

**United States Army Special Operations Command
Capability Developments Integration Directorate**

Handbook: Special Operations Joint Task Force



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The USASOC *Handbook: Special Operations Joint Task Force* is approved for public release as of 16 October 2019. It will be reviewed in the fourth quarter of every fiscal year to ensure the content remains current and adaptive to emerging conditions in the operating environment.

Executive Summary

Organization: The Handbook for employing the Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) in Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) is organized into two sections.

Section 1: Employment Guide for the Special Operations Joint Task Force. The purpose of this part of the handbook is to present the SOJTF as the special operations echelon most suitable to converge cross-domain effects in support of a Joint Force Commander during preparation of the operational environment during competition and in LSCO during conflict. This document is not doctrinal but conceptual therefore, some of the capabilities envisioned by the authors may not be available at present. However, most, if not all, of the capabilities required for LSCO are currently under development and are expected to be operational by the year 2028. The Army and Joint special operations communities are developing and testing the systems, structures, and skills that will allow for converging multi-domain effects, taking full advantage of SOF's unique abilities to see, sense, and strike deep. The SOJTF will be the organization of choice to converge SOF, Cyberspace, Space, Intelligence, and Fires to generate the effects that open windows of opportunity for Joint Force maneuver.

Section 2: The SOJTF Mission Command Handbook. Section 2 addresses SOJTF operational level mission command during LSCO. The primary purpose of this section is to describe the processes and staff functions that support the SOJTF Commander's decision cycle. The principal users are SOJTF staff officers, non-commissioned officers, and civilian personnel who develop SOJTF campaign plans, concepts of operation, and design operational level exercises and training programs to prepare for and execute special operations in LSCO. Section 2 describes various tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to assist the SOJTF staff in shaping the deep fight for the Joint Force through a combination of core SOF activities: Direct Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), Counterterrorism (CT), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Security Force Assistance (SFA), Hostage Rescue and Recovery (HRR), Counterinsurgency (COIN), Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), Preparation of the Environment (PE), Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and Civil Affairs Operations (CAO).

Way Ahead: The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) will distribute this document to the appropriate organizations for continued development through wargaming, experimentation, and operational application. Lessons learned will be collected, analyzed, and incorporated into subsequent versions of the handbook. USASOC expects to introduce this handbook into the formal Army and Joint doctrinal development processes in coordination with the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

Conclusion: This handbook consists of two parts for use by two distinct audiences. Section one, the SOJTF Employment Guide is an "up and out" strategic communication for use by senior leaders and staff members who will find it useful when incorporating a SOJTF into campaign plans and contingency operations that involve large scale combat. Section two is a "down and in" document aimed at SOJTF commanders and their staffs who can use the information as a checklist for developing SOJTF plans and policies when supporting the Joint Force in large scale combat at the operational level of war.

Section 1: Employment Guide for the Special Operations Joint Task Force in Large Scale Combat Operations

Purpose

This handbook describes how the Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) leverages the combat power generated by SOF in large scale combat operations (LSCO). The primary users of this section are joint force commanders and staff, the SOJTF commander and staff, senior service and staff college students, major subordinate SOJTF units, and commanders at echelons above brigade (EAB). Sister-service commanders and staffs will also find this handbook useful in planning and conducting LSCO with SOF.

Context

The major national security documents¹ posit a return to Great Power competition. The National Security Strategy (NSS) notes that, “China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests.”² The National Defense Strategy (NDS) observes that, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”³ While special operations forces (SOF) are optimized for operations in competition below armed conflict, the possibility that the Joint Force will have to engage in LSCO indicates the need for conceptual and doctrinal approaches that prepare SOF to contribute to success in that arena.

The NDS provides a Global Operating Model that has “four layers: contact, blunt, surge, and homeland. These are, respectively, designed to help the U.S. compete more effectively below the level of armed conflict; delay, degrade, or deny adversary aggression; surge war-winning forces and manage conflict escalation; and defend the U.S. homeland.”⁴ Within the NDS model, forward presence forces—including SOF—would operate in the contact layer during competition, maintaining persistent presence even in denied areas. In the event of conflict, SOF from the contact layer would provide a force that is “under the bubble” of enemy anti-access and area denial systems. They would also form part of the blunt and surge layers.

While the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) oversees the activities of SOF assigned and attached to the geographical combatant commander (GCC) for military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations, the SOJTF is the principal joint SOF organization tasked to meet all special operations requirements in major operations, campaigns, and contingencies.⁵

The SOJTF

A SOJTF is a modular, tailorable, and scalable SOF organization that allows the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to more efficiently provide integrated, fully capable, and enabled joint SOF to GCCs and subordinate Joint Force Commanders (JFC). SOF capacity may be especially challenged during major combat operations or other large scale campaigns. When theater SOF requirements exceed the TSOC’s capacity, GCCs may request a SOJTF from USSOCOM. In coordination with the GCC, theater component, and Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders, the SOJTF commander is responsible for planning, integrating, and conducting special operations in a designated operational area. When tasked, the SOJTF commander plans, integrates, and conducts all military operations in the designated theater of operations.⁶

A SOJTF is composed of four elements: the headquarters (HQ), SOF operational forces, SOF support forces, and Service and Interagency provided capabilities. The HQ element provides the

command and control (C2) of all SOF in the SOJTF. It may augment existing capability, or provide the full theater capability, as required. The second element consists of the SOF operational forces, which may include air, ground, maritime, and special designated SOF capabilities. The third element includes the SOF organic combat support and combat service support capabilities, which may include aviation support, fires support, intelligence, logistics, and communications. Since SOF are limited in size and capability, the fourth element is composed of Service and Interagency provided capabilities.




Figure 1. The SOJTF Organizational Construct. Source: Joint Publication 3-05.

The SOJTF’s scalability also allows it to expand into a multi-national force (MNF) as required. Depending on circumstances, the SOJTF may be directed to serve as the JTF, or a Joint Force Special Operations Component Command (JFSOCC). The SOJTF provides a capability to C2 multiple joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs)⁷ and a joint special operations air component (JSOAC)⁸ or a JTF consisting of both CF and SOF.⁹ JSOTFs and JSOACs are O-6 level HQs whose staff is normally augmented by Service or Interagency personnel.

The SOJTF is an operational level headquarters—usually commanded by a two-star general or flag rank officer—that functions as a maneuver element not simply as a supporting effort. During the fight, the SOJTF creates operational level physical, virtual, and cognitive effects across all domains in support of joint force priorities, lines of effort, and objectives. The SOJTF staff continuously analyzes effects and provides feedback to the higher headquarters as well as to subordinate elements to contribute to a shared understanding and how the SOJTF commander intends to affect the operational environment. The interaction will enable the synchronization of targeting, obtaining required authorities, risk acceptance, asset allocation, resource management, and battlespace management.

Directed by the SOJTF, subordinate elements conduct Special Operations core activities, including: DA, SR, CWMD, CT, UW, FID, SFA, HRR, COIN, FHA, PE, MISO and CAO.

The SOJTF in Large Scale Combat Operations

Multi-Domain Operations

Each of the Services are developing concepts to address the expanding nature of the current and future battlefield. This reflects a requirement to mass effects not only in the traditional domains of land, sea, and air but also in space, cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment. What the Services are coming to appreciate is that the Joint Force must apply capabilities more comprehensively (earlier, in greater capacity, at lower echelons) and in new ways (faster, with greater agility).¹⁰

The emphasis is on rapid operational tempo throughout all domains using a variety of actions to generate confusion and chaos which disorients the enemy and allows the Joint Force to create, and subsequently attack, weaknesses at all levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) while by-passing strengths. These concepts presume that conflicts can be favorably resolved by applying multiple methods—synchronized in time, space, and purpose—across multiple domains, in ways that reinforce one another while shaping conditions for others to affect the physical, virtual, and cognitive aspects of the enemy's system at all levels.¹¹

While multi-domain operations are conducted across the operational continuum—in both competition and conflict—this handbook concentrates on SOF support to the JFC during major operations or campaigns involving large scale combat. In LSCO, the Joint Force seeks to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the U.S., its multinational partners, and the host nation (HN). For large scale efforts, SOF conduct activities that support the JFC throughout the operation or campaign. Complex campaigns may require SOF and CF to conduct simultaneous activities. For such campaigns, USSOCOM may provide a SOJTF to C2 special operations.¹²

To be fully effective, the SOJTF must be integrated into operational and contingency plan (OPLAN/CONPLAN) development so that the Joint Force can appropriately template SOF on the battlefield and assign roles and missions based on capability and location.

In the Deep Fight

SOF provides the Joint Force with physical or virtual presence in areas normally denied to other ground forces deep in enemy territory. The SOJTF's subordinate organizations are designed to perform deep operations. These operations can be executed unilaterally, with a partner force, or through a resistance movement.

The SOJTF conducts deep operations whether the JTF is on the offense or defense. SOF deep operations complicate the enemy's decision-making by degrading his combat power, disrupting his ability to command, delaying the tempo of his operations, attriting forces, obstructing reinforcement, destroying installations and supplies, and ultimately breaking down the enemy's cohesion and morale. Maneuver, precision targeting, and mission command supported by intelligence combine to enhance SOF deep operations.

Deep operations in denied domains conducted by SOF, Cyberspace and Space elements are a vital part of both joint operations and multi-domain operations. The SOJTF ensures that SOF,

Cyberspace and Space assets work in concert to see and strike deep in the physical, virtual, and cognitive realms to create multiple 'fronts' that presents the enemy with compounding dilemmas during LSCO.

Whether the Joint Force is on the offense or defense, SOF deep operations interdict enemy lines of communication (LOC); disrupt counterattacks and the employment of follow-on forces; destroy units and critical targets; and cut off routes of withdrawal. SOF reconnaissance provides commanders with information and intelligence about enemy capabilities in depth. SOF disrupts the enemy's deep areas by conducting DA and sabotage against military capabilities and infrastructure.

Illustrative examples of those capabilities include attacks upon integrated air defense systems, logistics nodes, communications down-link sites, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) launch and recovery locations. SOF and their indigenous partners also target the enemy's infrastructure to disrupt rear area operations. Infrastructure targets include bridges, dams, railroads, power generation facilities, logistical storage sites and other operational or strategic targets. SOF achieves multi-domain effects employing space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare capabilities in deep areas.

The SOJTF commander directs SOF to attack the enemy's systems across multiple domains: air, land, sea, space, cyberspace, as well as the electromagnetic spectrum and the information environment. The sequencing and synchronizing of special operations in the deep area depends on the JTF's operational design. Special operations apply a broad range of capabilities sequentially, simultaneously, or systemically to achieve layered effects and create multiple, compounding dilemmas that disrupt the enemy's thinking and degrade his ability to act coherently.

In the Close Fight

SOJTF units support the Joint Force in the close fight. They conduct special operations that support and reinforce joint force maneuver. The commander applies combat power, both organic to the SOJTF and from indigenous forces, as necessary to support the JTF's main effort. The SOJTF Commander focuses on converging physical, virtual, and cognitive effects in support of ground maneuver during the close fight. Not all activities that are part of close operations necessarily take place near or at the point of direct enemy contact. An example would be precision targeting operations directed against enemy fires capabilities in the deep area.

Consolidating Gains

Commanders may establish a consolidation area, particularly in the offense as the friendly force gains territory. As the main force advances and bypasses enemy forces, its lines of communication become a critical vulnerability. Preserving those lines of communication directly affects the momentum at the forward line, and it affects operational tempo. The SOJTF conducts operations in support areas and in consolidation areas to assure freedom of maneuver and the continuity of operations, especially sustainment.

The SOJTF enables the consolidation of gains in the main battle area immediately behind the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT). Specially trained SOF elements help the JFC manage the civil populace and rapidly restore civil governance. SOF mitigate the impact of the civilian populace

on the conduct of LSCO by influencing civilians to avoid areas where friendly fire or maneuver are anticipated. SOF identify existing government infrastructure and resources to support the Joint Force in addressing the needs of the local populace.

In support of partners managing refugees or Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), SOF participate in screening activities, including the use of biometric screening, to cull enemy combatants or agents attempting to smuggle themselves in the IDP flow. SOF identify and counter enemy efforts to apply populace and resource control in contested areas.

SOJTF Relationship to the Joint Functions

Command and Control

USSOCOM will provide the core of deployable, Joint Task Force-capable, SOJTF headquarters up to the two-star level in support of Joint and Army multi-domain operations. The SOJTF provides C2 of U.S. SOF, CF, and partner nation (PN) forces. Once established, the SOJTF supports the JFC in a tactical control (TACON) or support role and typically remains under the operational control (OPCON) of the TSOC. When the JFC organizes forces into functional commands, the SOJTF commander may be designated as the JFSOCC and perform functions assigned by the JFC that are similar to those assigned to the other functional components.

During LSCO, planners should assume that the C2 systems upon which the Joint Force relies to ensure the execution of complex maneuvers will be denied or degraded by a peer enemy. The SOJTF's mission command philosophy focuses on decisive results, achieved by subordinate commanders exercising initiative at key times and places, rather than on rules, orders, and processes transmitted by technical means. The SOJTF exercises C2 of its distributed subordinate elements through mission-type orders that enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent.

When the tools of information processing are available, the SOJTF commander and staff exercise deliberate restraint to ensure that access to information and the ability to transmit orders does not raise the level of decision-making from the point of action. SOJTF staff members also ensure that their capacity to transmit information does not overwhelm the capacity of subordinate elements to assimilate it. The SOJTF leverages the culture of SOF, which encourages the operator's inclination to take the tactical initiative and provides the surest method of command and control.

Intelligence

The SOJTF is the primary echelon that converges and analyzes intelligence from strategic, operational, and tactical level sources. SOJTF ISR collection plans emphasize the mixing and cueing of assets in all domains to provide timely and accessible intelligence and targeting information. The SOJTF disseminates intelligence products in collaboration with adjacent units and higher echelons. It provides subordinate units with a synthesis of what the enemy appears to be doing and feedback on how enemy forces are reacting to the effects that subordinate unit operations generate.

The SOJTF intelligence staff creates a tailorable, sharable, multi-echelon, Joint and multi-national, multi-domain Common Operating Picture (COP). All SOJTF elements require network access to the multi-domain COP with sufficient bandwidth, processing power, data storage, and tools to enable situational awareness and coordinate cross-domain fires. The COP provides visualization

of kinetic and non-kinetic effects in all domains to enable the operations process, provide responsive targeting, and realize the fleeting windows of superiority required to converge lethal and non-lethal cross-domain effects in support of Joint Force maneuver.

Fires

The SOJTF extends the JFC's reach through unilateral and indigenous approaches; seeing, sensing, stimulating, and striking targets in the deep fires area. The SOJTF converges SOF-unique intelligence capabilities with precision lethal and non-lethal fires and from the air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace domains as well as the electromagnetic spectrum and the information environment to increase lethality, expand maneuver, enable joint force targeting, refine intelligence, and conduct operations in the deep fires area. The SOJTF employs lethal and nonlethal cross-domain fires to achieve physical, virtual, and cognitive effects. The SOJTF synchronizes the sensor-to-shooter capabilities that identify and characterize physical and virtual targets to provide targeting data and standardized interface protocols across delivery systems for long-range precision fires. The SOJTF targeting methodology emphasizes precision over mass. It aggregates distributed networks to deliver precision fires, support maneuver, and destroy, neutralize, or suppress critical enemy warfighting capabilities. As technology advances, AI-enabled network systems, sensors, and data assimilation improve SOJTF targeting, decision-making, deconfliction, and clearance of fires.

Movement and Maneuver

The maneuver elements of a SOJTF include teams such as Special Forces Operational Detachments, Civil Affairs Teams, and Psychological Operations Teams, as well as Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, and specialized logistics elements. The objective of SOF maneuver is to exploit enemy weakness or vulnerabilities in enemy dispositions. SOF may maneuver to gain a position of physical, virtual, or cognitive advantage from which to strike the enemy, exploit the effects of fires and cyber-electromagnetic activities (CEMA), and influence the enemy's thoughts and actions.

Protection

SOJTF elements are masters in the use of low visibility or low probability of detection communications and related TTPs. The lowest tactical echelons have integrated signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities to recognize when their element is under threat of detection by the enemy. Teams apply counter measures to reduce enemy detection.

The SOJTF applies complementary and reinforcing protection tasks and systems to preserve the force in LSCO. It integrates with unified action partners and layers protection capabilities across multiple domains to eliminate or mitigate the risk of threat effects. It employs primary and alternate protection capabilities as a continuous activity.

The SOJTF and its subordinate elements use operations security (OPSEC), conduct activities to support area security, employ air and missile defense including countering UAS, and are trained and equipped to operate in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environments. The SOJTF uses multi-sensor capabilities from UAS, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and space based platforms to provide awareness and protection. The SOJTF employs counter-improvised explosive devices (C-IED) and explosive ordnance disposal

(EOD) capabilities and expertise. The SOJTF maintains force health protection, conducts survivability operations, electronic protection, defensive cyberspace operations, cyberspace security and CEMA camouflage and electromagnetic signature shielding. The SOJTF employs military deception (MILDEC) and uses information and cyber supported platforms to enable protection and survivability.

Sustainment

The SOJTF conducts distributed operations with small operational and logistics footprints far from major bases in LSCO. Because SOF are not structured with robust logistical capabilities, the SOJTF relies on external support for sustained operations. Agile, integrated, and sustained relationships, networks, architectures, and capabilities enable sustainment. The SOJTF integrates cyberspace, artificial intelligence, and advanced analytical technologies to manage resources and anticipate logistical requirements. The TSOCs ensure connectivity to the theater logistics architecture and facilitate the implementation of non-standard logistical support for distributed operations in denied areas.

The SOJTF employs unmanned ground, air, and water-borne delivery systems, leverages indigenous procurement mechanisms, and utilizes additive manufacturing techniques—as they become available—to meet sustainment demands at the point of need. The SOJTF accounts for medical planning considerations, such as prolonged care and challenges of medical care in the deep areas. The SOJTF provides point of injury care and forward resuscitation capability. The SOJTF employs advanced trauma and resuscitation with prolonged patient care capabilities. SOJTFs may be augmented by Role II medical teams and Damage Control Surgery capabilities. The SOJTF may rely on CF assets for evacuation of casualties and treatment facilities.

Information

SOF conducts information operations (IO) to encourage popular support for FID programs. The SOJTF supports the joint campaign by planning and conducting influence operations. SOF identify influence opportunities to target enemy forces or populations and disseminate precisely tailored messages unilaterally or through its partner networks. SOF conducts tactical deception and identifies and assesses enemy information warfare efforts against the Joint Force.

The SOJTF may organize an Information Warfare Task Force (IWTF) to employ those units with information related capabilities (IRC) as a subordinate task force. The IWTF provides a means of massing virtual and cognitive effects and exploiting physical effects in competition and conflict. The IWTF is a new concept, but it does not contravene joint doctrine.¹³ Rather, it applies IO concepts to address the challenges outlined in the National-level strategic documents. *Information Operations* (JP 3-13) addresses the formation and functions of an IO cell within a joint staff.¹⁴

Other Considerations

The SOF, Cyberspace, and Space Nexus

A nexus exists among SOF, Cyberspace and Space forces and assets. SOF recognizes an immediate requirement for the nation to win in the cyberspace (virtual) and space (physical) domains against peer and near peer competitors during both competition and conflict. As such, the historically unassociated resource sets in SOF, Cyberspace, and Space forces, assets, and

operations must identify the point in time and space at which they converge, organize, and generate effects against adversaries. This is the nexus.

The SOJTF synchronizes SOF activities with a wide variety of groups across all domains, including commands with global reach such as Space, Cyber, Strategic, and Transportation Commands. As part of the Global SOF Network, the SOJTF achieves specific effects in multiple places, over time around the globe, creating compound dilemmas throughout the enemy's system. The task of integrating Cyberspace and Space capabilities belongs to the Joint Force however, the SOJTF could serve as the integrator and supported command in the competition space and in denied areas during major combat operations. The Cyberspace and Space information environments will become more congested and opaque, obscuring the Joint Force's visualization and understanding of the tactical environment. Forward positioned SOF units will have the best situational awareness. They will be best postured to coordinate Cyberspace and Space ISR, and process, exploit, and disseminate (PED) collected data, conduct targeting with high fidelity, and initiate precision Cyberspace and Space fires. SOJTF integration of SOF, Cyberspace and Space operations will enable the Joint Force to see deep and maximize targeting.

Unity of Effort

SOF-unique intelligence and targeting capabilities illuminate enemy high priority targets in the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL). Examples of priority targets include Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM), integrated air defense systems (IADS), the integrated fires complex (IFC), High Value Individuals (HVI) and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). SOF uses its capabilities and those of indigenous partners to identify enemy formations, especially operational and strategic reserves, equipment, and their locations or movements. Intelligence provided by SOF and its indigenous partners enables the JFC to determine the enemy's disposition and intent.

The SOJTF conducts future planning nested with that of its higher command. Futuristic assessments provide options for the higher command, and seeks opportunities to maximize synergy with other components and partners. Robust assessment feeds decisions at all planning and execution horizons. The SOJTF aggressively seeks to understand the enemy's aims and routinely validates the templates it uses to depict and predict the enemy's actions. The SOJTF maintains a future-looking picture of the enemy over time and space to develop desired battlefield effects. The SOJTF routinely cross-levels its view of the enemy with its subordinate elements' views. The shared macro-level COP provides the operational context for unified action.

The SOJTF sets conditions for its subordinate elements to conduct the tactical fight. It provides resourcing, authorities, and permissions. It manages operational level transitions between phases and adjusts to changes in the higher headquarters' priorities. It also has routine near term focus requirements. Staffs continuously monitor, report, and respond to Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). The SOJTF keeps ahead of critical resource paths, like the Air Tasking Order (ATO), and makes decisions regarding high risk missions.

Under some conditions, the tempo of LSCO will compress some of the SOJTF's planning horizons. The dynamics of the rapidly changing environment and a lack of fidelity about the enemy may compel the SOJTF to focus on near term event cycles. Some examples include battlefield synchronization of SOF elements and capabilities against indications of the enemy's intent, emerging critical targets, or prioritization and allocation of resources including ISR.

The SOJTF internalizes the higher headquarters' plan and masters the use of military terms and symbols including unit icons and control measures to synchronize the battlespace. The JFC may establish a joint special operations area (JSOA), which is an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned to the SOJTF to conduct special operations activities. JSOAs normally help coordinate and deconflict SOF and CF activities. The SOJTF commander may further assign subordinate commanders specific areas or sectors within the JSOA for mission execution. The scope and duration of the SOF mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of SOF deployed into a JSOA.¹⁵

CF-SOF Operational Synergy

SOF operates as an integral element of the Joint Force. The SOJTF combines people, processes, and programs to integrate joint operations across all domains. The SOJTF maximizes the inherent interoperability between SOF components and extend that interoperability to Service components to support the Joint Force. This requires the development of SOF and conventional force concepts and doctrine that provides relevant joint capabilities. The SOJTF communicates and collaborates across interoperable systems and equipment. Service professional military education and training programs enable personnel to gain and maintain an understanding of joint operations that prepares them to act as enablers in a Joint Force headquarters.

The establishment of a SOJTF (as in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) improves CF and SOF integration and interdependence. The SOJTF acts as a single headquarters to plan and coordinate all special operations in theater and also employs and sustains U.S. and multinational SOF. The SOJTF increases synergies in intelligence, communications, and information sharing, improves manpower efficiency, improves critical enablers to the force, and enhances coordination between all special operations in theater.¹⁶

The SOJTF plans, coordinates, and executes CF fire support for SOF elements operating in the deep maneuver and deep fires areas to support prosecution of the JFC's targets and post attack assessments, and to support SOF tactical actions. The SOJTF converges technical and traditional precision fires and intelligence capabilities from space, terrestrial and cyberspace platforms during LSCO in order to increase lethality and expand maneuver in the deep fires area.

SOF counters enemy networks. Using SOF-unique intelligence and targeting processes, the SOJTF identifies, isolates, and physically, virtually, or cognitively engages enemy networks throughout the area of operations. In rear areas, SOF may work with host-nation intelligence and security agencies to detect and identify enemy SOF, stay-behind units, or other clandestine networks.

When SOJTF operational and campaign planners design operations, they arrange them in such a manner and with such a tempo as to deny the enemy an opportunity to cope with emerging developments. Repeated and unexpected combinations of activities expose the enemy's vulnerabilities and weaknesses so that the Joint Force can exploit them. SOJTF planners describe SOF capabilities and limitations using the language of tactics and advocate for necessary resources that will synchronize combined arms effects.

Experimentation

As a joint warfighting headquarters, the SOJTF provides a platform for testing new SOF, Cyberspace, and Space capabilities as well as concepts of employment. The SOJTF evaluates emerging capabilities and pursues adaptive, leap forward solutions to counter adversary capabilities and provides timely, innovative advantages to the joint force.

Conclusion of Section 1

The SOJTF provides joint SOF solutions and options to the Joint Force in LSCO. It is an operational level headquarters that functions as a subordinate JTF or as a JFSOCC. SOJTF elements operate in the deep fires areas beyond the range of conventional ground forces. It synchronizes joint SOF operations to reduce enemy layered standoff and penetrate anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems. The SOJTF integrates indigenous forces and partner SOF to generate combat power in support of Joint Force objectives. The SOJTF achieves physical, virtual, and cognitive objectives while conducting multi-domain operations in Large Scale Combat Operations.

Section 2: Special Operations Joint Task Force in Large Scale Combat Operations—Mission Command Handbook

Why This Handbook?

This handbook is the second of a two-section set that amplifies joint doctrine. If conflicts arise between the contents of this handbook and the contents of a joint publication (JP), the JP will take precedence. This section addresses Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) Mission Command during Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). A SOJTF is an *operational level headquarters* which executes special operations *throughout* the operational area. In LSCO, it may operate as a Joint Force Special Operations Component Command (JFSOCC) under a Joint Task Force (JTF) or it may be a JTF.

This handbook uses the joint definition of mission command,¹⁷ “The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. (JP 3-31)¹⁸” This handbook also employs observations, trends, and best practices gathered from War Fighting Exercises (WFX) as well as historical vignettes for illustrative purposes. They are meant to spark thought, not to act as rigid guidelines. However, the axiom that “You will do in war what you did during training” applies.

The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the 2018 National Military Strategy (NMS) all recognize the re-emergence of Great Power competition and the resulting potential for large scale conflict. While there is a universal recognition that the U.S. must not lose the ability to prosecute Irregular Warfare, the Joint Force (JF) must develop the ability to fight and win during conflict through LSCO. The past twenty years have seen a distinct erosion of the Joint Force’s ability to conduct LSCO.

What is SOFs Value Proposition for LSCO?

In LSCO, the unique value of SOF comes from their ability to shape the deep fight through a combination of their core activities. As illustrated in the historical vignette below, SOF employed their abilities to conduct UW and employ the Iraqi Peshmerga to tie down eleven enemy divisions.

Historical Vignette

Task Force Viking, otherwise known as Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (CJSOTF-N), dramatically advanced the success of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) by employing UW forces against a conventional enemy comprised of one armor, two mechanized, and eight infantry divisions. By doing so, they disrupted the enemy and reduced his ability to reinforce southern Iraq. Having defeated the enemy to its front, CJSOTF-N then switched its focus from offensive combat to establishing stability throughout the region.

The SOJTF demonstrates the value of special operations in LSCO to the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander and staff. This begins with imparting an understanding of special operations core activities. These are: Direct Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), Counterterrorism (CT), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Security Force Assistance (SFA), Hostage Rescue and Recovery (HRR), Counterinsurgency (COIN), Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), Preparation of the Environment (PE), Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). All of these core activities contribute to LSCO.¹⁹

How Does SOF Help to Shape the Deep Fight?

SOF provides the only ground maneuver forces in the deep areas.²⁰ The following table provides an outline of how SOF enables the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and subordinate commanders to:

| Capability | Unit/Activity |
|--|---|
| See deep with both U.S. and indigenous capabilities employing: | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODAs)/Civil Affairs (CA)/Psychological Operations (PSYOP) • Indigenous forces • Rangers • Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) • SEAL Platoons |
| Provide terminal guidance to joint fires in the deep areas employing: | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ODAs • Rangers • MARSOC • SEAL Platoons |
| Employ indigenous assets in order to: | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct raids and ambushes. • Assist in cyber and information operations by providing a physical point of presence. • Conduct sabotage and subversion. |
| Seize or protect Critical Targets / Assets / Individuals with: | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rangers • ODAs • Indigenous forces • MARSOC • SEAL Platoons |
| Consolidate gains rapidly within newly won ground by employing: | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PSYOP • Civil Affairs • Indigenous forces |
| <i>Table 1. SOF contributions to the deep fight, arrayed by capability and corresponding unit.</i> | |

How Does the SOF, Cyber and Space Nexus Contribute to LSCO?

To meet the challenging requirements in the LSCO deep fight, the SOJTF may be tasked to support global and theater targeting. This will include integrating cyberspace and space assets to successfully affect the deep battlespace through Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), precision strike, Sensitive Activities (SA),²¹ and PE.²² Recognizing the combat multiplier effects the nexus has the potential to generate, SOF’s traditional roles will expand to include both supporting and supported relationships with these other capabilities.

However, in a contested multi-domain environment, deep reconnaissance may still rely on “boots on the ground” strategic reconnaissance teams. This will require capabilities to safely and securely transmit and retransmit field reporting. Additionally, the SOJTF will need to be able to compete in the information space – to leverage technology and existing means to project the friendly force narrative while countering, blocking, and obfuscating the adversary’s.

SOF provides the Joint Force with both a physical or virtual presence in areas normally denied to joint units. SOF organizations are organized, trained, and equipped to perform deep operations. They can execute these operations unilaterally, with a partner force, or through a resistance movement.²³ By beginning their efforts to develop indigenous networks during competition and continuing throughout conflict, SOF enables the future Joint Force to set the theater and seize or regain the initiative. It empowers partners to counter aggression below the threshold of open armed conflict and creates dilemmas for our adversaries.

What are Some Key SOF Limitations You Should Ensure the Conventional Force Commander and Staff Understand?

It is vital for the SOJTF Commander, staff, and Liaison Officers (LNOs) to educate and explain SOF limitations to those they support. These limitations derive from unit organization, training, and equipment.

Key SOF Limitations

- SOF units operating in denied areas forward of the Corps area of influence may not be able to maintain constant communications with higher headquarters.
- SOF units have limited mobility, especially when they are tethered to indigenous or partner forces.
- Improper employment of SOF runs the risk of rapidly depleting the SOF capacity. Due to the length of time required to recruit, train, and educate SOF operators, SOF cannot be quickly reconstituted or rapidly expanded.
- SOF should not be used to execute missions which can be executed by CF.
- Special operations missions require non-SOF support. SOF is not structured with robust logistic and sustainment capabilities. Therefore, SOF must rely on external support for sustained operations. Limited SOF logistical capacity requires support from CF structures, supplemented by host nation (HN), partner, or contracted support.

What are Some Important Task Organization Considerations?

The SOJTFs scalability also allows it to expand into a Multi-National Special Operations Force (MNF) as required.²⁴ Additionally, as explained in JP 3-33 (Joint Task Force HQs) other enablers may be required and are available to the SOJTF Commander.

The SOJTF Commander will face five concurrent challenges in task organization:²⁵

- Planning to accomplish the mission.
- Forming the HQ.
- Understanding, leveraging or supporting other joint, coalition, and interagency goals, authorities, and activities.
- Organizing, receiving, and commanding assigned or attached joint forces.
- Deploying the force and HQ.

Some Considerations and Benefits of Cross-functional Organization.

The typical J-Code organization of the SOJTF staff provides groupings of subject matter experts in necessary areas. Shared understanding improves staff integration through the use of cross-functional working groups (WGs), operational planning teams (OPTs), and cross-staff organizations. Cross-functional coordination is typically accomplished through the commander's battle rhythm. Cross-functional organizations are essential in avoiding stove piping within the J-

Codes which most often occurs due to the sheer volume of staff actions during operations. While their membership is drawn from across the staff, their oversight will fall under a primary or functional staff directorate.

The chief benefit of cross-functional organizations is that they allow the staff to concentrate their expertise to solve a problem. The habitual use of horizontal cross-functional organizations is a powerful means to achieve staff integration. Figure 2 below illustrates the types of cross-functional organizations which the SOJTF could consider during task organization.²⁶




Figure 2. Cross-functional organizations foster staff integration by breaking down stovepipes.

The SOJTF establishes operational planning teams (OPT) to solve a single problem related to a specific task or requirement on a single event horizon. **In most cases, OPTs are not enduring and will dissolve upon completion of the assigned task.** OPT membership is typically determined by the staff officer responsible for the event horizon in which the OPT is working; e.g., the J5 for future plans, J35 for future operations, and J33 for current operations.²⁷

Establishment of a SOJTF can change the C2 construct, affect how the Joint Force Commander (JFC) exercises command and control, and impact how the components operate. This change in C2 is significant, and if not understood can cause confusion and lack of synergy across the area of responsibility (AOR). Simplicity and unity of command, or at a minimum unity of effort, are essential for success.²⁸

During LSCO the SOJTF may support a JTF, combatant command (CCMD), or an established theater headquarters. Some insights into providing that support include:

- Anticipate some form of supporting command relationship with the JTF.
- Dispatch quality liaison teams to the JTF HQ to assist the HQ in understanding force capabilities, other ongoing AOR activities, employment considerations, risks, and challenges.²⁹

- Plan to operate as a coalition joint HQ together with U.S. Government (USG) Interagency partners.
- Take the time to develop trust based relationships with mission partners and stakeholders.
- Gain understanding of joint, coalition, and interagency perspectives, goals, authorities, and capabilities to increase synergy and effectiveness of the broader team effort.
- Spend time understanding the political and policy aspects of the mission, and the Combatant Commander's (CCDR) mission, intent, end state, and processes to better define the SOJTF role and mission.
- Maintain a bias for action by developing a lean HQ organization, requesting necessary staff expertise, leveraging an effective liaison network, and developing efficient staff processes.
- Understand the range of joint enablers.
- Develop and gain approval of manning, training, and equipping plans.

SOF operations combine features of both top down and bottom up approaches. This is because the SOF units operating forward of the Corps boundary are in periodic contact with the SOJTF to enhance their security and survivability. They require the latitude afforded by mission type orders to achieve the effects desired by the SOJTF Commander. Units within the Corps area of operations are another matter. The SOJTF can task them more frequently. ***Mission type orders should be the rule, not the exception.***

Setting a Battle Rhythm to Safeguard the Commander's Most Precious Asset – Time!

The battle rhythm process provides the management structure for the SOJTF's most important internal resource, the time of the commander and staff personnel, and integrates commander decision making with mission partners. It must serve the commander's needs and leadership style. However, it must also nest with that of higher headquarters (HHQ).

The battle rhythm must not only support decisions across the three event horizons, but also account for the battle rhythms of higher and adjacent mission partners, all while enabling timely direction and guidance to subordinate units. ***Effective and efficient HQs are marked by their logical arrangement of Operational Planning Teams (OPT) and other cross-functional organizations which support each other and commander decision-making.***

The battle rhythm must be flexible, adaptable, and able to handle dynamic changes in mission requirements and HHQ demands. At the same time, it should have a structure and foundation for staff and unit level interaction, planning, and prioritization. With all the complexities and demands on staffs, the commander's guidance is necessary regardless of mission, size, or scope.³⁰

Building the battle rhythm consists of two logical steps. The first starts with a logical arrangement of cross-functional teams around the commander's decision requirements with decision venues as culminating events. One means is to employ a critical path methodology to map inputs to and outputs from the cross-functional organizations to focus this effort. The critical paths are Operations (current and future), Plans, and Man-Train-Equip (or HQ Support). The second step lays out these events on a calendar or time schedule.

When creating a battle rhythm, maintaining sufficient unscheduled time or “white space” is crucial. Unless the SOJTF staff makes a conscious effort to preserve sufficient time for the commander and staff to think and work, the battle rhythm can become overwhelming and counterproductive. The battle rhythm must be governed by a disciplined approach. To develop the battle rhythm and enforce discipline, the SOJTF Commander must appoint either the Chief of Staff (COS) or another senior staff member with full authority over the battle rhythm.³¹

Another important element of battle rhythm management for the SOJTF is maintaining an awareness of critical staff positions that are in high demand for working groups and OPTs. High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) subject matter experts (SMEs) (e.g., Foreign Policy Advisor [POLAD] and staff judge advocate) are important members of cross-functional organizations and may not be able to support multiple events at the same time. It is important to identify manpower limitations of these key SMEs and ensure they are utilized effectively.

One means to impose discipline on the number of events on the battle rhythm is ensuring each battle rhythm event has a “charter” or what many call a “*Seven Minute Drill*”.³² The intellectual rigor and discipline required to create a charter makes it a valuable tool in both describing and vetting battle rhythm events. The COS typically approves the charter. It helps to ensure that every event on the battle rhythm has a necessary purpose as well as defined inputs and outputs. Any proposed battle rhythm event that has no output and only provides generic situational awareness, or an information brief outside the decision-making process does not belong on the battle rhythm.³³

| Battle Rhythm Event Charter - aka “Seven Minute Drill” - | |
|--|---|
| 1. Name of battle rhythm event: | Descriptive and unique |
| 2. Lead J code: | Who receives, compiles, and delivers information |
| 3. When / where does it meet in battle rhythm?: | Allocation of resources (time and facilities), and any collaborative tool requirements |
| 4. Purpose: | Brief purpose of the battle rhythm event |
| 5. Inputs required from: | Staff sections and/or B2C2WGs required to provide products (Once approved by CoS, these become specified tasks) |
| 6. When? | Suspense DTG for inputs |
| 7. Output / Process / Product: | Products and links to other B2C2WGs |
| 8. Time of delivery: | When outputs will be available |
| 9. Membership codes: | Who has to attend (Task to staff to provide reps) |

Figure 3. The Seven Minute Drill is a means to inject both logical thought and discipline into the SOJTF battle rhythm.

Remember to Include Interorganizational Partners and Allies.

During LSCO the SOJTF must consider interorganizational partners and allied during task organization. The following list provides a sample of some initial questions for functional staff consideration:³⁴

- Planning: Are your partners included in planning? Are you included in theirs? Are they assisting in design (understanding the operating environment and problem)?
- Assessment: How are you including your partners’ perspectives?
- Operations: Are your operations synchronized with your partners? Is your battle rhythm in synch with the supported agency’s battle rhythm?
- Fires: How are you integrating your nonlethal fires?
- Communication Strategy: Are all partners presenting a unified message?

- Legal: Does everyone understand their proper authorities?
- Intel: Is information from all mission partners included in the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)?

A key requirement for interorganizational coordination within the SOJTF is to establish the initial staff linkages to external partners. As part of the initial mission analysis, the SOJTF Commander and staff conducts an evaluation to determine those stakeholders who may influence or affect the mission. These relationships can become quite complex based upon the level of command group and staff interaction with partners. This complexity underscores the need for Terms of Reference (TOR) within the command to delineate roles and responsibilities for engagement and coordination. Listed below are questions to consider when determining whether to establish a separate internal coordinating entity within the SOJTF command structure:

- What is the current requirement for interorganizational cooperation?
- Who are we currently coordinating with?
- Are there other organizations we should be coordinating with?
- Is the current coordination sufficient?
- How is it affecting the mission?
- What would be the benefits of improved coordination?
- Are the current coordination processes for Phase 0 operations sufficient and effective when transitioning and operating in subsequent Phases?
- Are the coordination processes for supporting another organization effective?
- Are the coordination processes when the JFC is the supported command effective?
- Is the solution a new organizational entity or process, or just a refinement of current staff processes?

Some Joint level insights and best practices which apply to LSCO include but are not limited to:³⁵

- Develop Terms of Reference to define roles and responsibilities across directorates.
- Develop and maintain a close relationship with the POLAD (if assigned) to ensure that Department of State (DOS) perspectives and diplomatic considerations are represented in key Battle Rhythm events.
- Ensure external perspectives are included in appropriate staff processes (e.g., OPTs, assessments, daily Commander Briefs, the Operations Center).
- Develop and maintain relationships with the higher HQ to leverage their interagency contacts, relationships, and capabilities that can inform your command's operations.
- Understand your subordinates' capabilities to coordinate with relevant partners. Some subordinates may be better able and equipped to directly coordinate with relevant partners, while others may require your support.
- Develop and maintain relationships with pertinent private or commercial entities that may impact your mission.
- Send quality liaison personnel to the better help them to understand supporting force capabilities and challenges.
- Leverage liaison teams to stay informed of interorganizational and interagency requirements.

Always Maintain Operational Balance and Stance

The SOJTF must always maintain what former Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis described as a ‘boxer’s stance’. This means the SOJTF Commander and his staff must be alert and ready to respond to events. Besides situational awareness, the other key component of the stance is balance. That means not committing to any course of action before the time is right. A proper stance aids speed of decision as well.

One way for the SOJTF to maintain its stance is by adopting an approach common to Army staffs. A good example would be when a fires brigade is attached to an organization, that unit commander becomes the fires support coordination officer (FSCOORD) for the gaining unit. This sort of modularity could easily be adopted by the SOJTF. An example might be where the commander of an OPCON Civil Affairs brigade becomes the SOJTF J9.

Additionally, SOJTFs cannot afford to neglect the proper use of LNOs. This is particularly true in an environment where communications between headquarters may become difficult. It is in that analog space where an LNO is essential.

Appendix A of Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations* provides a guide to organizational considerations for the Joint Special Operations Task Force. The appendix can serve as a guide for higher or lower echelons as well.

How Do You Develop an Operational Framework?

Developing an operational framework involves intelligence preparation, defining the fight, and developing an operational approach:

- Intelligence preparation employs both Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment (JIPOE) and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) to provide input to an operational approach as well as defining the fight.
- Defining the fight answers the question, “How does SOF define the multi-domain fight across echelons, and in coordination with joint conventional components?” Defining the fight is intelligence dependent.
- Developing an operational approach depends upon intelligence. It relies upon a defined fight. It employs operational design, the Joint Planning Process (JPP), and the SOF Planning Process to determine SOF’s Role and provide feedback to the JPP and operational design process.

Intelligence Preparation is Vital to Successful Operations

For the SOJTF, intelligence preparation requires the use of both JIPOE and IPB. JIPOE “is the continuous process through which the J-2 manages the analysis and development of products that help the commander and staff understand the complex and interconnected” operating environment (OE) “the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities that bear on the decisions of the commander.”³⁶ IPB is “The analytical methodologies employed by the Services or joint force component commands to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, time, and terrain.”³⁷

JIPOE develops a strategic and operational framework employed by commanders and their staffs to foster understanding. IPB benefits from the JIPOE framework as it seeks to reduce uncertainty within the battlespace. Both are necessary for the SOJTF in LSCO.

When we look at the individual steps of JIPOE and the IPB processes in Figure 4, we see that they are essentially identical. *However, the overall focus of each process is different.* IPB is a more detailed process that uses micro-analytical techniques to focus on detailing specific threat courses of action (COA) and developing priority intelligence requirements (PIR) from those COAs that drive CDRs decisions.




Figure 4. JIPOE, IPB, or Both?

JIPOE, on the other hand, takes a more macro-analytic approach to develop a holistic view of the enemy. The primary objective of JIPOE is to identify critical threat vulnerabilities through a center of gravity analysis. JIPOE still develops threat COAs and PIRs that drive CDR decisions, however there is more focus on threat vulnerabilities rather than detailed COAs.

JIPOE and IPB products generally differ in terms of their relative purpose, focus, and level of detail. The JIPOE process emphasizes a holistic approach by analyzing from a systems and geospatial perspective while taking into account the force-specific IPB perspectives of the component commands, multinational partners, or other organizations. *JIPOE and IPB analyses support each other while avoiding a duplication of analytic effort.* JP 2-01.3 suggests that JIPOE is the province of the combatant command, and each component command uses IPB at their level to feed JIPOE.




Figure 5. The Relationship Between JIPOE and IPB

Figure 6 graphically depicts one of the most crucial aspects of the intelligence apparatus. The bottom line is that the joint operating environment is highly complex. As a result the J2 rarely has the full range of expertise to truly develop a holistic approach to intelligence preparation of the OE.

A full staff integration into the JIPOE process not only creates a better intelligence picture of the OE, but also serves as the starting point for crucial inter-staff relationships between the J2 and other staff elements. When done properly, staff integration into JIPOE sets the foundation upon which the staff understands the intelligence picture and continues to feed the J2 with information and expertise from their relative perspectives.

Event Templates (EVENTTEMP) are a Proven Means to Guide the Best Use of Collection Assets

These factors cause the commander to consider, “How can the J2 plan, collect, analyze, and disseminate timely, relevant, and focused intelligence?” The EVENTTEMP is the most effective way. It acts as a checklist of critical information about the enemy. It is a tool that enables the J2 to plan, collect, analyze, and disseminate timely, relevant and focused intelligence.

Staff Responsibilities in JIPOE




Figure 6. Developing a holistic approach to JIPOE requires participation by the entire SOJTF staff.

The J2 Challenge


Provide the commander a clear and concise understanding of the enemy commander's intent and how he will attempt to achieve his objectives.

The most effective way is to develop and maintain an Event Template (EVENTTEMP).

- This includes:
- Enemy Decision Points
 - Enemy Courses of Action
 - Time-Phase Lines
 - NAIs
 - An associated Event Matrix
 - Continuously Updated

From the EVENTTEMP:

- Collection Plan
- Decision Support Matrix
- Target Synch Matrix
- Intelligence Estimate



ATP 2-01.3, Chapter 6, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace

Figure 7. Meeting the J2 Challenge with EVENTTEMPS

The importance of the EVENTTEMP for collection planning cannot be overstated. They are critical in determining where and what to look for. ***A properly constructed EVENTTEMP guides the best use of collection assets.*** The EVENTTEMP is a model against which threat activity can be recorded and compared. It represents a sequential projection of events that relate to space and time on the battlefield and indicates the enemy’s ability to adopt a particular course of action. The EVENTTEMP is a guide for collection as well as reconnaissance and surveillance planning. It suggest answers to the questions where to look, when to look, and what to look for. It identifies Named Areas of Interest (NAI), which are points or areas where enemy activity or lack of activity confirms or denies enemy COAs. It is critical that NAI be placed far enough out that decisions can be made in time for units to react to specific intelligence collection at the NAI. It drives intelligence collection. Without a well prepared Event Template, collection becomes less focused and more resource intensive.

While EVENTTEMPs require a lot of work, they are worth it. They facilitate all other J2 processes- providing input to the Decision Support Matrix (DSM) and to the targeting process. EVENTTEMPs should be used in all working groups. It can be done on PowerPoint, an overlay, or as an event matrix. The key is to do it!




Figure 8. The SOF Intelligence Process puts together JIPOE to inform multiple Lines of Effort, develops EVENTTEMPs to guide IPB and informs the commander's decisions

Predictive Assessments are Difficult to Execute, but are Necessary

Making predictive assessments that span from tactical actions to strategic intent across multiple lines of operation that crosscut the tactical, operational, and strategic problem sets across a vast and highly complex battlespace becomes difficult. One approach to tackling this complexity might be to first apply the macro approach, or JIPOE, to establish the enemy’s vulnerabilities through a center of gravity (COG) analysis.

Once the J2 has established these vulnerabilities, they can further refine enemy courses of action (ECOAs) within each vulnerability by applying the micro approach, or IPB. This creates multiple ECOAs that we must deal with, but consolidating them into one EVENTTEMP for each vulnerability will reduce the complexity of the entire problem set into manageable smaller problem sets.

Each EVENTTEMP contains COAs, NAIs, temporal analysis, and PIRs that assist the decision making process. This allows the SOJTF staff to make predictive assessments within each problem set. Remember, the SOJTF staff can still make overarching predictive assessments by feeding these smaller problem sets back into their JIPOE and COG analysis to determine broader enemy assessments.

Developing an Operational Approach Requires Understanding the OE and Input from Assessments

An operational approach is a “broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission.”³⁸ Developing an operational approach is the next step in planning after understanding the OE. As noted in Figure 9, activities conducted during execution are key to an effective operational approach.

The shared understanding generated as the result of synchronization of the daily battle rhythm, staff processes, and staff battle drills provides context for assessments that influence the development of the operational approach. Assessments conducted during execution as well as by the IPB process also influence the operational approach, as well as defining the fight.




Figure 9. Relationship of Planning and Execution Activities during LSCO

Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning* describes how SOF should develop an operational approach.³⁹ This handbook supplements that information. It does not replace it.

From a SOF perspective in LSCO, we must consider not only SOF Lines of Effort (LOEs), but the CF Lines of Operation (LOOs). After all, SOF LOEs are supporting efforts to CF prosecution of LSCO. To ensure the synchronization of CF LOOs and supporting SOF LOEs, the SOJTF commander and staff must start the process in the planning phase.

It is vital that the SOJTF integrate effects on the enemy in time and space. The key to synchronized execution is interoperability. SOF LNOs who understand SOF capabilities, capacities, and the SOJTF commander’s intent will serve as an invaluable means of bridging the challenges of coordinating capability delivery, managing risks, and exploiting opportunities while retaining functional independence. This assures that SOF effects support the JFC’s objectives.

An Integrated Operational Approach




Figure 10. An integrated operational approach ensures SOF effects support the Joint Force Commander's objectives.

Defining the Challenges is Key to Understanding the Operational Environment

Figure 11 visually depicts how we define the fight, or more accurately the mission command challenges. In this particular instance, the figure depicts the most difficult of scenarios – operating as part of a combined force. Each command echelon varies in its operational reach, its tempo, planning horizons, and effects it can deliver. Each echelon has its own ongoing mission command challenges. As an operational level headquarters, the SOJTF manages five simultaneous mission command challenges continuously. It is important to recognize that they are interdependent and overlap to some degree.




Figure 11. Defining the mission command challenges takes place at multiple echelons in an interdependent set of dynamic processes.

The five principal mission command challenges are:

- Operational design, applying combat power.
- Staff processes.
- Subordinate units, orders and updates.
- Adjacent units, effects and processes.
- Indigenous and partners.

One implicit aspect not displayed in the graphic is the level of available resources. In theory, higher echelons have more resources available. This would allow them to task organize these resources to subordinate echelons to increase their responsiveness to a problem set. Also not depicted above are the control and coordination measures imposed by the Joint Force.

JFCs establish various control and coordination measures including maneuver control, airspace coordination, and fire support coordination measures to facilitate effective joint operations. These measures include boundaries, phase lines, objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations, air defense areas, operational areas, submarine operating patrol areas, no-fire areas, and others as required.

Boundaries are necessary control measures but can be potential seams not only in understanding the adversary and local population, but also in coherently working with our partners: the host nation, local governments, and other agencies. The SOJTF staff must advocate for SOF-friendly boundaries supported by their analysis of social, physical, and enemy aspects together with political and other agency boundaries to minimize these seams.

While operational level headquarters such as a JTF or Theater Army may ‘own’ battlespace, the SOJTF operates across their AORs and even that of a CCMD. The SOJTF supports these players (e.g., for targeting, intelligence) even though they may not ‘own’ them. Likewise, the SOJTF needs the support of battlespace owners (e.g., for a quick reaction force [QRF], intelligence, sustainment, casualty evacuation [CASEVAC]) to accomplish their tasks.⁴⁰

How do You Develop Shared Understanding?

Recognize that Shared Understanding is a Vital Component of Mission Command

Shared understanding is vital to the efficient and effective functioning of the SOJTF staff. As a key component of mission command, it is essential to the successful conduct of operations. Developing and maintaining shared understanding requires leadership and the ability to influence and inspire others. The commander plays a key part by providing vision, guidance, and direction. Subordinate commanders and staffs need more than information to make decisions that implement the SOJTF Commander's intent. They require the knowledge and shared understanding that over time will develop into wisdom. ***Without shared understanding, mission command and mission type orders are not possible.***

Joint Publication, 3-0, *Joint Operations* from which Figure 12 is taken describes how to build shared understanding.⁴¹ Based upon that knowledge, the SOJTF staff can ask several questions to better define their shared knowledge needs. Amidst all of the distractions of the daily battle rhythm the following questions must be answered:

- What products must you have to do your job?
- What products to you need to fight from?
- What products do you use to execute your plan?
- What is our process to create products and update them with the proper frequency – daily, every 12 hours, hourly?
- What is our process to refine those products?
- Have we organized our Targeting Working Group (TWG) properly to create products?
- Have we organized our TWG so that we are in synch with our mission command challenges at echelon?
- What do our PIR drive? (e.g., decision points).
- We will undoubtedly get bogged down in the targeting cycle, but to what other cycle(s) must we allot equal emphasis?




Figure 12. Commanders and staff require information, knowledge, and shared understanding to produce the wisdom essential to sound decision making.

There are four key questions which, when answered can help to overcome the organizational and process challenges to building shared understanding.⁴²

- With whom should we coordinate?
- How are we coordinating with them?
- How is this information getting into our staff processes?
- How are we supporting our partners?

Recognize the Relationship Between Information Sharing and Operational Success

Shared understanding between the SOJTF and the JTF is also vital to operational success. The best rule is to build relationships as early as possible and reinforce them with constant communication. Understanding the other person's perspective is key. Mission type orders are vital to conveying the commander's intent without unduly encumbering the actions of the staff and of subordinate commanders.

Shared information is the catalyst for shared understanding. The Information Management (IM) process facilitates the commander's decision making by improving the speed and accuracy of information flow, as well as supporting execution through reliable communications. IM, combined with knowledge sharing initiatives, contributes to creating conditions for shared understanding through the proper management of personnel, equipment and facilities, and procedures. Some examples of the types of information that should be shared between the SOJTF and the JTF include but are not limited to:

- Combat assessments.
- Situation reports.
- Intelligence summaries and products.
- Tracking intelligence from site exploitation for future targeting using all available assets.
- Post-operation intelligence tracking, collection systems, and battle drills for immediate input to the targeting cycle.
- Operational summaries and products.
- Target lists. *These must be continuously updated and disseminated.*
- Follow-on actions and future operations between CF and SOF. *LNOs must closely monitor the future operations section. This allows the LNO to immediately identify any branches or sequels to the executed operations orders (OPORD) or concepts of operations (CONOP).*
- After action review products to extract observations, insights and lessons learned.⁴³

Always Consider Interorganizational Factors

Shared understanding must extend beyond commanders and subordinates to ***interorganizational cooperation***.⁴⁴ The commander's decision cycle must include the incorporation of mission partners' viewpoints. This will facilitate an appreciation of different perspectives, development of potential solutions, and achievement of unity of effort.⁴⁵

Some key challenges to shared understanding in LSCO when seen in an interorganizational context include, but are not limited to:

- Developing trust, relationships, and unity of effort across a diverse group of organizations with differing cultures, policies, priorities, authorities, capabilities, and procedures.
- Limited presence of engaged USG agency partners at the theater and operational level.
- Information sharing with mission partners.
- Lack of HQs organization and processes that promote coordination and collaboration with partners.
- Interorganizational cooperation is essential to achieving unified action.

Some insights from Joint Lessons Learned which can apply to LSCO include:⁴⁶

- Develop HQ structures, processes, and procedures to facilitate inclusion and unity of effort.
- A comprehensive approach expands a military-centric perspective to a whole of government approach that is integrated with external partners and stakeholders.
- Commander's guidance and intent must evolve to adapt to changing conditions.
- Focus collective efforts on common goals to gain unity of effort.
- Strong personal relationships and defined roles, responsibilities, coordination mechanisms, and processes with interorganizational mission partners will promote unity of effort, and overcome organizational and cultural differences.
- Developing a shared understanding of the operational environment requires early interaction with mission partners in supporting a comprehensive approach.
- Understand mission partners' perspectives, goals, authorities, capabilities, capacities, and limitations.
- Extend the mission command principle of inclusion to mission partners. Build personal relationships and trust with mission partners through transparency, appropriate information sharing, and access to capabilities.
- Include mission partners in design, planning, execution, and assessment. External stakeholders have unique perspectives and expertise that build a broader assessment and understanding of the operational environment.

Interagency coordination, as a subset of interorganizational cooperation, is defined as coordinating across U.S. federal government agencies.⁴⁷ The interagency process continues to be the most efficient and effective means for the U.S. Government to leverage resources for securing America's interests abroad. While DOD is in the lead within an area of conflict, other government agencies will most likely be in the lead in areas outside the conflict area. Since the SOJTF is an operational level headquarters, it will likely control activities outside the immediate area of conflict as well.

Some insights on building shared understanding from joint operations through interagency coordination include:⁴⁸

- Develop and nurture relationships with interagency partners. Be inclusive.
- Understand the interagency process for both domestic and foreign operations.
- Leverage the POLAD as an advisor; they are not liaison officers from DOS.
- Leverage key interagency coordination groups to achieve unity of effort.
- Understand the key interagency partners in cyberspace operations. Leverage their expertise and capabilities for cyberspace situational awareness, timely threat identification, global and regional analysis and assessment, the development of tailored threat responses, or the execution of branch plans that account for stakeholder equities.

How do the Operations Process and Assessment Interact?

The Start Point is the Commander's Visualization

How does the SOJTF Commander visualize his mission and the employment of SOF forces? There are a number of means to do so but first the commander must have:

- Developed an understanding of the operational environment.

- Settled on an operational approach.
- Defined the fight.

At that point, the commander and staff should have developed PIRs, friendly force information requirements (FFIRs), and a DSM. A PIR is an intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need to *understand the threat* and other aspects of the operational environment (JP 2-01). An FFIR is information the commander and staff need to understand the *status of friendly force and supporting capabilities* (JP 3-0). PIRs will drive decision points while FFIRs support decision points. The DSM provides a *convenient visualization tool* to integrate both.

Some insights for the commander on operational design and assessment from joint operations include:⁴⁹

- Operational design helps the JFC and staff understand the environment, frame the problem, develop an operational approach to accomplish the mission, and inform targeting efforts.
- Gain the support of the broader Intelligence Community and coalition partners in JIPOE.
- COG analysis and target system analysis in order to understand the adversary, identify
- COGs, critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities.
- Prioritize target systems analysis and target development efforts.
- Inform and be informed by the broader U.S., interorganizational, and partner nation approaches to enrich targeting and achieve desired outcomes.
- Be prepared to spend time gaining authorities and permissions for information related capabilities (IRC).
- Emphasize integration of kinetic and non-kinetic fires to achieve desired effects.
- Spend time thinking through how the full range of non-kinetic fires can be employed more proactively to shape the environment as opposed to reactive responses to events (e.g., consequence management).
- Provide top-down guidance to focus and empower the targeting enterprise. Guidance includes: framing of the problem, visualization of the adversary's COGs and vulnerabilities, intent for fires as part of the operational approach, and scope of desired lethal and nonlethal effects on associated target systems and objectives. A target's importance derives from its potential contribution to achieving a commander's objective or supporting task.
- Empower and support the enterprise and subordinates in performing bottom-up target development and fires synchronization to gain speed, agility, and increased precision.

The Operations Process Depends on a Number of Other Processes

There are many staff processes, working groups, etc., that the SOJTF will conduct during execution, but the operations process, the intelligence process, and the joint targeting cycle will likely dominate the SOJTF staff's time and battle rhythm. ***These cycles are absolutely interdependent.*** In theory, the operations cycle should drive the intelligence cycle, while both feed the joint targeting cycle. While the rigor of the targeting cycle tends to draw attention and effort, it is a means to an end state. It is important to remember that supporting the commander's decision points is just as critical as generating kinetic and non-kinetic effects. Above all, our intelligence process must feed both processes efficiently.




Figure 13. There are three main cycles that dominate the battle rhythm during an operation - operations, intelligence, and joint targeting.

The Joint Targeting cycle noted in Figure 13 consists of six phases:

Phase 1—Commander's Objectives, Targeting Guidance, and Intent. The JFC develops and issues targeting guidance. This guidance includes targeting priorities, time-sensitive targets (TSTs) criteria and procedures, component critical targets, target acquisition and identification criteria, authorized actions against targets, and any delegated responsibilities for target validation and joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) approval.

Phase 2—Target Development and Prioritization. Target development is the systematic examination of potential target systems and their components, individual targets, and even elements of targets to determine the necessary type and duration of the action that must be exerted on each target to create an effect that is consistent with the commander's specific objectives.

Phase 3—Capabilities Analysis. This phase of the joint targeting cycle involves evaluating all available capabilities against targets' critical elements to determine the appropriate options available to the component commander for target engagement and developing the best possible solution.

Phase 4—Commander's Decision and Force Assignment. The force assignment process at the component level integrates previous phases of joint targeting and fuses capabilities analysis with available forces, sensors, and weapons systems.

Phase 5—Mission Planning and Force Execution. Upon receipt of component tasking orders, detailed unit-level planning must be performed for the execution of operations. The joint targeting process supports this planning by providing component planners with direct access to detailed information on the targets, supported by the nominating component's analytical reasoning that linked the target with the desired effect (phase 2).

Phase 6—Combat Assessment. The combat assessment phase is a continuous process that assesses the effectiveness of the activities that occurred during the first five phases of the joint targeting cycle.⁵⁰

Since LSCO as described by this handbook is executed primarily on land by land forces, a short discussion of the Army's *decide, detect, deliver, and assess* (D3A) targeting methodology is helpful. "Targeting provides an effective method for matching the friendly force capabilities against enemy targets. An essential part of targeting is the identification of potential fratricide situations and the necessary coordination measures to positively manage and control the attack of targets. Its functions complement the planning, preparing, executing, and assessing stages of the operations process."⁵¹ The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the D3A process.

Decide: Decide is the first function in targeting and occurs during the planning portion of the operation process. The "decide" function continues throughout the operation. The staff develops "decide" information to address:

- What targets should be acquired and engaged?
- When and where are the targets likely to be found?
- How do the rules of engagement impact target selections?
- How long will the target remain once acquired?
- Who or what can locate and track the targets?
- What accuracy of target location will be required to engage the target?
- What are the priorities for reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, sensor allocation, and employment?
- What intelligence requirements are essential to the targeting effort and how and by when must the information be collected, processed, and disseminated?
- When, where, how, and in what priority should the targets be engaged?
- What are the measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE) that determine whether the target has been successfully engaged and whether the Commander's desired effects have been generated by doing so?
- Who or what can engage high priority targets (HPT) for delivery to generate desired effects based on the Commander's end state and objectives?
- What or who will obtain information for determining the success or failure of each engagement?
- Who must receive and process that information, how rapidly, and in what format?
- Who has the decision making authority to determine success or failure, and how rapidly must the decision be made and disseminated?
- What actions will be required if an engagement is unsuccessful, and who has the authority to direct those actions?

Detect: Detect is the second function in targeting and occurs primarily during the prepare portion of the operations process. A key resource for fires planning and targeting is the intelligence generated through reconnaissance and surveillance activities to answer the targeting information requirements. Requirements for target detection and action are expressed as PIR and information requirements. Their priority depends on the importance of the target to the friendly course of action and tracking requirements. PIR and information requirements that support detection of HPTs are

incorporated into the overall unit information collection plan. NAIs and Target Areas of Interest (TAIs) are focal points particularly for this effort and are integrated into the information collection plan. The detect function continues during the execution of the OPOD. Target acquisition assets gather information and report their findings back to their controlling headquarters, which in turn pass pertinent information to the tasking agency.

The target priorities developed in the decide function are used to expedite the processing of targets. Situations arise where the attack, upon location and identification, of a target is either impossible (for example out of range) or undesirable (outside of but moving toward an advantageous location for the attack). Critical targets that the Joint Force cannot, or chooses not to, attack in accordance with the attack guidance must be tracked to ensure they are not lost.

Tracking suspected targets enables the execution of the attack guidance based on target selection standards. Tracking suspected targets also keeps them in view while they are validated. Planners and executors must keep in mind that assets used for target tracking may be unavailable for target acquisition. As targets are developed, appropriate weapon systems are tasked in accordance with the attack guidance and location requirements of the system.

Deliver: Deliver is the third function in targeting and occurs primarily during the execution stage of the operations process. The purpose is to engage HPTs to achieve the desired effects. The selection of a weapon system or a combination of weapons systems leads to a technical solution for the selected weapon.⁵²

Assess: Assess is the fourth function of targeting and occurs throughout the operations process. The Commander and staff assess the results of mission execution. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning* states that, “Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations. Theater-strategic and operational-level assessments provide a methodology for joint commands and Services to adjust planning and execution to be effective, match the dynamic operational environment, and better identify their risks and opportunities.”⁵³

The following are key considerations in assessment:

- Assess the results of mission execution:
 - If assessment reveals that the commander’s guidance has not been met, reattack recommendations should be nominated until the targeting objectives are achieved.
 - This feedback may result in changes to original decisions made during the target selection. These changes may influence the continued execution of the plan.
- Continuous assessment: The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander’s decisions throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations.
 - Staffs help the commander by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the commander timely information needed for decisions.
 - Planning for the assessment process helps staffs by identifying key aspects of the operation that the commander is interested in closely monitoring and where the commander wants to make decisions.

- Assessments require an asset(s) to be tasked with associated information collection requirements that provide observable indicators.
- Assess at all levels: Assessment occurs at all levels and across the spectrum of conflict.
 - Even in operations that do not include combat, assessment of progress is just as important and can be more complex than traditional combat assessment.
 - As a rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which such activity is assessed.

The validity and usefulness of assessments rests upon the development of observable or collectable MOE and MOP. A MOE is “An indicator used to *measure a current system state*, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time.”⁵⁴ A MOP is, “An indicator used to *measure a friendly action* that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.”⁵⁵ These can serve as indicators to identify risks and opportunities.



Figure 14. Assessments provide efficient feedback in the form of MOEs and MOPs that identify both risks and opportunities across multiple planning horizons.

MOE answer the question *are we doing the right things?* They assess changes in behavior, capability, or the operational environment. They are tied to the attainment of an end state, achievement of objectives, or creation of effects. MOP answer the question *are we doing things right?* These measure task performance or accomplishment. It is quantitative but can be applied using qualitative attributes.

Some questions which may assist in developing MOE and MOP for SOF mission sets are:

- J5, what kinds of outputs do you need from the assessments process to continue with planning? Within what timeframe would those assessments be more valuable to you?
- J35, what outputs of the assessments process might you need to further develop the plan from the J5 into fragmentary orders (FRAGO)? Within what timeframe would those assessments be most valuable to you?
- Fires, what assessments do you need in support of your targeting cycle? Within what timeframe would those assessments be most valuable to you?

As noted in the operational framework section, making predictive assessments that span from tactical actions to strategic intent across multiple lines of operation which span the tactical, operational, and strategic problem sets across a vast and highly complex battlespace is difficult. However, dividing the larger problems into smaller interrelated problem sets will allow the SOJTF staff a better capability to make predictive assessments. Many of these problem sets which can be reduced to EVENTTEMPS could conceivably be analyzed and processed using artificial intelligence (AI). As the Services explore the use of AI to aid decision making, the SOJTF commander and staff must follow suit.

Planning Horizons Scope the Operational Approach

How SOF units organize planning across horizons during LSCO may or may not be the same as conventional formations. The SOJTF commander and staff must understand both CF and SOF planning horizons and define these horizons for the SOJTF. This will help to organize the staff to feed assessments back into staff process at the right juncture.

Taken from left to right are long range, mid-range, and short range planning. Depending on the nature of the operation, the span of these time horizons may shift (Figure 15). During LSCO, current operations normally looks out a maximum of 120 hours and is the province of the J33. Future operations are handled by the J35 and may extend out to several weeks, depending on the operation. The J5 is responsible for long range planning. There is an art to managing the transition between the time horizons. It requires that the staff remain alert to changes in the operating environment and the operational tempo.




Figure 15. Planning horizons are flexible and depend upon the situation.

Some useful questions to define planning horizons are:

- Is this something that impacts the plan 5 days from now?
- Or the FRAGO for tomorrow?
- Or for the targeting mission tonight?
- Or all of the above?

Central to managing the hand-offs between planning horizons during LSCO is the assessment process. This makes it of primary importance that the SOJTF staff establish who specifically will be in charge of the assessments process. Regardless of who is placed in charge, they must have relatively unfettered access to the operational and intelligence data from across the SOJTF staff.

SOJTF Operations Take Place Throughout the Operational Area

The following paragraphs use operations within a Corps area *as an example*. However, their principles could easily apply to a Theater or Field Army. The point is that a SOJTF is an *operational level headquarters* which executes special operations *throughout* the operational area. Some of the graphics are taken from recent Warfighter Exercises and are meant as illustrative examples. They provide food for thought, not a prescriptive solution.

During Phases 0 – III SOF Operations can take place in the Corps area of operations. However, the SOJTF also has C2 of forces beyond the Corps forward boundary that operate in the Corps commander's areas of influence and interest. The groundwork for Phase III operations was laid

down during Phases 0 – II, where SOF shaped the environment. Figure 16 notes some of those shaping operations. It also shows some of the trends observed during Warfighter Exercises which would affect LSCO, as well as a number of points the commander should take into account during planning and execution.

It is important to note that the SOJTF will most likely exercise C2 of forces well outside the Corps fight during Phase III. Therefore, it is important that the SOJTF avoid becoming viewed by the Corps commander and staff as just another Division-level headquarters. The SOJTF is an operational level component command which supports the Corps fight but is not subsumed by it. This will require that the SOJTF commander, staff, and LNOs avoid overcommitting SOF to any LOE. A particularly thorny problem confronting the SOJTF commander and staff when working with the Land Component Commander of the Joint Force is that the Army cut all long range reconnaissance and surveillance unit (LRSU) force structure during a period of declining resources. This leaves a deficit in organizations designed for human based ground ISR at the strategic and operational levels. The unspoken solution is to employ CF infantry squads or SOF to fill the gap. **While Special Reconnaissance (SR) is a core activity, SR is not the same as a LRSU operation.**

Consolidation of gains is also important to the Corps Commander. All elements of the Joint Force will require time to reconstitute, retrain, and re-equip. Joint Force elements with IRC will be particularly critical in reestablishing a contact layer congruent with U.S. interests. The SOJTF has the means to coordinate SOF and CF Civil Affairs (CA) and PSYOP units to assist in gaining the support of the indigenous population. This will involve integrated messaging from the strategic to the tactical level as well as integrating Interagency and Host Nation (HN) relief and assistance efforts. SOF units such as Special Forces (SF), CA, and PSYOP and CF units such as the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB) will play a vital role in setting the conditions for a return to competition because of their ability to work with indigenous populations, allies, and partners.




Figure 16. The SOJTF exercises C2 of SOF operating within the Corps area as well as in areas well outside its areas of operations, influence, or interest.

This will require that the SOJTF

Conventional and SOF Considerations in Consolidation of Gains




Figure 17. Both CF and SOF have roles to play in consolidating gains. The SOJTF can be the catalyst for gaining the support of the indigenous population.

Appendices A and B of Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations* provide a guide to organizational considerations for the Joint Special Operations Task Force. The appendix can also serve as a guide for higher or lower echelons as well. Additionally, JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters* contains chapters that focus on each of the J-Staff directorates and special staff, as well as useful checklists.

Coordinating Deep Operations

Recent wargaming experience has indicated the efficacy of establishing a Deep Operations Cell within the SOJTF HQ.⁵⁶ Specifically, the DOC seeks to improve the SOJTF's ability to converge, organize, and synchronize cross-domain effects in pursuit of physical, virtual, and cognitive objectives.

Convergence. To plan, direct, monitor, and assess physical and information power capabilities and operations in the DOC, the SOJTF brings together SOF subject matter experts (SME) as well as selected J-Code and unit representatives. For the informational aspect of operations, the DOC incorporates assigned PSYOP and CA forces as well as planners representing Cyberspace, MILDEC, Public Affairs (PA), Fires, OPSEC, Space and Intelligence. The DOC also incorporates SOF physical maneuver (ARSOF, NAVSOF, MARSOC, AFSOC operators) and select interagency partners to blend physical power capabilities into the total scheme of operations.

Organization. The DOC contains planners and analysts that represent the entire SOF capability portfolio to include information and physical power capabilities and forces. The DOC organizes these planners into OPTs for each subordinate unit to conduct information planning. Each OPT consists of information, SOF maneuver, intelligence, fires, and interagency representatives. They provide multi-functional IO input into subordinate force plans. This input incorporates cognitive, virtual, and physical objectives into each of their respective forces' operations.

Synchronization. The DOC synchronizes information and physical effects into SOJTF operations through integrated planning, targeting, and assessments:

- **Integrated Deliberate and Dynamic Planning.** This process employs the converged SMEs to ensure that physical and information plans and operations are mutually supporting, and that each plan contains cognitive, virtual, and physical objectives.
- **Targeting.** The DOC supports SOJTF and subordinate operations and intelligence functions by developing targeting plans for physical targets and networks, cognitive mapping and population sentiment analysis, virtual infrastructure mapping, cyber nodal targeting, as well as conducting relative combat power analysis for friendly and adversary information and physical power capabilities.
- **Assessments.** The DOC develops and executes comprehensive assessment plans that gauge the effectiveness of all operations. This entails measuring the success of each operation based on its accomplishment of pre-determined physical, virtual, and cognitive measures of effectiveness or measures of performance. The DOC also manages an overarching assessment plan that determines SOJTF success in achieving directed operational objectives based on the successes and contributions of all subordinate forces across all domains.

Potential Deep Operations Cell Tasks:

- Support an integrated campaign design that optimizes information and physical power.
- Develop an information narrative that nests within higher level objectives.
- Incorporate the information narrative in all operations by assigning cognitive objectives to each plan and operation.
- Tailor operational plans to leverage integrated CF and SOF capabilities for deep operations.
- Conduct cognitive, virtual, and physical network mapping and analysis.
- Develop cognitive, virtual, and physical objectives for all SOJTF plans and operations.
- Integrate dynamic and deliberate cognitive, virtual, and physical targeting.
- Conduct comprehensive effects assessments for cognitive, virtual, and physical objectives for all operations.
- Develop integrated plans to consolidate gains.

How Does the Joint Effects Targeting Process Integrate With the Joint Planning Process?

Targeting is an Extension of Planning

Targeting is an extension of the joint planning process. It integrates and synchronizes joint fires in both the future and the current operations time horizon. Joint fires accomplish more than physical destruction; kinetic and non-kinetic fires also influence behavior and actions, as discussed in greater detail below. In short, they generate effects desired by the JFC to accomplish the Joint Force's goals.

There are a number of challenges to consider in the joint effects targeting process. They include but are not limited to:⁵⁷

- Understanding the adversary to identify COGs, vulnerabilities, and capabilities.
- Gaining commander visualization of desired effects upfront to drive targeting.
- Viewing targets as entities and objects with the objectives of influencing behavior or actions and physical destruction.
- Gaining authorities and permissions for non-kinetic actions (in addition to kinetic fires).
- Applying all capabilities across all domains. A single domain focus or sole reliance on kinetic fires does not bring together the full range of options to place the adversary at a disadvantage and can increase risk, escalate the conflict, and accelerate expenditure of critical resources.
- Codifying responsibilities for each step of the joint targeting cycle within a construct of top-down guidance and bottom-up refinement.

Planning has a conceptual component and a detailed component (ATP 5-0.1). The Army Design Methodology (ADM) is the conceptual planning element that develops the mission statement, commander's intent, and broad objectives with an approach for achieving them. The operational approach begins with LOO for offensive and defensive operations, or LOE for employment during Unified Land Operations (ULO). The environmental frame identifies the current state conditions of the operational environment and desired future state conditions. Problem framing recognizes distinguishable obstacles inhibiting progress towards the desired end state. The operational

approach defines broad actions through a logical progression of interconnected objectives towards resolving the problem frame. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) addresses the detailed planning component.

Detailed planning develops the specificity related to execution based on the operational approach established in the conceptual planning component. Detailed planning synchronizes tasks and develops the execution matrix for operations. Fire support planning is a shared collaboration between the Targeting Officer (TO) in G5 Plans and the Lethal Effects Cell. The daily FRAGO is published through G3 Chief of Operations (CHOPS) for subordinate units such as the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces (CJSOTF) to execute.

Some insights from the joint community applicable to the effects targeting process include:⁵⁸

- Engage the broader intelligence community to understand the environment and adversary.
- Emphasize JIPOE, COG analysis, target systems analysis, and collection management activities to inform target development, execution, and assessment.
- Nest joint targeting as part of a diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL) approach.
- Provide visualization of desired effects informed by design and planning to guide targeting efforts.
- Gain authorities and permissions for IRC to broaden options.
- Use the joint targeting cycle to gain alignment and synergy across the targeting enterprise.
- Apply mission command to targeting. Emphasize top-down guidance and bottom-up development.
- Focus top-down guidance on command objectives, priorities, requirements, and target systems that support the operational approach and plan.
- Gain the benefits of bottom-up target development and fires synchronization to increase speed, agility, and precision of fires.
- Access capabilities of all fires regardless of ownership to achieve effects.
- Use lethal and nonlethal terms to describe desired effects. Use kinetic and non-kinetic terms to characterize joint fires to improve integration.
- Codify roles and responsibilities internal and external to the HQ, and tailor HQ structure and processes to leverage capacity and increase effectiveness.

Deliberate Targeting is the component that bridges the gap between conceptual and detailed planning (see Figure 18 and 19). The purpose of targeting is to both integrate and synchronize capabilities and effects from conceptual plans to detailed plans during MDMP, and prior to COA development to enable task synchronization. In addition, targeting is achieved once the application of effects against problem sets (targets) is successfully “harmonized” in time and space. This occurs during COA development and is coordinated across each of the staff agencies. The ends, ways, and means are the elements of operational art that are visualized and described during conceptual planning.




Figure 18. Bridging the gap between conceptual and detailed planning using a conventional force targeting cycle example.

Targeting guidance can be interpreted from the desired end state. Targeting construes lethal and nonlethal effects from the desired end state, as determined during ADM. Targeting ensures the appropriate internal and external capabilities are identified during conceptual planning, and that these capabilities are the appropriate methods towards achievement of desired effects. Target System Analysis (TSA), which will be discussed later in this document, occurs during conceptual planning. TSA identifies the target system's critical element or COG that is required both for desired effects and for actionable targeting.




Figure 19. Conceptual, functional, and detailed planning synchronize effects to target enemy assets in the most efficient and effective manner.

SOF Employs an Integrated and Joint Approach to Targeting

An integrated and joint approach gets after what SOF brings to the joint targeting process. SOF employs the find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD) process to support both the joint deliberate and dynamic targeting processes. The SOJTF uses this process to engage selected targets or activities to support the JFCs objectives. F3EAD incorporates the same fundamentals of the joint targeting cycle and facilitates synchronizing maneuvers, intelligence, and fire support.⁵⁹ The JTF executes dynamic targeting with steps of find, fix, track, target, engage, and combat assessment (F2T2EA) (see Figure 20).⁶⁰ Both processes can apply to all targets whether developed during deliberate or dynamic targeting. Targets of opportunity have been the traditional focus of dynamic targeting because decisions on whether and how to engage must be made quickly. The SOJTF may accomplish the steps of dynamic targeting iteratively and in parallel. The find, fix, track, and assess steps tend to be ISR intensive, while the target and engage steps are typically labor, force, and decision making intensive.⁶¹




Figure 20. The dynamic targeting cycle provides a means for the JFC to address targets of opportunity (JP 3-60)

Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) Considerations and the Air Tasking Order (ATO) Process Constrain SOJTF Operations

In the target rich environment of LSCO, the ATO process imposes disciplined use of a finite asset. However, that means that most sorties flown will have been planned four days prior, as illustrated in Figure 21. This constrains SOF's agility, dependent as they are on air sorties for infiltration, exfiltration, fire support, and sustainment.

The JFACC employs a combination of deliberate and dynamic targeting to support Joint Force operations. The JFACC integrates targeting into the ongoing battle rhythm using the six-part joint air tasking cycle. The parts include: determining objectives, effects and guidance; target development; weaponnering and allocation; ATO production and dissemination; execution planning and force execution; and assessment. Of the six parts, the least flexible is ATO production and dissemination. The ATO determines how many sorties will be flown, by what aircraft, and for what purpose.




Figure 21. ATO Generation is the critical path in the joint air tasking cycle.

The SOJTF Integrates Non-Lethal and Lethal Effects From the Start of Planning

Always consider non-lethal effects from the beginning of the targeting process, rather than trying to tack them on at the end. SOF planning will synchronize both lethal and non-lethal effects in the physical, virtual, and cognitive realms. Planning and conducting highly sensitive and frequently extended duration missions, SOF will operate forward of conventional and coalition force partners,

often in areas where local adversaries may significantly reduce U.S. technological advantages. This will include a full suite of land, water, and aerial robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) capable of generating the desired effects. The table below lists a sample of SOF effects that can support the JTF.

| Example SOF effects that support the JTF | |
|--|---|
| Physical (Employment of Forces) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Destroy critical components of anti-access area denial systems • Sabotage of critical infrastructure in deep areas • Illuminate HPTL and networks with SOF / Indigenous Intel Capabilities • Defeat / degrade / disrupt enemy networks and SOF • Enhanced / layered population resource control |
| Virtual (Employment of Electrons) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inject malicious code into enemy networks in deep areas • Virtual mapping of networks using unilateral or indigenous cyberspace capabilities • Extract targeting data from enemy networks / Internet of Things (IoT) in deep areas |
| Cognitive (Employment of Ideas) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attacking the enemy's narrative • Influence enemy decision making • Reduce support for the enemy among key populations • Reduce enemy will to fight • Enhance layered populace and resources control and consolidation of gains through civil affairs operations • Increase support for friendly operations and objectives |
| <p><i>Table 2. SOF synchronizes effects in the physical, virtual, and cognitive realms across domains to achieve the JFC's intent.</i></p> | |

Non-Lethal and Lethal Effects Employ the Same Targeting Process

LOO and LOE are identified within a SOJTF's Area of Operations (AO) which focuses the priorities of the non-lethal efforts. ***The targeting process remains the same and concurrent for both lethal and non-lethal effects.*** This enables the targeting team to integrate a broader scope of capabilities to include CAO, MISO, and Cyberspace operations. Non-lethal effects co-opt, inform, organize, and influence the enemy and the population to set conditions for current and future operations.

Time is a vital consideration in planning, sequencing, and integrating physical, virtual, and cognitive actions throughout the operational area. ***Planning must consider that physical, virtual, and cognitive effects occur on different time scales.*** Physical effects have the advantage of being both familiar and observable. Virtual effects can be either measurable or observable but their time scale is outside that of normal human experience. Cognitive effects are the most difficult to assess, as they occur within the human mind. An analogy for sequencing physical, virtual, and cognitive actions for maximum effect is the fires concept of Time-on-Target (TOT) first developed by the U.S. Army in World War II, where fires from physically dispersed fires assets were massed with devastating effect.

Physical effects have time horizons that range from seconds to hours, with the exception of directed energy weapons, ***but it's their convergence with the virtual to achieve both physical and cognitive effects that makes the temporal aspects of physical activities and operations a more critical***

*consideration.*⁶² While the NDS envisions the contact layer as a competitive space, it does not rule out kinetic engagements. Virtual effects occur at or near the speed of light.⁶³ This could make a difference when operating at machine speed across continental distances.

Cognitive effects are the most difficult to place within a time horizon, as they occur within the human mind, and are often achieved by virtue of a combination of physical and virtual actions by the U.S. or our partners. However, a good rule of thumb for traditional influence operations (e.g., radio, leaflet) is that it will take more time – on the order of months or years – to change deeply held beliefs or to build trust. ***However, technologies such as enhanced reality, social media, and smart devices have given us direct access to individuals and populations from the sanctuary of the Continental United States (CONUS).*** These technologies provide great potential to both increase SOF's abilities for standoff into deep fires areas, and enhance the speed of desired cognitive change.

Non-Lethal Targeting Requires Non-Lethal Assessment Metrics

Non-lethal effects do not directly seek the physical destruction of the intended target but still seek to degrade, disrupt, delay, or influence the performance or function of an enemy. Therefore, the SOJTF can gauge non-lethal effects metrics by means of the intelligence analysis process. The sources of such intelligence may include social media, prisoner interrogation, or assessments from friendly forces in contact. Some non-lethal assessment metrics could include:

- Data from social media that the targeted population no longer supports or is beginning to doubt the enemy's narrative.
- Increased cooperation of key populations in a manner that favor friendly objectives.
- Increase in enemy combatant surrender rates.
- Increased compliance by the population with population resource control measures.
- Increased support for friendly operations and objectives in the local and international media.
- Decreased cyber electromagnetic activity (CEMA) directed against friendly forces.

Target System Assessment: This is a broad assessment of the overall impact and effectiveness against an entire target system capability, e.g., enemy air defense capability or indirect fire capability of a regimental sized enemy unit. A target system assessment may also look at subdivisions of the system compared to the commander's stated operational objectives. COG and nodal analysis of insurgent networks or criminal organizations are one example of this type of assessment.

Lethal Assessment Metrics Have a Well Established Framework – Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)

BDA are the primary type of assessments used to measure effectiveness against enemy forces. These assessments work effectively against targets categorized as systems, units, networks, or formations. They also are effective for infrastructure targets that serve a function. The three metrics for assessing battle damage on enemy forces are:

- Physical Damage Assessment: This assessment estimates the quantitative extent of physical damage through munitions blast, fragmentation, and fire damage effects to a target. This can be based on observed or interpreted damage.
- Functional Damage Assessment: This assessment estimates the effect of attack(s) on the target to perform its intended mission compared to the operational objective established against the target. This assessment is inferred based on all-source intelligence and includes an estimate of the time needed to replace the target function. A functional damage assessment is a temporary assessment used for specific missions. The following descriptions are suited for describing assessments made on enemy systems, units, or formations:
 - Catastrophic Kill (K-Kill): Described as damage that is non-repairable or beyond economic feasibility to repair.
 - Firepower Kill (F-Kill): Damage or effects that render the target immediately incapable of firing its primary armament and duration is indeterminate.
 - Functional Kill: Damage that produces loss of a facility or any key component or combination of components in a target that prevents it from performing its designated function or functions.
 - Incapacitation Kill: Damage sufficient to prevent personnel from providing the critical functions required by their assigned job before a given time has elapsed.
 - Mission Kill (MSN Kill): Measures the degree of target damage that prevents the target from completing its designated mission, however not to the extent of a K-Kill.
 - Mobility Kill (M-Kill): Damage sufficient to render a vehicle or ship incapable of executing controlled movement and damage is not repairable by the crew on the battlefield.
 - Passenger / Personnel Kill (P-Kill): Damage sufficient to cause the incapacitation of the transported personnel aboard a combat vehicle, crew members excluded.
 - Structural Kill: Occurs when sufficient structural damage, more than 50% of useable floor space, has been inflicted to a building or hardened structure to make it unusable.

Does the SOJTF Need an Information Warfare Task Force (IWTF)?

The IWTF Addresses Challenges in the Information Environment

The Information Warfare Task Force (IWTF) is a concept under development. It does not conflict with the joint doctrinal concept of Information Operations (IO). Rather, it couches IO in warfighting language as a means to address the challenges outlined in the national security documents. It also fills a gap not addressed by joint doctrine. Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations (JP 3-13)* addresses the formation and functions of an IO cell within a joint staff. However, the *IWTF envisions the employment of units with IRC as a Task Force* under a headquarters to support the SOJTF.

IO are “The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.”⁶⁴ *IO is a non-lethal Fires capability* and, like traditional fires, supports maneuver operations. Maneuver seeks to gain a position of advantage over an adversary through movement, tactics, and physical offensive and defensive operations. Traditional and IO fires support that effort by delivering precision and mass

effects against targets. Like traditional Fires, IO should be integrated at the beginning stages of planning through execution, exploitation, and assessment. IO are most effective when planned, rehearsed, employed, and assessed by phase and at echelon.

The purpose of U.S. Military Information Warfare (IW) is to evoke a behavior required to achieve U.S. objectives. In many situations, the establishment of an IWTF could support the SOJTF Commander, and subsequently, the JFC, by synchronizing effects of disparate capabilities (e.g., PSYOP, military deception (MILDEC), operations security (OPSEC), CA, Space Support, Special Technical Operations (STO), and Social Media Operations) to achieve operational and strategic objectives. If the SOJTF forms an IWTF, the IWTF Commander would relate to the SOJTF Commander and staff in the same way as a fires brigade commander who becomes the FSCOORD for a CF commander and staff.

When the goal is to influence, information – even information coated in emotion – may not be enough. ***Leveraging emergent technologies to converge information, indicators, and experience in concert with operations, commanders will be able to maintain freedom of action through their influence upon relevant audiences.*** This will enable them to achieve a cognitive window of advantage by influencing friendly and neutral populations to enable U.S. and partner operations while influencing enemy formations and populations to reduce their will to fight or increase their ability to cooperate.

The Key to IWTF Success is Integration at All Levels

The IWTF can integrate staff members and liaisons from each of the IRCs (e.g., computer network attack, computer network defense, MISO, and public affairs) early in the JPP and MDMP as well as throughout the F3EAD process. The IWTF staff can assist the SOJTF staff with incorporating information effects in the commander's intent and the scheme of maneuver. The IWTF would facilitate target development, JIPOE or IPB, and additional facets of military planning that require extended timelines for integration, deployment, and execution of information-related tasks. The IWTF could facilitate IO integration at the operational level in LSCO. As the SOJTF is an operational level organization, its IO practitioners conduct several common activities in order to fuse information power with physical power in planning and executing these operations. These fusion activities are convergence, organization, and synchronization.

The IWTF Develops Influence Plans

The IWTF develops a threat based influence plan as outlined in DODD O3607.02, *Military Information Support Operations (MISO)*. All influence campaign plans must be approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to ensure they incorporate both U.S. political objectives as well as the authorities to employ MISO to support those objectives. This military influence campaign is nested with and supports the U.S. National campaigns designed to promote American values while exposing enemy propaganda and disinformation. A common mistake made in planning is placing the bulk of the effort on developing the message or narrative instead of *first* determining the desired behavior.

In the close maneuver and support areas the IWTF operates along four broad lines of effort:

- Establish and defend the Joint Force’s legitimacy to conduct operations. The audience for the legitimacy line of effort are the international public opinion and civilian audiences within the contested area.
- Prevent the use of WMD. The IWTF conducts this task by rebroadcasting and amplifying national level cognitive objectives of holding the national leadership and units employing WMD accountable in the international community as well as a credible threat of exponential retaliation.
- Convey inevitability of the enemy’s defeat. The purpose of this line of effort is to attack the enemy’s will to resist the Joint Force’s effort. The audiences for this LOE are the enemy’s political and military leadership, rank and file service members, and hostile civilian populace.
- Control of the civil populace. Information warfare reduces a civil populace’s interference with friendly military operations. The IWTF can also use IW to move a civil populace in a manner to hinder enemy movement. Lastly, information warfare can be used with a local populace to report enemy SOF, by-passed units, and other critical information. With the increased emphasis on dense urban areas, controlling and influencing the civil populace will gain in importance.

IWTF Operations Can Occur Throughout the Operational Area

In the areas beyond the forward line of troops (FLOT), information warfare should be employed to attack political, social, economic, and informational systems the enemy relies upon. The enemy fears the use of information to foster political and social dissent similar to “color revolutions” and “Arab Spring”⁶⁵ in their strategic support area. This use of information warfare serves as a deterrent in the competition phase and denies the enemy sanctuary during conflict. Information warfare is also used to degrade the enemy Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) and Integrated Fires Complex (IFC) in denied areas. Information warfare degrades enemy IADS and IFC in the information environment by locating, deceiving, and targeting them.

The locating portion of the IW task is twofold. First, using technology to aggregate data points that range from smart phone data, social media posts, smart applications (apps), and other devices the Joint Force is able to develop targetable information against high value anti-access systems. Secondly, the information environment with its social media and smart apps provide the Joint Force the mechanism for people in denied areas to report the location of high value anti-access systems. Information warfare specialists are fully capable of producing this behavior in desired audiences. This behavior is demonstrated by “Pokémon go”, and “TripAdvisor” phenomena.

Information warfare uses scatterable multispectral reprogrammable “media” to deceive enemy IADS and IFC. The scatterable media possess the ability to broadcast false signals to enemy systems as well as prevent enemy systems from sharing information. The targeting task is designed specifically to attack the will of the operator. This task includes inducing doubt regarding equipment and leadership performance in the operator’s mind, highlighting long term health risks from operating specific equipment, and informing operators of losses suffered amongst other similar systems. Desert Storm demonstrated this capability with great effect.

How Does the SOJTF Achieve CF-SOF Interdependence, Interoperability, and Integration (I3)?

Understand Their Different Perspectives

Crucial to I3 is an understanding that CF and SOF are structured, trained, maintained, and employed differently to deliver separate capabilities. This means that ***CF and SOF perceive the battlefield differently***. These perceptions are filtered through mental models that can provide stability but also serve to block ideas which do not fit preconceived or deeply held beliefs. Because of their training and operational experience in dealing with foreign cultures, SOF should have an advantage in overcoming the friction and obstacles created by deeply ingrained mental models.

CF-SOF I3 are part of a triad that when synchronized enables SOF to achieve the JFC's desired end states. All three elements of the I3 triad develop concurrently. ***To foster interdependence, the SOJTF Commander and staff must diligently inject themselves into CF MDMP and the JPP as early as possible.*** This will involve every means of coordination and communication from video teleconferences to face-to-face-coordination to the early employment of LNOs.




Figure 22. The CF-SOF I3 triad allows the SOJTF to integrate SOF unique effects.

It is important to understand the differences between interdependence, interoperability and integration. Interdependence links the capabilities, authorities, and actions of military forces and other government partner's to produce the maximum operational effect. Interoperability is the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.⁶⁶ Integration arranges military forces and their actions in time and space to bring the maximum force to bear against an adversary.

In the long run, ***interdependence requires interoperability of both digital systems and mission command processes***. The SOJTF commander and staff must be know how to employ CF C2 systems while still retaining the ability to use SOF-specific systems. Integration allows the SOJTF to integrate effects that are SOF-unique into other joint component command target sets, thereby achieving the JFC's desired end states. The required degree of ***integration*** varies over time and circumstance, but is ***shaped by a thorough consideration of both the capabilities and the limitations*** of the Joint Force.

Additional Considerations for SOF-CF Interoperability

Within the joint community, the Joint Air Tasking Cycle results in an ATO which provides for integrated, efficient use of air assets. Just as the IWTF does not run counter to joint doctrine, the development of a Joint IW Tasking Cycle which produces an **information warfare task order (IWTO)** for IRCs does not, either. An IWTO could provide commanders and their staffs with a means to efficiently conduct IW. It would also provide a conceptual framework well understood by the joint community.

An additional means to optimize joint operations would be to create a special operations tasking cycle and a **special operations task order (SOTO)**. This would help the joint force components plan, sequence, and integrate special operations. Much like the ATO does for air assets, this would rationalize SOF resource allocation and deconflict employment of SOF. It may help the conventional components realize that they don't need to "own" a SOF slice; they can "rent" it just as SOF requests air, maritime, cyberspace, and space assets.

Establish Authority – Who is in Charge?

“Establishing authority is paramount in integrating CF and SOF. The establishing authority for the support command relationship is the JFC. The establishing authority defines the support command relationship among the subordinates in terms of who is supported and who is supporting, the degree of authority, and overall priorities, especially where there are limited resources supporting numerous operations.”⁶⁷ The establishing authority adjudicates between subordinate organizations which are unable to come to agreement.

The SOJTF will most often be the supporting commander. Therefore, the SOJTF Commander and staff must internalize the supported commander's intent. ***This deep understanding will provide a framework for the SOJTF to employ forces and assess risk.*** The SOJTF Commander and staff will need to educate and inform their CF counterparts on the capabilities and limitations of the SOJTF. SOF LNOs are critical to this process particularly during LSCO where the pace of operations will often be at machine speed and communications will be degraded.

The SOJTF Commander and staff should impress on their CF counterparts that SOF are most effective when special operations are fully integrated into the overall plan. ***They must ensure integration at every step of the planning process.*** SOF can operate unilaterally, independently as part of the overall plan, or in support of a conventional commander. The SOJTF provides a robust C2 structure to integrate and coordinate the SOF effort. It also provides a C2 structure responsive to the needs of the operational units and provides the most flexibility and agility in conducting special operations.

Consider Multinational Operations I3

Another aspect of I3 during LSCO is the need to operate with allied and partner forces. This holds true for SOF as well as CF. During multinational operations, U.S. forces establish liaison early with forces of each nation to:⁶⁸

- Foster better understanding of caveats, capabilities, and limitations.
- Facilitate the ability to integrate and synchronize operations.
- Assist in sharing information.
- Developing trust and an increased level of teamwork.

Interoperability within a coalition construct (allies and partners) has two main elements. The first is a human dimension based on trust, transparency, and inclusion. The second is technical. Coalition operations stand or fall based on the human dimension. The SOJTF cannot allow technical limitations of information sharing networks, tools, and databases to fracture their operations within the coalition. Language differences can pose formidable challenges. However, that is precisely where the SOJTF has an advantage and can add value to CF operations.

In a multi-national environment, it is important to select words carefully, avoid acronyms, and confirm understanding early rather than risk confusion later. Ensure information-exchange technical platforms are in place, necessary disclosure and information sharing training is accomplished, and establish a strong “write for release” policy to enable collaboration both within and external to the HQ.

Some insights and best practices applicable to the SOJTF from joint lessons learned include:⁶⁹

- Understand the speed at which your partners can plan and operate.
- Personal relationships and building mutual trust are often more important than formal command relationships.
- Include and empower coalition partners by not over-classifying information and effectively sharing with them. Include Foreign Disclosure Officers.
- Political considerations, directed authorities, and national caveats will heavily influence the coalition command structure and operations. Understand the domestic politics of participating nations to gain awareness of factors influencing national objectives, capabilities, and limitations.
- Leverage relationships to overcome potential technical interoperability challenges.

What is Necessary to Sustain SOF in LSCO?

Integration between SOF, CF, and Other Sustainment Sources is Paramount

LSCO typically involve the deployment, sustainment, and retrograde of large combat forces. During LSCO, the SOF sustainment team, consisting of the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) J4, 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne), Service and Component sustainment organizations, and the SOJTF J4 must ensure integration with the CF sustainment infrastructure as early as possible in the planning process. The SOF sustainment team must ensure that sustainment activities are uninterrupted throughout the entire operation including the return to competition.

Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations* sums up the SOF sustainment requirements as, “Most special operations missions require CF logistics support. SOF are not structured with robust sustainment capabilities, therefore, SOF must frequently rely on external support for sustained operations. Limited SOF logistic capacity frequently requires support from CF supplemented by host-nation support (HNS) and/or operational contract support.”⁷⁰

When considering task organization, Joint Publication 3-05 further observes that “The routine sustainment of forces is monitored by the J-4 who is responsible for recommending logistic priorities to the CDRJSOTF, monitoring Service support to SOF, arranging inter-Service support agreements when advantageous and coordinating special operations peculiar logistic support with the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).”⁷¹

The SOF sustainment team should be knowledgeable about every sustainment resource, standard and non-standard within the AO. The SOF sustainment team must also understand the sustainment requirements of SOF forces operating in friendly, contested, and denied areas. Within the limits

imposed by communications and the ATO cycle, the SOF sustainment team must plan and execute both push and pull sustainment packages for both SOF and their indigenous partners.

Consider the Following in the Planning Process

The following is a list of some SOJTF J4 sustainment planning considerations:⁷²

- How will the terrain, weather, and enemy activities impact logistics support?
- Does the planned support complement the tactical plan? Is it adequate and feasible?
- What is the best time-phasing for introduction of logistics elements to support the combat forces?
- Where do the SOJTF and their subordinate units fit in the theater of operations' sustainment structure?
- What are the sustainment liaison requirements?
- Who will provide supply, maintenance, transportation, and field service support? Which logistics elements will provide that support?
- What are the basing requirements? SOF missions may necessitate living outside traditional basing footprints.
- What are the requirements for, and types of, contracted support that may support the operation? What is the supporting contracting organization?
- What are the security requirements for movement and resupply of forces, assets, and classes of supply?
- What are the funding responsibilities? Who is paying for what?
- What commercial logistics resources are available (e.g., civilian transport or freight carriers)?
- What are the inter- and intra-theater lift requirements for both administrative and tactical movements (e.g., ground, air, and maritime)?
- What are the redeployment requirements?
- What are the transshipment and storage constraints under certain arms control treaties and agreements, to which either the U.S. or HN may be party? *These may prohibit moving and storing certain weapons systems or classes of munitions on or over HN territory and in territorial waters.*
- What are the SOF-unique requirements for procurement and maintenance of nonstandard vehicles?
- What HN support is available? What are the subsequent risks to relying on that support?
- What special operations-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services does the operation require?
- What is the procurement process for special operations-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services?

The SOF sustainment team must articulate the SOJTF's sustainment needs to the JTF and the Services. This process must begin early in planning and continue throughout the operation. In order to obtain the best sustainment support possible, the SOJTF J4 should:

- Provide specific response time requirements by class of supply and location, if necessary.
- Identify requirements as global, regional, local, or a combination.

- Identify the support duration requirement.
- Provide any repositioning requirements.

The SOJTF J4 and LNOs should ensure that all sustainment organizations understand that SOF has unique requirements and capabilities. Some of these are:

- Specially designated Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA), MARSOC, and SEAL operators function as the unit logisticians and supply officers. They can serve as field ordering officers (FOO) or paying agents, and maintain the unit's property books.
- SOF elements can conduct some level of sustainment through procurement from indigenous sources. This capability, based on local availability, may require arrangements for tracking and reissue of funds, accountability for acquired property, contract management, and protocols for final distribution of property.
- Some special operations are classified and involve using sensitive equipment, or common equipment employed for sensitive purposes. This property is tracked outside standard supply channels and cannot be recorded on routinely used property books without compromising those operations. Accountability, disposition, and resupply of this material needs to be coordinated through the TSOC operational control element.
- Some SOF core activities, such as UW, have unique logistical considerations.

Since parent Services are responsible for the logistic support of their SOF units, the J4 must be conversant in the nuances of each supply system. USSOCOM component commands are normally capable of supporting deployed SOF elements for an initial period of 15 days. By the end of that period, the SOJTF J4 must have arranged for what will most likely be a combination of Service, joint in-theater support, non-standard, and special operations peculiar support.

Health Support Planning Considerations

Joint Publication 4-02, *Joint Health Services* states that “Due to the necessity to perform lifesaving interventions for personnel suffering combat trauma within minutes of wounding or injury, medical resources must be arrayed in close proximity to the forces supported. This array also permits the medical assets to rapidly clear the Joint Operating Area (JOA) of casualties and enhances the JFC's ability to quickly take advantage of opportunities that present themselves during the battle.”

It further notes that the SOJTF “surgeon staff must be included in the planning process for combat operations. To ensure effective and efficient health support within the OE, medical support plans must adhere to the supported joint functions. Noncontiguous operations units must understand the various support relationships described in the OPORD to ensure a seamless continuum of health support is established and can be maintained.”⁷³

Considerations for medical planning efforts to support LSCO include:

Threat. The threat is a composite of ongoing or potential adversary actions; occupational, environmental, geographical, and meteorological conditions; endemic diseases that can reduce the effectiveness of the joint force through wounds, injuries, illness, and psychological stressors; and the employment of weapons of mass destruction.

Medical Intelligence. Medical intelligence is produced by the National Center for Medical Intelligence and consists of the collection, evaluation, and analysis of information concerning the health threats and medical capabilities of foreign countries and non-state actors that have immediate or potential impact on policies, plans, or operations. That category of intelligence resulting from collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign medical, bio-scientific, and environmental information that is of interest to strategic planning and to military medical planning and operations for the conservation of the fighting strength of friendly forces and the formation of assessments of foreign medical capabilities in both military and civilian sectors.

Patient Movement (PM). Timely PM is the result of collaborative lift-bed planning and involves selection of patients for movement based on medical condition, location of available beds, route planning, selection of movement platforms, and movement control. The SOJTF Surgeon must work with the JTF Surgeon and GCC Surgeon to ensure inter-theater and intra-theater medical evacuation. SOF does not have medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets. All SOF aircraft have the alternate mission of casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), which usually takes place on exfiltration.

Patient Movement Items (PMI). PMIs are specific medical equipment and durable supplies that must be available to support patient movement (PM). The purpose of the PMI system is to support PM through pre-positioning, exchanging, and recycling of PMIs so medical treatment facility capability is not degraded.

Clinical Capabilities and Medical Logistics (MEDLOG) Support. Specific clinical capabilities, location, MEDLOG supportability, and bed requirements must be considered when planning health support and must be detailed in the respective OPLAN. Resupply of whole blood must also be planned for by the SOJTF, JTF, and GCC surgeons. The Army is the executive agent for blood on the battlefield.

Preventive Medicine (PVNTMED) and Health Surveillance. The deployment health surveillance program is initiated and the means to counter the health threats in the OA are identified to the greatest extent possible, before the forces arrive. Specific PVNTMED procedures are generally the responsibility of the component commands. The Joint Force Surgeon (JFS) advises the combatant commander on specific PVNTMED procedures to be implemented, typically accomplished through the component commands.

Prevention of Stress Casualties. A coordinated program must be planned for the prevention, treatment, and return to duty of combat stress reaction casualties.

Mass Casualty Situations. The SOJTF Surgeon must work closely with the JFS to ensure the communications, transportation, triage and emergency management, PM, and MEDLOG management aspects of the mass casualty plan are thoroughly rehearsed.

Prolonged Field Care. SOF medical personnel must be prepared to provide prolonged field care in instances where casualties cannot be evacuated expeditiously. The tyranny of distance in undeveloped theaters requires units to hold casualties who need surgery or advanced treatment

until evacuation assets are arranged. This requires expeditious resupply coordination of Class VIII, whole blood, and blood products.

SOF Surgical Teams. In the absence of Role 3 facilities, SOF and Service Forward Surgical Teams may be in the evacuation chain for casualties. These teams provide damage control resuscitation and damage control surgery. They increase the chance of casualty survival until a Role 3 facility is reached. These teams are very light and require expeditious resupply of critical Class VIII, whole blood, and blood products. The SOJTF, JTF, and GCC surgeons must keep them resupplied before their stocks are depleted.

Role 3 Hospitalization and Definitive Surgery. The SOJTF Surgeon must work with the JTF and GCC surgeons to ensure that a Role 3 medical facility is in the evacuation chain for the movement of casualties requiring definitive surgery.

Coordination between Joint Health Services Sources (HSS) is Paramount

The TSOC Commander coordinates conventional health service packages to augment the SOF organic medical capability using the organic surgeon section. This is critical as SOF has no organic Role 2 or Role 3 medical capabilities. Role 3 capability provides definitive surgery. Role 3 support is doctrinally provided by GCC service capabilities.

SOF HSS includes limited quantities of medical, critical care management, casualty evacuation, patient holding, and primary care capabilities. The special operations advanced tactical practitioner is a highly trained special operations medic who delivers a selected level of medical care normally reserved for health care providers.

Organization of the health support system is determined by the joint force's mission, the threat, intelligence, anticipated number of patients, duration of the operation, the theater PM policy, available lift, MEDLOG capabilities, and hospitalization requirement.

Acronym List

A2/AD – Anti-Access/Area Denial
ADM – Army Design Methodology
AI – Artificial Intelligence
ATO – Air Tasking Order
C2 – Command and Control
CA – Civil Affairs
CAO – Civil Affairs Operations
CASEVAC – Casualty Evacuation
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CCDR – Combatant Commander
CCIR – Commander’s Critical Information Requirement
CEMA – Cyber-Electromagnetic Activities
CHOPS – Chief of Operations
C-IED – Counter-improvised explosive devices
COA – Course of Action
COG – Center of Gravity
COIN – Counter Insurgency
COP – Common Operating Picture
COS – Chief of Staff
CT – Counterterrorism
CWMD – Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
D3A – Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess
DA – Direct Action
DIMEFIL – Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement
DSM – Decision Support Matrix
EAB – Echelons Above Brigade
EOCA – Enemy Course of Action
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EVENTTEMP – Event Template
F2T2EA – Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Combat Assessment
F3EAD – Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Assess, and Disseminate
FHA – Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FID – Foreign Internal Defense
FLOT – Forward Line of Troops
FOO – Field Ordering Officer
FSCOORD – Fire Support Coordination Officer
GCC – Geographic Combatant Command
HD/LD – High Demand/Low Density
HHQ – Higher Headquarters
HN – Host Nation
HRR – Hostage Rescue and Recovery
HSS – Health Services Sources
HVI – High Value Individuals
I3 – Interdependence, Interoperability, and Integration

IADS – Integrated Air Defense Systems
IDP – Internally Displaced Person
IFC – Integrated Fires Complex
IO – Information Operations
IPB – Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IRC – Information Related Capabilities
ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
IWTF – Information Warfare Task Force
IWTO – Information Warfare Tasking Order
JFC – Joint Force Commander
JFS – Joint Force Surgeon
JFSOCC – Joint Force Special Operations Component Command
JIPOE – Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Area
JIPTL – Joint Integrated Priority Target List
JPP – Joint Planning Process
JSOA – Joint Special Operations Area
JSOAC – Joint Special Operations Air Component
JSOTF – Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTF – Joint Task Force
LNO – Liaison Officer
LOC – Lines of Communication
LOE – Line of Effort
LOO – Line of Operation
LRSU – Long-range Reconnaissance and Surveillance Unit
LSCO – Large Scale Combat Operations
MARSOC – Marine Special Operations Command
MDMP – Military Decision Making Process
MEDEVAC – Medical Evacuation
MEDLOG – Medical Logistics
MILDEC – Military Deception
MISO – Military Information Support Operations
MNF – Multi-national force
NAI – Named Area of Interest
NDS – National Defense Strategy
NMS – National Military Strategy
NSS – National Security Strategy
OE – Operating Environment
OPCON – Operational Control
OPSEC – Operations Security
OPT – Operational Planning Team
PE – Preparation of the Environment
PED – Process, Exploit, and Disseminate
PIR – Priority Intelligence Requirement
PM – Patient Movement
PMI – Patient Movement Items
PN – Partner Nation

POLAD – Political Advisor
PVNTMED – Preventive Medicine
SF – Special Forces
SFA – Security Force Assistance
SFODA – Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha
SIGINT – Signals Intelligence
SME – Subject Matter Expert
SOF – Special Operations Forces
SOJTF – Special Operations Joint Task Force
SOTO – Special Operations Tasking Order
SR – Special Reconnaissance
TACON – Tactical Control
TAI – Target Area of Interest
TBM – Theater Ballistic Missile
TO – Targeting Officer
TOR – Terms of Reference
TOT – Time on Target
TSOC – Theater Special Operations Command
UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
ULO – Unified Land Operations
USSOCOM – United States Special Operations Command
UW – Unconventional Warfare
WFX – War Fighting Exercise
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

End Notes

¹ The National Security Strategy 2017, the National Defense Strategy 2018, and the National Military Strategy 2018.

² The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017, 25.

³ Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018, 1.

⁴ NDS, 7.

⁵ Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff J7. 16 July 2014. III-4.

⁶ Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff J7. 16 July 2014. III-4.

⁷ Joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. Also called JSOTF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

⁸ Joint special operations air component commander. The commander within a joint force special operations command responsible for planning and executing joint special operations air activities. Also called JSOACC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-05)

⁹ Ibid. III-4.

¹⁰ United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*. 6 December 2018.ix.

¹¹ Osinga, Frans P.B., *Science, Strategy, and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*, New York, NY: Routledge, 1977. 41.

¹² Ibid. I-9

¹³ A draft Training Circular on the Combined Special Operations Joint Task Force (CSOJTF) based upon experience from Warfighter Exercises and other Lessons Learned is exploring the concept of the IWTF.

¹⁴ The Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, Washington, DC: Joint Staff J-7, 27 November 2012, Incorporating Change 1, 20 November 2014, II-4 through II-13.

¹⁵ Source JP 3-05. III-11.

¹⁶ Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff J7. 16 July 2014. III-17.

¹⁷ ADP 6-0, Mission Command defines it as, "A philosophy of command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation."

¹⁸ Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC. Department of Defense. January 2019. 155.

¹⁹ Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff, J7. 16 July 2014. I-7. x.

²⁰ United States Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028*. 6 December 2018.

²¹ Sensitive Activities (SA). Operations, actions, activities, or programs that, if compromised, could have enduring adverse effects on U.S. foreign policy, DoD activities, or military operations, or cause significant embarrassment to the U.S., its allies, or the DoD. These are generally handled through special access, compartmented, or other sensitive control mechanisms. (DoDD 5143.01, October 24, 2014)

²² Operational preparation of the environment. The conduct of activities in likely or potential areas of operations to prepare and shape the operational environment. Also called OPE. (JP 3-05)

²³ Resistance movement. An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability. (JP 3-05)

²⁴ Ibid. I-7. III-4.

²⁵ Department of Defense. *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Forming a JTF HQ*. Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7. September 2015. 3.

²⁶ Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff, J7. 31 January 2018. I-7. II-18.

²⁷ Department of Defense. *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Joint Headquarters Organization, Staff Integration, and Battle Rhythm*. Second Edition. Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7. July 2013. 5.

- ²⁸ Department of Defense. *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Forming a JTF HQ*. Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7. September 2015. 1.
- ²⁹ For example, SOJTF-A sent Special Operations Force Liaison Elements (SOFLEs) to each Train, Advise and Assist Command (TAAC) and all other commands that supported US Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A).
- ³⁰ Department of Defense. *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Joint Headquarters Organization, Staff Integration, and Battle Rhythm*. Second Edition. Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7. July 2013. 9.
- ³¹ *Ibid.* 9, 10.
- ³² Joint Publication 3-33 contains another example of Seven Minute Drill. The key is to cover pertinent information quickly to conserve the commander’s time. See: Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff, J7. 31 January 2018. I-7. IV-20.
- ³³ *Ibid.* 12.
- ³⁴ Department of Defense. *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Interorganizational Cooperation*. Fifth Edition. Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7. April 2018. 11.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.* 12.
- ³⁶ Department of Defense. Joint Publication 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff, J7. 22 October 2013. x.
- ³⁷ Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC. Department of Defense. January 2019. 117.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.* 174.
- ³⁹ Department of Defense. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff, J7. 16 June 2017.
- ⁴⁰ Department of Defense. *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: JTF C2 and Organization*. Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7. April 2017. 9.
- ⁴¹ Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff, J7. 17 January 2017. III – 14, 15.
- ⁴² Department of Defense. *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Interorganizational Cooperation*. Fifth Edition. Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7. April 2018. 6.
- ⁴³ Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff, J7. 31 January 2018. I-7. IV-15.
- ⁴⁴ See Chapter XIII, Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff, J7. 31 January 2018 for a discussion of the CMO Directorate/Interagency Operations Directorate and additional considerations.
- ⁴⁵ Department of Defense. *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Interorganizational Cooperation*. Fifth Edition. Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7. April 2018. 1.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 1, 4.
- ⁴⁷ See Annex J to Appendix A (Checklist for JTF J9), Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff, J7. 31 January 2018.
- ⁴⁸ Department of Defense. *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Interorganizational Cooperation*. Fifth Edition. Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7. April 2018. 8.
- ⁴⁹ Department of Defense. *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Synchronization of Joint Fires*. Fourth Edition. Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7. July 2018, 2.
- ⁵⁰ Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-60, *Joint Targeting*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff, J7. 28 September 2018, x, xi.
- ⁵¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army. *Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-09, Fires*. Washington, DC. Department of the Army. 31 August 2012. 5.
- ⁵² Headquarters, Department of the Army. *Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-09, Fires*. Washington, DC. Department of the Army. 31 August 2012.
- ⁵³ Department of Defense. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff, J7. 16 June 2017. xii.
- ⁵⁴ Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC. Department of Defense. January 2019. 140.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 140.
- ⁵⁶ During Warfighter Exercise 19-4, the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) acted as a SOJTF and formed a Deep Operations Cell which facilitated SOF targeting and maneuver in the deep fires area.
- ⁵⁷ Department of Defense. *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Synchronization of Joint Fires*. Fourth Edition. Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7. July 2018. 1.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 1.

⁵⁹ Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-60, *Joint Targeting*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff, J7. 28 September 2018. II-31.

⁶⁰ Ibid. II-23.

⁶¹ Ibid. II-23.

⁶² Virtual Reality (VR) and Mixed Reality (MR) can be effective tools to bring this about. They represent a quantum leap in the capability to influence others.

⁶³ Light slows down when it travels through a medium other than the vacuum of space. For example, it travels as slowly as $\frac{1}{2} c$ in fiber optic cable.

⁶⁴ Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC. Department of Defense. January 2019. 112.

⁶⁵ “The Arab Spring was a series of anti-government protests, uprisings, and armed rebellions that spread across North Africa and the Middle East in the early 2010s. It began in response to oppressive regimes and a low standard of living, starting with protests in Tunisia. In the news, social media has been heralded as the driving force behind the swift spread of revolution throughout the world, as new protests appear in response to success stories shared from those taking place in other countries. In many countries, the governments have also recognized the importance of social media for organizing and have shut down certain sites or blocked Internet service entirely, especially in the times preceding a major rally. Governments have also scrutinized or suppressed discussion in those forums through accusing content creators of unrelated crimes or shutting down communication on specific sites or groups, such as through Facebook.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring Accessed 9 September 2019.

⁶⁶ Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC. Department of Defense. January 2019. 119.

⁶⁷ Ibid. 5.

⁶⁸ Department of Defense. *Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Interorganizational Cooperation*. Fifth Edition. Deployable Training Division, Joint Staff J7. April 2018. 9.

⁶⁹ Ibid. 10.

⁷⁰ Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-05, *Special Operations*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff, J7. 16 July 2014. I-7.

⁷¹ Ibid. A-17.

⁷² See also, Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*, Chapter VIII, and Annex F to Appendix A (Checklist for JTF J4) for additional information

⁷³ Department of Defense. Joint Publication 4-02, *Joint Health Services*. Washington, DC. The Joint Staff, J7. 11 December 2017. V-1.

