Managing Partnerships

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Plan

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
07 October 2008

FOREWORD FROM THE DIRECTOR

I am pleased to forward this report on Managing Partnerships – The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Plan (EAPWP).

This project represents a new phase in the JALLC's work and areas of activity, as it is the first time the JALLC has been required to study NATO activity at the politico-strategic level, and to provide a report and recommendations directly to NATO Headquarters. Although the study topic was initiated by ACT and ACO, it was subsequently determined that NATO HQ itself should be the principal customer. On that basis, the standard caveat on a JALLC report, to the effect that it is "not yet endorsed by the Bi-SCs", is not used for this study.

The Project Team has sought input from a wide range of organisations and personnel involved in Outreach activity, including senior NATO civilian staff, senior officers in the IMS and Strategic Commands (SC), representatives of NATO and Partner nations, NATO and Partner desk officers, administration and data management staffs.

The multi-faceted aspects of NATO Outreach in general, and the EAPWP in particular, make this a complex area of study and are a factor in preventing the identification of simple recommendations for progressive improvements. Nevertheless, the analysis has identified a number of areas where changes and improvements to current systems and methods should provide significant benefits. These include recommendations for: adjustments to management and coordination structures and clarification of responsibilities; the introduction of strategic military guidance; creation of a methodology to capture and use feedback, particularly from operations, to inform activity planning; changes to the related e-PRIME software system; and a review of resource allocation. Some of the recommendations may also be applicable in the context of NATO's other Outreach programmes, such as the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

The requirement for this report was initiated at SC level, although ownership later transferred to the International Staff (IS). It has been produced to meet the IS's requirement for an external review of the EAPWP, with the aim of providing recommendations for improvements, ahead of the NATO Summit 2009. It is therefore my hope that the report will contribute towards the future management of policy and activity generation in NATO's Outreach programmes in general, and the EAPWP in particular, by helping to build closer understanding, relationships and coordination within NATO, and between NATO and Partners, as well as by enhancing cooperation in relation to preparations for operations.

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Managing Partnerships

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Executive Summary

BACKGROUND

In a high-level conversation between SHAPE and Allied Command Transformation (ACT), a need was identified for an analytical study of Partnership for Peace (PfP); this was subsequently narrowed down to the specific requirement for an analysis of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Plan (EAPWP) and its management mechanisms. International Staff (IS) Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, Euro-Atlantic Integration and Partnership Directorate (PASP-EIPD), recognising that there was room for improvement in the coordination and management of the EAPWP, requested that JALLC analyse the issues and make recommendations.

MISSION

The JALLC was tasked by ACT at the request of the IS PASP-EIPD, to prepare an analysis report on Managing Partnerships, with a specific focus on the EAPWP. The Analysis Requirement (AR) was:

> *To analyse the generation and execution of the EAPWP in order to enable the stakeholders to optimise the work plan's utility against NATO's PfP Policy, Partners' objectives, and the current operational environment.*

The agreed Analysis Objectives (AO) were:

AO-1. Review the process for the generation of the objectives and activities, and the subsequent execution of the activities, within the EAPWP, taking into account such factors as the NATO Military Authorities' (NMA) Strategic Priorities and Objectives; operational requirements; broader interoperability requirements and capabilities - including Planning And Review Process (PARP) relationship to the Defence Policy and Planning (DPP) Division of the IS; incorporation of Lessons Learned; and defence institution building.

Sub AO-1.1. Review the process for the generation of the objectives for the EAPWP.

Sub AO-1.2. Review the process for the generation of activities for the EAPWP.

Sub AO-1.3. Review the procedures for the execution of EAPWP activities.

AO-2. Facilitate the EAPWP community in identifying appropriate Measures of Effectiveness, and an assessment methodology for the evaluation of EAPWP activities, with particular emphasis on the needs for support to NATO-led operations.

METHODOLOGY

The project was effected by a study of all relevant policy documentation; a series of interviews with selected NATO and Partner staff officers from the IS, International Military Staff (IMS), Allied Command Operations, ACT and Partnership Coordination Cell, all of whom deal regularly with Partnership and EAPWP matters; interviews with Partner nations' representatives, mainly from their missions to NATO HQ or their ministry of defence desks responsible for Partnership and liaison with NATO; questionnaires sent to all NATO Nations; and analysis of the EAPWP entries in the e-PRIME database. The resultant analysis identified a number of areas of strengths and weaknesses, and possible methods to achieve improvements.

KEY FINDINGS

PfP in general was viewed very positively by all Partner nations interviewed. The EAPWP, as a building block for other PfP activities, is also considered as highly

valuable, although many NATO and Partner staffs observe that it could be improved. The analysis has identified gaps in management procedures and systems, including insufficient capability for review, feedback, operational input and responsiveness. More proactive management, together with some new mechanisms, could greatly improve the relevance and effectiveness of the EAPWP.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are the most significant recommendations to arise from this study:

a. A coordinating inter-staff group, led by IS PASP, should be created at the working-level to effect the practical management of the EAPWP and to fill the role of an "action body" for the Political Military Steering Committee on PfP, and to ensure all EAPWP activities are planned, coordinated and effected in the best way possible.

b. The Terms of Reference for the Political Military Steering Committee on PfP should be reviewed and updated.

c. The responsibility for EAPWP management needs to be allocated to one sole department, and this needs to be clearly publicised.

d. Strategic military guidance should be created and published by the IMS, to guide NATO military bodies, and the militaries of NATO Nations and Partner nations on the desired military approach and methods to support the political requirements of Partnership.

e. A system to gather lessons from ongoing activities, particularly from Partner participation in operations, should be designed and implemented, to inform future years' EAPWP planning and assist in identifying (and seeking the means to fill) activity gaps.

f. The EAPWP should be subject to regular, in-depth review and update.

g. NATO should ensure that relevant training is available to and accessible by Partner nations who are supporting, or training to support, NATO-led operations, and that priority for places is given to Partners preparing for operations, in preference to others.

h. NATO should review the resource requirements to provide effective and proactive management of the EAPWP, in conjunction with the resource implications of other recommendations.

i. NATO should review the role, requirements and effectiveness of the Bi-SC Evaluation Team Report, which covers only activities organised by the two Strategic Commands, and consider its expansion to cover the full EAPWP.

j. A regular feedback and assessment mechanism should be designed and implemented, to measure the overall performance and effectiveness of the EAPWP, to ensure it is supporting NATO's Outreach goals.

k. NATO should promote more effectively the use of e-PRIME by NATO and NATO Nations, as well as Partners, and provide more accessible training for users.

l. Consideration should be given to the need for further or follow-on studies in the field of NATO Outreach. Possible subject areas include: the rationalisation of Outreach programmes; the integration of contact countries into Outreach programmes; relationships between Outreach programmes; Partner interoperability on NATO-led operations; areas for development; subsidies and other budgetary matters.

Distribution

Action:

External:

NATO HQ IS – Director, PASP-EIPD

COS ACO

COS ACT

Information:

External:

NATO HQ IS – PDD

NATO HQ IS – DPP

NATO HQ IMS – CRSD

HQ SACT TI-340

HQ SACT TI-3592

HQ SACT TI-3593

SACTREPEUR

ACT SEE PCC

SHAPE J5 PMX

SHAPE J7 TTX

Bi-SC Military Cooperation Division

JWC

JFTC

NDC

NATO School Oberammergau

National Liaison Representatives to SACT

Partner Nation Delegations (through IS PASP)

Internal:

JALLC Operations Division

JALLC Training, Exercise and Experimentation Division

JALLC Production Branch

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Introduction

BACKGROUND

Identification of Requirement and Customers

1. In its 2007 Programme of Work (Reference A), the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) was tasked with undertaking a study on NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). Given the complexity of the subject and the large number of stakeholders, it took some time to identify the principal customer and agree the exact analysis requirement. In view of the breadth of the PfP programmes, and the primarily political nature of PfP, it was agreed that NATO HQ's International Staff (IS), specifically the Political Affairs & Security Policy Division, Euro-Atlantic Integration and Partnership Directorate (PASP-EIPD), would be the principal customer, and that the study would focus on the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Plan (EAPWP). Other main stakeholders were identified as the International Military Staff (IMS) – Cooperation and Regional Security Division (CRSD), SHAPE J5 PMX, HQ Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SACT) TI-340, the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC), and Nations. This approach was communicated to the relevant NATO bodies by a letter from Director JALLC on 29 November 2007 (Reference B).

NATO Outreach – Overview and Context

2. Within NATO's overall Outreach concept, the main (and oldest) initiative is PfP. All PfP members are also members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) which provides the overall framework for cooperation between NATO and its partner countries. PfP comprises a number of programmes and mechanisms, the principal ones being the Individual Partnership Programme (IPP); the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP); the Planning and Review Process (PARP); the Operational Capability Concept (OCC), and the Political Military Framework.

3. Outreach, Partnership policies, and new programmes or initiatives are agreed at NATO summits and ministerial meetings. Thereafter, NATO staffs develop the means and methodology for the implementation of activities to support the programmes. The EAPWP was created in 2004, by "merging the former Partnership Work Programme and the EAPC Action Plan, with a view to harmonising the relationship between EAPC and PfP and improve the management and organisation of the EAPC and PfP process"[1]. In essence, the EAPWP provides Overarching Guidance (OG) and a compendium of activities open to Partners, and forms the "foundation stone" to support all PfP programmes. The 2008 EAPWP includes over 1300 activities.

4. In discussion with the principal customer and other stakeholders, it was agreed that while "Outreach" or "Partnership" would be too broad for a single study, an analysis of the EAPWP, seeking methods to achieve improvements in its design and management, would offer benefits across all Outreach activities. Agreement was reached on the Analysis Requirement and Analysis Objectives, as shown below.

ANALYSIS REQUIREMENT

To analyse the generation and execution of the EAPWP in order to enable the stakeholders to optimise the Work Plan's utility against NATO's PfP Policy, Partners' objectives, and the current operational environment.

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[1] Director IMS Memo on Consolidating PfP Directives (Reference C)

ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES

AO-1. Review the process for the generation of the objectives and activities, and the subsequent execution of the activities, within the EAPWP, taking into account such factors as the NATO Military Authorities' (NMA) Strategic Priorities and Objectives, operational requirements, broader interoperability requirements and capabilities—including Planning And Review Process (PARP) relationship to the Defence Policy and Planning (DPP) Division of the IS, incorporation of Lessons Learned, and defence institution building.

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AO-2. Facilitate the EAPWP community in identifying appropriate Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), and an assessment methodology for the evaluation of EAPWP activities, with particular emphasis on the needs for support to NATO-led operations.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

5.	The analysis covered five main areas of study, which have been used as the chapter headings: Policy and Guidance, and Generation and Coordination of Objectives (Chapter 2); Management and Coordination Structure (Chapter 3); Generation of Activities (Chapter 4); Activity Administration, Coordination and Execution (Chapter 5); and Measures of Effectiveness / Performance (Chapter 6). This structure was chosen as it allows working from the top down, starting with the political-level through management to execution. Since in reality, these layers overlap considerably, the report does likewise contain some overlap in topics between chapters. While this may seem repetitive to the reader, JALLC thinks this structure allows each layer to be investigated more thoroughly. A summary of the main points is provided at Chapter 7.

METHODOLOGY

6.	The analysis was initiated by a review of all major policy documentation relating to the EAPWP, and other documents on the broader topics of Outreach and PfP, as well as documents relating to analyses already effected, such as the annual Bi-SC Evaluation Team's (BET) reports. The Project Team then attended the Bi-SC Military Cooperation Coordination Workshop (MCCWS) in March 2008, as observers, informally interviewing NATO and Partner staffs. Formal interviews and discussions were arranged with staff of the IS (PASP and DPP); the IMS (CRSD); SHAPE (J5); Allied Command Transformation (ACT) Staff Element Europe (SEE); and the PCC. Separately, the Team requested interviews with representatives of 21 Partner nations, obtaining agreement from 12 (some representatives of other Partners were interviewed informally at the MCCWS). [2] Research was undertaken on the content of the 2008 EAPWP, using the e-PRIME database. Finally, a questionnaire was forwarded by JALLC to the 26 NATO Nations regarding their use of and contributions to the EAPWP. (The questionnaire format was used in order to give nations the opportunity to address issues back to their ministries, should they so wish.) Eight replies were received by JALLC.

7.	The analysis involved a review of EAPWP activities within the e-PRIME system. This included analysis of the numbers of activities by Area of Cooperation (AOC),

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[2] A list of sources is provided at Annex C.

activity type and provider, and a review of activity descriptions. This was followed by mapping the results of the various interviews to facilitate the identification of major points, recurring themes, and apparent gaps in the system or the Work Plan. Interpretation of the analysis of the evidence was assisted by representatives from two Partner nations (Austria and Sweden), who also helped with the early stages of report drafting.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE ANALYSIS

8.   The following factors have affected the analysis:

a. 50% of PfP Partner nations responded to the request for interview.

b. 35% of NATO Nations responded to the questionnaire.

c. The bulk of the data collection was completed by May 2008. Although effort has been made to include some recent developments, changes after May cannot be guaranteed to be reflected in this report.

d. The study topic allows a reasonable degree of quantitative analysis (e.g. how many activities took place; how many participants attended; etc) However, the task requirement is primarily for a qualitative analysis, to facilitate an assessment of how effective the EAPWP is in relation to its aims and those of its users. The resultant input may be considered subjective; nevertheless, given the nature of PfP, and the EAPWP within it, source identification would be inappropriate. This should not be allowed to detract from the value and cumulative effect of the evidence.

OTHER FACTORS OBSERVED

9.   While the study was being conducted a number of issues became apparent that were important, but which were not directly related to the Analysis Requirement. In order that these issues are not lost they have been detailed at Annex B. Equally, the research identified some areas related to NATO Outreach which might bear further study. These are shown in the final recommendation of Chapter 7.

PARTNERS' OPINIONS ON PFP AND THE EAPWP

10.   During the research for this report the JALLC team determined that all Partners interviewed thought extremely favourably of the PfP concept, the various programmes within it, and the EAPWP as a supporting element. Indeed, several representatives stressed that they did not wish to see any changes in the overall programmes, even though various elements could be more focused, or better managed. As examples of the views received:

- A senior officer of a Partner nation stated, "Our general view is absolutely positive. Partnership Goals (PG), the OCC etc. are all excellent. PfP acts as a trigger for national development and for drawing national funding to support it."

- Another said, "The great thing about PfP is that it is a programme inviting a range of nations to participate in a very broad range of activities at differing levels— there is nothing like it anywhere else. NATO created this, and nations can be quite selective on how involved they want to be—it's a great system."

11.   Therefore, when reading this report, the observations and recommendations should be set against this overall context of the Partners seeing PfP as a successful and valued initiative.

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Policy and Guidance – Generation and Coordination of Objectives

12.   This chapter examines the origins of the EAPWP and the way in which policy, guidance and objectives are created and used. It highlights shortcomings in the formal management structure and consultative mechanism used in the creation of NATO's EAPWP Overarching Guidance (OG), which outlines the policy for the EAPWP. It also addresses the lack of any helpful end state for Outreach activity (with utility below the highest political level), the *perceived* lack of consultation with (and therefore input from) Partners, and the adjustment of the EAPWP activities to support priorities and objectives.

ORIGINS OF THE EAPWP

13.   The EAPWP was formed by the merger of the EAPC's Action Plan and the Partnership Work Programme [3] in 2004. IS and IMS staff involved acknowledge that the majority of the content of the EAPWP stems from that era, and has changed little since then. The EAPWP is NATO's primary vehicle for Partner nations to work towards interoperability, the development, as appropriate for each Partner, of new capabilities, reform and membership of the Alliance. It has been used as the blueprint to produce corresponding plans for the MD, the ICI and the Afghan Cooperation Programme. The PMSC on PfP has stated that the EAPWP:

> *"Provides political-military guidance through a coherent and comprehensive statement of Partnership's objectives and assists NATO and Partners in assigning cooperation priorities and allocating resources. … The activities serve as a primary tool for the development of IPPs in support of PARP PGs, [Membership Action Plan] or IPAP objectives, and other Partnership Action Plans. … Activities should support the objectives described in the OG and/or [Military Tasks for Interoperability] MTIs"[4]*

14.   Much of the evidence gathered suggests that while the EAPWP provides political guidance, there is very little strategic military guidance within it.

NATO'S PFP END STATE

15.   As explained by a senior NATO officer, there is a need for end states[5] within the PfP environment that give the requisite focus for work at each successive level:

> *"A NATO end state plus direction and guidance should lead to the OG; OG plus political plans and activity should lead to a strategic plan which, with direction and guidance, would in turn lead to a military (IMS-level) plan. From that, a Bi-SC plan would be developed which would cascade logically to ACO and ACT implementation plans."*

16.   The December 2007 meeting of NATO Nations' Foreign Ministers confirmed the value of PfP and the EAPC, but stated that both needed to be more focused. This comment is particularly relevant to the EAPWP, which is the building block of activities in support of both PfP and the EAPC. The current, stated objectives of NATO's partnership policy are "dialogue and cooperation; defence reform; operations; and

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[3] SECGEN's *Harmonisation of the EAPC Action Plan and Partnership Work Programme* (Reference D)

[4] PMSC for PfP's *Partnership Programmes, Structures and Procedures* (Reference E)

[5] The term "end state" is further explained in Chapter 6.

enlargement."[6] The nature of PfP is such that each individual Partner nation will have its own end state, which may range from membership of the Alliance to simply political liaison and rapprochement. A significant number of interviewees—NATO civilian and military staff as well as some Partners and Alliance nations—feel there is no identifiable end state for NATO with Partnership, beyond the rather broad (and largely un-measurable) objectives listed above. A senior representative from one Partner stated, "We need a new policy and plan from NATO on what is the future of PfP: politico-strategic aims and intentions". This was also stated independently, in very similar words, by another Partner representative.

17.   The publication of the OG and the Priorities and Objectives at regular intervals provides guidance on intentions and requirements for the forthcoming years. Logically, such guidance should be linked to a long-term goal or end state; however, as NATO has not expressed an overarching end state for its Outreach programmes (as opposed to the specific ones included in a Membership Action Plan, PARP, etc), the focus is on generalities plus the short- or medium-term aims.

18.   A number of individuals from the IS, IMS, PCC and some Partners expressed the view that "interoperability" should be the (or at least an) end state. Yet interoperability is currently not specifically listed as an objective, although it is included in the detail under the "operations" heading. This may suggest a need for more clarity that will ensure Partners are fully aware of its inclusion in the objectives. It is acknowledged that interoperability is not applicable to all Partners, and focuses entirely on military and operational aspects of partnership, whereas some Partners require only political dialogue or cooperation. It is evident that a "one size fits all" NATO end state will not be achievable, given the variation in Partners' aims and abilities. The difficulty in defining an end state for a series of programmes and policies such as PfP is clearly expressed by Rittel and Webster: "Plurality of objectives held by pluralities of politics make it impossible to pursue unitary aims."[7]

19.   Some Partners also raised the suggestion that the inclusion within the OG of some form of road map to show "where Partners should be going in order to achieve what NATO requires"[8], would be very useful to them. As one IS officer stated, "there is no overarching NATO position … there is no global view of where NATO wants to go with its relationships".

20.   While it is clear that NATO has objectives and goals within its PfP programmes and documentation, they are expressed in broad terms and as such are generally not targets against which progress can be measured. Within parts of NATO and among some Partner nations, there seems to be a desire to drive partnership, with a clearer sense of direction, as the perception is that what is currently provided is too general in nature.

OVERARCHING GUIDANCE

21.   The EAPWP comprises both the OG and the compendium of activities, although many interviewees from both NATO and Partners mistakenly think of it as only the activity list. The OG provides the objectives of NATO's Partnership Policy and the current priorities. To help structure the activities of the EAPWP, the OG then defines 31 functional Areas of Cooperation (AOC) and sets objectives for them that provide functional targets that Partners might wish to pursue to meet their national goals set out in their IPPs.

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[6] EAPWP Overarching Guidance for 2007-2008 (Reference F)

[7] Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning (Reference G).

[8] From an interview with a Partner representative.

22.   IS PASP-EIPD produces the OG section of the EAPWP in consultation with other key stakeholders, and it is intended to be the basis for EAPWP activity planning. The OG is generally reviewed, amended and re-issued after each NATO Summit, and may be revised further in the light of any significant change in circumstances. Because it derives from Summit declarations and high-level political statements, the language of the OG is not always helpful to the NMA or subordinate formations, which need to use it as the basis to guide the delivery of their activities in support of PfP/EAPWP. This is evident from the apparent lack of adjustment of the military activities within the EAPWP to support stated priorities and objectives, such as with the geographic example given below.

23.   Once a new iteration of the OG is drafted, prior to formal publication, it is circulated within the IS as well as to the IMS, the Strategic Commands (SC) and NATO Nations for comment; however, many recipients state that they consider they receive it for information, rather than for comment or input. Some IS officers say that they are not asked for input to the OG. Several Partners believe that little attempt is made to take into account the wishes or needs of Partner nations. In fact, the wide distribution of the draft OG and the related staffing process provide ample opportunity for comment. This suggests that most recipients either do not understand the request for their input or do not wish to provide comments. PASP could perhaps benefit from proactively promoting participation to relevant individuals and organisations and by clarifying the process and requirements.

24.   Partner nations are divided, almost equally, into those who believe the OG to be too general to be of any practical value, and those who see it as the cornerstone for all partnership activity. Most NATO Nations which responded to the JALLC questionnaire believe the OG to be of high value in setting out the policy oversight. The OG's target audience of NATO HQ, NATO Nations and all Partner nations is viewed by some as too broad—many users would prefer to receive more practical and focused guidance.

Geographic Priorities within the OG

25.   In 2004 a NATO policy document on the Euro-Atlantic Partnership (Reference H) highlighted the special focus on Central Asia and the Caucasus. Since then each issue of the OG up to 2007 has stated, albeit in slightly varied wording, that in the context of the overall objectives of Partnership, the geographic priority is a:

> *"special focus on the regions of Caucasus and Central Asia … in response to the changing international environment, the Alliance will put special focus on engaging with Partners in the strategically important regions of Caucasus and Central Asia. As a result of the accession of seven former Partners to NATO, where possible and appropriate, NATO will refocus existing resources toward these two regions." – Overarching Guidance 2007-2008 (Reference F)*

26.   Despite efforts by the SCs, there is little visible evidence, in military terms, that NATO has adjusted its efforts to increase or improve relationships with Partner nations of Central Asia and the Caucasus[9]. Whereas the political/civilian staffs of NATO have implemented the policy focus by the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary General for the region, and by providing in-region liaison officers for those areas, there has been no apparent move to refocus military activity or to make related adjustments to the EAPWP as required by the 2004 review of PfP Plans, Programmes, Structures and Procedures (Reference E). Furthermore, notwithstanding the OG statements making the Caucasus and Central Asia priority regions, there is little knowledge among some NATO HQ staff that they are a priority.

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[9] ARM, AZE, GEO, KAZ, KRG, TAJ, TKM, UZB

27.   The NMAs' *Priorities and Objectives* is issued annually, under signature of the Secretary-General. One of the functions of this document is to provide the Military Committee (MC) with a basis for resource allocation. In the 2006 iteration covering the years 2008-2012,[10] "cooperation activities that will lead to increased Partner participation on Alliance operations" is specifically listed as one of NATO's four strategic priorities. In the following year's update[11], which "reflects strategic direction and guidance that has emerged in the last year", cooperative activities remain a NATO priority. However, in the annexes which break out more detail on each priority serial, neither document makes any mention of the prioritisation, within the cooperation field, of the Caucasus or Central Asia. On a positive note the Partners can be seen to have been influenced by NATO's prioritisation, as shown by one Partner nation's 2006/2007 IPP:

> "At the Istanbul Summit in 2004 NATO stated that one of PfP's main efforts will be the support of Security Sector Reform of the less developed Partner countries with a geographical focus in Central Asia and the Caucasus area. Our country has also participated in this aspect of PfP by presenting crisis management training to other partners, sending a South-Caucasus specialist to NATO, and training Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in civil emergency matters. Furthermore, we have participated in several NATO/PfP Trust Funds."

Communication of Priorities from the OG

28.   Many of those interviewed highlighted the confusion caused by political statements within the OG on the allocation of priorities that are not accompanied by related guidance on how such priorities are to be implemented, what action is expected from the military level, or what such prioritisation is intended to achieve. The absence of such guidance was also cited as an explanation for the need for military interpretation, by the IMS, of the OG. One NATO nation recommended that the OG should set out NATO's priorities for the 31 AOC used to categorise the activities in the EAPWP and highlight activity gaps, thus enabling providers to see what the main requirements are. The need for the identification of activity gaps is reinforced by the fact that most NATO Nations who responded to the JALLC questionnaire stated that they had never been asked by NATO to provide any new or additional activities for the EAPWP.

29.   Using the geographic example given earlier, without a translation of the nomination of the Caucasus and Central Asia as a "priority" into practical guidance on what that might mean and what actions are expected, it is perhaps not surprising that there is little evidence of any increase in military focus or activity, nor has there been any adjustment to the content of the EAPWP to reflect the stated priorities of the last three years.

30.   It is evident from interviews that the OG and the priorities within it would benefit from greater promotion within NATO and NATO and Partner nations. There are a number of opportunities where this could be achieved, particularly at annual PfP conferences and seminars, and in the PMSC.

Strategic Military Guidance

31.   The OG is written at the political level and is used by the IS, the Alliance and Partner nations. Staff in the PCC and some IS personnel believe that the OG is too general to be of practical value to them; both of these entities have the opportunity to engage in the OG drafting process, but appear not to have done so. Nonetheless, given that many of the activities within the EAPWP are created and run by military

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[10] NMA Strategic Priorities and Objectives for 2008-2012 (Reference I)
[11] NMA Strategic Priorities and Objectives for 2009-2013 (Reference J)

bodies (NATO, NATO Nations or Partners), there is a need for translation of the OG into more practical direction and guidance for the SCs and for use by the military as they plan and propose activities; there is currently no mechanism to produce this guidance. Instead, it is passed without staffing by the IMS to each SC, which then formulates its own direction and guidance for subordinate formations, primarily focussing on the required methodology to implement the administrative and financial aspects of their elements of the activity programme.

32. The IMS has stated that, "A consolidated MC guidance on prioritization and main efforts on Partnership projects and goals does not exist".[12] This lack has been highlighted by numerous NATO military personnel at SCs, the PCC, and the Joint Force Command (JFC) HQs, as well as by Partner representatives, who further identified the potential benefits in the provision of strategic military guidance—of a more practical nature than the OG—as well as in a stated IMS military vision of partnership that would include the aims and methods by which the military should support the political objectives. Such an interpretation and vision would serve to guide those involved, at the practical level of activity organisation and coordination, and to enable them to set their work within the overall perspective of the higher HQs' intent. Nevertheless, an IMS representative stated that they do not have the expertise to filter the OG, and see their only role in this context as the development of the Military Objectives (MO) to guide activity creators and providers.

SUMMARY

33. There is little evidence of any top-down influence from the policy and guidance on the provision of EAPWP activities. The lack of a clear end state for NATO's Outreach activities, including PfP, engenders the lack of continuity from OG to activity generation through implementation to evaluation. The perceived lack of Partner input to the policy-level OG, linked to the mistaken belief that the EAPWP is only a list of activities and an apparent inability to translate the OG effectively into activities, demonstrates a lack of awareness of the role of the OG in relation to activity generation.

34. The drafting process for the OG does not appear to make use of all available sources. Despite circulation of the initial draft for comment, many recipients fail to provide meaningful contributions. The lack of strategic military guidance is reflected in a failure to adjust EAPWP activities to support revised policy and priorities. The NMAs' Priorities and Objectives do not reflect the priorities of the OG. Each of these issues could be improved by better coordination and cooperation between staffs, which could be achieved by more formal coordination structures[13].

RECOMMENDATIONS

35. NATO should consider improving the articulation of the desired end states or long-term objectives for its Outreach programmes.

36. A methodology should be devised to ensure that the OG and its priorities and requirements are comprehensively staffed and coordinated, and subsequently well communicated to all users.

37. The IMS should provide a military interpretation of the OG to issue as strategic military guidance.

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[12] Director IMS's *Review of PfP Plans, Programmes, Structures and Mechanisms* (Reference K)
[13] This area is developed further in Chapter 3

3
Management and Coordination Structure

38.   This chapter examines the responsibilities and mechanisms in use for the management of the EAPWP and for its coordination across the various levels of command.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

39.   The EAPWP is the responsibility of NATO's PMSC on PfP. One PMSC on PfP paper (Reference E) describes the activities within the EAPWP as a "rolling programme under the supervision and control of the IS and IMS," and day-to-day management is carried out by IS PASP-EIPD. In reality, however, because the paper states both the IS and IMS are involved, without specifying to what degree, there is confusion within and beyond NATO regarding who has the overall responsibility for directing the implementation of management decisions. The IMS, SCs and Partner nations acknowledge that in theory the IS (that is, the PASP-EIPD) has overall responsibility for managing the EAPWP, but in practice PASP-EIPD are somewhat constrained in that they have no authority for issuing instructions or for formal direction of the Work Plan, and cannot require other divisions or NATO organisations to coordinate with or through them. This does not currently cause any significant problems, as strong relationships between PASP and external contributors to the EAPWP allow the work to be conducted effectively. Nevertheless, there is a degree of risk to have the effectiveness dependent on personal relationships rather than an established process. A more formalised or structured mechanism for IS leadership of the EAPWP would minimise such risks by ensuring that any new staff would inherit a clearly defined structure and system.

40.   Another issue that hinders IS (PASP-EIPD) management of the EAPWP is that IS (PASP-EIPD) personnel have limited subject matter expertise to determine what military activities should, or should not, be in the Work Plan. While current incumbents have gained much experience in making these decisions through long-term involvement in the EAPWP, lack of an established process demands that each new person assigned to this task will need a certain time to become familiar with requirements. Further, in addition to the current civilian personnel, practical, military expertise is needed to ensure activities are correctly categorised and validated. As the IMS has similar shortfalls in resources and expertise, there is a need for a mechanism to facilitate the fuller engagement of the SCs, to provide Subject Matter Experts (SME) when required and to assist in the vetting of military aspects of proposed activities.

MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS

Overarching Responsibility

41.   While the PMSC on PfP is responsible for the EAPWP, a senior staff member observed that partnership issues are supported in NATO HQ by a complex and fragmented structure, characterised by a split, introduced relatively recently, between the political, ambassadorial level of the EAPC and the practical programme levels which fall to the PMSC on PfP. With political decisions now made at the more senior, political committee, the PMSC may have lost some of its authority and there is also doubt as to the effectiveness of the political committee because of low-level representation. This is reflected in a comment by a senior Partner representative:

> *"the agendas of the Political Committee and Ambassadors' meetings show a lack of cooperation and interest …. Several NATO nations' Ambassadors don't*

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even attend the EAPC Ambassador-level meetings—they don't show the expected level of engagement in Partnership which would recognise its supposed importance to the Alliance."

42.   As a result, there is concern that political decisions being made by the PMSC on PfP are now too abstract and somewhat divorced from practical reality.

43.   In addition to the issue of the level of decision-making, the PMSC on PfP is working to extremely outdated and over-classified TOR. The TORs (Reference L) were approved in 1994 and are classified NATO CONFIDENTIAL, which means that PMSC members from Partner nations, all of which are represented on the committee, require security dispensation in order to read their TORs. Furthermore, despite changes and developments in the international security environment (Iraq War, Afghanistan, 9/11, etc.) and within NATO (new members, restructuring, etc.) in the 14 years which have elapsed, the TORs have never been updated. It is understood that there are concerns within NATO HQ regarding the study of NATO's committee structure and TORs, but it is impractical for any committee to work to TORs which are both out of date and inaccessible to some members.

Working Level Responsibility

44.   Below the PMSC on PfP, there is no official staff coordination group to coordinate and advise on EAPWP issues, and no formal structure or mechanism for the planning, coordination or evaluation of activities. The *de facto* management is carried out by one desk officer within PASP-EIPD, who has other duties and can thus dedicate no more than 30% of working time to the entire Work Plan. Furthermore, management of the EAPWP is not mentioned in the Job Description or TORs for the post. On this basis the incumbent spends a maximum of 74 staff days per year working on the EAPWP[14]. This requires 18 activities to be reviewed on each of those days, just to ensure that every activity is checked once per year, before any higher level EAPWP management tasks can be completed. The desk officer meets, as required, with a representative of the IMS (a Partner nation officer) and the database manager[15] to consider proposals for new EAPWP activities.

45.   Given Partners' complaints about poor NATO responses on certain partnership (EAPWP and other) issues, the critical role that the EAPWP plays in supporting PfP (as well as, indirectly, MD, ICI and Afghan Cooperation Programme), the staff time available, and the perceived need for better responses to Partner inputs, there appears to be a sound case to consider increasing the resources committed to the EAPWP. Within current requirements for the management of the EAPWP, the lead desk officer is content that the resources available are at the correct level for the tasks. There is, however, scope for increasing and enhancing the management and coordination, and thereby the effectiveness, of the EAPWP. If tasks are to be increased to improve the utility of the EAPWP and ensure more proactive management, resource requirements will need to be reviewed and possibly increased.

Standard Operating Procedures

46.   There are no Standard Operating Procedures for the management of the EAPWP. The nearest document to a Standard Operating Procedure is the PMSC on PfP paper on "Partnership Programmes, Structures and Procedures" (Reference E). This is, however, partially outdated, as many of the procedures were created when

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[14] Based on 365 - 30 days leave - 104 weekends -10 days NATO holidays = 221 /3 = 74. 1300 activities /74 = 18

[15] The database manager is responsible for all of the databases run on e-PRIME (PfP EAPWP, MD, ICI, ACP)

NATO was not heavily involved in operations. The covering letter states that the policy should be reviewed a minimum of every two years, but there is no evidence of a full review. Some clearly laid-out and current procedures would provide clarity for the broad range of managers, contributors and users of the EAPWP.

EAPWP Review

47.   There has never been a formal, in-depth review of the whole EAPWP, since its inception. PASP-EIPD carried out an initial, internal review in 2007, but lacked the time or resources to investigate all aspects, confirm their findings or develop solutions. The principal findings of their review have been taken into account within this present study.

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION OF EAPWP

48.   Given the number of different organisations (within and outside NATO) involved in the creation and management of the EAPWP and its many activities, the JALLC team considered it necessary to determine how the efforts of the various entities are coordinated. Good coordination should ensure that staffs are able to produce and control a coherent work plan, within the context of NATO's Outreach policies, which is beneficial to all users. At present, however, there is no coordination body at the working level, involving all main entities (IS, IMS, SCs and the PCC, as a minimum) which meets periodically to discuss, steer, coordinate, approve and agree activity, and to ensure that NATO's policies and perspectives are communicated to all relevant desks, and used as a basis for activity planning. The creation of such a forum would enhance management and coordination. Meetings could be linked to scheduled events already attended by the key players, to reduce the resource implications. Frequency of meetings, and the feasibility of electronic or VTC, rather than physical meetings, would be determined by the new body, according to requirements.

49.   Many interviewees (Partners, NATO Nations and the PCC) observed that it can be difficult at times to locate the correct NATO point of contact (POC) for specific partnership issues. A representative from one NATO nation gives, as an example, the difficulty in matching OCC points of contact with the NATO Task List (NTL) and with EAPWP training activities, which requires pulling information from different areas and different desk officers to gain the complete picture.

50.   This issue may be symptomatic of the concerns expressed by various Partners regarding the lack of a coordinated approach from NATO. The impact is that poor coordination is evident to several Partner and Alliance nations, with representatives stating that they sometimes get the impression that NATO is disjointed and fails to coordinate its approach to Partnership activities. However, this is not a universally held view, as a number of Partners believe NATO to be well coordinated. The discrepancy in viewpoints may relate to perspective, levels of involvement, or the complexities of a Partner's interests.

Cooperation and Coordination Within the IS

51.   Many NATO HQ interviewees stated that there is little coordination between the different divisions of the IS on EAPWP (or even PfP) issues, and equally little effort to deal with Partners from the perspective of a consistent, overarching NATO position.

52.   In parallel, JALLC discovered that some divisional staff working on a particular country or grouping do not liaise with their counterparts in other IS divisions, or indeed with those with similar roles in the IMS, SCs or the PCC. Indeed, some have never even spoken to their counterparts.

53.   Given the lack of face-to-face coordination within NATO HQ, the creation of a mechanism for the provision of an internal, cross-NATO "country position" available to

all relevant desks would enhance awareness of the appropriate NATO activities relating to the relevant Partner(s). The creation of this mechanism would also help ensure a coordinated NATO approach to Partners from the various NATO HQs and staffs. Once the initial compilation and coordination is complete, such a system would only need to be reviewed annually or if a major political or military change occurred. Although NATO currently has Short Country Briefs, many HQ staff appear not to be aware of their existence and a number of IS members believe that they would need to be developed further to be of any practical use in a coordinating role.

54.   There are two programmes in the Partnership arena which have traditionally been maintained virtually separately from the EAPWP, even though some of their activities fall within the EAPWP context: the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) programme and Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) activities. The funding for these two EAPC programmes is ring-fenced and thus effectively separate from all EAPWP activity funds. It is acknowledged that there may be good political reasons for maintaining them as stand-alone programmes; nevertheless, the lack of visibility of these activities to those responsible for running the EAPWP is not conducive to cooperation or coordination, and means that any measurement of performance or effectiveness of the EAPWP will be based on incomplete data. PASP and PDD have now reached a formal agreement on cooperation between their programmes, and measures are in hand to engineer a patch to allow the PDD activity management software to interface with e-PRIME. This will be another positive move to increasing Partner visibility of activities through one point of entry.

NATO HQ Internal Cooperation and Coordination

55.   The only long-standing, regular, working-level meeting between the IS and IMS on the EAPWP is focused on vetting proposed activities for suitability and inclusion in the Work Plan. It involves the IS PASP-EIPD manager of the Work Plan, the IMS manager of the e-PRIME software system used to manage it, and a Partner nation military officer representing the IMS.

56.   The Director of PASP-EIPD runs an informal Partnership Task Force, with weekly meetings between IS and IMS staffs to discuss political and military issues relating to PfP. The creation of the informal NATO Coordination Policy Overview Tool also provides improved visibility of partnership-related activities at NATO HQ, although the information included is subject to certain limitations, and the NATO Coordination Policy Overview Tool is not available outside NATO HQ[16]. Additionally, PASP-EIPD and IMS CRSD are currently running a small-scale collocation trial in which some IS and IMS staff are working together on the EAPWP in one section. The Partnership Task Force, the NATO Coordination Policy Overview Tool and the collocation trial should all greatly enhance IS – IMS coordination, to the benefit of the EAPWP. Additionally, the imminent creation of the new Bi-SC Military Cooperation Division (MCD)[17] at SHAPE will provide a central focus for the military aspects of the EAPWP at SC level and should ease the IS / IMS coordination task. If the value of the new joint section is confirmed in practice, it would be sensible to formalise the status, including re-focusing and rationalising taskings and TORs, and perhaps reorganise related posts within IS PASP and IMS CRSD to ensure that the new office is empowered to act for the IS and IMS, and that improvements can be safeguarded for the future.

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[16] Political sensitivities make it unsuitable for external dissemination.

[17] While this report was in preparation, the MCD was officially inaugurated (01 September 2008)

Coordination between the SCs and Partners

57.   The main forum for coordination of EAPWP matters between the two SCs and Partner nations is the MCCWS. The 2008 MCCWS (for the 2009 EAPWP) was the first to be a joint event with both SCs, which had each previously held its own conference with Partners. It was viewed by Partners as a major step forward, although several also used it as an example of NATO's being slow to react to Partners' recommendations, as they had first requested such a joint event more than four years previously. Despite the progress, various issues remain outstanding:

- Although a single workshop was held this year, the two SCs' staffs dealt very differently with the Partner nation representatives, and Partners made critical comments on the observed disparity between the styles of approach of the two SCs. Partners were left with an impression that NATO (and particularly the two SCs) has still not grasped the need for a properly coordinated approach to the EAPWP. (This situation should be improved with the creation of the MCD.)

- A number of Partners commented on the lack of representation from various NATO Agencies (e.g. NC3A, NATO Research and Technology Organisation), which provide numerous activities within the EAPWP. They feel strongly that more NATO bodies should attend the MCCWS as active participants, thus making the MCCWS a far more comprehensive event.

- Partners also strongly wish to see the NATO School Oberammergau (NSO) synchronize its planning cycle with NATO's two-year EAPWP activities planning cycle such that it coincides with the MCCWS (which is already coordinated between NATO HQ, the SCs and JFCs, and some NATO agencies).

58.   With respect to the last bullet, the IMS recognised, as early as 2006, that: "Some Partners felt that the planning cycle for the EAPWP OG, Military Training and Exercise Programme and NSO could be better harmonized."[18] The 2005 and 2006 Bi-SC Evaluation Team (BET) Reports both covered the NSO timing issue, and the report compiler observed that "Partners are right to complain about the continuing problems relating to NSO's bidding and allocation schedule, since nothing has changed". This issue still remains to be addressed and is seen by some Partners as symptomatic of the inertia caused by the current structures and procedures.

SUMMARY

59.   The EAPWP is seen by some Partners as not being fully coordinated through all levels of NATO. These views are based on the perception that NATO should strive to ensure common attitudes and responses across all organisational levels, to enable more proactive management and coordination. The lack of an overarching position creates a risk of different divisions acting at cross-purposes with regard to Partner nations, or even contradicting each other, which should be reduced by greater visibility and coordination. Increased coordination and cooperation, and a broader visibility of activities within the SPS and PDD, will reduce the risk of overlap and duplication of activity across different IS divisions.

60.   There are some good initiatives to improve coordination, which should have a positive effect on the management of the EAPWP. However, with the PMSC on PfP working to outdated TORs and the lack of any formalised working-level coordination bodies or mechanisms beneath them, there are risks to the efficiency and effective coordination of the EAPWP. The responsibilities for control and management of the EAPWP should be more clearly stated. Positive engagement, with increased proactive management by NATO, would optimise the benefits of the Work Plan. An in-depth

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[18] Director IMS's *Review of PfP Plans, Programmes, Structures and Mechanisms* (Reference K)

review of EAPWP activities would facilitate their adjustment to suit new priorities, as well as efforts to encourage providers to offer new activities. The opportunity should be taken to create a harmonised NATO view of each Partner nation's needs from Outreach. The PDD and SPS areas should be linked to the coordination processes, to achieve higher visibility.

61. Desk-level meetings between specialist staffs responsible for certain Partnership activities or countries within the strategic HQs (IS, IMS and SCs) would negate the current, somewhat fragmented approach and enhance information sharing and general awareness of Outreach activities.

62. Greater involvement of NATO agencies and other organisations that contribute to the EAPWP, and synchronisation of the main planning cycles leading to the MCCWS, should enhance Partners' perspectives of NATO coordination, although it is acknowledged that an increased number of actors may in itself make coordination more difficult.

RECOMMENDATIONS

63. A working level body should be created, to coordinate EAPWP issues within NATO below PMSC level. It should involve representatives of the IS, IMS, and SCs (in due course, the Bi-SC MCD would presumably be the sole representative organisation for both SCs). The primary roles would be to ensure that NATO's policies and perspectives on each Partner's needs and goals for each Partner are coordinated with, communicated to and used by all involved to influence the provision of activities. This body could be tasked with the detailed review of EAPWP activities in relation to new priorities, and coordinate efforts to encourage providers to offer new activities.

64. Subject to progress and an assessment of effectiveness, the new joint IS / IMS cell should be formalised in the future NATO HQ structure. Information on this cell, like all other NATO contact points for EAPWP, should be made readily available to all NATO, NATO Nation and Partner nation offices dealing with the EAPWP.

65. The TORs of the PMSC on PfP should be reviewed and updated. Furthermore, although it is acknowledged that ownership of the EAPWP sits with IS PASP (under the direction of the PMSC on PfP), PASP's authority to manage the EAPWP should be more clearly defined. This could be effected by a reinforced and clear statement in the OG within the next issue of the EAPWP, rather than that of 2004 which splits responsibility between the IS and IMS.

66. The IS should, when implementing any changes to EAPWP management and tasking, review the need for additional resources which may be required to facilitate working-level implementation of PMSC-level policies, increased knowledge and awareness, and more proactive management.

67. Staff officers within all NATO structures involved in EAPWP should be encouraged to meet and coordinate with their counterparts on a routine and regular basis, whether formally or informally.

4

Generation of Activities

68.   Chapter 4 offers a deeper look into the EAPWP's structure, the theory and practice of how EAPWP activities are generated, including: the balance across AOCs; how requirements are assessed; linkage to operational requirements; supply *versus* demand; and how new activities are introduced into the EAPWP.

STRUCTURE OF THE EAPWP

The EAPWP as a Compendium versus a Plan

69.   Despite its name, and the fact that the EAPWP includes not just the list of activities, but also the OG, most Partners and NATO organisations see the EAPWP as a compendium of activities, rather than a work plan. Regardless of NATO's intentions, Partners believe that it is not designed as a progression, and there is no related road map which a Partner nation would be advised to follow in progressing its PGs and IPP. Notwithstanding the fact that such matters are covered in IPP meetings, it is evident that several Partners would prefer the progressive road-map approach. Nevertheless, most Partners agree that, as a compendium, the EAPWP provides them with a structured "pick-list" of activities from which they may choose the events which they find most useful or appropriate. There is also consensus among Partners that it is in their interest for the pool of activities to be as broad and deep as possible.

Activity Groupings

70.   The activities within the EAPWP are grouped in 31 AOCs, to provide a structure and enable activities related to any particular topic to be listed together. For each AOC there are associated objectives which are intended to serve as the primary tool for the development of IPPs[19]. For military related AOCs there are MOs which link to MTIs. Some activities, however, have clearly been misallocated, and even when originators have been asked to review their entries, they have sometimes failed to make the recommended and logical changes.

71.   Most Partner nations see the AOCs as being very helpful in guiding their activity selection, but some consider the associated objectives to be too broad and thus of limited use, while others believe that certain AOCs have too many objectives going into too much detail. Analysis shows that the number of military objectives linked to each AOC varies from two to eleven, although sub-objectives can double the total for some AOCs. One AOC has only two activities but five objectives, which may indicate that activities are not being generated to match agreed objectives, as discussed later in this chapter. Partners also observe that they sometimes have difficulty relating MOs to their own objectives, or to their PG.

72.   For the 2009 EAPWP, NATO's intention is that MOs will relate to the NTL. This is a popular move, particularly among the more operationally engaged Partners, who wish to see NATO and Partners working from the same baseline, although some have doubts about NATO's ability to cross-link partnership activities with NTL line items. They were also very concerned about whether security or releasability issues might affect access to the NTL, or prevent NATO from linking NTL to activities in the EAPWP. While this appeared briefly to be a problem, the latest information is that the IS, IMS

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[19] PMSC for PfP's *Partnership Programmes, Structures and Procedures* (Reference E) Paragraph 3.2

and SCs have resolved the difficulties and the NTL will indeed be linked to the MOs in the EAPWP and on e-PRIME.

Activity Types

73.   There is a good cross section of different types of activities available in the EAPWP that includes both active (exercises and field training) and passive (conferences and seminars) events. A review (on e-PRIME) of all the activities in the 2008 EAPWP shows that there are 452 courses or training events, 259 meetings, 209 conferences, seminars or lectures, 138 working groups or working parties, 54 workshops, and 23 exercises. Some 54% of all activities are broadly military (although definition is difficult in some cases).

74.   JALLC is unable to recommend any objective methodology which would assist in evaluating the relative merits of different types of activity, since each will depend on the subject matter, attendance, and quality of the event.

ACTIVITY PROVIDERS

75.   Activities are provided by NATO bodies, individual NATO Nations, Partnership Training Centres and Partner nations. Partnership Training Centres' programmes are now beginning to appear on e-PRIME, and the Partnership Training Centres agreed in February 2008 that all their activities will in future be incorporated. This move should significantly increase the utility of the EAPWP and e-PRIME, and reduce the number of places in which a Partner has to search for activities. The NATO Defense College (NDC) places very little information onto e-PRIME related to the activities it runs which are open to Partners. There seems great benefit in NDC activities being included.

76.   Analysis of the 2008 EAPWP activities listed in e-PRIME gives the breakdown by providers, as shown in the pie chart (Figure 1) below. Clearly, this data is incomplete since, as mentioned previously, many items are not entered into e-PRIME. It does however represent the only available, consolidated list of activities, both for analysis purposes as well as for use by those who wish to participate in activities. Aside from NATO structures, activities are hosted by 7 Partner nations, and by 12 NATO Nations. When data from the Partnership Training Centres is included, as well as the increased contribution of activities provided by the United States (in the 2008 EAPWP, many US activities did not initially appear for technical reasons), the picture of activity provision will be clearer and more comprehensive.


Figure 1: EAPWP Activity Providers (Data extracted from e-PRIME in early May 2008.)

77.   Some NATO and Partner nations provide PfP-type activities, which are not shown within the EAPWP (e-PRIME), but are simply advertised by the providers to

nations they wish to invite. Certain activities are organised on a one-to-one or one-to-many invitation basis, but may not be open to all Partners for various reasons which might include security, politics, budget etc. This factor should be taken into consideration when targeting nations for additional provision. The fact that 14 NATO Nations do not provide EAPWP activities suggests that there may be the opportunity to target NATO Nations to provide an increased level of support where a need is identified for additional activities in the EAPWP.

78.   The longer-standing and/or more militarily advanced Partners make it clear that there are many activities within the EAPWP which are of no interest—primarily because they already have fully developed mechanisms within their nations—and in which they never or rarely participate. Examples given included activities relating to: border security and control; food and agriculture planning; procurement and contracting; small arms and light weapons. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that such activities may be of greater significance to other Partners. This demonstrates the complexity of supplying EAPWP activities to Partners with varying goals and levels of development or interest.

79.   NATO HQ has no formal system to proactively seek national activities that could be open to all PfP nations but are not currently included in the EAPWP; to do so would certainly enhance the EAPWP listings and its benefits to Partners, but would also have an impact on resources. Evidence suggests that there are also still gaps in the EAPWP because some activities that are needed, and that have been requested by Partners, are still not on offer. The "clearing house" mechanism is used for Partners in some regions, while the NATO / PfP Education and Training Network (NPETN) facilitates meetings, coordination and integration of members' capabilities within the education and training fields. Both are seen as positive ways of supporting Partners' needs.

BALANCE AND FOCUS OF TOPICS

80.   The e-PRIME database showed 1317 line entries (activities) in the 2008 EAPWP, as at 13 May 2008. Certain topic areas involve a greater number of activities than others. The number of activities in each AOC varies from 2 to 365, but any decision on an "ideal" number would be subjective. Some Partners have complained about the lack of activities and choices in certain AOCs, and the fact that they are not linked to PGs.

Review of Activities

81.   Some Partners believe that NATO should undertake a detailed review of EAPWP activities, and abandon those which have proved to be of less interest to Partners, or which are peripheral to current needs and priorities, in order to focus efforts and budgets on the more valuable ones, particularly those related to operations. Nevertheless, as already stated, different nations have different needs, and thus certain types of activity may be relevant to one Partner if not another. Within the EAPWP concept of providing a compendium to cover the needs of all users, the cancellation or deletion of activities may do more harm than good. There is general consensus among NATO and Partner staffs that the majority of EAPWP activities are essentially repetitions (with or without updates) of activities which have been in the EAPWP for many years. Nevertheless, it is not clear that the halting of one activity would free up resources for expenditure in another area; given that many activities are provided (and funded) by Nations, there is no certainty that funding could be re-focused in the event of activity cancellation.

82.   The requirement for review of activities is clearly stated in the Partnership Programmes, Structures and Procedures paper: "The implementation of the EAPWP should be evaluated regularly with a view to ensuring the adequate linkage between

the overall guidance, specific activities and requirements of partners"[20]. The result of such a review should be to ensure a more focused EAPWP, and the possibility of adding new, focused activities would be beneficial.

83.   PASP conducts a 100% review of activities each year, as described in the previous chapter, but resource constraints limit that to a superficial check of each line item. There is currently a strong sense among Partners that NATO is content to run the programme without committing the resources required to provide a more robust and intense level of proactive management. The value of the EAPWP could be increased by implementing more comprehensive reviews, including crosscutting examination of groups of related activities, to facilitate adjustment of the programme. PASP could also enhance visibility of their efforts in this regard by ensuring that they communicate to Partners the work they are doing, thus reassuring Partners that management measures are in place and effective.

84.   In terms of the operational balance, Partners' perspectives vary according to their level of involvement. Several Partners that contribute to ISAF and/or KFOR believe that operational aspects should take precedence over other partnership activities. One senior Partner officer justified this as follows:

> "When a Partner improves, NATO gets better battlefield support. It is in our mutual interests to improve the EAPWP quality. We need better updates, by involving nations more and persuading them of the required commitment and the value. But the IS/IMS need to take their responsibilities seriously, and do a comprehensive review. The important thing is to get Partners and NATO elements and nations to take data collection and input (into e-PRIME) more seriously."

85.   It is noted that, since the data gathering was completed for this analysis, the IMS has planned an Operational Package[21], to be linked with the NATO/PfP Education and Training Network (NPETN). Assuming it is endorsed, it will be used to facilitate access for Partners to certain NATO activities.

GENERATION PROCESS

86.   There is no formal process for the generation of activities that are focused on the requirements. Contributors offer whatever they have available which can be opened to Partners, and which they consider suitable for EAPWP entry. Offers are then vetted and, if appropriate, included. Equally, there is no established mechanism to review Partners' requests, or seek recommendations from operational theatres, or any other form of feedback to assist in generating appropriate activities. NATO lacks the mechanism to develop and add activities to meet Partners' needs, even in relation to operational training. Such a mechanism, incorporating a methodology to seek new activities, would enable NATO to adjust the EAPWP content to achieve a comprehensive, constructive and focused Work Plan (see also the section on Feedback, later in this chapter). Combining this with the absence of regular formal coordination within NATO on EAPWP issues, the lack of a consensus view within NATO on the needs of Partners, and the fact that many partnership activities take place outside the EAPWP[22], it is evident that the EAPWP is less focused on Partners' and NATO's needs than it could be. The creation of the formal desk-level coordinating body, below the PMSC on PfP, as recommended in Chapter 3, should facilitate a more

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[20] Reference E, Appendix 1 Paragraph 10.

[21] IMS Working Memo on opening courses to partner personnel (Reference M).

[22] For example, activities within the Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) and Science for Peace and Security (SPS), and those run by NATO or Partner nations "in the spirit of PfP" but outside the formal EAPWP because they are not open to all.

coordinated approach to activity generation. The chart at Figure 2 shows the various aspects of the EAPWP planning and management process, and highlights in red the areas which seem to be missing.


Figure 2: EAPWP Processes

SUPPLY-DRIVEN OR DEMAND-LED EAPWP

87.   There is agreement among NATO and Partner representatives that the EAPWP content is supply-driven rather than demand-led. In essence, NATO invites Partners to participate in its events, with Partner requirements added in; few activities are specifically designed or created for Partners. Thus, offered activities are accepted into the Work Plan, but requests for new activities, or for increased availability of existing ones, appear to elicit little or no response from NATO, and there is no clear system or process to check Partners' needs and requirements against the EAPWP listing (IPPs could be cross-referred to EAPWP activities to seek gaps, for example). Partners generally raise requirements whenever they occur with the appropriate NATO department and also at the major conferences (e.g. MCCWS). However, they complain that they often receive little response beyond the original acknowledgement.

88.   There is no methodology to examine the list of activities, to identify gaps and potential requirements, or to state those requirements to possible providers, with a request that they consider filling the gaps. An IS officer considered that this is not a NATO HQ problem, as it is the responsibility of NATO Nations to provide activities, and the IS has no way to enforce the generation of specific activities. Another was clear that it should be the role of NATO (IS, IMS and SCs) to identify gaps and encourage providers to fill them. This shows not merely difference of opinion, but a lack of coherency and awareness of responsibilities, in a field where both interviewees are subject matter experts. Most of the NATO Nations which responded to the JALLC questionnaire stated that they had never been approached by NATO with a request to fill gaps in the EAPWP. A senior ACT representative assumed that a request from a

Partner would always result in provision by NATO "if feasible", in contrast to the opinions of almost all other interviewees and particularly all Partners.

89.   Discussion with Partner and NATO personnel revealed a consensus view that, because many activities are provided not by NATO itself, but by its member nations, a completely demand-driven programme would be very difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, Partners would like NATO to be more responsive to their stated requirements. Given the contributions made by Partners to NATO-led operations[23], increasing NATO's provision of training and education in response to Partners expressed needs would seem to be a good investment. It is acknowledged that much education is provided by NATO Nations, on a bilateral or by-invitation basis, but not necessarily in response to demand. To achieve progress in this area, NATO will need to agree on clear delineation of responsibilities. JALLC notes that this is now being addressed in NATO's *Education, Training, Exercise and Evaluation* study (Reference N).

90.   One particular request, made by three Partners, was for "more advanced activities". An IS Country Officer gave the same view and suggested that activities could benefit from being annotated as "introductory" and "advanced" to aid Partners in selecting activities. An example given by Partners was the NATO Staff Officers' Orientation Course, which, they suggest, should be followed up by a subsequent, more intense and demanding version designed to help the individual function in a fast-moving operational staff post: this was an area where they felt unable to generate training for themselves, and that they see as being essential if their personnel are to contribute effectively to NATO's operational HQ staffs.

LINKAGE OF ACTIVITIES TO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

91.   At the Riga Summit, the Heads of State and Government agreed that NATO would

> *"increase the operational relevance of relations with non-NATO countries, and in particular strengthen NATO's ability to work with those current and potential contributors to NATO operations and missions ….   NATO will particularly promote the development of Partner capabilities that provide a unique or high-value contribution."[24]*

92.   The EAPWP 2007-2008 OG revision states:

> *"NATO will continue to prepare interested Partners for participation in NATO-led operations. It will cooperate with all partners, giving greater attention to their individual abilities and interests, in order to support their efforts to develop military interoperability."[25]*

93.   Despite this statement, there was no change in the stated priorities in the post-Riga OG.

94.   It is in NATO's interest that Partners maintain or enhance their contributions and that Partner nations who do not currently contribute do so in the future. In order to contribute effectively to a NATO operation, Partners need to achieve certain levels of interoperability, and to do this they need to participate in specified NATO (or NATO-led) activities. Some Partners are however disappointed to find that NATO seems to make

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[23] Eighteen nations outside the Alliance, most of them PfP Partners, currently contribute to NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, providing some 3000 troops, or 4.5% of forces, some of which provide specialist resources not readily available from within the Alliance (counts only PfP nations' contributions, with no MD, ICI or Contact Countries).

[24] Riga Summit Declaration (Reference O).

[25] EAPWP Overarching Guidance for 2007-2008 (Reference F).

insufficient effort to facilitate their access to such activities. They perceive that NATO and NATO Nations do not prioritise the allocation of places based on operational contributions, to assist those Partners in achieving the required standards. From the Partners' perspective, NATO needs their support in operations, and thus NATO must exert itself to facilitate their preparation, by providing training—whether by creating new activities, if a new requirement is identified, or by providing additional space on current activities (larger courses, extra iterations of courses, etc.) when Partners have difficulty in accessing sufficient places.

95.   Despite repeated requests for this (e.g. at least two Partner nations have been seeking extra places on Forward Air Controller and Evaluator training courses for several years and one has frequently asked for C4ISTAR training), neither new activities nor extra capacity in these fields has been added to the EAPWP, thus Partners perceive some reluctance on NATO's part to invest sufficient effort to help Partners achieve the required levels of interoperability. Ten Partner nations made comments to this effect at MCCWS. On a positive note, the IMS is currently working on an initiative to increase availability of places for Partners on evaluator training courses (Reference P).

96.   For Partner nations already involved in operations, access to appropriate training is essential. One specific issue of this type is Partner nations' filling of Legal Advisor positions at the Regional Command / Provincial Reconstruction Team levels of ISAF. Partner Legal Advisors attend the basic NATO Legal Advisor course at the NSO, but are not allowed to attend NATO's more advanced operational law course. Thus they have different background knowledge and training than the NATO Legal Advisors operating in HQ ISAF, which reportedly greatly hampers cooperation, coordination and accuracy. It is noted that some progress has been made on this issue, since JALLC data collection occurred, through the IMS's Operational Package for Education and Training – Opening Courses to Partner Personnel (Reference M).

97.   Despite the fact that in some areas, at least, NATO staffs and bodies do make efforts to support contributing Partner nations, and to prioritise their access to activities, some Partners do not realise this is happening. It is in NATO's interest to ensure that Partners are given the correct information and have a clear understanding of why some activities could not be offered.

98.   Several Partner representatives at MCCWS observed that they see no evidence that NATO is learning from operations—operational lessons are not fed back into the EAPWP, which continues to offer mainly what it always has. This comment does not reflect immediate operational feedback to inform the various ISAF training packages (Mission Rehearsal Training, ISAF Individual Augmentee Pre-deployment Course and other forms of Mission Specific Training) provided by JFC Brunssum, Joint Warfare Centre, etc. Rather, this refers to background training on operations and general interoperability issues, which require longer-term adjustments to training packages. This view was endorsed by staff from the IMS, SHAPE, ACT SEE and JFC Brunssum. Lieutenant General J-P Bovy, JFC Brunssum Chief of Staff, raised this issue recently, in a letter (Reference Q) to NATO and Non-NATO Troop-Contributing Nations (NNTCN) regarding pre-deployment training for HQ ISAF personnel:

"I must stress that the main concern with regard to HQ ISAF manning is not participation in the NATO pre-deployment training (although this is a prerequisite to success, and it is therefore a requirement) but the fact that significant numbers of HQ ISAF personnel are poorly prepared for their duties in theatre due to inadequate qualifications, background and experience. Personnel with little or no experience on the job they will be required to do in HQ ISAF will not gain that required experience by attending NATO pre-deployment training. Therefore, it is an essential prerequisite to operational success that

personnel nominated to fill posts in the HQ ISAF CE meet the requirements of the NATO job description."

99.   Logically, if NATO requires Partners (as well as Alliance nations) to provide better qualified personnel for NATO-led operations, it would be in NATO's interest to assist Partners in the long-term professional development of their personnel. This will require NATO to link provision of activities to the needed skill sets that are identified from operations, and may need NATO to review its stance on the responsibility for the provision of individual training. The ongoing *Education, Training, Exercise and Evaluation* study may provide a start in this direction.

100. A number of Partner representatives made it clear that if they are to achieve their PGs, which have been agreed directly with NATO, they expect NATO to facilitate their access to related activities. They expressed disappointment that NATO does not seem to have a robust system to link the PGs to the allocation of places for activities.

101. Notwithstanding the above, a Partner-nation, senior engineering officer serving in ISAF, interviewed in the context of another JALLC study, stated that he was extremely satisfied with the interoperability of his and other Partner nations' troops, and that NATO's general and mission specific training served its purpose well, implying that good interoperability is a sign that the correct skill sets are in place. His nation "gains good levels of interoperability through access to STANAGs, from NATO Working Group attendance, and by integrating STANAGs into national training and procedures."

102. The provision of activities within the EAPWP, many of which are intended *inter alia* to assist Partners in enhancing operational capabilities and interoperability, continues without any means to adjust for operational requirements. Although NATO has a feedback system for ISAF-related courses, training and exercises, there is currently no formal NATO requirement for feedback directly from operations, on the interoperability of, or contribution by, Partner forces. The NATO lessons learned database has been searched and nothing was found that addressed the interoperability of PfP Partners on operations. A SHAPE J5 officer stated, "the only measurement we can use is to see how effective Partners are when participating in operations. There is no standardised mechanism for such feedback, but there should be." One NATO nation has specifically suggested that there should be a linkage between the EAPWP and the OCC which would help the development of capable contributors. Essentially, NATO HQ should encourage the SCs to identify, from operations, problem areas in relation to Partner interoperability that could be addressed through the EAPWP.

103. In seeking to improve the linkage to operations it should be borne in mind that not all PfP Partners will want to be involved in such activities. Therefore, a balance needs to be retained within the EAPWP in order to ensure it retains its relevance for a broad range of Partner ambitions. The following comment from a senior Partner representative reflects this view:

> *"Partnership is much broader than NATO Operations, but there is a need for a determination of what NATO wants and what Partners want. There was a tendency for NATO to focus on operations—but the security challenges in broader terms are significant—the challenges are not all military; asymmetric. NATO needs a special tool, and special cooperation with Nations, to meet the challenges and threats. Operations & sending troops is not the whole picture. To build security in the whole region, we must focus on reforms."*

ACTIVITY EVALUATION AND FEEDBACK

Evaluation

104. According to the PMSC on PfP, "the implementation of the EAPWP should be evaluated regularly with a view to ensuring the adequate link between the overall

guidance, specific activities and requirements of Partners."[26] There is, however, no allocation of responsibility for effecting the evaluation, no evidence of any formal mechanism for evaluation, and no stated basis against which the EAPWP is to be evaluated.

e-PRIME Feedback Facility

105. There is no central PfP or EAPWP mechanism to gather feedback on activities, other than the After-Action Report (AAR) facility in e-PRIME, which is available for every EAPWP activity within the system. The system currently allows a time-lapse of up to three months following an activity for the provision of feedback, which can limit its analysis and use in time for the following year's planning cycle. The AAR facility in e-PRIME is little and badly used and the resultant data is unreliable. Many Partners and some NATO Nations suggest that the AAR is too simplistic and unfit for its purpose, and also that many people who attend activities do not, on their return home, have "write-access" to e-PRIME to complete the AAR. Completing a manual AAR, which then has to be submitted via the national POC, is administratively difficult and time-consuming. This may explain why, although ACO requires AARs from all its EAPWP activities, when interviewed (08 May 2008) a SHAPE J5 representative reported that of some 60 events which had taken place from January to March 2008, he had to that date received AARs on only three of them. There are strong indications of doubt among NATO and Partner nations on the value of providing feedback.

106. Concerns regarding the use NATO will make of any provided AARs were raised by one Partner nation delegate at MCCWS and by a Partnership Staff Element representative; they both recommended that feedback be collected at the end of an activity, by the organisers, before the attendees dispersed. The organiser could then upload the data into e-PRIME.

107. Improvement in the collection of AARs would also provide additional data for NATO to implement a programme of measurement towards objectives, as described in Chapter 6.

General Feedback Issues

108. To ensure the EAPWP is responsive to changing requirements, it needs to take into account the following: feedback from activities, particularly those related to operations; Partner requests for new or amended activities; and suggestions from activity contributors. A well run process of this nature would encourage nations to provide valuable feedback on activities.

The Bi-SC Evaluation Team Report

109. The Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) inherited the task of compiling an annual report on those EAPWP activities run by the two SCs (currently some 41% of all activities listed in e-PRIME), in an effort to show trends, draw conclusions, and make recommendations. There are several problems with production of this report. They are:

- The Report is compiled in a vacuum, as the PCC receives no direction and guidance on purpose, requirements, content, priorities, target areas for analysis, structure or methodology.

- The statistics it draws on sometimes lack accuracy. They are taken primarily from e-PRIME, yet it is known that many activity organisers fail to update the

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[26] PMSC for PfP's *Partnership Programmes, Structures and Procedures* (Reference E)

information in the system; thus the Report is based on incomplete or possibly erroneous data.

- Statistics are counted and cross-related, and some conclusions drawn, but the PCC is not always in a position to be able to determine the reasons for certain figures or trends. As an example, the 2007 report[27] concludes that the Submarine Commanders' Conference is not desirable because a low percentage of Partners attend, but there are only four Partner nations with submarines, so even very low attendance figures still indicate high levels of interest. Increased resources, together with clearer tasking, would enable the PCC to execute the detailed analysis which is required and to create a more authoritative report.

- Although the BET Report is sent by Director PCC to the two SCs, as well as to the IS and IMS, and is briefed to the EAPC and at Military Cooperation conferences, the PCC receives no formal feedback or comment on it, and nothing tangible results: recommendations are not validated or endorsed for subsequent action.

110. Seven Partners of eleven interviewed see the BET report as being of little value, partly because it only covers a limited percentage of EAPWP activity. They doubt the accuracy of the statistics, which they believe need to be complemented by more focused analysis and interpretation. They also comment adversely on the fact that some of the findings and recommendations are not supported by any evidence within the Report body.

111. NATO personnel and Partners (even those who do not like the current BET Report) generally agree that a broader-based report along the same lines, compiled at the IS / IMS level and encompassing the full EAPWP activity list, would be beneficial. The PCC endorsed that view, while emphasising that they have neither the resources nor the remit to cover such a broad tasking. Director PASP-EIPD agrees with the concept, but also lacks the human resources to fulfil such a task.

SUMMARY

112. The process for generating activities for the EAPWP is not structured to acquire or use input from the many potential sources. Many relevant activities are not included in the EAPWP, and NATO seems to lack the mechanisms to create and insert new ones to meet Partners' needs, even in relation to operational training. Most users view it as a compendium, with useful sign posting through AOCs and objectives (although some objectives are considered by many to be less precise or focused than would be ideal), rather than as a work plan. The linkage of objectives to MTIs and in the future to the NTL is seen as helpful, providing it can be achieved effectively; there are still doubts on this and NATO does not seem to be keeping Partners fully informed. It is clear that there is a wide range in Partner nations' desires and expectations, with regard to Partnership generally and the EAPWP in particular, and NATO seeks to make the Work Plan suitable for all; unfortunately, this sometimes means it will not be sufficiently focused for some. Some Partners are looking for a roadmap to support their participation in PfP programmes and in compiling their IPPs.

113. The contributions made by NATO Nations to PfP are not as clear as may appear from the e-PRIME data on activity providers. The imminent inclusion of the contributions of Partnership Training Centres will help consolidate the picture, which would also be improved by more information from the NDC. Nevertheless, many bilateral and multilateral activities will remain outside the EAPWP, thus NATO will

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[27] 2007 BET Report (Reference R)

always lack full visibility and therefore the ability to meaningfully analyse the balance of contributing organisations.

114. There is a demand for more advanced levels of training to be included in the EAPWP. Partners, and many in NATO, do not believe the EAPWP provides adequate levels of activities for those preparing for or participating in operations. In particular, Partners preparing to contribute to operations feel that NATO does not accord them sufficient priority when allocating places for EAPWP events, or make sufficient efforts to allow Partner personnel preparing to deploy to participate in courses which would normally be NATO-only. There is also a strongly held view, among Partners and NATO staff, that NATO is neither learning from Partners' participation in operations nor using post-operations feedback to help shape EAPWP activities. There is widespread criticism of feedback mechanisms, both in- and outside e-PRIME[28]. Users (NATO and Partner) agree that more use should be made of feedback, but also that methods for submitting it need to be better structured and simpler, and NATO needs a formal system to review, evaluate and (when appropriate) make practical use of the feedback. There is little operational linkage, and despite NATO efforts to accommodate Partner requirements, there is a strong *perception* amongst Partners that their needs to facilitate their ongoing provision of support to operations are not taken into account through any form of feedback process.

115. In its current format, despite the excellent efforts of its compilers, the BET Report seems to be under-utilised and perhaps under-valued, because of its limited coverage and doubts about the underlying data. Despite this, most agree that a broader report in a similar vein, but covering the whole (or as much as possible) of the EAPWP would be very worthwhile.

RECOMMENDATIONS

116. A process should be devised and implemented to capture relevant input and feedback, particularly from operations, to help shape EAPWP activities and guide the process of activity generation.

117. The compendium structure should be retained, but there is a need to review what the objectives are achieving. Work should continue to streamline the AOCs and MOs. NATO should consider the feasibility and desirability of creating a clear road map defining how Partners might progress in their Partnership process.

118. NATO authorities and nations should seek to include a mix of introductory and more advanced levels of training and activities within the EAPWP, and to categorise each activity in that context.

119. The issue of retaining links to MTIs or changing to the NTL must be clearly communicated and explained to Partners.

120. NATO should make efforts to create, or to request that Alliance members create, operationally relevant courses which are not currently available, but which Partners need, based on feedback from operations and from Partners' input. There is also an urgent need to create exceptions, where appropriate, so that selected Partner staffs destined to participate in a NATO-led operation can attend courses normally limited to NATO personnel. Progress is anticipated through the "Operational Package for Education and Training – Opening Courses to Partner Personnel."

121. NATO should define and implement a method to ensure that Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations have priority over other Partner nations for access to training and activities which will enhance their interoperability and/or operational capabilities.

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[28] Feedback on e-PRIME is covered in more detail in Chapter 6

Equally, NATO should seek to increase the number of places available to Partners on existing but over-subscribed operations-related courses.

122. The process for feedback through AARs needs to be improved. It is recommended that the AAR format be updated and that the activity provider be required to complete the required review at the end of the activity and feed it immediately into e-PRIME.

123. NATO should also make efforts to increase the transparency of its actions in relation to all of the above, so that Partners understand what is being done or what the problems and reasons are for delays.

124. The BET Report recommendations should be formally reviewed and, where recommendations are endorsed, there should be a process in place to ensure that appropriate action is taken. If the BET report is to continue, Bi-SC guidance should be issued to the PCC (or the MCD) on the requirements for the following year's data collection and analysis. NATO should consider the benefits to be gained by producing a NATO-wide report on the EAPWP, along the lines of the BET Report, but which also takes into account the concomitant resource implications.

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Activity Administration, Coordination and Execution

125. Chapter 4 examines the way in which the EAPWP activities are administered, including: Partners' selection of activities; funding issues; and the e-PRIME system usage and training.

ACTIVITY SELECTION BY PARTNERS

126. NATO staff attempt to encourage Partners to participate in those events which will help them to fulfil their PGs, or enhance interoperability; however, Partners have a free choice of activities. ACT SEE personnel have identified that some Partners choose activities that will help improve their militaries, but not necessarily with the purpose of achieving PGs, participating in NATO-led operations, or even improving interoperability generally. A SHAPE representative agreed, noting that choices may relate more to national goals, but even then they may not be coordinated with the nation's IPP or PGs.

127. Activity choices are approved in the biannual IPP executive summary or, in odd years, within e-PRIME by IS Country Officers after screening[29]. Some IS Country Officers feel however that they have had less involvement than they believe they should in guiding a Partner's choices. Whereas an IPP helps a Partner nation focus on what it wants to achieve through partnership, an agreed NATO perspective on what a Partner needs (and what NATO wants the Partner to achieve) would benefit all those involved in administering the EAPWP or its activities. Having said that, some Partners use their PARP and PGs—which are chosen specifically to achieve the capabilities for international operations which their government has decreed—as the main basis for participation in the EAPWP. They clearly see the activities as existing to support achievement of agreed goals.

128. Several Partners agreed with a comment by ACT SEE, that NATO should, but does not, push Partners to undertake activities which NATO thinks they should do, and which would be in NATO's interest as well as that of the Partner nation; partnership activities should generally be of mutual benefit. There should be scope for NATO to take a stronger line, to allow resources and effort to be re-focused towards operational issues or other NATO priorities, and to refuse participation in activities which NATO considers inappropriate. PASP-EIPD currently has insufficient capacity (in terms of resources or skill-sets) to scrutinise bids in that manner, although this may be achievable by changes in tasking or responsibilities (for example, of Country Officers).

129. ACT SEE has seen some Partners choose activities purely on the basis of cost. Where a NATO nation is offering a 100% subsidy, certain Partners may choose to participate in that, rather than a NATO-sponsored activity with only an 80% subsidy, even if the NATO activity would be more relevant to their PGs or other stated aims. In a few cases, this may be because certain Partner nations are almost unable to send representatives without a full subsidy. In contrast, however, the IMS became aware of one officer attending the same 1-day training event three times (and applying for a fourth), apparently because he liked the location, and his attendance was fully subsidised.

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[29] PMSC for PfP's *Partnership Programmes, Structures and Procedures* (Reference E)

FUNDING POLICY AND ISSUES

Background

130. NATO's initial funding policy for Outreach activities, excluding the SPS and PDD programmes, was issued by the Civil Budget Committee in 1993[30]. A PfP Funding Policy Update, covering basic regulations, eligibility, etc. was issued in 1997[31], with a further update in 2004[32]. EAPWP activities are funded from a variety of sources, including NATO authorities, NATO Nations and Partner nations. PfP funding policies relate primarily to running IS or IMS sponsored activities, and subsidising some Partner representatives participating in PfP activities. NATO funding for military PfP activities is relatively small, since the bulk of activities are part of the SCs' own programmes, which they have opened to Partners[33]. Indeed, the majority of activities in the EAPWP are provided by NATO organisations or nations, within their own budgetary regimes.

2008 Budget Allocation

131. The Civil Budget Committee authorises the civilian budget for Partnership activities. Excluding salaries and operational expenditure, the Civil Budget Partnership Programmes (Resource Pool 4) has allocated 16 million euro (MEUR) to the IS in 2008. Of that 16 MEUR under the Objective Global "Partnership" total, 13 MEUR is allocated for projects and activities under Science for Peace and Security, which operates under the PDD (but not all of that 13 MEUR is for EAPWP-related activities).

- PDD activities under the "Partnership" heading include NATO-Russia cooperative activities (mainly the NATO-Russia Council); NATO-Ukraine practical cooperation; and projects under the EAPWP, with ICI and/or MD nations, contact countries, etc.

- PDD also undertakes other related activities, not strictly under the partnership banner, by managing communication-related activities to convey NATO messages to Partner and other countries. These are accounted for under the Global Objective "Public Relations".

132. The remaining 3 MEUR is divided into 2 MEUR for PASP programmes (including management of the EAPWP), 0.9 MEUR for Operations, and the balance for Defence Investment Division and the NATO Office of Security.

Measurement and Value for Money

133. PASP-EIPD might benefit from an increased understanding of its expenditure and that of other funding which influences PfP programmes. Given that many EAPWP (and other PfP) activities are provided, and mainly funded, by NATO Nations, Partner nations, NATO agencies, or the SCs, it would be extremely difficult to determine the true costs of the entire Work Plan. The measures needed to track expenditure would be cumbersome or impracticable, and costly. Nations may not wish to disclose such budgetary information, and in any case nations' accounting methods differ. Attempts to measure the full costs of the EAPWP are therefore unlikely to justify the cost and effort required.

134. The overall EAPWP is subject to very little analysis, feedback or measurement. Without some measurement of the success of the activities (see also Chapter 6), it is impossible to determine value for money. Given the range of activities within the

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[30] Civil Budget Committee's Outreach Activity – Guidelines for Expenditure (Reference S)

[31] SECGEN's *PfP Funding policy Update* (Reference T)

[32] SECGEN's *Funding Arrangements for Partnership Activities* (Reference U)

[33] ACO's 2008 budget estimate for PfP activities was €864,450 (Reference V)

EAPWP, the wide variation in Partner nations and their individual aims and requirements, the current lack of measurable end states, the wide range of activity providers, and the political nature of many of the activities, it is unlikely that any accurate, effective and objective method of determining value for money can be identified for application across the Work Plan. Nevertheless, as covered in Chapter 6, some degree of effectiveness measurement (even if not measurement of value for money) should be achievable.

Subsidies

135. In general, Partner nations may request subsidisation for participation in NATO-sponsored EAPWP activities. Certain Partner nations are exempt from the scheme[34], and some others choose not to request subsidies. The level of available subsidy, on the military side of NATO, varies between the SCs and even within ACT. Subsidies are based on the overall NATO policy, but are subject to SC interpretation. ACO subsidies are generally 80% of costs. Within ACT, in contrast, there are 3 categories:

- 100% (food, accommodation and travel) for an activity organised by a NATO HQ;

- 80% for activities run by ACT's NATO Training Group;

- 70% on flights and 100% on food and accommodation, for NSO courses.

136. Additionally, the application method for, and the payment of, subsidies varies between the SCs, with ACO generally refunding against receipts, while ACT generally purchases flight tickets directly. A number of Partner nations see these variations as confusing and as an administrative burden; they would prefer consistent levels of subsidy across NATO, accompanied by the use of only one application form, and consistent methodology for payment of the subsidy.

137. Some activity providers complain about wasted places, caused when a Partner has bid for and been allocated a place, but no one attends. Some Partners have admitted to over-bidding in order to achieve the number of places they actually require. In view of the number of course places lost in this way, some Partner nations suggested that it might be sensible to require Partners to fund some of the costs, perhaps 5%, of an activity, as soon as they reserve their place; this would serve to encourage them to make every effort to fill allocations. Nevertheless, there are often justifiable reasons for non-attendance (several nations stated they have sometimes had problems obtaining visas, for example), which would need to be taken into account. A Partner contribution on attendance might help in focussing course selection on where it can achieve the most benefit rather than where there is full subsidy and also help limit the places taken to those actually required. Implementation of such a deposit system would require politically sensitive management.

Priorities

138. EAPWP priorities have little effect on budgets. Most activities within the EAPWP are multi-national, so a change in focus will make little difference to the costs. Indeed, within NATO's PfP funding policies there is limited scope to target funds at specific countries or regions, since all PfP activities must be open to all Partners.

THE USE OF E-PRIME

System Description

139. e-PRIME is the latest version of the original PRIME software system developed by Switzerland and given to NATO to run the EAPWP. e-PRIME is maintained and

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[34] AUT, CHE, FIN, IRL, SWE

managed by IS PASP EIPD. It runs on unclassified computers and is accessible (password controlled) via the Internet. NATO organisations, NATO Nations and Partners may open e-PRIME accounts, with varying levels of access and permissions. The system has a large reference library, a good search facility, and the capability to create user working groups (with unlimited or controlled access) for projects or information exchange. It is user-friendly, and permits the organisation of activities by various fields, with detailed descriptions, POCs, application forms, and other details. NATO uses it to manage the EAPWP, as well as MD and ICI activities, and is beginning to use it for the Afghan Cooperation Programme and the Iraqi Annual Work Programme.

140. e-PRIME (and its predecessor system) has been in use for the EAPWP for several years. Fewer than 1500 accounts have been opened in that time (and many of them have subsequently been closed). Given that it needs to be regularly used by the 26 NATO Nations, 22 Partners, and some 20 NATO HQs and agencies, the average number of accounts per user group is under 25, and as some organisations have large numbers of accounts, there are evidently others with very few users. It is acknowledged that some Partner nations may be constrained (for technical, budgetary or political reasons) in their access to computers and the Internet.

Database Usage Problems

141. All Partners and NATO users interviewed agree that e-PRIME is an excellent system, and provides an extremely effective management tool for the EAPWP. They also see that it could be improved, and that there are a number of problems with quality of content input into the basic database as opposed to its capabilities, current or potential:

- Partners complain that many activities are very poorly described and suggested that originators need to take more time and care in their completion. A JALLC review of a sample of 104 activities (selected across all AOCs and activity providers) showed that 27—over a quarter—were poorly or inadequately described, and the activity providers varied from NATO bodies and Nations to Partners. Examples of poor descriptions are: simple repetition, under the "description" heading, of the activity title; descriptions which are bland statements which give no help to users in determining what the activity is; or no entry at all. The organisation providing the most consistently good and useful descriptions is the NSO, which should be used as an example of best practice[35].

- All Partners raised the fact that many activities have empty information fields, showing just "TBD", and originators fail to review and update them. Sometimes the POC for the activity has changed, but the entry remains unaltered.

- Often, an activity entry will lack essential information such as security limitations or attachments (such as application forms) even when it says they are included. Alternatively, they may be constructed illogically. For example, the NATO Research and Technology Organisation activities state that application must be made through its website, but the web page is not accessible to Partners.

- Errors are made in terms of activity submission and inclusion.

- Partners comment that there are many PfP-related activities that are not in the system at all. Occasionally this may be because a submission has not been accepted, but there are also numerous providers who do not put activities into e-

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[35] NATO HQ has identified a number ways to ease the inputting task for providers and is in the process of implementing updates to e-PRIME software.

PRIME, or who only enter selected ones. As previously explained, this may well be for justifiable reasons, which might include security, politics, budget etc.

General System Usage

142. The major users of e-PRIME are the IS, IMS, ACO and ACT. The IMS judge that many others, including most Allies, make little use of the system, perhaps initially inserting details for EAPWP activities which they are organising, but rarely accessing the other capabilities and often not even returning to update their own information. Many Partners would like to see greater use made of the e-PRIME system for all EAPWP activity, especially by NATO Nations. All nations (NATO and Partner) need to understand that this is the one system covering partnership activity which is available to all Partners (including MD and ICI etc) and is thus the ideal mechanism for management of the EAPWP and its activities; more comprehensive usage would significantly enhance its effectiveness.

143. Many of the problems listed above relating to poor quality of data input could be eradicated if the data generation and input personnel and responsible staffs in all user communities were better trained and more familiar with the requirements of the system. Unfortunately, administrative staff often have no in-depth understanding of the EAPWP or its functions, so they may not appreciate the problems caused by inaccurate completion or failure to update entries. Authorising the system managers to make adjustments for technical reasons to other bodies' entries, which is currently not possible, might alleviate some problems or inaccuracies.

144. PASP-EIPD agree that NATO could make much better use of e-PRIME, and that it needs wider and clearer publicity within the NATO community and better training for all users. Some IMS CRSD staff believe that use of e-PRIME for all EAPWP issues should be mandatory for all NATO organisations, NATO Nations and Partners.

System Training

145. The IS, which administers the e-PRIME system, has run many training courses for users. There are, however, still many who have not been trained, and those at the basic administrative levels, who perhaps use it only for a small percentage of their work, may not have the time to attend a training course. An IS member recommended the creation of a simple guide, perhaps with a self-taught on-line training package, accessible to all users. This concept is supported by JALLC as a practical, efficient and inexpensive approach to improving user training. In conjunction with this, there is a need for strenuous effort to encourage all users to ensure that personnel nominated to work on the e-PRIME system are given a better understanding of how it works and of the need for accuracy and updating. Although the problems cited are not related to the software itself, a continuing review of the system input methodology and software might offer ways to simplify the process and thus avoid some of the data input quality problems.

SUMMARY

146. NATO needs to determine whether or not it should increase the influence it has over Partners' choices of activity and whether to facilitate Partners getting places on courses considered to be of most value to them. Whatever is decided should be transparent to Partners. If increased influence is to be exercised, the guidelines and procedures will need to be well publicised to all Partners.

147. Many Partners are confused by the variations in policies and methods for subsidy. They have suggested that it would be much better to have one simple, single system for subsidies, both in terms of amounts and administrative methodologies.

148. e-PRIME is considered almost unanimously to be an excellent system, but also to be under- and inconsistently used. Despite its value, there is still much room for improvement. Training is lacking in NATO, NATO Nations and Partners. There is a need for better training for users (and particularly their e-PRIME data entry staff), to ensure that activity listings offer more accurate and complete information for users.

RECOMMENDATIONS

149. NATO should consider closer monitoring of activities selected by Partners, and possibly refusing participation where it is not justified and facilitate it where it should take place.

150. The level of subsidies for NATO-sponsored activities should be the same across NATO (this will require more detailed study on feasibility, and on likely effects) and the same processes should be adopted by NATO HQ and both SCs. Depending on policy decisions in this area, an exclusion clause may be required for certain Partner nations.

151. EAPWP management should consider improving the methodology for insertion of activity information into e-PRIME, and the means of ensuring that activity providers provide better data.

152. The use of e-PRIME for PfP and other Outreach activities should be promoted throughout NATO, the 26 NATO Nations and amongst all Partners. The following areas within e-PRIME need to be addressed:

a. User training should be improved. A simple on-line training package should be produced, and widely publicised, to maximise the number of trained users at minimum cost.

b. Activity administration by the providers needs to be improved. (This should be helped by better user training.)

6
Measures of Effectiveness / Performance

153. IS PASP requested the JALLC to provide guidance on ways in which the EAPWP might be measured, to ensure that it fulfils its aims and provides value for money. To achieve this, the JALLC Team looked at the relevant definitions, possible methods for measurement, the related structures, and resource requirements. This Chapter therefore looks at what is meant, in relation to the EAPWP, by the terms *end state*, *measures of effectiveness* (MOE) and *measures of performance* (MOP), and the factors involved in establishing criteria. It then examines some of the issues surrounding measurement of the EAPWP, and makes appropriate recommendations.

BACKGROUND – DEFINITIONS

End state

134.   Before defining MOEs and MOPs, the meaning of the term *end state* needs to be understood. AAP-6 defines end state (in the operational context) as "the political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved." In the context of assessment of a programme, in order to measure progress, it is essential to know precisely what that programme or activity is intended to achieve—the final result, or end state; that is the sense in which the term is used in this report. In contrast to the end state, aims, goals or objectives may be ongoing activities (such as dialogue or cooperation).

135.   Progress can be measured at any stage of the process towards a defined end state, because we know exactly what that end state is—a single, simple, easily identified situation. As explained in Chapter 2, however, defining a single end state for the EAPWP (within the PfP context) is a challenging task.

MOEs/MOPs

136.   Although there are accepted definitions, in the commercial world, of MOEs and MOPs, there is as yet no NATO doctrine on the subject beyond some tactical applications. In essence, MOEs measure a state change or a *status quo*, while MOPs measure the execution of an action. In general terms, to be able to develop appropriate measures, there is a need to determine what you wish to achieve by doing a programme or activity (i.e. its outcome), what the task involves; what resources are required, and what the cost benefits are. A Bi-SC Working Group has developed the following definitions:

> "MOEs are criteria used to evaluate how system behaviour or capabilities have been affected by actions. Essentially, a MOE is an indicator of the system state, used to help answer the question "Was the intended new system state—the desired effect—created? A MOE must describe one system element or relationship of interest; describe how that element or relationship is expected to change the desired trend(s); be observable; and be as specific as possible. Additionally a MOE should be reducible to a quantity (as a number, percentage etc) and be objective in nature. Each MOE must also include threshold(s) of change for a system element or relationship that indicates effect status.

> A MOP is defined as the criteria used to evaluate the execution of actions. Each MOP must align to one or more own-force actions; describe the element

that must be observed to measure the progress of status of the action; and have a known deterministic relation to the action." [36]

WHY MEASURE?

154. PASP, and the EAPWP community as a whole, needs to be clear, before starting to use MOEs, what exactly it wishes to use them for. Are MOE being sought:

    a. To assess EAPWP activities' success in achieving the required change in the PfP programmes?

    b. To assess the EAPWP's success in supporting PfP programmes to achieve changes in the various Partner nations?

    c. To track that improved value for money is being achieved?

    d. To monitor that the changes desired by Partners are being achieved through the PfP programmes?

    e. To monitor that the direction given from NATO summits is being met?

    f. Or … Something else?

155. Clearly, the MOE used will depend upon why they are being employed. The issue to be considered is whether the resources required for instigating the process, and the time and effort required to fulfil the measurement task, would be worth the investment. Given that it has been highlighted that issues raised at NATO summits in relationship to PfP have not always made sufficient progress, this may be an indication that it would be appropriate to apply the necessary resources to implement an assessment programme.

Resource Implications

156. If measurement is to be effective it will require considerable resources. In the preparatory stages, end states, with related objectives and/or targets must be set, in such a way as to be measurable; measurement methods have to be determined; mechanisms for measuring and reporting need definition and design; responsibilities need to be allocated. Once the system is in place, regular assessment will be required, with formal measurement and reporting at appropriate stages. If the resources for all of the above are inadequate or unsustainable, the end results are likely to be inaccurate and thus of little value, and the effort will be wasted.

Methodology

157. Ideally, at the time that objectives are set and the desired outcomes defined, the measurement methods, mechanisms and thresholds should also be identified. Objectives should be created in such a way as to be measurable, and each objective should be accompanied by an absolute minimum of two measures, with at least one for every single activity within that objective.

APPROPRIATE AREAS FOR EMPLOYMENT OF MOEs

158. NATO's Outreach programme has four objectives at the higher level: Dialogue and Cooperation; Reform; Operations; and Enlargement. Additional guidance is then forthcoming from NATO summits. This is then, in consultation with the various Alliance stakeholders, used in the development of the EAPWP OG.

159. Attempting to define measurement methods for the current EAPWP will be difficult as the objectives were set under the OG and AOCs without concurrent

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[36] From the Bi-SC WG EBAO Draft Pre-Doctrinal Handbook (Reference W)

identification of appropriate MOEs. As a result, some of the objectives are not written from an MOE perspective and would need review. This is not a task that should be underestimated in terms of the resources required. Data collection will require very detailed awareness of NATO's interaction (at all levels) with Partners, in addition to a well-developed system, structure and methodology for collection, analysis and evaluation. As an indication of the extent of the task, it is noted that the development, at the Joint Command level, of an effects-based management plan with MOEs took approximately a year to complete, even though there was buy-in from the highest level of command and significant resources were applied to the task.

160. Given the above, there are a number of options for PASP to consider in developing MOE:

- PASP could look at the progress it is making on achieving the four objectives of the overall Outreach programme. These are set at an extremely high level, would be difficult to assess, other than in general and subjective terms, and would be unlikely to provide clear information that could be used to manage the work.

- The OG could provide a more refined set of objectives that would be better suited to measurement. Measurement at this level would allow PASP and NATO HQ to report back to summits with clearly defined progress, or lack thereof, against the direction that had been received.

- As NATO agrees PGs with each Partner, it would be possible to measure the progress that is being made towards meeting them. The definition of success is likely to vary from nation to nation, and direct measurement by NATO might be considered unacceptably intrusive by Partners. Furthermore, there will be 22 sets of PGs to be measured—a daunting task.

- A final area where objectives could readily be identified is within the AOCs. There would be some difficulties with measuring them, particularly in terms of resources. There are 252 objectives, each of which would need to be measured by at least 2 indicators; thus there would be at least 504 indicators to be defined and then monitored. The JALLC considers that this would be beyond the current resources available. The other issue is that the activities under the AOCs are not always under NATO's control, and the uptake and benefit gained depends on the 22 PfP Partners, which could each have differing views of success.

161. Given these options, it seems that the OG is the area in which it is most appropriate for PASP to employ the use of MOEs to ensure that the changes sought by NATO are being achieved. The objectives under the AOCs could subsequently be looked at on an "as required" basis, if the initial OG MOE identified areas of concern. The introduction of MOE will be an additional task for PASP, and will need to be appropriately resourced. An outline of which aspects of the 2007-2008 OG might have been measured, and in what way, is given in the subsequent section on possible measurements.

162. It may be possible to reduce the workload involved in measurement if use can be made of any of the data already available in NATO HQ (for example, that used for the NATO HQ Management Board).

MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE

163. The individual activities within the EAPWP are suitable for assessment with MOPs. This assessment could be achieved through the current AAR system on e-PRIME as detailed in Chapter 4. The MOPs are a management tool to check such things as:

- Did the event take place?

- Did the appropriate or desired people / organisations attend?

- Were any problems identified?

164. This type of measurement will not indicate quality, or show whether the attendance was beneficial in any particular way, but would be an indicator when assessing whether the activity contributed to the objectives of the OG. It might also, depending on circumstances, provide a limited ability to assess the value for money of an activity.

165. Introduction of more detailed and focused AARs for EAPWP activities would facilitate MOP analysis, and ensure a complete and standardised dataset. Even then, the opinions and comments will be subjective and may be influenced by external factors such as cultural sensitivities or politics.

POSSIBLE MEASUREMENTS REGARDING THE 2007-2008 OG[37]

166. Against the assumption that a decision is taken on why NATO wishes to measure the EAPWP, in relation to its support for PfP programmes and overall Outreach effectiveness, JALLC has examined the 2007-2008 EAPWP OG, and the following paragraphs show abbreviated extracts from that document, and suggest certain aspects which might in future years be measured, and how they might be assessed.

- Para 4.1: "Conduct dialogue and practical cooperation ... develop same on a geographical or functional basis ... encourage and support regional initiatives ..."

  Count the number of dialogue initiatives (activities), and the number of Partners involved. How many are ongoing, how many are new, how many have ceased? Statistics only. This would go some way towards showing whether the initiative was of any interest to Partners, and would give a picture of NATO's will and ability to provide in practice what it has offered. But it would not necessarily reflect activities of minority interest (e.g. submarine-related issues are relevant to very few Partners so even a small involvement might represent maximum interest levels).

- Para 4.2: "provide interested Partners with advice on and assistance in defence and security aspects of domestic reform ..."

  Count how many Partners sought NATO assistance in these areas, and how many NATO has helped. (Statistical analysis.) Identify factors that are measurable to and indicate concrete progress in relevant areas. (This will show levels of interest and commitment.)

- Para 5.1 (also 5.2): "special focus on engaging with Partners in the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia ... refocus existing resources towards these two regions ... give priority to these countries"

  Assess whether NATO (politically and militarily) has actually put any special emphasis on engaging with Partners in these areas. If so, how much (funds, effort) has been committed and what (if assessable) was the outcome? How much (resources) has been refocused? (Enables at least partial evaluation of the real effect of such statements of priority.)

- Para 6.1: "priority to helping Partner Nations, in particular those in the Caucasus and Central Asia, to develop ... democratically responsible defence institutions ..."

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[37] Para numbers refer to those in the 2007-2008 OG (Annex 1 to Reference F).

Quote how many of those nations have actually sought NATO assistance in these areas. Then assess what (if anything) NATO has done, and what it has achieved (what effect NATO has had). (Encourages evaluation of the effort.)

- <u>Para 7.2</u>: The Alliance will seek the earliest possible involvement by NNTCNs in the decision-making process. NATO will ensure access to the relevant documentation ..."

  Survey Partners, to verify at what stage they are involved, what access they have, and whether they are content with progress in this area. Are they involved in operational planning? (NNTCNs' opinions are crucial if NATO wants to maintain their support and involvement.)

- <u>Para 8</u>: (Quote from the Istanbul Declaration.) "NATO has adopted a comprehensive policy to contribute to the international effort to combat the trafficking of human beings ... We are determined to work together with our Partners..."

  Map what NATO is actually doing, how it is doing it and with what, with which Partners. (Would show what, if anything, is being done to fulfil the policy statement.)

SUMMARY

167. PASP staff need to decide why they want to implement a programme of measurement. From an external perspective, it is suggested that PASP would gain the most benefit, given current resources, by setting MOE against the OG's objectives. If their assessment at the OG level highlights areas of concern with any particular AOCs, then a detailed assessment of the situation with respect to those AOCs, utilising MOEs at the AOC level, could be used to support effective changes being implemented.

168. Creation of MOE or MOP, with the relevant systems and structures to measure, report, compile and analyse the results, will require considerable effort and human resources, and will require cooperation and effort from all relevant bodies, NATO and national.

169. Implementation of improved management of the EAPWP through MOE will require the requisite resources to be made available, including expert advice on measurement methodologies. It is likely to take a protracted period to set up and then implement the process.

RECOMMENDATIONS

170. PASP, perhaps with other stakeholders, should review the reasons why measurement might be required in the EAPWP context, and assess the likely resource implications. The following recommendations are valid only if the decision is taken to move forward with efforts to measure.

171. Having agreed on measurement, the methods, reasoning and methodology should be publicised widely across the EAPWP community.

172. Before work on MOE is commenced it is recommended that the current NATO HQ Management Planning process be checked to see if some or all of the required information is already available.

173. For the EAPWP 2009-2010, urgent consideration should be given to possible measures (based on the examples given above) for the OG. PASP might consider organising a working group with other stakeholders and SME advice, to agree on what can or should be measured, how and by whom. Methods, reporting systems and timelines will need to be determined.

7
Principal Findings

GENERAL

174. While the EAPWP is recognised by both Partners and Nations as an essential element of NATO's Outreach programmes, some users believe it could be run more effectively. This seems a reasonable observation, given that there have essentially been very few changes to the programme content since its inception, yet over the same period of time, NATO's PfP concept, PfP membership and NATO's focus of effort have all changed dramatically.

175. Our review of all aspects of the EAPWP found that it currently lacks sufficient guidance (external and internal) and coordination, as well as review, feedback and update mechanisms, to keep pace with NATO's evolution. If the EAPWP is to provide optimum value, NATO will need to consider how to make improvements in these areas. The following paragraphs provide more detail on the issues affecting the ability of EAPWP to remain current.

176. A recurring theme, in the context of the EAPWP, and indeed PfP generally, is that there is often a difference between what NATO is doing, and what Partners believe it is doing (or not doing). This implies a need for better communication by NATO, to ensure that Partners are aware of efforts being made, problems and progress, and that they understand why some things take longer to achieve or cannot be done at all.

GUIDANCE AND COORDINATION

177. The EAPWP is intended to serve NATO and Partners, but there is no NATO Partnership end state linked to it. The lack of focused activity generation, combined with the lack of coordination and communication between partnership offices throughout NATO, means that the EAPWP is more an indexed list of activities from which to choose, rather than a coherent plan—indeed, the term "work plan" is a misnomer—and may not be working effectively to support NATO's partnership aims. [Paras 15-20; 48-58]

178. There is a lack of strategic-level military guidance that interprets the political OG into practicable, military, aims and intentions. The NATO military structure, NATO Nations and Partners would all benefit from more focused guidance on the military policy and requirements, to guide them in devising practical activity to support the political aims of partnership. This should be provided by the IMS, and would need to incorporate a military translation of the political priorities. [Paras 31-32]

179. Greater cooperation and coordination between all contributors to the EAPWP, whether political / civilian, or military, is required to ensure consistency of messages as well as relevancy and completeness of the offered activities. [Paras 48-58; 86-88]

MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS

180. The Political Military Steering Committee (PMSC) on PfP, which oversees the EAPWP, is working to outdated Terms of Reference (TOR). The introduction of updated TORs, identification of a single lead, and a management structure with a cross-NATO coordination group, would provide the means to put into effect the higher-level decisions of the PMSC on PfP, and to staff the many aspects of management of the activity programme. [Paras 39-56]

181. There is a need for better evaluation of activities in the wider context to ensure they are supporting the aims of the partnership programmes, and particularly NATO's

priorities. Operational feedback, together with input from Partner nations, should be incorporated, to ensure that lessons identified in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Kosovo Force (KFOR), etc. actually feed into the planning for future years. This would also enable the managers to identify gaps in the activity list, and seek the means to fill them. Linked to this is the need to ensure that Partner nations have access to the training they need to participate in operations. [Paras 87-102]

REVIEW AND UPDATE

182. There has been no complete, in-depth review of the EAPWP since it began. There is also very little analysis or measurement of the effectiveness of the EAPWP. The BET report provides feedback on the status of some of the military activities but nothing similar is produced to cover the remainder, or the political side. There is no process to ensure that BET Reports are evaluated and that recommendations are (if appropriate) implemented. Therefore, the EAPWP content is not actively adapted to meet NATO's operational needs, particularly interoperability, or to meet other identified needs or shortfalls. [Paras 47; 104-111]

183. If NATO is to ensure that the EAPWP remains current and provides value to NATO and its Partners, it needs to improve the link between political level guidance and the EAPWP content, and ensure that the EAPWP is implemented in a coordinated way. Part of the solution is to set up a process for regular review and update, with the associated resources. [Paras 47; 81-85]

DATABASE, COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY ISSUES

184. The e-PRIME system is generally well designed, popular with all users, and mainly effective. It provides a good database and reference facility as well as a communications and information channel. Nevertheless there is scope for improvement, particularly in terms of user training and awareness. [Paras 139-141]

185. Partners would be assisted by more comprehensive use of the e-PRIME system by all involved, which would make it a "one-stop-shop", the source of all information on the EAPWP, and the system for all communications regarding activities. This would require more commitment from all users and contributors, and more proactive management, to ensure that the system is maintained in an accurate, complete and fully up-to-date status. [Paras 142-145]

MEASUREMENT

186. The EAPWP could be subject to some form of assessment activity, by using MOEs to ensure that it is achieving its aims and supporting NATO's Outreach policies. The design of appropriate measures, and the mechanisms to put them into effect, will add a further burden to the resources currently dedicated to the EAPWP, as any such measurement system will require planning, design, oversight and management. [Paras 154-156; 158-165]

MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

187. While there are numerous recommendations in this report, the JALLC considers the following to be the most significant ones:

a. There is a need for strategic military guidance, to help to focus efforts on military activities in support of the broader political requirements outlined in the OG.

b. A coordinating inter-staff group (consisting of representatives from IS, IMS, Allied Command Operations (ACO), ACT and PCC) should be formed, at the working level, to deal with all EAPWP planning and administration, providing a coordinated approach, advice and direction.

c. Although it is clear that ownership of the EAPWP sits with IS PASP (under the direction of the PMSC on PfP), and effective working relationships permit them to manage it, PASP's authority to manage the EAPWP should be more clearly defined. This could be effected by a reinforced and clear statement in the OG within the next issue of the EAPWP.

d. The TORs of the PMSC on PfP should be reviewed and updated.

e. The EAPWP could be subject to measurement and evaluation. If this is to be achieved, the aims and objectives for the EAPWP will need to be rewritten within the context of better defined end state(s) for NATO's Outreach and for PfP, so that they can be measured and linked to the wider context of NATO Outreach. Additionally, the mechanisms for staffing the BET reports and reacting to its conclusions need to be revised, and consideration should be given to creating a broader NATO-wide report on the EAPWP.

f. NATO should identify methods to ensure that partners preparing to support, or already involved in, NATO-led operations have access to the training they need in order to fulfil their role.

g. A system and procedure for regular review and update of the EAPWP should be devised, to include ways to: gather and incorporate operational lessons and feedback into the generation of EAPWP activities; identify shortfalls against NATO and Partner needs and fill them; and respond to Partner needs and requests (particularly when related to operations).

h. The resources allocated to organising and managing the EAPWP should be reviewed and adjusted as necessary to enable the above recommendations to be implemented effectively.

i. NATO needs to find ways to enhance its transparency and communication with Partners, in order to ensure they have full visibility of NATO efforts in the EAPWP arena, including changes, improvements and problems.

j. NATO should promote more effectively the use of e-PRIME by NATO organisations and NATO Nations, as well as Partners, including providing more readily accessible training for users.

k. NATO, and particularly the Strategic Commands, should consider whether the various levels of subsidy, and application mechanisms, can be streamlined.

l. While undertaking this project, the JALLC Team identified possible areas for further study and analysis, within the overall context of NATO Outreach:

- The rationalisation of NATO's Outreach programmes;

- The possible integration of Contact Countries into Outreach programmes;

- Relationships between Outreach programmes—PfP, Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) etc;

- Partner interoperability on NATO-led operations—areas for development;

- Subsidy levels and mechanisms for Outreach activities.

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Annex A
Other Factors Observed

1.   The following additional factors, which relate to the EAPWP or the broader issue of cooperation and Outreach, but are outside the focus of this report, were noted. Further study of the issues may be required.

Issue Raised by IMS

2.   Partner Posts in NATO HQs. The IMS expressed concern, at the MCCWS (February 2008), that they only had eight offers against 55 Partner posts. Some Partner nations explained that they are not interested in filling posts unless they are within the NATO J-structure rather than in separate Military Cooperation sections.

Issues Raised by Partners

3.   Partner Access to Classified information. Partners involved in NATO-led operations such as ISAF need access to operationally related NATO classified information, including the classified NATO Lessons Learned database. If they commit their personnel to support such operations, they feel very strongly that they should be allowed access to documentation, Lessons Learned, etc. that might assist their awareness and training prior to and during deployment. *"NATO has to accept that some Partners are fighting alongside them—and thus sharing the risk—but are not getting all the information they need. NATO must improve its information sharing, if it wants Partners to stay engaged."[38]* JALLC is currently engaged in a study into Information Sharing in ISAF, for JFC Brunssum and ACT, and the report should be published before the end of 2009.

4.   Partner Offers to Run Training Courses. Partner nations which offer to provide courses (e.g. CJTF training; Exercise Planners Course) within the EAPWP requiring NATO endorsement, feel that their efforts are being stalled by NATO—particularly the NATO School Oberammergau (NSO)—and have waited in some cases for two years or more, for NATO approval. As the NSO is not currently planning to run such a course they see no reason why they should not be given approval and feel that NATO needs to be more responsive to such offers.

5.   Requirement for a PfP Roadmap. There is a lack of clarity among Partner nations, particularly the newer ones, on how the various Partnership programmes and mechanisms work, how they inter-relate, and how the Partner should progress through them. Several Partners believe NATO should produce a clear and comprehensive guidebook on all Partnership and related Outreach programmes. Given the vast quantity of information which JALLC analysts had to locate and absorb in the preparation of this report, the JALLC fully supports this view.

6.   Transparency of NSO Allocation procedures. Partners do not have clarity on the procedures and priorities used by the NSO to allocate places on courses, and have particular concerns when they are preparing units or people for an operational deployment but fail to acquire the places they need. Greater transparency would reduce their confusion and facilitate their understanding of why they sometimes do not obtain all the places they request.

7.   Partner Representation below SC Level. A Partner officer serving in the Military Cooperation Section at a NATO HQ observed that when the Bi-SC MCD is formed, the JFCs will lose their Partner officers, and coordination at the operational JFC level will

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[38] Senior officer, Partner nation

then become much more difficult. However, IMS later assured JALLC that this was an incorrect assumption and that JFCs would retain Partner staff posts.

8.   <u>War Colleges</u>. A number of Partner nations mentioned their lack of capacity for training senior staff, and their inability—because of their small size and military numbers—to create a national war college. Given the success of the regional war college concept, demonstrated by the Baltic example, NATO should consider whether to assist in promoting other such regional colleges, if groups of nations can agree to share in a like manner.

Annex B
Glossary of Acronyms

AAR	After Action Report
ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
AO	Analysis Objective
AOC	Area of Cooperation
BET	Bi-SC Evaluation Team
C2ISR	Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
CE	Crisis Establishment
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CRSD	Cooperation and Regional Security Division
DPP	Defence Policy and Planning Division
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EAPWP	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Plan
EBAO	Effects Based Approach to Operations
EIPD	Euro-Atlantic Integration and Partnership Directorate
e-PRIME	(electronic) Partnership Real-time Information Management and Exchange system
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
IMS	International Military Staff
IPAP	Individual Partnership Action Plan
IPP	Individual Partnership Programme
IS	International Staff
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (in Afghanistan)
JALLC	Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre
JFC	Joint Force Command
JFTC	Joint Force Training Centre
JWC	Joint Warfare Centre
KFOR	Kosovo Force
LEGAD	Legal Advisor
MBC	Military Budget Committee
MC	Military Committee
MCCWS	Military Cooperation Coordination Workshop
MCD	(Bi-SC) Military Cooperation Division (Formed 01 September 2008)

MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
MEUR	Million Euro
MO	Military Objective
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
MOP	Measure of Performance
MTI	Military Task for Interoperability
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NC3A	NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency
NDC	NATO Defense College
NMA	NATO Military Authority
NNTCN	Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nation
NSO	NATO School Oberammergau
NTL	NATO Task List
OCC	Operational Capabilities Concept
OG	Overarching Guidance (for EAPWP)
PARP	Planning And Review Process
PASP	Political Affairs and Security Policy Division
PCC	Partnership Coordination Cell
PDD	Public Diplomacy Division
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PG	Partnership Goal
PMSC	Political Military Steering Committee
POC	Point of Contact
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SC	Strategic Command
SEE	Staff Element Europe
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SPS	Science for Peace and Security
STANAG	Standardisation Agreement
TBD	To be determined / decided
TOR	Terms of Reference
VTC	Video Tele-Conference

Annex C
List of Sources

Nations from Which Interviews were Requested:

ALB, ARM, AUT, AZE, BLR, BIH, CHE, FIN, FYR, GEO, HRV, IRL, KAZ, KGZ, MDA, MNE, SRB, SWE, TJK, TKM, UZB.

Nations with Which Interviews were Conducted:

ARM, AUT, AZE, BIH, CHE, FIN, GEO, HRV, IRL, KAZ, SRB, SWE.

Nations Informally Interviewed at the MCCWS

ALB, BLR, MNE.

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES:

RANK / TITLE	NAME	WORKPLACE or NATION	WHERE DATA GATHERED
LTC	BEGOIDZE Omar	GEO	NATO HQ
Col	BEREA Viorel	PCC	PCC
Col	BYRNAK Jens Kaare	ACT	ACT / MCCWS
Col	CARTER Thomas	IRL	MCCWS
Col	CHRISTANDL Bernhard	AUT NLR	ACT
Col	CORBO Amir	BIH	NATO HQ
Mr	D'ANDURAIN Jean	IS PASP	NATO HQ
Mr	ELGERSMA Steffen	IS PASP	NATO HQ
Capt	FARSON Daniel	IMS	NATO HQ
LTC	FELL Mario	ACT SEE	MCCWS
MG	FORGO Jozsef	PCC	PCC
LTC	FUHRER Hans-Peter	CHE	NATO HQ
Col	GASSER Gernot	AUT	NATO HQ
Mrs	GURUN Agatha	IMS	NATO HQ
LTC	HAJRO Agim	ALB	MCCWS
LTC	HALL Gerard	ACT SEE	PCC
Maj	HAPPALA Tommi	FIN	NATO HQ
Ms	JACOBSSON Kristin	SWE	MCCWS / NATO HQ
LTC	KOBAL Viljem	NSO	MCCWS
Mr	KOVALEV Valerij	KAZ	NATO HQ
Ms	LARSSON Monica	SWE	MCCWS
MG	LEBEL Georges	IMS	NATO HQ

Mr	MALET Gerard	IS PASP	NATO HQ
LTC	MARET Christophe	NSO	MCCWS
Col	MEHMEDOV	AZE	NATO HQ
LTC	MELZER Rainer	PCC	PCC / MCCWS
Capt	MESROBYAN Ara	ARM	MCCWS
Mrs	MITIC Milena	SRB	NATO HQ
Amb	MKRTCHIAN Samvel	ARM	NATO HQ
Cdr	MOMMADOV	AZE	MCCWS
Mrs	MUIR Laurie	IS PASP	NATO HQ / MCCWS
Cdt	MURPHY Noel	IRL	MCCWS
Maj	NOVRUZOV Mehman	AZE	MCCWS
Mr	OLLIVIER Jean-Pierre	IS EMD	e-mail/phone
LTC	PANDZIC Slobodan	HRV	MCCWS
Col	PEKKALA Jarmo	FIN	NATO HQ
Mr	PERKOVIC Krunoslav	HRV	NATO HQ
Mrs	POND Susan	IS PASP	NATO HQ
LTC	PUPIC Jozo	HRV	MCCWS
Maj	RILLA Gabriel	PCC	PCC
LTC	SAARENTO Heikki	FIN	NATO HQ
Cdr	SALTER Jeffrey	SHAPE J5 PMX	PCC
LTC	SAMADOV Elman	IMS	NATO HQ / MCCWS
Mr	SEISENBACHER Harald	AUT	JALLC
Col	SHARRA Agron	ALB	MCCWS
CDR	SILVA Carlos	SHAPE J5 PMX	MCCWS / PCC
Dr	SKONIEZCKA Jaroslaw	IS PASP	NATO HQ
Mr	SMET Erik	PCC	PCC
Mr	SQUELCH Jim	IS DPP	NATO HQ
LTC	STOJANOVSKI Zlate	PCC	PCC
Col	STOLT Peter	SWE NLR	ACT
Mrs	van CAMP Beatrice	IS PASP	NATO HQ
Mr	VINNIKOV Alexander	IS PASP	NATO HQ
Min	von CASTELMUR Linus	CHE	NATO HQ
Col	von GOETHEM Patrick	BEL NLR	ACT
LTC	VOTTELER Michael	IMS	NATO HQ
Mr	WALKER, Laurie	IS PASP	NATO HQ

Col	YERMOLAIEV, Volodymyr	JFC Brunssum	MCCWS
CWO	ZIMMERMANN Kilian	CHE	NATO HQ