

NATO UNCLASSIFIED



17 March 2017

NSO(JOINT)0399(2017)AO/3700

Chair AO WG/AJOD WG and related custodian  
Info: ALL TA/DTAs

**ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS (STANAG 3700) –  
ALLOCATION OF STUDY NUMBER AND DETAILED TASKING**

References:

- A. NSO(JOINT)0377(2017)1/JSB dated 15 March 2017.
- B. AAP-47(B).


1. With MCJSB approval (Reference A) of the Doctrine Task (Enclosure 1) the AO WG is tasked by this letter to develop the standardization documents in accordance with Reference B and in coordination with AJOD WG for harmonisation.

2. NSO allocated the following STUDY number, long and short titles to the STANAG and AJP:

**STUDY 3700 AO EDITION 9 - ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS  
– AJP-3.3 EDITION C VERSION 1**

3. In accordance with Reference A the custodianship for these standardization documents is given to the JAPCC.

4. The publication will be developed with **Normal Priority**.

  
Paul BECKLEY  
Captain, USAN  
Chairman

Enclosures:

- I. DT FOR ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS (STANAG 3700)
- II. REPORT FROM DATA FUSION WORKSHOP
- III. ACT COVER LETTER

NATO Standardization Office – Bureau OTAN de normalisation  
B-1110 Brussels, Belgium Internet site: <http://nso.nato.int>  
E-mail: [joint@nso.nato.int](mailto:joint@nso.nato.int) – Tel 32.2.707.5573 – Fax 32.2.707.5718

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**Originator:** MCJSB [MCJSB reference]  
**To:** AJOD  
**Cc:** ACT

**DOCTRINE TASK (DRAFT)**  
**ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS**

**References:**

- A. AJP-01(E) (STANAG 2437)
- B. AJP-3 (STANAG 2490)
- C. AJP-5 (STANAG 2526)
- D. AJDCP Version 16 - 4
- E. Joint Air Power Strategy (JAPS)
- F. NSO (JOINT)1530(2015)1/ AJOD dated 25 November 2015
- G. NSO (JOINT)1623 (2015) 1 / JSB dated 14 December 2015
- H. AAP-47 (B), Jun 2016

**Enclosure:**

- 1. Consolidated RFF Comments
- 2. Data Fusion Summary Report

**BACKGROUND**

The Military Committee (MC) recognized the requirement to provide updated overarching doctrine and operational guidance to NATO commanders and their staff on the operational level.

A fundamental need is to ensure harmonization between SACEUR's Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) and the development of AJPs 01,3,4,5, 6 and 3.20.

AJP-3.3 presents key planning principles, considerations and processes required to provide joint air- and space operations and / or activities in a wide range of potentially simultaneous activities across a spectrum of conflict, which ranges from combat to humanitarian aid with constantly less head time.

The recent development of AJP-3.3 has been driven to ensure coherence with HQ AIRCOM extant AIR C2 CONOPS. As a result the current edition of AJP-3.3 does not fully reflect NATOs air operations practice and the Joint Air Power thinking, or the conduct of broader coalition air operations.

ACT initiated the review of AJP-3.3 with the release of a Request for Feedback (RFF) in February 2016. The RFF responses received provided the basis for discussions at

a combined RFF adjudication meeting and data fusion workshop, led by ACT, in September 2016.

## **RESPONSIBILITIES**

**AJP sponsor:** IMS (O&P)

**HQ SACT project officer:**

ACT Doctrine Coherence Section, LTC Harribert Rahmel, DEU A;

Phone: +1 757 747 4166; email: harribert.rahmel@act.nato.int

**International Military Staff doctrine sponsor point of contact:**

IMS O&P, LTC Francesco DEASTIS

Phone: +32 2 707 5308; email: deastis.francesco@hq.nato.int

**Custodian:**

JAPCC

Participating nations / organizations: GBR, FRA, USA, DEU, ACT, JWC, AIRCOM, MARCOM, JFC Naples

## **AUDIENCE**

Audience for this publication are primarily Commanders and staff at the operational level and those who develop doctrine and TTPs and associated programs. It could also be used to provide the necessary context for activities at the tactical level of warfare and support NATO training and education programs. The doctrine is intended for use by NATO forces but can also be used as a source of reference by partners, non-NATO armed forces or civilian organizations that may be deployed in a NATO JOA.

## **ACT ASSESSMENT**

Based on the expert reviews conducted during the data fusion workshop 06<sup>th</sup> – 08<sup>th</sup> September 2016 in DCDC, SHRIVENHAM, GBR the ACT data fusion summary report included the following key recommendations:

**Scope, Purpose and Application:** Align with the standard approach used for other AJPs, mainly Cape and Keystone AJPs.

**Policy:** Retain coherence with MC Policy, particularly when describing necessary adjustments to NATO and national command responsibilities during air and space operations in a complex and multinational environment.

**Strategy:** Clarify the relationship and impact from the currently developed Joint Air Power Strategy with/ on this AJP.

**Terminology:** Ensure coherent application of NATO's procedures for approval of introduced terminology.

## **DETAILED GUIDANCE**

### **Context**

- Field of standardization: Operational.

- Operational domain: Joint.
- Services/formations: All stakeholders in NATO-led operations.
- External forum where the task also has application: Partners and non-NATO nations involved in multinational operations, including military and civilian actors.
- Affected NATO nations: All.
- Doctrine already in existence or being prepared for the Alliance: STANAG 3700, AJP-3.3 (B) v.1 promulgated April 8<sup>th</sup>, 2016.
- Review subordinate APs for operational doctrine and incorporate into AJP-3.3 as required.
- Identify consequential changes that will affect other APs and recommend changes to the HJDA as appropriate.

## **Structure**

The data fusion workshop proposed the publication should get a new structure to better integrate the space operations parts. A Preface will be newly introduced to reflect Scope, Purpose and Application in line with the approach to Cape – and Keystone AJP's:

## **Preface**

**Scope:** The scope of AJP-3.3 is to provide fundamental principles for the effective employment of joint air and space capabilities, throughout the range of military operations, in order to ensure unity of effort.

**Purpose:** It describes the characteristics, roles and missions, organization, command and control of joint air operations and explains the joint air planning process. It also provides an overview of how military space operations can support the joint war fighter.

**Application:** AJP-3.3 is intended primarily as guidance for NATO commanders and staffs. However, the doctrine is instructive to, and provides a useful framework for, operations conducted by a coalition of NATO members, partners and non-NATO nations. It also provides a reference for NATO civilian and non-NATO civilian actors.

## **Chapter 1 Fundamentals of Air & Space Ops;**

## **Chapter 2 Commanding & Controlling**

- a. Joint Air
- b. Space Operations;

## **Chapter 3 Employing**

- a. Joint air assets
- b. space assets;

## **Chapter 4 Planning**

- a. Joint Air
- b. Space Operations;

**Chapter 5 Tasking & Executing Joint Air Operations;**

- a. Executing Control of the Air;
- b. Executing Attack;
- c. Executing Intelligence & Situational Awareness;
- d. Executing Air Mobility;

**Annex: Coordination & Control Measures.**

**Annex: Current Chapter 3**

**Annex: Standing operations and force structure**

**Annex: Remainder of the current Chapter 5 detail that cannot be integrated into the new structure**

**Annex: Additional annexes identified in the adjudication of the comment matrix**

**LEXICON**

**PART I** Acronyms and Abbreviations

**PART II** Terms and Definitions

**REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS**

**SCHEDULE**

Normal priority. Enter ratification 12 months from approval of DT

**PROMULGATION CRITERIA**

This publication shall be ratified by 14 NATO nations.

**OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION**

- AJP-3.3 requires classification as NATO UNCLASSIFIED
- For related documents and publications, see ANNEX A.
- NATO effective date (NED) not required.

Haribert Rahmel

LTC, SH Doctrine coherence, ACT

**Enclosure(s):**

1. AJP-3.3 RFF Adjudicated Comment Reporting Matrix, final
2. AJP-3.3 Data Fusion Summary report

**Distribution:**

MC JSB via NSO Joint Branch

AO WG

AJOD WG

JAPCC (custodian)

IMS (O&P)

ACT, Cap Dev, CEI, IDLL

**Documents Related to AJP- 3.3**

**Policy Documents:**

- Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 19 Nov 2010.
- C-M(2011)0022, Political Guidance, 14 Mar 2015
- AC/237-D(2010)0003, Approval of the NATO Crisis Response System Manual 2010
- PO(2010)0143, Comprehensive Approach Report, 13 Oct 2010
- PO(2011)0141, Political Military Framework for Partner Involvement in NATO-Led Operations
- PO(2011)0045, Updated List of Tasks for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the Lisbon Summit Decisions on the Comprehensive Approach”, 7 March 2011
- SG(2006)0244 Rev 1, Force Declarations and Designations
- SG(2008)0806(INV), NATO Lessons Learned Policy, 31 Oct 2008.

**MC Documents:**

- MC 0586/1, MC Policy for Allied Forces and their Use for Operations (UNDER REVIEW)
- SACEUR's Standing Defence Plan (SDP) 11000 Persistent Effort for NATO Integrated Air Missile Defence (IAMD), 23 May 2016 (Rev1 to be issued)
- MC 0613, Military Committee Concept for the NATO Integration of Air & Missile Defence System(NATINAMDS) and NATO IAMD, (to be issued NTL Feb 17)
- MC 0593/1, The Minimum Level of C2 Services, Interoperability and Connectivity Required to Ensure Effective Coordination, C2 of Forces and Elements Deployed on Land, Involved in a NATO-led Operation
- MCM-0077-2000, MC Guidance on the Relationship between NATO Policy and Military Doctrine (to be revised)

**Allied Publications:**

- AAP-47 B, Allied Joint Doctrine Development
- AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions

- AAP-15 NATO Glossary of Abbreviations
- AAP-03(J), Production, Maintenance and Management of NATO Standardization Documents, Edition J, Version 1, 10 Nov 2010
- AJP-3(B), March 2011, Allied Joint Publication for Operations,;

**Doctrine:**

- AJP-01(E), Allied Joint Doctrine
- AJP-2(A), Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security
- AJP-2.4, Allied Joint Doctrine for SIGINT
- AJP-2.7, Allied Joint Doctrine for JISR
- AJP-3(B), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
- AJP-3.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations
- AJP-3.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint targeting
- AJP-3.3(B), Edition B, Version 1, Ratification Draft 1, 2016, Allied Joint Publication for Air Operations,
- AJP-3.3.1(B), 2010, Allied Joint Publication for Counter Air
- AJP-3.3.3(A), Edition A Version 1, 2009, Allied Joint Publication for Air-Maritime Co-ordination
- AJP-3.3.5(B), Edition B Version 1, 2013; Allied Joint Publication for Air & Space Control
- AJP-3.4(A), October 2010, Allied Joint Publication for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
- AJP-3.5 Edition A Version 1, December 2013, Allied Joint Publication for Special Operations
- AJP-3.6, Edition A Version 1, July 2012, Allied Joint Publication for Electronic Warfare
- AJP-3.9, Edition A Version 1, Ratification Draft 1, Undated, Allied Joint Publication for Joint Targeting,;
- AJP-3.10, Edition A Version 1 Ratification Draft 1, Undated, Allied Joint Publication for Information Operations
- AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning

**ACO Directives:**

- COPD Allied Command Operations, Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (Interim Version 2.0), dated 04 Oct 2013

**Other:**

- NATO Crisis Response System Manual

## **AJP-3.3, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS DATA FUSION ASSESSMENT SUMMARY**

### **1. Background**

a. The Custodian for Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations, is Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) . The scope of AJP-3.3 is to provide fundamental principles for the effective employment of joint air and space capabilities, throughout the range of military operations, in order to ensure unity of effort.

b. The formal assessment of AJP-3.3 was initiated with the release of a request for information (RFI) in February 2016 to the Allied Joint doctrine development community. This summary represents an analysis of comments received on the RFI as well as other inputs gathered in research such as lessons learned, best practices, changes in policy and guidance, concept development, additional doctrinal sources, and other open sources.

c. Responses to the RFI were received from 14 nations and NATO organizations:

FRA, BGR, CZE, LVA , ROU, AIRCOM, POL, MARCOM, JWC, GBR, USA, ITA, ACO, DEU

### **2. Analysis and Discussion of Responses**

Ahead of the main analysis of the responses, attendees were asked to consider the scope, purpose and application of the new publication. The following were agreed as the means to shape the writing team:

- **AJP-3.3 Scope Statement**

The scope of AJP-3.3 is to provide fundamental principles for the effective employment of joint air and space capabilities, throughout the range of military operations, in order to ensure unity of effort.

- **Purpose of AJP-3.3**

It describes the characteristics, roles and missions, organization, command and control of joint air operations and explains the joint air planning process. It also provides an overview of how military space operations can support the joint war fighter.

- **Application of AJP-3.3**

AJP-3.3 is intended primarily as guidance for NATO commanders and staffs. However, the doctrine is instructive to, and provides a useful framework for, operations conducted by a coalition of NATO members, partners and non-NATO nations. It also provides a reference for NATO civilian and non-NATO civilian actors.

**Questionnaire and Responses Overview.** The RFF questionnaire included 15 general questions (GQs), 12 specific questions (SQs), and a section for additional comments not covered by the questions. There were 373 responses to the RFF that for a first event, were not categorized. Analysis of the responses reveals significant commonality in themes from



responders and harmonization requirements with the keystone and capstone publications as well as the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). The groupings and discussions below address the comments from Enclosure 1.

- (1) GQ1      The scope of AJP-3.3 is to provide fundamental principles for the effective employment of joint air and space capabilities, throughout the range of military operations, in order to ensure unity of effort. It describes the characteristics, roles and missions, organization, command and control of joint air operations and explains the joint air planning process. It also provides an overview of how military space operations can support the joint warfighter. Should the scope statement be modified? If so, be specific with LO/LI modifications and provide rationale.**

There were 12 responses. Although consensus was that the focus was acceptable there is still a need to refocus the scope. The result of the revision would be a shorter document with fewer redundancies or overlaps with other doctrinal documents. The rationale being improved clarity and standardization.

- (2) GQ2      Have any organizational changes within the NATO Command and Forces Structures impacted AJP-3.3. If yes, how?**

There were 8 responses. During the revision of AJP 3.3.3, NSO and IMS rejected the term “JFMC” on the basis of the current CFAO document which labels the maritime component as “MCC”, and not JFMC.

- (3) GQ3      Is this publication consistent with AJP-01 and does it provide adequate guidance for the conduct of Allied Joint Doctrine? If not, provide recommendations.**

There were 6 responses. In broad terms AJP-3.3 is consistent with both the promulgated AJP-01(D) and the RD for Edition E. However, Edition D contains the term ‘Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)’ within its Lexicon; highlighting the use of non-approved terminology within AJP-3.3 (B) arising from HQ AIRCOM’s Air C2 CONOPs. This needs to be addressed.

- (4) GQ4      Is this publication consistent with AJP-3 and other Allied joint doctrine publications? Specifically identify any harmonization issues and provide rationale for changes.**

There were 17 responses. JTWG/JTCB are referred to as the same organization but they are completely different. AJP-5 and other doctrine do not address a “joint operations plan (JOP). It remains unclear what this plan exactly is. The commonly used term is “operation plan”. In this context, an expression like “the joint commander’s operation plan” may be adequate. The described importance of EW in NATO (based on AJP 3.6 Edition B, V1) should be reflected in AJP 3.3. Every/any air operation will use the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and take place in the electromagnetic environment (EME).

As per GQ3, the current AJP is broadly aligned with AJP-3, 3.1 and 3.2. However there is inconsistent terminology between the 4 wrt JFACC/ACC/COM JFAC. In addition, further clarity needs to be given concerning the term APCMO vice ASFAO (3.1) and SCAR which is used within 3.2. It is also worth noting that there are discrepancies with AJP-3.7 (PR vice JPR) and AJP-3.9 concerning the NATO targeting process. AJP-3 is under revision, but especially the air operations publication. Command and Control part of Joint Air Operations, should be harmonized with AJP-3.1 and AJP-3.2. AJP-3 provides a fundamental framework

based on predominant campaign themes and military activities for joint operations. Again, the term “joint force air component” is inconsistent with AJP-3 which uses the term “component commands” and specifically “air component commander (ACC).” Recommend this difference be noted in the publication until AJP-3 can be changed.

**(5) GQ5 Is the publication consistent with existing or new policy documents such as NATO’s Air and Missile Defence policy? Are there harmonization issues evident?**

There were 13 responses. There is a minor harmonization issue: term and definition of “Air Mobility Operation” must be harmonized with the ATP 49 and other AP’s associated with the use of airborne systems in land operations. There are a number of policy-documents that need to be reflected in a revision of the STANAG: IAMD, SEAD, EW, Cyber and AirC2. NATO IAMD policy integrates BMD and Air Defence into a single IAMD mission IOT make full integrated and efficient uses of all resources. Separating SBAD from AD and BMD into the organization of JFAC and into the logic of Air Ops planning creates a wedge that can adversely affect the effectiveness of Joint Air Power as a whole and it is not consistent with NATO IAMD policy. Moreover, dual capable systems (AD + BMD) may not be effectively operated outside a comprehensive IAMD approach.

**(6) GQ6 What ongoing concepts or initiatives being evaluated or occurring in the joint experimentation program, joint exercises, transformation initiatives, real-world situations, and lessons learned, may reasonably be expected to affect the revision of this AJP?**

There were 10 responses. Changes in the NATO Level of Ambition needs to be taken into account (reorientation toward alliance defence): • Political Guidance 2015. For completeness it was recommend to have a greater focus on A2 AD and operating in a contested or denied operating environment (cyber, electromagnetic and traditional aspects such as airspace denial, etc), and the strategy-to-task process as there is still too much misunderstanding between strategy, objective, task, activity and effect. The RAF publication AP3002 Ed3 provides clarity in this area and could easily be précised and adapted for AJP-3.3(C). In addition, we would welcome greater content wrt GBAD planning and employment concepts.

**(7) GQ7 Can AJP-3.3 be better structured to enhance readability and comprehension? If so, be specific with LO/LI modifications and provide rationale.**

There were 7 responses. There is no coverage at this stage of the concepts of supported or supporting commander. It is covered later in Section 2.2.2 but it would be more useful here which is the first point at which it is relevant to a commander/planners considerations. A more logical flow (with additional material) would improve its readability and understanding. For example, chapters might be arranged as follows: 1- Fundamentals of Air & Space Ops; 2- Commanding & Controlling Joint Air & Space Operations; 3- Employing joint air & space assets; 4- Planning Joint Air & Space Operations; 5- Tasking & Executing Joint Air Operations; 6- Executing Control of the Air; 7- Executing Attack; 8 – Executing Intelligence & Situational Awareness; 9 – Executing Air Mobility; 10 – Coordination & Control Measures.

**(8) GQ8      What sections or subject areas of AJP-3.3 are redundant and should be combined, deleted, consolidated internally, or moved to another publication, either horizontally or vertically? Provide rationale with recommended modifications.**

There were 9 responses. Control of the air is the level of influence in the air domain relative to that of an adversary, and is typically categorized as parity, superiority, or supremacy. The degree of control lies within a spectrum that can be enjoyed by any combatant. This can range from a parity (or neutral) situation, where neither adversary can claim control over the other, to air superiority, to air supremacy over an entire operational area. Control of the air often requires at least air superiority to enable the successful execution of joint operations such as strategic attack, interdiction, and close air support.

Normally, counter air operations are classified as offensive or defensive. However, missions and aircraft are able to shift from defensive to offensive (or vice versa) to adapt to changing conditions in the operational environment. Counter air operations can be conducted across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict by any component or element of the joint force. Operations may be conducted over and in enemy, friendly, and international airspace, land, and waters; as well as space and cyberspace. They range from seeking out and destroying the enemy's aircraft (manned and unmanned) and missiles (air-to-air, surface-to-air, cruise, and ballistic), through taking measures to minimize the effectiveness of those systems, to countering efforts to contest control of the air through other domains such as cyberspace. The joint force commander's (JFC's) or the Air and Missile Commander's (AMDC's) objectives and desired effects determine when, where, and how these operations are conducted to gain the desired degree of control of the air.

This is not the current doctrine.

**Air parity** is described as a condition in which no force has control of the air. This represents a situation in which both friendly and adversary land, maritime, and air operations may encounter significant interference by the opposing force. Parity is not a "standoff," nor does it mean aerial manoeuvre or ballistic missile operations have halted. On the contrary, parity may be typified by fleeting, intensely contested battles at critical points during an operation with maximum effort exerted between combatants in their attempt to achieve some level of favourable control.

**Air superiority.** Joint doctrine defines air superiority as, "that degree of dominance in the air battle by one force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats" (JP 3-01). For conceptual clarity, Air Force doctrine further defines air superiority as "that degree of control of the air by one force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats, including cruise and ballistic missiles." Air superiority may be localized in space (horizontally and vertically) and in time, or it may be broad and enduring.

**Air supremacy.** Joint doctrine defines air supremacy as "that degree of air superiority wherein the opposing force is incapable of effective interference within the operational area using air and missile threats" (JP 3-01). For conceptual clarity, Air Force doctrine further defines air supremacy as "that degree of control of the air by one force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without effective interference from air and missile threats, including cruise and ballistic missiles." Air supremacy may be localized in space (horizontally and vertically) and in time, or it may be broad and enduring. This is normally the highest level of control of the air that air forces can pursue.

**(9) GQ9      Is the information/guidance accurate and useful? If not, provide details.**

There are 10 responses. For the most part, the information in AJP-3.3. is accurate and useful. However, as noted in the questions above and below, it is recommended that the terminology throughout the document be better aligned with NATO accepted terms and usage. Also, the previous version of AJP-3.3 included an Annex to Ch 4 which detailed the steps and considerations for the planning process for developing a supporting Joint Air Plan. Recommend this annex be re-added to the next version.

**(10)        GQ10      Does the publication adequately cover the full range of potential NATO operations (major and small operations, expeditionary operations, crisis response operations)?**

There are 10 responses. No, the current publication does not adequately address the contributions of air power and planning consideration for potential operations NATO forces may encounter. It does state that air power is flexible and can support various operations, but it does not address in any detail how it can best be used in various types of operations. Recommend a section be added which more explicitly describes best employment of air power in various NATO operations.

**(11)        GQ11      Does AJP-3.3 adequately address the role, function, and capabilities of the Joint Forces Air Component (JFAC)? If not, what specific improvements are required?**

There were 23 responses. The ALCC functions are not defined in the document. ATCC in the only air transport structure describe in the document. We understand that ALCC and ATCC are the same. COM JFAC's responsibilities include Data Link Management. COM JFAC is responsible for the integration of all data-link-capable units which contribute to the Joint Air effort. All NATO JFAC HQs are dependent on augmentation. Therefore, a maximum of standardization is required addressing role, function, and capabilities of the JFAC, which can be achieved by describing common understandings in this document.

However, AJP-3.3 introduces several new terms, abbreviations, aspects and understandings, which are not or differently used in higher policy documents (AJP 1, AJP 3, AJP 5). This might cause confusion.

**(12)        GQ12      Are the roles and responsibilities of the various commands, commanders, and other entities described accurate and complete? If not what changes, additions, or deletions should be made?**

There were 19 responses. All the Nations are not taking part in the planning of the nuclear mission (NPG, Nuclear Planning Group). So these specific missions will most of the time stay under the umbrella of AIRCOM. AIRCOM should be responsible for nuclear operations and not the designated JFAC.

Delete all references to the recognized air picture (RAP) production areas and air defence areas (ADAs). ADAs and RAP production areas should be identified in the Air Defence Plan and OPTASK AAW as responsibilities of the ADC. Ref AJP-3.3.1(b) para 0305.

As capabilities/forces of all components (and not made available to COM JFAC) contribute to DCA operations, the AOD is not the most appropriate document for the ADC to disseminate guidance.

- (13) **GQ13 Are the figures depicted in AJP-3.3 useful and current and contribute to the understanding of the text? Do they illustrate or support the key facets of joint air and space operations? Are other figures needed? Provide specific recommendations for any changes with rationale.**

There were 30 responses. Individual items identified in matrix.

- (14) **GQ14 Does AJP-3.3 adequately reflect JOINT air and space operations? )? If not, what specific improvements are required?**

There were 13 responses. AJP-3.3 does generally reflect joint air and space operations. However, recommend the incorporation of meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) support requirements and integration of cyberspace threats, vulnerabilities, and security with respect to air operations be added.

- (15) **GQ15 Are the terms and definitions within AJP-3.3 clear and does the current lexicon adequately address terminology needs of the publication? If not, provide specific LO/LI recommendations.**

There are 21 responses. See matrix for details.

16. **SQ1 Does AJP-3.3 adequately address air and space operations across the range of military operations? If not, what should be added or changed**

There were 9 responses. Similar to question GQ10, the current AJP-3.3 only generally addresses air and space operations across the range of military operations. Recommend a section be added which details the specific contributions of and considerations for the application of air power from engagement and security cooperation up to major combat operations. As specific weather considerations for UAV are not mentioned, add the following sentence : “Depending on the type of UAS and mission being conducted, planners may have to consider the weather in four separate and widely dispersed locations (satellite relay, launch and recovery base, transit route(s), and anticipated target location).”

- (16) **SQ2 Does Chapter 1 adequately address the definition of Air Power?**

There were 10 responses. The definition should be aligned with the Joint Air Power Strategy. The discussion is taking place there right now.

- (17) **SQ3 Are all air power roles and types of air operations in Chapter 1 adequately identified and explained? Are there any other roles, tasks or mission types missing that should be included in this chapter (i.e. Air C2, close combat attack, counter RAM, etc.)? Is the Is the defined structure of four air power roles and subordinated types of air operations adequate or needs it to be redefined? Provide rationale and specific LO/LI changes to the text.**

There were 16 responses. Space environment is a critical vulnerability (GPS satellite) for air operations and is not mentioned. Note further content explaining what is meant wrt SCAR, Dynamic Attack (AIRCOM requested) and CCA may be beneficial.

- (18) **SQ4 Is the time ripe to introduce Control of the Space (including counter space operations and space situation awareness) as a new core role of air power? If not, are there another specific improvements in this domain required?**

There were 9 responses. AJP 3.3 Ed B. considers already Space Situational Awareness as a role. Currently, most NATO Nations do not have sufficient space mission forces and space capabilities to support a separate NATO AJP on Space

Operations. It is often the national Air Forces that conduct space operations, but it is not air power that enables space operations. There is significant merit in adding Control of the Space as a new core role (vice Space Situational Awareness which is a term used by many NATO nations).

- (19) SQ5 Are the roles and responsibilities of joint air operations command and liaison elements, described in Chapter 2, current and adequately identified and explained? Provide rationale and specific LO/LI changes to the text.**

There were 12 responses. After “capabilities through the JFAC.” insert “COM JFAC exercise OPCON by delegation of COM JTC”. This is also inconsistency with other NATO publications as some JFAC Air C2 elements are missing in this paragraph : - CRC / D-CRC - AOCC / ASOC WOC and SQN OPS are not air C2 elements.

- (20) SQ6 Does a level-2 publication (AJP-3.3) needs to provide a detailed structure of a JFAC organization such as described in Chapter 3 or should this remain at the discretion of a JFAC commander? If incorporation in this AJP is correct, does Chapter 3 then correctly reflect the current situation?**

There were 11 responses. Yes, it should be included, or possibly moved to a level-3 publication. The point is to have it in formal doctrine. Some paras are too detailed for a level-2 publication. The core JFAC structure should be doctrinally founded in order to lay the foundations for the explanation of the ATO cycle. All NATO JFAC HQs are dependent on augmentation. Therefore, a maximum of standardization is required addressing role, function, and capabilities of the JFAC HQ, which can be achieved by describing structure and common understandings in this document. The current description does not reflect the NATO (NCS & NFS) common understanding of a JFAC HQ (see NATO JFAC Battle Staff Handbook, HQ AIRCOM). However, the AJP does not need to copy the content of the Battle Staff Handbook, thus the level of detail should be adjusted.

- (21) SQ7 Is Chapter 4 (planning for joint air operations) still consistent with the revised COPD (V2.0, 4 October 2013)? If not, what should be added or changed?**

There were 12 responses. The SBAD missile defence (MD) team contributes in very close coordination with all AD capable entities (i.e. maritime and land forces) to the planning of the air operation by developing the ADP. This plan will support the COM JTF's overall campaign plan and is meant to coordinate the joint AD efforts and to efficiently employ the scarce AD capable assets. This applies especially to the planning of Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD), as TBMD capable assets are very limited and successful adversary attacks with ballistic missiles could have great political and psychological impact. The TBMD mission is planned and executed through the Joint Prioritized Defended Assets List. At the beginning of the process, NAC will provide D&G on High Value Asset (HVA) based on host Nation(s) at Risk and political considerations through a critical assets (Political CAL) list. Then based on the CVRT (Criticality, Vulnerability, Recuperability and Threat) process each CCs will elaborate their prioritized critical assets list. Whilst an iterative process, the JDAWG is responsible, on behalf of the COM JTF to finalize the proposed Joint Prioritized Critical Assets List (JPCAL). The JDAWG will reduce duplicates and where possible merge assets which are in close proximity into one single asset. The outcome will be one single list of non-military high value and military assets providing the priority order for AD, the recommended Joint Prioritized Defended

Assets List (JPDAL). This JPDAL list, together with an Initial Air and Missile Defence Design, will be presented at the JCB to the COM JFC. Once approved by COM JFC, the list will be sent through SACEUR, the MC and to the NAC for final approval. Once approved by the NAC, the list becomes the JPDAL, which is sent back to the COM JFC and onward to the JDAWG, which, in turn, sends it to the AMDC AMD Planners to develop the Joint Air Defence Plan for the Operation. It will be published as an Annex to the Joint Coordination Order (JCO). Due to the required operational adaptability of any CRO, this JPCAL/JPDAL process should stay a dynamic process. For BMD planning, nations and CCs provide their prioritized critical assets and areas list (PCAAL) to SHAPE, which, under political guidance, merges these assets into a joint prioritised critical assets and areas List (JPCAAL). Based on available TMD assets, the JPCAAL is translated by AIRCOM into an initial defence design with a joint prioritised defended assets and areas list (JPDAAL). The JPDAAL needs to be approved by the North Atlantic Council. After approval, the defence design is transmitted to BMD units.

- (22) **SQ8 Does Chapter 5 (space support to NATO operations) provide a JFAC commander with sufficient guidance to fully integrate space in the planning of air operations? If not, what should be added or changed?**

There were 7 responses. Since Space Support Coordination is a new concept and not trained within nations, a more detailed explanation and visualization, how this entity interacts with the rest of the staff (e.g. battle rhythm) is required. Ch 5 does generally provide sufficient guidance on space support to air operations. However, see GQ13 for a correction to Fig 5.1 and additional LO/LI corrections to Ch 5 in the Additional Comments section.

- (23) **SQ9 Does AJP-3.3 need to address SOF air operations? If yes, provide LO/LI text and rationale.**

There were 7 responses. Existence should be announced, however, further details should not be necessary in this document. (Like nuclear operations it's there, it's important, but it's not within this publication)

- (24) **SQ10 What are the strengths of the publication?**

There were 4 responses. The current AJP-3.3 is very clearly and succinctly written, and logically lays out the concepts it is trying to convey. The next revision should strive to maintain that same clarity and brevity.

- 25. SQ11 What are the weaknesses of the publication?**

There were 6 responses. The biggest weakness and single most distracting aspect of the publication is the numerous terms and their usage that are inaccurate and inconsistent with accepted NATO terminology and higher-level publications. See the Additional Comments section for LO/LI corrections.

- (25) **SQ12 Are additional Annexes needed? Should any of the annexes be modified or deleted? Provide specific recommendations. Add sufficient detail to assist the custodian in developing any additional annexes.**

There were 62 responses comments submitted, all were covered through the course of analyzing and answering the GQs and SQs.

- a. **Emerging doctrine and other doctrinal issues.**

- (1) The writing team/custodian is required to inform those RFFs, based on this report and also take into account their findings and subsequent doctrine tasks. The custodian should report any anomalies or divergence between publications to ACT, Section Head Doctrine Coherence.
  - (2) The custodian should also maintain coherence with developments in AJP 3 and related doctrine.
- b. **Policy.** ACT is to provide advice and guidance where appropriate.
- c. **Concepts.** No concepts at this stage that could affect the development of AJP 3.3
- d. **Lessons Learned.** ACT to ensure provision of lessons learned where applicable.
- e. **Best Practices.** None identified outside of the normal RFF responses. But it was noted that Nations' comments should contain justification, especially if not attending a Data Fusion event.

### **3. Recommendations**

- a. Conduct development of AJP-3.3 using the process outlined in AAP-47(B).
- b. Harmonize this revision with the rest of the capstone and keystone AJP's utilizing the AJOD WG.
- c. Develop text, terms, definitions, and references to ensure consistency with current policy and joint doctrine per this summary and the adjudicated comments in Enclosure.
- d. Incorporate other change recommendations and additions per the analysis and discussions above and the adjudicated comments in Matrix.





**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION**  
**ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD**  
HEADQUARTERS SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION  
7857 BLANDY ROAD, SUITE 100  
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA, 23551-2490



5000/TSC FET 0200 /TT-160240/Ser:NU

TO: NSO, Joint Branch attention to MCJSB via AJOD WG

SUBJECT: Review STANAG 3700, AJP – 3.3 “Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations”

DATE: November 14<sup>th</sup> 2016

REFERENCE(S): A. AAP- 47 (B)  
B. AJDCP version 3.4 (approved)

Please find attached the documentation on the AJP-3.3 RFF and Data Fusion process from ACT that has been scrutinized and prepared by ACT and supporting staffs in order to allow the NSO to present a Doctrine Task to the nations that is supported by Data Fusion in accordance with AAP-47.

The documentation includes the consolidated and adjudicated comment matrix, Draft Doctrine Task and Summary Report from the data fusion event.

NSO is requested to assign a SO to work the DT from its current draft status to be finalized. The Authority Line is not required when a DCOS/ACOS/Branch Head is not signing the letter on behalf of SACT.

Should there be any questions, our point of contact is LTC H. Rahmel, SH Doctrine Coherence, [harribert.rahmel@act.nato.int](mailto:harribert.rahmel@act.nato.int).

Harribert Rahmel  
LTC, DEU Army  
Section Head Doctrine Coherence

ANNEX(ES):

- A. Adjudicated Comment Matrix AJP-3.3
- B. Data Fusion Summary Report AJP-3.3
- C. Draft Doctrine Task AJP-3.3
  - C1. Scope Statement from the DF WS
  - C2. Structure Proposal from the DF WS agreed by participating nations and entities

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