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# Public consultation on strengthening the quality of corporate reporting and its enforcement

Fields marked with \* are mandatory.

### Introduction

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High quality and reliable corporate reporting is of key importance for healthy financial markets, business investment and economic growth. The <u>EU corporate reporting framework</u> should ensure that companies publish the right quantity and quality of relevant information allowing investors and other interested stakeholders to assess the company's performance and governance and to take decisions based on it. High quality reporting is also indispensable for cross-border investments and the development of the <u>capital markets union (CMU)</u>.

In the context of this consultation, corporate reporting comprises the financial statements of companies, their management report that includes the non-financial and corporate governance statements and country-by-country reporting. It would also include sustainability information pursuant to the <u>proposed Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive</u>.

The consultation takes into account the outcomes of the 2018 consultation on the EU framework for public reporting by companies and the 2021 fitness check on the EU framework for public reporting by companies. This consultation however focuses on companies listed on EU regulated markets (hereafter 'listed companies' or 'issuers'), that is a subset of the companies subject to public reporting requirements under EU law. Please note that in terms of reporting, this consultation does not seek the views of stakeholders on the applicable accounting standards, such as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or the standards in the Accounting Directive, or the views of stakeholders on public country-by-country reporting or the Commission's proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive.

The 2018 consultation did not cover the areas of corporate governance or statutory audit. Therefore, this consultation contains questions to evaluate aspects of the <a href="Audit Regulation 537/2014">Audit Directive 2006/43/EC</a> and of <a href="Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU">Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU</a>. However, it covers the EU framework on corporate governance only in so far as relevant for corporate reporting by listed companies and the statutory audit of so-called public interest entities (PIEs). Listed companies, credit institutions, insurance undertakings and entities designated as such by Member States are PIEs.

This consultation also builds on the work carried out by the <u>European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)</u> and the <u>Committee of European Audit Oversight Bodies (CEAOB)</u>.

This consultation is divided into 5 parts

- The first part seeks your views about the overall impact of the EU framework on the three pillars of high quality and reliable corporate reporting - corporate governance, statutory audit and supervision. It also seeks your views about the interaction between the three pillars
- The second part of the questionnaire focuses on the corporate governance pillar, as far as relevant for corporate reporting. It aims to get your feedback in particular on the functioning of company boards, audit committees and your views on how to improve their functioning
- The third part focuses on the statutory <u>audit pillar</u>. The first questions in this part aim at getting your views on the
  effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of the EU audit framework. It focuses in particular on the changes
  brought by the <u>2014 audit reform</u>. Subsequently, the questions aim to seek views on how to improve the
  functioning of statutory audit
- The fourth part asks questions about the supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms
- Finally, the consultation will ask questions about the supervision of corporate reporting and how to improve it

This consultation will directly feed into an impact assessment that the Commission will prepare in 2022 with a view to possibly amend and strengthen the current EU rules.

Please note: In order to ensure a fair and transparent consultation process only responses received through our online questionnaire will be taken into account and included in the report summarising the responses. Should you have a problem completing this questionnaire or if you require particular assistance, please contact <u>fisma-corporate-reporting@ec.europa.eu</u>.

More information on

- this consultation
- the consultation document
- the consultation strategy
- company reporting
- the protection of personal data regime for this consultation

### **About you**

- \*Language of my contribution
  - Bulgarian
  - Croatian
  - Czech

0	Danish
	Dutch
•	English
	Estonian
	Finnish
0	French
0	German
0	Greek
0	Hungarian
	Irish
0	Italian
	Latvian
	Lithuanian
	Maltese
	Polish
0	Portuguese
0	Romanian
0	Slovak
0	Slovenian
0	Spanish
0	Swedish
*I am	giving my contribution as
0	Academic/research institution
	Business association
	Company/business organisation
	Consumer organisation
	EU citizen
	Environmental organisation
	Non-EU citizen
	Non-governmental organisation (NGO)
	Public authority
	Trade union
	Other

*First name			
Martin			
*Surname			
PARKES			
*Email (this won't be p	oublished)		
martin.parkes@blackro	ck.com		
*Organisation name			
255 character(s) maximum	,		
BlackRock			
*Organisation size			
Micro (1 to 9 en	nnlovees)		
Small (10 to 49			
	249 employees)		
<ul><li>Large (250 or n</li></ul>			
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*Country of origin			
Please add your country of	origin, or that of your organis	sation.	
Afghanistan	Djibouti	Libya	Saint Martin
Åland Islands	Dominica	Liechtenstein	Saint Pierre and
			Miquelon
Albania	Dominican	Lithuania	Saint Vincent
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Algeria	Ecuador	Luxembourg	Samoa
American Samo		Macau	San Marino
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			São Tomé and
			Príncipe
Angola	Equatorial Guine		Saudi Arabia
Anguilla	Eritrea	Malaysia	Senegal
Antarctica	Estonia	Maldives	Serbia
Antigua and	Eswatini	Mali Mali	Seychelles
Barbuda			
Argentina	Ethiopia	Malta	Sierra Leone
Armenia	Falkland Islands	Marshall Islands	3 1
Aruba	Faroe Islands	Martinique	Sint Maarten
Australia	° Fiji	<ul><li>Mauritania</li></ul>	Slovakia
Austria	Finland	Mauritius	Slovenia
Azerbaijan	France	Mayotte	Solomon Islands
Bahamas	French Guiana	Mexico	Somalia
Bahrain	French Polynesia	a Micronesia	South Africa
Bangladesh	French Southern	Moldova	South Georgia
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			Islands
Barbados	Gabon	Monaco	South Korea
Belarus	Georgia	Mongolia	South Sudan
Belgium	Germany	Montenegro	Spain
Belize	Ghana	Montserrat	Sri Lanka
Benin	Gibraltar	Morocco	Sudan
Bermuda	Greece	Mozambique	Suriname
Bhutan	Greenland	Myanmar/Burma	a Svalbard and
			Jan Mayen
Bolivia	Grenada	Namibia	Sweden
Bonaire Saint	Guadeloupe	Nauru	Switzerland
Eustatius and			
Saba			
Bosnia and	Guam	Nepal	Syria
Herzegovina			
Botswana	Guatemala	Netherlands	Taiwan
Bouvet Island	Guernsey	New Caledonia	Tajikistan
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Brazil	Guinea	New Zealand	Tanzania
<ul><li>British Indian</li><li>Ocean Territory</li></ul>	Guinea-Bissau	Nicaragua	Thailand
British Virgin	Guyana	Niger	The Gambia
Islands			
Brunei	Haiti	Nigeria	Timor-Leste
Bulgaria	<ul><li>Heard Island and McDonald Island</li></ul>		Togo
Burkina Faso	Honduras	Norfolk Island	Tokelau
Burundi	Hong Kong	Northern	Tonga
		Mariana Islands	
Cambodia	Hungary	North Korea	Trinidad and
			Tobago
Cameroon	Iceland	North Macedonia	a <sup>©</sup> Tunisia
Canada	India	Norway	Turkey
Cape Verde	Indonesia	Oman	Turkmenistan
Cayman Islands	Iran	Pakistan	Turks and
			Caicos Islands
Central African	Iraq	Palau	Tuvalu
Republic			
Chad	Ireland	Palestine	Uganda
Chile	Isle of Man	Panama	Ukraine
China	Israel	Papua New	United Arab
		Guinea	Emirates
Christmas Island	Italy	Paraguay	United Kingdom
Clipperton	Jamaica	Peru	United States
Cocos (Keeling)	Japan	Philippines	United States
Islands			Minor Outlying
			Islands
Colombia	Jersey	Pitcairn Islands	Uruguay
Comoros	Jordan	Poland	US Virgin Islands
Congo	Kazakhstan	Portugal	Uzbekistan
Cook Islands	Kenya	Puerto Rico	Vanuatu
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Costa Rica	Kiribati	Qatar	Vatican City
<ul><li>Costa Rica</li><li>Côte d'Ivoire</li></ul>		<ul><li>Qatar</li><li>Réunion</li></ul>	<ul><li>Vatican City</li><li>Venezuela</li></ul>

	Croatia		Kuwait		Romania		Vietnam
0	Cuba		Kyrgyzstan	0	Russia	0	Wallis and Futuna
0	Curaçao	0	Laos	0	Rwanda		Western Sahara
	Cyprus		Latvia		Saint Barthélemy		Yemen
0	Czechia	©	Lebanon		Saint Helena Ascension and Tristan da Cunha	© 1	Zambia
0	Democratic Republic of the Congo	0	Lesotho		Saint Kitts and Nevis	0	Zimbabwe
	Denmark		Liberia		Saint Lucia		
* Is yo	our organisation a public interest of A public interest of A listed company  None of the above the Don't know / not a	enti e	ty	or a	ı listed company?		
* Role	in the corporate re	еро	rting market				
0	Preparer of corpo	rate	e reporting				
0	User of of corpora	ate	reporting				
0	Preparer and use	r of	corporate reporti	ng			
	Statutory auditor						
0	Accounting profes	ssic	onal				
0	Supervisor						
0	None						
0	Other						
* Field	I of activity or sector	or (i	if applicable)				
	Accounting						
	Auditing						
	Banking						
	Credit rating ager	ncie	es				
	Insurance						
	Pension provision	1					

<b>V</b>	Investment management (e.g. hedge funds, private equity funds, venture
	capital funds, money market funds, securities)
	Market infrastructure operation (e.g. CCPs, CSDs, Stock exchanges)
	Other financial services (e.g. advice, brokerage)
	Social entrepreneurship
	Trade repositories
	Other
	Not applicable

The Commission will publish all contributions to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would prefer to have your details published or to remain anonymous when your contribution is published. Fo r the purpose of transparency, the type of respondent (for example, 'business association, 'consumer association', 'EU citizen') country of origin, organisation name and size, and its transparency register number, are always published. Your e-mail address will never be published. Opt in to select the privacy option that best suits you. Privacy options default based on the type of respondent selected

### \*Contribution publication privacy settings

The Commission will publish the responses to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would like your details to be made public or to remain anonymous.

### Anonymous

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Only organisation details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published as received. Your name will not be published. Please do not include any personal data in the contribution itself if you want to remain anonymous.

### Public

Organisation details and respondent details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published. Your name will also be published.

I agree with the personal data protection provisions

# Part I - The EU framework for high quality and reliable corporate reporting

The EU framework for corporate reporting has developed significantly since the EU adopted the <u>fourth company law Directive (Directive 78/660/EEC)</u> which coordinated the national provisions on the presentation, content and publication of annual accounts and management reports of limited liability companies. This Directive also already required a statutory audit of the annual accounts of limited liability companies.

Today, the Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU, the Statutory Audit Directive (2006/43/EU) and Audit Regulation (537 /2014) and the Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC provide the main requirements that ensure the quality of corporate reporting and its enforcement in the EU. Moreover, the ESMA Regulation (EU)1095/2010 gives tasks to ESMA in relation to corporate reporting. Given the inclusion of the Transparency Directive in the scope of the ESMA Regulation ESMA can make use of its powers in the ESMA Regulation, such as to issue guidelines.

The main elements of this framework that guarantee the quality and reliability of corporate reporting can be summarised as follows

- Corporate governance:
  - Responsibility of company boards for corporate reporting; the establishment by PIE's of an audit committee to minimise risks and to enhance the quality of financial reporting
- A u d i t :
  The requirements for a statutory audit of the annual accounts to ensure that there are no material misstatements
- S u p e r v i s i o n :
   The supervision of statutory auditors and audit firms to ensure the quality of audits and the supervision of corporate reporting by listed companies to ensure the quality of corporate reporting

The three pillars of the corporate reporting framework can be mutually reinforcing. At the same time, weaknesses in one pillar also negatively impact other pillars. Appropriate responsibilities and supervision of company boards provide incentives to company boards to focus on the quality of their corporate reporting. It will also incentivise them to see statutory audit not as a burden, but as an important external check by statutory auditors. On the other hand, where company boards are insufficiently accountable and supervised, there is a risk that boards may pay insufficient attention to the quality of reporting and that they provide insufficient resources for a proper audit.

Question 1. As a user of corporate reporting (retail or wholesale investor, credit rating agency, NGO, public authority, employees, suppliers, other stakeholders), what is the relative importance of the information contained therein compared to other sources of information?

- 1 Very low
- 2 Low
- 3 Medium
- 4 High
- 5 Very high
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

Question 2. How do you assess the overall effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added value of the EU legislation, considering each of the pillars underpinning corporate reporting individually, but also in combination with each other?

#### a) Corporate governance

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	©	•	•
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	©	•	•	•	©	•
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	©	•	•	•	©	•
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	•	•	•	•	•	•

### b) Statutory audit

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	©	•	•	•	©	•

II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	©	•	•	©	©	•
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	©	•	•	•	•	•
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	©	•	•	•	•	•
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	•	•	©	©	©	•

### c) Supervision by public authorities of statutory auditors/audit firms

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Relevant in terms of	©	©	©	©	©	•

overall needs and objectives						
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	©	•	•	•	•	•
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	©	•	•	•	•	•

### d) Supervision by authorities of corporate reporting

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	©	•	•	•	•	•
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	©	•	•	•	•	•
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	©	•	•	•	•	•

V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	©	•	•	•	©	•

### e) The eco-system composed of all of the above

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	0	0	0	0	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	©	•	•	•	•	•
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	©	•	•	•	•	•
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	•	•	•	•	•	•

Question 2.1 Please describe the main issues that you see, if any, in the four areas mentioned in question 2 and in the eco-system composed of all four areas. Where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment.

You may want to consider the following aspects

- have any factors reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?
- is there room to improve efficiency via further simplification?
- are existing provisions coherent with each other?

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We note that the audit tender requirements in the Audit Directive and Regulation have not had the effect of increasing competition within the auditing industry as there has been limited opportunity for other firms to build up the scale and resources needed to compete with the leading firms.

We also note there is ongoing discussion in respect of the auditing of non-financial reporting where the provision of reliable, harmonized and audited reporting will be essential for the provision of quality ESG data. Investors are increasingly looking for the same quality of reporting (in terms of data and indicators) for ESG data as for financial data and thus would ultimately benefit from ESG data being audited by authorised entities.

The <u>ESMA report on enforcement and regulatory activities of European enforcers in 2020</u> notes that supervisors undertook the examination that year of 729 financial statements drawn up in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Based on these examinations, European enforcers took enforcement actions against 265 issuers in order to address material departures from IFRS. This represents an action rate of 38%.

As regards the audit sector the Commission's market monitoring report highlights deficiencies in audit firms' internal quality control systems, but also in individual files for audits of PIEs. National audit oversight bodies also report that part of statutory audits is not up to standards.

Question 3. Based on your own experience how do you assess the quality and reliability of corporate reporting by listed EU companies?

- 1 Very low
- 2 Low
- 3 Medium

5 - Very high
 Don't know / no opinion / not applicable
 Question 3.1 Please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment in question 3 and explain the consequences that the quality and reliability of corporate reporting or lack thereof has on you.
 2000 character(s) maximum including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

4 - High

nc	cluding spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Question 4. There are no generally accepted standards or indicators to measure the quality of corporate reporting and of statutory audit, nor the effectiveness of supervision. In light of this, what are your views on the following questions?

	<b>1</b> (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
Would it be useful to have specific indicators to measure the quality of corporate reporting, of statutory audits and the effectiveness of supervision?	©	©	•	©	©	•
Is it possible to have clear and reliable indicators to measure the quality of corporate reporting, of statutory audit and the effectiveness of supervision?	0	0	•	0	0	0
Should the European Commission develop indicators on the quality of corporate reporting, of statutory audits and the effectiveness of supervision?	0	0	•	0	0	0

Question 4.1 Please provide any further explanation supporting your views, and, where relevant, please suggest possible indicators of the quality and reliability of corporate reporting, statutory audit and supervision, where possible with concrete examples:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

In responding to this question we note that it is difficult to generalise at a pan EU level. Companies are responsible for ensuring they have appropriate governance structures to serve the interests of shareholders and other key stakeholders. We believe that there are certain fundamental rights attached to shareholding. Companies and their boards should be accountable to shareholders and structured with appropriate checks and balances to ensure that they operate in shareholders' best interests to create sustainable value.

BlackRock looks to companies to provide timely, accurate, and comprehensive disclosure on all material governance and business matters, including environmental, social, and governance (ESG)-related issues. This transparency allows shareholders to appropriately understand and assess how relevant risks and opportunities are being effectively identified and managed. Where company reporting and disclosure is inadequate or we believe the approach taken may be inconsistent with sustainable, long-term value creation, we will engage with a company and/or vote in a manner that encourages progress.

In particular, we believe that well-managed companies will deal effectively with material environmental and social ("E&S") factors relevant to their businesses. Governance is the core structure by which boards can oversee the creation of sustainable, long-term value. Appropriate risk oversight of E&S considerations stems from this construct. Robust disclosure is essential for investors to effectively evaluate companies' strategy and business practices related to material E&S risks and opportunities. Given the increased understanding of material sustainability risks and opportunities, and the need for better information to assess them, BlackRock will advocate for continued improvement in companies' reporting, where necessary, and will express any concerns through our voting where a company's actions or disclosures are inadequate.

Question 5. In your view, should the Commission take action in the areas of the corporate governance pillar, the statutory audit pillar, the supervision of PIE auditors and audit firms and the supervision of corporate reporting to increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?

- Yes, there is a need to improve the some or all of the areas listed above
- Yes, there is a need to improve some or all of the areas listed above as well as other areas
- No, but there is a need to improve other areas than those listed above
- No, there is no need to take further action in any area
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

Please indicate to what extent you think the Commission should take action in each of the areas below to increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies:

	<b>1</b> (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
Improve the corporate governance pillar	0	0	•	0	0	0
Improve the statutory audit pillar	0	0	•	0	0	0
Improve the supervision of PIE auditors and audit firms	0	0	0	0	0	•
Improve the supervision of corporate reporting	0	0	0	0	0	•

# Question 5.1 Please provide any further explanation supporting your views, and where appropriate describe what actions you would prioritise and why, with concrete examples:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We believe that, to advance long-term shareholders' interests and particularly in terms of improving the corporate reporting pillar, companies should consider the interests of their key stakeholders. It is for each company to determine its key stakeholders based on what is material to its business, but they are likely to include employees, business partners (such as suppliers and distributors), clients and consumers, government, and the communities in which they operate. To ensure transparency and accountability, companies should disclose how they have identified their key stakeholders and considered their interests in business decision-making, demonstrating the applicable governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets. These disclosures should be included in the company's annual report and reviewed by the company's auditors. This approach should be overseen by the board, which is well positioned to ensure that the approach taken is informed by and aligns with the company's strategy and purpose.

As part of this transparency, companies should articulate how they address adverse impacts that could arise from their business practices and affect critical business relationships with their stakeholders. We expect companies to implement, to the extent appropriate, monitoring processes (often referred to as due diligence) to identify and mitigate potential adverse impacts and grievance mechanisms to remediate any actual adverse material impacts.

# Question 5.2 At what level should action be taken to improve the quality of corporate governance, audit, audit supervision and/or supervision of corporate reporting?

	<b>1</b> (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
Companies themselves should take action to improve their reporting	•	•	0	•	•	•
Auditors themselves should take action to improve audits	©	©	0	•	0	0
Audit supervisors themselves should take action to improve their functioning	•	•	•	•	•	•
Individual Member States should take action if the situation in their market requires this	0	0	0	•	0	0
The EU should take action	0	0	•	0	0	0
Several of the above should take action	0	0	•	0	0	0

## Question 5.3 Please provide any further explanation supporting your views expressed in question 5.2:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

As the corporate governance regimes and practices in individual members states vary significantly primary responsibility for ensuring best practices is are adhered to lies with individual member states and ensuring who should ensure sufficient resources are allocation allocated to supervision and oversight.

There are a number of areas where EU action could be beneficial such as aligning corporate governance reporting requirements for companies and tendering and rotation requirements for audit firms as the differing approaches in individual national regimes leads to unnecessary complexity for firms operating on a cross-border basis.

# Question 6. To what extent is there a need to modify the EU framework on corporate reporting to support the following objectives?

	(not at all necessary)	2 (rather not necessary)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather necessary)	5 (highly necessary)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. The green transition	©	0	0	•	0	•
II. The digital transition	0	0	•	0	0	0
III. Facilitating doing business by SMEs	0	0	•	0	0	0
IV. Reducing burdens and/or simplification	0	0	0	(0)	0	0
V. Better corporate social responsibility, including tax transparency and fair taxation	0	0	•	0	0	0

### Question 6.1 Please provide, if needed, any further explanation supporting your views expressed in question 6:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

As noted in our response to Question 2.1 there are increasing expectations around ESG disclosure. In this respect, while we recognise current limitations of standards against which ESG disclosure by issuers can be independently assessed, we would expect external auditors to provide at least some form of independent assurance on the company's sustainability processes (e.g. process for defining a company carbon reduction plan). Investors value external audit work, and, in time, independent assurance of ESG data to support their long-term assessment of investee companies. There is still a lot of work to be done to develop reliable and consistent sustainability reporting practices and metrics at the EU level with work under way in the CSRD negotiations and the ongoing work of EFRAG. Until there is a common set of baseline standards, auditors will need a ramp up period to build their expertise to independently assess climate metrics (e.g. portfolio temperature metrics, carbon emissions intensity of a portfolio and whether it is on track to meet a certain trajectory). Many of these metrics involve forward-looking models and auditors will need to build appropriate experience of assessing and testing these models and scenarios – e.g TCFD climate scenarios. Similarly, "social" metrics are possibly even harder to quantify and hence assess (e.g. lives improved, communities helped, etc.) and biodiversity indicators are still in their infancy and dependent on the ongoing work of bodies such as the TNFD. The working assumption is that these metrics will be agreed on a slower time frame than climate disclosures. Therefore, flexibility will be needed in terms of the timing of reporting to be considered by companies. As such we recommend the EU phases in additional audit requirements following finalisation of relevant standards and reporting metrics, with sufficient time for both issuers and auditors to build up sufficient rigour in both reporting and assessment processes.

### Part II - Corporate governance

The EU corporate governance framework focuses on the relationships between company boards, shareholders and other stakeholders, and therefore, on the way a company is managed and controlled. The framework consists of a combination of EU and Member State legislation and soft law, namely national corporate governance codes applied on a 'comply or explain' basis. It aims inter alia to provide protection for shareholders and other parties with a particular interest in companies, such as employees and creditors.

A <u>sustainable corporate governance initiative</u> is planned to be adopted by the Commission in 2021. (In addition, the <u>Commission's study on directors' duties and sustainable corporate governance, July 20</u>20, assesses the root causes of 'short termism' in corporate governance and discusses their relationship with current market practices and/or regulatory frameworks).

Key features of the EU framework on corporate governance that are relevant for corporate reporting are

- The collective responsibility of the members of the administrative, management and supervisory bodies of a company for drawing up and publishing annual financial statements and management reports
- The requirement for a statement by the persons responsible within the issuer that, to the best of their knowledge, the financial statements prepared give a true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss of the issuer
- The requirement for PIEs to establish, in principle, an audit committee

Question 7. How do you assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence of the key features of the EU framework on corporate governance, considering how they underpin quality and reliability of corporate reporting?

### a) Board responsibilities for reporting

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	0	•	0	0	•

### b) Liability of company boards for reporting

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence						

with relevant	©	•	0	0	©
EU rules					

### c) Obligation to establish an audit committee

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	0	0	•	•	•

### d) Rules on the composition of the audit committee

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	<b>3</b> (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	©	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence						

with relevant	0	0	0	•	0	0
EU rules						

### e) Tasks of the audit committee

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	0	0	•	0	•

### f) External position of the audit committee (e.g. in relation to shareholders)

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	©	•	•	•	©	•
III. Coherence						

with relevant	0	0	0	•	0	©
EU rules						

Question 7.1 Please describe the main issues you see, if any, as regards corporate governance and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment.

You may want to consider the following aspects

- are there factors that have reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?
- is there room to improve efficiency via further simplification?
- are existing provisions coherent with each other?

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Financial statements should provide a true and fair picture of a company and the assumptions made by management, and reviewed by the auditor should be reasonable and justified.

We recognise that a broader range of risks and opportunities have the potential to materially impact financial performance. Over time, we expect increased scrutiny of the assumptions underlying financial reports, particularly those pertaining to the impact of transition to a low carbon economy on a company's business model. This is likely to impact the range of skills required to conduct and oversee a quality audit. In this context, audit committees play a vital role in a company's financial reporting system by providing independent oversight of the accounts, material financial and non-financial information, internal control frameworks, and, in the absence of a dedicated risk committee, Enterprise Risk Management systems. We believe that effective audit committee oversight strengthens the quality and reliability of a company's financial statements and provides an important level of reassurance to shareholders Members of the audit committee are responsible for overseeing the management of the audit function.

Audit committees should always act independently when setting the scope of the audit and when overseeing the production of audit reports that meet investors' needs. Independence can be shown by relevant individuals being independent of company management and having no executive responsibilities. Any proposed requirements should reinforce investor expectations that accountability is properly placed on relevant directors.

Audit committees should continue to be required to ensure that auditors, as well as audit committee members themselves, challenge company management's assumptions and judgement.

We think it is important that directors of companies are held accountable and appropriately sanctioned if they fail to fulfil their duties, including in an audit context.

Question 8. Considering the level of material departures from IFRS reported
in the ESMA report on enforcement and regulatory activities of European
enforcers in 2020, to what extent can such departures be attributed to
deficiencies of the EU framework on corporate governance?

	1 - Not at all
0	2 - To a limited extent
0	3 - To some extent
0	4 - To a large extent
	5 - To a very large extent

Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

Question 8.1 Please explain the main issues you see, and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment:

2000 character(s) maximum
including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Question 9. How effective and efficient would the following actions be in increasing the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?

# a) Strengthen the (collective) responsibilities of the board / tasks for reporting / liability of boards for incorrect reporting

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

b) Require proper expertise of specific board members in relation to corporate reporting (internal controls, accounting framework, sustainability reporting, etc.)

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

## c) Increase the responsibilities of specific board members (e.g. Chief Executive Officer or the Chief Financial Officer) and their liability on corporate reporting

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

d) Give company boards an explicit responsibility to establish effective risk management and internal control systems for the preparation of corporate reporting, including as regards controls for risks of fraud and going concern

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	©	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

# e) More transparency of company boards about the effectiveness of the companies' risk management and report on the actions undertaken during the reporting period

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

### f) Remove exemptions in EU legislation for establishing an audit committee

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

# g) Increase the tasks of the audit committee, e.g. for providing assurance on internal control systems for the avoidance of risk and fraud and going concern

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

# h) Strengthen the external position of the audit committee (e.g. vis-à-vis the auditor or by reporting to shareholders)

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

i) Require the setting up of specific whistle blowing procedures inside listed companies and supervisors of corporate reporting to strengthen the protection of whistle blowers

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

j) Require auditors to provide assurance on the systems and internal controls implemented by the board, including fraud, going concern and related reporting requirements

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

# k) Strengthen the role of shareholders on corporate reporting

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	•	0	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	•	0	0	0	0

Question 9.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?

- Yes
- ON O
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

# 9.1.1 Please specify to what other action(s) you refer in your answer to question 9.1:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

On Points 9c and 9j we support increased assurance on internal controls over financial reporting – see our views in response to Question 9.2

# Question 9.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

BlackRock is supportive of the case for strengthening internal controls. We believe that the lines of accountability to the company's management in case of material financial misstatements can be further strengthened as existing requirements on internal controls do not go far enough and lack accountability. From a stewardship perspective, we would welcome investee companies to provide this additional level of reassurance from management, but it is important to understand how this would translate in practice. In this regard, we believe that focus should be on internal controls over financial reporting. An attestation over all internal controls is much more complex, would take a long time and be a costly exercise without providing material information to investors. In addition, further clarity is needed to understand what underlying oversight processes should be adopted by the management team to come up with this confirmation and what will be the Audit Committees' oversight expectations on it.

From a stewardship perspective, having management signing off the accuracy of internal controls framework will create an additional layer of accountability and ensure that internal controls are effective and prioritised. We agree with the principles of extending this requirement to all Directors, with a particular focus on the CEO and CFO. We believe that the scope should be limited to internal controls over financial reporting as outlined in the consultation and not widened to cover all internal controls.

### Part III - Statutory audit

The overall objective of statutory audits is to ensure that financial statements are free from material misstatements and provide a true and fair view. The auditor has to identify and assess the risk of material misstatements and gather

sufficient and appropriate audit evidence as the basis for his opinion that the financial statements provide a true and fair view and to publicly report on the results of his audit work. The EU audit rules promote audit quality and seek to ensure the independence of auditors and audit firms.

Therefore, the final objective of statutory audit is to contribute to the quality and reliability of financial statements of companies.

Question 10. How do you assess the effectiveness, efficiency and the coherence with other relevant EU frameworks of the key features of EU audit legislation in so far as it applies to PIE auditors and audit firms?

# a) The rules on independence of auditors/audit firms and absence of conflicts of interest

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	0	0	•	0	•

#### b) The rules on the content of the audit and of the audit report

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•

II. Efficie has the framewo been co efficient	ork st	•	•	•	•	•	•	
III. Coherer with rele	evant	•	•	•	•	•	•	

# c) The rules applicable to non-audit services

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	0	•	•	•	•

# d) The rules on auditor/audit firm rotation

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•

II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	•	•	•	•	•	•

# e) The rules on transparency (transparency report, additional reports to other parties / audit committees / supervisors)

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	•	•	0	•	0
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	©	0	•	©	©	©

Question 11. Please describe the main issues you see, if any, in the audit pillar and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment.

You may want to consider the following aspects

- are there factors that have reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?
- is there scope to improve efficiency via further simplification?
- are existing provisions coherent with each other?

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

The rules on rotation of statutory audits allow member states to apply different time limits. Furthermore, we also observe that there is still a wide diversity of definitions of what entity constitutes a PIE across the European Union. This process brings in added complexity for corporate groups operating on a cross-border basis without leading to increased competition and choice of auditors in the single market.

We also recommend that the EC apply a proportionate approach to the inclusion of listed open-ended UCITS and AIFs as public interest entities. Unlike fixed capital trading companies, European open-ended funds UCITS and AIFs are required by EU legislation to appoint an independent depositary with responsibility for ongoing oversight of the funds' assets and for loss of any assets held in custody. The role of the fund's auditor in this scenario differs from that of an auditor in a trading company and the application of the rules on auditors should recognize the additional level of protection investors in investment funds already receive.

As noted in our responses on statutory audit pillar we note that the audit tender requirements in the Audit Directive and Regulation have not had the effect of increasing competition within the auditing industry as there has been limited opportunity for other firms to build up the scale and resources needed to compete with the leading firms.

The ESMA report on enforcement and regulatory activities of European enforcers in 2020. Based on these examinations, European enforcers took enforcement actions against 265 issuers in order to address material departures from IFRS. This represents an action rate of 38%.

As regards the audit sector the Commission's market monitoring report highlights deficiencies in audit firms' internal quality control systems, but but also in individual files for audits of PIEs. National audit oversight bodies also report that part of statutory audits is not up to standard.

# Question 12. To which extent you agree to the following statements?

	<b>1</b> (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Statutory audits contribute as much as is possible to the quality and reliability of corporate reporting by PIEs	•	•	0	•	0	•
II. I am satisfied with the role of the statutory auditors / audit firms of PIEs	•	•	0	•	0	•
III. The work of auditors is reliable so I trust their assessment and reports and their work inspires trust in capital markets	•	0	0	•	0	0
IV. There is not enough choice for public interest entities in finding an audit firm at appropriate costs	0	0	0	0	•	0
V. Joint audits contribute to the quality of audit	0	0	•	0	0	0

# 12.1 If you want to add any comments, and/or mention specific issues you see you can insert them here. Where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

In determining the future development of the audit market we note that there are a number of different objectives. These include improving audit quality, encouraging greater competition in the provision of audit services or supporting the development of additional skill sets within audit firms to respond to the challenges of the green and/or digital transition.

Each of these potential objectives requires different solutions and an assessment of different avenues. While some member states have experience of joint audits following the 4 eyes principle, we remain sceptical about the impact of scaling up this practice as it could present difficulties for cross-border groups in the selection of audit firms, especially where the definition of a PIE and national periods for rotation differ. Moreover, a direct consequence of scaling up the joint audit model in the medium term would likely be a smaller number of audit firms for the companies to choose from and a costly transition, unless additional steps are also successfully taken to increase the availability of experienced audit firms.

Furthermore, these issues are exacerbated for international groups who are required to comply with different legal requirements, where different audit independence considerations are in force. The application of these overlapping rules mathematically forces firms to have multiple different auditor engagements to meet different rotation requirements detracting from what should be the main focus to seek the highest audit quality. Ultimately the ideal would be for both the US and the EU to agree a globally consistently applied standard set of independence rules, e.g. IESBA, which for example has rules on rotation of key partners within an audit engagement.

We also note that, so far, auditor tendering/regulations have not meaningfully increased competition and we would encourage a broader review of the mechanisms that effectively increase competition in the future.

The audit quality issues that occur most often at EU level are

- deficiencies in audit firms' internal quality control systems
- the lack of, or inappropriate, monitoring of high-risk audited entities
- and the lack of audit evidence and documentation.

# Question 13. To what extent can these quality issues be attributed to deficiencies in the EU legal and supervisory framework for statutory audit?

	N	lot.	at	പ	ı
- 1	IN	IJι	aı	aı	ı

2 - To a limited extent

3 - To some extent

4 - To a large extent

5 - To a very large extent

46

### Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

# Question 13.1 Please explain, and where possible, provide evidence for your assessment under question 13:

20	2000 character(s) maximum	
incl	cluding spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.	

Question 14. How effective and efficient would the following actions be in increasing the quality of statutory audits of PIEs?

a) Ask auditors to disclose how they have assured the directors' statement on material fraud, and what steps they have taken to assess the effectiveness of the relevant internal controls and to detect any fraud

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	•	0	•	0	0	©
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

# b) Strengthen the informational value of audit reports

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

# c) Improve the internal governance of audit firms

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

# d) Incentivise or mandate the performance of joint audits for PIEs, including to enhance competition on the PIE audit market

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	•	0	0	0	0

# e) Further harmonise the rules on mandatory rotation

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	©	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

# f) Limit the scope for statutory auditors and audit firms to provide non-audit services

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

# g) Increase or eliminate caps on auditor liability, at least for cases of gross negligence of statutory auditors

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

# h) Limit the number of Member State options in the EU Audit framework to ensure consistency across the EU and to incentivise cross-border statutory audits

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

i) The creation of a passporting system for PIE auditors and audit firms, allowing auditors to provide their services across the Union based on their approval in a Member State

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	•	0	0	•	0	©
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

Question 14.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of statutory audits of PIEs?

- Yes
- O No
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

# 14.1.1 Please specify to what other action(s) you refer in your answer to question 14.1:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Revisit the rules on auditor rotation through greater consideration of audit partner rotation. Consider an economic cost benefit analysis on allowing competitor firms to build up skills in providing non audit services. A European passport would likely assist in the tender process and create opportunities for more candidates.

# Question 14.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We believe that auditor independence can also be enhanced through greater consideration of audit partner rotation.

In our response to 14 f. on the provision of non-audit firms we note that there are a number of competing views to consider. On one hand we believe it is valuable for the talent development of individuals within audit firms to develop a broad skill set looking in both audit and audit-related areas which materially benefits the delivery of audit services over time. However, the concentration of non-audit services within relatively few firms can have the effect of reducing competition and preventing competitor firms developing the resources and skills to compete more effectively. As such we believe further economic analysis is required to assess which additional steps are most likely to result in more competition and choice in audit firms.

### Part IV - Supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms

National competent authorities are responsible for the approval and registration of statutory auditors and audit firms, the adoption of audit standards, quality assurance and investigative and administrative disciplinary systems.

At European level, the cooperation between competent authorities is organised within the framework of the <u>Committee of European Audit Oversight Bodies (the 'CEAOB')</u>. The CEAOB has different tasks aimed at supervisory convergence, but it has no power to take binding decisions (Article 30 Audit Regulation).

Question 15. How do you assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence of the key features of the EU supervisory framework for PIE statutory auditors and audit firms?

#### a) The supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms in the EU

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	©	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	•	•	•	•	•

### b) The establishment and operation of national audit oversight bodies

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•

III.	0	0	0	0	0	•	
Coherence							
with relevant							
EU rules							

# c) The Member State systems for investigations and sanctions

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	0	0	0	0	•

# d) The role of the CEAOB

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	<b>3</b> (medium)	4 (high)	<b>5</b> (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	0	©	0	0	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	©	©	©	©	•

III. Coherence with relevant	0	0	©	©	0	•
EU rules						

Question 15.1 Please describe the main issues you see, if any, in relation to the supervision of statutory auditors and audit firms and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment. You may want to consider the following aspects

- are there factors that have reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?
- is there scope to improve efficiency via further simplification?
- are existing provisions coherent with each other?

		unting method.	

Question 16. Considering the findings in the <u>Commission monitoring report</u> and reports of national audit oversight bodies how would you rate the quality of audit supervision?

- 1 Very low
- 2 Low
- 3 Medium
- 4 High

- 5 Very high
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable
- 16.1 If you want to add any comments and/or provide evidence for your assessment in question 16, you can provide it below. You may also include the consequences that your assessment of the quality of audit supervision or the lack thereof has:

	2000 character(s) maximum		
inclu	cluding spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the	MS Word characters counting r	nethod.

Question 17. How effective and efficient would the following actions be to increase the quality and effectiveness of supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms?

# a) Ensure better the independence and appropriate resources of supervisors of auditors and audit firms

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	•	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

# b) Increase the transparency of audit supervisors

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

### c) Increase the consistency of supervision of cross-border networks of audit firms

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	©	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

# d) Ensure supervision of audit committees

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	©	•	0	0	•
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

# e) Harmonise and strengthen the investigation and sanctioning powers of audit supervisors

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	0	•
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	0	•

# f) Ensure that at European level there are legal instruments available that ensure supervisory convergence as regards statutory audit of PIEs

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

# g) Grant a European body the task to register and supervise PIE statutory auditors and audit firms

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	0	•
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	0	•

Question 17.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms?

$\odot$	Vac
	res

- No
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

Question 17.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:

2000	character(s) n	naximum					
includi	ing spaces and	d line breaks, i.	e. stricter than	the MS Word o	haracters cour	nting method.	

# Part V - Supervision and enforcement of corporate reporting

The supervision and enforcement of corporate reporting refers to the examination by competent authorities of listed companies' compliance with the disclosure obligations stemming from the applicable reporting framework, as well as taking appropriate measures when infringements are identified.

Based on enforcement activities by national competent authorities, ESMA reports a significant level of material misstatements. In the follow up of the Wirecard case and based on its experience, ESMA recommended a number of actions to improve the enforcement of corporate reporting (see ESMA letter of 26 February 2021 to the Commissioner McGuinness on next steps following Wirecard - ESMA32-51-818).

The Transparency Directive includes a number of requirements relating to supervision of corporate reporting

- the designation of a central competent authority in each Member State. For the enforcement of corporate reporting, Member States may designate a competent authority other than the central authority and/or delegate tasks to other entities
- national central competent authorities must be independent from market participants. There are no specific
  provisions as regards the independence of other designated authorities. As regards entities with delegated
  tasks, the entity in question must be organised in a manner such that conflicts of interest are avoided and
  information obtained from carrying out the delegated tasks is not used unfairly or to prevent competition
- Member States must provide competent authorities with certain powers, including investigative powers
- ESMA is tasked to foster supervisory convergence as regards the enforcement of financial statements prepared in accordance with the IFRS. For this purpose it has adopted in <a href="2014 guidelines">2014 guidelines on the enforcement of financial information</a>

This part of the consultation complements the <u>Commission targeted consultation on the supervisory convergence and</u> the Single Rulebook from 12 March 2021 to 21 May 2021.

Question 18. Considering the level of material departures from IFRS in the financial statements of listed companies found in the <u>ESMA report on enforcement and regulatory activities of European enforcers in 2020</u>, how would you rate (on a scale of 1 to 5) the degree to which such departures can be attributed to deficiencies in the EU supervisory framework?

0	1 - Very low
0	2 - Low
0	3 - Medium
	4 - High
	5 - Very high
0	Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

18.1 If you want to add any comments and/or provide evidence for your assessment in question 18, you can provide it below. You may also include the consequences that your assessment of the quality of audit supervision or the lack thereof has:

20	2000 character(s) maximum				
incl	including spaces and line breaks, i.e	. stricter than the M	IS Word characters	counting method.	

Question 19. How effective and efficient would the following actions be in increasing the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?

a) Clarify the role and responsibilities of the national authorities charged with the enforcement of corporate reporting and entities to whom the supervision of corporate reporting is delegated/designated, and improve their cooperation

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	©	•	0	0	©
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

b) Improve the system for the exchange of information between authorities and entities involved in the supervision of corporate reporting, and other relevant national authorities

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	•	0	0	•	0	©
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

# c) Strengthen the rules ensuring the independence of national authorities or entities involved in the supervision of corporate reporting

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

# d) Increase the resources of national authorities or entities involved in the supervision of corporate reporting

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	©	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

e) Increase the powers for national competent authorities to enforce corporate reporting, such as forensic, powers to obtain any necessary information from banks, tax or any other authorities in the country, powers to request information and corrective actions, etc.

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	0	•
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	0	•

# f) Improve cooperation and coordination between national authorities of different Member States

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	•	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

# g) Increase transparency on the conduct and results of enforcement activities by national authorities

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

# h) Strengthen the role of ESMA on the enforcement of corporate reporting

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

Question 19.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?

(iii)	Vaa
$\sim$	Yes

- No
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

Question 19.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:

20	000 character(s) maximum	
inc	cluding spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.	

#### **Additional information**

Should you wish to provide additional information (e.g. a position paper, report) or raise specific points not covered by the questionnaire, you can upload your additional document(s) below. Please make sure you do not include any personal data in the file you upload if you want to remain anonymous.

The maximum file size is 1 MB.

You can upload several files.

Only files of the type pdf,txt,doc,docx,odt,rtf are allowed

#### **Useful links**

More on this consultation (https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/finance-consultations-2021-corporate-reporting 
Consultation document (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/2021-corporate-reporting-consultation-document en)

Consultation strategy (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/2021-corporate-reporting-consultation-strategy en)

More on company reporting (https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing\_e Specific privacy statement (https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/specific-privacy-statement\_en)

More on the Transparency register (http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do?locale=en)

#### Contact

fisma-corporate-reporting@ec.europa.eu