National Food and Agriculture Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operations Plans

August 2019

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Executive Summary

The National Food and Agricultural Incident Annex (FAIA) is an annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs). The FAIA utilizes the same concepts of operation for delivering response and recovery core capabilities, as outlined in the FIOPs, and highlights the unique attributes of a food, plant, or agricultural incident, including intentional acts of terrorism. For the purpose of this annex, a food and agricultural incident refers to any incident, regardless of cause, that poses significant human, animal, and environmental health impacts and/or jeopardizes the economic stability of the U.S. agricultural or agribusiness industry to include animal disease outbreaks, plant and pest pathogens, and intentional or accidental adulteration of the food supply chain.

FAIA is composed of a base annex and four branches dedicated to the specific incident types: food, animal agriculture, plant agriculture and intentional incidents. The FAIA is scalable, flexible, and adaptable to a wide range of food and agricultural incidents regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. The four branches detail the importance of establishing operational coordination with the Prevention Mission Area regarding the response to food and agricultural incidents, specifically imminent intentional threats or acts of terrorism.

Incident Types

Food - A food-related incident involves the unintentional adulteration and/or contamination, threatened or actual, of food, that impacts or may impact human health.

Animal - Animal health officials define an exotic or foreign animal disease (FAD) incident as an important transmissible livestock or poultry disease believed to be absent from the United States and its territories that has a potential significant health or economic impact.

Plant - An incident involves the detection of an invasive plant pest or disease whose introduction into the country can cause damage to the economy or natural resources.

Intentional – The threat of or the intentional use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents and other hazardous contaminants against the U.S. food and agriculture sector.



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Operational Support Construct

Public, animal, and plant health agencies or officials at the state, local, tribal or territorial (SLTT) level of government are the primary responders for food and agricultural incidents. As incidents change in size, scope, complexity, and type of incident, a higher level of coordination among responsible agencies at the SLTT and federal levels may be required for supplementary or complementary support. During a food or agricultural incident, the state or tribal public health agency or agricultural health agency is normally the lead response agency for the geographic area. When federal support is required for response and recovery efforts, the lead federal agency (LFA) is the agency that has the regulatory authority for each type of incident. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the LFA for food incidents as they pertain to human health and would coordinate with the lead regulatory agency, depending on the implicated food product in the outbreak. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is the LFA for both animal and plant agricultural incidents. As such, the LFA would be the originator for federal agency-to-agency operational support tasks.

Lead Federal Departments and Agencies for Food and Agricultural Incidents

Incident type	Lead Federal Agency
Response to and Recovery from Food Incidents: a) All human health impacts related to the incident b) Adulterated meat, poultry, and processed egg products c) Adulterated foods not under FSIS authority (beverages, dairy, infant formula, juices, produce, seafood, shell eggs, animal/pet food, etc.)	a) HHS b) USDA Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) c) HHS Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
Response and Recovery from Animal Agricultural incidents	USDA
Response and Recovery from Plant Agricultural incidents	USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ).
Law Enforcement for Intentional Incidents: a) Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions b) Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Investigations and Prosecutions	a) Lead: – Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Supporting – FDA Office of Criminal Investigation for Food and/or USDA Office of Inspector General (OIG) for Animal and Plant b) Attorney General (prosecutions)
Note: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) may be called upon to provide supplemental operational coordination support to the LFA during complex incidents.	

Critical Considerations

Incident Phases: Operational phases for the response to and recovery from a large-scale incident vary based on the size, scope, and complexity of the incident. Each differing incident, whether intentional or incidental, may not follow the standard operational phases and require a more dynamic approach.

Operational Coordination: Each LFA will make the determination to activate the UCG and establish federal interagency support using key parameters that span all incidents. Potential triggers are located in Table 4 of the Base Annex.

Private Sector: Nearly 100% of all food and agricultural production within the United States falls within the private sector and as such there may be legal challenges in providing direct federal assistance outside SLTT channels.

Resource Shortfalls: The size, scope, and/or complexity of an incident may overwhelm existing SLTT capabilities and resources, potentially causing significant strain on the whole community (specialized teams, personnel, waste, equipment, logistics, etc.).

Economic Impact: The impacts to the food and agriculture sector extend far beyond immediate health and food safety issues and include the potential for extensive local, state, national, and international economic impacts.

Waste Management: Agent and pathogen type may have an impact on waste processing and disposal. Management of large quantities of waste, some deemed hazardous, will prove challenging and further drain resources. Adequate disposal sites may not be available in the impacted areas.

Concept of Operations (con't)

Incident	Triggers
Food	Programmatic support for response/recovery from the LFA is no longer able to meet the resource requirements for managing the incident. Multiple states declare public health emergencies. Multiple states request federal assistance that cannot be met by the available LFA resources. Incident is determined to be an intentional incident.
Animal Agriculture	APHIS' Dr. Jere L. Dick Operations Center is activated due to the animal disease outbreak. APHIS' Incident Coordination Group is activated at headquarters to oversee coordination of nationwide APHIS response activities for the animal disease outbreak. Secretary of USDA has activated its intradepartmental Multi-Agency Coordination Group in response to the animal disease outbreak to maintain situational awareness, coordinate USDA component activities to assist APHIS in its response activities, analyze food/agricultural economic impacts resulting from the outbreak, and coordinate USDA strategic communications/outreach to affected communities. APHIS VS Incident Management Teams are deployed to affected states with confirmed animal disease cases to oversee, coordinate, and/or execute response activities at affected farms (both non-commercial and commercial facilities). Incident is determined to be an intentional act.
Plant Agriculture	Incident is determined to be an intentional act.

Major Key Leader Decisions

Topic	Decision Point
Emergency Declarations	-Public Health Emergency declared by the Secretary of HHS -Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency by the Secretary of USDA -Presidential declaration of a National Emergency -Stafford Act Emergency or Major Disaster Declaration by the President
Supplemental Support to the LFA	-LFA determination and request for supplemental support through: (a) direct requests of other D/As per memorandum of agreement; or (b) request for activation of an Emergency Support Function
Planning	-Provide early supplemental crisis planning support and coordination with the LFA to assist in crisis action planning and coordination
Public Information and Warning	-Formally establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) in support of the UCG to coordinate interagency messaging with the SLTT and the public
Operational Coordination	-Formally establish a UCG at the national level -Designation of Senior Response Official (SRO) by the LFA head, per PPD-44 -Establish a national Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator (at state, regional, or national level)
Funding Considerations	-Public Health Service Act, Public Health Emergency Fund (Section 319) -Animal Health Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §8301 et seq.) -Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) -Supplemental Appropriations -Interagency Agreements / Economy Act -Disaster Relief Fund

Tiered Approach to Operational Coordination (Non-Stafford)*

Incident	Coordination Structure
Level 3 – Normal Response Operations	The LFA operates under regulatory authorities and programmatic responsibility to respond to and recover from the ongoing incident.
Level 2 – Normal Response Operations with the possible establishment of a Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator (FDRC)	As complexity increases and federal funding is provided to aid in sector recovery, the LFA may designate and coordinate response and recovery operations with an FDRC, and may coordinate with Recovery Support Function (RSF) leads as appropriate.
Level 1 – Large-Scale, National Incident	The LFA, in coordination with interagency partners and executive branch leadership, may establish an integrated interagency coordination structure to manage response and recovery operations through the establishment of a UCG.

*A FCO is not mentioned as FAIA incidents will most likely be non-Stafford incidents

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Adapted Base UCG Coordinating Structure



Handling Instructions

Information contained in this National Food and Agriculture Incident Annex is subject to the restrictions outlined in the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans. Public availability is determined under 5 United States Code §552.

Intended Audience

The intended audience for this annex includes agencies and officials of the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government as well as other whole community partners involved in planning for the response to and/or recovery from food and agriculture incidents.

Use of this Document

This annex provides guidance and serves as a reference for federal agency planning efforts involving food and agriculture incidents. Other whole community partners (e.g., state, local, tribal, territorial, and insular area governments; nongovernmental organizations; voluntary agencies; and the private sector) engaged in their own planning will find this document useful in enhancing their understanding of how the National Food and Agriculture Incident Annex will be implemented and how their planning efforts can be complementary.

Those involved in incidents that either involve or may have been caused by criminal or terrorist activities are addressed in Branch 4 to this annex to enhance their understanding of the additional coordination required with the law enforcement community.

Distribution, transmission, and destruction of this annex will be in accordance with the Department of Homeland Security Directive 11042.1, which is publicly available. Questions pertaining to the distribution, transmission, or destruction of this annex should be submitted to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of Response and Recovery, Planning Division, National Planning Branch at response-planning@fema.dhs.gov.

Rescission Notice

Publication of this National Food and Agriculture Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans hereby rescinds the following document: Food and Agriculture Incident Annex to the National Response Framework, 2008.

Document Change Control

Version	Date	Summary of Changes	Name

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Annex Overview

The National Food and Agriculture Incident Annex (FAIA) is an annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs). The FIOPs provide details regarding agency roles, responsibilities, critical tasks, and identify resources and sourcing requirements for delivery of core capabilities. The FAIA utilizes the same concepts of operation for delivering response and recovery core capabilities, as outlined in the FIOPs, and highlights the unique attributes of a food or agriculture incident, including acts of terrorism. This annex is supplemental to the FIOPs and other plans including the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) departmental or agency plans but not limited to response to food and agriculture incidents that do not rise to the level of federal-to-federal support. This annex does not alter or impede the ability of any federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, or insular area agency to execute authorities or meet responsibilities under applicable laws, executive orders, and directives.

The FAIA is composed of a base annex and four branches dedicated to the specific details of each type of incident for food, animal agriculture, plant agriculture and intentional incidents. The FAIA is scalable, flexible, and adaptable to a wide range of food and agriculture incidents regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. Figure 1 represents the basic FAIA support construct contained in the plan. The four branches detail the importance of establishing operational coordination with the Prevention mission area regarding the response to food and agriculture incidents, specifically imminent intentional threats or acts.



Figure 1: FAIA Support Construct

This annex describes the process and organizational constructs used by the Federal Government, when the LFA requests federal-to-federal support from interagency partners, to support response and recovery efforts during large-scale food and agriculture incidents[1]. Actions described in this annex may take place without a Stafford Act declaration but could be in conjunction with a public health emergency declaration by the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services or a declaration of extraordinary emergency by the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture.

Although the FAIA provides guidance for the whole community, it focuses on large-scale incidents in the nation's food and agriculture sector that may threaten public health, animal health, food and livestock production, wildlife, rangelands and wetlands, as well as cascading effects and economic impacts. Coordination across all mission areas will help ensure risk-

[1] For the purpose of this annex, a food and agriculture incident refers to any incident, regardless of cause, that poses significant human, animal, and environmental health impacts and/or jeopardizes the economic stability of the U.S. agricultural or agribusiness industry to include animal disease outbreaks, introduction of a plant pest or pathogen, and intentional or accidental adulteration of the food supply chain.

informed decision-making. The term "response" within this annex refers to those activities and capabilities within the Response and Recovery Mission Areas that minimize the impacts of the incident and secure the U.S. food supply and agricultural industries. Response actions are exclusive of any law enforcement and criminal investigations activities and capabilities otherwise described within the Prevention and Protection Mission Areas. Information on the U.S. Government's law enforcement response is available in Branch 4: Intentional Food and Agriculture Incident to this annex. Mitigation actions are not listed or described in this plan.



Figure 2: FAIA Branches

Base Plan

Situation



The food and agriculture sector accounts for roughly one-fifth of the nation's economic activity. An incident can range in scope and severity and happen anywhere within the United States. Its impact extends far beyond immediate health and food safety issues to include the potential for extensive economic impacts. An incident that is identified as a food and agriculture incident would have cascading impacts on service industries and require a responsive messaging campaign to try to minimize the effects. Food and agriculture incidents can occur anywhere within the United States and can range significantly in scope and severity. A large-scale incident in the food and agriculture sector may pose a threat to public health, plant health, animal health, and/or food and livestock production, with potential impacts to the security, cost, and safety of the U.S. food supply.

Interdependencies:

A strong emergency response strategy is required to address natural or intentional incidents that could result in significant adverse impacts to the food and agriculture sector. Traditional approaches to response and recovery address significant incidents in the food and agriculture sector. However, to address all components of these incidents, there must be a clear understanding of the intricate connections between humans, plants and animals in the food and agriculture sector with crosscutting approaches for incident response and recovery. This annex leverages a "one health" approach, which recognizes that the health of people is connected to the health of animals, plants and the environment.

Collaborations across the public health, animal health (including wildlife), environmental health, and plant health communities are critical if decision makers are to understand, prevent, respond to, and mitigate/recover from

large-scale, significant incidents in the food and agriculture sector with far reaching public, plant, environmental, and animal health impacts as well as economic losses.

Threat Environment:

Response to and recovery from food and agriculture incidents are complex and challenging for the whole community. Each type of pathogen or threat poses unique response and recovery challenges that the United States may be forced to confront. Novel and re-emerging pathogens, including those difficult to detect and/or treat can spread quickly throughout the globe, posing threats to the food and agriculture sector. Environmental shifts, disasters, or other incidents can change disease patterns, raising the risk of a food and agriculture incident. Genetic changes may alter the characteristics (i.e., virulence and transmissibility) of common pathogens, potentially resulting in increased morbidity and/or mortality. The widespread and improper use of antibiotic, anti-viral, anti-fungal, and anti-parasitic treatments or other Medical countermeasures (MCMs) is playing a role in the emergence of drug-resistant pathogens. Zoonotic diseases, where a virulent pathogen may move between animal and human communities, also require a level of collaboration and coordination between multiple agencies for response and recovery. Adulteration of a food source with a toxin, radiological material, or chemical may also pose a challenge in detection, quickly determining the adulterant and treatment.

Public Response:

Public response to food and agriculture incidents typically includes fear, therefore coordinated public messaging regarding the risks is crucial. Behavioral health impacts may be significant amongst the impacted population. In some situations, large numbers of impacted individuals may seek medical assistance, which, if not mitigated by behavioral and medical triage, can quickly overwhelm the ability of medical facilities and workers to assist the sick. Studies of populations affected by disaster show that a disaster's consequences upon people can include long-term psychiatric disorders such as depression, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, phobias, and alcohol and drug abuse. Early interventions are designed to mitigate the increased prevalence of long-term psychiatric disorder in the affected population. Responders are also susceptible to stress and should have a program available to assist in its control while deployed.

Incident Specific Branches:

Throughout the Food and Agriculture Incident Annex (FAIA) planning process, departments and agencies recognized that a large-scale food and agriculture incident would cover a broad range of scenarios and require such a range of resources and support from the interagency that one plan could not cover all of the nuances among each type of incident. As such, the annex was crafted into a base plan and four incident-specific branches.

Branch 1: Federal Response to and Recovery from Food Incidents

The U.S. food supply is among the safest in the world. The food industry operates entirely by private ownership in highly competitive global markets under the regulation of the Health and Human Services (HHS)/Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)/Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). Industry has worked closely with these regulatory agencies to promote a food defense posture to minimize the threat to the

food supply and the risk of accidental and intentional adulteration of food. Foodborne outbreak response and recovery requires a highly collaborative partnership between federal, SLTT, academia, and industry entities. In addition, HHS/FDA, USDA, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have worked closely with federal partners and industry to promote security at multiple levels throughout the production chain. These security measures include physical security, security during manufacture, production, processing and storage, security in shipping, and protocols for managing biological risks on farms for products that lead directly into the food supply. While there have been foodborne animal and plant disease outbreaks across the United States, to date, all incidents were managed within each regulatory agency's authorities without requests for large-scale response support.

Branch 2: Federal Response to and Recovery from Animal Agricultural Incidents

Animal agriculture accounted for slightly less than half of farm cash receipts from the sale of farm commodities in the United States in 2017, with cattle and calves accounting for nearly 40% of annual sales.

Animal agriculture industries face increased challenges for managing infectious disease among U.S. herds and flocks. As a result of the increased importation of animal products and expansion of international businesses into the United States, animal agriculture industries create new challenges to protect industry from the introduction of pathogens, including high priority foreign animal diseases (FAD). A large-scale disease outbreak in animal agriculture may result in devastating effects on the affected livestock industry as well as the agriculture sector and economy. Such an outbreak will require the coordination of response and recovery efforts, including animal health response, animal welfare management, and large-scale waste management/carcass disposal.

The USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Veterinary Services (VS) protects and improves the health, quality, and marketability of our nation's animals, animal products, and veterinary biologics. USDA APHIS VS prevents, controls, and eliminates animal diseases and monitors and promotes animal health and productivity. In the event of a foreign animal disease or other large-scale animal incident, USDA APHIS VS will activate the policies and procedures within the disease specific incident response plans as outlined in the *FAD Preparedness and Response Manuals (FAD PReP).* According to this manual, USDA follows the standard incident coordination structure with multi-agency coordination providing resource, coordination, and policy support to deployed incident management teams. The FAIA enhances these response strategies and seeks to support interagency operational coordination for large-scale incidents where federal-to-federal support is requested.

Branch 3: Federal Response to and Recovery from Plant Agricultural Incidents

Plant agriculture spans a large variety of commodities in the United States including grains, vegetables, fruits, nuts, and berries as well as timber used in the lumber and paper industries. The introduction of a plant pest or pathogen can have significant impacts to these industries. With the increase in international travel and efficient transportation of goods, new challenges arise for minimizing the risk of the introduction of a foreign plant pest or pathogen.

The USDA APHIS Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) is the lead federal agency for plant health emergencies and for safeguarding U.S. plant agriculture against the entry, establishment,

and spread of pests, as well as the facilitation of the trade of agricultural products. USDA APHIS PPQ focuses on preventing the introduction of invasive insect and mite species, mollusks, nematodes, plant diseases, and weeds into U.S. plant agriculture. With the introduction of a plant pest or pathogen, USDA APHIS PPQ works with state entities to coordinate response operations and minimize the impact. USDA APHIS PPQ follows the response strategies outlined in the *National Plant Emergency Response Framework*. While plant pests and pathogens can be devastating to crop populations, commercial production can continue while response strategies are implemented; however, the pest does affect trade and export markets and the quality of product for consumers.

Branch 4: Intentional Food and Agriculture Incident

Branch 4 is active when there is evidence of a planned or actual use of a CBRN agent, a suspicious disease, intoxication, or contamination incident of undetermined cause, and/or intelligence threat reporting must be considered as a suspected or actual act of terrorism, espionage, or other federal crime. This consideration is further supported if the response requires integration of consequence management, critical infrastructure protection, and/or law enforcement/counterterrorism operations. In these cases, joint criminal and epidemiological investigations by law enforcement and public, animal, and/or plant health authorities should be conducted to determine the cause. The wide variety of possible perpetrators, motivations, threat materials, and methods available demonstrates the complexity of the threat and the need for integrated response operations.

The intent of the Intentional Food and Agriculture Incident Branch is to support the integration of Response and Recovery Missions (including consequence management and critical infrastructure security and resilience operations) with the Prevention (imminent threats or attacks) and the Investigation missions (criminal or counterterrorism). Effective integration requires unity of effort across these mission areas as well as coordinated communication and time-sensitive information sharing between operational and decision-making elements. An effective joint effort increases the likelihood of successfully attributing/resolving threats, protecting the food and agriculture sector, and ensures that rapid response and recovery operations do not interfere or impede law enforcement operations or vice versa.

Existing CBRN Incident Annexes define general operational requirements for the interagency response to incidents involving specific CBRN threat agents (Biological Incident Annex, Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, and Oil/Chemical Incident Annex) from the standpoint of the management of incidents involving each separate material.

The FAIA and Intentional Incident Branch plan address consequence management and threat/incident investigations from an all-hazards approach for the multiple food and agriculture infrastructure elements that may be targeted with a spectrum of CBRN and hazardous contamination threats.

Purpose

The FAIA provides hazard-specific supplemental information to the Response and Recovery FIOPs. Presently, the lead federal agencies (LFAs) for food and agriculture incidents have been capable of managing response and recovery operations under their existing authorities and capabilities. The FAIA will facilitate the federal interagency response to and recovery from a

large-scale food or agriculture incident to minimize the overall impact to public, animal, and plant health while reducing the negative impact of the incident on the economy, industry, and the environment in order to maintain public safety and confidence. The annex facilitates interagency resource coordination once an incident response becomes too complex for the lead agency under its own authorities. This annex does not replace the constructs and response strategies from these individual agencies; normal interagency coordination, including with law enforcement, is ongoing using internal agency processes.

Scope

The FAIA applies to federal response and recovery activities for food or agriculture incidents that exceed the ability of the LFA to respond to and recover from the incident within its own authorities, existing programmatic support, available resources, and laws. Such incidents may involve the following (but not limited to):

- Any incident that results in an animal disease outbreak or large-scale injury or death of animals, including high priority FADs, emerging and re-emerging diseases, and zoonotic diseases in animal populations.
- Plant pests and pathogens
- Intentional or incidental adulteration of the food supply chain[2,3].
- Upstream and downstream disruptions (e.g., equipment, feed, pesticides) to consumer markets and the environment

While zoonotic diseases pose a threat to both human and animal populations, the severity of the disease in each population will dictate whether response and recovery actions are managed through the FAIA or the Biological Incident Annex (BIA). For the FAIA, zoonotic diseases that primarily affect animal populations are addressed in the animal branch. However, a clear delineation is drawn between zoonotic diseases that are in reservoir species and are not causing significant disease in humans. The BIA is the appropriate operational annex for those diseases that present stuttering or sustained infections[4] and severe or life-threatening disease in human populations.

The FAIA will—

- Describe the process and organizational constructs the Federal Government will utilize to support response and recovery efforts from a large-scale food or agriculture incident when federal-to-federal support is requested.
- Outline the process for federal response and recovery operations for a non-Stafford Act incident.

[2] Where there is a suspected or actual terrorist threat or a suspected act of terrorism, consult the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex and national policy to identify coordination mechanisms.

[3] It is understood that not all food and agriculture incidents may be intentional and all intentional food and agricultural incidents may not be terrorism.

[4] Stuttering and sustained infections pertain to the definition of zoonotic disease transmission between human and animal populations outlined in *Epidemic dynamics at the human-animal interface.*

Lloyd-Smith, JO, George, D, Pepin, KM, Pitzer, VE, Pulliam, JR C, Dobson, AP, Hudson, PJ, and Grenfell, BT (2009) Epidemic dynamics at the human-animal interface. *Science* **326**: 1362-1367. doi: 10.1126/science.1177345.

- Provide information that is specific and unique to federal food and agriculture incident response and recovery processes, assets, resources, and teams.

This annex does not address the following:

- National food shortage
- Aquaculture
- Companion and service animals except when the animal serves as a vector that could further propagate the spread of disease in animal agriculture.
- Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8 Public Health and Medical Services or #11 Agriculture and Natural Resources, resources/procedures for natural disasters.
- Food and agriculture response and recovery from a nuclear or radiological incident as described in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex.
- The loss of critical infrastructure including but not limited to electricity, transportation and telecommunications.

Facts, Planning Assumptions, and Critical Considerations

The facts, planning assumptions, and critical considerations that contribute to the development of an operational environment for the FAIA and are supplemental to the Response and Recovery FIOPs were determined to be incident and commodity specific, and are described in the respective incident-specific (food, animal agriculture, and plant agriculture) branch plan.

In absence of fact, planning assumptions represent information presumed to be true and are necessary in order to facilitate planning. Assumptions are a baseline set for planning purposes, and they do not take the place of specific activities or decision points that would occur during an incident.

Facts:

Incident specific information is outlined within the branches of this plan.

- **Situational Awareness**: Full information about the incident (cause, origin, transmission, impact and shortfalls) may not be immediately available and may take hours (e.g., pathogen identification), days (e.g., exposure areas and populations), or months (e.g., attack and secondary attack rates, lethality, susceptibility to countermeasures) to unfold. Situational awareness will largely depend on the type of agent and its epidemiologic characteristics. Response decisions will likely be made without complete information.
- **Incident Cause**: The cause of an incident (e.g., intentional, accidental, or naturally occurring) may not be readily apparent.
- **Disease Origin**: The geographic origin of the incident may not be readily apparent; the first detected cases may not be in the location of the initial release or exposure. Incidents that originate abroad have the potential to spread quickly to the domestic U.S. population.
- **Disease Transmission**: A contagious disease or food incident may include waves of secondary and tertiary infections/illnesses within the original outbreak region and beyond. “Waves” of infections/illnesses and recurrences demonstrate how different levels of impacts on the country could be possible and how strictly aligning response to planning phases can be challenging.
- **Disproportionate Impacts**: People at lower socio-economic levels and persons with access and functional needs experience disproportionate impacts from emergencies and

disasters. Responders and first responders may be disproportionately impacted either medically or behaviorally, depending on the agent and the nature of the event.

- **Economic/Conservation Impacts**: Animal disease may affect a broad range of animal species (including wildlife and animals in zoos or other animal collections). The resulting incident may have significant impact, both from an economic and a species conservation perspective.
- **Public Information:**
    - The incident will garner media attention, and coordinated messaging will be required to communicate the safety of the U.S. food supply.
    - Communications will likely include incident information as well as animal health and public health guidance that are more complex than most emergency messages.
    - Special permissions and/or non-disclosure agreements between the public and private sectors will be required to protect proprietary information and may allow for disclosure and dissemination on a need-to-know basis.
    - To ensure that all persons have equal access to the information distributed to the public, the information will be provided, as needed, in alternate formats for persons with disabilities and with other access and functional needs, and in languages other than English for persons with limited English proficiency.
- **Significant Resource Shortfalls**: The size, scope, and/or complexity of an incident may overwhelm existing SLTT capabilities and resources, causing significant strain on the whole community.
    - **Healthcare and Mental Health Response**: Individual practitioners, healthcare organizations, healthcare coalitions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may become an integral part of response to a food or agriculture health incident.
    - **Medical countermeasures (MCMs) Development and Production**: For pathogens with no pre-established MCMs, development and production of appropriate MCMs should occur as quickly as possible.
- **Long-Term Recovery**: Recovery of the impacted populations and environments may take years.

Planning Assumptions:

During response and recovery operations, planning assumptions may be validated as facts. The following are some overarching planning factors whether food, agriculture, plant, or intentional incident related:

- **Non-Stafford Act Response:** A large-scale food and agriculture incident may not result in a major disaster Stafford Act declaration but may require federal-to-federal support.
- **Criminal / Counterterrorism Investigations**: Any potentially intentional threat or incident will require a joint criminal and epidemiological investigation. During an act of terrorism, the FBI will coordinate criminal investigative activities with appropriate SLTT and federal partner agencies such as HHS, USDA, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and other partners as appropriate; there is more information in Branch 4: Intentional Food and Agriculture Incident.

Critical Considerations for Crisis Action Planning:

The following general critical considerations are supplemental to those outlined in the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans. Additional considerations apply specifically to each Branch. Table 1 outlines some, but not all critical considerations.

Table 1: Critical Considerations

Coordinating Structures	
Risk	• Public health, emergency management, environmental, and law enforcement stakeholders will require close collaboration at the incident level, and in the national multi-agency coordination centers.
Management	• Coordinating among SLTT governments, the private sector, federal partner agencies, and international partners will facilitate prompt response and recovery operations and actions. • Close coordination with law enforcement, in the case of a suspected or actual terrorist threat, between the animal and plant agriculture health community and the counterterrorism community will be required throughout the incident.
Decision Coordination	
Risk	• Interdependent decisions of mission areas should be coordinated to avoid unintended consequences.
Management	Interdependent decisions include, but are not limited to— • Pre-positioning of MCMs • Security of points of entry or enhanced screening • Public messaging • Operations to resolve the threat, etc.
MCMs Prioritization and Dispensing	
Risk	• Available but limited MCMs may fall short of the required demand due to a variety of factors (e.g., geographical variance in the severity of the outbreak, logistical issues, disruption to pharmaceutical production). • SLTT entities may lack the capability to immediately provide MCMs and personal protective equipment and may require assistance.
Management	• Ensure HHS prioritization of Strategic National Stockpile distributions are consistent with national priorities. • Coordinate and promulgate single federal guidance on the prioritized procurement and dispensing of MCMs among federal, state, local, and private sector users. • Acquire and ensure federal operational support of existing SLTT City Readiness Initiative (CRI) MCMs dispensing plans.
Waste Management	
Risk	• Agent and pathogen type can have an impact on waste processing and disposal. Management of large quantities of waste, some deemed hazardous, will prove challenging and further drain resources.
Management	• Ascertain technical guidance on the collection, decontamination, and transportation of waste. • Coordinate with SLTT on the means, route, and destination of waste.

	• Communicate protective measures to responders and the public for the handling of waste.
Fatality Management	
Risk	• Fatality management resources will likely be strained by both naturally occurring and intentional incidents. • Regular processing mechanisms may be overwhelmed due to large numbers of human, animal, or plant remains, which are possibly hazardous due to the presence of the causative agent(s). • Evidence taken from remains might have to be recovered and preserved as part of ongoing law enforcement investigations.
Management	• Coordinate with SLTT to align federal support to local decision making on the identification, management, and handling of remains. • Adherence to law enforcement direction and protocols to preserve evidence.
Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPI)	
Risk	• NPIs (e.g., social distancing, quarantine, import/export restrictions, stock yard closures, manufacturing plant closure, etc.) may have unintended consequences and require judicial implementation (to include but not limited to civil rights and civil liberties, financial impacts, implementation challenges, consistent applications, and efficacies).
Management	• Coordinate with SLTT on the risks/benefits of local decision making to impose NPIs. • Issuance of protective action guidance and facility instructions for federal responders. • Inclusion of guidance with public affairs materials and messaging.
Competing Priorities	
Risk	• Private sector priorities may not be in-line with the federal priorities for the response.
Management	• Close coordination is required in order to bring the priorities into agreement to facilitate agreed upon results.

Additional critical considerations, in addition to those found in the Response and Recovery FIOPs are as follows:

- **Complex Medical and Health Information:** Communications must synthesize complex medical and health information to promote public compliance with guidance.
    - Information from SLTT, federal, and private sector partners will be necessary to develop a full understanding of risks, identify appropriate response actions, and provide accurate risk communications.
- **Resistant Pathogens:** There is the potential for pathogens to be resistant to MCMs, limiting the availability of prophylaxis and treatment options.
- **Immunity of Populations:** There will be limited, if any, immunity in the population to some novel emerging infections.
- **Responder Exposure**
    - Responders may be placed at risk if not adequately protected.

  - Responders could also become contaminated with a pathogen or agent before recognition of its presence has occurred.
  - Tracking of responder health post deployment.
- **New Therapies or Diagnostics:** Unique therapeutic and unapproved or novel therapies and diagnostic tests may need to be used after appropriate regulatory authorization.
- **Contact Tracing:** State and federal authorities should have documented processes to accomplish contact tracing which involves the identification of other people, animals, or plants that may have been exposed to the pathogen in question. The process should:
  - Look forward and backward from initial detected incident site,
  - Identify exposed people, animals, plants or mechanical vectors,
  - Identify measures to mitigate further exposure, and
  - Be prepared to manage recalcitrant individuals.
- **Decontamination**
  - A few pathogens or agents could require long-term or permanent closure of buildings or public spaces in the instance of a wide-area dissemination.
  - Decontamination may take an extended period of time, closing affected areas to individuals and businesses.
- **Behavioral Health Impacts:** Public concern for exposure without demonstration of illness and the desire for preventive prophylaxis will all amplify the demand for medical and health resources.
  - Due to the characteristics of incidents, behavioral health impacts should be anticipated.
- **Transportation Protocols:** Appropriate protocols may be necessary when transporting persons, animals, and plants from areas affected by a pathogen or agent to include restriction of movement. Protocols will delineate the screening and follow-up requirements of those infected within the United States, as well as those from overseas.
- **National/Global Markets:** Response activities associated with an animal disease outbreak or a plant pest/pathogen (e.g., quarantines, use of vaccinations) may impact national and global markets.

Mission

The mission of the LFAs in incident response and recovery efforts is to save lives, reduce human and unnecessary animal suffering, protect private property and the environment, and re-establish business operations to stabilize the food and agriculture sector to restore and maintain public confidence in the U.S. food supply and all levels of government.

End State

The desired end state of federal response and recovery operations to a food and agriculture incident occurs when food and agriculture operations are restored to the nation while maintaining public safety and consumer confidence in the U.S. food supply and all levels of government. This end state is achieved when:

- Measures are in place for the restoration of food and agriculture sector operations.

- Federal and SLTT governments are returned to pre-incident operations.
- All lifesaving and life-sustaining operations have been completed.
- Public safety and health protection assurances have been made and healthcare and veterinary infrastructure capacities are operating at pre-incident levels.
- The public has been provided the necessary information to protect against and recover from the food or agriculture threat.
- Long-term public health monitoring and behavioral health programs are in place for affected victims, responders, and other populations.
- Long-term animal and plant monitoring programs are in place for affected agriculture populations.
- For intentional incidents, determination of attribution has been made and prevention and protection measures have been completed against further attacks.
- Contaminated debris and waste is managed, transported, contained and/or disposed of.
- Pathogen transmission has been stopped, slowed to a target rate, or has ceased within the U.S. borders.
- Environmental impacts are mitigated and assurances can be made that contaminated areas have been assessed for safety, continued decontamination, and reoccupancy.
- SLTT governments can provide food and agriculture businesses with the means to rebound from their losses in a manner that sustains their economic well-being.
- Economic impacts both locally and nationally have been minimized and vital markets are functioning.

Authorities:

See Appendix 3: Authorities and References which lists and details the primary federal authorities applicable to food and agriculture incidents.

- This annex ***does not*** alter or impede the ability of any federal department or agency to exercise their authorities or perform their responsibilities under law.
- This annex ***does*** establish parameters and methods for interagency coordination without a Stafford Act declaration.

Execution

Concept of Operations

Public, animal, and plant health agencies or officials at the SLTT level of government are the primary responders for food and agriculture incidents. As incidents change in size, scope, complexity, and type of incident, a higher level of coordination among responsible agencies at the SLTT and federal levels may be required for supplementary or complementary support. During a food or agriculture incident, the state or tribal public health agency or agriculture health agency is normally the lead response agency for the geographic area. When federal support is required for response and recovery efforts, the LFA is the agency that has the regulatory authority for each type of incident. HHS is the LFA for food incidents as they pertain to human and animal health, and would coordinate with the lead regulatory agency depending on the implicated food product in the outbreak. USDA is the LFA for both animal and plant agriculture incidents. As such, the LFA would be the originator for federal agency-to-agency operational support tasks. Under these incidents, a Stafford Act declaration is not likely, but FEMA and other interagency partners may facilitate additional resources and coordination support to the LFAs, upon an approved request.

Table 2: Lead Federal Departments and Agencies for Food and Agriculture Incidents

Incident type	Lead Federal Agency
Response to and Recovery from Food Incidents: a) All human health impacts related to the incident. b) Adulterated meat, poultry, and processed egg products. c) Adulterated foods not under FSIS authority (beverages, dairy, infant formula, juices, produce, seafood, shell eggs, animal/pet food, etc.).	a) HHS b) USDA FSIS c) HHS FDA
Response and Recovery from Animal Agriculture incidents	USDA
Response and Recovery from Plant Agriculture incidents	USDA APHIS PPQ
Law Enforcement for Intentional or Terrorist Acts: a) Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions b) Counterterrorism / Counterintelligence Investigations and Prosecutions	a) Lead: – FBI (investigations); Supporting – FDA Office of Criminal Investigation for Food and/or USDA Office of Inspector General (OIG) for Animal and Plant b) Attorney General (prosecutions)
Note: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) may be called upon to provide supplemental operational coordination support to the LFA during complex incidents.	

Incident complexities require the LFA to establish interagency coordination mechanisms to support all components of federal response and recovery.

For intentional incidents, coordination between crisis and consequence management entities is required to ensure that rapid response and recovery operations do not interfere or impede law enforcement operations or vice versa.

Steady State

Multiple federal agencies, SLTT governments, and private sector entities manage the steady state for each type of incident in the food and agriculture sector. Syndromic surveillance disease reporting; public, animal, and plant health investigations occur as part of ongoing activities under the regulatory authorities of each agency. Multiple federal agencies are tasked to seek and report any abnormalities or unusual cases of concern as part of their daily work, in order to prevent and detect food and agriculture threats.

Each food or agriculture incident will vary greatly as it unfolds. Before activating this annex, activities will occur at the local, state appropriate departments and agencies as well as within the Lead Federal Agency. As the incident moves from a normal response to a large-scale response, additional Federal departments and agencies may provide resources to the LFA. Given the numerous roles and responsibilities of various departments and agencies, the agencies that are "activated" will vary from incident to incident. Operational phases for food and agriculture incidents are different from the traditional operational phases typically seen in emergency response and recovery operations.

HHS Incident Recognition/Initial Decision-Making Process

Within HHS, the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) is the lead for coordinating federal public health and medical preparedness and response to disasters and other emergencies. ASPR also has responsibilities for providing departmental resources to assist federal and SLTT government requests for public health and medical assistance. ASPR collaborates with senior leadership, their designated subject matter experts (SMEs) across HHS operating divisions, and staff divisions to convene and collaborate with senior leadership and their designated subject matter experts (SMEs) across HHS, to discuss policy issues and develop solutions to support preparedness, response, and recovery related to a national incident or event. The ASPR ensures a coordinated HHS-wide strategic approach among the executive leadership of HHS operating divisions and staff divisions. In some instances, leaders from additional federal departments and agencies could be included in these strategic discussions.

If HHS is the lead, ASPR is responsible for determining when interagency coordination is required. ASPR is able to convene representatives and subject matter experts from across the Federal Government to coordinate operational response. The initial decision for interagency coordination may be apparent if certain parameters exist, such as—

- Departments and agencies agree, through the interagency policy process described in National Security Presidential Memorandum 4 or its successor that enhanced interagency coordination is recommended.
- The lead agency has exhausted or has insufficient domestic incident management capacity to meet incident demand, necessitating augmentation.
- The incident has the potential to increase in magnitude and complexity such that it requires other elements outside of the abilities in HHS.

- Existing obligations require the U.S. Government to report certain developments through international mechanisms (International Health Regulations (IHR), International Food Safety Authorities Network, World Organization for Animal Health).

When the need for interagency coordination is not immediately apparent, ASPR will consider all known information including input from other federal agencies as appropriate. Information to be evaluated may include the following:

- Availability and deployability of effective "medical countermeasures" or "medical interventions," effectiveness of medical countermeasures and NPIs.
- Immediate and short-term needs of local public health authorities and medical facilities;
- Need for health risk communication and public affairs coordination.
- Data regarding the effectiveness of public health interventions.
- Impacts on long-term community resiliency and recovery.
- Need for, and availability of, international assistance.
- Impacts on international relationships, foreign travel, and global trade.
- Need to support law enforcement, criminal investigation, and interdiction activities while simultaneously mitigating public and worker health impacts.
- Gaps in current knowledge and needs for immediate and long-term research.

Many additional factors will also be considered when making a decision on enhanced coordination, some of which may include:

- Potential or actual Public Health Emergency (PHE) declaration.
- Exceeding public health capabilities and resources or expanding geographic impact necessitating the local, tribal, county, parish, territory, or state to request public health assistance from its neighbors or elevated supporting agency.
- Simultaneous occurrence of similar illness in non-contiguous areas, unusual geographic or seasonal distribution.

USDA Incident Recognition/Initial Response Actions

The following represents a high-level overview of the communication and decision flow of information from the initial detection/onset of a food/agriculture incident to the response implementation. Although these incidents may have the greatest impact on USDA, they do not represent all possible scenarios in which the USDA would respond.

Foreign Animal Disease (FAD)

- For more information about specific details concerning the FAD PReP, contact APHIS VS. Resources available for a foreign animal disease outbreak include FAD PReP materials (i.e., general concept of operations, specific disease response plans, and livestock industry manuals), the National Animal Health Emergency Management System Guidelines, and the National Veterinary Stockpile.
- Local veterinarian determines if sick animal(s) could potentially be infected with a FAD.
- The local veterinarian reports the case to state agriculture department/APHIS VS Area Office.
- State agriculture department/APHIS VS Area Office assigns a FAD-trained veterinarian to the case.
- FAD-trained veterinarian travels to the site of the sick animal(s) for critical examination.

- FAD-trained veterinarian identifies animal(s) potentially infected with a FAD.
- Veterinarian collects samples and calls state agriculture department/APHIS VS Area Office to open FAD ticket and establish priority level.
- In high priority situations, APHIS senior leadership is notified directly.
- APHIS senior leaders notify USDA Office of the Secretary (OSEC), Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and other need-to-know USDA agencies and/or offices.
- Samples from animal(s) are delivered to USDA lab.
- Presumptive positive results received.
- Lab director notifies APHIS senior leadership
- As determined by the Office of the Secretary, stand up a Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) Group
- MAC Group is made up of USDA agencies/offices that coordinate response and recovery efforts for the Department.

Food Contamination (FC)

For the complete terminology, responsibilities and public notification procedures regarding the voluntary recall of FSIS meat and poultry products, refer to FSIS-Directive 8080.1. As depicted below, FSIS would utilize the recall procedures with or without the Emergency Management Committee (EMC) activation. FSIS senior managers determine if EMC activation is warranted for a particular incident. If FSIS determined an intentional contamination, law enforcement may be notified and the incident would be restricted to individuals on a need to know basis.

- Significant number of consumer illnesses related to the consumption of food is noted
- Local Health Departments may report illness to the State Health department, who will in turn report to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
- CDC notifies FSIS.
- FSIS notifies relevant FSIS districts and offices.
- The incident is reviewed to see if it has characteristics, such as being large scale, multi-jurisdictional and/or expanding rapidly that would require the EMC to be activated to address and manage the Agency's response.
- EMC is activated.
- EMC notifies OSEC and OHS.
- As determined by the Office of the Secretary, stand up a MAC Group, if determined necessary.
- MAC Group leads/coordinates response efforts with support from other USDA agencies/offices.

Plant Pest/Disease

- Potential quarantined plant pest/disease detected.
- APHIS PPQ National Identification Services confirms identification
- Pest status evaluated/options stated
- Solicit stakeholder input
- Recommendations made/assessment of options against resources made
- APHIS PPQ leadership chooses an option and course of action
- Response plans are developed as applicable to pest or disease and environmental factors

- Action taken and APHIS PPQ partners with states and tribes to implement response
- As determined by the Office of the Secretary, stand up a MAC Group
- MAC Group leads/coordinates response efforts with support from other USDA agencies/offices.

Initial response and recovery operations follow the standard response and recovery strategies managed by the federal agency with the appropriate authorities for incident management. For elevated incidents, the LFA may designate an FDRC who will coordinate with the appropriate RSFs to facilitate the coordination of recovery efforts for those affected by the incident.

Activating Unified Coordination

Notification of unified coordination will likely take place in the 2b or 2c phase of response operations. Appendix 4 outlines the roles and responsibilities of federal interagency partners in response to and recovery from food and agriculture incidents.

The LFA, in coordination with Executive Branch (National Security Council, Domestic Resilience Group [DRG]) leadership and interagency partners, will make the determination to establish a federal Unified Coordination Group (UCG). The LFA is responsible for identifying the relevant departments and agencies and the level of coordination support required for participation in the UCG. The establishment of a UCG may occur without any formal emergency declaration, though a PHE or Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency could result in the establishment of a UCG to manage the large-scale incidents. The LFA will use a flexible and scalable approach to coordination that adapts depending upon the severity of the incident.

Senior Response Official: In the event of a large-scale incident that requires unified coordination, the LFA will designate a senior response official (SRO) and establish the UCG with those interagency partners that have responsibilities and programmatic authority to support response and recovery. The senior response official,[5] in coordination with the federal interagency partners and Executive Branch leadership, will determine the level of operational support required for the incident. Table 3 outlines the tiered approach to operational coordination that allows for flexibility and scalability depending on the severity of the incident through the establishment of a UCG.

Table 3: Tiered Approach to Operational Coordination

Incident	Coordination Structure
Level 3 – Normal Response Operations	The LFA operates under regulatory authorities and programmatic responsibility to respond to and recover from the ongoing incident
Level 2 – Normal Response Operations with the establishment of a Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator (FDRC)	The LFA designates and coordinates response operations with an FDRC, and will coordinate with RSF leads as appropriate
Level 1 – Large-Scale, National Incident	The LFA, in coordination with interagency partners and Executive Branch leadership, may establish an integrated interagency coordination structure to manage response and recovery operations through the establishment of a UCG

[5] Per PPD-44, When the President designates or agencies agree to recognize a lead Federal agency for a domestic incident pursuant to this policy, the agency head will identify a senior response official who will be fully dedicated to the response.

Timing: Each LFA will make the determination to activate the UCG and establish federal interagency support using key parameters that span all incidents. Table 4 outlines the general triggers based on the commodity affected, which may indicate a UCG will be established. The list of triggers below is not inclusive of all items that may generate a federal-to federal support request. It is important to note that if one or more of the triggers occurs, the LFA is not required to automatically request establishment of a UCG. It is still within the discretion of the LFA to determine whether or not to initiate a request for a UCG.

Table 4: Potential triggers to establish a UCG to manage large-scale food and/or agriculture incidents

(The Secretary of Agriculture and/or the Secretary of Health and Human Services decide whether to establish the UCG)

*The Secretary of Agriculture and/or Secretary of Health and Human Services decide whether to establish a UCG	
Incident	**Triggers**
Food	• Programmatic support for response/recovery from the LFA is no longer able to meet the resource requirements for managing the incident • Multiple states declare public health emergencies • Multiple states request federal assistance that cannot be met by the available LFA resources • Incident is determined to be an intentional act
Animal Agriculture	• APHIS' Dr. Jere L. Dick Operations Center is activated due to the animal disease outbreak • APHIS' Incident Coordination Group is activated at headquarters to oversee coordination of nationwide APHIS response activities for the animal disease outbreak • Secretary of USDA has activated its intradepartmental Multi-Agency Coordination Group in response to the animal disease outbreak to maintain situational awareness, coordinate USDA component activities to assist APHIS in its response activities, analyze food/agriculture economic impacts resulting from the outbreak, and coordinate USDA strategic communications/outreach to affected communities • APHIS VS Incident Management Teams are deployed to affected states with confirmed animal disease cases to oversee, coordinate, and/or execute response activities at affected farms (both non-commercial and commercial facilities) • Incident is determined to be an intentional act
Plant Agriculture	• Incident is determined to be an intentional act

UCG Organization: The UCG structure below demonstrates a “plug and play” model where the actual interagency partners will be incident dependent based on the roles and responsibilities outlined in Appendix 4.

The centralized coordination structure establishes a high-level coordinating group with the capability to make deliberate federal resource adjudication recommendations across multiple regions and states. This entity will be comprised of senior federal interagency leaders who possess subject matter expertise and decision-making authority and the ability to interact effectively with SLTT regulatory offices, Governors’ offices, and tribal leadership (Figure 3). The UCG will have direct ties to any pertinent law enforcement investigations to ensure that crisis and consequence management activities can run concurrently without impeding one another. To leverage private sector assets and information to facilitate response and recovery during the incident, this coordinating body provides key private sector partners and stakeholders with direct access to federal decision-makers.



Figure 3: Operational coordination structure for the establishment of a federal UCG

External Affairs Coordination – Activation of a Joint Information Center

The LFA will use its existing and pre-approved external affairs structure that coordinates with federal and SLTT agencies, and the private sector and other entities to provide credible messaging and accurate information to affected populations using all available technologies and tools through their public information officers (PIO) and external affairs offices.

- The SRO and LFA public information officer may elect to establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) for large-scale food and agriculture incidents
- The JIC ensures all potential stakeholders for food and agriculture incident response and recovery efforts are provided the necessary information for release
- The JIC can deconflict all information prior to release and provides a unified public message regarding the status of the incident response and recovery as well as any food safety and public, animal, plant, or environmental health impacts that may arise from the incident
- If applicable, the JIC will have direct contact with the UCG as outlined in Figure 3 to ensure that all messaging coincides with the ongoing response and recovery operations
- All efforts should be taken to minimize delays to release cleared messaging ensuring:
    - Equal access to the information distributed to the public
    - Information, as needed, in alternate formats for persons with access and functional needs, children, and elderly persons
    - Languages other than English for persons with limited English proficiency, as appropriate

Recovery

Food or agriculture incidents create economic challenges that may be exacerbated by natural resource contamination and health and social services issues. These incidents are unlikely to directly impact infrastructure and housing. The Recovery FIOP applies for integrating and synchronizing federal resources to support SLTT recovery in both Stafford and non-Stafford Act declarations. The Recovery FIOP should be initiated early to minimize impacts to the affected populations and businesses, and assist in returning the food and agriculture sector back to normal business operations to maintain consumer confidence in the U.S. food supply.

Eliminating any ongoing threat is the critical basis for any recovery. Economic recovery, which could encompass wide swaths of industries associated with food and agriculture nationally, will depend upon messaging to assure the public that the threat, which in worst cases may have led to multiple deaths, has been controlled and the food supply is safe. Efforts to restore the environment will be limited to the areas with direct impact from the contamination. Economic recovery and the efforts of health and social service experts may be far more wide ranging than the affected area.

Key Federal Response and Recovery Decisions

Table 5 below provides key federal response and recovery decision points for a food or agriculture incident. This list is not all encompassing of the potential federal decisions during a food or agriculture incident. These decisions, along with key tasks and critical considerations will be maintained in an execution checklist spreadsheet within FEMA's WebEOC.

Table 5: Key Federal Response and Recovery Decisions.

Topic	Decision Point
Emergency Declarations (summarized below)	• Public Health Emergency declared by the Secretary of HHS • Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency by the Secretary of USDA • Presidential declaration of a National Emergency • Stafford Act Emergency or Major Disaster Declaration by the President
Supplemental Support to the LFA	• LFA determination and request for supplemental support through: • (a) direct requests of other D/As per memorandum of agreement; or • (b) request for activation of an Emergency Support Function
Potential or Confirmed Intentional Act	• See Triggers within Branch 4: Intentional Food and Agriculture Incident for coordinated execution of law enforcement investigations with sector lead federal agency response operations
Planning	• Provide early supplemental crisis planning support and coordination with the LFA to assist in crisis action planning and coordination
Public Information and Warning	• Prepare public messaging with fundamental information that provides messaging regarding the safety of the food supply, pertinent information on any potential transmissibility of disease to human populations, status of response to the incident • Formally establish a JIC in support of the UCG to coordinate interagency messaging with the SLTT and the public • To ensure that all persons have equal access to the information distributed to the public, provide information, as needed, in alternate formats for persons with access and functional needs, children, and elderly persons, and in languages other than English for persons with limited English proficiency, as appropriate
Operational Coordination	• Formally establish a UCG at the national level • Designation of Senior Response Official (SRO) by the LFA head, per PPD-44 • Formally establish a national Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator (at state, regional, or national level)
Critical Transportation	• Coordinate interstate transportation waivers, if required, for the licensing and transport of contaminated biomass across jurisdictional lines • Ensure compliance with the proper packaging and transport of hazardous materials, including regulated medical waste, and biomass
Environmental Response/Health and Safety	• Provide advice and support on appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities • Provide advice and support on appropriate locations and certification of biomass disposal sites
Infrastructure Systems	• Determine the scope and scale of support to the private sector to minimize health and safety impacts • Determine the level of support required to efficiently restore the commodity system
On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement	• Determine the requirements to provide security and protection for responders and people in the affected areas
Operational Communications	• Determine the level of communications support required to security, operations, and situational awareness between the affected communities, producers, and responders within the affected area

Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	• Determine the requirements to avoid additional disease and injury to provide targeted public health, medical, and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations and responders
Situational Assessment	• Determine the level of information and process for providing senior leadership with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the incident, any cascading effects, and the status of the response
Economic Recovery	• Determine the best and most appropriate way forward to return the affected sector activities to the pre-incident levels
Health and Social Services	• Determine the strategy to promote a resilient, independent pre-incident community

Potential Emergency Declarations

In a large-scale food or agriculture incident, the following declarations may be issued and may influence incident response and recovery actions. In any of the declarations listed below, the National Response Framework (NRF) and National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) may serve as guidance documents to assist the LFA in responding to an incident.

HHS Declaration of Public Health Emergency

Section 319 of the Public Health Services Act (PHSA) authorizes the Secretary of HHS to declare a public health emergency (PHE) if the Secretary (1) determines a disease or incident presents a PHE, or (2) a PHE, including significant outbreaks of infectious diseases or bioterrorist attacks, otherwise exists. A declaration authorizes the Secretary to take appropriate actions consistent with other authorities to respond to the emergency, temporarily suspend or modify certain legal requirements, and expend available funds in the PHE Fund to respond to the PHE. The Secretary has broad authorities to respond to a public health emergency, regardless of whether a formal PHE is declared.

USDA Extraordinary Emergency Declaration

In the event of a plant health or animal health emergency, the Secretary of USDA may declare an extraordinary emergency and may elect to provide compensation for economic losses incurred because of actions taken under the declaration of extraordinary emergency. When a plant pest or animal disease threatens any segment of agricultural production in the United States, the Secretary, with concurrence from the Office of Management and Budget, may transfer funds from other appropriations or funds available to the agencies or corporations that are necessary to control, eradicate, or prevent the spread of the pest or disease. Under a declaration of extraordinary emergency, the Secretary of USDA may use federal authorities to take action within a state if the affected state is unable to take appropriate action to control and eradicate the disease or pest. Actions taken during an animal or plant emergency are guided by and coordinated with SLTT entities and local preparedness and response officials, homeland security officials, and existing USDA internal policies and procedures.

Presidential Declaration of a National Emergency

Section 201 of the National Emergency Act (NEA) authorizes the President of the United States to declare a national emergency. Under NEA Section 301, statutory emergency authority enabled by the national emergency declaration cannot be exercised until the President specifies the provisions of law under which the President or other officials will act. Such specification may be made either in the declaration or in subsequent Executive Orders published in the Federal Register and transmitted to Congress.

Stafford Act Declaration

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) is not often discussed for response to a food or agriculture incident; however, there is a small possibility it could be used for incident response. When the President of the United States issues a declaration under the Stafford Act for a food or agriculture incident, coordination of interagency partners and tasking through mission assignments will occur through the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) or the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) of the affected jurisdictions. The National Response Framework (NRF) and the NDRF, as well as the associated FIOPs, will serve as guidance to provide the appropriate federal assistance.

Administration, Resources, and Funding

Administration

Federal agencies are responsible for managing their own financial activities during all operational phases and across all mission areas within their established processes and resources. The Financial Management Support Annex to the NRF provides financial management guidance for federal agencies that provide support for incidents that require a coordinated federal response.

Resources

Federal departments and agencies are responsible for personnel augmentation to support operations under this annex. Each federal agency possesses individual policies for personnel augmentation that are predicated on its authorities, various policies, memoranda of understanding, and mutual aid agreements. Federal agencies will provide their full and prompt cooperation, resources, and support, as appropriate and consistent with their own responsibilities.

Funding

Funding to support federal response operations will be consistent with applicable laws and authorities as detailed within the Financial Management Support Annex to the NRF. Under the NRF, the LFA or a UCG may request federal-to-federal support by executing inter/intra-agency reimbursement agreements in accordance with applicable authorities under the Economy Act of 1932. Table 6 describes available funding sources for federal response.

- Federal agencies providing mutual aid support may request reimbursement from the requesting agency for eligible expenditures
- Funding for resource requests may come directly from the requesting entity’s budget or through another source, such as an incident-specific congressional appropriation

Table 6. Funding Sources for Federal Response

Source of Funds	Managed by: Each Department/ Agency	Coverage: Steady-state statutory mission requirements	Contingency / Cap Amounts: As established by Congress (most federal agencies do not have disaster response appropriations and specific guidance from agency financial management offices should be obtained)
Public Health Service Act, Public Health Emergency Fund (Section 319)	HHS	Disease or disorder presenting a public health emergency; or Public Health Emergency (ie, significant outbreaks of infectious disease or bioterrorism)	• "No-year" funds • Supplements (does not supplant) other FSLTT funds provided for public health grants, awards, contracts, and investigations • Secretary must report to Congress 90 days after the fiscal year any funds spent from the PHEF and the activities undertaken with respect to the emergency
Animal Health Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §8301 et seq.)	USDA	Declaration of an agriculture emergency or an extraordinary agriculture emergency. Covers protective actions against the spread of livestock disease, including seizing, treating, or destroying animals if USDA has reason to believe stated action will prevent the spread of disease or pests affecting livestock.	• Compensation to producers for animals that must be euthanized, for their disposition, and for infected materials that must also be destroyed. Provided by annual appropriations or USDA unobligated funds • Additional funding may be available with the approval of the Office of Management and Budget • Secretary determination that an extraordinary emergency exists because of the presence of a pest or disease of livestock and that the pest or disease of livestock threatens livestock in the U.S. • The Secretary may take action in a state upon finding that the measures being taken by the state are inadequate to control or eradicate the pest or disease
Supplemental Appropriations	Congress	Emergency funding requirements beyond annual appropriations.	• Congress may designate certain spending for disaster relief, which is not subject to the discretionary caps specified in the statute
Interagency Agreements / Economy Act	Supporting D/As	Any costs not already covered by the above	• Federal departments and agencies may execute inter/intra-agency reimbursable agreements • D/As may request reimbursement from the requesting agency for eligible expenditures
Disaster Relief Fund	FEMA	Tasks initiated pursuant to ESF #8, 10 or 11 or Mission Assignments	• Funds from the DRF are used to pay for ongoing recovery projects from disasters occurring in previous fiscal years, meet current emergency requirements, and as a reserve to pay for upcoming incidents • The DRF is funded annually and is a "no-year" account

Other Funding Options

U.S. Small Business Administration Disaster Loan Program

The Small Business Administration's (SBA's) federal disaster loan program is activated by an SBA disaster declaration when the governor of a disaster affected state requests a declaration and

SBA documents that the physical damage or economic injury meets the declaration threshold. SBA also makes a disaster declaration for a Presidential disaster declaration that includes Individual Assistance or Public Assistance and when the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture designates an agriculture disaster.

There are two types of SBA disaster loans:

- Physical Disaster Loans: For businesses of all sizes and private nonprofit organizations, SBA offers Physical Disaster Loans to repair or replace damaged or destroyed real estate, machinery, equipment, inventory and other business assets. The SBA can also lend additional funds for mitigation to help business with the cost of making improvements that protect, prevent or minimize the same type of disaster damage from occurring in the future.
- Economic Injury Disaster Loans: For small businesses, small agriculture cooperatives, and most private nonprofit organizations, SBA offers Economic Injury Disaster Loans to help meet working capital needs caused by the disaster. Economic injury assistance is available regardless of whether the business suffered any property damage.

There is a $2,000,000 statutory limit for business loans for any combination of physical, economic injury, mitigation, and refinancing for each business and its affiliates. If a business is a major source of employment, SBA has the authority to waive the $2,000,000 statutory limit.

Under a Presidential disaster declaration for Individual Assistance or an SBA Administrative disaster declaration, SBA disaster loans are available to homeowners to repair or replace their damaged or destroyed primary residence and to homeowners and renters to repair or replace damaged or destroyed personal property.

Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

Oversight:

In response to food incidents with large-scale human health implications, HHS is responsible for coordinating the federal government's public health and medical response in support of the affected SLTT. During animal and plant agriculture incidents, USDA is responsible for coordinating veterinary or agriculture support to those affected states and premises.

FEMA, in close coordination with HHS and USDA, is the executive agent for this annex.

Coordinating Instructions:

For food incidents that potentially have large human health impacts, ASPR will coordinate resources at the Federal level. The HHS Emergency Management Group (EMG) provides public health and medical coordination and incident support functions to the regions and/or joint field offices, conducts operational planning, deploys national-level resources, and collects and disseminates incident information. The LFA with the regulatory authority for each commodity manages all response activities.

- USDA FSIS is the public health agency responsible for ensuring that the nation's commercial supply of meat, poultry, and processed egg products is safe, wholesome, and correctly labeled and packaged.
- HHS/FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by ensuring the safety and security of our nation's food supply. HHS/FDA has regulatory authority for all foods, which are not under the regulatory authority of FSIS including beverages, dairy, infant formula, juices, produce, seafood, shell eggs, animal feed, and pet food, etc.
- For large-scale agriculture incidents, the USDA Operations Center is the primary coordinating body for resources from the USDA National/headquarters level. The USDA Operations Center assists in the development and coordination of policies, capabilities, and procedures for reporting and response to emergencies affecting the USDA mission or personnel. The Operations Center receives, assesses, and analyzes emergency's or incidents, making internal and external notifications as required.

Consistent with the NRF, the NDRF, and in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, the Secretary of DHS, through the FEMA Administrator or other appropriate officials, will coordinate the federal government's resources utilized in response to or recovery from a food or agriculture incident when required by HSPD-5. In cases of intentional threats or acts giving rise to a food or agriculture incident, the Secretary will coordinate, as necessary, with the Attorney General. In the absence of a Stafford Act declaration, FEMA may designate a Federal Resource Coordinator and/or rely on the pre-existing MOU/Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with each LFA operating through reimbursable Interagency Agreements for the requested level of support.

Communications:

Each agency will identify the appropriate communications systems to relay the necessary information throughout the course of incident response and recovery operations. All situational awareness and communications channels will be coordinated through a central coordinating body, such as the UCG. In the instance of a intentional/terrorist act or threat, the FBI shall be consulted before issuing sensitive media/press releases.

Branch 1: Federal Response to and Recovery from Food Incidents



Situation

This branch plan addresses the specific components to response and recovery for large-scale food incidents.

Purpose

This branch plan provides scenario-specific supplemental information to the Food and Agriculture Incident Annex (FAIA) base plan. Federal interagency partners will respond in a lead role or in support to SLTT governments to save lives, protect private property and the environment, and meet basic human needs when there is an accidental or intentional adulteration of the U.S. food supply.

Scope

This branch plan applies to all federal responses to large-scale food incidents, regardless of complexity, unless otherwise noted. The primary focus is on a large-scale incident where the need for immediate federal and state assistance is obvious, resource pre-positioning is not possible, and the exact nature of resource and asset requirements is unknown.

Facts, Planning Assumptions, and Critical Considerations

Facts

The following facts pertain to food incidents:

Lead Roles	
LFAs for food incidents (e.g., USDA//FSIS, HHS/FDA)	• The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) have ongoing regulatory requirements for inspection of facilities according to their own programmatic responsibilities under their own authorities • The lead federal agency (LFA) does not participate in the cleaning and disinfection of a private firm's facility during food adulteration incidents; the LFA does monitor the process and procedures and indicates when industry may resume normal operations • Response operations will primarily use capabilities of the SLTT health organizations, private healthcare facilities, and the food industry
USDA/FSIS	• Ensures the safety of meat, poultry, and processed egg products
HHS/FDA	• HHS/FDA has regulatory authority for all foods, which are not under the regulatory authority of USDA/FSIS, including beverages, dairy, infant formula, juices, produce, seafood, shell eggs, animal/pet food, etc.

- **Situational Awareness:** Full information about threats or causative agents may not be immediately available due to the time for investigation and laboratory testing require to identify the adulterant and for any delayed symptoms to present in exposed populations
- **Economic:** A food incident may result in intermittent shortages of the affected product on the store shelves, but will not cause a long-term food shortage
- **Public Information:**
  - The incident will garner media attention, and coordinated public messaging will be required to communicate the safety of the U.S. food supply
  - Public concern for exposure, similarity of initial symptoms to more common illnesses, and the lack of definitive knowledge about exposure areas and times may amplify the demand for medical and health resources
- **Response:** Medical needs for a large-scale food incident will overwhelm existing healthcare capacity including staff, facilities, equipment, and medical countermeasures
- **Recovery:** A food incident may have cascading effects beyond the direct impacts to industry, including economic losses to related industries, economic losses to surrounding communities, trade restrictions/closures, and related public and behavioral health impacts

Planning Assumptions

The following are planning assumptions that are supplemental to those outlined in the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs) and base plan:

- **Declarations:** A food incident may not result in a major disaster Stafford Act declaration but may require federal-to-federal support

Critical Considerations

Protecting Proprietary Information	
Risk	• Disclosure and dissemination of private sector proprietary information
Management	• Special permissions and/or non-disclosure agreements between the public and private sectors may be required to protect proprietary information and allow for disclosure and dissemination on a need-to-know basis
Healthcare Services	
Risk	• Healthcare services typically operate with a just-in-time inventory that may impact patient care and availability of resources
Management	• Identifying the early onset of healthcare system becoming overtaxed in order to deploy medical assistance to the impacted locations
Incomplete Information	
Risk	• Decisions may be required with incomplete information on the exact agent and the source of the adulterant
Management	• Determine courses of actions appropriate for the most relevant information available
State Resources	

Risk	• States may withhold resources in order to ensure that sufficient capability exists to respond in their own jurisdictions.
Management	• Determine available resources within the impacted state and adjoining states • Provide close coordination and communication with both the impacted and adjoining state on possible mutual aid requirements

Execution

In response to a food incident of any size, scope, or complexity, response operations will place immediate priority on mitigating the human and animal health impacts and identifying the causative adulterant and the affected food product. Under normal response operations, each agency will manage the response activities that pertain to each's programmatic and regulatory authority as outlined in Figure 4 of the FAIA base plan**.**

Throughout the response, operational coordination will follow the well-established response plans for each agency with regulatory and programmatic authority for the incident. Interagency support and coordination will occur through the pre-established coordination channels as outlined in Figure 4. Each agency has national; regional or district; and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) constructs that support the ongoing response efforts for a food incident. Included in this coordination structure are coordination mechanisms for law enforcement investigations, support from interagency partners, and all levels of SLTT government. These coordination structures are well practiced and follow the routine response structures of each agency. These follow the ongoing coordination mechanisms and response strategies that the LFA previously established under each agency's programmatic and regulatory authority for emergency response.



Figure 4: Coordination structures for routine response to foodborne incidents and outbreaks

Operational Phases

Operational phases for the response to and recovery from a large-scale food incident vary based on the size, scope, and complexity of the incident. A food incident, whether intentional or accidental adulteration, may not follow the standard operational phases and require a more dynamic approach to understanding each phase of response and recovery efforts as seen in Figure 5. For food incidents, Response, Recovery, and Prevention Mission activities are interdependent and often concurrent. Decisions made and priorities set early in response will have a cascading effect on the nature and speed of recovery and resolution of the incident.

Traditional operational phases for response and recovery follow more finite timelines, with distinct activities that relate to each phase. Operational phases for food incidents overlap and each phase is typically longer than standard response and recovery timelines given the nature of disease etiology for foodborne outbreaks.



Figure 5: Normal operational phases for response and recovery (top). Operational phases for food incidents (bottom)

Phase 1a (Normal Operations)

Phase 1a activities include the normal programmatic operations of the lead federal agencies based on their ongoing authorities, statutory requirements, and mission. The USDA FSIS performs routine inspections of facilities under their regulatory authority to ensure all practices within processing plants and facilities meet regulatory requirements for providing safe and wholesome foods to the U.S. food supply. FDA performs routine processing plant inspections and works with industry on food safety requirements through multiple coordination structures, including the Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council. FDA and USDA serve as the Co-Chairs of the Food and Agriculture Sector Government Coordinating Council. The sector is a public-private partnership that combines expertise from several federal agencies as well as SLTT officials (representing agriculture, public health, and veterinary services) and the private sector (more than 100 trade associations and individual firms).

As outlined in the FDA *Emergency Operations Plan*, FDA may employ a number of activities prior to the confirmation of an incident that are designed to minimize the threat of acts, regardless of intent, against FDA-regulated products and protect consumers from public health hazards. FDA leverages heightened and targeted preventive measures at various points in the processing and distribution chains to protect the safety and security of regulated products and protect consumers from harm. These activities are conducted in coordination and collaboration with FDA organizational components, federal and SLTT partners, industry, academia, foreign governments, and international organizations including, but not limited to:

- Implementing risk communications with government and industry partners
- Prioritizing examination of food commodities based on potential for contamination
- Identifying entities handling specific FDA-regulated consumer products
- Conducting targeted inspections and investigations and collecting samples
- Readying laboratory response and other scientific capabilities to analyze/test for chemical and microbiological agents
- Requesting or requiring appropriate recall of food products that might cause a temporary health problem or pose a slight threat of a serious nature

- Educating establishments on security measures to minimize the risk of intentional adulteration or protect against the effects of disease
- Provide establishments information on suggested mitigation strategies to minimize the risk of intentional adulteration
- Working as appropriate with federal and SLTT governments and international partners
- Issuing warnings, alerts, advisories, and other advice to consumers regarding food product safety
    - To ensure that all persons have equal access to the information distributed to consumers, the information will be provided, as needed, in alternate formats for persons with disabilities and with other access and functional needs, and in languages other than English for persons with limited English proficiency

FDA uses targeted preventive measures in coordination with other intergovernmental partners to provide a significant increase in coverage, awareness, and preparedness to respond to incidents relating to FDA-regulated products. The overarching goal is to provide for more protected supply and distribution chains and a national network that is better prepared to respond to an identified threat or hazard.

FSIS is the public health agency in USDA responsible for ensuring that the nation's commercial supply of meat, poultry, and processed egg products is safe, wholesome, and correctly labeled and packaged. Through its mission, FSIS collaborates with partners and stakeholders across government, industry, and academia to implement an aggressive program to build a resilient U.S. food infrastructure with the ability to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from intentional adulteration of the food supply. Throughout normal operations, FSIS routinely performs inspections and ensures that all products meet regulatory compliance. FSIS also works collaboratively with a group of stakeholders to identify and share information about potential vulnerabilities in the food supply chain. Programs within FSIS support preparedness for an incident involving intentional adulteration of the food supply such that the agency can support industry with protecting its business, products, and employees to further create resiliency within the U.S. food supply.

Phase 1b and 1c (Elevated Threat and Credible Threat)

As adulterated food products reach stores and food preparation facilities, small pockets of illness will begin to arise from those exposed to the adulterant through consumption of the product. Medical and veterinary facilities and/or poison control centers will see an increase in illness, while SLTT level public health officials begin to report clusters or similar illnesses across multiple geographic locations. SLTT public health officials may reach out to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for support in performing epidemiological investigations to identify the food product causing illness as well as the causative agent. States may also request assistance from the LFA for public health response and any potential messaging related to the spreading foodborne outbreak.

Upon determination of an incident, the LFA, for response, will perform preventive and protective measures in order to mitigate the incident. For example, these may include:

- Increasing surveillance of adverse incidents and emerging public health concerns regarding the incident
- Increasing surveillance of food products to ensure no further adulteration is occurring

- Providing initial public messaging regarding the potential for a foodborne incident
- Beginning to deploy/position personnel to perform investigations of facilities initially implicated in the incident

Phase 2a (Immediate Response)

Upon identification and verification of a large-scale foodborne outbreak, the LFA will implement initial response activities. Included in this phase are activities that seek to provide accurate and credible information to affected individuals, healthcare providers, as well as any applicable interagency partners. In addition, any indication of an intentional adulteration of the food supply will result in immediate coordination with law enforcement to investigate the potential criminal or terrorist origins of the adulterant, as outlined in Branch 4.

Throughout the ongoing outbreak, FDA or FSIS is actively engaged in investigations to determine the potential adulterated food product. Laboratories will see an increase in clinical and food samples for agent identification, clinical confirmation of disease, and investigation of the causative food agent. CDC will continue ongoing epidemiological investigations to support the identification of the causative agent. In the event that the associated clinical symptomology exceeds the routine treatment at hospitals, medical, or veterinary facilities, SLTTs may request the release of medical countermeasures from the Strategic National Stockpile to support patient management.

Phase 2b (Deployment)

As the food incident progresses through the population, HHS will implement and deploy federal response-related resources to include personnel, personal protective equipment, and medical countermeasures to supplement and support SLTT health authorities and activities and protect public health and safety. Throughout this phase, interagency coordination will continue to maintain federal situational awareness and understanding of any additional federal assets that may be required. In addition, FDA and/or FSIS will be working with industry to understand the full scope of the incident and begin public messaging campaigns about the safety of the U.S. food supply for the consumer. The focus of these efforts is to minimize both the public health impacts as well as any economic impacts to the U.S. food supply.

Phase 2c (Sustained Response)

The incident will transition into sustained response activities. Upon identification of the adulterated food item, the LFA with the appropriate regulatory authority for that product will work with industry to establish a voluntary recall of the adulterated food product. The LFA and industry will coordinate to release appropriate public messaging regarding the affected food and the appropriate courses of action for disposal.

Phase 3 (Recovery)

Recovery from a food incident includes short- and long-term actions to ensure and restore the safety and availability of food products within the U.S. food supply and to ensure that the consumer is protected from the food incident and public confidence in the safety of the food supply remains high after food incident. Included among these recovery activities, the LFA may be responsible for the following:

- Continue inspections or investigations of regulated facilities to collect and analyze samples from implicated products.

- Oversee product destruction or product reconditioning as appropriate to the incident.
- Oversee the sanitization of the food production facility that may have processed or was implicated in the adulterated food product.
- Determine impacts to and provide appropriate information for recovery support to any facilities that manufacture/process, pack, or hold food for human or animal consumption during the incident.
- Provide clear and consistent information to assist industry in understanding and complying with regulations in the post-incident environment.

Depending on the size, scope, and complexity of the incident and the amount of recovery support required for the incident, the LFA may designate a Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator for the coordination of recovery operations with the national and SLTT entities. The standard operational coordination structure would remain the same adding in operational coordination of recovery activities as outlined in Figure 6.



Figure 6: Normal operational coordination for food incident response remains the same, but incorporates the coordination of recovery efforts through the addition of the FDA

Branch 2: Federal Response to and Recovery from Animal Agriculture Incidents

Situation

This branch plan addresses the unique nature of large-scale animal agriculture incidents.

Purpose

This branch plan provides supplemental information to the Food and Agriculture Incident Annex (FAIA) base plan. Federal interagency partners can respond in a lead role or in support to SLTT governments to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs when there is a natural, unintentional, or intentional introduction of an animal agriculture disease-causing agent among the U.S. livestock and poultry populations.

Scope

This branch plan applies to all federal responses to large-scale animal agriculture incidents. The focus is on an incident where the need for immediate federal and state assistance is obvious, resource pre-positioning is not possible, and the exact nature of resource and asset requirements is unknown.

Facts, Assumptions, and Critical Considerations

Facts

The following facts pertain to large-scale animal agriculture incidents:

- The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) has robust Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) Preparedness and Response plans (PRePs) including the disease-specific response plans for Foot and Mouth Disease, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, Classical Swine Fever, and Newcastle Disease, in addition to well-developed internal plans, policies, and procedures for response operations under its authorities and capabilities.
- In a novel or emerging disease outbreak, information about the agent and associated risk will require additional research to identify the pathogen and understand pathogenicity.
- In a known FAD outbreak, vaccine matching and other strain characterization can take days to complete.
- FAD is not limited to livestock and poultry animals and can affect other susceptible animals on farms, pets, wildlife, and zoo animals, which would create challenges with response.
- **Economic:**
    - In consultation with the U.S. Department of State and our U.S. Missions abroad, export markets may close for affected animal and animal products.

Planning Assumptions:

The following planning assumptions are supplemental to those outlined in the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs) and base plan:

- **Declarations:**
    - An animal incident may likely result in an Extraordinary Emergency Declaration.
    - An animal incident may not result in a major disaster Stafford Act declaration but may require federal-to-federal support.
- **Economic:** Job losses may endure for months as farms recover and repopulate the affected herds.
- **Containment:**
    - Individuals may hide animals or move them outside of a quarantine zone to avoid depopulation.
    - Vehicles and persons might also serve as fomites for distributing pathogen(s).
- **International:** Due to an outbreak, other countries may implement bans and trade restrictions on U.S. animals and animal products affected, until the disease is eradicated.
- **Responder Capability:**
    - Increased biological safety training may be needed to ensure that all workers, including those on farms, are trained to utilize appropriate personal protective equipment and clean and disinfect responder equipment prior to entry onto or exiting from quarantined premises to prevent disease spread as a result of response efforts.
    - There is a significant need for large-scale transport and disposal of large quantities of infected biomass.
    - The need for veterinarians, animal health technicians, and animal handlers may far exceed existing numbers of qualified individuals, and varying state licensure requirements will create additional challenges for outbreak response.
    - Composting subject matter experts and other disposal personnel may be in very short supply.
    - Behavioral health support may be required for the affected farmers, general population, and responders supporting depopulation and disposal efforts.
- **Recovery:**
    - Repopulation of all affected livestock may take months,and some farms might be unable to return to normal operation after the outbreak.
    - Cascading effects will arise, and specific outbreak management plans may be needed if other animal industry groups such as zoos or other exhibitors are impacted by the outbreak.

Critical Considerations

The following are critical considerations that are supplemental to those outlined in the Response and Recovery FIOPs:

SLTT Resources

Risk	• SLTTs may withhold resources in order to ensure that sufficient capability exists to respond in their own jurisdictions.
Management	• Determine available resources available within the impacted SLTT and adjoining SLTTs. • Provide close coordination and communication with both the impacted and adjoining state on possible mutual aid requirements.
Waste Management and HAZMAT Transport	
Risk	• Limited national capacity for large-scale contaminated and/or hazardous materials transport, storage, and disposal exist. • Waste management for larger scale incidents may require regional and national approaches and facilities to supplement SLTT expertise and capacity. • Depending on the threat to public health, movement of infected biomass disposal may require additional permitting and be subject to regulation. • SLTTs refuse the transportation of contaminated biomass across jurisdictional lines creating coordination challenges for final disposal.
Management	• Determine public/private sector coordination requirements within the impacted zones.
Quarantines	
Risk	• Quarantines may require road closures and detours, which may impact federal interagency and private sector response and recovery operations.
Management	• Determine effective measures, movement controls, and public messaging guidance for SLTT jurisdictions that retain the lead role for designating population protection measures.
Physical Site Security	
Risk	• Increased physical security may be required to protect the premises and responders from individuals and groups who wish to disrupt response operations.
Management	• Determine the applicability for the use of ESF #13
Animal Movement and Wildlife Interface	
Risk	• Animal movement during an outbreak may increase disease spread due to the potential for animals to be asymptomatic but infected. • If animal agriculture disease spreads into state, federal, and tribal wildlife, resource management agencies should be consulted immediately to determine acceptable disease response and control options.
Management	• Determine proper movement protocols to limit or eliminate the risk associated with animal movement.

Execution

In response to an animal agriculture incident of any size, scope, or severity, response operations will place immediate priority on mitigating the animal health impacts while minimizing the spread of disease or identifying the cause of the incident. USDA APHIS Veterinary Services (VS) is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for responding to all significant incidents that affect the U.S. livestock and poultry populations, including the introduction of a FAD. Under normal response operations to an incident affecting the livestock and poultry populations, USDA APHIS, SLTT, and private sector partners should initiate standard response strategies outlined in the FAD PRePs that were previously established under the agency's regulatory and programmatic authority. USDA APHIS will follow the goals outlined in the FAD PReP manuals to contain, control, and eradicate the disease in U.S. livestock and poultry populations, including but not limited to the following:

- public communication and messaging,
- rapid appraisal and indemnity processing for producers, as applicable,
- imposition of effective quarantine measures and movement controls,
- rapid diagnosis and disease reporting,
- epidemiological investigation and tracing,
- increased surveillance,
- continuity of business measures for non-infected premises based on the secure food or supply plans,
- biosecurity measures,
- mass depopulation, emergency vaccines and euthanasia as the response strategy indicates,
- effective and appropriate disposal measures

Interagency support and coordination will occur through the pre-established coordination channels as outlined in Figure 7.



Figure 7: Coordination structures for response to animal agriculture incidents and outbreaks

USDA APHIS VS has national; regional or district; and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) constructs that support the ongoing response efforts for an animal agriculture incident. Included in this coordination structure are coordination mechanisms for law enforcement investigations, industry partners, support from interagency partners, and all levels of SLTT government. This coordination structure outlines the ongoing coordination mechanisms and response strategies that USDA previously established under the programmatic and regulatory authority for emergency response.

In the event an LFA is designated by the President in concert with an Emergency Declaration[6] under the Stafford Act, the Joint Field Office (JFO) and its associated functions should remain separate from any non-Stafford Act support provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to the LFA. If a Unified Coordination Group (UCG) is established by the LFA, early separation of Stafford Act emergency management disaster roles and non-Stafford Act UCG activities is essential to maintain compliance with statutory and financial requirements. What is critical to these parallel operations is the coordination of situational awareness information as well as public information and messaging efforts between their respective Joint Information Center functions to ensure the unity of effort and provide a singular messaging strategy for the incident.

[6] Emergency Declaration: Can be declared for any occasion or instance when the President determines federal assistance is needed. Emergency Declarations supplement SLTT efforts in providing emergency services such as the protection of lives, property, public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States. The total amount of assistance provided for a single emergency may not exceed $5 million. If this amount is exceeded, the President shall report to Congress.

Operational Phases

The response to and recovery from a large-scale animal agriculture incident, whether an intentional or accidental introduction of a FAD, does not follow the standard Response FIOP operational phases and requires a more dynamic approach to understanding each phase. Response and recovery is a more time-consuming effort and operational phases may overlap or take longer to accomplish tasks and to transition from one phase to the next, as seen in Figure 8. For animal agriculture incidents: Response, Recovery, and Prevention Mission activities are interdependent and often concurrent. Decisions made and priorities set early in response will have a cascading effect on the nature and speed of recovery and resolution of the incident.



Figure 8: Traditional operational phases for response and recovery (top). Operational phases for animal agriculture incidents (bottom)

Phase 1a (Normal Operations)

Phase 1a activities include the normal programmatic operations of USDA APHIS VS that focus on carrying out its ongoing mission to support the health of the U.S. livestock and poultry populations. USDA APHIS VS works with external stakeholders and industry partners to promote public preparedness messaging, educational opportunities, general response awareness, and training to recognize the signs and dangers associated with threats to the U.S. livestock and poultry populations, especially those of FADs. Throughout U.S. livestock and poultry populations, state or federal veterinarians visit farms to investigate reportable disease issues, impose quarantines, or for other purposes. In addition, livestock animals are issued Certificates of Veterinary Inspection from accredited private veterinarians to validate the health of the animal prior to movement for sale, slaughter, etc.

Phase 1b and 1c (Elevated and Credible Threat)

Upon identification of a sick animal on a farm, farm management isolates the animal and requests evaluation from the private veterinarian to diagnose the illness. In the presence of clinical signs resembling a FAD, a FAD diagnostician in consultation with a state or federal veterinarian will examine the animal and take samples for appropriate diagnostic testing to a National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratory capable of performing the initial to a National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratory capable of performing the initial and concurrent testing on the sample (Figure 8) in addition to sending to

National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) for validating initial NAHLN results and to initiate confirmatory diagnostics and pathogen typing.



Figure 9: National Animal Health Laboratory Network

Phase 2a (Immediate Response)

After confirmation of an FAD in the U.S., USDA APHIS VS will immediately activate the FAD PReP response protocols for that particular disease outlined in the disease specific FAD PReP manual. In general, initial actions will include:

The National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) forms part of a nationwide strategy to coordinate the work of organizations providing animal disease surveillance and testing.

- Establish quarantine, hold orders, movement restrictions, and standstill notices for relevant zones and regions.
- Initiate appraisal process for animals affected by the disease.
- Begin depopulation activities.
- Notify SLTT, Extension, industry, and trading partners and the media of confirmed positive disease.
- Implement increased biosecurity measures to minimize the spread of disease
- Initiate epidemiological investigations and tracing activities.
- Initiate management organizational structures and processes.
- Begin data collection and information management in the APHIS Emergency Management Response System (EMRS).

Phase 2b (Deployment)

Upon initial detection and implementation of quarantine and movement controls, USDA APHIS VS will move forward with deployment and will focus on containment of the disease. Ongoing activities include:

- Evaluate quarantine and movement controls to ensure that they are appropriate.
- Continue depopulation and disposal activities for all animals that are presumed positive for FAD.
- Ensure that the appraisal and compensation process moves forward for indemnity for eligible livestock and poultry affected by the disease.
- Proceed with surveillance and tracing activities to rapidly identify any potential spread of the disease or new outbreaks.
- Execute timely and accurate data entry in EMRS.
- Initiate a public awareness messaging and communication campaign on the status of the outbreak.
- Implement and enforce increased biosecurity measures.
- Initiate continuity of business plans for the affected industry.
- Continue confirmatory diagnostics at NAHLN laboratories and NVSL.
- Determine if a vaccine match is available to use and decide when to order.
- Deploy Incident Management Teams to the field and prepare SLTT entities for the arrival of the teams.
- Establish incident command and incident coordination groups, as appropriate.
- Deploy appropriate assets from the National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) as requested by SLTT to support incident response.
- Alert and mobilize other federal agencies about the potential request(s) for assistance.

Phase 2c (Sustained Response)

As the disease continues through the impacted species, USDA APHIS VS will continue to manage the incident, focusing on minimizing disease spread and eradicating the disease to quickly return to normal business operations. USDA APHIS VS will continue to support the incident with ongoing activities including:

- Augment incident command and incident coordination groups, as needed.
- Ensure compensation process proceeds efficiently.
- Continue all ongoing depopulation and disposal activities.
- Continue timeline and accurate data entry into EMRS.
- Continue ongoing surveillance and tracing actions.
- Continue implementation and enforcement of biosecurity measures.
- Continue public awareness campaign.
- Initiate permitting and other continuity of business actions to minimize the impacts of the disease to industry.
- Deploy identified personnel from other federal agencies to a reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) point for just in time training and deployment to the incident location(s).

Throughout the sustained response, USDA APHIS VS will continue to deploy NVS assets and make any policy determinations to support incident response. Among these decisions, USDA

may alter the approach to the usage of veterinary countermeasures and depopulation/euthanasia[7] as a means to manage the impacts of the ongoing incident. The Secretary of Agriculture will make the determination based on the ongoing situational assessment of the incident under his or her authority. This decision will be incident-specific and based on multiple factors including, but not limited to the extent of the outbreak, the affected animal populations, location of the outbreak, and ability to contain or eradicate the disease quickly and effectively.

Phase 3 (Recovery)

Current secure food supply plans written or in development for turkey, dairy, egg, pork, and beef.

Recovery operations for an animal agriculture incident will occur simultaneously with response operations. Recovery is achieved when the disease has been eradicated using strategies that seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, and the economy, and protect public health, animal health, and the environment. Throughout response operations, USDA APHIS VS works with SLTT and industry to minimize the impacts from the disease through business continuity plans highlighted by the secure food supply plans, a series of industry specific plans that outlines the continuity of business plans for the management of non-infected premises and non-contaminated animal products in the event of a FAD outbreak. These plans provide science- and risk-based approaches and systems as a critical activity in FAD response to support agriculture and food industries, to maintain business operations during incident response, and to support the quick return to normal business operations. The overarching goals of the plan seek to avoid interruptions in animal and animal product movement to commercial processing from premises with no evidence of an FAD, and to provide a continuous supply of wholesome foods to consumers and maintain business continuity for producers, transporters, and food processors through response planning.

Depending on the size, scope, and complexity of the incident and the amount of recovery support required for the incident, USDA might designate a Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator for the coordination of recovery operations with the national and SLTT entities. The standard operational coordination structure would remain the same adding in operational coordination of recovery activities as outlined in Figure 10.

[7] It is important to understand that USDA APHIS recognizes a difference between euthanasia and depopulation. Euthanasia involves transitioning an animal to death as painlessly and stress-free as possible. Mass Depopulation is a method by which large numbers of animals must be destroyed quickly and efficiently with as much consideration given to the welfare of the animals as practicable.



Figure 10: Normal operational coordination for animal agriculture incident response remains the same, but incorporates the coordination of recovery efforts through the addition of a FDRC

Branch 3: Federal Response to and Recovery from a Plant Agriculture incident

Situation

This branch plan addresses the unique nature of a large-scale plant agriculture incident.

Purpose

This branch plan provides supplemental information to the Food and Agriculture Incident Annex base annex. Federal interagency partners can respond in a lead role or in support to SLTT governments to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs when there is a natural or intentional introduction (non-terrorism) of a plant pest or pathogen within the U.S. crop and plant industries.

Scope

This branch plan applies to all federal responses to large-scale plant agriculture incidents, regardless of scope and complexity, unless otherwise noted. The focus is on an incident where the need for immediate federal and state assistance is obvious, resource pre-positioning is not possible, and the exact nature of resource and asset requirements is unknown.

Facts, Assumptions, and Critical Considerations

Facts

The following are facts that pertain to large-scale plant agriculture incidents:

- The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) maintains the *National Plant Health Emergency Management Framework* as well as well-developed internal plans, policies, and procedures for response operations under its own authorities and capabilities.
- Full information about scope of infestation will not be immediately available and will take days for identification or weeks for delimitation surveys to be completed depending on the identified pest.
- Neighboring areas that have not been designated as infected must also be surveyed for the presence of the pest, requiring even more resources.

Planning Assumptions

The following are planning assumptions that are supplemental to those outlined in the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs), and base plan:

- **Declarations:** A plant incident will not result in a major disaster Stafford Act Declaration but may require federal-to-federal support.
- **Response Capabilities:**
  - Quarantines require agricultural inspections at state and/or tribal boundaries
  - Movement of host materials may be refused

- USDA's resources may become overwhelmed within 60-90 days, especially in an agro-terrorism incident or a concurrent agriculture incident.
- Plant incidents may not cause long-term national commodity shortages.
- Export markets for affected commodities may close based on U.S. foreign policy considerations with the importing country, conditions set within pre-established trade negotiation agreements, and the import country's plant, pest, and pathogen profiles.
- The size, scope, and complexity of a plant incident, may overwhelm existing capabilities and resources, causing significant strain on the whole community.

Critical Considerations

The following critical considerations are supplemental to those outlined in the Response and Recovery FIOPs:

Pest Surveillance	
Risk	• Due to the nature of plant pest infestations, limitations exist in the ability to conduct surveillance. • Plant pests may move quickly to other states beyond the initial site of the incident requiring additional resources for response on a national scale.
Management	• State, local, and private sector resources will be leveraged to assist USDA APHIS PPQ with pest surveillance given the 3-6 month minimum that is required for verification of pest-free status.
Criminal Incidents	
Risk	• Identification may be delayed, or become more complex in the event of law enforcement investigations and intelligence operations. • If a large-scale plant incident is treated as intentional, such as a suspected or actual act of terrorism, espionage, or other federal crime, or if the cause of a biological incident is undetermined, the response requires integration of consequence management, critical infrastructure protection, and law enforcement/counterterrorism operations. • A suspected or actual intentional large-scale plant incident could take many forms.
Management	• Mission area planning should account for a full range of possible incident scenarios. • Terrorist threat-related information collected domestically, including suspicious activity reporting involving suspected federal crimes of terrorism, may be shared comprehensively and immediately with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces so that threats can be investigated and resolved as soon as possible.

Physical Site Security	
Risk	• There will be an immediate need to inform the public of the situation and what protective actions to take.
Management	• Determine the requirement for establishment of a JIC to ensure one message from the USG.

Execution

In response to a plant agriculture incident of any size, scope, or complexity, response operations will place immediate priority on mitigating the spread of the plant pest or pathogen while trying to determine the cause or source of the pest or pathogen. USDA APHIS PPQ is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for responding to all significant incidents that affect plants in the United States, including exotic plant pests and pathogens. Under normal response operations to a plant pest or pathogen, USDA APHIS PPQ will follow the protocols and guidance outlined in the *National Plant Health Emergency Management Framework* previously established under the agency's regulatory authorities. Interagency support and coordination will occur through the pre-established coordination channels as outlined in Figure 11. USDA APHIS PPQ has national, regional or district, and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) constructs that support the ongoing response efforts for a plant agriculture incident. Included in this coordination structure are coordination mechanisms for law enforcement investigations, industry partners, support from interagency partners, and all levels of SLTT government. This coordination structure outlines the ongoing coordination mechanisms and response strategies that USDA previously established under the programmatic and regulatory authority for emergency response.

In the event an LFA is designated by the President in concert with an Emergency Declaration[8] under the Stafford Act, the Joint Field Office (JFO) and its associated functions should remain separate from any non-Stafford Act support provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to the LFA. If a Unified Coordination Group (UCG) is established by the LFA, early separation of Stafford Act emergency management disaster roles and non-Stafford Act UCG activities is essential to maintain compliance with statutory and financial requirements. Critical to these parallel operations is the coordination of situational awareness information, as well as public information and messaging efforts between their respective Joint Information Center (JIC) functions to ensure the unity of effort and provide a singular messaging strategy for the incident.

[8] Emergency Declaration: Can be declared for any occasion or instance when the President determines federal assistance is needed. Emergency Declarations supplement SLTT efforts in providing emergency services, such as the protection of lives, property, public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States. The total amount of assistance provided for a single emergency may not exceed $5 million. If this amount is exceeded, the President shall report to Congress.



Figure 11: Coordination structures for response to plant agriculture incidents

Operational Phases

The timing of the operational phases identified in the Response and Recovery FIOPs are seen in Figure 12. For plant agriculture incidents: Response, Recovery, and, if applicable, Prevention Mission activities are interdependent and concurrent. Decisions made and priorities set early in response will have a cascading effect on the resolution of the incident and the nature and speed of recovery. Operational phases for plant agriculture incidents overlap and each phase is typically longer than standard response and recovery timelines given the nature of the incident.



Figure 12: Normal operational phases for response and recovery (top). Operational phases during plant agriculture incidents (bottom)

Phase 1a (Normal Operations)

USDA APHIS PPQ works to safeguard agriculture resources and natural resources to ensure an abundant, high quality, and varied food supply, and for safeguard plant health in the U.S. prior to an incident, USDA APHIS PPQ, in coordination with federal and SLTT departments and agencies and industry, works to prepare, build, and sustain operational capacity and capabilities to support a strategy for mitigating threats to plant health threats and pest introductions including:

- Early detection capabilities
- Timely, accurate, and confirmed diagnostics
- Effective containment, mitigation, and control strategies

USDA APHIS PPQ performs routine surveillance operations to investigate for pests and pathogens that pose a threat to the United States both within and at the borders. USDA APHIS PPQ uses multiple early warning systems to evaluate and prepare for plant pest and pathogen threats. These warning systems provide data that support the development of response strategies including:

- Identification and diagnostic services
- PPQ-New Pest Advisory Group assessments and recommendations
- New Pest Response Guidelines
- Formation of Incident Management Teams
- Incident Command System training, including emergency response exercises

Phase 1b and 1c (Elevated and Credible Threat)

Pests and pathogens are detected in the United States through various means from PPQ-targeted surveys, SLTT Cooperative Agriculture Pest Surveys, or by growers and private individuals. Preliminary diagnosis may occur through PPQ identifiers, taxonomists, SLTT diagnosticians, and the National Plant Diagnostic Network, unless it is an unknown plant pest and then PPQ's National Identification Service must provide the final diagnosis. As a pattern is identified that does not follow the normal spread or location of the plant pest or pathogen, USDA APHIS PPQ will initiate outreach and communication protocols with SLTT, potentially impacted industries, and trading partners. The communication includes the biological and ecological parameters of the pest and its regulatory significance, economic importance, potential impact on industries, trade implications, affected states, and other pertinent information.

Phase 2a (Immediate Response)

At the onset of response operations, USDA APHIS PPQ initiates rapid detection and delimiting surveys to facilitate the rapid containment, control, and eradication of the pest or pathogen. USDA APHIS PPQ staff, under the oversight of the state plant health director, conducts survey activities to assist in delimiting the distribution of the pest or pathogen. In the event of the introduction of an exotic pest or pathogen, PPQ's National Identification Service will provide the necessary information to provide the foundations for quarantine action decisions. After understanding the full scope of the pest or pathogen, USDA APHIS PPQ will implement regulatory measures, quarantines, and other response strategies to minimize the spread and support efforts to eradicate or eliminate the pest or pathogen.

Phase 2b (Deployment)

Upon the identification of a large-scale plant incident or plant health emergency, USDA APHIS PPQ and collaborators will activate, assemble, and transport the resources, both equipment and personnel, necessary for successful emergency response.

Phase 2c (Sustained Response)

USDA APHIS PPQ will continue response operations in coordination with federal and SLTT departments and agencies, academia, industry, and related stakeholders to minimize the spread of the plant pest or pathogen and establish regulatory and other control measures to contain or eradicate the pest or pathogen.

Phase 3 (Recovery)

Recovery operations are ongoing through response operations. USDA APHIS PPQ works with federal and SLTT departments and agencies, universities, and the private sector to develop and implement systems designed to provide long-term stability and protection from the pest or pathogen that caused the incident. The recovery activities include:

- **Long-term Protection Planning**: Long-term plans designed to prevent further domestic plant health emergencies from occurring through the use of eradication, pest mitigation, and regulatory strategies.
- **Demobilization:** The process and procedures to ensure orderly, safe, and efficient return of an incident resource to its original location and status, including the debriefing of personnel and return and inventorying of equipment and materials.
- **National Plant Disease Recovery Systems:** System to ensure tools, infrastructure, communication networks, and capacity required for mitigating the impact of plant pests or pathogens are available to allow for a reasonable level of crop production.
- **Science-based methods and technology:** Scientific assessments of methods and technologies that support recovery strategies to ensure that tools and methods are developed to achieve pest and pathogen mitigation goals.
- **Outreach:** Providing key stakeholders and interested parties as well as federal and SLTT partners with vital information on the proposals, overall progress, and available public and industry meetings to support recovery strategies.

Depending on the size, scope, and complexity of the incident and the amount of recovery support required for the incident, USDA might designate a Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator for the coordination of recovery operations with the national and SLTT entities. The standard operational coordination structure would remain the same adding in operational coordination of recovery activities as outlined in Figure 13.



Figure 13: Normal operational coordination for plant agriculture incident response remains the same, but incorporates the coordination of recovery efforts through the addition of a Federal Disaster Response Coordinator

Branch 4: Intentional Food and Agriculture Incident

This branch plan addresses the unique nature of the threat of or the intentional use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents and other hazardous contaminants against the U.S. food and agriculture sector. For the purposes of this document, these various materials are hereinafter referred to as "threat agents."

Situation

Due to current world conditions, is critical to recognize the food and agriculture infrastructure as a national security resource no less important than other defense and security capabilities. The complex structure and dispersed nature of all phases of production make it a potential target for intentional disruption by adversaries with various motivations and methods of disruption, deliberate contamination, introduction of pathogens, or espionage.

The developing technical capability and motivations of domestic and international threat actors, the threat of economic espionage and technology theft, advances in synthetic biology, and the accessibility to a multitude of existing or emerging CBRN threat agents, increases the risks for their misuse for nefarious purposes. Potential targets include: agricultural commodity production infrastructure, food processing and the credibility of food safety and security, as well as agricultural biotechnology/genomic research and development capability.

To prevent and detect intentional incidents, it is essential to continuously develop the tools to recognize threats, threat actors, and potential targets and to perform effective joint responses. When evaluating the credibility of whether suspicious, unusual, or unexplained food and agriculture incidents are intentional acts we must consider:

- what adversary would benefit from deliberate attacks
- what is the motivation, goal or desired effect, and the value gained
- what methods are available and feasible

Potential perpetrators include multiple categories of groups or individuals with varying capabilities, available technical means, and motivations:

- Non-state sponsored terrorists (radicalized political / religious / nationalist groups)
- Criminal Elements / Cartels
- State Sponsored CBRN warfare or espionage programs by foreign adversary governments
- State sponsored terrorist operations
- International corporate competitors
- Domestic
    - Terrorists (militant animal-environmental rights groups / anarchist and anti-government extremist groups)
    - Commercial or corporate competitors

  - Home Grown Violent Extremists (HVE) (self-radicalized U.S. residents recruited or directed by foreign entities)
  - Lone offenders with individual motivations
- "Insider Threats" or employees that exploit their position, credentials, trust, or employment to gain access to carry out acts of terrorism or espionage. Their employment allows special access which can bypass security protocols.

The requirements for acts of terrorism or espionage may generate recognizable triggers of suspicious behaviors and actions: 1- Perpetrator (with sufficient expertise, capability, motivation), 2- Access and ability to acquire CBRN threat agents, 3- Agricultural Target (livestock, crops, biotech, laboratories, markets, food processing, transportation, etc.), 4- Operational Capability (planning activities, training, logistics, rehearsals, personnel), 5- Access to the Target, 6- and Effective Means of Dissemination.

The first indication of an intentional incident may be the initial reports of suspicious or unusual syndromic surveillance detections and investigations of high consequence human, animal, or plant disease incidents. The ability of responders to identify and accurately report initial suspicious activity or an incident (e.g., clinical signs, necropsy findings, epidemiological investigations, and interviews) will be key to timely prevention or investigation operations (e.g., official state/USDA Foreign Animal Disease/Exotic Plant Disease Investigations or FBI/law enforcement investigations/intelligence operations).

Evidence of terrorism in an agricultural environment, is inherently fragile and may be difficult to recognize and detect. The window of opportunity to identify and report threats, suspicious activities, or unusual disease events; initiate investigations, and prevent or disrupt ongoing terrorist and/or criminal operations is limited.

The food and agriculture sector provides multiple, disparate vulnerabilities and points of access for the intentional introduction of threat agents. To facilitate threat risk analysis and incident detection, investigation, and joint response operations, agriculture production is classified into "Pre-Harvest" and "Post-Harvest" phases of production.
This differentiation is pertinent for concurrent, multi-agency criminal and epidemiological investigations between the FBI, other federal law enforcement agencies (e.g., FDA Office of Criminal Investigation [OCI] and USDA Office of Inspector General [OIG]), and the lead federal agencies (LFAs) responsible for biosurveillance, epidemiological investigations, and response operations for food and agriculture incidents (e.g., HHS, FDA, USDA FSIS, USDA APHIS). These federal interagency partners can respond as the lead or in support to other government agencies with the common mission to prevent, detect, and respond to the threat of or an intentional incident.

Pre-Harvest Agriculture Phase:

The intentional use of high consequence CBRN agents or other hazardous contaminants against pre-harvest agriculture targets (field level production of livestock, and crops) up to the point of delivery for processing into food. The intended effect is to disrupt U.S. agriculture production, the national economy, and to undermine the trust and credibility of the availability and safety of U.S. food and agriculture products.

Biological Threat	
The most credible CBRN threat to pre-harvest agriculture is the use of high consequence biological agents that specifically target production animals and crops with diseases, pests, or toxins that may have minimal or no direct effect on human health.	
Consequences: Highly contagious biological agents (unlike chemical or R/N agents) may spread exponentially beyond the initial point-source of dissemination as a result of variable disease characteristics, environmental factors, and production/marketing activities.	**Accidental, Naturally Occurring or Intentional:** The introduction of foreign, emerging, or zoonotic animal diseases; exotic plant diseases or pests; and contaminants can occur by natural incursion, accidental introduction, or as an intentional criminal or terrorist act. Due to current world threats, LFAs must not rule out intentional introductions when developing epidemiological investigation courses of action for unusual or suspicious disease events.

Chemical and Radiological/Nuclear Threat	
The threat or use of agricultural, industrial, or weapons grade chemicals and radiological/nuclear agents is feasible and includes exposure and contamination of livestock and crops as well as secondary environmental contamination of soil, water, pasture, equipment, and feed materials.	
Consequences: Multiple incidents or a single widespread event could have short- or long- term effects and deny the use of contaminated crop and pasture land. Although potentially catastrophic, the threat and effects of an intentional radiological dispersal device or deliberate release from a nuclear facility may be limited by the accessibility of R/N components, required technical capability, and patterns of release and dispersion.	**Vulnerability / Exposure:** The direct effects of chemical or R/N agents to exposed animals and plants may vary from acute mortality to minimal or undetectable clinical signs and be limited to the exposure of an individual herd, crop production unit, or premises within a defined geographical area. Contamination in asymptomatic animals or crops without apparent physical damage may only be detected by diagnostic laboratory screening techniques.

The FBI, other federal law enforcement agencies, and the Intelligence Community consider the use of all CBRN agents and hazardous contaminants as a spectrum of potential tools and methods available to state or non-state adversaries when performing threat modeling and incident credibility evaluations.

Post-Harvest Production:

The intentional contamination of post-harvest food products with various threat agents is a recognized threat that specifically targets public health and the human or animal population consuming the affected products.

Post-Harvest Threat	
Vulnerability: Contamination can occur throughout the phases of processing, storage, transportation, wholesale or retail distribution, and preparation with a multitude of points of access prior to consumption. • The introduction of CBRN agents into the phases of food processing can have potentially catastrophic effects on the human or animal population consuming contaminated food products, with both acute and chronic health effects. • As with threats to pre-harvest production, the potential use of R/N agents may be more limited due to technical requirements and availability of materials. • Biological contamination of food products is a constant risk to the production and delivery of safe and wholesome food regardless of means of introduction or sources. The deliberate introduction of pathogenic bacteria, viruses, or toxins obtained from natural, laboratory, or clandestine sources would have severe public health consequences and would be difficult to detect or prevent; especially if the perpetrator is an "insider threat" with legitimate access to processing systems.	**Consequences:** The desired effects are to generate high human casualty rates (e.g., illness, debilitation, and death) primarily through the consumption of food products intentionally contaminated with human or zoonotic biological agents, other CBRN agents (e.g., agricultural-industrial-military chemicals, toxins, and R/N materials), various available hazardous contaminants (e.g., unregulated toxic materials/compounds; physical debris such as metal, glass, or wire; or other organic/inorganic particles), and other materials that create a possible health risk or otherwise make products unfit for human consumption. • Threatened or actual acts of terrorism potentially have severe consequences to agriculture production, domestic agricultural markets, international export markets, the economic security of the greater agriculture community, the perception of food safety and food security, and the economic stability and national security of the United States. • Consequences of a terrorist event would include unanticipated security requirements, multiagency joint investigations, and simultaneous disease response and control operations from multiple lead agencies. • The degradation of the perceived security of the food supply and the

	response efforts would further tax the credibility and capabilities of the LFAs.

Law Enforcement Interaction with Responding Agencies

While the LFAs for public, animal, and plant health (HHS, FDA, USDA) are performing time-sensitive epidemiological investigations and response operations, the LFAs for law enforcement investigations (DOJ/FBI, FDA OCI, and USDA OIG) will be tasked to perform concurrent, joint criminal/terrorism investigations and response operations.

These concurrent operations will likely be performed at the same locations potentially contaminated with hazardous threat agents, involve interviewing the same witnesses, victims, or other personnel, as well as collecting diagnostic biological and environmental epidemiological samples and physical evidence for diagnostic laboratory or forensic examination.

Establishing and initiating joint public, animal, plant health, and law enforcement investigation protocols is critical for the early recognition and reporting of initial indicators/triggers of suspected or confirmed acts of terrorism and the subsequent coordinated prevention, response, and investigative operations.

Suspicious or unexplained food and agriculture incidents that are suspected of or confirmed to be a terrorist act would likely trigger psychological effects in the general public. Unsubstantiated claims, hoaxes, and inaccurate information from perpetrators: clandestine or unofficial social media sources could disrupt effective disease control operations as well as response messaging/information operations by the responsible LFAs.

Purpose

This branch plan provides supplemental information to the Food and Agriculture Incident Annex (FAIA) to define the roles and responsibilities for law enforcement and public, animal, and plant health agencies during suspected or confirmed criminal/terrorist incidents. It further describes the prevention, detection, disruption, joint criminal-epidemiological investigation, and attribution of these incidents as a critical component of the U.S. National Security posture.

The strategic end state is an enhanced awareness of threats before they manifest into incidents. This enables earlier recognition of threats and ensures that responsible investigation and response decision making is informed by intelligence, threat forecasting, and risk assessment by the responsible agencies. Early and sustained intelligence collection and analysis improves understanding of the capabilities, intention, and motivations of threat actors.

Scope

This branch plan applies to the federal response to intentional incidents against food and agriculture sector targets, regardless of size or complexity. The primary focus is a covert incident where there is an apparent need for federal and state response assistance, resource pre-positioning is limited or delayed, and the exact nature of the resource and asset requirements is undetermined. The scope of activities specifically refers to the joint criminal and epidemiological investigation and response to the threatened, suspected, or known intentional introduction and use of a CBRN agent or other hazardous contaminant. Unlike existing federal incident annexes that address the interagency response to the effects of individual CBRN agents, the FAIA

addresses the response to incidents affecting the specific food and agriculture infrastructure and the several classes of commodities. This branch plan specifically addresses the intentional use of a wide spectrum of possible CBRN agents and other contaminants from an all-hazards approach.

Facts, Planning Assumptions, and Critical Considerations

Lead Roles	
LFAs for food and agriculture (e.g., USDA, HHS, and FDA)	• Executing the spectrum of production, processing, biosecurity, safety, and quality assurance activities with either primary, supporting, or shared roles and responsibilities in the event of an intentional attack. • Agencies with the technical expertise and regulatory responsibility for these classes of agriculture and food commodities are critical to the initial detection, epidemiological investigation, and rapid reporting of unusual or suspicious incidents and the jointly recognized triggers of the possible use of threat agents. • Support requests made by the FBI Director to provide technical and logistical support for search and neutralization, WMD crime scene operations, WMD forensic evidence preservation, collection, and examination, and render safe operations within their areas of expertise and authority or in accordance with interagency agreements. • Federal and state, local, territorial, and tribal authorities (SLTT) who suspect or discover potential CBRN threats or terrorist activity should be advised, trained, and encouraged to contact their nearest FBI Field Office or the WMD Coordinator to report and resolve the threat. LFAs with responsibilities identified in the FAIA should coordinate with their state and local counterparts to participate in FBI sponsored interagency CBRNE threat and response outreach and training initiatives.
DOJ - Attorney General	• The Attorney General, generally acting through the Director of the FBI, leads and coordinates the operational law enforcement response and related investigative and intelligence activities related to imminent threats and incidents against food and agriculture infrastructure assets.
FBI - Director	• The FBI Director has the lead responsibility for: operational law enforcement response and criminal investigation of terrorist threats, or incidents in the United States and its territories. • The FBI Director has the lead responsibility for searching for: finding, and neutralizing chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) threats within the United States and its territories in response to information received through law enforcement, intelligence, or other channels. This includes search planning, operational activity and identifying, detecting, deterring, and disrupting terrorist operations before they occur. • Lead and coordinate the law enforcement, criminal investigational response, and related intelligence activities to resolve the threat through the FBI Joint Operations Center (JOC) for all suspected intentional incidents involving the suspected or known use of CBRN and other hazardous materials • Execution of threat awareness and prevention/outreach operations, intelligence operations, and the investigation of possible intentional incidents in accordance with FBI authorized CBRN risk-based assessment and crime scene investigation protocols to protect the health and safety of responders and investigators as well as to preserve critical forensic evidence.

	• The FBI has primary jurisdiction to investigate, apprehend, and prosecute those responsible for threatened or actual acts of terrorism and the intentional acquisition, manipulation, and dissemination of CBRN agents and other hazardous contaminants.
FBI - Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)	• Acting through the JTTFs the "FBI is the lead for investigative activities involving federal crimes, terrorism, espionage and domestic intelligence operations including coordination of Federal resources to respond to and assist in terrorist incidents. • Suspected federal crimes, espionage, or terrorism threat information from domestic or international sources, including suspicious activity reports (SAR) of suspected federal crimes of terrorism, will be shared with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces to expedite threat investigation and resolution. This includes performing threat credibility evaluations (TCEs) and determining the appropriate interagency prevention or response actions.
FBI On-Scene Commander (OSC)	• Leads and coordinates the overall federal operational law enforcement and investigative activities necessary to prevent and resolve imminent threats and retains the authority to take appropriate operational measures (including hostage rescue, tactical response, render safe, and bomb management operations) at any time during the response. • Oversees crime scenes and evidence management operations.
FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Coordinators	• Serve as the primary FBI points of contact and interagency liaisons for outreach with all of the local/state/regional critical infrastructure partners (e.g., law enforcement, HAZMAT/emergency management, public, animal, or plant health agencies and private food and agriculture entities). • Establish joint CBRN/WMD threat or incident reporting protocols and to develop and coordinate interagency information sharing and joint investigations capabilities regardless of the suspected or known source, means of introduction, target, or type of threat agent. • Under the oversight of the FBI OSC, may be assigned as the official case agent responsible for the tactical, operational management of a law enforcement investigation of a specific incident or continue to provide investigational expertise as the FBI liaison to the interagency Unified Command structure. • Located in all 56 FBI Field Offices and multiple resident agencies.

Facts

There are striking differences in the various phases of the production, processing, and ultimate use of pre-harvest and post-harvest agriculture and food commodities.

The primary differences are between the public health consequences of an intentional incident targeting post-harvest food products intended for human or animal consumption and the mostly economic and trade consequences of an intentional incident against pre-harvest livestock and crop production systems.

Coordination:

Attacks against animal or plant health targets will require joint responses and resource allocations from both state and federal agriculture agencies with the responsibility and authorities for disease surveillance, detection, epidemiological investigation, and response operations.

- Operational coordination with the FBI OSC is critical for risk-based operational decisions for specific incidents across the Response, Recovery, and Prevention Missions.

The incident will require a national effort to identify the potential targets or affected human populations, food products, livestock, or crops and initiate medical countermeasures, epidemiological investigations, and disease control operations as appropriate.

Consequences:

Intentional public health or food incidents may result in a large number of human and animal casualties; the resulting need for medical or veterinary services can quickly overwhelm city or state resources.

Depending on the agent, contamination may spread to uncontaminated areas from transit through the contaminated zones.

Mobilization:

Full information about a threat agent incident may not be immediately available and can take hours, days, or months to become known. Early and periodic interagency evaluations are essential for timely information sharing and the coordination of joint field investigations.

Availability and deployment will vary depending on asset status, political decisions, infrastructure availability, and other operational considerations.

Adequate federal and state resources (personnel, equipment, commodities, and materiel) capable of safe and efficient operations will require several hours of activation, staging, and deployment prior to the commencement of tactical operations.

Assumptions:

The following are planning assumptions that are supplemental to those outlined in the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs):

Nexus to Terrorism/Criminal/Espionage Incidents

- A terrorist threat or incident may occur at any time of day with little or no warning, may involve single or multiple geographic areas, and may involve the use of multiple threat agents against a variety of food and agriculture targets.
- Unusual or suspicious threats, investigations, and incidents that meet the criteria for joint interagency triggers and tripwires will be treated as an intentional act until determined otherwise.
- The types of detection may identify the initial triggers of intentional CBRN and other hazardous contamination incidents.

Triggers and Tripwires

For the purposes of this document, the following definitions are critical to the recognition and reporting of unusual or suspicious incidents:

- Triggers are the first signs or traces of characteristic behaviors, activities, or disease incidents that are recognizable as being unusual, atypical, or suspicious and suggestive of an intentional (criminal/terrorist) act.
- Tripwires are the specific, agreed-upon threshold levels of these triggers used to activate interagency notification and information sharing protocols.
- The development of interagency tripwire initiatives establishes a mechanism for the timely reporting of these triggers and is critical to rule in or rule out potential links to

criminal/terrorist actions at the earliest possible opportunity and to notify partner food, agriculture, and law enforcement/intelligence agencies.

- **Joint Operations for Investigations until a Determination is Made on Intentional Act:**
  - Initial determination of whether a suspected intentional incident is a criminal or terrorist act may not be readily apparent, therefore, law enforcement investigations and responses will be joint operations by the FBI, the USDA Office of Inspector General, and/or the FDA Office of Criminal Investigation until it is determined that a link to terrorism does or does not exist.
  - If a nexus to terrorism is suspected or identified, the FBI will be the lead law enforcement/investigatory agency. If no terrorist link can be determined, the FBI will defer further criminal investigations to USDA OIG or FDA OCI depending on the affected phases of food or agriculture production and will continue in a supporting role
- **Incident Detection:** Detection will occur through one of the following methods:
  - Field intelligence and threat information reports
  - Criminal and epidemiological investigations of unusual or suspicious activities or disease incidents.
  - Syndromic surveillance by state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT); federal, public, animal, and plant health authorities
  - Biosurveillance from human/animal/plant disease field investigations by private practitioners and official epidemiological investigators
  - Mandatory state and federal agency lists of reportable diseases
- **Mutual Aid:** Neighboring and host states may withhold emergency services resources to ensure that sufficient capability exists to secure their own jurisdictions.

Critical Considerations for Crisis Action Planning:

Intentional Incidents: Unlike the interagency planning and operational response protocols to incidents involving specific CBRN materials (e.g., Biological Incident Annex, Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, and Oil/Chemical Incident Annex) the variety of possible intentional food and agriculture scenarios may involve one or more, but are not limited to, the following characteristics:

- **Non-contagious biological agent:** Not all biological agents are transmissible between individual humans, animals, or plants. In these circumstances, disease may be limited to those immediately exposed during an intentional dissemination; however, exposures could occur from exposure to residual biological agents in the environment or through cross-contamination.
- **Contagious biological agent:** Some biological agents are highly contagious and may be readily transmitted, resulting in the spread of disease beyond the initial premises, herd, or geographic area of the attack. Subsequently, livestock, crops, or humans infected during the initial attack as well as cross-contaminated equipment, vehicles, and other fomites may spread infection beyond the original point-source of dissemination; thus, the area at risk may expand across state and international borders. It is critical that public, animal, and plant health as well as criminal investigators share information in order to contain and stop ongoing or planned attacks.

- **Chemical agents:** The intentional use of chemical agents can range from contamination of human food or livestock feed in storage and during production; direct or indirect dissemination targeting livestock, crops, and humans; and small or large scale deliberate spills or releases from commercial or clandestine production or storage facilities.

The chemical products for intentional use can vary from readily available over-the-counter commercial products, toxic agriculture or industrial chemicals, illicit street drugs, illicit and gray market pharmaceuticals, military grade chemical warfare agents, or various improvised chemical agents manufactured in clandestine facilities. Criminal and epidemiological investigations in these incidents require the use of appropriate WMD/CBRN operations protocols to protect investigators and response personnel.

Secondary exposures could also occur from contact with residual chemical agents in the environment or through cross-contamination of personnel, equipment, or vehicles.

Radiological/nuclear agents (R/N): The intentional use of R/N materials could potentially have long term catastrophic effects depending on the type and grade of material used, isotope half-lives, and methods of dissemination. Most exposure scenarios would be secondary to an accidental incident or the intentional release from (1) radiological dispersion devices, (2) a security breach and release from a nuclear facility, (3) the detonation of a nuclear device, and (4) the theft and release of weapons or industrial grade R/N materials.

Intentional releases and dissemination of R/N agents could directly contaminate soil, water sources, livestock feed, pastures and forage, livestock, crops, and human food products and also deny the use of large livestock and crop production areas either for years, decades, or permanently depending on the characteristics of the materials.

Criminal and epidemiological investigations in these incidents requires the use of appropriate WMD/CBRN operations protocols to protect investigators and response personnel from direct or secondary exposures to residual R/N agents in the environment or through cross-contamination.

Delayed initiation of public, animal, and plant disease control/eradication operations	
Risk	• Delayed reporting can allow terrorist, criminal, or espionage operations to continue undetected resulting in more rapid and widespread disease transmission well beyond the original point of introduction. The delay of hours to days can have exponentially greater negative consequences to the U.S. economy and national security.
Management	• Ensure incident annex triggers are formally tracked as critical information requirements. • Enforce joint operations and information sharing among the LFA and law enforcement agencies.
Delayed Attribution and Communication of Intentional Act	
Risk	• The intentional introduction of a threat agent may be initially difficult to discern from an accidental or naturally occurring incident resulting in separate law enforcement, public, animal, and plant health investigations. • Uncoordinated investigations and response operations can impede mutual situational awareness and effective communication between the disciplines,

	delay attribution, and miss the opportunity to prevent/disrupt criminal or terrorist actions.
Management	• Perform concurrent and coordinated joint criminal-epidemiological investigations to facilitate more rapid attribution of intentional CBRN incidents (e.g., identify threat agents, sources, perpetrators, motivations, and means of dissemination) and prevent or reduce further harm to the food and agriculture sector • Execute FBI, CDC, and USDA concepts and protocols to perform Public, Animal, and Plant Health Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations of unusual or suspicious CBRN incidents include: o Interagency Relationships Joint Prevention/Threat Awareness o Joint Trigger/Tripwire Reporting Initiatives and time sensitive Alert Notification Protocols o Joint Threat Assessments (Threat Credibility Evaluation(TCE)) o Joint Information Sharing o Joint Investigations o Joint Memorandum of Understanding/Interagency Agreements o Joint Training (example: FBI-USDA Animal-Plant Health Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations Course, FBI WMD Coordinator sponsored interagency agroterrorism working groups, state and local law enforcement CBRNE courses, table top and field exercises)
Mitigate Mobilization Delays through Information Sharing	
Risk	• Immediate alert notification and information sharing of the detection of jointly recognized trigger and tripwire incidents is critical to mitigate expected delays in the deployment of responding assistance
Management	• Identify threshold levels to notify interagency partners of disease and law enforcement triggers and the follow-on information sharing protocols should be low. • Early consideration of a possible intentional incident and the initiation of a joint threat credibility evaluation (TCE) is essential to prevent, detect, and disrupt planned or ongoing criminal or terrorist operation, despite the fact that initial incident reports and investigational information may be limited or incomplete.
Simultaneous Operational Mission Requirements	
Risk	• Multiple interagency missions will, by necessity, occur simultaneously
Management	• Establishment of a UCG in an active and fluid situation requires both initial and sustained interagency coordination (e.g., criminal/terrorism and epidemiological investigations; CBRNE incident response operations; intelligence/ counterterrorism operations; crime scene investigations; disease control/eradication operations; and continuity, response, and recovery operations).
Locations as Crime Scenes	
Risk	• The location of a suspected or actual intentional incident will be treated as a federal crime scene. Due to the environment, ongoing farming or processing operations, and the method of attack, the crime scene and forensic evidence may be minimal, fragile, and not appear out of the ordinary.

	• Materials and equipment used to transport and disseminate threat agents may go unnoticed and be commonly found in livestock/crop production operations or food processing facilities.
Management	• Ensure that public, animal, and plant health investigators as well as response and recovery personnel recognize and preserve possible crime scenes and evidence during epidemiological investigations of suspicious or unusual disease incidents. • Criminal and epidemiological investigations training for the public, animal, and plant health investigators
Need to Preserve Crime Scenes and Evidence	
Risk	• The early recognition, preservation, and collection of evidence is critical to determine the identity of culpable parties or information of additional planned attacks.
Management	• Coordinate and ensure CBRN/WMD crime scene investigations follow approved FBI WMD operations guidelines and protocols to: (1) Perform risk assessments to protect criminal and epidemiological investigators from unknown CBRNE threats and secondary explosives devices. (2) Preserve and collect contaminated physical/forensic evidence for examination, characterization, and later prosecution. (3) Field screen evidence for chemical/radiological/nuclear agent contamination before submission to animal, plant, and public health diagnostic network laboratories and forensic/analytical laboratories (FBI or partner agencies). (4) Prevent secondary cross contamination of equipment, evidence, personnel, and spread outside of the crime scene. (5) Transport evidence to a laboratory capable of forensic examination of contaminated evidence. (6) Follow approved forensic evidence chain-of-custody protocols.
Responder Safety	
Risk	• Federal agencies with defined investigation and response missions and responsibilities for CBRN incidents must ensure the safety, physical, and behavioral health of their assigned response and recovery personnel (including contract workers).
Management	• Determine and distribute MCMs as required/directed • Determine/provide guidance on use of MCMs (e.g., antimicrobials, vaccines, and immunotherapeutics) • Determine appropriate behavioral health service to provide responders
Immediate Public Information Is Warranted	
Risk	• Timely and situationally appropriate information sharing and messaging operations are critical to address the concerns of the public and provide guidance and recommended response measures for the LFAs for public, animal, and plant health and law enforcement.

Management	• Guidelines for media releases related to joint investigative activities requires mutually agreed upon and coordinated through a Unified Command Joint Information Center (JIC). • Information concerning a suspected or actual intentional incident will not be released without coordination with and approval from each agency conducting investigations and ongoing response operations.
Indeterminate location(s)	
Risk	• The location of an intentional incident provides critical intelligence value to determine the identity of the perpetrators as well as their methods of operations. This information may help law enforcement stop ongoing or future CBRN attacks; however, the location may not be immediately known
Management	• Public, animal, and plant health agencies should coordinate and share information with the FBI and federal law enforcement agencies responsible for leading law enforcement investigations, counterterrorism, and intelligence activities to identify possible locations associated with the attack. • Evaluate all suspicious, unusual, or suspected intentional incidents as defined by the FAIA, Presidential and Congressional Policy directives, interagency agreements, and joint protocols to determine if there is a credible criminal/terrorist threat. • Treat all highly suspicious or suspected intentional incidents as terrorist threats until determined otherwise as the effects of the intentional acquisition, manipulation, and dissemination of threat agents may be indistinguishable from a naturally occurring or an accidental public, animal, or plant health incident.
Multiple attacks	
Risk	• Criminal and epidemiological personnel may be required to respond concurrently to multiple incidents in multiple locations possibly involving more than one threat agent or other hazardous contaminant.
Management	• Utilize pre-existing joint interagency capabilities, protocols, and resources for effective prevention and response to threats. • Assist and coordinate with the prevention mission area to plan and prepare for multiple threat locations.
Multiple areas	
Risk	• The effect of a threat agent may be temporally and geographically dispersed with no readily identifiable or defined “incident site.”
Management	• Close coordination between criminal and epidemiological investigators may provide critical information needed to detect pending or ongoing attacks and to identify a possible crime scene location • Intelligence analysis and linking unrelated but similar reports and investigations is critical for the recognition of a complex attack.

Execution

In response to an intentional incident, immediate response actions must focus on protection and stabilization of public, animal, and plant health, continuity of operations for food and agriculture infrastructure, and activation of interagency protocols for alert notification, information sharing, TCEs, and joint criminal-epidemiological investigations.

Operational phases for the response to and recovery from an incident vary based upon the size, scope, and complexity of the incident. The FAIA base annex provides an overview of the default posture. For an intentional incident, Response, Recovery, and Prevention Mission activities are interdependent and often concurrent. The phases detailed below are where certain actions during an intentional incident may diverge from actions detailed in the base FAIA.

Phase 1a (Normal Operations)

- Phase 1a activities include industry, interagency, and public preparedness messaging, educational outreach operations, general threat awareness and trigger recognition, and training of emergency responders to develop and recognize the joint triggers and report tripwire detections associated with the detection of and response to an incident.

    Examples are:
    - the FBI-USDA Animal-Plant Health Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations Course;
    - the FBI-CDC (Public Health) Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations Course;
    - WMD Coordinator-Sponsored One Health and Agroterrorism Working Groups;
    - FBI, state-local CBRNE awareness training courses (State and Local Law Enforcement, HAZMAT, public health, and agriculture sector agencies);
    - monthly Ag-Intelligence Meetings;
    - Joint FBI Field Office – Public Health MOUs;
    - Joint FBI, USDA APHIS, USDA OIG, USDA FSIS, HHS/CDC, FDA, and EPA MOUs and agreements and outreach programs to public, animal, and plant health agencies, food and agriculture industry groups, and university programs;
    - the FBI and law enforcement are constantly vigilant for threats of terrorism, including CBRNE incidents;
    - the public, animal, and plant health community and emergency management officials should work closely with law enforcement regarding positioning resources and appropriate capabilities in the case of an intentional CBRN threat or incident

Key Investigative Information

- Determination of a suspected or confirmed threat through the FBI's TCE process.
- Alert notification of suspicious or unusual incidents utilizing joint criminal-epidemiological investigation protocols between partnered public, animal, and plant health and law enforcement agencies (e.g., existing interagency agreements between FBI WMD Directorate, FBI Laboratory Division, FBI Field Offices, USDA APHIS, USDA

FSIS, USDA OIG, FDA, and HHS/CDC Joint Criminal-Epidemiological Investigations/Select Agent programs, state departments of agriculture, and state public health departments).

- Clinical recognition of key syndromic signs and symptoms by public, animal, and plant health investigators and private medical/veterinary healthcare providers.
- Presumptive or confirmed laboratory diagnosis of high consequence human, animal, or plant pathogens or other hazardous materials indicative of an intentional act.
- Disease surveillance activities suggest a suspicious pattern that may indicate an intentional act.
- Threat information from field intelligence operations, Guardian, criminal investigations, and other FBI and law enforcement CBRN threat reporting and outreach programs.
- Sensitive information shared between the LFAs (e.g. FBI, USDA, FDA) will be classified, declassified, and safeguarded according to Executive Order 13526, Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1, and handled appropriately as prescribed by the originating agency and with the concurrence of the other agencies.
- Joint interagency notifications of the detection of public, animal, or plant health triggers, law enforcement/intelligence triggers, and interagency tripwire reports of suspicious incidents are highly sensitive and critical to the recognition of possible intentional criminal or terrorist operations.
    - This information, as well as that of associated epidemiological and criminal/counterterrorism investigations, as stated in existing interagency agreements, will be handled as "For Official Use Only (FOUO) // Market and Law Enforcement Sensitive."
    - The additional classification caveats limit the distribution to those personnel and elements with an operational need-to-know requirement for joint investigations.

Recognition of an Intentional Incident

The FBI and law enforcement agencies are constantly vigilant for threats or intentional incidents using CBRN, explosive devices, and other hazardous contaminants. The public, animal, and plant health community and emergency management officials should work closely with law enforcement to position resources and develop appropriate capabilities for the investigation of and response to the detection of an intentional incident. Threat information is provided through a variety of sources, including open source, private sector, SLTT partners, federal departments and agencies, the intelligence community, or from foreign governments. Important informational or decisional points for each of the various phases of response, which may point to a suspected or actual intentional incident, are addressed below.

Triggers and Tripwires

During the course of daily operations, public, animal, and plant health and law enforcement agencies may receive reports of suspicious disease incidents and activities that could indicate early or ongoing criminal/terrorist/espionage operations operations. These reports may be the first recognizable trigger and should be communicated between the partner agencies in an appropriate, timely manner to facilitate a joint investigation and response.

Triggers can be indicators of overt or covert actions by individuals, groups, and state or non-state sponsored programs, or non-specific intelligence and information of suspicious or unexplainable disease incidents. These may include detection of suspicious or unusual clinical signs and

necropsy findings from syndromic surveillance programs, during official State/USDA Foreign Animal Disease/Exotic Plant Disease Investigations, or from law enforcement investigations/intelligence operations).

Through the use of interagency tripwire initiatives, the following list of incident triggers can be used to prompt interagency operational elements to share information and initiate joint investigative protocols. These key indicators can either originate from epidemiological investigations of suspected or confirmed disease incidents or from law enforcement and intelligence operations and evidence potentially linked to a developing threat or attack.

Public, Animal, and Plant Health Triggers

- Presumptive or confirmed diagnosis of high consequence human, zoonotic, foreign or emerging animal diseases, or exotic plant pests and diseases
- Unusual or suspicious syndromic surveillance detections:
  - Highly suspicious Foreign Animal Disease/Emerging Disease Investigations (e.g., Priority 1 and Priority A submissions)
  - Highly suspicious Public Health Epidemiological Investigations
  - Unusual Exotic Plant Pathogen Investigations
- Simultaneous or progressive outbreaks of unusual or suspicious human, zoonotic, emerging or foreign animal diseases, or exotic plant pests or pathogens in multiple locations with no epidemiological link.
- Unusual increase in the number of sick or dying animals or plants, including disease outbreaks or reports of dead animals at a strategic, iconic, or other target of interest.
- Large numbers of animals and humans with similar, unexplained clinical signs or symptoms or outbreaks of disease that are associated with high morbidity or mortality.
- Multiple unusual or unexplained diseases in the same animal or herd and human populations.
- Disease with an unusual geographic or seasonal distribution or atypical signs and clinical presentations.
- Similar genetic type among biological agents from geographically distinct sources.
- Identification of an unusual, atypical, genetically engineered, or antiquated strain of a biological agent.
- Unexplained increase in incidence of endemic diseases or changes in virulence of clinical signs and susceptible species.
- Simultaneous suspected or confirmed outbreaks of the same disease in animals and people.

Law Enforcement Triggers

Overt:

- A public declaration of a threat, a crime, or the intention to commit a crime against U.S. food and agriculture.
- An overt increased activity or protest against a specific agriculture target.
- Claims of responsibility for visible acts, or detection of developing or on-going criminal/terrorist/espionage acts.

Covert:

- Suspects apprehended with agriculturally significant threat agent dissemination devices, processing equipment, or equipment for preserving and transporting various threat agents or other hazardous materials.
- Efforts to avoid/violate prohibited dual-use material import/export restrictions.
- Notifications received regarding reports of threats or unusual activity at livestock/crop production facilities and farms, food processing and production facilities, markets and transportation systems, animal-plant disease diagnostic laboratories, biotechnology research/development laboratories (corporate, university, or state/federal), commercial agricultural equipment, vaccine, and other biotechnology production facilities.
- Reports or intelligence of potential "Insider Threat" operations at food and agriculture sector laboratories, research, production, or processing facilities.
- Suspicious or unexplained Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services Select Agent and Toxin Program (Division of Select Agents and Toxins/Agriculture Select Agent Services) discrepancy reports.
- Any intelligence of or indication that individuals, groups, or organizations are unlawfully in possession of or attempting to acquire high-consequence human, animal, or plant disease agents.
- Identification or seizure of literature pertaining to the production or dissemination of threat agents affecting human, animal, or plant health.
- Any intelligence or field assessments that indicates that a credible threat exists against food and agriculture infrastructure targets.
- Intelligence of or detection of a novel pathogen, chemical agent, or radiological material suspected or known to be developed by or used by a state or non-state sponsored adversary.
- FBI Hazardous Evidence Response Team or state/local hazmat investigations and crime scene operations that involve the discovery of human, animal, or plant CBRN agents or other hazardous contaminants (e.g., clandestine laboratory investigations) .
- Actions identified by intelligence sources, the recognition of operational planning and development activities, or evidence of an attack through the detection and attribution of human, animal, and plant diseases or other CBRN threat agents.

Phase 1b and 1c (Elevated Threat and Credible Threat)

Phase 1b and 1c (Elevated Threat and Credible Threat) involve employing preventive capabilities to detect threat materials (to include CBRN and other hazardous contaminants) at the point of manufacture, transportation, and use and to identify the nature of material through adjudication or resolution of the detection alarm. The Department of Justice (DOJ), through the FBI, is the lead agency during these two phases. HHS, USDA, or FDA would serve as the lead agencies to advise and to support the crisis management activities of the DOJ/FBI in medical, public health, and animal/plant health matters relevant to the use of CBRN materials and other hazardous contaminants.

- Discovering and locating threats may be accomplished through active and passive surveillance and search procedures, the use of systematic examinations and assessments, and physical investigations and intelligence.

- Suspected intentional threats and incidents are immediately evaluated to determine whether the threat is credible. Law enforcement personnel may be confronted with a number of situations involving the actual or threatened use of a material as a weapon. These can range from non-credible threats (hoaxes), announcements or indications that a release of an agent has occurred (overt), or unannounced releases of an agent (covert)
- No single agency, department, or level of government can independently complete a threat picture of all terrorism and national security threats.
    - With this in mind, intentional threat intelligence and information sharing involves engagement across SLTT, federal, private sector, and international partners to facilitate the collection, analysis, and sharing of suspicious activity reports to facilitate the identification and prevention of terrorist threats; enhance situational awareness of threats, alerts, and warnings; and develop and disseminate risk assessments and analysis of national intelligence to SLTT and private sector partners and across mission areas as appropriate.

Figure 3 is an example of an operational construct that could be used in phases 1b through 1c. Phase 1c begins with the determination of a credible threat, through the use of the Threat Credibility Evaluation (TCE). All suspected terrorist threat information concerning the food and agriculture infrastructure will be assessed through a timely TCE. The TCE is a real-time interagency conference call between field level investigators, HQ –national level assets, and food and agriculture SME's to assess the credibility of the threat and associated adversarial intent, operational practicability, and technical feasibility. The FBI may contact various federal and SLTT subject matter experts (SMEs) to assist in assessing threat credibility. The TCE results inform the Protection and Prevention response. After the threat has been deemed credible, the FBI will determine courses of action such as how to best collect and analyze the evidence, including CBRN environmental samples. Led by the FBI, the interagency Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategic Group (WMDSG) provides a mechanism for information sharing support to strategic decision making and coordination of operations during a suspected or intentional incident requiring investigation into the incident's association with an actual or potential terrorist threat.

Notification of an Intentional Incident

Law enforcement personnel may be confronted with a number of situations involving the actual or threatened use of a CBRN agent, explosive device, or other hazardous material as a weapon. These can range from non-credible threats (hoaxes), announcements or indications that a release of an agent has occurred (overt), or detections of previously unannounced releases of an agent (covert). Notification of the triggers of a suspicious incident requires response personnel to develop and initiate a number of communication channels including: interagency memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and joint information sharing protocols, agroterrorism working groups, development of agricultural threat tripwire initiatives, and participation in JTTFs, Intelligence Fusion Centers, and the FBI INFRAGARD program. InfraGard is a partnership between the FBI and members of the private sector. The InfraGard program provides a vehicle for seamless public-private collaboration with government that expedites the timely exchange of information and promotes mutual learning opportunities relevant to the protection of Critical Infrastructure.

Conduct a Law Enforcement Investigation

The occurrence of an intentional food and agriculture incident may result in an emergency that overwhelms SLTT capabilities and undoubtedly requires a whole community approach. Joint law enforcement and epidemiological investigation responsibilities extend across the spectrum of disease incident operations. The initial reporting and epidemiological investigation of a suspicious or unusual incident involving food and agriculture production operations is potentially the earliest indicator of a criminal/terrorist/espionage incident. Table 7 outlines key decisions for intentional acts.

The activation of joint alert notification, information sharing, and investigation protocols is critical to prevent, disrupt, or minimize the effects of an attack on the food and agriculture infrastructure and is based upon the triggers and tripwire initiatives defined by agreements between the lead departments and agencies. The delayed or failed consideration that the detection of a suspicious or unusual incident (e.g., animal, plant, or zoonotic disease or other hazardous contamination incident) is a potential developing or ongoing terrorist attack will dramatically affect the size, scope, and consequence management requirements by the LFAs responsible for food and agriculture incidents (FDA, HHS, USDA).

Table 7: Key Decisions for Intentional Acts

Topic	Decision Point
Conduct Investigations	• All suspicious incidents are rapidly evaluated to determine if they involve the nefarious use of CBRN agents and are possibly linked to terrorism. • Perform a TCE conference call between key field and headquarters investigations personnel initiated and led by the FBI WMD Operations Response Unit. No other authority will be the lead to hold a TCE other than the FBI. • Determine at FBI Headquarters and/or FBI Field Offices the need to initiate and conduct an official law enforcement investigation in conjunction with an ongoing public, animal, and plant health epidemiological investigation.
Reporting and Information Sharing	• Report confirmed high consequence reportable human, animal, or plant diseases or pests to appropriate international health organizations in accordance with federal agency (USDA, HHS, or FDA) and international regulations and protocols. • Once the report of a criminal/epidemiological threat trigger of a potential intentional incident is received, the FBI will perform an interagency TCE and either initiate a law enforcement investigation if appropriate or continue to monitor/evaluate the credibility of the potential threat in coordination with the agencies performing the epidemiological investigation. • Share information with the Federal LFAs (USDA, FDA, HHS, and EPA) and SLTT in order to determine potential public, animal, and plant health and environmental impacts. Early joint threat assessment and course of action development is critical in cases of undetermined but suspicious threat agent incidents.
Coordination Support	• Determination at FBI Headquarters and/or FBI Field Offices to conduct a counterterrorism response and the standup of the FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategy Group (WMDSG). • Make recommendations concerning possible deployment and composition of the Domestic Emergency Response Team (DEST). • Notify FEMA and coordinate the Consequence Management Coordination Unit (CMCU) support to the FBI WMDSG's counterterrorism response to a suspected or actual intentional incident. • Determine the stand down of the DEST, WMDSG, and CMCU to transition to long-term recovery operations.

Support and Coordination Elements:

To facilitate federal interagency coordination and information sharing during an incident (Figure 14) several support and operational coordination elements are utilized. These elements, combined with the additional critical response assets, resources, and teams, represent unique or critical federal CBRNE capabilities that support federal, state, and local response and recovery operations.

Domestic Emergency Support Team: The DEST is a specialized, rapidly deployable interagency team that augments the FBI's JOC. As part of its mission, the DEST supports the FBI OSC and other officials to integrate and prioritize consequence management decisions

within the operational space of the Prevention Mission. The team supports the FBI OSC through a JOC WMD desk and maintains connectivity with the JOC Consequence Management Group and the CMCU. The DEST also provides the FBI OSC with expert advice and guidance to shape prevention operations in order to save lives and protect property. Team composition includes FEMA, FBI, DOD, HHS Office for the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, DOE, EPA, and others as may be appropriate. Based upon the threat and requirements, the FBI determines the composition of the DEST and maintains operational control throughout its activation predicated upon an interagency developed and proposed composition. The FEMA Administrator is responsible for policies and planning governing the team and for facilitating approval for its deployment.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategic Group (WMDSG): The FBI-led interagency WMDSG crisis action team is activated within the Strategic Information and Operations Center. It supports information exchange and deconfliction of counterterrorism activities to resolve imminent WMD terrorist threats while simultaneously coordinating with the nationwide effort to save lives; minimize harm to public, animal, and plant health; and to protect the food and agriculture sector. The WMDSG, through its collection of interagency representatives, facilitates the application of real time investigative information, intelligence, and technical analysis to WMD counterterrorism (WMD-CT) law enforcement operations; facilitates the identification and acquisition of interagency assets that could support WMD-CT law enforcement operations; and enhances WMD-CT investigative information/intelligence sharing and synchronization of law enforcement operations with counterterrorism-related public health, homeland protection, and consequence management activities. Counterterrorism and consequence management activities may occur simultaneously.

Consequence Management Coordination Unit (CMCU): FEMA staffs and manages the CMCU, which is the principal advisory unit for consequence management considerations within the WMDSG and provides strategic recommended and integrated courses of action in light of ongoing and evolving counterterrorism operations. The CMCU is supported by federal technical capabilities provided through DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration, HHS, DOD, and DHS. The CMCU responsibilities include:

- Coordination of the identification of potential threats to impacted populations and the food and agriculture infrastructure,
- Identification of potential preparatory actions to reduce those risks to life and property by lessening the impact of the event,
- Positioning the response community to be able to respond should the event occur.

Phase 2 (Response)

Phase 2 begins the implementation of the initial response whereby DOJ/FBI retains the lead in crisis management (e.g., identify the scope and nature of the threat and conducting ongoing investigative and intelligence activity), but HHS, USDA, or FDA in a large-scale incident may establish a Unified Coordination Group with federal departments/agencies with equities in the same core capabilities identified for naturally occurring/unintentional incidents. Implementation of public, animal, and plant health response operations and delivery of critical operational response services and materials (e.g., Strategic National Stockpile or National Veterinary Stockpile) and the implementation of a Recovery Support Strategy for affected food and agriculture industries, resources, production capability, and affected populations are consequence

management operations and the responsibility of the appropriate lead food and agriculture agencies.



Figure 14: Operational Construct for Intentional Food and Agriculture Incident

Phase 2a (Immediate Response)

This phase is dominated by efforts to provide accurate and credible information to affected individuals, food and agriculture entities, and state and federal public, animal, and plant health agency partners. In addition, law enforcement and counterterrorism operations are now actively underway.

The Prevention Mission will work to fully identify the scope and nature of the threat such as previously unknown targets or attacks, threat network resources, additional threat agents, and development/delivery systems. This will include conducting ongoing investigative and intelligence activities to further identify and update information and intelligence of the threat, associated networks, sites, and suspected or identified threat materials, etc. These actions may also be taken to verify or characterize the threat of materials or weapons that have already been located. Finally, the White House Director of Communications will coordinate risk communication strategies by implementing the Domestic Communications Strategy.

Phase 2b (Deployment)

This phase begins with the implementation and deployment of law enforcement response-related resources (Hazardous Evidence Response Team personnel, CBRNE response and contaminated crime scene equipment, and operational criminal investigation command and control resources).

Phase 2c (Sustained Response)

As response operations transition to recovery, the law enforcement and counterterrorism response will likely continue (assuming the threat has not been fully neutralized), and the overall incident response begins to enter a sustained, long-term operation. The delivery of public,

animal, and plant health response will correspond to plans for the respective branch to this annex (food, animal agriculture, or plant agriculture incidents). Branch planning will also guide Phase 3, especially in cases where a Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator is appointed. A Mission Scoping Assessment and Recovery Support Strategy will be developed as needed to address the scope and complexity of the incident and subsequent short and long-term effects on the food and agriculture sector.

Transition from Counterterrorism Response to Consequence Management

The completion of the response to a possible or actual intentional incident will be determined by the unique aspects and magnitude of each situation. The timeline required to neutralize the criminal element will vary greatly. The criminal investigative end state will transition the response efforts from counterterrorism activities into consequence management. The FBI, in conjunction with FEMA, will use ongoing critical information sources to provide situational awareness to facilitate the gradual stand down of several groups.

Appendix 1: Policy and Capability Development Topics

This appendix presents some important areas that require additional attention of which stakeholders should be aware. Attempts to address these issues early will likely mitigate potential negative impacts.

Federal-to-Federal Support

Federal-to-federal support may not be mandatory under the National Response Framework (NRF) during a non-Stafford Act Incident such as a food or agriculture incident. Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) and Interagency Agreements (IAA) remain required and may cause delays in requested support to a lead federal department or agency.

Waste and Carcass Management[9]

In the event of a large-scale animal agriculture incident, sufficient waste and carcass management resources will be required to manage large quantities of carcass, infectious biomass, and other waste materials that result from ongoing response operations. These required resources must be available to handle all waste management needs while minimizing the environmental impacts and preventing further spread of the disease to non-infected or native animal populations.

Several policy options will require further development or leadership action during an incident.

Waste Management Decision Support Tools and Training

- Responders should leverage the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) decision support tool and the EPA's All Hazards Waste Management Planning Tool (www.epa.gov/homeland-security-waste)
  - These tools help responders to understand and minimize the amount of protein needing disposal, determine which of the available disposal options is best for the current waste management needs, and leverage all available onsite disposal options prior to initiating any infectious or contaminated biomass transport to an alternate disposal site.
  - USDA's disposal options tool is established and well validated for use in determining the best disposal method for biomass and other animal related waste.
  - EPAs tool provides an integrated all hazards approach as part of a community response.
  - Both of these tools outline multiple options to support carcass management and disposal issues. While these tools provide additional information to responders, they do not fully resolve the bio management needs that will be required during a large-scale animal agriculture incident.

[9] In the case of a mass incident, resulting from suspected terrorism or other criminal activity, animal remains and plant material may be deemed of evidentiary value. For suspected or actual terrorist incidents, the FBI On-Scene Commander has primary responsibility to conduct, direct, oversee crime scenes, their security, and evidence management; including fatalities management, through all phases of the response, managed through a FBI Joint Operations Center.

- Tools and training programs need may be developed to support waste and carcass management emergency response planning at the state local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) levels of government. Typically, SLTT emergency managers focus on the immediate needs of response including disease management and animal or public health concerns.
    - SLTT use of response tools and training programs for carcass management may help to clearly outline and plan for the carcass and waste management resources that will be required during an animal agriculture incident.
    - The identification of available waste management sites throughout a state and designate the appropriate regulations regarding waste management will allow the emergency responders to identify appropriate disposal sites while minimizing the risk of environmental contamination or further spread of disease or other threat agent from transport.
    - Continued USDA development of training for carcass and waste management issues during response.

Waste Disposal Agreements

- Carcass and waste management practices require agreements with waste disposal sites prior to disposing waste. During an incident, SLTT agencies may develop agreements to allow for the disposal of carcass and other infectious or contaminated biomass and waste products.
- Agreements in place prior to the incident are non-binding and may require renegotiation during the incident.
- USDA coordination with national waste management associations may enable national level agreements and issues unique to large animal agriculture incidents.
- USDA coordination of a national level outreach campaign with national waste management associations, state and territorial solid waste management associations, and waste management industry groups to ensure that waste management industries have the necessary information regarding the safety and potential environmental impacts associated with disposing carcass and other waste by-products from response operations.

Waste Disposal Sites

- The disposal sites required for carcass and waste management could exceed available space for disposal within the state or in other nearby facilities regardless of the agreements that are in place.
- Emergency responders and policy-makers performance of a real-time evaluation of disposal policies to determine the best path forward for efficient and environmentally safe disposal of waste from response operations with the goal to minimize the amount of protein needing disposal or slowing the flow of waste to disposal sites.
- USDA coordination to ensure that SLTT agriculture and environmental officials have the necessary information regarding the safety and potential environmental impacts associated with disposing carcass and other waste by-products from response operations within their region.

Coordination of Surge Veterinarians and Animal Health Technicians

Emergency response operations during a large-scale animal agriculture incident need sufficient veterinarians and animal health technicians to manage the ongoing animal health and animal care issues as well as the additional testing and diagnostics that support the detection of disease or

identification of the threat agent. Current licensing regulations are managed at the SLTT-level and veterinarians and animal health technicians are licensed in states rather than regions or nationally.

Surge Support Options

- During a large-scale animal agriculture incident, USDA may leverage external resources they have developed to provide the necessary surge support to state assets already available for response.
- USDA will use state assets first and provide federal support to SLTT response as necessary
    - These external resources are finite in numbers and may not provide sufficient animal health response resources should the incident span multiple regions and jurisdictions.
- USDA may request assistance from the HHS National Veterinary Response Team or Department of the Interior (DOI).
- USDA may also request surge support from the DOD which may provide assistance through general purpose forces or DOD Veterinary Services during the incident.
    - However, expertise from these veterinarians may not be specific to the affected livestock and poultry diseases and require pre-existing agreements to be in place for a non-Stafford Act incident.

State Licensure Agreements and Waivers

State licensure boards require specific qualifications in order to practice veterinary medicine or be a veterinary technician in each state, if the veterinarian or technician are not federally employed. During a large-scale incident, an out-of-state veterinarian not employed by the Federal Government may not be licensed to work in a state affected by the incident. The Federal and State Governments may need to continue to work with state licensure boards for veterinarians and technicians to allow responders to leverage out-of-state resources through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact during an animal agriculture incident. Each state must establish these agreements and blanket waivers to allow licensed veterinarians and technicians from any state or federal agency to support incident response under emergency conditions.

Recovery from an Intentional Act

In the event of a terrorist attack or intentional incident, law enforcement agencies may be unable to identify and/or prosecute a responsible party or the perpetrator of the incident may be financially unable to cover all losses from the incident. Under these circumstances, there are few defined options to support recovery and additional policy decisions are required to facilitate recovery from a large-scale food or agriculture incident.

Under normal circumstances, industry will coordinate the sanitization, decontamination, and other remediation actions to resume normal business operations as well as reroute supply chains to minimize the effects on demand for the affected commodity. Industry will be able to initiate these actions immediately with a direct focus on maintaining business continuity and does not immediately draw on government resources for support. However, given the cost of recovery and

the extent of contamination that is present from the incident, industry may opt to close a facility or business instead of managing high remediation costs. These decisions may result in the affected business or facility closing, localized economic hardship including job loss and economic losses to associated businesses, and abandoned contaminated facilities that pose a threat to human, animal, and environmental health.

Appendix 2: Wildlife Animal Interface

This appendix describes the support that can be provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Department of the Interior (DOI) to the Lead Federal Agency for an agriculture incident in which a disease is transmitted to wildlife. Many animal diseases are a threat to multiple species including domestic animals and pets, commercial livestock and poultry, to wildlife and other exotic and protected species. Of elevated concern is the threat of foreign animal diseases that can be transmitted bi-directionally from commercial or domestic livestock and wildlife, including but not limited to foot-and-mouth disease, classical swine fever, and highly pathogenic avian influenza. In the event of a large-scale agriculture incident, responding agencies will require strategies that minimize the risk of disease spread into wildlife populations and strategies that reduce the impacts from pathogen transmission between wildlife and domestic or commercial animals.

USDA and DOI, in coordination with other federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) agencies have the jurisdictional authority and subject matter expertise to support response and recovery operations should an agriculture incident extend to wildlife populations, including marine mammals and sea turtles for which DOI shares jurisdiction with the Department of Commerce (DOC). USDA works to prevent the introduction and transmission of disease from domestic animals to wildlife. USDA administers the National Wildlife Disease Surveillance and Emergency Response System that is responsible for conducting coordinated disease surveillance on the wildlife diseases it manages and for responding to a variety of emergencies including animal disease outbreaks. DOI works to promote early detection and rapid response to wildlife diseases on federal lands. DOI also coordinates with SLTT and nongovernmental stakeholders for national wildlife disease detection and response.

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) supports DOI through aquatic and terrestrial wildlife disease surveillance and research activities. USGS capabilities include disease mapping, modeling, laboratory support, disease research, and decision analysis. USGS maintains aquatic and terrestrial high-containment laboratories (Western Fisheries Research Center and National Wildlife Health Center (NWHC)) to support DOI land management bureaus through disease diagnostic support and research. The NWHC works with department bureaus, as well as SLTT and other federal entities, on wildlife disease investigations, providing the best available science and technical support for issues related to wildlife health and disease.

The National Wildlife Health Center (NWHC) is a World Organization for Animal Health Collaborating Centre for Research, Diagnosis, and Surveillance.

In the event of a zoonotic disease outbreak in wild animals, the NWHC works with federal and state natural resource, animal health, and public health agencies to support timely and effective one health-based response. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) wildlife program collaborates with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and state agency responses in relationship to disease outbreaks and chronic disease issues. BLM wildlife specialists also provide technical assistance. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) works with tribes, NWHC, and other federal agencies along with SLTT governments to facilitate coordinate response to a wildlife disease. BIA administers some of the agriculture leases/permits including business leases for agriculture enterprises on Indian trust lands. The National Wildlife Refuge System has developed the

Wildlife Health office to enhance the capabilities of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in monitoring and managing wildlife populations. The program conducts wildlife health and disease surveillance, response, and management activities to address the impacts of environmental changes on wild populations and to support the wildlife conservation, population monitoring, and management goals of the Service. Wildlife Health office activities include establishing wildlife health baselines; identifying existing and emerging wildlife health and disease risks; ensuring disease preparedness and prevention; developing, guiding, and implementing management actions; providing an early warning system for diseases that have the potential to impact humans as well as poultry and livestock agri-businesses; and disease surveillance and investigations. Actions unique to wildlife that can contribute to an effective federal response and recovery strategy include the following:

- Awareness of wildlife's role as reservoirs of disease requiring surveillance and monitoring;
- Mapping capabilities to track disease in wildlife to protect domestic/commercial animals;
- Care of wildlife animals on federal lands and conservation lands present unique challenges relating to mitigating disease impacts while addressing specific challenges, such as preserving endangered species, conservation issues, animal migration, etc.;
- Care and housing of wildlife in quarantine for treatment prior to habitat reintroduction;
- MCMs distribution to wildlife in the wild and zoos or exhibits to minimize disease spread;
- Capture, quarantine, humane depopulation, disposal, transport of infectious biomass creates additional challenges for wildlife species affected by disease;
- Risk communications to animal industry (veterinarians, agriculture, zoos, licensed exhibitors, etc.) relating to disease in wildlife populations and potential implications for domestic and commercial animal exposure;
- Risk communications to recreational hunters, those visiting federal lands, and subsistence and cultural hunters and gatherers about the disease and potential transmission risks (e.g., game hunters bringing infected carcass to a farm with susceptible animals); and

Mitigation to protect the economic and conservation value of hunting and hunted wildlife populations.

Appendix 3: Authorities and References

This appendix provides a summary of specific authorities, in order of relevance, to a large-scale food or agriculture incident. The National Response Framework, National Disaster Recovery Framework, and the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs) capture overarching authorities for disaster response and recovery activities.

Nothing in this annex alters or impedes the ability of federal agencies to carry out their respective authorities and associated responsibilities under the law. This annex does not create new authorities nor change existing ones.

Federal agencies may take appropriate independent emergency actions within the limits of their own statutory authority to protect the public, mitigate immediate hazards, and gather information concerning the emergency to avoid delays.

The Food and Agriculture Incident Annex may be used in conjunction with other incident-specific annexes to the Response and Recovery FIOPs or other federal emergency operations plans.

Table 8 below is not an exhaustive list of statutory and regulatory authorities. Lead federal agencies are well versed in what statutory and regulatory authorities apply to their specific incident responses.

Statutory and Regulatory Authorities

Table 8: Statutory and Regulatory Authorities

Title	Description
Public Health Service Act 1944	Forms the foundation of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) legal authority for responding to public health emergencies. It authorizes the Secretary of HHS to: • Develop and take necessary steps to implement a plan to assist states and localities to control epidemics and to meet other health emergencies or problems, • Assist and promote research and studies into the causes, diagnosis, treatment, control, and prevention of diseases, • Establish isolation and quarantine, • Maintain the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), • Activate the U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps and the National Disaster Medical System, and deploy select members of the Medical Reserve Corps; • Maintain safety of food, drugs, biological products, and medical devices. • Provide temporary assistance to needy families and respond to needs of "at-risk" individuals • Waive certain requirements for drugs covered by risk evaluation and mitigation strategies • Declare a public health emergency • HHS may need supplemental appropriations to carry out incident management activities consistent with this authority

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.)	• Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may order the detention of any article of food that is found during an inspection, examination, or investigation if the FDA has a reasonable belief that such article is adulterated or misbranded. • If FDA reasonably believes an article of food, and any other article of food that the Secretary reasonably believes is likely to be affected in a similar manner, is adulterated and presents a threat of serious adverse health consequences or death to humans or animals, each person (excluding farms and restaurants) who manufactures, processes, packs, distributes, receives, holds, or imports such article must permit FDA to have access to and copy certain records relating to such article and to any other article of food the Secretary reasonably believes is likely to be affected in a similar manner. • If FDA believes there is a reasonable probability that the use of or exposure to an article of food, and any other article of food that the Secretary reasonably believes is likely to be affected in a similar manner, will cause serious adverse health consequences or death to humans or animals, each person (excluding farms and restaurants) who manufactures, processes, packs, distributes, receives, holds, or imports such article must permit FDA to have access to and copy certain records relating to such article and to any other article of food the Secretary reasonably believes is likely to be affected in a similar manner. If FDA determines there is a reasonable probability that an article of food (other than infant formula) is adulterated or misbranded and the use of or exposure to such article will cause serious adverse health consequences or death to humans or animals, the Secretary must provide the responsible party with an opportunity to cease distribution and recall such article. If the responsible party refuses to or does not voluntarily cease distribution or recall such article within the time and in the manner prescribed by the Secretary, the Secretary may, by order, require such person to (a) immediately cease distribution of such article; and (b) as applicable, immediately notify persons to immediately cease distribution of such article. After providing an opportunity for an informal hearing, FDA may require a recall of such article. • Food facilities must report to FDA as soon as practicable, but in no case later than 24 hours, within determining there is a reasonable probability that the use of, or exposure to, an article of food (other than infant formula) manufactured, processed, packed, or held by the facility will cause serious adverse health consequences or death to humans or animals. • If FDA determines that food manufactured, processed, packed, received, or held by a facility has a reasonable probability of causing serious adverse health consequences or death to humans or animals, FDA may suspend the registration of a facility that was responsible for such reasonable probability or knew, or had reason to know of, such reasonable probability and packed, received, or held such food. If a facility's registration is suspended, no person can introduce food from such facility into interstate or intrastate commerce in the United States. • FDA must receive prior notice of imported food shipments before the food arrives at any U.S. port, which, among other information, must include the identity of the article of food, the manufacturer (if applicable), the grower (if applicable and known), the country of origin, the country from which the

	article is shipped, and any country to which the article has been refused entry. • FDA is authorized to conduct examinations and investigations through the officers and employees of another federal department or agency, pursuant to a memorandum of understanding (MOU), at facilities or other locations that are jointly regulated by FDA and such department or agency.
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) 2006	PAHPA amended the PHSA and designates the Secretary of HHS to lead all federal public health and medical response to public health emergencies and incidents. It authorizes the Secretary to establish an interagency agreement with any federal agency to assume control of emergency public health and medical response assets, as necessary, in the event of a public health emergency, except members of the armed forces under the authority of the Secretary of Defense.
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act (PAHPRA)(2013)	PAHPRA amended the PHSA to reauthorize funding for public health and medical preparedness programs and for the purchase of MCMs. The legislation increases the flexibility of state health departments in dedicating staff resources to meeting critical community needs in a disaster.
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Bioterrorism Act) (P.L. 107-188)	Under this act, FDA is responsible for carrying out certain provisions, particularly, Subtitle A (Protection of Food Supply), which provides for the following FDA authorizations: FDA is charged with providing for research on tests and sampling methodologies designed to test food to detect adulteration rapidly, particularly methodologies that detect intentional adulteration and tests that are suitable for inspections of food at ports of entry to the U.S. • FDA, in direct coordination with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and USDA, is charged with coordinating the surveillance of zoonotic diseases. • FDA assists the Secretary, other HHS operating divisions, and federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government partners in response to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies.
Public Health Emergency Declaration 319 of the Public Health Service Act	Allows HHS to determine that (a) a disease or disorder presents a public health emergency or (b) that a public health emergency, including significant outbreaks of infectious disease or bioterrorist attack, otherwise exists.
Public Law No: 115-43 Securing our Agriculture and Food Act	To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to make the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Health Affairs responsible for coordinating the efforts of the Department of Homeland Security related to food, agriculture, and veterinary defense against terrorism, and for other purposes
9 CFR 53	Foot and Mouth Disease, Pleuropneumonia, Rinderpest, and Certain Other Communicable Diseases of Livestock or Poultry
9 CFR 71.2	Secretary of Agriculture rule governing quarantine and interstate movement of diseased animals, including poultry
9 CFR 71.3	Interstate movement of diseased animals and poultry is generally prohibited

9 CFR Part 121	implements the provisions of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 setting forth the requirements for possession, use, and transfer of select agents and toxins
7 CFR Part 331. 9	implements the provisions of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 setting forth the requirements for possession, use, and transfer of select agents and toxins
32 CFR PART 185	Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), also referred to as civil support
42 CFR Part 73	Implements the provisions of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 setting forth the requirements for possession, use, and transfer of select agents and toxins
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C 1531 et seq.	Discusses the USDA role in assisting in emergencies to protect natural, cultural, and historic resources. Protects endangered and threatened species and their habitats by prohibiting the "take" of listed animals, except under federal (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service) permit
Title 9 of the CFR	Provides detailed USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) administrative regulations for the control and eradication of animal diseases, including foreign animal diseases and emerging animal diseases
21 US Code	• **21 US Code §134a**: USDA authorization for seizure, quarantine, and disposal of livestock and poultry to guard against introduction or dissemination of communicable disease. • **21 US Code §113a**: USDA authorization to establish research laboratories, including the acquisition of necessary land, building, or facilities, and technical experts or scientists • **21 US Code §451 et seq.: Poultry Products Inspection Act:** USDA authorization to ensure the safety of the nation's supply of poultry and poultry products, to inspect and retain/seize/and/or detain adulterated poultry and poultry products, to inspect and retain/seize/and/or detain adulterated poultry and poultry products • **21 US Code §601 et seq.: Federal Meat Inspection Act:** USDA authorization to ensure the safety of the nation's supply of meat and meat products • **21 US Code §1031 et seq.: Egg Products Inspection Act**: USDA authorization to ensure the safety of egg products distributed in commerce, to inspect and retain/seize/and/or detain adulterated egg products
Animal Health Protection Act, 7 U.S. Code §8301 et seq.	In instances when the Secretary of Agriculture determines that because of the presence in the U.S. of a pest or disease of livestock and that the presence of the pest or disease threatens the livestock of the U.S., the Secretary (may declare an) "Extraordinary Emergency" and may take measures in a state to control or limit the spread of such diseases or pests. • Grants USDA APHIS permanent and general regulatory authority. Gives the Secretary of Agriculture authority to prevent, detect control and eradicate diseases and pests of animals, including foreign animal and emerging diseases, in order to protect animal health, the health and welfare of people, economic interests of livestock and related industries, the environment, and interstate and foreign commerce in animals and other articles.

	• **7 U.S. Code §8303-8305**: Authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to prohibit or restrict the importation, entry, or interstate movement of any animal, article, or means of conveyance to prevent the introduction into, or dissemination within the United States of any pest or disease of livestock. • **7 U.S. Code §8308**: Authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out operations and measures to detect, control, or eradicate any pest of disease of livestock, including poultry. • **7 U.S. Code §8315**: Authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations and issue orders to carry out the Animal Health Protection Act.
Animal Welfare Act 7 U.S.C. Chapter 54	• Emergency confiscation of animals under authority of the Animal Welfare Act for certain egregious violations of the Act and accompanying regulations. • Monitor the health and welfare of animals at regulated facilities.
Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.:	If the Secretary of Agriculture determines that an extraordinary emergency exists because of the presence of a plant pest/pathogen or noxious weed that is new to or not known to be widely prevalent in or distributed within and throughout the U.S. and that the presence of the plant pest/pathogen or noxious weed threatens plants or plant products of the U.S., the Secretary may: • Hold, seize, quarantine, treat, apply other remedial measures to, destroy or otherwise dispose of any plant, biological control organism, plant product, article, or means of conveyance that the Secretary has reason to believe is infested with the plant pest or noxious weed. • Quarantine, treat, or apply other remedial measures to any premises, including any plants, biological control organisms, plant products, articles, or means of conveyance on the premises that the Secretary has reason to believe is infested with the plant pest or noxious weed. • Quarantine any state or portion of a state in which the Secretary finds the plant pest or noxious weed or any plant, biological control organism, plant product, article, or means of conveyance that the Secretary has reason to believe is infested with the plant pest or noxious weed. • Prohibit or restrict the movement within a state of any plant, biological control organism, plant product, article, or means of conveyance when the Secretary determines that the prohibition or restriction is necessary to prevent the dissemination of the plant pest or noxious weed or to eradicate the plant. • Authorizes USDA to take appropriate actions to guard against plant pests/pathogens and noxious weeds and to promulgate or change existing regulations to facilitate control or eradication. Authorizes USDA to regulate the movement of plant pests/pathogens and noxious weeds and their carriers into and through the U.S. and to take emergency actions, issue quarantines, and modify or create regulations to control the spread of a pest/pathogen.
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 7 U.S.C §136 et seq. (1996)	• Provides for federal regulation of pesticide distribution, sale, and use. All pesticides distributed or sold in the U.S. must be registered (licensed) by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Before EPA may register a pesticide under FIFRA, the applicant must show, among other things, that

	using the pesticide according to specifications "will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment." • Defines the term "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" to mean "(1) any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide, or (2) a human dietary risk from residues that result from a use of a pesticide in or on any food inconsistent with the standard under section 408 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act."
Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §8301 et seq.	Authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate the possession, use, and transfer of biological agents and toxins that could have a severe impact on plants or plant products.
Dairy Indemnity Payment Program Public Law 90-484 Section 3 as amended by Public Law 113-79, 7 U.S.C. 450j-l and 7 C.F.R. 760.1-760.33	Under the Dairy Indemnity Payment Program (DIPP), the Farm Service Agency is authorized to make payments to dairy farmers for milk and manufacturers of dairy products who, through no fault of their own, have been directed by a public agency to remove their milk or dairy products from commercial markets because of the residues of certain chemicals. Under the DIPP, payments are also authorized to be made to dairy producers when they are directed to remove their raw milk from the commercial market because it has been contaminated by nuclear radiation or fallout, or toxic substances and chemical residues other than pesticides.
Emergency Loan Program, under the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act, 7 U.S.C. §1921, et seq.	Under the Emergency Loan Program, the Farm Service Agency is authorized to provide direct and guarantee loans to farms and ranchers who are U.S. individuals and who operate family farms that have been substantially affected by a quarantine imposed by the Secretary under the Plant Protection Act or the animal quarantine laws, a natural disaster, or by a major disaster or emergency designated by the President under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Privacy Rule, 45 CFR Parts 160 and 164	Protecting public health, including through public health surveillance, program evaluation, terrorism preparedness, outbreak investigations, and other public health activities often requires access to or the reporting of individually identifiable health information of individuals, referred to as protected health information. This information is used to identify, monitor, and respond to disease, death, and disability among populations. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Privacy Rule recognizes the legitimate need for public health authorities and certain others to have access to protected health information for public health purposes and the importance of public health reporting by covered entities to identify threats to the public and individuals. Thus, the Privacy Rule permits covered entities to disclose protected health information without authorization for specified public health purposes.
Title 18, USC (Sections 175, 176, 229, 831, 1038, 2332a and 2283)	Defines crimes and criminal procedure. Several sections within Title 18, specifically section 175, 175a, b, and c; 176; and 2332a provide key authorities for the FBI to implement its unique role as the lead law enforcement entity of the Federal Government.

	• Section 175 (Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act) and the associated subparts make knowingly developing, producing, stockpiling, transferring, acquiring, retaining, or possessing any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon, or knowingly assisting a foreign state or any organization to do so, or attempting, threatening, or conspiring to do the same a crime. There is extraterritorial federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section committed by or against a national of the U.S. • Section 176 and the associated subparts define the circumstances and procedure under which the Attorney General may request the issuance of a warrant authoring the seizure of any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system that pertains to activities defined in section 175. • Section 229 and the associated subparts makes it unlawful for any person knowingly to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon or to assist or induce, in any way, any person to violate paragraph (1), or to attempt or conspire to violate paragraph (1). • Section 831 and the associated subparts makes whoever...without lawful authority, intentionally receives, possesses, uses, transfers, alters, disposes of, or disperses any nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material and—(a) thereby knowingly causes the death of or serious bodily injury to any person or substantial damage to property or to the environment or (b) circumstances exist, or have been represented to the defendant to exist, that are likely to cause the death or serious bodily injury to any person, or substantial damage to property or to the environment...knowingly threatens to use nuclear material or nuclear byproduct material to cause death or serious bodily injury to any person or substantial damage to property or to the environment under circumstances in which the threat may reasonably be understood as an expression of serious purposes—a crime. • Section 1038 makes whoever engages in any conduct with intent to convey false or misleading information under circumstances where such information may reasonably be believed and where such information indicates that an activity has taken, is taking, or will take place a crime. • Section 2332a defines the activities that constitute a crime using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including biological agents, toxins, or vectors. • Section 2283 and the associated subparts makes it unlawful for whoever knowingly transports aboard any vessel within the United States and on waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or any vessel outside the United States and on the high seas or having United States nationality an explosive or incendiary device, biological agent, chemical weapon, or radioactive or nuclear material, knowing that any such item is intended to be used to commit an offense listed in 2332(b).
The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007	The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Commission Act) established within DHS the National Biosurveillance Integration Center. The Center is tasked with enhancing the capability of the Federal Government to rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track biological incidents of national concern by integrating and analyzing data related to human health, animal, plant, food, and environmental monitoring systems and to disseminate alerts if any such incidents are detected. A central responsibility is to develop and oversee the National Biosurveillance Integration System, a federal interagency consortium and information management concept that was

	established to integrate and analyze biosurveillance-relevant information to achieve earlier detection and enhanced situational awareness.
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act	• The Stafford Act authorizes the programs and processes by which the Federal Government provides disaster and emergency assistance to SLTT governments, tribal nations, eligible private nonprofit organizations, and individuals affected by a declared major disaster or emergency. • The Stafford Act covers all hazards, including natural disasters and terrorist incidents. • At the request of the Governor of an affected state, or a Chief Executive of an affected Indian Tribe, the president may declare a major disaster or emergency if an incident is beyond the combined response capabilities of the state, tribal, and jurisdictional governments. Among other things, this declaration allows federal assistance to be mobilized and directed in support of state, tribal, and jurisdictional response efforts. Under the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. §5191), the president can also declare an emergency without a gubernatorial request if primary responsibility for response rests with the Federal Government because the emergency involves a subject area for which the U.S. exercises exclusive responsibility and authority. In addition, in the absence of a specific request, the president may provide accelerated federal assistance and federal support where necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate severe damage and notify the state of that activity.
Public Law 109-308 (PETS Act)	The Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act ensures that SLTT emergency standards (PETS) Act of 2006 amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act preparedness operational plans address the needs of individuals with household pets and serviceanimals following a major disaster or emergency
33 U.S.C. Clean Water Act	The Clean Water Act (CWA) establishes the basic structure for regulating discharges of pollutants into the surface waters of the U.S. and establishing quality standards for those waters. Under the CWA, EPA has implemented water pollution control programs such as setting wastewater standards for industry. EPA oversees water quality standards programs established by the States, and where applicable, tribes. The CWA made it unlawful to discharge any pollutant from a point source into waters of the U.S., unless authorized, for example, through a permit.
National Emergencies Act	Authorizes the president to declare a national emergency. A declaration under National Emergencies Act triggers emergency authorities contained in other federal statutes.
Occupational Safety and Health Act 1970	Passed to prevent workers from being killed or seriously harmed at work. This law created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which sets and enforces protective workplace safety and health standards. OSHA also provides information, training, and assistance to employers and workers.

	OSHA's role primarily is to provide oversight and guidance for federal departments and agencies: individual occupational safety and health programs through the Designated Agency Safety and Health Official and agency safety and health management staff. Executive Order (EO) 12196, Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal Employees (Feb. 26, 1980), as amended, extends protections provided under OSHA to most private sector employees. Generally, federal employer responsibilities under the EO and OSHA apply no matter where the federal employee is located (e.g., outside the continental U.S.).
Economy Act, 31 U.S.C.	In the absence of, or in addition to, the Stafford Act, the Economy Act can be used by lead federal agencies to request goods or services, on a reimbursable basis, from other federal agencies. However, use of the Economy Act is limited to circumstances in which the head of the requesting federal agency determines that the support cannot be provided by contract as conveniently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise.
Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA)	The DPA is the primary source of presidential authority to expedite and expand the supply of critical resources from the U.S. industrial base to support the national defense and homeland security. In addition to military, energy, and space activities, the DPA definition of "national defense" includes emergency preparedness activities conducted pursuant to Title VI of the Stafford Act, protection and restoration of critical infrastructure, and efforts to prevent, reduce vulnerability to, minimize damage from, and recover from acts of terrorism within the U.S. The President's DPA authorities are delegated to the heads of various federal departments in Executive Order 13603. DPA, however, does not necessarily increase the production of critical resources if those production lines are already operating at a maximum capacity and the demand for such resources are high resulting in significant national shortages. Authority to require acceptance and priority performance of contracts and orders to promote national defense. Defense Priorities and Allocations System, administered by the Department of Commerce, governs use of Defense Production Act priorities and allocations authority for most materials, services, and facilities available from the U.S. industrial base. FEMA has been delegated authority to place Defense Priorities and Allocations System priority ratings in contracts and orders supporting most DHS/FEMA missions to ensure timely delivery of critical resources. • Through its priority procurement authority, private sector contractors, vendors, suppliers are required to give preferential treatment for contracts and orders. This authority can ensure timely delivery of materials and services from private businesses to restore power disruptions. Priority ratings can be placed on either government (local, state, federal) or private sector contracts. • The authority to allocate materials, services, and facilities, as needed or appropriate to respond to or recover from a food or agriculture incident. • Voluntary agreements under the DPA could be used to facilitate cooperation among business competitors to protect or restore systems in connection with food or agriculture incidents.

	Participants in a voluntary agreement are granted relief from antitrust laws. • The installation of government-owned equipment authority could be used to expedite and prioritize restoration of both public and private power infrastructure disrupted by either natural or man-caused hazards.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act," 42 U.S.C. §9601 et seq. (1980)	The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly referred to as Superfund, was enacted to provide response authorities to actual or potential releases (1) of hazardous substances or (2) of pollutants or contaminants that may present an imminent and substantial danger to public health or welfare. An animal or plant pathogen may be considered a "pollutant or contaminant" when it meets the definition in CERCLA. CERCLA's implementing regulation is the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) (40 CFR Part 300). For an actual or threatened release to the environment, CERCLA provides the EPA and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) with the authority to gather information, collect samples, and take action to contain and mitigate the threat. Executive Order 12580 (January 23, 1987) and the NCP also include responsibilities for other federal agencies regarding releases on or from facilities or vessels under their jurisdiction, custody or control. CERCLA also gives the Federal Government the authority to compel responsible parties to respond to releases of hazardous substances (but not to releases of pollutants or contaminants).
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)	• Under RCRA, EPA issues regulations and guidelines to properly manage nonhazardous (Subtitle D) and hazardous (Subtitle C) solid wastes and provides support and technical assistance to SLTT governments on how these wastes can be best managed. The RCRA regulations generally define a solid waste as hazardous waste if it: 1) is a listed waste (40 CFR §261.30-261.33), or 2) exhibits specific characteristics (40 CFR §261.20-261.24). States (except for Alaska and Iowa) have the primary responsibility to implement the hazardous waste regulations and play the lead role in implementing nonhazardous waste programs. They can impose more stringent requirements than the federal program. All regulated hazardous wastes should be managed in appropriate hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities that comply with federal, state, and local regulations. For more information on the federal regulations that apply to hazardous waste management (see https://www.epa.gov/hw). • Nonhazardous solid waste management is primarily regulated at the state level. EPA has established national regulations for nonhazardous solid waste disposal facilities under RCRA (40 CFR § 257-258), and provides support and technical assistance to SLTT governments on how nonhazardous wastes can be best managed. All nonhazardous wastes should be managed in appropriate facilities that comply with applicable federal, state, and local regulations.
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)	NEPA requires federal agencies to assess the environmental effects of their proposed actions prior to making decisions.

Clean Air Act (CAA) 42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq. (1970)	The CAA is the comprehensive federal law that regulates air emissions from stationary and mobile sources. Among other things, this law authorizes EPA to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards to protect public health and public welfare and to regulate emissions of hazardous air pollutants
National Security Act of 1947	This Act realigned and reorganized the U.S. Armed Forces, foreign policy, and Intelligence Community apparatus and officially made the FBI a member of the Intelligence Community. By having both law enforcement and intelligence community responsibilities, the FBI plays as key role in investigations, intelligence collection, and analysis
Title 28, CFR, Section 0.85	Outlines the investigative and other responsibilities of the FBI. Specific paragraphs within this section provide the FBI authorities in support of this annex: • Paragraph (a) directs the FBI to investigate violations of United States law and collect evidence in cases in which the U.S. is or may be a party of interest, except in cases where responsibility is by statue or assigned to another investigative agency. • Paragraph (d) directs the FBI to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and other related matters, including investigating any potential violation of the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, the Trading with the Enemy Act, or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act relating to any foreign counterintelligence. • Paragraph (e) directs the FBI to establish and conduct law enforcement training programs to provide training for SLTT law enforcement personnel and to develop new approaches, technique, systems, equipment, and devices to improve and strengthen law enforcement and assist in conducting SLTT training programs. • Paragraph (g) directs the FBI to operate the FBI Laboratory to serve not only the FBI, but also to provide, without costs, technical and scientific assistance for all law enforcement agencies, other organizational units of the DOJ, and other federal agencies, which may desire to avail themselves of service
6 U.S. Code Section 313	(2) Specific activities in support of the primary mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Administrator shall— (A) Lead the nation's efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against the risk of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, including catastrophic incidents. (B) Partner with SLTT governments and emergency response providers, with other federal agencies, with the private sector, and with nongovernmental organizations to build a national system of emergency management that can effectively and efficiently utilize the full measure of the nation's resources to respond to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, including catastrophic incidents.

Executive Orders and Presidential Directives

Table 9: Executive Orders and Presidential Directives

Title	Description
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents	• HSPD-5 enhances the ability of the U.S. to manage domestic incidents by directing the establishment of a single, comprehensive National Incident Management System. This management system provides a consistent nationwide approach to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. The system allows all levels of government throughout the nation to work together efficiently and effectively. • In HSPD-5, the President designated the Secretary of Homeland Security as the Principal Federal Official for domestic incident management. As such, the DHS Secretary is responsible for coordinating preparedness activities and operations within the U.S. to respond to and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. As part of these responsibilities, the Secretary coordinates federal entities to ensure federal unity of effort for domestic incident management.[10] The DHS Secretary coordinates the Federal Government's resources utilized in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if and when any one of the following four conditions applies: (1) a federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary, (2) the resources of SLTT authorities are overwhelmed and federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate SLTT authorities, (3) more than one federal department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to the incident, or (4) the Secretary has been directed to assume responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the President. • It is within the purview/at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security as to how he/she will execute their HSPD-5 responsibilities.
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-2 Implementation of the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats 2009	The strategy in PPD-2 will guide our efforts to prevent biological incidents by reducing the risk that misuse of the life sciences or derivative materials, techniques, or expertise will result in the use or intent to use biological agents to cause harm. It also complements existing policies, plans, and preparations to advance our ability to respond to public health crises of natural, accidental, or deliberate origin.
Presidential Policy Directive-8: National Preparedness 2011	PPD-8, signed in March of 2011 by President Barack Obama, directed the systematic development of a series of policy and planning documents to enhance national preparedness across five mission areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. PPD-8 also called for the development of a National Planning System to integrate planning across all levels of government with the use of private and nonprofit sectors to deliver key capabilities.

[10] This does not include those activities that may interfere with the authority of the Attorney General or the FBI Director as described in PPD-8.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food	HSPD-9 has been codified into law by Public Law No: 115-43. Establishes a national policy to defend agriculture, food, and water systems. This directive charges the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of Central Intelligence with developing and enhancing intelligence operations and analysis capabilities focusing on the agriculture, food, and water sectors. The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General are responsible for working with the heads of other appropriate departments and agencies to prioritize, develop, and implement mitigation strategies to protect vulnerable critical nodes of production or processing from the introduction of diseases, pest, or poisonous agents. Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs, shall carry out a program to coordinate the Department's efforts related to defending the food, agriculture, and veterinary systems of the United States against terrorism and other high-consequence incidents that pose a high risk to homeland security.
Presidential Policy Directive-9	PPD-9 directs maintenance of the veterinary national stockpile.
Presidential Memorandum on the Support for National Biodefense	Section 1. Policy. (a) It is the policy of the United States to preserve our national and economic security by protecting the Nation from biological threats. Acting within the biodefense enterprise, the United States Government will undertake actions at home and with partners abroad to reduce the risk of natural, accidental, and deliberate biological threats to humans, animals, agriculture, and the environment that have the potential to significantly affect the national and economic security of the United States.
National Security Policy Directive (NSPD)-33/HSPD-10: National Policy for Biodefense	Defines a comprehensive framework for biodefense. This directive charges the FBI, through the Attorney General, to coordinate domestic intelligence gathering and counterterrorism activities of other members of the law enforcement community to detect, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the U.S. using WMD, including biological agents and toxins. The Directive directs the establishment of the National Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC) under DHS to conduct and facilitate bioforensic analysis in support of the lead federal agency (historically the role is given to the FBI to act as the lead agency for investigating acts of terrorism; this support has been provide strictly to the FBI in all but a few cases).
Presidential Policy Directive-44	Enhances the ability of the Federal Government to respond to domestic incidents by providing for the timely identification of a lead federal agency, when appropriate and by ensuring that an appropriate incident management capability is available to support Federal domestic incident response efforts.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-21: Public Health and Medical Preparedness 2007	HSPD-21 (October 2007) mandates the development of a national strategy for public health and medical preparedness that built upon principles set forth in HSPD-10. HSPD-21 identifies four critical components of public health and medical preparedness—biosurveillance, countermeasure distribution, mass casualty care, and community resilience—and establishes federal agency planning requirements in each of these areas. The directives establish a formal mechanism for an annual review of the SNS composition. The directives also address planning in the areas of risk awareness, education and training, and disaster health systems. The directive outlines the requirement for DHS, in coordination with HHS, to communicate risks to public health posed by relevant

	threats and establishes a mechanism to provide up-to-date and specific public health threat information to qualified heads of SLTT governments.
Executive Order 12333	Further defines the FBI's role as the lead intelligence community component charged with domestic intelligence collection related to espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign powers or their intelligence services against the U.S. and its interests; threats to the U.S. and its interest from terrorism.
MMPA 16 USC 1371	Discussion of subsistence use of marine mammals for food by native Alaskans

Waivers

Table 10: Waivers

Lead Agency	Description
FEMA	During an emergency, waivers can be offered on reporting requirements, enabling responders to focus more fully on the restoration efforts.
FEMA	Waivers can be used to remove the need for State cost-share under the Stafford Act, in order to accelerate the government components of the response.
FDA	Under an Emergency Use Authorization, the FDA Commissioner may allow emergency use of an unapproved medical product (e.g., drug, vaccine, diagnostic) or an unapproved emergency use of an approved medical product to diagnose, treat, or prevent a serious or life-threatening disease or condition caused by a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear threat agent, including an emerging infectious disease, when there is no adequate, approved, and available alternatives, and when all other statutory criteria under section 564 of the FD&C Act are met.
FDA	When certain determinations and declarations have been made concerning an emergency or potential emergency, FDA may authorize the use of certain human drugs and devices, and animal drugs, intended to address chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear threats when that use has not otherwise been approved or cleared under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The authorizations will specify conditions that will apply to the uses authorized. In certain emergency circumstances, FDA may also permit the use of certain approved or cleared drugs or devices for such uses that are to be used beyond their labeled expiration dating, that deviate from current good manufacturing practices in certain respects, that are dispensed without a prescription that would otherwise be required, or that are sold with instruction for use, created by CDC that deviate somewhat from FDA-approved labeling.
DOT	Toll waivers, which may be issued on a case-by-case basis by the state, local authority, or private entity that owns the specific piece of tolled infrastructure, can be used in certain emergency situations to expedite response processes.
EPA	Under FIFRA section 18, the EPA Administrator may exempt any federal or state agency from any provision of FIFRA if it is determined that emergency conditions exist that require such exemption. This provision may be applicable, for example, when a serious pest problem jeopardizes production of agricultural goods or public health, but no pesticides are currently registered for that situation.

Source Documents and References

The following tables provide some examples of source documents and references for federal departments and agencies and industry stakeholders. These tables are not an exhaustive list but provide some insight into the key resources used in a food or agriculture incident.

Table 11: Source Documents and References

Federal Department and Agency Source Documents and References
The Federal Anti-Tampering Act (FATA), 18 U.S.C. 1365, authorizes FDA to investigate any tampering of FDA-regulated consumer products (Federal Anti-Tampering Act Website)
The Code of Federal Regulations - Title 21, Chapter I is the portion of the CFR that governs FDA-regulated products within the U.S. for FDA. The regulations described within Chapter I of CFR 21 are enforced by FDA, based on the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act and other applicable laws (Code of Federal Regulations - Title 21)
Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) December 29, 2010; Incorporating Change 2, Effecive March 19. 2018: Establishes DOD policy and assisgns responsibilties for DSCA; provides guidance for the execution and oversight of DSCA; authorizes the use of immediate response authority.
DOD Instruction (DODI) Public Health and Medical Services Support of Civil Authorities", January 30, 2017

Appendix 4: Roles and Responsibilities for Response and Recovery to a Large-Scale Food or agriculture Incident

This section details the roles and responsibilities of federal departments and agencies that may be involved in the response to and recovery from a large-scale food or agriculture incident. This list represents the most prominent stakeholders and leaders and is not exhaustive; additional agencies may be called upon to support these primary response and recovery agencies.

Federal and Regional Government Offices

Federal response and recovery support following a food and agriculture incident must be coordinated closely with SLTT governments and jurisdictional federal agencies located in areas affected by the incident. The following departments, agencies, and offices may play a role in response and recovery:

- Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
  - Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR)
  - Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
  - Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
  - Administration for Children and Families (ACF)
  - Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)
  - National Institutes of Health (NIH)
  - Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA)
  - Indian Health Service (IHS)
- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
  - Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
  - Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
  - U.S. Forest Service (FS)
  - Agricultural Research Service (ARS)
  - Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS)
  - Office of Homeland Security (OHS)
  - Farm Service Agency
  - Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS)
  - Rural Development (RD)
  - Food and Nutrition Service (FNS)
  - Office of Inspector General (OIG)
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
  - Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
  - Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
  - Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
  - Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
  - Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD)
- Department of Justice (DOJ)
  - Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

- Department of Defense (DOD)
    - Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense & Global Security
    - Defense Health Agency
    - Affected Combatant Commands
- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
- General Services Administration (GSA)
- Department of State (DOS)
- Department of Transportation (DOT)
    - Office of the Secretary/Office of Intelligence, Security, and Emergency Response
    - National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
- U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI)
    - U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
    - Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
    - National Parks Service (NPS)
    - Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
    - Bureau of Indian Affairs
- Department of Labor (DOL)
    - Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
- Department of Commerce (DOC)
    - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
        - National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
- Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
- Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

HHS is the principal agency for protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential human services, especially for those who are least able to help themselves. The mission of HHS is to enhance the health and well-being of Americans by providing for effective health and human services and by fostering sound, sustained advances in the sciences underlying medicine, public health, and social services.

In addition to federal statutes, a number of national strategies and presidential directives establish HHS as the lead federal department responsible for the protection of the health of the civilian population against all health-related incidents including those in the food and agriculture sector. HHS is also responsible for coordinating with other federal agencies and impacted state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT); private sector; and nongovernmental partners, as appropriate, in responding to food and agriculture incidents that negatively affect human health. The Secretary of HHS leads all federal public health and medical response to public health and medical emergencies covered by the National Response Framework (NRF).

Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR)

ASPR, created under Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) after Hurricane Katrina, leads the nation and its communities in preparing for, responding to, and recovering

from the adverse health effects relating to public health emergencies and disasters. ASPR focuses on public health and medical preparedness planning and response; assisting locally led recovery efforts in the restoration of the public health, health care, and social services networks of impacted communities; building federal emergency medical operational capabilities; medical countermeasures research; advanced development and acquisition; and grants to strengthen the capabilities of hospitals and healthcare systems in public health emergencies and medical disasters. ASPR leads the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise, which comprises the CDC, NIH, FDA, and interagency partners DHS, DOD, VA, and USDA. Additionally, ASPR, in collaboration with CDC, and in coordination with Secretary of DHS, exercises the responsibilities and authorities of the HHS Secretary with respect to the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). The office provides federal support, including medical professionals through ASPR's National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), to augment SLTT capabilities during an emergency or disaster.

HHS leads all federal public health and medical response to public health emergencies and incidents. Consistent with provisions established in statutes under the PAHPA and Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act (PAHPRA), the Secretary of HHS delegates to ASPR the leadership role for all health and medical services support function in a health emergency or public health incident and lead responsibility within the department for emergency preparedness and response policy coordination and strategic direction. Additionally, HHS ASPR manages the International Health Regulations (IHR National Focal Point (NFP), consisting of the ASPR, the IHR program, and the HHS Secretary's Operations Center, which serves as the official pathway for notifications to the World Health Organization of incidents that may have potential international impact.

ASPR serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of HHS on all matters related to federal public health and medical emergency management for public health emergency. ASPR supports the Secretary of HHS in the execution of their responsibilities to lead the federal public health and medical response to emergencies under ESF #8 of the National Response Framework in support of federal and SLTT requests for assistance. ASPR also leads the Health and Social Services Recovery Support Function (RSF) of the National Disaster Recovery Framework to assist locally led recovery efforts in the restoration of the public health, health care, and social services networks of affected individuals and communities.

ASPR manages a diverse portfolio of programs to ensure that ASPR has the plans, procedures, logistical support, systems, and training to support emergency operations and response needs and enhance readiness.

U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

The CDC is an operational component of HHS responsible for the nation's health protection. The CDC's administration, scientists, and staff track diseases, research outbreaks, and respond to emergencies to protect the nation from health, safety, and security threats, both foreign and in the United States. The CDC performs many critical functions to effectively prepare for, respond to, and recover from any incident that has significant human health impacts, including those relating to a food or agriculture incident. The following list outlines some of the CDC's functions in a food or agriculture incident:

- Provide technical assistance to SLTT, federal, and industry partners to support public health activities;

- Provide laboratory support for the identification, quantification, confirmation, characterization, and drug susceptibility of biological, chemical and radiological agents and pathogens of concern;
- Provide environmental assessment consultations and/or conduct environmental sampling to support epidemiologic and surveillance activities and identify exposure pathways to support implementation of intervention strategies;
- Provide guidance on identification, diagnosis, and clinical management of human cases;
- Distribute MCMs as required/directed;
- Provide guidance on use of MCMs (e.g., antimicrobials, vaccines, and immunotherapeutics);
- Develop effective infection control practice recommendations for healthcare settings when the incident involves a communicable disease;
- Provide guidance on non-pharmaceutical mitigation strategies to assist with the containment and control of infectious agents;
- Provide expertise and technical support in the characterization and mitigation of occupational safety and health hazards workers face during response and recovery;
- Coordinates the development and dissemination of key public health messaging to provide timely, accurate, clear, consistent, credible, and easily accessible information relevant to the information needs of all stakeholders, easily accessible information includes information in alternate formats for persons with access and functional needs and in languages other than English for persons with limited English proficiency, as appropriate;
- Provide guidance in coordination with USDA on threats to human health from exposed animals, their clinical management, and appropriate animal population control measures;
- Provide rapid and sustained public health assessment, leadership, expertise, and support by deploying personnel both to the impacted area and to the CDC EOC (and other emergency operation centers) for technical and administrative mission support; and
- Conduct epidemiologic and surveillance activities to define cases, identify the populations at risk, and determine the source of exposure.

Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

FDA is responsible for protecting and promoting the public health by, among other things, ensuring the safety and effectiveness of human and veterinary drugs, cosmetics, biological products, medical devices, and tobacco products and ensuring the safety and security of the nation's food supply. FDA's Medical Countermeasures Initiative (MCMsi) led by the Office of Counterterrorism and Emerging Threats (OCET) provides strategic leadership and coordination for FDA's counterterrorism and emerging threat portfolios and works to identify and resolve complex scientific and regulatory challenges facing medical countermeasure development, approval, availability, and security. OCET coordinates FDA's MCMsi, facilitates relevant intra- and interagency counterterrorism communications, and coordinates MCMsi emergency use, including Emergency Use Authorization, activities. The FDA has a number of authorities related to providing access to investigational and/or unapproved, or unapproved uses of approved, medical products for emergency use.

Office of Foods and Veterinary Medicine (OFVM)

The Office of Foods and Veterinary Medicine (OFVM) provides executive leadership and strategic direction to the OFVM programs to protect and promote the health of humans and

animals by ensuring the safety of the U.S. food supply, food additives, and dietary supplements as well as the safety of animal food and the safety and effectiveness of animal drugs. OFVM is responsible for leading FDA's efforts in responding to foodborne outbreaks and adulteration. OFVM programs lead the implementation of FDA's roles and responsibilities in the FSMA.

Office of Coordinated Outbreak Response and Evaluation Network (CORE)

The Office of Coordinated Outbreak Response and Evaluation (CORE) Network is a component of CFSAN and is responsible for coordinating and managing response activities related to incidents involving multiple illnesses linked to FDA-regulated human food, cosmetic, dietary supplement, and infant formula products. In addition to responding to outbreaks, CORE includes a signals and surveillance component to improve early detection of incidents in order to limit or prevent illnesses, as well as a post-response component that looks to implement lessons learned from outbreaks into preventive strategies to minimize future outbreaks. The CORE Network includes not only the CORE staff but FDA's field and headquarters staff from the Office of Regulatory Affairs, the Rapid Response Teams that work with state partners, the Office of Crisis Management at FDA, FDA's Offices of Public Affairs and External Relations, and the subject matter experts at CFSAN and CVM.

Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM)

The Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) is a component of OFVM and is responsible for surveillance, coordinating, response, recalls, and post-response activities related to animal deaths, illness, and injury linked to FDA-regulated food, drugs, and devices for animals. CVM has a dedicated response team (Complaint, Emergency, Recall Team) that is comprised of a group of members at the FDA headquarters level that are assigned on a continuous, full-time basis to multidisciplinary teams to coordinate efforts internally within FDA. These efforts include CORE, Veterinary Laboratory Investigation and Response Network (Vet-LIRN), District Offices, Regional Offices, and CVM subject matter experts as well as with external stakeholders, including CDC, USDA, state departments of agriculture, and state-funded Rapid Response Teams.

Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN)

The Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) is another component to OFVM and is responsible for ensuring the U.S. food supply is safe, sanitary, wholesome, and honestly labeled to promote and protect public health. CFSAN has the authority to regulate establishments that manufacture, process, pack, hold, or grow food, including manufacturers, distributors, and warehouses. During a foodborne outbreak or incident, CFSAN collaborates with public health agencies and industry regarding food adulterants; provides critical information on food safety, food defense, and regulatory issues; and protects human health through regulatory, legal, and other administrative actions.

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

USDA is responsible for developing and executing federal laws related to farming, agriculture, forestry, and food with a primary focus to promote agricultural trade and production, to assure food safety, to protect natural resources, to foster rural communities, and to end hunger in the

United States. USDA serves as the primary agency for the security and resilience in the commercial production of food and consequence management of outbreaks and/or attacks that may occur in animals and plant products used in the commercial production of food and other commercial industries. USDA, HHS, DHS, and the FBI collaborate through surveillance systems with states and private industries to protect the nation's food supply and U.S. livestock and poultry from terrorist threats and to prepare for and respond to catastrophic disasters, including the natural or intentional introduction of a foreign animal disease (FAD) or plant pest or pathogen of concern.

USDA has the federal authority to declare an emergency for food or agriculture disasters that are separate from local or other federal disaster declarations. Included among these declarations, the Secretary of Agriculture can declare an emergency, an extraordinary emergency, and an agriculture disaster declaration.

Office of Homeland Security (OHS)

USDA OHS provides departmental executive leadership in government-wide initiatives and leads security, preparedness, and response efforts through training, coordination, and the development and execution of policies to ensure employees and stakeholders are prepared to support the USDA mission. Within OHS, the Emergency Programs Division manages the Operations Center and serves as the focal point for emergency management and coordination of natural or man-made disasters within the scope of USDA's mission. The Operations Center also assists in the development and coordination of policies, capabilities, and procedures for reporting and response to emergencies affecting the USDA mission or personnel. The Operations Center receives, assesses, and analyzes emergency incidents or incidents, making internal and external notifications as required.

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)

USDA APHIS is a multi-faceted agency with a broad mission that seeks to protect the health and value of American agriculture and natural resources to ensure an abundant, high quality, and varied food supply. In the event of the introduction of a pest or disease of concern, USDA APHIS implements emergency protocols and collaborates with affected states to quickly address the incident. USDA APHIS has six operational program units:

- ***Animal Care:*** Under the authority of the Animal Welfare Act, determines and promotes standards for the humane care and treatment of regulated animals through inspections and education.
- ***Biotechnology Regulatory Services:*** Protects agriculture resources by ensuring safe development of genetically engineered organisms using a science-based regulatory framework.
- ***International Services:*** Provides international animal and plant health expertise to safeguard U.S. agriculture health and promote agriculture trade.
- ***Plant Protection and Quarantine:*** Safeguards agriculture and natural resources from risks associated with the entry, establishment, or spread of pests, noxious weeds, and pathogens.
- ***Veterinary Services:*** Protects and improves the health, quality, marketability of our nation's animals, animal products, and veterinary biologics by preventing, controlling, and/or eliminating animal diseases, and monitoring and promoting animal health and productivity.

- ***Wildlife Services:*** Provides leadership in managing conflicts with wildlife to protect agriculture, natural resources, property, and human health and safety.

Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)

FSIS is the public health regulatory agency within the USDA responsible for ensuring that the nation's commercial supply of meat, poultry, and processed egg products is safe, wholesome, and correctly labeled and packaged. FSIS works to lower the incidence of pathogens that cause foodborne illness and limit the occurrence of outbreaks in the products it regulates. FSIS performs food safety inspection activities at more than 6,000 establishments nationwide, maximizes domestic and international compliance with food safety policies, enhances public education and outreach to increase safe food-handling practices, and strengthens collaboration among internal and external stakeholders and other public and private sector partners to prevent foodborne illness.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

The Secretary of DHS is the principal federal official for domestic incident management. The Secretary is responsible for coordinating federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks; major disasters; and other emergencies. DHS provides biosurveillance capabilities to detect intentional introduction of threat agents and pathogens into the environment and to coordinate information sharing with federal partners on health-related threats to humans, animals, and plants. The DHS Secretary coordinates the federal response as provided in HSPD-5.

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) serves as the department's medical, veterinary, and public health advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the FEMA Administrator, and all DHS components. Specifically, CWMD supports the food, agriculture, and veterinary mission through the oversight and management of DHS's implementation of HSPD-9 in coordination with other federal departments and agencies, SLTT governments, and the private sector.

DHS Science and Technology (S&T) serves as the research and development arm for DHS by delivering effective and innovative insight, methods, and solutions for the critical needs of the Homeland Security Enterprise. S&T leads DHS's agriculture defense programs, which in coordination with USDA and other federal partners and stakeholders, develops novel countermeasures to support response and recovery from a large-scale FAD outbreak. S&T also operates the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, a joint DHS and USDA laboratory that serves as the nation's premier defense against the introduction of foreign animal diseases. The laboratory provides a host of high-impact, indispensable preparedness and response capabilities, including vaccine research and development, diagnostics, training, and bioforensics.

S&T also operates the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) with laboratory capabilities that include the National Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC). NBFAC is designated by Presidential Directive as the lead federal facility to conduct and facilitate the technical forensic analysis and interpretation of materials recovered following a biological attack in support of the appropriate lead federal agency. The NBFAC component of NBACC conducts bioforensic analysis of evidence from a biocrime or terrorist attack to attain a "biological fingerprint" to help investigators identify perpetrators and determine the origin and method of attack. The National Biological Threat Characterization Center (NBTCC) component

of NBACC conducts studies and laboratory experiments to fill in information gaps to understand current and future biological threats, to assess vulnerabilities and conduct risk assessments, and to determine potential impacts to guide the development and use of countermeasures such as detectors, drugs, vaccines, and decontamination technology.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

FEMA is an operational component of DHS that coordinates Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and RSFs and funding support to impacted areas during Stafford Act incidents. For food or agriculture incidents, will provide operational support as requested from the lead federal agencies (LFAs) managing the incident.

The FEMA Administrator is the principal advisor to the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Council regarding emergency management. The FEMA Administrator's duties include assisting the President, through the DHS Secretary, in carrying out the Stafford Act; operating the NRCC; supporting all ESFs and RSFs; and preparing for, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from an all-hazards incident. A Federal Coordinating Officer, appointed by the President in a Stafford Act declaration coordinates federal activities in support of SLTT governments. Reporting to the DHS Secretary, the FEMA Administrator is also responsible for managing the core DHS grant programs that support homeland security activities.

FEMA develops DHS Surge Capacity Force personnel requirements with OPM and other federal departments and agencies.

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

CISA works with partners at all levels of government and from the private and non-profit sectors to share information and build greater trust to make secure critical infrastructure and key resources. Protective Security Advisors forge strong relationships with federal and SLTT government mission partners and private sector stakeholders to enhance public/private collaborative efforts to protect critical infrastructure. The Private Security Advisors will remain focused on contingency outreach to owners and operators of critical infrastructure regarding the evolving food or agriculture incident. CISA will sustain communications with the respective Sector Coordinating Councils and sector-specific Government Coordinating Councils on appropriate information sharing related to the evolving food or agriculture incident through DHS IP information summary to include the Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Council.

Department of Justice (DOJ)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

The Attorney General, acting through the FBI Director, leads and coordinates the operational law enforcement response, on-scene law enforcement, and related investigative and appropriate intelligence activities related to terrorist threats and incidents. This includes the coordination of the law enforcement activities to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist threats. The FBI, acting primarily through its Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), has lead responsibility for investigative activities involving federal crimes of terrorism. This includes the receipt and resolution of suspicious activity reporting of terrorist activities or acts in preparation of terrorist activities.

The Attorney General, acting through the FBI Director, has primary responsibility for searching for, finding, and neutralizing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within the United States and its territories. The FBI On-Scene Commander is responsible for leading and coordinating the federal operational law enforcement response and investigative activities necessary to prevent or resolve terrorist threats or incidents. The FBI On-Scene Commander retains the authority to take appropriate law enforcement actions (tactical-response, render safe, and bomb-management operations) at all times during the response. Additionally, the FBI On-Scene Commander has primary responsibility to conduct, direct, and oversee crime scenes, to include those involving WMD, their security, and evidence management through all phases of the response.

All WMD threat information having a potential impact on the United States will be immediately passed to the FBI to conduct a timely Threat Credibility Evaluation to assess the credibility and severity of the threat and consider initiation of appropriate WMD counterterrorism response protocols. In the case of substantial credible threats or incidents, the FBI will notify appropriate senior leaders of departments and agencies, to include the National Counterterrorism Center, DHS, HHS, USDA, and DOD, and will stand up the interagency Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategic Group (WMDSG). The WMDSG supports efforts to resolve imminent WMD terrorist threats or incidents while simultaneously coordinating its information with the nationwide effort to save lives and protect property.

The FBI has assigned a WMD Coordinator to each of its field offices who is responsible for managing the office's WMD program and serves as a point of contact for emergency responders and public health at the SLTT level in a threat scenario or incident potentially involving WMD. In such an incident, the WMD Coordinator serves as a conduit for obtaining federal assistance for operational response direction and threat evaluation support.

Terrorist threat-related information collected domestically, including suspicious activity reporting involving suspected federal crimes of terrorism, will be shared comprehensively and immediately to the FBI JTTF so that threats can be investigated and resolved. Terrorist threat-related information will also be shared promptly with National Counter-Terrorism Center and in addition, as authorized by law, with the Terrorist Screening Center, DHS, and DOD. Specific terrorism-related threat information and the collection and investigative activities related thereto will be coordinated with and through the FBI JTTFs. The Laboratory Response Network (LRN), in coordination with CDC, tests samples for the presence of specific threat agents for human health. The National Animal Health Laboratory Network, in coordination with USDA, tests samples for the presence of specific agents in animal populations. Any agency or organization that identifies an unusual or suspicious test result should contact the FBI to ensure coordination of appropriate testing at an LRN laboratory. The FBI, in coordination with HHS or USDA, makes decisions on where to perform additional tests on evidence. All relevant threat and public health assessments should be provided to the DHS National Operations Center as appropriate. Test results on human samples from non-LRN facilities are a "first pass" or "screening" test.

Department of Defense (DOD)

DOD provides support, as able, to the Lead Federal Agencies in response to domestic emergencies and, in the case of a food or agriculture incident, provides a spectrum of capabilities that protect DOD and the public.

To ensure advanced warning of threats, the Defense Intelligence Agency/National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI) provides intelligence assessments of foreign health threats, including pandemic warning, to prevent strategic surprise across the broad threat spectrum. NCMI's products assess risk and project the impact of incidents to deliver decision advantage to U.S. warfighters, defense planners, and DOD policymakers.

DOD, via the Services and the Defense Health Agency, Armed Forces Health Surveillance Branch, conducts comprehensive health surveillance of DOD forces. DOD serves a key role in biosurveillance to detect disease and to understand the threats from endemic and emerging infectious diseases relevant to DOD forces. Though the focus is on infectious disease threats relevant to DOD, DOD serves as a significant source of information to inform the larger U.S. biosurveillance mission and to maintain situational awareness.

DOD is organized by geographical combatant commands (CCMD), each of which contains a functional cell with the Command Surgeon that works on various aspects of the medical capabilities for the DOD and engagement with other countries militaries and agencies. Each cell includes force health protection staff that help facilitate preparedness and response to disease incidents that may impact DOD force health and mission assurance, as well as international health protection, to varying degrees based on available resources. During food and agricultural incidents that may have significant impact on DOD missions or populations outside of the continental United States (OCONUS), it is important that the LFA maintains adequate communication through the appropriate DOD chain-of-command to ensure information-sharing on the incident with the relevant force health protection teams in the potentially affected CCMD. Some roles and responsibilities of the CCMD during a food and agricultural incident of operational significance include the following:

- Disseminate DOD/Service guidance and clinical practice guidelines specific to the event.
- Collaborate with other DOD surveillance agencies (e.g. National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI), AFHSB) to maintain visibility on disease surveillance information.
- Develop guidance for meeting movement requirements related to the containment and control of a pathogen.
- Disseminate CCMD guidance and Force Health Protection (FHP) recommendations related to movement across borders, travel, import/export criteria, etc.

The first priority for DOD is to ensure that DOD can continue its missions and protect DOD personnel, installations, and other assets to provide mission assurance. Under immediate response authority, DOD officials may, under imminently serious conditions and if time does not permit higher authority approval, provide an immediate response, when requested, to save human lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. Normally, when requested by an LFA and approved by the Secretary of Defense, DOD provides defense support of civil authorities to the response to minimize the consequences of the incident. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense & Global Security is responsible for Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and serves as DOD's Domestic Crisis Manager (DOD Directive 5111.13, March 23, 2018). DOD's response capabilities may include specialized MCMs research, diagnostics, emergency medical and lifesaving capabilities, veterinary capabilities, epidemiology/outbreak investigation support, laboratory support, logistics, and transportation support. Upon request, and depending on the size and scope of the incident, DOD may employ

additional command and control capabilities to facilitate the management of DOD assets and to support the larger response effort.

DOD has limited medical services capabilities beyond those authorized for the DOD healthcare system, which likely would be equally affected during a large-scale (regional epidemic/ pandemic) food or agriculture incident—but may be able to provide surge capabilities (laboratory, emergency care, logistics, etc.) for more finite incidents. However, when requested, DOD may provide medical logistic support and general support, such as transportation, to enable civil responders.

DOD also has limited veterinary services capabilities to support a food or agriculture incident similar to the surge capacity for other DOD medical assets. DOD veterinary services has both animal and food safety/food defense capabilities. Personnel can work in teams or individually augment agencies as needed. These resources would be requested only when all other federal veterinary and food safety resources have been fully utilized.

The Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. §1385) generally prohibits DOD military forces from conducting civilian law enforcement-type activities such as search, seizure, and arrest in the absence of specific statutory authority to engage in such activities. One such authority, 10 U.S.C. §282, permits DOD to provide support to the DOJ under certain circumstances in emergencies involving WMD, including biological weapons and materials.

DOD may also support DOJ and/or other law enforcement agencies and/or other authorities with logistical support such as sheltering and transportation. Upon a determination that a food or agriculture incident was the result of an intentional attack, DOD emergency assistance may include the operation of equipment to monitor, contain, disable, or dispose of adulterated material involved or elements of any potential biological or chemical weapons.

DOD's capabilities in biological and chemical forensics and technical analysis may be called upon to support the FBI in determining whether an incident is natural, accidental, or intentional. This forensic capability allows DOD to provide expert advice, technical assistance and, if necessary, operational support to the attribution assessment process.

DOD may also provide assistance to USDA/APHIS for response to animal diseases and other all-hazards incidents through the DOD-USDA Memorandum of Agreement (updated in 2016). Areas of DOD support include epidemiology, surveillance and tracing; laboratory diagnostic capability; training; transportation, logistics, and installation support; public affairs/communication support; debris (animal) removal and disposal; decontamination and disinfection of vehicles, facilities, or premises that housed or transported infected animals; and personnel to support field operations. Through the MOA, DOD's assistance to USDA is provided in accordance with the Economy Act of 1932 (31 U.S.C. §§ 1535-1536).

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

EPA has responsibilities and resources for response to domestic emergencies. EPA promulgates regulations that implement various environmental laws enacted by Congress. In the case of food or agriculture emergencies, EPA would likely provide support to the lead federal agencies on issues related to facility decontamination, waste management and water security and resilience.

EPA responds to releases of hazardous substances to the environment, including substantial threats of release of pollutants or contaminants that may present an imminent or substantial

danger to the public health or welfare (which may include animal or plant pathogens) (see App. 3, CERCLA). EPA also regulates the management of hazardous waste and disposal of nonhazardous solid waste (see App. 3, RCRA). Under the Food Safety Modernization Act, EPA, in coordination with HHS, DHS, and USDA, provides support for and technical assistance to state, local, and tribal governments in preparing for, assessing, decontaminating, and recovering from an agriculture or food emergency.

EPA also has the responsibility to register a pesticide before it can be sold or marketed in the United States. A pesticide is a substance or a mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, including microorganisms, fungi, insects and other invertebrates, or plants. The process of registering a pesticide is a scientific, legal, and administrative procedure through which EPA examines a pesticide's ingredients; sites or crops where it will be used; the amount, frequency, and timing of its use; and storage and disposal practices. In evaluating a pesticide registration application, EPA assesses a wide variety of potential human health and environmental effects associated with use of the product. Individuals or companies wanting to produce the pesticide must provide data from studies that comply with EPA testing guidelines. EPA also evaluates and approves the language that appears on each pesticide label to ensure the directions for use and safety measures are appropriate to any potential risk. Following label directions is required by law and is necessary to avoid unreasonable adverse effects. EPA can also grant time-limited emergency exemptions to state or federal agencies for unregistered uses of a pesticides when a serious pest problem jeopardizes production of agriculture goods or public health. (See App. 3, FIFRA.)

EPA serves as the federal lead (Sector-Specific Agency) for protecting the nation's drinking water and wastewater systems against all hazards—from terrorism to natural disasters.

As the Sector-Specific Agency, EPA is responsible for identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating the protection of the nation's drinking water and water treatment systems. EPA works with tribes, states, drinking water and wastewater utilities, communities, and other partners to enhance the security and resiliency of water and wastewater infrastructure in an all-hazards context.

Department of the Interior (DOI)

The primary DOI mission during disease outbreaks is to conduct regulatory and mission-critical work in protection of their lands and resources. While DOI land and resource management regulatory authorities are not superseded by USDA's Animal Health Protection Act, DOI actions may be carried out in coordination with USDA animal disease response activities. The skills and expertise DOI employees utilize in their mission-critical work could also be utilized to support interagency animal health authorities and response activities.

Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)

BIA enhances quality of life, promotes economic opportunity, and carries out responsibilities to protect and improve trust assets of American Indians, Indian Tribes and Alaska Natives. BIA supports the self-determination of tribes by supporting their natural resource programs and providing technical support to include facilitating investigation of and response to wildlife disease outbreaks on trust lands. BIA hosts the Federal Interagency Tribal Assistance Coordination Group for emergency management support.

Bureau of Land Management (BLM)

BLM sustains health, diversity and productivity of public land for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations as set forth in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. This act mandates the management of public land resources for a variety of uses while protecting a wide array of natural, cultural and historical resources. BLM manages more than 245 million acres of public lands. These lands include more wildlife and plant habitat than any other Federal or state agency in the country. BLM's wildlife management program maintains and manages wildlife habitat to help ensure self-sustaining populations and a natural abundance and diversity of wildlife on public lands. BLM emergency management resources include a permitting system database that identifies public lands available for livestock grazing (allotments) and the kind of livestock authorized to graze. The system provides contact information for permit holders and BLM field offices, which would provide information on numbers and locations of authorized livestock on BLM managed lands and credentialed incident management teams.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)

FWS works to conserve, protect and enhance fish, wildlife and plants and their habitats for the continuing benefit of the American people. FWS provides scientific and technical advice, information and assistance for animal disease events. FWS assumes responsibility for managing or coordinating emergency response on lands within its jurisdiction and assists other Federal and state agencies on adjacent lands as requested. National Wildlife Refuge System law enforcement and firefighting personnel maintain incident command expertise. FWS personnel provide expertise on threatened and endangered species and migratory birds to include appropriate response and recovery techniques. FWS provides all federal permitting activities for hazing, collecting, rescuing, and holding threatened and endangered species. State to state differences in wildlife management highlights the complex role of federal land and wildlife management agencies in ensuring connectivity with state counterparts.

Department of Transportation (DOT)

The DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is responsible for regulating and ensuring the safe and secure movement of hazardous materials to industry and consumers by all modes of transportation, including pipelines. To minimize threats to life, property, or the environment due to hazardous materials-related incidents, PHMSA's Office of Hazardous Materials Safety develops regulations and standards for the classifying, handling, and packaging of over one million daily shipments of hazardous materials within the United States.

DOT regulations assign the responsibility to the shipper (e.g., hospital) for complying with the proper packaging and transport of hazardous materials, including regulated medical waste. However, there are individual states that may have additional rules, and, thus, appropriate state regulations may apply in a biological incident response and recovery operation.

U.S. Department of Labor (DOL)

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

OSHA assures safe and healthful working conditions by setting and enforcing standards and providing training, outreach, education, and assistance. OSHA has the authority to provide technical assistance and support to other federal and SLTT agencies, including states with their

own OSHA-approved occupational safety and health programs (State Plans), as requested. OSHA leads implementation of the NRF Worker Safety and Health Support Annex preparedness and response actions to protect response workers. OSHA can provide technical assistance and support to protect response and recovery workers through the following: risk assessment and management; identification, assessment, and control of health and safety hazards; development and oversight of site health and safety plans; site safety monitoring; worker exposure monitoring, sampling, and analysis; personal protective equipment (PPE), including PPE selection, use, training, and decontamination and respirator fit-testing; and incident-specific worker safety and health training. During a food or agriculture incident, CDC, through the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, should consult OSHA when working with senior SLTT health officials to protect first responders, first receivers, critical infrastructure/key resource workers, public health workers, agricultural workers, and other workers involved in the incident.

State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments (SLTT)

SLTT governments are primarily responsible for detecting and responding to food or agriculture incidents and implementing measures to minimize the health, social, and economic consequences of such an incident. These measures may include, but are not limited to dispensing MCMs, laboratory services, implementation of quarantine and isolation measures, human, agriculture, and facility decontamination, and public messaging. The primarily role of state governments is to supplement and facilitate local efforts before, during, and after disasters. The state provides direct and routine assistance, including human and veterinary public health, medical and veterinary services, to its local jurisdictions. Tribes handle the affairs in the same manner on tribal lands.

Private Sector

The private sector public health, animal health, plant health, and medical and veterinary service organizations and infrastructure provide local response capabilities for all health impacts during a food or agriculture incident. Hospitals; community clinics; animal hospitals and veterinary offices; nurses and animal health technicians; and trained, certified, or other specialists in public, veterinary, or academic institutions or agriculture health are all representatives of the public, veterinary, and agriculture health infrastructure at the private sector level. Their services, equipment, and advanced technologies assist with the delivery of local food or agriculture incident response and recovery capabilities. Nongovernmental medical or disaster relief organizations, as well as culture- and faith-based organizations, and industry resources can also bolster and assist local response capabilities.

Appendix 5: Federal Response Capability Inventory – Food and Agriculture Specific Assets, Resources, and Teams

This appendix lists the resources that may be utilized in a large-scale food or agriculture incident. It does not assign responsibility to any agency or organization; it solely provides insight into potential resources available to assist with response and recovery operations. This is not an exhaustive list as other departments, agencies, organizations, and private sector entities may have resources that can be leveraged during the incident through coordination with the LFA or UCG.

Table 12: Food and Agriculture Specific Assets, Resources, and Teams

Organization	Resource Name	Description
USDA	Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)	Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for both animal and plant response. The agency provides technical assistance and response capabilities for animal and agriculture emergency management. APHIS coordinates with nonprofit and private organizations, and other government agencies to ensure an effective response
USDA (APHIS)	Veterinary Services (VS)	VS is a program within APHIS that works to protect and improve the health, quality, and marketability of our nation's animals and supports emergency response to high-consequence diseases in the livestock and poultry populations.
USDA (APHIS)	VS National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL)	NVSL are USDA laboratories that seek to safeguard animal health and contribute to public health by ensuring that timely and accurate laboratory support is provided in an emergency including providing diagnostic services and reagents and supporting the NAHLN laboratories.
USDA (APHIS)	Emergency Management Response System (EMRS)	A web-based application used for the reporting of routine investigations of foreign animal disease (FAD), surveillance and control programs, state specific disease outbreaks, and national animal health emergency responses.
USDA (APHIS)	National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN)	The NAHLN is a nationally coordinated network and partnership of federal, state, and university-associated laboratories that provide animal health diagnostic testing to detect threats to the nation's food animals and support early detection, rapid response, and appropriate recovery from high-consequence FAD.
USDA (APHIS)	Wildlife Services (WS)	WS provides surveillance and monitoring of diseases in wildlife and assists with emergency response when requested.
USDA (APHIS)	Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ)	PPQ is the program of APHIS whose mission is to safeguard U.S. agriculture and natural resources against the entry, establishment, and spread of economically and environmentally significant pests and facilitate the safe international trade of agricultural products.
USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA)	National Plant Diagnostic Network	National network of diagnostic laboratories that rapidly and accurately detect and report pathogens that cause plant diseases of national interest.
USDA	Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)	The USDA public health agency responsible for ensuring that the nation's commercial supply of meat, poultry, and processed egg products is safe, wholesome, and correctly labeled and packaged.

USDA (FSIS)	FSIS Incident Management System (FIMS)	A web-based common operating platform that allows program managers to rapidly identify, respond to, and track FSIS response to significant incidents involving meat, poultry, and processed egg products and other emergencies that affect FSIS-regulated products.
USDA Food and Nutrition Service (FNS)	USDA Foods	Disaster Household Distribution is a nutrition assistance option that States may exercise with approval from FNS. In a Disaster Household Distribution, FEMA, non-governmental feeding organizations, or other partners may distribute household-sized products to individuals who prepare and consume meals at home. These packages may be supplemental and, under some conditions, may be designed to increase particular nutrients.
USDA	Risk Management Agency (RMA)	Crop Insurance protects agriculture producers against crop losses due to natural perils. The program, administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Risk Management Agency (USDA RMA), offers several plans for crops and livestock. Availability and plans vary by state and county.
USDA (APHIS)	National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS)	During an animal disease incident, USDA APHIS may provide resources to state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments to support response efforts. The NVS is the repository of veterinary countermeasures, animal vaccines, antivirals, therapeutic products, supplies, equipment, and response support services for use in responding to animal disease outbreaks.
USDA	Farm Service Agency	County offices provide direct service to producers to help them understand available programs, eligibility and requirements, application processes and deadlines, and business plan development assistance.
USDA	Rural Development	Technical assistance is targeted to help communities build capacity from within thereby empowering them to develop and sustain their own communities. Technical assistance includes strategic planning or leadership development, developing and strengthening partnerships and finding financial resources and bringing them to the table.
USDA	U.S. Forest Service (FS)	A multi-faceted agency that manages and protects 154 national forests and 20 grasslands in 43 states and Puerto Rico. The agency's mission is to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the nation's forests and grasslands to meet the needs of present and future generations.
USDA (FS)	Research & Development	Consists of seven research stations and 81 experimental forests and ranges. Forest Service R&D interacts with national forests in nine regions and with the agency's State and Private Deputy Area throughout the United States. Forest Service R&D is also allied with agencies in the USDA Research, Education, and Economics mission area, including the Agricultural Research Service (ARS), National Institute of Food and Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, and ARS' National Agricultural Library. Forest Service R&D also partners with other federal agencies, non-governmental organizations, universities, and the private sector.
USDA (FS)	Wood Products Laboratory	Nation's only federally funded wood utilization research laboratory
USDA (FS)	Forest Health Protection	Provides technical assistance on forest health-related matters, particularly those related to disturbance agents such as native and non-native insects, pathogens, and invasive plants.

USDA	Natural Resources Conservation Service	County offices provide planning assistance for watershed protection projects, water quality improvement projects, wetland preservation, and management for agricultural and rural communities.
USDA	Extension Disaster Education Network (EDEN)	EDEN links Extension educators from across the U.S. and various disciplines, enabling them to use and share resources to reduce the impact of disasters. EDEN is supported by a grant from the USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture to Purdue University.
DHS	Domestic Communication Strategy	The Domestic Communication Strategy is a guidebook, which provides options for public information strategies, complementing existing federal plans and strategic guidance documents, which may be employed in a domestic terrorist attack or a credible threat to the homeland.
DHS	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) serves as the department's medical, veterinary, and public health advisor to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the FEMA Administrator, and all DHS components. Specifically, CWMD supports the food, agriculture, and veterinary mission through the oversight and management of DHS's implementation of HSPD-9 in coordination with other federal departments and agencies, SLTT governments, and the private sector.
DHS	Integrated Consortium of Laboratories (ICLN)	ICLN provides for a federally coordinated and interoperable system of laboratory networks that provide timely, credible, and interpretable data in support of surveillance, early detection, and effective consequence management for acts of terrorism and other major incidents requiring laboratory response capabilities. The ICLN is a partnership between nine federal agencies: Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of the Interior (DOI), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of State (DOS), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The ICLN includes thte following networks: DOD Laboratory Network, Environmental Response Laboratory Network (ERLN), Food Emergency Response Network (FERN), Laboratory Response Network (LRN), NAHLN, National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN), and the Veterinary Laboratory Investigation and Response Network.
DHS (S&T) Office of National Labs (ONL)	Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC)	Plum Island Animal Disease Center, a joint DHS and USDA laboratory that serves as the nation's premier defense against the introduction of foreign animal diseases. The laboratory provides a host of high impact, indispensable preparedness and response capabilities, including vaccine research and development, diagnostics, training, and bioforensics.
DHS	National Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC)	Conducts bioforensic analysis of evidence from a biocrime or terrorist attack to attain a "biological fingerprint" to help investigators identify perpetrators and determine the origin and method of attack. NBFAC is designated by Presidential Directive to be the lead federal facility to conduct and facilitate the technical forensic analysis and interpretation of materials recovered following a biological attack in support of the appropriate lead federal agency.
DHS	National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC)	DHS S&T Laboratory with two component Centers: the National Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC) and the National Biological Threat Characterization Center (NBTCC). NBACC is a 24x7 operational national security capability operating at the highest level of biocontainment.
DHS	National Biological Threat	Conduct studies to guide the development and use of countermeasures to understand current and future biological threats, to assess vulnerabilities

	Characterization Center (NBTCC)	and conduct risk assessments, and to determine potential impacts to guide the development of countermeasures such as detectors, drugs, vaccines, and decontamination technology and use
DHS	National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIC)	The mission of NBIC is to enhance the capability of the Federal Government to— • Rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track a biological incident of national concern. • Integrate and analyze data relating to human health, animal, plant, food, water, and environmental domains. • Disseminate alerts and pertinent information. • Oversee development and operation of the National Biosurveillance Integration System interagency community.
DHS	Surge Capacity Force	Organized into four tiers, for the purpose of prioritizing and providing for an informed selection of deployable human assets: • Tier 1 comprises FEMA Reservists with FEMA credentials • Tier 2 comprises FEMA Permanent Full-Time Employees with FEMA credentials • Tier 3 comprises DHS full-time federal employees • Tier 4 comprises full-time or part-time federal employees from other federal departments and agencies
DHS (CBP Laboratories and Scientific Services)	Weapons of Mass Destruction Response Teams	Provide level "A" hazardous material technical response capabilities
DHS (CISA)	Sector-Specific Agency	The Sector Outreach and Programs Division builds stakeholder capacity and enhances critical infrastructure security and resilience through voluntary partnerships that provide key tools, resources, and partnerships. The division operates the council and stakeholder engagement mechanisms for the critical infrastructure security and resilience community. The division serves as the sector-specific agency for 6 of the 16 sectors and collaborates with the other 10.
DHS (CISA/Federal Protective Service)	Hazardous Response Program	This program Includes initial investigations of suspicious or threatening chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incidents; conduction of CBRNE threat assessments; confirmations of unauthorized presence of CBRNE agents and materials; and the conduct of emergency operations. The Hazardous Response Program also provides evacuation support during CBRNE incidents, CBRNE mutual aid response through agreement and training assistance. The program is compliant with OSHA and National Fire Protection Association guidance and regulations.
DHS (FEMA)	Consequence Management Coordination Unit (CMCU)	In response to notification of a terrorist threat or actual incident, FEMA will activate the CMCU in support of FBI-led crisis management operations at the Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategic Group (WMDSG). Within the WMDSG, the FEMA staffs and manages the CMCU. This unit is supported by federal technical capabilities provided through the DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration, HHS, DOD, and DHS. As the principal advisory unit for consequence management considerations within the WMDSG, the CMCU provides recommended courses of action in light of ongoing and evolving operations. The CMCU provides a link between FBI-led crisis response and FEMA-coordinated consequence management response operations.

DHS (FEMA), DOJ (FBI), DOD, HHS, EPA	Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST)	A rapidly deployable, interagency team responsible for providing expert advice and support to the FBI Special Agent in Charge concerning the Federal Government's capabilities in resolving a terrorist threat or incident.
DHS (FEMA)	Federal National Ambulance and Para-transit Support Services	The Federal National Ambulance and Para-transit Support Services is not to be used to transport contagious patients.
DHS (FEMA)	National Incident Management Assistance Teams (N-IMAT)	N-IMATs are trained on CBRN-related scenarios and will be FEMA's lead in the field to coordinate and integrate inter-jurisdictional response in support of the affected state(s) or U.S. territory(s). N-IMATs provide initial situational awareness for federal decision makers and support the initial establishment of a unified command. IMATs provide for multi-disciplinary needs of emergency management and may include members from the inter-agency community.
DOD	Defense Intelligence Agency/National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI)	NCMI provides intelligence assessments of foreign health threats, including pandemic warning, to prevent strategic surprise across the broad threat spectrum.
DOD	DOD Veterinary Services	A formal memorandum of agreement exists between USDA APHIS and DOD concerning the response to animal diseases and other all-hazards incidents. Additionally, military veterinary and public health personnel may be able to provide specific surge capabilities in a food or agriculture incident in teams or as individual augmentees.
DOD	Defense Health Agency, Public Health Division, Armed Forces Health Surveillance Branch (AFHSB)	DOD serves a key role in biosurveillance to detect disease and to understand the threats from endemic and emerging infectious diseases relevant to DOD forces; inform the larger U.S. biosurveillance mission to maintain situational awareness.
DOE (NNSA)	Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center	Coordinates federal radiological monitoring and assessment activities with those of state and local agencies.
DOI (USGS)	U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Environmental Health	The USGS Environmental Health Mission Area has the capability to develop models and tools for identifying, monitoring, and assessing emerging environmental health threats and pathways for human and animal exposure. These activities build upon USGS's expertise in the hydrologic, atmospheric, geologic, and ecologic processes that affect the transport and fate of agents in the environment.
DOI (USGS)	USGS Ecosystems	The USGS Ecosystems Mission Area maintains core capabilities for early detection and rapid response to invasive species and wildlife disease. These include situational awareness mapping, mathematical modeling and risk assessment, laboratory support for early detection of aquatic and terrestrial wildlife diseases, and research and development of disease management strategies and tools as well as decision analysis support.
DOI (USGS)	USGS National Wildlife Health Center (NWHC)	USGS and its NWHC serve as the federal lead for wildlife disease emergencies including zoonotic diseases outbreaks under ESF #11. Assists in responding to disease events involving free ranging fish and wildlife populations including infectious diseases, biohazard events, and toxicological diseases resulting from exposure to environmental contaminants by providing wildlife emergency response teams, geospatial assessment and mapping tools, assistance in the identification of new emerging and resurging zoonotic diseases, diagnostic laboratory support (up to and including biological safety Level 3 containment), assistance with

		the prevention, control, and eradication of any disease involving wildlife, and carcass disposal facilities, as appropriate.
DOI (FWS)	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS) Health Office	The FWS Wildlife Health Office conducts critical work in wildlife health and disease surveillance, response, and management. The Wildlife Health Office comprises a network of wildlife health experts located across the country supporting refuges, wetland management districts, and other service programs by (a) providing technical advice about wildlife disease issues, (b) providing guidance on adapting management strategies to prevent wildlife diseases, (c) identifying health surveillance needs, (d) conducting research projects to determine best practices in disease prevention, (e) providing veterinary services for field activities, and (f) supporting emergency response efforts.
DOI (NPS)	National Park Service (NPS) Wildlife Health Branch and Office of Public Health	The NPS Wildlife Health Branch provide professional veterinary consultation and technical assistance to aid parks in conserving wildlife, identifying and responding to zoonotic diseases in wildlife populations, and working closely with the NPS Office of Public Health and SLTT health departments in zoonotic disease prevention and response. The NPS Office of Public Health is staffed by public health service officers including physicians, veterinarians, environmental health service officers and engineers that oversee food, drinking water, and wastewater safety in parks as well as assisting in zoonotic and vector-borne disease surveillance and responses in parks.
DOJ (FBI)	Federal Bureau of Investigation	The FBI is the lead Federal law enforcement agency to identify, detect, deter and disrupt terrorist operations and threats from the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) before they occur. The FBI has the primary jurisdiction to investigate, collect intelligence, apprehend and prosecute those responsible for WMD-related threats, incidents, and acts of terrorism.
DOJ (FBI)	Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategic Group (WMDSG)	The WMDSG is an FBI-led interagency coordination mechanism to resolve imminent WMD terrorist threats or incidents, to include food and agriculture threats or incidents.
DOJ (FBI)	Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC)	SIOC is the command and communications center to support crisis management, special event monitoring, and the capability for 24 hour operations to provide situational awareness and as a clearinghouse to collect, process, and disseminate information.
DOJ (FBI)	WMD Directorate (WMDD)	WMDD coordinates all incidents related to the use of WMD or CBRN materials (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) and to prevent their intentional use for purposes and motivations by adversaries to the U.S.
DOJ (FBI)	WMDD Countermeasures Operations Section (COS)	COS integrates WMD preparedness programs and initiatives through a multi-layered preparedness strategy to prepare for, identify, respond, and disrupt WMD threats and incidents
	WMDD Operations Response Unit (ORU)	ORU coordinates, plans, and trains, and leads the response against the use or threatened use of WMD against the United States. ORU is divided by modality/program: Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear, Response, and Support.
DOJ (FBI)	WMDD Chemical-Biological Countermeasures Unit (CBCU)	CBCU works cooperatively with local, state, tribal, federal, private, and academic partners to deter, detect, and disrupt the production, acquisition, and intentional misuse of chemical and biological materials by developing

		and executing foreign and domestic outreach, tripwire, and countermeasure initiatives.
DOJ (FBI)	WMDD Chemical-Biological Intelligence Unit (CBIU)	CBIU provides timely and actionable intelligence analysis to identify, understand, and mitigate current and emerging WMD threats and vulnerabilities in collaboration with key stakeholders in the US Intelligence Community (USIC), foreign and domestic law enforcement, the private sector, and academic partners
DOJ (FBI)	Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)	JTTFs are teams of locally based investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists from state, local, tribal, and federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share information regarding terrorist activities and the intelligence base. There are 175 task forces with at least one in each of 56 FBI field offices.
DOJ (FBI)	Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG)	CIRG integrates tactical, negotiations, behavioral analysis, and crisis management resources for the rapid response to critical CBRNE incidents. Consists of special agents and professional support SME's to provide expertise in crisis management, hostage rescue, surveillance and aviation, hazardous devices analysis mitigation, crisis negotiations, behavioral analysis, and tactical operations.
DOJ (FBI)	Laboratory Division	FBI Laboratory is the primary US forensic crime lab to support domestic and foreign law enforcement, intelligence, military, and forensic science partners for the scientific analysis of crime scene evidence including DNA, latent print, crime scene documentation, evidence response team operations, firearms-toolmarks, handwriting analysis, trace evidence, and forensic chemistry.
DOJ (FBI)	Hazardous Evidence Response Team (HERT)	HERTs are field teams trained, equipped, and authorized to collect CBRNE evidence in hazardous crime scene and other contaminated environments. There 26 HERT teams regionally assigned to FBI Field Offices
DOJ (FBI)	Field Office WMD Coordinator (WMDC)	There is at least one WMDC in all 56 FBI Field Offices and 400 smaller Resident Agencies (RA's) that are tasked to respond to and investigate potential threats or incidents with a nexus to CBRNE - WMD threats. WMDCs act as a conduit to FBIHQ for technical information, advice, intelligence and assistance with emphasis on pre-event planning and prevention through the use of outreach and liaison efforts with Federal regional counterparts and state, county and local
EPA	CBRN Consequence Management Advisory Team	This team is the lead EPA special team for provision of scientific and technical support for all phases of environmental response to a CBRN incident, including health and safety, site characterization, environmental sampling and analysis, environmental monitoring, building, structure, and outdoor decontamination, waste management, environmental cleanup, and clearance; manages the EPA's Airborne Spectral Photometric Environmental Collection Technology fixed-wing aircraft, which provides chemical/radiological data and deploys and operates mobile and fixed chemical and biological laboratories.
EPA	Environmental Response Laboratory Network (ERLN)	ERLN provides capability to perform routine and emergency analysis of environmental samples. ERLN is integrated into the ICLN organization.
EPA	Environmental Response Team	This team provides scientific and technical expertise for response to traditional chemicals and hazardous materials, including health and safety, environmental sampling, air monitoring, toxicology, risk assessment, waste

		management, contaminated water/scientific divers, and site decontamination and cleanup and provides field-analytical and real-time air monitoring for chemicals with the EPA mobile laboratories known as Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzers.
EPA	National Criminal Enforcement Response Team	This team provides technical, safety, hazardous evidence collection, and other forensic support to law enforcement in the instance of a WMD terrorist attack or environmental catastrophe.
EPA	National Response Team (NRT)	NRT is a national-level multi-agency coordination entity comprised of 15 federal agencies that provides technical assistance and resource and policy support to the federal On-Scene Coordinator during NCP and ESF #10 responses to oil and hazardous materials.
EPA, DHS (USCG)	Regional Response Team (RRT)	RRTs are co-chaired by the EPA and USCG. A regional-level multi-agency coordination entity comprised of 15 federal agencies, state, and tribal representatives that provide technical assistance and resource support to the federal On-Scene Coordinator during NCP and ESF #10 responses to oil and hazardous materials.
EPA, DHS (USCG)	On-Scene Coordinators (OSC)	EPA/USCG OSCs coordinate the on-scene, tactical response to oil and hazardous substances incidents. Actions include assessment of the extent and nature of environmental contamination; assessment of environmental cleanup options; and implementation of environmental cleanup, including decontaminating buildings and structures and management of wastes. The EPA generally provides the federal OSC for incidents in inland areas, while the USCG provides the federal OSC for incidents in coastal areas.
HHS	Administration for Children and Families (ACF)	ACF promotes the self-sufficiency of individuals, families, and populations with access and functional needs prior to, during, and after disasters; Human Services Technical Assistance assets are utilized in the field to provide these services. Persons with access and functional needs include those who have disabilities, live in institutionalized settings, are elderly, are children, are from diverse cultures, have limited English proficiency, are transportaion disadvantaged, have chronic medical conditions, or have pharmacological dependency.
HHS	Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR)	ASPR leads the nation and its communities preparing for, responding to, and recovering from the adverse health effects of public health emergencies and disasters. ASPR focuses on preparedness, planning, response, and recovery; provides federal support, including medical professionals through the NDMS deployable teams, to augment SLTT capabilities during an emergency or disaster; and leads the federal Health and Social Services RSF of the National Disaster Recovery Framework to assist locally led recovery efforts in the restoration of the public health, health care and social services networks of impacted communities.
HHS	Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (ASPA)	The HHS ASPA assumes the lead in media response for public health, coordinated with and through the Joint Information Center. HHS ASPA coordinates the overall HHS Public Affairs planning, development, and implementation of emergency incident communications strategies and activities for the department.
HHS (ASPR)	At-Risk, Behavioral Health and Community Resilience	Provides subject matter expertise, education, and coordination to internal and external partners to ensure that the functional needs of at-risk individuals and behavioral health issues are integrated in the public health and medical emergency preparedness, response, and recovery activities of the nation to facilitate and promote community resilience and national health security.

HHS (ASPR)	Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA)	BARDA, within the ASPR Office of HHS, provides an integrated, systematic approach to the development and purchase of the necessary vaccines, drugs, therapies, and diagnostic tools for public health medical emergencies.
HHS	Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program	A state grant program administered by HHS Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration and funded by FEMA.
HHS (ASPR)	Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT)	A DMAT is a group of professional and para-professional medical personnel (supported by a cadre of logistical and administrative staff) designed to provide medical care during a disaster or other incident. DMATs are designed to be a rapid-response element to supplement local medical care until other federal or contract resources can be mobilized, or the situation is resolved.
HHS (ASPR)	Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT)	DMORTs are teams of subject matter experts that are activated in the case of a disaster and directed by ASPR/Office of Emergency Management (OEM). Teams are composed of funeral directors, medical examiners, coroners, pathologists, forensic anthropologists, medical records technicians and transcribers, finger print specialists, forensic odonatologists, dental assistants, x-ray technicians, mental health specialists, computer professionals, administrative support staff, and security and investigative personnel.
HHS (ASPR)	Disaster Portable Morgue Unit (DPMU)	DPMUs are staged on the East and West coasts for immediate deployment in support of DMORT operations. The DPMU is a depository of equipment and supplies for deployment to a disaster site. It contains a complete morgue with designated workstations for each processing element and prepackaged equipment and supplies.
HHS (ASPR)	Emergency Management Group (EMG)	The EMG is a scalable team that is utilized every day at some operational level of intensity. Its organization is designed to be flexible and can expand as needed. The EMG is the established structure through which information and potential threats are received and decisions, including the deployment of an Incident Response Coordination Team, are made. The EMG operates within the principles of the Incident Command System and National Incident Management System. The EMG effectively operates 24/7 but can reach its full capacity with associated liaisons within four hours.
HHS (ASPR)	Incident Response Coordination Team (IRCT)	The IRCT and the IRCT-Forward act as the HHS agents on-scene at emergency sites under the direction of the EMG. The IRCT directs and coordinates the activities of all HHS personnel deployed to the emergency site and assists SLTT and other federal departments and agencies as applicable.
HHS, DOD, VA, and DHS	National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)	ASPR Office of Emergency Management (OEM) provides deployable medical response teams through the NDMS to augment the nation's medical response capabilty and support SLTT authorities. In addition, NDMS, a federal partnership between HHS, DOD, Veterans Administration (VA), and DHS provides (1) patient evacuation from the affected area or a location near the affected area to medcial care locations remote from the affected areas and (2) definitive medical care at NDMS civilian member hospitals.
HHS	National Public Health Information Coalition	HHS will leverage a network of SLTT health public health communicators to exchange information and increase the likelihood of consistent messaging and communication activities between federal and SLTT governments regarding the emergency and its impact on health.

HHS (ASPR)	National Veterinary Response Team (NVRT)	HHS's cadre of individuals within the NDMS who have professional expertise in areas of veterinary medicine, public health, and research. It is the primary HHS resource for the treatment of injured or ill animals affected by disasters.
HHS (ASPR)	Regional Emergency Coordinators	ASPR's primary representatives throughout the country at the regional level; coordinates preparedness and response activities for public health and medical emergencies.
HHS (ASPR)	Secretary's Operations Center (SOC)	The SOC operates 24/7/365. The mission of the SOC is to serve as the focal point for synthesis of critical public health and medical information on behalf of the U.S. Government.
HHS (CDC)	CDC Emergency Operations Center (CDC-EOC)	The CDC EOC coordinates the deployment of CDC staff and the procurement and management of all equipment and supplies that CDC responders may need during their deployment. When activated for a response, the CDC EOC can accommodate up to 230 personnel per 8-hour shift to handle situations ranging from local interests to worldwide incidents.
HHS (CDC)	Epidemic Information Exchange	CDC's secure, web-based communications network that serves as a powerful communications exchange between CDC, state, and local health departments, poison control centers, and other public health professionals. The system provides rapid reporting, immediate notification, editorial support, and coordination of health investigations for public health professionals.
HHS (CDC)	Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) Officers	EIS officers work in many health departments in the U.S. or at the CDC through the CDC's Center of Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory Services and are dispatched to investigate possible epidemics, due to both natural and artificial causes, including *Bacillus anthracis,* hantavirus, West Nile virus, and the Ebola virus .
HHS (CDC)	Health Alert Network	CDC's primary method of sharing cleared information about urgent public health incidents with public information officers, federal, state, territorial, and local public health practitioners; clinicians and public health laboratories.
HHS (CDC)	National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)	NIOSH is the U.S. federal agency that conducts research and makes recommendations to prevent worker injury and illness. NIOSH provides technical support and expertise in the characterization of complex, unknown, and multiple-contaminant worker exposures. NIOSH can deploy a multidiscipline team to provide guidance and technical assistance on responder and worker safety and health.
HHS (CDC)	Laboratory Response Network (LRN)	The LRN and its partners maintain an integrated national and international network of laboratories that are fully equipped to respond quickly to acts of chemical or biological threats, emerging infectious diseases, and other public health threats and emergencies.
HHS (ASPR)	Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)	The U.S. national repository of antibiotics, vaccines, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, and other critical medical supplies for use in a public health emergency upon request from SLTT responders.
HHS FDA	Regulated Products/Commodity Response Teams	Provides assistance to SLTT health authorities or in the absence of SLTT health investigators, assumes primary responsibility for evaluation and recovery of food service establishments and pharmacies.
HHS FDA	Medical Countermeasures Initiative (MCMsi)	This office coordinates FDA's MCMs development, availability, preparedness, and response. FDA ensures that MCMs—including drugs, vaccines, and diagnostic tests—to counter CBRN and emerging disease

	Office of Counterterrorism and Emerging Threats (OCET)	threats are safe, effective, and secure. This includes coordinating research, setting deployment and use strategies, and facilitating access to MCMs.
HHS FDA	Office of Foods and Veterinary Medicine (OFVM)	Includes the Center for Food Safety and Nutrition and the Center for Veterinary Medicine and provides executive leadership and strategic direction to the OFVM programs to protect and promote the health of humans and animals by ensuring the safety of the U.S. food supply, food additives, and dietary supplements as well as the safety of animal food and the safety and effectiveness of animal drugs.
HHS FDA	Office of Coordinated Outbreak Response and Evaluation Network (CORE)	FDA CORE is a component of CFSAN that ensures in-depth signal, trending and surveillance; streamlined decision making and quicker response time during an outbreak; seamless coordination and enhanced communication; and ultimately, increased public health protection leading to effective preventive food safety practices and policies.
HHS (FDA) and USDA (FSIS)	Food Emergency Respond Network (FERN)	Network of food testing laboratories to detect, to identify, to respond, and recover from emergencies and outbreaks in the U.S. food supply.

Appendix 6: Acronym List

Table 13: Acronym List

Acronym	Term
ACF	Administration for Children and Families
AFHSB	Armed Forces Health Surveillance Branch
AHPA	Animal Health Protection Act
APHIS	Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
ARS	Agricultural Research Service
ASPA	Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
ASPR	Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
BARDA	Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority
BIA	Biological Incident Annex
BLM	Bureau of Land Management
CAA	Clean Air Act
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives
CCC	Commodity Credit Corporation
CCMD	Combatant Command
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CERCLA	Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
CFSAN	Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition
CISA	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
CMCU	Consequence Management Coordination Unit
COG	Continuity of Government
COOP	Continuity of Operations Plan
CORE	Office of Coordinated Outbreak Response and Evaluation Network
CVM	Center for Veterinary Medicine
CWA	Clean Water Act
CWMD	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
DEST	Domestic Emergency Support Team
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIPP	Dairy Indemnity Payment Program
DMAT	Disaster Medical Assistance Team
DMORT	Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team
DOC	Department of Commerce
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOI	Department of the Interior
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOL	Department of Labor
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
DPA	Defense Production Act
DPMU	Disaster Portable Morgue Unit
DRG	Domestic Resilience Group
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
D-SNAP	Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
EDEN	Extension Disaster Education Network
EIS	Epidemic Intelligence Service
EMC	Emergency Management Committee

Acronym	Term
EMRS	Emergency Management Response System
EO	Executive Order
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
ERLN	Environmental Response Laboratory Network
ESF	Emergency Support Function
FAD	Foreign Animal Disease
FAIA	Food and Agriculture Incident Annex
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FD&C Act	Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
FDA	Food and Drug Administration
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FERN	Food Emergency Response Network
FIFRA	Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
FIMS	FSIS Incident Management System
FIOP	Federal Interagency Operational Plan
FS	U.S. Forest Service
FSIS	Food Safety and Inspection Service
FSMA	The Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011
FWS	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
HRSA	Health Resources and Services Administration
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HVE	Homegrown Violent Extremist
IAA	Interagency Agreement

Acronym	Term
ICLN	Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks
IHR	International Health Regulations
IP	Infrastructure Protection
IRCT	Incident Response Coordination Team
JIC	Joint Information Center
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
LFA	Lead Federal Agency
LRN	Laboratory Response Network
MAC	Multi-Agency Coordination
MCMs	Medical Countermeasures
MCMsi	Medical Countermeasures Initiative
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAHERC	National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps
NAHLN	National Animal Health Laboratory Network
NAP	Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program
NBACC	National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center
NBFAC	National Bioforensic Analysis Center
NBIC	National Biosurveillance Integration Center
NBIS	National Biosurveillance Integration System
NCP	National Contingency Plan
NCMI	National Center for Medical Intelligence
NDMS	National Disaster Medical System
NDRF	National Disaster Recovery Framework
NEA	National Emergencies Act

Acronym	Term
NEPA	National Environmental Protection Act
NFP	National Focal Point (IHR)
NIH	National Institutes of Health
N-IMAT	National Incident Management Assistance Teams
NIOSH	National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NPDN	National Plant Diagnostic Network
NPI	Non-pharmaceutical Intervention
NPS	National Park Service
NRCC	National Response Coordination Center
NRCS	Natural Resources Conservation Service
NRF	National Response Framework
NRT	National Response Team
NSPD	National Security Policy Directive
NVRT	National Veterinary Response Team
NVS	National Veterinary Stockpile
NVSL	National Veterinary Services Laboratories
NWHC	National Wildlife Health Center
OSEC	Office of the Secretary
OCET	Office of Counterterrorism and Emerging Threats
OCI	Office of Criminal Investigation
OCONUS	Outside the Continental United States
OFVM	Office of Foods and Veterinary Medicine
OHS	Office of Homeland Security
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
OSC (EPA/USCG)	On-Scene Coordinator
OSC (FBI)	On-Scene Commander

Acronym	Term
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PAHPA	Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act
PAHPRA	Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act
PETS	Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act
PHE	Public Health Emergency
PHEF	Public Health Emergency Fund
PHEIC	Public Health Emergency of International Concern
PHMSA	Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration
PHSA	Public Health Service Act
PIADC	Plum Island Animal Disease Center
PIO	Public Information Officer
PPD	Presidential Policy Directive
PPQ	Plant Protection and Quarantine
PReP	Preparedness and Response Plan
RCRA	Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RD	Rural Development
REC	Regional Emergency Coordinator
R/N	Radiological/nuclear
RRCC	Regional Response Coordination Center
RRT	Regional Response Team
RSF	Recovery Support Function
SAMHSA	Substance Abuse and Medical Health Services Administration
S&T	Science & Technology (DHS)
SBA	Small Business Administration
SLTT	State, local, tribal, territorial
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SNS	Strategic National Stockpile
SOC	Secretary's Operation Center

Acronym	Term
TCE	Threat Credibility Evaluation
UCG	Unified Coordination Group
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
USGS	U.S. Geological Survey
VA	Department of Veterans Affairs
VS	Veterinary Services
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMDSG	Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategic Group
WMD-CT	Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterterrorism
WS	Wildlife Services