. Planning considerations for Rail Security Operations should include but are not limited to:

- (1) Obtain a detailed threat assessment of the route prior to movement in order to identify likely threats;
- (2) Coordinate with HN Police and NATO Security Forces prior to movement in order to minimize these vulnerable points with additional security. When feasible, a detailed movement plan should be given to NATO Forces responsible for the areas so they can prepare and rehearse response force actions as needed;
- (3) Determine HN and other National border crossing requirements in order to ensure no issues develop at crossing points. If issues are anticipated then coordinate with other NATO MP or HN Police units to assist;
- (4) Safety considerations should be stressed throughout the duration of the mission. A variety of dangers exists depending on the type of trains being used; and

- (5) The number of NATO MP used for Rail Security Operations will depend on the inherent risk posed to the train (sensitivity of the cargo and threat capability), duration of the mission and size of the train.
- f. **Pipeline Security.** NATO MP can conduct dedicated Pipeline Security Operations or as part of an Area Security Operation in order to secure vulnerable portions of pipelines. Pipelines, if not secured, are easy targets for sabotage and could prevent commanders from manoeuvring if pipeline operations are not functioning. Pipelines cross multiples areas of responsibilities and should be parts of all commanders' critical sites and/or assets list. With the extensive distance that pipelines cover it is nearly impossible for NATO MP to secure the entire area. It is essential to identify risk points along the pipeline that are likely to be threatened and where would they most likely have a successful attack, this is where the NATO MP should be employed (above ground pipelines, pumping stations and storage facilities).
- g. **Aviation Security.** The training and selection for these aviation security operations should consist of specially trained MP for the search of dangerous materials that could endanger NATO personnel aboard the aircraft. NATO MP conduct Air Marshalling operations in a theatre of operation in order to secure personnel and cargo aboard military aircraft.

305. PERSONNEL SECURITY

- a. Personnel security is concerned with all personnel-related measures designed to counteract the threat posed by hostile intelligence organizations, subversive groups or individuals. NATO MP (depending on national consideration) contribute to personnel security by the conduct of security vetting and identification control.
- b. **Security Vetting.** NATO MP in coordination with Military Intelligence, HN Police and other authorities conduct security vetting for potential employment of personnel in order to deter, detect and eliminate acts of sabotage, espionage and other security risks. Considerations for Security Vetting should include but are not limited to:
- (1) Local Police criminal record check;
 - (2) Applicants submit Biometric Data (pending on national consideration);
 - (3) Applicants complete an employee questionnaire;
 - (4) Applicants complete an interview and submit references for further validation;
 - (5) Additional checks are conducted via public records and credit agencies; and
 - (6) Medical screening is conducted in order to evaluate the mental state and infectious diseases of the applicant.
- c. **Identification Control.** Identification systems are established at NATO military installation/bases to provide personal recognition through the use of security badges or

cards (possibly Biometrics depending on security levels and national considerations). These systems assist in the security of the installation and control of incoming and outgoing personnel. NATO MP may assist in the identification control in a number of ways. Identification Control considerations should include but are not limited to:

- (1) NATO MP conduct random identification checks on NATO installation/bases or assisting security personnel at entrance and exit points;
- (2) Provide oversight and conduct assessments of the visitor and identification centre (if applicable);
- (3) Conduct random searches of vehicles and personnel in accordance with security level procedures; and
- (4) Augment entry and exit points during high traffic hours or elevated security levels.

306. CLOSE PROTECTION

a. NATO MP may be tasked to conduct and support Close Protection Operations for High Threat Persons (HTP). The mission of HTP/VIP security is to protect high-risk personnel from assassination, kidnapping, injury and embarrassment. Security personnel must be able to react instantly by securing and evacuating high-risk personnel in case of attack. Personnel are likely to be targets because of their rank, assignment, symbolic value, and vulnerabilities. NATO MP must be properly resourced with personnel and equipment and trained to accomplish security missions. Security Teams from each nation may be composed of civilian and/or military personnel depending on the position of the persons being protected. Close Protection is a national interest and will vary from nation to nation.

b. **Advance Teams.** Close Protection Teams may send Advance Teams to conduct reconnaissance operations in the particular AOO, prior to the HTPs visit. Coordination with the NATO MP in the area will help to harmonize movement issues and facilitate additional security concerns (medical stations, call-signs and radio frequencies). It is not unusual for several HTP/VIPs to be in the same AOO at the same time, so communication between NATO MP and Advance Teams is critical in order to ensure a safe and successful visit.

c. **Close Protection Teams.** As stated previously, close protection is primarily a national responsibility and team make-up, size and operating procedures will vary from nation to nation. The HTP/VIP status (civilian or military) will also impact the intangibles of a team. Highly specialized training, weapons, equipment and team selection/cohesion are integral to the team. While many nations utilize MP to make these teams, it is certain that NCMP will support HTP/VIP visits. Planning considerations for Close Protection Operations should include but are not limited to:

- (1) In-depth threat brief of the AOO must be obtained prior to Advance Team arrival to any site. Updated briefs should also be obtained prior to any HTP/VIP movements;

- (2) Utilization of the MWD to sweep meeting areas or briefing rooms prior to the arrival of the HTP/VIP. Once an area is swept it must be secured for the duration of the engagement;
- (3) Reconnaissance Operations will be conducted by Advance Teams. While close coordination must be made with the terrain owner, it is more than likely that the Advance Team will check in with the local NCMP or TCN MP in order to receive the best information for the VIP visit;
- (4) VIP visits usually involve more than one VIP and large entourages, so the number of persons being secured/protected is far more than what a typical Close Protection Team can handle. NCMP and/or TCN MP and/or local forces may be requested to provide additional security to support the large number of personnel; and
- (5) Developing extraction and counter-attack plans with in-location friendly forces to ensure CAT (Counter-Attack Teams) are available for the duration of the visit.

307. INFORMATION SECURITY

a. Information Security deals with organizational, procedural, physical and technical measures designed to safeguard all types of information. This applies to information that is verbal, documentary or electronic form and in any operational environment. Breaches of information security may include, but are not limited to any of the following: unauthorized disclosure, modification, destruction, interruption, or loss. MP may contribute to information security in the form of participation in the accreditation process information system networks and the provision of forensic computer expertise to safeguard against malicious intrusions and to support crime scene protection.

b. **Crime Scene Protection.** NATO MP are trained in Crime Scene Protection. Upon notification of a computer crime or security information violation, NATO MP will likely be the first responders called in order to secure the crime scene and ensure evidence is categorized and not tampered with before other resources (computer forensic experts) can evaluate and process the scene. Considerations for Crime Scene Protection involving computer or Information Security violations include but are not limited to:

- (1) As technologies advance and change, the procedures for securing crime scene must be adapted accordingly;
- (2) Establish a cordon of the area that evidence is likely to be in;
- (3) Ensure the physical security of the scene is adhered to and documented; allowing only those authorized access in and out of the area;
- (4) Protect evidence against destruction from physical elements when applicable to include electronic devices that may not be located within the cordon;

- (5) Other evidence is likely in the area that is non-electronic (i.e. passwords written down, calendars, photos) and must also be protected and documented;
- (6) Photograph the scene when tasked, in order to provide a better evidentiary view of the scene prior to packing and transporting it to another location. Ensure that if a computer is involved that the computer screen is photographed as well as any other parts to the computer; and
- (7) Turn over the crime scene only when you have been properly relieved by a superior MP authority.

CHAPTER 4

DETENTION OPERATIONS

401. AIM

The purpose of this chapter is to provide guidance and principles for detention operations and handling of captured persons (CPers) by NATO Military Police (MP).

402. INTRODUCTION

a. The MP provide specialised planning and advice, oversight and surety for the correct handling and processing of CPers in accordance with applicable international conventions and laws (AJP-3.2.3.3.). Member nations that conduct detention operations are expected to handle and process CPers in accordance with their national responsibilities under the Geneva Conventions using national procedures with regards to handling, control and internment.

b. All detention operations must be conducted in accordance with the provisions set forth by Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (GWS), Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GWS SEA), Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC); and the Hague Conventions.

403. PRINCIPLES FOR DETENTION OPERATIONS

a. **Humane Treatment.** MP are well trained in the law of armed conflict and applicable policies. All CPers must be protected from unlawful acts of violence and deprivation of basic human necessities, and must be detained in a safe and secure environment. While MP must be fair and firm, humane treatment is essential to establish goodwill among CPers and to prevent adversarial relationships between guard forces and the CPers. Standards for humane treatment are derived from the substantive provisions of the Geneva Conventions that provide for the protection of non-combatants, who deserve to be respected, and deserve to be protected at all times.

b. **Close Contact.** The very nature of detention operations places MP in close contact with CPers. Detention operations may place MP in continuous contact with or near insurgents, terrorists, or criminals who will exploit every opportunity to escape and kill or injure NATO personnel or multinational partners.

c. **Care, Custody, and Control.** Detention operations require detailed, advanced planning and execution to provide responsive and thorough care, custody, and control of large quantities of CPers. MP and other armed forces must plan, procure, and provide the necessary resources to care for CPers, to include subsistence, clothing, hygiene, shelter, and transport to appropriate locations. MP may be responsible for providing direct supervision and/or control of CPers to ensure their control, health care and health,

welfare, and safety. MP will be expected to mitigate unlawful or inappropriate actions of others, prevent self-harm, and protect persons under their control.

d. **Accountability.** When given the mission, MP are accountable for CPers, property, evidence, and related documents from the moment of capture until they are released, resettled, repatriated, or transferred to another authority. During detention operations MP are required to document CPers in order to track their property, evidence, and related documents. Accountability must be maintained throughout all activities required for custody; property and evidence control; records management; database management; investigations through legal disposition; and reporting to theater, national, and international organizations (IOs) according to international laws, regulations, and policies.

e. **Segregation.** CPers include numerous types or groups of individuals that must be segregated for a variety of reasons. CPers are segregated based on their legal status (according to the Geneva Convention). Additionally, gender and juveniles within the CPers are typically segregated from the general population. CPers deemed to be juveniles are initially to be segregated from adult CPers but may not remain segregated indefinitely. Female juveniles may be collocated with adult female CPers. The capture of a juvenile is to be reported to the chain of command at the earliest opportunity. CPers may also be segregated by ethnic, tribe and family groups and further segregated to protect vulnerable individuals. Further, CPers may be categorized by behavior (cooperative, neutral, or combative) to accurately resource guards and facilities. Individuals within the CPers may also be segregated to prevent self-harm.

f. **Minimum Force.** MP, guards, and security personnel performing detention operations must use the minimum level of force necessary to protect them and others, prevent escapes, or prevent CPers from self-harm. Commanders carefully balance using applied force when an unlawful activity or civil disturbance occurs, violence escalates, or an escape attempt occurs. MP, guards, and security personnel must apply a measured response when confronting violent and/or noncompliant CPers. Minimum force also applies when using restraints. Individuals who pose an imminent escape risk or are identified as a potential threat to themselves or others may need to be restrained to prevent them from escaping or committing acts of violence. The level of restraint required varies with each situation. In the most severe circumstances, restraining individuals may involve applying restraints to fully immobilize them. Restraints should only be applied to mitigate actual risks. Restraining for any other purpose may not be compliant with international laws. Application of force must be consistent with authorized ROE.

Note: if it does not violate the ROE and/or a Nation's laws or National caveats, weapons may be used against CPers who escape or attempt to escape, but such use should only be made as a last resort and must be always preceded by warnings appropriate to the circumstances.

g. **Self-Defence.** Individuals and units have a right to defend themselves against attack or an imminent attack. In exercising this right to self-defence act in accordance with National laws.

404. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

- a. The Geneva conventions place a duty on their signatories in peace and war to circulate the text of the Conventions as widely as possible within their countries. They are especially required to ensure that the implications of the Conventions are clearly understood by the members of their Armed Forces and by the civilians attached to them.
- b. The Conventions state that any military or other authority assuming responsibility for dealing with CPers in time of war must be in possession of the text of the Conventions and that its personnel must be instructed in how the Conventions affect them in the execution of their duties with CPers.

405. DETERMINING CAPTURED PERSONS STATUS

- a. CPers can be divided into two broad categories: CPers who meet the criteria of a POW or that of a protected person under the Third and Fourth Geneva Convention (GC), and other persons whose liberty has been restricted.
- b. All CPers enjoy the protections of the GC as set forth in the Third Geneva Convention (GPW), until such time as their status is determined. The definition of the status of a POW is derived from the wording of Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention (GPW) and the 1977 protocols on relative treatment of POW.
- c. A CPers status must be determined as soon as possible. When doubts arise regarding the status of a CPers, a competent tribunal should be established as soon as practical by the detaining power to determine the CPers status. The tribunal need not be judicial but may be administrative in nature and its composition and working methods should ensure adequate input of relevant expertise, including legal expertise.

Note. it is essential to understand the distinction between the terms treatment and status. To treat a CPers as a POW does not mean that the CPers has the actual status of a POW as set forth in the Geneva Conventions.

406. GUIDELINES FOR HOLDING FACILITIES

- a. The conduct of detention operations will require MP to be familiar with the types of holding facilities used and their general limitations. Such facilities are: Collecting Point, Central Collecting Point, and Compound/Camp.
- b. **Collecting Point.** The Collecting Point is the first staging area in the CPers handling process. It is a temporary facility where CPers are consolidated after capture prior to being moved out of the combat zone/hostile area. For maritime missions, a vessel or ship may be regarded as a collecting point. The following should be considered when planning to establish a Collecting Point:
 - (1) Proximity to the Main Supply Route (MSR) will speed up the evacuation process;
 - (2) Collecting Points must be able to move with little or no notice;

- (3) If feasible, the Collecting Point should be based on an existing building. This increases the shelter available for CPers and reduces the need for engineer support to erect perimeter wire and overhead shelter (CPers can be made to dig for their own protection); and
 - (4) There is no formal design for a Collecting Point but it must be built to suit the climate, the weather and the operational situation.
- c. **Central Collecting Point.** The Central Collecting Point is an intermediate node in the CPers handling process located between the Collecting Point and the CPers camp. It is a semi-permanent facility capable of accommodating large numbers of CPers for extended periods. This might be conveniently located close to a point where the MSR enters the Divisional Support Group or higher formation area.
- d. **Compound/Camp.** The Compound/Camp is the final stage in the CPers handling process. It is a permanent or semi-permanent purpose built facility capable of accommodating large numbers of CPers for an indefinite period. The Geneva Conventions are not specific about the details of the construction of holding facilities. However, the following are the recommended minimal requirements:
- (1) CPers are only to be held in facilities which are based on land and in circumstances which guarantee the maintenance of adequate standards of hygiene and health;
 - (2) CPers are not normally to be detained in prisons;
 - (3) CPers are to be quartered under conditions as favorable as those of the forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area. These conditions must take into account the habits and customs of the CPers and must be in no way prejudicial to their health;
 - (4) Accommodation is to be protected from weather and fire and adequately heated and lit, particularly at night;
 - (5) Latrine facilities for use both by day and night are to be provided;
 - (6) Baths and showers are to be provided together with sufficient supplies of water for personal hygiene and laundry;
 - (7) Adequate accommodation is to be provided for messing;
 - (8) A medical centre capable of accommodating sick CPers is to be provided;
 - (9) Sufficient open space is to be provided for CPers to take exercise; and
 - (10) CPers holding facilities are to be marked so as to be easily identifiable from the air by day.

e. **Construction.** It is not possible to set out detailed construction instructions for a range of CPers holding facilities that will meet every operational and environmental scenario. Neither is it possible to set out detailed lists of construction equipment and holding facility furnishings to meet every contingency. With the exception of the basic collecting point, the construction of all CPers facilities is an engineer responsibility. Nevertheless, MP must be intimately involved in the planning and advise accordingly. The tasking of engineer support is a G3/J3 responsibility. The provision of construction materials is a G4/J4 responsibility.

407. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR HOLDING FACILITIES

a. To the maximum extent possible, detention facilities will be protected from the hazards of the battlefield. To protect the CPers population, commanders must:

- (1) Manage the control of captured protective equipment that could be used to meet requirements; and
- (2) Ensure that when planning for individual protective measures and facility protection, the potential presence of CPers is considered. As a general rule, CPers should derive the same benefit from protection measures as do members of the detaining force.

b. **Use of Force.** In accordance with national regulations, planning and preparation for use of force is a necessary element in maintaining order. Personnel assigned the mission of providing for the control of CPers and the security of the facilities should be issued and trained on rules for the use of force (RUF) that are specific to that mission. Theater rules of engagement (ROE) remain in effect for defending the holding facility from an external threat.

c. **Safety and Evacuation.** When controlling large CPers populations, commanders must develop thorough safety and evacuation plans to evacuate, shelter, protect, guard (as appropriate) and CPers populations from fire, combat hazards, natural elements, and non-battle injuries. Safety plans must be incorporated into the holding facility standing operating procedures (SOPs) and refined through continuous risk assessments, exercises and mitigation.

408. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETENTION OPERATIONS

a. These planning considerations are not all-inclusive. A thorough mission analysis is critical to determine requirements and establish adequate training plans to ensure success. The Geneva Conventions provide minimum standards for the care of CPers.

b. **Medical Care.** The holding facility commanders must consider a wide range of topics when planning for medical support, to include a trained or possibly credentialed health care provider to monitor the general health, nutrition, and cleanliness of CPers. The medical facility must have procedures to mitigate communicable diseases.

c. **Sanitation.** Certain sanitation standards must be met to protect the health of all CPers and allied forces associated with the holding facilities (such as disease prevention

and facility cleanliness). These standards include providing adequate space within housing units to prevent overcrowding, enforcing food sanitation procedures, properly disposing of human waste, and conducting pest control activities as required.

d. **Strategic Reporting.** Strategic reporting of CPers requires adherence to the theater specific reporting protocols. The timely and accurate reporting of data is critical to ensuring accountability and compliance with international laws. Detention operations are monitored at the strategic level. Reporting will be managed by a National Information Bureau (NIB). The NIB will forward reports to the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent) or Protecting Power Central Tracing Agency.

e. **Legal Support.** Proper legal support must be considered to ensure that international laws and national policies are observed. Actively involving legal personnel at all stages of detention operations is essential.

f. **Training.** All personnel involved in detention operations must be trained, relevant to their role, in advance of supporting detention operations. At a minimum the training should include the familiarization with the Geneva Conventions and laws, regulations, policies, and other issuances applicable to detention operations.

g. **Transportation Requirements.** The modes of transportation for movement of CPers are by foot, wheeled vehicle (preferably bus or truck), rail, air, inland waterways and sea. Each operation requires unique security and accountability planning which must closely adhered to and be carefully planned. The flow of personnel must be coordinated with movement control personnel as appropriate.

h. **Transfers and Transitions.** The successful end state of detention operations is the final disposition of CPers. This may include their transfer, release, resettlement, or continued detention. The permanent transfer or release of CPers from the custody to the HN, other multinational forces, or any government entity requires the approval of the higher operational headquarters and/or national authorities. The permanent transfer of CPers to a foreign nation most likely will be governed by bilateral agreements. Any transfer to the HN or a foreign nation will include assurances that the receiving nation is willing and able to provide adequate care and treatment that is required by the Geneva Conventions.

i. **Liaison with External Agencies.** During the course of detention operations, it is likely that commanders will encounter representatives of various government agencies, IOs, NGOs, and international humanitarian organizations that have a role in protecting the interests of CPers. Commanders must anticipate that these organizations will request access to CPers populations and will continue to do so throughout the operation. The ICRC will be given the opportunity to provide its services to CPers. Generally a liaison officer will be designated as the commands liaison to the ICRC (See section below). The following are some examples of external agencies:

(1) UNHCR;

(2) ICRC;

- (3) IFRC; and
- (4) UNDRC.

409. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

The ICRC act as a monitoring agent for the proper treatment of CPers according to the Geneva Conventions. The ICRC also coordinates international relief operations for victims of conflict, reports human rights violations, and promotes awareness of human rights and further development among nations of the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

- (1) Generally, a neutral state or an international humanitarian organization (such as the ICRC) is designated by NATO as a protecting power to monitor whether CPers are receiving humane treatment as required by international laws and national policy, including the Geneva Conventions. Duly accredited representatives of the protecting power, the ICRC, and others visit and inspect holding facilities and other places of detention in the discharge of their official duties. If the visit or assistance is within the limits of military and security considerations, the commander grants these organizations the necessary access to holding facilities. At times, the inspections will be previously authorized by the theater commander. Such visits will not be prohibited, nor will their duration or frequency be restricted, except for reasons of imperative military necessity and then only as a temporary measure. The facility commander, in consultation with the legal advisor, decides if this measure is required and immediately notifies higher headquarters and the ICRC/protecting power. Facility commanders, in consultation with the legal advisor, develop and foster relationships with ICRC personnel to address and resolve CPers issues, requests, or complaints;
- (2) If requested, these representatives may interview CPers without witnesses; and
- (3) CPers may make complaints or requests to the ICRC/protecting power regarding the conditions of their internment. CPers may not be punished for making complaints, even if those complaints prove to be unfounded. Complaints will be received in confidence because they might endanger the safety of other CPers. Appropriate action, including segregation, will be taken to protect CPers when necessary. Formal and informal information received from the ICRC shall be reported to the higher chain of command.

410. CAPTURE, INITIAL DETENTION AND SCREENING

Personnel conducting detention operations must ensure that operations are performed in a manner that provides for the humane treatment and care of CPers, thereby reducing the probability of incidents of abuse involving MP and CPers. All CPers will be treated according to the GPW and GC unless directed otherwise by competent authority.

Professional detention operations is critical in sustaining goodwill among the indigenous population. NOTE: The presumptive status of a CPers(until determined otherwise by a tribunal or combatant commander guidance) from the point of capture (POC) to the permanent camp is as an enemy POW.

411. PROCESSING CAPTURED PERSONS

a. CPers processing begins immediately and at the point of capture. At the point of capture, processing is accomplished to collect critical information that may be of intelligence value, preserve evidence, maintain accountability, and protect CPers from danger or harm.

b. Once a person is captured and taken into custody, the capturing force executes the following actions in accordance with ACO Handbook on Treatment and Handling of CPers:

- (1) Disarm;
- (2) Search;
- (3) Identification;
- (4) Segregate;
- (5) Secure;
- (6) Guard; and
- (7) Evacuate.

412. DOCUMENTATION

Taking a person into custody requires a significant amount of documentation and reporting. Capturing troops must make every effort to fully identify CPers and document circumstances of capture. At a minimum this documentation should include a capture tag and a capture report. In more complex operations these activities may be conducted by specially trained or qualified personnel such as MP using full investigative techniques and standards, however all soldiers must be able to properly complete a capture tag and a capture report in accordance with the ACO Handbook on Treatment and Handling of CPers.

413. TREATMENT OF CAPTURED PERSONS

In accordance with International Law and the GC, CPers will receive the same medical treatment as NATO casualties with priorities for treatment and evacuation being allocated according to medical criteria. Upon capture, wounded CPers are moved up the casualty evacuation chain to medical aid post but should be processed using the same protocols, “disarm, search, identify, segregate, secure, guard, and evacuate”, as any CPers.

414. CUSTODY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF PROPERTY, EVIDENCE AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

a. The accountability of CPers, CPers property, and items with evidentiary or potential intelligence value begins at the point of capture. Complete and thorough documentation is essential to link all confiscated property, evidence, or potential intelligence to the CPers. Documentation of medical conditions, treatment, and custody transfer records will become a permanent part of the CPers record. All MP should possess a CPers processing kit, which contains the items essential for the safe and proper processing of a CPers.

b. **Confiscated Items.** Confiscated items are weapons, ammunition, and military equipment other than those items allowed for personal protection. Medication in a CPers possession are confiscated and placed in a plastic bag that is clearly marked. Medical personnel determine if CPers are permitted to retain their medication on their person for emergency treatment (such as an inhaler). All other medications are administered by medical personnel as required and/or directed.

- (1) MP coordinate with the intelligence and counterintelligence collectors to determine that confiscated items are of evidentiary and/or intelligence value. Personal items such as diaries, letters from home, and family pictures may be taken by the intelligence personnel for review but are later returned to the MP so that they can be returned to their owners. Items with evidentiary value must be marked (for example, engraved) in such a manner that the item can be positively linked to the CPers and to the supporting statements rendered by the CPers or witnesses of the suspected criminal activity. Evidence documented must be transported to a centralized storage facility that has procedures in place regarding proper accountability, storage, and security until final disposition;
- (2) Currency is only confiscated on the order of a commissioned officer and formal documentation (receipt) should be issued to maintain accountability. Confiscated currency may be impounded, retained as evidence of a crime, or retained for specific intelligence purposes. In any case, currency must be safeguarded and promptly evacuated into appropriate security channels until final and proper disposition is determined. Impounded items are not returned to CPers during detention because they may make escape easier or compromise security interests. Items normally impounded are cameras, radios, and currency; and
- (3) Property should be bundled or placed in bags to keep it intact and separated from other CPers possessions. Accounting for property is important for returning items and preventing claims against the detaining unit and also to link CPers to their property for intelligence exploitation. Property accountability is critical for possible criminal proceedings. Evacuate all property retained by the CPers when the CPers is moved to the next detention level.

c. **Retained Items.** Retained items are items that CPers may keep during their captivity (initially, all items are confiscated). Retained items are generally divided into two groups. The first group consists of items taken during the initial processing, and they may be returned later during final processing. The items include but are not limited to:

- (1) Military mess equipment (except knives and forks);
- (2) Helmets;
- (3) CBRN protective suits and masks;
- (4) Clothing;
- (5) Badges of grade and nationality;
- (6) Military decorations; and
- (7) Identification cards and tags.

d. The second group consists of items that CPers may keep at all times. It contains, but is not limited to:

- (1) Religious literature (within reason); and
- (2) Personal items that have sentimental value (such as rings and pictures).

415. ESCORTING OF CAPTURED PERSONS

a. CPers must be closely guarded/escorted from the moment of capture. If necessary, force may be used to prevent escape in accordance with national laws and ROE. Special care must be taken to ensure that CPers do not destroy equipment or documents in their possession or exchange identities and identification with other CPers. Escorts should prevent CPers from communication with each other and should remain strictly neutral towards all CPers.

b. Escorts can assist the gaining unit, intelligence, and medical personnel by noting the demeanor of CPers under their control. In addition, escorts should report anything of significance such as excessive fear, obvious self-confidence or behavior inconsistent with the rank and status of the CPers.

c. **Escorts.** The primary role of any escort is to prevent CPers from escaping. The responsibility of an escort begins at the dispatching facility and ends when they are transferred to another competent authority. The following are planning considerations for escorts:

- (1) The Escort Element. The basic principle of escorting is that the minimum escort should consist of no less than the basic 4 person team. The number of CPers to be escorted will determine the size of the escort element. The condition and morale of the CPers is also a contributing factor;

- (2) Method of Movement. Movement on foot offers more opportunities for escape than vehicle movement. Certain types of movement such as movement by truck, train and air require specific precautions to be taken by the escort;
- (3) Terrain. The terrain across which the CPers are to be moved will influence the numbers in the escort and the method of escorting the CPers. Close terrain will require more escorts than open desert;
- (4) Enemy Activity. Any likelihood of enemy interference with the move will require an escort capable of protecting itself while still maintaining its mission. Before departure, the escort should familiarize itself with the location of units on its planned route in order to be able to seek assistance or make rest stops in the course of the journey. The escorts are to be in communication at all times with the headquarters of the formation through whose AOO it is moving; and
- (5) Transportation. It is unlikely that there will be dedicated transport for the evacuation of CPers. Their movement will be based on the return journeys of vehicles and aircraft delivering combat supplies forward to the general area from which the CPers are to be moved. Transport arrangements will be coordinated by the J1/G1 and J4/G4 staffs at the formation headquarters concerned. The movement of CPers on foot will only be carried out when there is no transport available and immediate evacuation is essential for operational reasons.

d. **The Guard**. The role of the Guard is to prevent the escape and to maintain discipline. The provisions for a guard force are found in all formed military units. CPers must be briefed, through an interpreter when possible, before movement takes place. They must understand the meaning of the word "Halt", they should understand the 'Silence Rule' applies at all times throughout the move (No talking to the escort, no talking to each other), and actions to take in the case of an emergency.

CHAPTER 5

POLICE OPERATIONS

501. AIM

a. The aim of this chapter is to provide authorities, definitions and tasks, which NATO MP may require during NATO operations under joint or combined policing conditions, in order to protect the integrity and effectiveness of the Force.

b. This chapter will also provide the basis for a NATO MP unit to conduct police operations that are intended towards the enforcement of rules and regulations that are inherent in the proper maintenance of a disciplined NATO Force.

502. INTRODUCTION

a. The enforcement of discipline and the conduct of investigations are of national responsibility and authority, in accordance with national laws and procedures. The multinational composition of the Force will introduce a dimension of complexity with undefined or overlapping jurisdictions and varying standards of national authority. This will require a NATO Combined Military Police (NCMP) to be assigned to carry out a standardized set of policing duties that ensures the maintenance of discipline and good order of the Force as a whole notwithstanding individual national authority on behalf of the NATO Force Commander.

b. It is critical that the MP assigned to the NCMP Unit or to a specific contingent within the Force be assigned appropriate authority to stop an offence and hand over to the respective TCN MP to continue with the investigation in accordance with national authority. A proper understanding of the multinational environment is of utmost importance. The execution of a policing task by any MP assigned to a NATO Force, whether as part of the NCMP Unit or not, will ensure appropriate actions to be taken by a TCN of the Force without violating national authority.

503. SERIOUS OFFENCES

Serious criminal offences or transgressions are listed herein. The following list may be amended and include additional serious offences or transgressions relevant to specific operations, with the concurrence of the TCN:

- (1) Murder;
- (2) Manslaughter;
- (3) Rape or aggravated sexual assault;
- (4) Offences involving firearms;
- (5) Offences involving illicit drugs;

- (6) Robbery;
- (7) Aggravated assault or infliction of serious bodily harm;
- (8) Black marketing and unlawful marketing of goods obtained by a crime;
- (9) Arson;
- (10) Possession, soliciting or encouraging child pornography/Prostitution;
- (11) Human trafficking/Prostitution;
- (12) Serious military offences such as crime against humanity, mutiny, war crime, terrorism, sabotage, espionage, cooperation with enemy, treason, taking hostages, bribery, and freedom of prisoner;
- (13) Attempts to commit any of the above; and
- (14) Any other offence for which, under national law of the suspect, a conviction could be punishable with a term of lengthy imprisonment.

504. LIMITATIONS

The following limitations apply to MP during the conduct of police activities on multinational NATO operations:

- (1) Wherever possible, suspects are to be detained and investigations of alleged offences are to be conducted by the national MP of the suspect. Unless otherwise agreed with the TCN concerned, all investigations of the alleged offences are to be conducted by the national MP of the suspect, in order that subsequent disciplinary or criminal proceedings not be jeopardised;
- (2) Where an alleged offence occurs which results in MP from another nation taking the initial police action, the suspect in the incident is to be handed over to the jurisdiction of his own nation as soon as is practicably possible; and
- (3) Where an incident takes place, involving personnel from more than one nation, a joint investigation, co-ordinated by the Provost Marshal at the next level of command, should be initiated.

505. JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY

a. **Jurisdiction.** NATO MP have jurisdiction over all members and vehicles/equipment of the Force within the designated theatre of operations for the mission. This jurisdiction extends to, but is not limited to, all installations and

infrastructures under the authority of NATO. Jurisdiction must respect the limitations set out in paragraph 504.

b. **Authority.** To ensure proper execution of police tasks, NATO MP have the following authority:

- (1) Order the co-operation of members of the Force;
- (2) Stop and request formal identification;
- (3) Stop and direct motor vehicles of the Force;
- (4) Detain personnel when the circumstances do not allow the member of the Force to be detained by someone from their own nation and;
 - (a) If the member of the Force is in the process of committing, attempting to commit, or has committed an offence and detention is necessary to prevent the suspect from escaping, to prevent further commission of the offence or to preserve evidence, or
 - (b) If the member of the Force is in the process of or attempting to commit any act that would make them a danger to themselves or others if they were not detained, or
 - (c) The member of the Force fails to stop or produce formal identification when requested to do so, or
 - (d) For any other reason that is in the interest of good order and military discipline to detain the member of the Force.
- (5) Investigate and report incidents or offences that follow the limitations outlined in paragraph 504 and respects the following circumstances;
 - (a) It is not clear who the suspect is or who was involved, or
 - (b) The property of more than one TCN is involved, or
 - (c) The civilian population or civilian property and more than one TCN is involved, or
 - (d) The incident or offence is of particular interest to the Force and the TCNs involved have authorized NCMP to investigate.
- (6) Search and seizure;
 - (a) Persons detained. When a person has been detained, MP may conduct a non-intimate search of the person and their immediate property and seize:

- i. Items which may be used to cause harm against law enforcement personnel or to the detained person, or
 - ii. Physical evidence relevant to the alleged offence or incident for which the person is detained.
- (b) NATO Property or Installations. Where an installation is occupied by more than one TCN, the senior NATO Commander responsible for the property or installation can authorize NCMP to search a NATO installation or parts thereof and seize:
- i. Items that are not authorized by NATO or the HN within the AOO, such as alcohol, drugs, pornography, weapons, etc, or
 - ii. Items that are suspected to have been obtained or used during the commission of an offence or is expected to be used during the commission of an offence, may be seized as physical evidence or for disposal.
- (7) Disclose information that is relevant to a TCN which will allow the continued investigation of the offence under nation authority.

506. LAW ENFORCEMENT

a. NATO MP, in conjunction with Force Commanders, are responsible for the maintenance of discipline and good order through the enforcement of military laws and where appropriate civil laws over personnel of the Force. In order to achieve this function, NATO MP conduct law enforcement operations that may consist of the following, but are not limited to:

- (1) Conduct patrols;
- (2) Conduct searches and seizures of personnel, vehicles and installations;
- (3) Apprehension of persons;
- (4) Speed and traffic control;
- (5) Drug and alcohol prevention;
- (6) Employ MP working dogs;
- (7) Conduct investigations; and
- (8) Education.

b. Law enforcement is of national responsibility and will require TCN MP to fulfil these activities within national authority. Nonetheless, proper coordination will be

required amongst the MP communities assigned to NATO to ensure proper coverage and respect of jurisdictions within a multinational environment.

507. CRIME PREVENTION AND AWARENESS

a. Commanders assisted by MP are responsible for the maintenance of discipline and good order of the Force. As such crime prevention and awareness become essential to retain integrity and credibility of the Force by reducing opportunities for crime to ever occur.

b. The conduct of certain proactive law enforcement activities, such as patrolling and speed control, is considered to be crime prevention. A visible NATO MP force is part of the overall plan on preventing crime. In addition to proactive law enforcement or police activities, MP will be expected to provide commanders with the following to help prevent crime and educate the Force:

- (1) Provide seminars and professional development periods. These sessions are intended to help educate the Force into taking appropriate actions or preventive measures to better safeguard property and personnel from crime;
- (2) Provide commanders with statistics on criminal trends and activity that identify areas of concern;
- (3) Make recommendations for potential deterrent or active measures that can reduce criminal activity;
- (4) Develop an effective crime prevention program; and
- (5) Share information with other TCN MP or NCMP Units.

c. It cannot be stressed enough; key to a successful crime prevention program is to be proactive with the Force and to get the Force involved.

508. INVESTIGATIONS AND REPORTING

a. **General.** Incidents and offences committed against the Force (personnel or property) or committed by the Force (personnel), reduce morale, military discipline and adversely affect operations and the credibility of NATO and its contributing nations. Investigations and reporting of such incidents and offences is necessary to preserve the commander's operational capability and to preserve overall credibility of the Force.

b. Investigations can be ordered by NATO, the government of a nation, a commander or be initiated by a member of the Force and be one of the following types of investigations:

- (1) Ministerial Inquiry;
- (2) Board of Inquiry;

- (3) Coroner's Inquiry;
- (4) Summary Investigation;
- (5) Disciplinary Investigation;
- (6) Criminal Investigation; and
- (7) Any other type of investigation or inquiry that requires the reporting of facts relating to an offence or incident.

c. Although it is understood that NATO MP possess investigative skills that will require them to actively participate in all of the above mentioned investigations or inquiries, this chapter will limit itself to investigations that will most commonly require or mandate the specialist skills of the NATO MP in support of a NATO commander. For the purpose of this chapter, the following types of MP investigations are most common:

- (1) Criminal or Service Offence Investigation. Investigation to gather and evaluate information and evidence to resolve a complaint of a criminal or service offence nature;
- (2) Security Investigation. Investigation into the alleged breach or infraction of security that may impact personnel and/or operations. It is to determine cause and fault in order to assist in judicial proceedings and allow commanders to conduct damage control; and
- (3) Traffic Investigation. Investigation initiated after a traffic accident to determine the cause and fault in order to assist in the judicial procedure and claims made against the Force.

d. **Conduct of Multinational Investigation.** In a multinational environment, the likelihood of investigating incidents and offences that are not under the sole authority of a TCN is always present and must be considered through the course of an investigation. All TCN with involvement in a case will be required to share information and may do so through the exchange of investigative reports as per national authorities. In all cases where the conduct of a multinational investigation is required in accordance with paragraphs 504 and 505, the following principles will apply:

- (1) The lead nation in a multinational investigation should be the nation from which a suspect is most likely to come from, based on the evidence available at the time of the commencement of the investigation, or, where no suspect is identified, the nation with the most direct interest in the case, particularly where financial issues or consequences are involved;
- (2) The nation of the victim or witnesses to an incident should be invited to assist in the investigation, as should the civilian police if civilians or their property are involved;

- (3) Where it is not possible to determine a lead nation or an additional nation having an interest in a particular case, the most appropriate police agency should be used until such a time a lead nation or interested nation can be identified. In most cases, the NCMP Unit would be the default policing asset to be used;
 - (4) Where MP of a suspect's own nation are not available, the investigation may be conducted by another nation's MP, in the presence of an officer from the suspect's nation, but only at the request of the authorities of that nation. In these circumstances, the investigation must be conducted in the language of the suspect;
 - (5) The scene of an incident shall be preserved, where necessary, by the first MP to arrive at the scene. However, examination or exploitation of the scene shall be conducted, where possible, by the nation from which the alleged offender is most likely to come from;
 - (6) Any dispute in relation to the conduct of a multinational investigation will be resolved by the Provost Marshal of the next level of command; and
 - (7) Investigation of cases involving more than one TCN and falling outside the formation commander's level of responsibility should be co-ordinated by Provost Marshal of the next level of command.
- e. **Procedures for Reporting Incidents or Offences.** Where NCMP Unit or TCN MP take police action against personnel from the Force, but from another TCN, the following reporting procedures are to be followed:
- (1) The MP involved are to inform the authorities of the responsible TCN and the NCMP Unit (if not initiated by them), through the chain of command and MP technical channels immediately or as soon as reasonably practicable; and
 - (2) The chain of command and the NCMP unit are to confirm that the appropriate TCN authority has been informed.
- f. **Sharing of Unique Investigative Capabilities.** NATO MP units may deploy with a wide range of policing skills and investigative capabilities. However, services will sometimes be limited and will not cover the full complement that would normally be available for the proper investigation of an offence or incident. In such cases and depending on the time sensitivity of the investigation, TCN would normally deploy specific skills in support of an investigation to meet national requirements. On occasion, the sensitivity of a file or the immediate availability of specialist skills may be such that they would not be made available in a timely manner to properly conduct the investigation and could potentially affect the outcome of the investigation. In such circumstances, the TCN may benefit from specialist investigative skills from the NCMP unit or other TCN MP units under pre-authorized MOUs or agreements. The following skills could be examples of specialist skills not readily available to all TCN MP:
- (1) Forensic Lab;

- (2) Mortuary Affairs;
 - (3) Polygraph Services;
 - (4) MP Working Dogs; and
 - (5) Any other capability that could be considered a unique specialist skill to conduct an investigation.
- g. Prior to using MP specialist skills, equipment or facilities from another TCN, it is essential that legal advice be obtained to determine if the use of external policing skills will be recognized by the judicial system of the investigating TCN. If so, limitations or conditions must be respected for a judicial system to accept out of nation skills.

509. WAR CRIMES AND BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INVESTIGATIONS

a. Investigations of the sort are investigations of crimes against humanity and crimes committed in violation of international laws and conventions by any person or persons, military or civilian. War crimes may be committed by Force members or by enemy personnel against the force or against the local population. Inclusive in support in the apprehension and detention of persons indicted for war crimes.

b. Investigations into war crimes and other breaches of international law investigations are extremely complex and lengthy due to its unique international environment and the gathering of evidence. As such, a specially appointed committee would be formed/appointed to investigate and trial such infractions of international laws. For this reason, investigations of the sort will be treated separately from those investigations already identified in paragraph 508, as NATO and its MP would not normally be appointed lead to investigate such crimes, but could potentially be the first official investigative body to respond to such a crime. It is therefore imperative for NATO to fully understand the role that MP may play in the initial stages of a war crimes investigation.

c. During the conduct of NATO operations, war crimes and other breaches of international laws may be uncovered or may be committed by members of the Force. When a NATO Commander is faced with such circumstances, he will form an immediate response team (to include MP with special investigative skills) and will assign them responsibilities to appropriately respond to the allegations of the war crimes while protecting the credibility and effectiveness of the NATO Force. When NATO MP are assigned to respond to a war crime, the following employment should be planned:

- (1) Protection of the crime scene. Most important task that can be assigned, as the preservation of evidence is of the utmost importance when an investigation is initiated. When a crime scene has been discovered, its size

and sensitivity will require NATO Commanders to plan and execute the following;

- (a) Access control,
 - (b) Perimeter security,
 - (c) Construction of temporary shelters,
 - (d) Transport,
 - (e) Media awareness,
 - (f) Note taking; and
 - (g) Any other tasks required to protect the integrity of a crime scene.
- (2) Gathering witness statements. Most often, the presence of NATO forces at a location where a war crime has occurred may provide a sense of security to the region and facilitate the free disclosure of information from its residents. As such, MP must be ready to take witness statements immediately to ensure all and free information is gathered;
- (3) Liaison with HN, NATO and international authorities. In this instance, liaison will be limited to determining jurisdiction and sharing of information; and
- (4) Detain alleged suspects.

d. As previously mentioned, NATO may be an initial responder to a war crime until a formal war crime committee has been formally stood up or may be requested to provide support to the assigned committee tasked to investigate. In all cases, NATO's initial response will be one of professionalism and limited to taking initial steps that will preserve the integrity of a judicial process. Thus the following considerations must be adhered to:

- (1) NATO's actions must be limited to preserving and protection of all evidence. The processing of evidence should be of last resort and restricted to personnel having the requisite skills to do so. MP may be requested to process some evidence under specific instructions by the appointed committee;
- (2) Gathering of information should be limited to the gathering of witness statements. Further investigative interviews must be left to the investigators assigned as lead by the specially appointed committee. MP may be requested by this committee to initiate certain interviews with specific guidelines;

- (3) Use of interpreters and cultural advisors will be essential for the successful interaction with the local population. In most cases, the initial contact will determine the active participation of witnesses and victims; and
 - (4) With an understanding that such investigations will be handled by a separate organisation assigned to investigate and prosecute war crimes, proper handover procedures will have to be developed between NATO and the assigned war crimes organisation.
- e. NATO MP may be heavily involved in the initial stages after a war crime has been reported and it will become a priority of work as a result of international sensitivities. MP Commanders and Provost Marshals must have a firm understanding that the role of MP assigned in response are in a supportive role and their initial actions could potentially determine the outcome of a successful investigation. It is in the best interest of the Force to commit MP with specialized skills and limit their actions to the protection of the scene and information gathering until relieved by the lead investigative organization or directed otherwise.

510. LIAISON

One of the fundamentals for the proper conduct of military operations is the notion of liaison to ensure superior echelons and flanks maintain proper situational awareness and can co-ordinate activities accordingly. This same principle applies to the MP and therefore maintaining strong liaison within the MP community will not only ensure good situational awareness and co-ordination of MP activities, it will ensure the proper sharing of vital information and resources.

511. CONFINEMENT OPERATIONS

- a. **General.** Confinement of members of the Force who have transgressed laws and regulations is an inherent part of a military justice system to ensure discipline and good order of the Force. Confinement is a task normally assigned to the MP but may be done by specialist organisation of a TCN within a MP unit. For the purpose of this chapter, service custody/confinement will be under the authority of the MP Commander of the TCN.
- b. **Confinement is a national responsibility.** It should only be conducted by MP from the responsible TCN in accordance with paragraphs 504 and 505. In some cases, TCN may not have facilities or expertise in an AOO to detain a member of their nation and assistance may be requested to another TCN or the NCMP to detain a member of the Force. The goal of confinement is temporary detainment until the Force member can be tried by a judicial process or returned to the nation. This paragraph will provide the principles, treatment of detained Force personnel and other information that needs to be considered when conducting confinement of members of the Force.
- c. **Principles.** When conducting confinement of a member of the Force that cannot be immediately be done by a TCN, the following principles shall apply:

- (1) Only when a member presents a hazard to the mission, themselves, others, or who has committed a grievous act should be placed in confinement;
- (2) Specific guidelines for confinement should be developed by legal officers and distributed to commanders;
- (3) Proper logistic support will be necessary to construct an appropriate facility and sustain confinement; and
- (4) Most important, **Force members are NOT to be confined with CPers (e.g. enemy prisoners of war (POW)).**

d. **Treatment of Detained Force Personnel.** When a person is detained by any member of the Force the following shall be observed:

- (1) The facts are to be reported immediately to the authorities of the TCN concerned;
- (2) Any instructions from the authorities of the TCN concerned are to be applied to the continued confinement of the detained person;
- (3) From the time a TCN is informed that one of their personnel is being detained, continued confinement of that person may only take place with the expressed authority of the detained members nation;
- (4) Detained persons are to be transferred to custody of either the MP of their own TCN or to other authorities of the TCN to which they belong as soon as practically possible;
- (5) Detained persons are not to be questioned about their alleged offence unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that the detained person may have knowledge which may affect the mission or which could be used to save life;
- (6) If it is deemed necessary to question a detained person or a detained person volunteers information, details are to be recorded of what was said as soon as practically possible and this record is to be signed, timed and dated by the person to whom the statement was made. In addition, this record shall be forwarded and released to the authorities of the detained person's TCN;
- (7) Subject to the provisions outlined in (5) and (6) above, detained persons are only to be questioned by MP of the detained person's nation; and
- (8) A full record of the detained person's time in custody is to be maintained and released to the detained person's national authorities when he is released in their custody.

e. **Special Considerations.** In the event that confinement of members of the Force is absolutely required or a request for assistance from a TCN of the Force to place their personnel in custody, the following considerations should be followed:

- (1) Should a TCN of the Force not possess confinement abilities throughout their contribution during the mission, they should seek immediate assistance from another TCN and have a service level agreement (SLA) or a memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed between the TCN providing the service and the TCN receiving the service; and
- (2) If a member of the Force is to be confined in facilities other than those of their respective TCN, guards shall be provided by their TCN. These guards do not have to be MP and are to receive appropriate instruction from authorities of their nation.

512. CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE

a. Criminal intelligence activities are an essential part of police operations and will shape policing activities, awareness and to a certain degree operations. NATO MP, by the very nature of their work, will be the primary provider of criminal intelligence as it relates to the Force and as such, commanders will rely on their MP to maintain up to date accurate information to police its Force.

b. NATO MP commanders and Provost Marshals should consider the following principles when dealing with criminal intelligence:

- (1) Establish a criminal intelligence section to collect, analyse, process, store, disseminate, and provide reports on trends and predictions;
- (2) Exploit technology to facilitate intelligence processing;
- (3) Understand what information is pertinent to the commander; and
- (4) Receive appropriate authorities in order to share information within NATO and TCN.

c. Criminal intelligence is sensitive by nature and its distribution may be restricted by national regulations and laws. Working within a multinational environment, such as NATO, it becomes important for the MP community to be able to share as much information as possible through the course of their duties. Without violating national restrictions, reports should be produced in such a manner that it releases statistics and trends for all to benefit from.

513. CUSTOMS

a. Customs and excise is a unique law enforcement activity entrusted to a separate government agency of a nation. On deployed operations, customs agents could be prepositioned in the AOO to help facilitate returning troops and equipment home. In some cases, customs agents are not deployed in the AOO and they will coordinate the return of personnel and equipment through a military movement control office or the MP. In all cases, MP may assist TCN Customs by:

- (1) Coordinating with differing custom agencies and foreign nations to obtain clearances;
 - (2) Provide baggage and load searches with or without MP Working Dogs;
 - (3) Provide positive identification control prior to departure; and
 - (4) Investigate infractions.
- b. During customs activities, it is important to note that NATO MP are not the lead organization and are in an assistance mandate only.

CHAPTER 6

STABILITY POLICE OPERATIONS

601. AIM

This chapter is to be a brief introduction to Stability Police Operations that is currently being developed by the NATO MP Panel into doctrine.

602. INTRODUCTION

a. An efficient response to a complex crisis may require the response by both military and police components of the Force. In situations or environments which lack even basic law and order or where local security forces and civic structures are unable to re-establish or maintain rule of law, it will be necessary for NATO forces to create a safe and secure environment. In this framework, Stability Police Operations are an essential component of the wider success of a NATO mission.

b. Stability Police Operations are intended to support restoring the rule of law to a failing or failed state. The respective themes of Stability Police Operations could be but are not restricted to; substitute if necessary, reinforce and restore, train and to monitor local (police/security) forces, in accordance with the comprehensive approach as mentioned in the NATO Strategic Concept.

c. According to the decision of the NATO LOWG, a need for separate doctrine on Stability Police Operations has been identified. The NATO MP Panel will establish a writing team to develop this doctrine.

CHAPTER 7

NATO MILITARY POLICE REPORTING

701. RELATED DOCUMENT

- a. STANAG 2020 – Operational Situation Reports.
- b. STANAG 7149 - NATO Message Catalogue
- c. STANAG 5500 - NATO Message Text Formatting System

702. AIM

The aim of this chapter is to provide reporting procedures for the NATO Military Police (MP) that can be used when conducting operations under joint or combined policing conditions. These procedures are not designed to replace National reporting requirements but to enhance the NATO Commander's and/or Provost Marshal's situational awareness.

703. INTRODUCTION

- a. NATO MP regularly find themselves in a variety of environments that prove to be less than conducive for communicating critical information due to the decentralized and dispersed way in which the NATO MP often operate. Precise and timely reporting is critical in order to formulate an accurate picture for the Commander from the NATO MP perspective.
- b. NATO MP and Provost Marshals will have the flexibility to add reporting procedures as needed in order to ensure the appropriate level of visibility is obtained throughout different operations. Some additional reports that are not included in this chapter could include: Monthly Police Station Reports (Host Nation); Military Working Dog Utilization Reports; Commander's Assessment Reports; Operational Readiness Reports and various others.
- c. It is critically important that the NATO MP Commander or Provost Marshal maintains coordination and reporting relationships with all other national, adjoining and NATO Combined Military Police (NCMP) Chiefs in theatre. NATO MP should use forms and reports in their operations that will cover the information requirement for national authorities, national and NATO chains of command and jurisdiction, according to NATO Status of Force Agreement (SOFA).
- d. Filing. Documents will be filed according to the regulations of the responsible country. These documents might serve as basis for further investigations or follow-on measures in the national field of the corresponding country.
- e. The senior Provost Marshal will ultimately determine the procedures to be used for reporting and filing according to the operation.
- f. NATO MP Reports must be in-line with STANAG 7149 (NATO Message Catalogue) and conform to STANAG 5500 (ADatP-3(A) NATO Message Text Formatting System).

704. REPORTS

a. NATO Operational Situation Reports are the principal means reporting the operational situation to higher authorities. Routine reports are submitted at times specified by higher authority and, in addition, reports may be called for at any time.

b. The operational situation report (normally known simply as 'situation report') gives the situation in the area of the reporting unit or formation. It includes information of the tactical situation and such administrative information that may affect the tactical situation. While these forms are not MP specific they supersede all other formats for reporting when reporting non-NATO MP specific information or Commander's Critical Information Requirements. Reports listed below will be used by NATO MP:

(1) Operational Situation Report located in ANNEX A of STANAG 2020; and

(2) Operational SITREP in Message format located in ANNEX B of STANAG 2020.

c. Examples of law enforcement operational reports used by NATO MP during various levels of conflict could be but are not limited to:

(1) NATO Military Police Incident Report. This report is to be used by NATO MP to inform national commanders and authorities, and the allied chain of command, of incidents taken care of by the NATO MP. It includes the status of personnel and property involved. It is the principal mechanism for reporting incidents reported by the NATO MP. The information will be passed by the responsible MP/Provost Marshal's office that is reporting the incident to the appropriate national commander, and through the chain of command to allied HQ;

(2) Law of Armed Conflict Violation Report. This report is to be used by NATO MP to inform higher headquarters of violations of the Law of Armed Conflict. The report will be submitted by the responsible Provost Marshal or NATO MP, which received the complaint (or observed) that a violation of the Law of Armed Conflict has occurred;

(3) Preliminary Detention Report. This report is to be used by NATO MP to inform higher headquarters of the person(s) apprehended by the MP. It is the principal mechanism for daily functional reporting for the Operations described. This report will assist the identification of the apprehended person(s) and inform superior HQ, Local Police and the apprehended person(s) and

(4) NCMP Patrol Report. This report is to be used by NCMP to inform higher headquarters of the current situation regarding activities that have occurred patrolling the area of responsibility, during a shift of duty. It is the principal mechanism for daily functional reporting. This report will assist the

identification of daily routines and detailed information in cases processed by the NCMP.

d. Examples of Traffic Control operational reports used by NATO MP during various levels of conflict could be but are not limited to:

- (1) NATO Military Police Situation Report. This report is to be used by NATO MP to inform higher headquarters of the current situation regarding MP forces, or specific serious incidents which have occurred. This report is to be used by Provost Marshals or commanding MP Officers to report routine activities over a 24-hour period. This report will assist the identification of functional capability shortfalls;
- (2) NATO Military Police Traffic Offence Report. This report is to be used by NATO MP and is to be processed through higher headquarters to the offender/driver's Commanding Officer. It is to be used to report specific serious traffic offences/incidents which have occurred; and
- (3) Convoy Progress Report. This report is to be used by NATO MP to provide higher headquarters with information on convoy progress. The information will be used to co-ordinate traffic control on routes and to enable future planning to be conducted. Reports will be passed from designated Traffic Control Posts (TCP) to the Movement Control Centre (MCC) through the appropriate HQ.

e. Captured Persons (CPers) Operations and the formats for reports used by NATO MP will be added once the ACO Handbook on Treatment and Handling of CPers is ratified.

ANNEX A

MILITARY POLICE IDENTIFICATION

A1. PRINCIPLES OF IDENTIFICATION

a. NATO Military Police (MP) will wear on duty their national uniform and, as required, carry arms.

b. **Members of the NATO Combined Military Police (NCMP) unit employed in garrison type duties** will wear a NATO blue (authorised colour) arm-band bearing the NATO star in white between the letters "MP" also in white. The arm-band is worn on the upper left arm. The arm-band should be approximately 16 ½ inches (42 cm) long and 3 ½ inches (9 cm) wide. The letters M and P should be approximately 2 3/8 inches (6 cm) high by 1 ¾ inches (4 ½ cm) wide. The NATO star should be approximately 2 3/8 inches (6cm) in width and height.



c. **Members of the NCMP unit employed in field type duties** will wear a discrete NATO MP identifier to match the colour of the field uniform with a visible "MP" symbol with NATO star. No set standard will be prescribed as uniforms will vary from nation to nation. However the NCMP Chief may set a fixed standard for his unit.

d. **Members of a TCN MP** must wear a visible "MP" symbol to be recognized as such. Standards are to be prescribed by national authority.

e. In certain situations, where non-NATO/PfP MP are working together the lead nation will establish an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on any variations to be made to the prescribed arm-band.

f. **Vehicles used by NCMP units** are to display, in addition to their national markings, a NATO blue (authorised colour) plate bearing the NATO star in white between the letters "MP" also in white. The NATO star should be approximately 3 inches

(7½ cm) in width and height. The letters M and P should be each approximately 3 inches (7½ cm) high by 2½ inches (6½ cm) wide. These plates will be affixed to the front, rear and both sides and are to be approximately 6 inches (15 cm) high by 12 inches (30 cm) wide. If the need arises, MP may be put on in the local language.



A2. TRAFFIC CONTROL IDENTIFICATION

When employed in military traffic duties the NATO MP must be provided with additional distinguishing features, so that at night and in bad visibility they may be recognised as MP. They must wear, as required, when on duty, reflective white cuffs, with longitudinal light-reflecting stripes, giving a white or yellow effect to be worn on each sleeve. Additionally, reflective vests should be worn to enhance visibility, or something similar in accordance with national uniforms.



ANNEX B

LEXICON

B1. ACRONYMS

| | |
|--------|--|
| AA&E | Arms, Ammunitions and Explosives |
| ACO | Allied Command Operation |
| ADCO | Area Damage Control Operations |
| AOO | Area of Operations |
| ASR | Alternate Supply Route |
| C2 | Command and Control |
| CCIR | Commander's Critical Information Requirements |
| CIMIC | Civil Military Cooperation |
| CIVPOL | Civilian Police |
| CPers | Captured Persons |
| ECoA | Enemy Course of Action |
| EOD | Explosive Ordnance Disposal |
| GC | Geneva Conventions |
| GPW | Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War |
| GWS | Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea |
| GWSC | Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field |
| HN | Host Nation |
| HTP | High Threat Person |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent |
| IO | International Organization |
| JTCC | Joint Transport Coordination Centre |
| LCA | Local Cultural Advisor |
| LOAC | Law of Armed Conflict |
| LOWG | Land Operations Working Group |
| MOU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MP | Military Police |
| MPIO | Military Police Intelligence Operations |
| MSO | Mobility Support Operations |
| MSR | Main Supply Route |
| MWD | Military Working Dogs |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NCMP | NATO Combined Military Police |
| NIB | National Information Bureau |
| NMCC | National Movement Coordination Centre |
| PM | Provost Marshal |
| POW | Prisoner of War |
| RoE | Rules of Engagement |
| RUF | Rules for the Use of Force |

| | |
|------|-------------------------------|
| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
| SOFA | Status of Force Agreement |
| SOP | Standing Operating Procedures |
| TCF | Tactical Combat Force |
| TCN | Troops Contributing Nation |
| TCP | Traffic Control Point |
| VIP | Very Important Person |

B2. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

- a. **The Force.** Personnel belonging to the armed forces of NATO member states to include the civilian component, together with the armed forces of non-NATO members states and the civilian component thereto, participating in the mission.
- b. **Military Law.** The Law governing the Armed Forces of each state.
- c. **NATO Combined Military Police (NCMP).** A formation or unit under the operational command of a NATO commander consisting of military police (MP) belonging to the forces of more than one member nation under the command of a MP Officer.
- d. **Provost Marshal.** The Provost Marshal serves as the commander’s proponent for policy, plans, procedures and doctrine for MP. The provision of advice of the role and employment of MP in support of NATO operations is provided at the strategic, operational and tactical level to the respective commander.