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B-7010 SHAPE - BELGIQUE

SHJ7/TTX/AN/09 - 206552

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SUBJECT: Lessons Identified on NATO Logistics Support to ISAF

DATE: 24 April 2009

REFERENCE: JALLCCG/09/022, JALLC Report on NATO Logistics Support to ISAF, dated 02 Mar 09.

1. At the Reference, as part of the 2008 JALLC Programme of Work (POW), JALLC has developed a report on NATO Logistics Support to ISAF. The initiator was ACT DACOS LOG. SHAPE, JFC Brunssum and HQ ISAF were the other major stakeholders.
2. The lessons identified in the report have been staffed at SHAPE and, consequently, the lead entities for endorsed recommended actions have been established (see Enclosure 1). HQ SACT is the lead command to address the recommended action under serial 1 (NATO LLD b 866).
3. Based on the endorsed recommendations, each action body is to develop an action plan in order to implement the recommended actions. SHAPE J7 will monitor the implementation of the action plans and report on their status regularly until completion.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE:

  
Karl-Heinz Lather  
General, DEU A  
Chief of Staff

Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre - Registry -
Date-in: 03/07/09
Mail-Log-No: 356/09

ENCLOSURE:

1. Lessons Identified in the JALLC Report on NATO Logistics Support to ISAF

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JALLC Report on NATO Logistics Support to ISAF - LESSONS IDENTIFIED

SRL	TITLE	OBSERVATION	DISCUSSION	CONCLUSION	RECOMMENDATION	SHAPE COMMENTS AND ENDORSEMENT	ACTION BODY	Suspense Date
1	Lack of Participation in LOGREP / LOGUPDATE	Not all Troop Contributing Nations (TCN), Regional Commands (RC), or Air Points of Departure (APOD) in ISAF participate in LOGREP / LOGUPDATE. Furthermore, the data which is provided is often incomplete. This decreases the utility of this software and the value of this system to NATO. LOGREP/LOGUPDATE do not achieve their purpose as envisioned by NATO doctrine.	<p>Doctrine: Use of LOGREP/LOGUPDATE is required by Bi-SC Directive 80-3, Logistics Reports, Volume 5, 01 January 2000 and JFC-Brunssum OPLAN 30302, Revision 3, 07 January 2008.</p> <p>In Dec 2007 and Jan 2008 correspondence from HQ ISAF and SHAPE identified problems obtaining LOGREP/LOGUPDATE reports from nations participating in ISAF. Similar findings were identified during the NRF Exercise STEADFAST JAGUAR 2006, (as described in a JALLC Report "Execution of the JLSG Concept, 1710.13/JALLCEX/003.06, 27 October 2006") and also during a SHAPE Study which described LOGREP use in KFOR / SFOR ("2030/SHLLR/DHCE/11703-97274, 28 Feb 2003").</p> <p>Entries in the NATO Lesson Learned Database (#380, 573, and 865) each indicate problems associated with the NATO Logistic software system.</p> <p>In Nov 2008 JFC-Brunssum reported to the LOGREP Working Group that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Two of five Regional Commands do not submit LOGREP / LOGUPDATES.</li> <li>-One of two major APODs does not submit LOGREP / LOGUPDATES data.</li> <li>-Most national elements in RCs failed to upgrade the LOGREP software on their computers. Two RC HQs had not updated their LOGREP software, and two RCs and one APOD did not have LOGREP software on their machines.</li> <li>-As observed at several NATO J4 staff sections, LOGREP/LOGUPDATE reports are not used or analyzed, but other reports from ISAF in plain text are being utilized and shared.</li> <li>-Although there are several factors (Personnel, Training, and Material issues) which can contribute to a lack of national participation. Of note, LOGREP / LOGUPDATE were not designed to be interoperable with National LOG Systems.</li> </ul>	<p>NATO Policy and Doctrine states that LOGREP / LOGUPDATE participation is required by TCNs in NATO led operations.</p> <p>National participation is one method to measure support for NATO programs, and historically, national participation with LOGREP has been inadequate, in SFOR, KFOR, in NRF exercises and ISAF.</p> <p>Lack of participation and incomplete LOGREP / LOGUPDATE data limits the validity and utility of these reports and cannot meet NATO's doctrinal expectations as once envisioned.</p> <p>There is a disconnect between the policy and doctrine requiring LOGREP and its use. A business analysis could address this disconnect in order to improve the link between NATO Doctrine and operational practice.</p>	<p>ACT should request a detailed business analysis and evaluation to reassess the utility of LOGREP.</p>	<p>SHAPE does not agree with the deductions made in the JALLC report, since the process itself seems to be misunderstood.</p> <p>The report states that the value of LOGREP to each level of command in NATO is undetermined because the accuracy, completeness and currency of national data provided cannot easily be verified, and because there is limited participation using this reporting tool. However, LOGREP is designed for planning purposes and not for NSN reporting. Furthermore, not the accuracy and completeness of national data provision is the main issue of concern, it is the understanding in terms of the purpose of a LOGUPDATE and the willingness and acceptance by Nations to provide the required information.</p> <p>The recommendation need to be adjusted as follows: The LOGUPDATE report will achieve its full effectiveness only through the establishment, maintenance and transfer of logistics core database (LOGBASE) information whereas nations have to provide correct data. Then LOGREP will display its full capabilities.</p>	HQ SACT	TBD

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2	Logistics arrangements in ISAF	A centralized approach to Class I (Food and Water) and Class III (Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants) support in ISAF provides economy of scale and increases asset visibility. Logistics support in ISAF is dominated by national support / national arrangements.	Nations can select available NATO support arrangements or make their own. Whilst national support arrangements dominate Supply in ISAF, the exceptions are Class I and Class III. National elements in HQ ISAF, Kandahar Airfield (KAF), and Kabul International Airport (KAIA) use NATO contracts for Class I and III support. Similarly, NATO ensures Class III support to the majority of ISAF. This demonstrates collective responsibility for logistics support at work between NATO and nations in accordance with NATO Policy (MCM 319-2). Class I support is most frequently provided by contractors to NATO forces in Afghanistan. Field rations are generally provided by the TCN or national agreements. HQ ISAF and KAIA are covered by one contract created by JFC-Brunssum. NAMSA created a separate contract for KAF. Class III is supplied by contracts arranged by NATO for ISAF created by JFC-Brunssum. NATO pays only for the quantity of fuel delivered. Major risk in transit is assumed by the contractor. The number of national and NATO contracts may not be the most cost effective approach in-theatre. A single contracting Agency can provide: - Economy of scale for NATO and for the Nations. - Increased asset visibility for NATO Commanders.	National support arrangements dominate Supply in ISAF, but Class I and III are exceptions. NATO arrangements for Class I support to HQ ISAF, KAF and KAIA, and NATO functioning as the Lead Agency for Class III provides economy of scale and asset visibility.	NATO (ACO) should promote the use of a Lead Agency approach when feasible	Recommendation not Endorsed. There are two basic contract mechanisms for operations: either national or NATO funded. National funded contracts are quite rightly managed by the nation concerned. NATO funded contracts are awarded by authorised NATO J8 staff in the relevant headquarters or the Theatre Allied Contract Organisation. In the case of NATO contracts they are managed by the Theatre Head of Contracts (THOC) or by a contract integrator – such as NAMSA for NRF and some ISAF contracts. Current OPLANS describe the coordination and de-confliction role of J8 THOC. Hence policy, guidance and capabilities already exist and are employed in ISAF.  No further action is required.	Not Applicable	Not Applicable

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3	Multinational sharing of a Class V storage site	<p>Multinational logistics support is a tool which can enhance efficiency and effectiveness, NATO's goal as described in MC319/Z, NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics. One example of this approach is multinational Class V (Ammunition) storage. Multinational storage can be found in RC-Capital, RC-North and RC-South in ISAF.</p>	<p>Class V (Ammunition) is a national supply responsibility, and Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) generally maintain their own Class V Ammunition Supply Point (ASP). However, multinational Class V storage sites are found in RC-Capital, RC-North and RC-South. The ASPs shared by TCNs in RC Capital, RC North, and RC South represent good practice by implementing NATO doctrine for multinational support. This reduces the overall logistics footprint and optimizes resources for administration and security by reducing the number of troops required to guard multiple sites, and improves the capability to secure the storage points. These sites could serve as models for future NATO operations.</p> <p>NATO Logistics Principles envision multinational / mutual support mechanisms as a vehicle to achieve greater economy of scale, to increase reserve capacity and to improve overall support. Class V storage facilities would be a logical opportunity for multinational cooperation where security, and administrative issues can be resolved. Despite NATO standard calibres of ammunition, sharing ammunition is a rare occurrence that typically Shared ASPs can reduce the overall NATO logistics</p>	<p>NATO doctrine envisions multinational / mutual support mechanisms as a vehicle to achieve greater economy of scale, to increase reserve capacity and to improve overall support. The ASPs in RC-Capital, RC-North, and RC-South, represent good practice by implementing NATO doctrine for multinational support, reducing the overall logistics footprint, the amount of troops to guarding the site and increasing the capability to secure the storage points. These sites could serve as models for future NATO operations.</p>	<p>NATO (ACO) should promote Multinational Class V storage facilities to reduce the overall logistics footprint where security and risk management factors make this feasible.</p>	<p><b>Recommendation Endorsed.</b> Recommendation agreed in principle and already under action in ISAF but there is no requirement to update AJP 4.9 for this specific commodity. AJP4.9 sets out the policy and principles for the use of the various types of multinational logistic modes. It is not designed nor intended as a means of describing all the functional multinational logistic options. NATO and nations should adopt the multinational solutions that are appropriate for the prevailing operational circumstances. JFC Brunssum and ISAF OPLANS note the requirement for RCs to promote multinational logistic cooperation within their regions hence there is no need to reiterate these policies.</p>	<p>SHAPE J4 JFC Brunssum HQ ISAF</p>	TBD