NATO OTAN	NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
	COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

28 March 2014   MCM-0034-2014

SECRETARY GENERAL, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

NATO SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE CONCEPT

References:

A. PO(2010)0169, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 19 Nov 10.
B. PO(2011)0045, Updated List of Tasks for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the Lisbon Summit Decisions on the Comprehensive Approach, 04 Mar 11.
C. MC 0400/3-REV2 (Final), Military Committee Guidance for the Military Implementation of NATO's Strategic Concept, 12 Aug 13.
D. IMSM-0470-2012, Tasking to SCs for Development of a NATO Security Force Assistance Concept, 20 Dec 12.
E. IMSM-0040-2014, Completion of the NATO Security Force Assistance Concept, 30 Jan 14.

BACKGROUND

1.   At Reference A (Paragraph 25), NATO's ability *"to train and develop local forces in crisis zones"* was highlighted as one major contribution to improve effectiveness across the crisis management spectrum. In serial 1.7 of Reference B the task to develop the capability *"to train and to develop local forces in crisis zones"*, so that local authorities are able, as quick as possible, to maintain security on their own, was also given to NATO-bodies.

2.   In Paragraph 24 of Reference C the development of the capability *"to train and develop local forces in crisis areas"* is described as a cross cutting issue that needs to be fully synchronized with other strands of related work currently being pursued under the NATO Comprehensive Approach Action Plan.

3.   At Reference D the Strategic Commands (SCs) were tasked to develop a NATO Security Force Assistance Concept. Following initial conceptual work by the SCs, the Military Committee Working Group (Strategic Plans and Concepts) convened and, working with SC staff, developed at Reference E the NATO Security Force Assistance Concept.

4.   This MCM needs to be read in conjunction with its enclosure.

AIM

5.   To submit the Military Committee (MC) endorsed NATO Security Force Assistance Concept (Enclosure 1) for North Atlantic Council (NAC) approval.

CONSIDERATIONS

6.   The NATO Security Force Assistance Concept covers the requirements that it was set out to meet at Reference D:

   a. "Train and develop" will encompass the generation, organization, training, enabling, advising and mentoring;

   b. "Local forces" will address indigenous, non NATO military security forces;

   c. "Crisis zones" will cover the geographical area where a NAC approved NATO operation/mission is executed.

7.   The NATO Security Force Assistance Concept may contribute to further work strands in the framework of Defence Capacity Building.

CONCLUSION

8.   The NATO Security Force Assistance Concept is coherent with agreed Alliance policies and it operationalises the strategic guidelines set by the key MC documents. Therefore, the MC endorses the NATO Security Force Assistance Concept.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9.   The MC recommends that the NAC approve the NATO Security Force Assistance Concept.

10.   This document clears IMSWM-0069-2014, and all SDs thereto.

FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

Sir Christopher Harper
Air Marshal
Director General
International Military Staff

<u>Enclosure</u>:

1. Enclosure 1 to SH/PLANS/J5/PLP/JES/14-305189, Delivery of the Bi-SC signed Security Force Assistance (SFA) Concept, 21 Feb 14 (as amended on 18 Mar 14)

<u>Copy to:</u>   SDL T, IS-OPS, IS-DPP
<u>Action Officers:</u>   Col B. Lebrun, P&P (5640); LtCol M. Dingler, P&P (5862)

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

ENCLOSURE 1 TO
SH/PLANS/J5/PLP/JES/14-305189
dated 21 Feb 2014
(as amended on 18 Mar 2014)

NATO
Security Force Assistance
Concept

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REFERENCES

A. PO(2010) 0169, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 19 November 2010.
B. PO(2011)0045, Updated List of Tasks for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the Lisbon Summit Decisions on the Comprehensive Approach, 04 March 2011.
C. MC 0400/3-REV2 (Final), Military Committee Guidance for the Military Implementation of NATO's Strategic Concept, 12 August 2013.
D. IMSM-0470-2012, Tasking to SCs for Development of a NATO Security Force Assistance Concept, 20 December 2012.
E. Lisbon Summit Declaration, 20 November 2010.
F. PO(2013)0590-REV1, Tasking on Defence and Related Security Capacity Building, 02 December 2013.
G. MC 0334/2 (Final), NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support, 19 January 2005.
H. MC 0578, MC Concept for Military Support to Defence Reform, 23 February 2009.
I. PO(2010)0140, Political Guidance on Ways to Improve NATO's Involvement in Stabilisation and Reconstruction, 06 October 2010.
J. MC 0437/2 (Final), Special Operations Policy, 21 April 2011.
K. C-M(2011)0022, Political Guidance, 14 March 2011.
L. MC 0458/2, NATO Education, Training, Exercise and Evaluation Policy, 12 October 2009.

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1.   The NATO Strategic Concept (Ref. A) sets forward the requirement for the Allies to "develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance." This requirement is captured under Serial 1.7 of the Updated List of Tasks for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan (CAAP) and the Lisbon Summit decisions on the Comprehensive Approach (Ref. B).

2.   The NATO Military Committee, in MC 0400/3 (Ref. C), emphasized this requirement and noted it as a cross-cutting issue that needs to be fully synchronized with other strands of related work currently being pursued under the NATO Comprehensive Approach Action Plan.

3.   The Nations, through the International Military Staff, tasked (Ref. D) the NATO Strategic Commands to develop a Concept for Security Force Assistance.

4.   The requirement to train and develop local forces capabilities, as part of NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach, has been underscored in recent operations. Although NATO has experience in providing assistance to local forces in crisis zones, there is no dedicated Allied doctrine to guide and synchronize efforts across the spectrum of possible conflict scenarios.

5.   As agreed by Nations at Lisbon Summit (Ref. E), comprehensive approach is best undertaken by those actors and organisations that have the relevant expertise, mandate, and competence.   Should such actors be hampered, NATO must have the ability to plan for, employ, and coordinate civilian as well as military crisis management capabilities that nations provide for agreed Allied missions.

6.   Security Force Assistance concept shall be considered as a plan included into a broader strategy, aimed at reinforcing the military capacities of some non-NATO nations and being currently conceptualized within the framework of the tasking on Defence and relevant Security Capacity Building (Ref. F).   This framework specifies in particular that support to nations except Allies and Partners should be upon request, within agreed resources, in complementarity with other international organisations (especially the UN and the EU), and open to contributions from Allies and partners, as appropriate.

AIM

7.   To provide NATO with a usable and useful framework to train and develop local forces in crisis zones.

SCOPE

8.   The Security Force Assistance Concept describes in a comprehensive manner NATO support to the generation and development of sustainable local forces in crisis zones.

9.   The MC-tasking (Ref. D) defines the following scope:

a.   "Train and develop" will encompass the generation, organization, training, enabling, advising and mentoring;

b.   "Local forces" will address indigenous, non-NATO military security forces;[1]

c.   "Crisis zones" will cover the geographical area where a NAC-approved NATO operation/mission is executed.

10.   While the training of non-military indigenous forces should be considered the primary responsibility of other relevant national or international organizations, there may be circumstances that preclude those organizations from immediately undertaking that responsibility. In such circumstances, NATO may decide to fill that gap until the conditions allow for the transfer of that responsibility to the appropriate organization.

11.   The Concept is aligned with related Allied joint publications (AJPs) and other relevant doctrinal work taken forward by Allies.

12.   The Concept does not cover any assistance to local forces that takes place through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) or similar programs[2].

13.   The implementation of the Security Force Assistance Concept is a political decision by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), following MC advice.

APPLICABILITY

14.   NATO Security Force Assistance activities require NAC approval.

15.   Security Force Assistance activities are conducted at all levels of operations (military strategic, operational, and tactical)[3].

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[1] Local forces as defined by IMSM-0470-2012 (Ref. D), except non-legitimized armed groups within crisis zones.

[2] Similar programs such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

[3] As defined by AJP-01(D) *Allied Joint Doctrine*, Paragraph 0113 through 0117.

16.   Security Force Assistance applies only where Host Nation[4] requests assistance to train and develop a local force in order to make it "...able to maintain security without international assistance".

17.   Security Force Assistance can be tailored to operations across the entire spectrum of crisis response scenarios and levels of threat.

APPROACH

18.   This Concept recognizes the need for a comprehensive approach, where NATO will be required to play its part in close coordination with, and sometimes in support of, other actors. It strives to capitalize on the history, experiences, and lessons learned from NATO operations, as well as from other key players involved in providing assistance to local forces. The Concept also emphasizes that there is no one-size-fits-all scenario and that each Security Force Assistance activity should be tailored to the local needs and conditions.

Part I – Security Force Assistance Framework

19.   This section outlines the framework for NATO Security Force Assistance, including key definitions, principles, and other important considerations. It also introduces the framework of assistance activities that have been developed out of multiple national approaches and reflects existing operational best practices. These activities may or may not occur in a sequential order and may or may not be conducted concurrently.

DEFINITION

20.   **NATO Security Force Assistance** encompasses all NATO activities that develop and improve or directly support the development of local forces and their associated institution[5].

CONCEPTUAL LINKAGES

21.   Security Force Assistance relates to and its implementation will impact upon other NATO concepts, policies and doctrines including the following:

22.   **Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO).**   NA5CRO "include multifunctional operations, falling outside the scope of Article 5, which contribute to conflict prevention and resolution or serve humanitarian purpose, and crisis management in the pursuit of declared Alliance objectives."[6] As NA5CRO may include the conduct of all types of military

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[4] According to MC 0334/2 (Ref. G) a Host Nation is "a Nation which, by agreement (Host Nation Support Arrangements like Memorandum of Understanding, Status of Forces Agreement etc.): 1. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory; 2. allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or 3. provides support for these purposes.

[5] For military forces the associated institution is the Ministry of Defence or the Nations equivalent institution.

[6] AJP-3.4(A) *Allied Joint Doctrine for non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*, October 2010.

activities, such as offence, defence, stability, and enabling[7], Security Force Assistance may play a pivotal role or merely contribute to the overall strategic aims of the operation.

23. **Security Sector Reform (SSR).** "SSR is the restoration or the transformation of a country's security institutions which includes all actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated effectively, legitimately and accountably in a manner that is more consistent with sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework."[8] When such a process is in place, Security Force Assistance might form or be part of NATO's contribution to SSR, which is led by the Host Nation with the support of the International Community. NATO Security Force Assistance activities ought to be fully planned and coordinated at all levels with the other SSR-involved actors to ensure comparative advantages. Security Force Assistance, when provided to indigenous, non-NATO military security forces, directly contributes to the Defence Reform which "is the transformation or development of defence organizations and institutions, including the appropriate oversight and management bodies, so that they play an effective, legitimate, and legally accountable role within the security sector. It is a key subset of security sector reform".[9]

24. **Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R).** In accordance with Paragraph 4 of Ref. I "S&R efforts address complex problems in fragile, conflict and post-conflict states. Stabilization and reconstruction efforts contribute to a comprehensive approach to crisis management and to complementarity, coherence and coordination of the international community's efforts towards security, development and governance." S&R can include the support of security sector reform, which in turn can require the provision of Security Force Assistance. Therefore, NATO may contribute to "S&R", should a program of this kind be conducted by relevant actors and include the support of "SSR". In that specific case, NATO's contribution to "S&R" would then follow the provisions of paragraph 23.

25. **Military Assistance (MA).** MA is a broad range of activities that support and influence critical friendly assets through training, advising, mentoring, or the conduct of combined operations (Ref. J). According to National policies and doctrines and/or circumstances, MA may be conducted by Special Operations Forces (SOF) or other military forces than SOF.

26. **Counter-insurgency (COIN).** COIN is defined as "the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances".[10] Security Force Assistance can form part of the military contribution to COIN.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE PRINCIPLES

27. The following principles provide guidance for the success of any Security Force Assistance mission. They are not in any particular order of priority.

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[7] AJP-3.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*, October 2009 describes military activities as offensive, defensive, stability, and enabling.

[8] Working definition as provided by Ref. H.

[9] Working definition provided by Ref. H

[10] AJP-3.4.4. *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN)*, February 2011.

28. **Host Nation Commitment.** Political and, if possible, financial commitment over the long term by the Host Nation is essential for the local ownership, and therefore success of the mission. The achievement of a desired end-state for Security Force Assistance activities is dependent on the agreement of a common plan.

29. **Political Primacy.** The commitment to security transition and the allocation of resources to conduct Security Force Assistance are intrinsically political decisions. Political primacy in both the local authorities/Host Nation and the Alliance is the key to effective security transition because it sets the conditions for co-operation and co-ordination across all the actors.

30. **Legitimacy.** It is essential that all Security Force Assistance actors and the local forces are viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the local population and the international community. Without legitimacy, the broader political objective will be undermined.

31. **Comprehensive Approach.** Provided that wider political and security conditions are addressed through a comprehensive approach by the international community, Security Force Assistance, when executed, might form or be part of NATO's contribution to the Defence Reform within such comprehensive approach. Security Force Assistance activities ought to be planned, executed and assessed through extensive coordination and cooperation among all relevant actors[11], especially the UN and the EU, in order to avoid duplication of efforts and competition.

32. **Local Ownership and Empowering Local Forces.** Security Force Assistance requires a specific mind-set focusing on empowering the local forces. Local forces be empowered to make their own decisions, learning from their successes and failures, to take local ownership for their own organization, preparation, planning and execution of operations to ensure sustainability. Building on effective results, local ownership must be appropriately fostered in order to facilitate the transfer of responsibilities to the local forces.

33. **Understanding.** An in-depth understanding of the operational and information environment and in particular the political, economic, social, gender, religious, cultural and organizational specifics of the Host Nation is critical to the planning and conduct of Security Force Assistance. Each Security Force Assistance plan must find an effective balance between NATO established best practices and Host Nation's needs, capabilities and traditions.

34. **Sustainability.** Planning for Security Force Assistance activities must consider local force capabilities in the long term. The local forces must be self-sustaining and enduring after the end of NATO's mission/operation. Sustainability must be considered with regards to Host Nation politics, organisations, processes and resources.

35. **Force Protection.** Security Force Assistance activities will require NATO forces to work closely with the local forces within the whole spectrum of threat levels. This gives rise to

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[11] Political Guidance (Ref. K, Paragraph 3): "NATO will undertake all its activities related to partners and international organisations in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the relevant decisions, including those taken at the Lisbon Summit."

specific security challenges, for example insider threat or medical support, which need to be addressed during the planning process. Threat levels must be taken into consideration and continuously assessed in both planning and executing Security Force Assistance in order to mitigate the risk involved in Security Force Assistance operations.

36.   **Strategic Communication.**   In conjunction with the Security Force Assistance activities, strategic communication should promote a positive perception of the Security Force Assistance mission within the local population as well as the international community. The strategic communication plan should promote visible, credible results with the aim of building trust and transparency.

37.   **Visible and Controlled Effectiveness.** Security Force Assistance is to produce visible, timely and credible results. It must contribute to the disengagement of the NATO forces that have been deployed. It requires the implementation of indicators of effectiveness.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE COORDINATION

38.   NATO will not be the only organisation providing assistance to the development of local forces or otherwise contributing to stabilization and reconstruction in the region. Therefore it is essential to ensure that coordination measures are in place, such as liaison officers; this will promote visibility, de-confliction and cooperation amongst the different organisations.

39.   Information sharing[12] is of great importance as one organization's good intentions may have unintended consequences on another. Additionally, NATO must build good working relationships with other local and international organisations in the area in order to leverage these to help fill shortfalls. This may help make the whole operation more efficient by avoiding duplication of effort.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES

40.   Security Force Assistance is comprised of the full spectrum of NATO assistance activities as listed below. Security Force Assistance may range from carrying out a single activity to executing some or all of them.   Each activity should be tailored to the local conditions and supported by well defined and agreed necessary resources. Activities do not necessarily occur in a sequential order and may or may not be conducted concurrently.

41.   **Generate**. This involves assisting a Host Nation to create a local force capability (a whole institution or a discrete function/capability) and includes selection, recruitment and vetting of local force personnel and determination of material requirement. It also may cover, if

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[12] Information sharing, when necessary, with International Organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations and Non NATO Nations will be in accordance with
   • C-M(2002)49, Security within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation;
   • C-M(2002)60, Policy on the Management of Non-Classified NATO Information;
   • C-M(2007)0018, NATO Information Management Policy;
   • Agreement between NATO and the European Union on the Security of Information, 14 Mar 2003.

required, re-generation, disbanding of an established local force and transforming it into a new one in support of a wider Disarmament, Demobilization, Re-integration (DDR) process.

42.   **Organize.** This activity encompasses measures taken to assist a Host Nation to shape its local force. Considerations may include (but are not limited to): C2 structure, functional areas, processes, retention, and career progression.

43.   **Train.** This includes all initiatives that contribute to education and training of the local force, both at the individual and collective level. A comprehensive training program should align with all stakeholders to ensure a coordinated approach.

44.   **Enable.** This activity assists the Host Nation by addressing shortfalls in their local force capability. Access to combat enablers/force multipliers, i.e. CIS, administrative and logistical support, must be regarded as a temporary measure pending the development of a sustainable Host Nation capability.

45.   **Advise.** Activities assisting the Host Nation by providing subject matter expertise and advice to local forces. Advising activities are applicable from the tactical to the strategic level and in support of individuals or groups.

46.   **Mentor.** Activities assisting the Host Nation by providing continuous guidance and counsel to specific individuals, teams or units until they are capable to function independently. Mentoring is normally focused on developing personnel in leadership and command positions.

47.   Advise and mentor activities may start right from the very beginning and be conducted throughout until the very termination of Security Force Assistance.

48.   Generate, Organise, Train, Enable, Advise and Mentor spell out 'GOTEAM' and therefore this mnemonic can be used, if desired, for communication purposes. If this is used, it should be made clear that the activities might not be sequential.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE ASSESSMENT

49.   Assessment is part of any NATO mission; however, there are two main types of assessment directly relevant to Security Force Assistance, both conducted in coordination with the Host Nation and other relevant actors:

    a.   Initial assessment of the requirements of the local forces and the shortfalls between their current and proposed capability. This includes the development of transition criteria and will help define the baseline against which assistance activity can be planned, executed and measured.

    b.   Regular assessments conducted to measure progress of the local force capabilities against the plan and the required level of NATO involvement.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE PLANNING

50.   The established NATO planning process applies to Security Force Assistance.

51.   Planning for the overall NATO contribution should consider which Security Force Assistance activities (Generate, Organize, Train, Enable, Advise and Mentor) are to be executed in order to meet the requirements and criteria agreed during the initial assessment.

52.   Detailed planning for specific activities should be done in coordination with the Host Nation and other relevant actors, for example a training plan would be discussed with the Host Nation.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE EXECUTION

53.   Security Force Assistance should be tailored to each situation. Core approaches are:

a.   Unit-oriented, where the focus is on improving the capability of a particular unit within the local force;

b.   Functionally-based, where the focus is on improving a specific capability (e.g. logistics);

c.   Military authorities/Key leaders – oriented, where the focus is on assisting to design and develop structures, systems, policies and programs, including activities conducted in other countries or in international training centres, as well as on identifying and improving the skills and capabilities of personnel in leadership roles.

d.   Any combination of the above.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE TRANSITION

54.   As the Host Nation, possibly supported by other international organizations, becomes increasingly self-sustainable and able to maintain its own security, the level of involvement of NATO in Security Force Assistance related activities will gradually decrease until the Security Force Assistance end state is reached. To achieve that end state, NATO should foster the creation of local mechanisms and capacities to assume the training and development of the local forces.

55.   Conditions for this transition will be based upon the outcome of the assessment process and will entail appropriate planning.

Part II – Implementation and Recommendations

56.   Below is the necessary initial guidance on concept implementation towards the development of a comprehensive, effective, efficient, and affordable security force assistance

capability. The implementation guidance and recommendations are provided through the DOTMLPFI[13] framework of capability elements.

DOCTRINE

57. The NATO Security Force Assistance Concept is the foundation for the development of a doctrinal document. Once approved, the Security Force Assistance framework will be incorporated in related AJPs.

58. In accordance with the MC-tasking, Ref. D, the term "local forces" has been used throughout the document. This addresses indigenous, non-NATO military security forces. According to Ref. I, there may be a requirement to fully support the security sector reform by training and mentoring police forces and advising local government officials in the areas of law and order and rule of law when other actors are hampered and unable to do so. These responsibilities normally lie with relevant actors, like the UN and the EU. Future conceptual development should take into account that NATO efforts in such a field should be articulated in complement with these actors.[14].

59. The Security Force Assistance doctrine custodian should take into consideration NATO agreed concepts spanning the entire military environment (Land, Maritime, Air and SOF).

60. The Security Force Assistance missions should not lead to the creation of new NATO structures or additional NATO financial spending. Any other arrangement will be consistent with the agreed framework on defence and relevant capacity building.

ORGANISATION

61. Within the existing means and capabilities, a network of SMEs to provide Security Force Assistance advice during the implementation and execution process, will be established at the Strategic Command level.

62. At the operational and tactical level, depending on the mission specific Security Force Assistance objectives, the commander should dedicate Security Force Assistance staff positions to plan and coordinate Security Force Assistance activities.

63. While the NATO C2 structure remains independent, the NATO Security Force Assistance functional organization should reflect the local forces command framework.

TRAINING

64. There are two aspects for education and training (E&T): The first is the E&T of NATO and possible non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) both individually and collectively in

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[13] Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Interoperability.
[14] The doctrinal work taken forward with *Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing* is to address part of this matter.

order to conduct the Security Force Assistance mission. The second is the activity of providing E&T to the local forces within the framework of a NAC approved operation/mission.

Education and Training for NATO and TCN

65.   There is a requirement to prepare TCN forces prior to a deployment in a Security Force Assistance role in accordance with Ref. L[15]. Pre-deployment training (PDT) is mainly a national responsibility. Unity of effort, interoperability and standardisation in the long term will be enhanced if Security Force Assistance becomes institutionalized within NATO. This can be achieved through a broad E&T package across all phases of training (e. g. Phase 1 – National; Phase 2 – NATO-sponsored; and Phase 3 – Entry into theatre).

66.   Within existing means and capabilities, an ACO Requirements Authority (RA) will be appointed to define and operationalize the Security Force Assistance training requirements. A SACT nominated Department Head (DH) will transform these requirements into educational courses or other programs.

67.   Inclusion and integration of Security Force Assistance aspects into NATO exercises will be determined either by the Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE) or by the Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE). In the first case it will be aligned with the priorities and guidance articulated in SACEUR's Annual Guidance on Education, Training, Exercise and Evaluation (SAGE), whilst in the second it will form a specific training objective in accordance with the operational requirements.

Education and Training for Local Forces

68.   Execution of Security Force Assistance necessitates a methodical approach in order to obtain the desired effects within a given timeframe. In order to capture all E&T requirements, as a method, the in-theatre commander can use the Bi-SC agreed global programming framework to facilitate the development of a local forces training program. Therefore the commander may elect to appoint staff members to develop a strategic training plan for the NATO E&T support to the local forces, assess and validate the training requirements and the training needs. The conclusions of these analyses will recommend the most suitable E&T solutions and venues (e.g. in-country or out of country) to meet the desired end state.

69.   Security Force Assistance will be considered throughout the Strategic and Operational OPLAN development processes. All necessary provisions should be included to facilitate access for the operational commander to NATO enablers to support his effort (to include out of theatre capacities if required) in the OPLAN.

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[15] MC 0458/2 Para 62 states "Based on MC endorsement and Council approval, NATO may be required to train host nation or indigenous security forces or individuals. In such circumstances, NATO may develop individual and collective training opportunities for Alliance personnel deploying in a capacity to support the training of those forces. If such a training opportunity exists, Alliance personnel are required to attend NATO-led training prior to deployment to ensure standardisation and unity of effort."

MATERIAL

70.   No additional NATO equipment is required to develop the NATO Security Force Assistance capability. However, donors may contribute material to equip the local forces. If appropriate, NATO should be ready to harmonize with donors of material and synchronise the non-NATO nation equipping programs to ensure that supply processes can sustain the equipment. NATO may be requested to support the delivery of and training on this equipment as a complementary part of Security Force Assistance activities.

71.   Care should be taken when donating new or used equipment to ensure that it fulfils HN needs, is interoperable, sustainable and does not adversely impact on the local economy. In addition, as a military body NATO has neither the organic capability nor the authority to provide funds or equipment as part of a Security Force Assistance programme. However, it may, as appropriate, identify, coordinate, facilitate or advise on related projects implemented or funded by individual Allies, third States or international organizations, under their responsibility.

LEADERSHIP

72.   NATO Leadership at all levels has to be aware of the importance of Security Force Assistance as a tool contributing to mission success. This will be addressed in the development of the strategic training plan for Security Force Assistance E&T to NATO and TCN.

PERSONNEL

73.   TCN personnel deployed to conduct Security Force Assistance activities should be carefully selected as the environment is a multicultural and complex one.

74.   The Strategic Commands recommend the development of generic Security Force Assistance personnel profiles to assist TCN in identifying appropriate personnel to conduct Security Force Assistance activities in a NATO context. The generic profile could comprise an overview of professional, experience-related, E&T and language skills, essential qualifications and/or desirable qualifications.

75.   Taking into consideration that building up mutual trust with the local forces is time-demanding, longer tours should be considered to ensure continuity and success of effort.

FACILITIES

76.   When the situation allows, it is desirable to use local facilities where possible. This approach would support the overall strategic development and the establishment of a self-sustaining local forces organization.

INTEROPERABILITY

77.   The implementation of this concept and in particular the development of a doctrine and a generic E&T package will further enhance interoperability. This is in line with the Connected Forces Initiative.

Part III – Legal and Resources Considerations

LEGAL

Legal framework for the mission

78.   The assistance provided to local forces must be both based on the necessary legal standards and approved by the NAC.

79.   As any other NATO operation/mission, Security Force Assistance is subject to National constraints.

80.   In addition, the status of the personnel providing the assistance, and the functional relationship with the local authorities and the training audience must be determined in a written agreement with the Host Nation (SOFA or any other applicable agreement).

Legal consistency of Security Force Assistance activities

81.   The assistance provided to local forces must promote the knowledge and respect of applicable bodies of Law.

RESOURCES

82.   For Security Force Assistance as an operational activity all associated costs would have to be borne according to the principle of "costs lie where they fall".

83.   To save resources and efforts, coordination with other donor organisations should take place.   For the best coordination of Security Force Assistance activities, any specific agreement (donations, procurements, training, etc.) between an Ally and the HN should be reported to NATO authorities.

84.   The HN will be encouraged to pay for its own training using its own budget.

85.   Any TCN pre-deployment training events would need to be funded nationally, unless Alliance Operations and Missions (AOM) funding is specifically granted. Exercises could be funded via the Military Training and Education Program (MTEP) or Exercise Budget User Group (eBUG) processes.