Joint Logistics Support Group Standard Operating Procedure

700

Joint Logistics Support Group - General
(JLSG General)

Drafted by:	FCMD	Version:	V 3
Authorized by:	COS SHAPE	Latest Update:	15 Oct 2011
Release date:	01 Dec 2011		

References:

A MC 317/1 - NATO Force Structure
B MC 319/2 - NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics
C MC 0526 - Logistics Support Concept for NATO Response Force (NRF) Operations
D AJP-4(B) - Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine
E AD 80-96 - NRF Directive (31 Jan 11)
F JLSG SOPs Serial 700

Content:

Amendment Record:

Serial	Amendment Number	Date
01	Version 0	28 Nov 08
02	Version 1	01 Jul 10
03	Version 2	14 Jan 11
04	Version 3	01 Dec 11
05		
06		

Related SOP:

701	JLSG CSE
704	JLSG Operations

INTRODUCTION

1. Potential NATO missions require robust and agile logistic forces capable of providing effective and efficient support to all elements of the deployed force. Pressure on limited resources such as strategic lift and in-country support will always be considerable and it is therefore vital that the appropriate logistic support is provided with the minimum amount of personnel and equipment, i.e. by reducing the overall logistic footprint. Key to this is acceptance of collective responsibility (NATO and nations) for logistics, creating unity of effort and command at the theatre level1 of logistic support, based on a joint and multinational approach.

2. To meet the logistic challenges of future Operations NATO has decided to establish a JLSG designed to act as the executive body for delivery of the necessary support, which is subordinate, tasked and commanded by the Joint Force Commander (JF COM). As such, the JLSG is a combination of HQ and logistic capabilities/units, responsible for accomplishing the RSOM process and the overall provision of coordination of the logistics support of the deployed joint force. The strength and composition of the JLSG will be tailored to meet operational demands of the actual situation. Information management remains also a key enabler.

3. The overall purpose of establishing the JLSG is to enhance the ability to control and coordinate logistic effort, including medical and engineering. Through a combination of directly assigned units and collocated functional logistic elements, the JLSG HQ will exercise OPCON (or the C2 relationship granted by the providing nation) over its assigned units and as a minimum, logistic control[2] (LOGCON) as the lowest degree of command and control over the assigned NSEs. As part of this it is envisaged that theatre logistic operations will be grouped together as far as is practicable, with NSEs (preferably) collocated in the Theatre Logistic Base (TLB) with assigned units and others logistic units as CSS for instance. The TLB will be formed out of the first unit lower in line (hierarchy) and will be reinforced with capacities and capabilities as required. The overall staff responsibility will remain within JLSG HQ.

AIM

4. To provide an overview of JLSG, operations in support of NATO Operations, organisation and structure.

SCOPE

5. This SOP describes the JLSG theatre logistics support requirements, organisation and functional area specifics across the spectrum of potential NATO operations.

6. JLSG, as part of an expeditionary force, must be capable of deploying quickly, and of operating as a stand-alone force using embedded logistics capabilities. These

---

[1] Also referred to as 3rd level or line logistics, this relates to those functions that can more effectively be combined at theatre level, for example in order to achieve economies of scale, but does not detract from individual Component Commands' direct responsibilities for providing support at unit or formation level, i.e. 1st and 2nd level/line.

[2] "That authority granted to a NATO Commander over assigned logistic units and organisations in the theatre, including National Support Elements (NSEs), that empowers him to synchronise, prioritise, and integrate their logistic functions and activities to accomplish the joint theatre mission. It does not confer authority over the nationally-owned resources held by an NSE, except as agreed in the Transfer of Authority or in accordance with the NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics."

embedded capabilities - including sustainment supplies - must be allocated and available to the force during its full rotation. To enhance responsiveness and agility, the required level of supplies to accompany the force (Accompanying Supplies (AS)) during initial deployment, with the balance arriving as Follow-On Supplies (FOS), must be determined during the operational planning process for the individual operation. NATO forces must also be capable of supporting operations beyond 30 days if re-supplied. These extended operations must also plan for regeneration of personnel and equipment, as required. Since Host Nation Support (HNS) may not be available in the Area of Operations (AOO), TCNs must ensure that sufficient deployable support enablers are provided, proportional to the overall troop contribution, in support of operations.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT CONCEPT

7. To provide the logistics support to the operational requirements, JLSG support forces must be useable and available, and as cohesive, flexible, tailorable and agile as the force itself. To achieve this versatility and agility, the JLSG must operate under the principle of Unity of Effort and should adhere to the maximum extent possible to Unity of Command by reducing national or component support stovepipes and increasing multinational joint logistics cooperation. As the JLSG Commander assumes more responsibility for theatre-level logistics, to include greater reliance on multinational solutions, there should be a corresponding reduction in the size of NSEs. Nations need only to provide through their NSE those functionalities which are not carried out at the theatre level. Redundancy and competition for scarce resources has to be avoided. Nations are to be encouraged in this case to look for multinational solutions. Because the NATO Response Force (NRF) will be pre-generated to meet the requisite readiness timelines, planners will be better able to develop multinational support solutions prior to its stand-by period. Pre-generation will also permit the certification of the effectiveness of these multinational solutions to meet the military requirement.

8. The Operational Environment.

   a. NATO Operational Concepts clearly anticipate the requirement to deploy away from Alliance territory into an austere environment. NATO Commanders therefore should make maximum use of HNS or In Country Resources (ICR) where available, and efficient integration of commercial support solutions.

   b. The JLSG faces a myriad of potential deployment options. Poor infrastructure, long intra-theatre movement, challenging climate and terrain all must be anticipated in the preparation of strategic and operational guidance to provide the necessary flexibility for force tailoring and operational planning once the precise mission and area of operations is identified.

   c. The logistic support for each operation will be designed to provide efficient, effective support by deploying only what is needed for the operation. It is possible that only the JLSG or a single component commander may be deployed (e.g., immediate response to a natural disaster) and will be responsible for in-theatre logistics. In fact, it is conceivable that a unit or element assigned to a NATO mission may be deployed with its integral logistics support only, when the situation dictates.

   d. Most military operations today will be joint or are potentially joint in nature. This has significant logistical implications and all sustainment solutions must therefore appreciate the complexities of the joint dimension. “Thinking joint” is necessary even if the mission begins as a single component operation. Joint logistics also implies planning for the most efficient utilisation of assets with

components taking on force-wide responsibilities. Truly joint and combined theatre logistics will increase efficiency without sacrificing effectiveness by avoiding competition between components and/or between contributing nations. It will allow the commander to allocate possibly scarce resources where necessary to achieve the required operational effect. In order for the JF COM to optimise the logistic effort, the force requires integrated logistics with a command and control structure that can properly plan and coordinate RSOM and theatre sustainability, as well as maintain the visibility of assets.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

9. Command and control is by default mission driven, and thus logistics command and control structure will be developed for each operation as it arises. This will ensure that the logistics C2 structure is tailored to the requirement and prevent the deployment of a large C2 structure that may not be needed for a small operation. In fact, the ability of commanders and logistics staff officers to adapt the arrangements outlined in this document for specific operations will be the key to success.

10. The JF COM with its JHQ Main is responsible for logistics planning. These plans should be co-ordinated with the Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) wherever possible. Execution will be conducted through the JLSG HQ. The JLSG COM will have Command and Control of the units, which will execute these logistics activities. For operations and exercises, he will apply OPCON (or the C2 relationship granted by the providing nation) over force elements assigned to the JLSG CJSOR and as a minimum LOGCON over assigned NSEs and he will also provide tactical level logistic direction and guidance to the Force during the operations.

11. To achieve this all assigned logistics units at the theatre level and not organic to tactical level formations should be provided to the JLSG Commander under the same level of control (most preferable OPCON) as the combat forces to the CCs. Logistics Control (LOGCON) is the minimum C2 authority required to ensure seamless integration and reliable service provision If the situation requires or necessitates the usage of Logistic Lead Nation (LLN) or Logistic Role Specialist Nation (LRSN) the appropriate level of command (minimum LOGCON) should be assigned to COM JLSG.

12. The JF COM, through the JLSG, must also have sufficient control of the national logistics forces deployed in the JOA to maintain unity of command and effort. Nations and NATO may agree to a graduated Transfer of Authority (TOA) to ensure that the JLSG Commander is assigned LOGCON, to include location and control of intra theatre movements of the NSEs and prioritisation of units designated to receive support from its respective NSE.

13. The JLSG Commander is responsible for all Joint Logistic Support Areas (JLSA[3]). The JLSG HQ is not manned or equipped to carry out the multifunctional responsibilities as a (joint enabling / joint rear) area commander. If a (joint enabling / joint rear) area is assigned, most of the logistics functions of the JLSG are likely to

[3] The JLSA is the area where theatre level logistic functions are consolidated in logistic sites (e.g. SPOD, APOD, FLS, TLB, CSC etc.) to achieve increase of effectiveness, efficiency and unity of command under the JLSG. The JLSG is inter alia responsible for coordination of force protection, CIS, RLS including medical support etc. at these sites.

occur in this area. As a result it is essential that the command relationship between the JLSG and the (joint enabling / joint rear) area command be designated in the OPLAN.

14. In cases where the JLSG HQ is the first or only joint HQ in theatre, the C2 structure and additional responsibilities must be defined before deployment as part of the planning process. These additional responsibilities will require further augmentation of the JLSG HQ from JHQ Main and/or JHQ FE. In particular, the JLSG HQ must have sufficient authority (as a minimum TACON) over deploying forces to execute RSOM effectively. The JLSG HQ must be capable of maintaining situational awareness at the operational level whilst at the same time executing actual logistic support at the tactical level. The JLSG HQ must therefore continue to develop its character as a command HQ, but without losing the essence of its functional purpose.

15. **Air operations**. While the air component command (ACC) is directly responsible for the tasking of all fixed wing (FW) aircraft in theatre, the JLSG HQ will coordinate intra-theatre airlift system (ITAS) in close liaison with the ACC and prioritise the requirement for transportation. This may also include ACC rotary wing (RW) aircraft and even land and maritime component command (LCC and MCC) RW assets as available and if necessary.

16. **Maritime operations**. To support the maritime component commands (MCC) under OPCON of the JLSG HQ is the FLS and ALSS. In order to enhance the joint support concept both the FLS and the ALSS should be collocated within the SPOD to control the distribution and flow of personnel, mail and cargo (PMC). Other maritime assets such as support ships capable of assisting with surface transport and other logistic support functions may also be assigned to the JLSG. In this case the JLSG has direct liaison authority (DIRLAUTH) with the MCC for the usage of these capabilities.

17. **Land operations.** Close cooperation regarding Main Supply Routes (MSRs), to the LCC is required due to the fact that the LCC is the owner of the roads in its AOO (which means they will take care of e.g. repair, recovery and SNIC teams) and JLSG is the unit to control the movements on these roads. Details must be specified in the OPLAN with emphasis on movement control and convoy/force protection

18. A strong relationship between the JLSG HQ and the deployed Component Commands (CCs) is essential for effective theatre support. The JLSG HQ will assign liaison officers responsible for integrating the service contributions to the joint mission. Details will be laid down in SOP 701.01.

PRINCIPLES OF LOGISTIC OPERATIONS

19. One of the key principles of logistics operations is the primacy of the operational requirement to ensure mission success. There must be close coordination between the operational staffs and JLSG HQ logistics staffs at all stages of the operation. From initial deployment planning through to recovery planning, the logistics plans must aim to meet the operational requirement. Operational plans must reflect logistic realities and this may sometimes result in the allocation of priorities. This same interdependence can exist during the earliest stages of the strategic movement of personnel and equipment to the theatre when strategic movement assets may be limited. It is crucial that the JLSG command and control structure be established with sufficient authority and be functioning at the earliest stages of the operation in order

to assist SHAPE and TCNs in such de-confliction. This necessitates that logistics units and stocks be at the same readiness levels as the force that they are to support. Some essential enablers (RSOM assets, engineers, medical, etc.) may need to be at a higher readiness for the force to meet its requirements.



Basic flow of goods

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

20. The JLSG HQ is not designed to be a long term planning HQ and has limited short term planning capabilities. It is absolutely apparent that the HQ, as the primary theatre level logistic practitioner and in spite of the small number of personnel permanently available to provide the necessary input, must be involved in the Operational Planning Process (OPP) for any potential NATO deployment from the outset. This includes representation on the Operational Liaison and Recce Team (OLRT) through Joint Logistics Recce Team (JLRT) in advance of any actual operation. Similarly, even though strategic deployment is a JF COM/SHAPE responsibility, the JLSG HQ must also be closely involved in the development of the Multinational Detailed Deployment Plan (MNDDP).

21. The requirement for, and deployment of, the JLSG HQ will be determined as part of the OPP, and will be spelt out in any resulting OPLAN. In the case of an Initial Entry Operation (IEO), it could be deployed initially to the Forward Mounting Base (FMB) to facilitate deployment into theatre. In most other land-based missions the JLSG HQ, and its associated key JLSG enablers, will probably be deployed early into theatre, perhaps at the same time as or even prior to any JHQFE, in order not only to conduct RSOM, but also conceivably to act as the overall coordinator of the theatre activation process, particularly with regard to such major facilities as the SPOD.

22. The JLSG HQ must have the appropriate delegated negotiating, financial and contractual authority and capability to make the necessary agreements. Utilizing

contractual solutions (Basic Contractual Instruments, BCIs), pre-arranged by NAMSA contributes to the timely delivery of logistics services (fuel, food, water, etc). Further contracted support (accommodation, camp services, sanitation etc) will be required in line with the operational characteristics. To ensure maximum efficiency NAMSA will provide contracting personnel within the JLSG.

OPERATIONS

23. RSOM/Reverse RSOM

RSOM is an essential stage of any expeditionary operation. It transitions deploying forces (personnel, equipment and materiel) into forces capable of meeting the operational requirements. Because arriving troops have not yet re-formed into mission capable forces, RSOM must take place in a permissive environment as provided by security and force protection measures. RSOM units and other critical enablers will be required to enter the JOA before the main body and should be identified in the OPLAN.

The JLSG HQ will conduct RSOM during the deployment phase using its assigned units, but the responsibility for Integration will lie with the deploying units' parent CCs. At the same time, the TLB will be built up to provide the core of sustainment support to the force. This will involve not only storage of the necessary stocks, but also building ammunition, fuel and other storage areas, and ensuring freedom of movement within the JLSA. The JLSG HQ will also establish the appropriate logistic coordination mechanisms as soon as possible and deploy its medical capabilities.

Further details are described in SOPs 704 (Operations) and 705 (RSOM/ Reverse RSOM).

24. Sustainment

The NATO Force Commander must develop a comprehensive sustainment plan to meet the pre-defined stand-alone requirement (tailored to the mission). To maximise the operational flexibility, sustainment systems should aim to establish a network comprised of a set of logistics nodes. These nodes provide the structure for a distribution-based system where requirements are generated through highly accurate predictive models or automated requisitions. This will enable the JLSG HQ and subordinate elements to deliver sustainment stocks forward to the components as they are needed. Tactical units would then be supplied from those stocks as determined by the Components.

As soon as possible after deployment, the JLSG HQ will set up the routine sustainment system, processing all daily demands and passing them to the TLB HQ to assemble the necessary convoys.

25. A real-time Recognized Logistic Picture (RLP)

JLSG has to provide a daily RLP in order to give the commander greater adaptability, speed and agility of the force while minimising the logistics footprint in theatre through sensor-driven, network-centric capabilities. Logistic Information Management (LIM) is the critical enabler for distribution-based sustainment systems to ensure that units have appropriate stocks at all times. Among other significant benefits, it allows the commander to appropriately control the phasing of deployment and RSOM to achieve desired effects and increase efficiency of multinational logistics formations that rely on national data to carry out their missions.

JLSG STRUCTURE

26. JLSG Theatre-level multinational logistics capabilities are:
    a. Water & rations provision
    b. Vehicle recovery
    c. Combined Joint Movement Control Units
    d. Intra-theatre Transportation
    e. Supply distribution
    f. Class I (food and water) storage and distribution
    g. Class V storage
    h. Fuel storage and distribution
    i. Contracting
    j. Medical (to include Medical Evacuation units (MEDEVAC))
    k. Camp Construction, Maintenance and Management (only for NATO common funded camps)
    l. Cargo Transfer Units
    m. Coordinating and organizing HNS
    n. Military Engineering
    o. Real Estate Control
    p. Movement Control on MSRs
    q. RSOM including Control of PODs
    r. Providing the Recognized Logistics Picture (RLP)

27. JLSG Organisation.

Structure of a generic JLSG



Relation of the generic structure JLSG to the IRF list of the NRF.

Line NRF/IRF FG List	Unit	Description	IRF/RFP	Code
xx.1.07.01	JLSG HQ	Joint Logistics Support Group HeadQuarters	IRF	JLSG HQ
xx.1.07.02	HQ SPT	Head Quarters Support Command	IRF	
	CIMIC	Civil Miltary Cooperation unit	RFP	
	PA	Public Affairs	RFP	
xx.1.07.02.1	RLS	Real Life Support unit	IRF	
xx.1.07.02.2	CIS	Communication Information Systems unit	IRF	
xx.1.07.02.3	FP	Force protection unit	IRF	
	TLB	Theatre Logistic Base	RFP	SUP-BN-HQ
	TPT	Transportation Batallion	RFP	TPT-BN-HQ
	CL I	Class I unit	RFP	SUP-H-COY
	Water	Water	RFP	MILENG-WAT
	CL III	Class III	RFP	SUP-POL-STO-MBFI
	CL V storage	Class V storage	RFP	SUP-A-COY
	ALSS	Advanced Logistics Support Site	RFP	N-ALSS
xx.7.01	RSOM	Reception Staging Onward Movement unit	IRF	RSOM-BN-HQ
xx.7.01.1	TPT	Transportation Unit	IRF	TPT-BN-HQ
xx.7.01.2	TMCC	Theatre Movement Control Centre	IRF	RSOM-TMCC
xx.7.01.3	MCT	Movement Control Team	IRF	RSOM-MCT
xx.7.01.4	CSC	Convoy Support Centre	IRF	RSOM-CSC
xx.7.01.5	CATO	Container Air Terminal Operations unit	IRF	RSOM-CATO
xx.7.01.6	POU	Port Operations Unit	IRF	RSOM-POU
xx.7.01.7	RAIL MGMT	Railway Operations Management	IRF	RSOM-RAIL
xx.7.01.8	TRC	Theatre Reception Centre	IRF	RSOM-TRC
xx.7.01.9	SASU	Staging Area Support Unit	IRF	RSOM-SAS
xx.7.01.10	FLS	Forward Logistics Site	IRF	N-FLS
xx.7.01.11	NAS	Navy Amphibious Small Ship	IRF	NAS
xx.7.01.12	NAL	Navy Amphibious Large Ship	IRF	NAL
xx.7.01.13	FP	Force Protection unit	IRF	
xx.7.02	MILENG	Military Engineering unit	IRF	ENG-GS-COY
	MED	Medical unit (Role 3 or Role 2E)	RFP	MED-R3 MED-R2E
	FP	Force protection unit	RFP	

28. JLSG HQ.

See JLSG SOP 701.