Civil Liberties in the Digital Environment: Portfolio Review Document

Open Society Information Program

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OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS

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Portfolio Review Document

I. Definition of portfolio

The Digital Civil Liberties portfolio is made up of the Information Program grants to civil liberties groups working to advance law and policies that protect civil liberties – free expression, privacy and due process – in the online environment. This portfolio currently comprises ten core grantees located primarily in Europe and Latin America, most of them receiving general support. We complement our general support grants with a limited number of project grants. The annual disbursed budget in 2013 was $1,360,000 and has increased slightly over the past three years. The recommended budget for 2014 is $1,380,000.

II. Original ambition

Throughout most of the 2000s, the Information Program funded CIS-based policy groups and experts via the Global Internet Policy Initiative managed by the Centre for Democracy and Technology and Internews. It also supported the international work of major US civil liberties groups such as the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The yearly spending was around $500,000.[1]

After reflection, we adopted a new approach in 2009. We decided to stop funding via US intermediaries and instead to work directly with local groups to build their organisational capacity. The ambition was to build a professional, diversely funded civil society infrastructure for digital rights advocacy in Europe and Latin America. This choice was motivated by the following theory of change: (a) In light of the dysfunctional global rule-making system for the internet, we focussed on regions where the creation of human rights compliant legal standards was likely and, given the influence of the country or region, would have spillover effects elsewhere; (b) In our chosen regions, the digital rights field was mostly volunteer-driven and a professional infrastructure was only starting to emerge. This meant that we were often the first funder of these fledgling groups and by developing a professional civil society infrastructure, often from scratch, we could have a disproportionate impact on the overall field.

III. Why have we chosen to review this portfolio?

Six days after we had submitted the 2014-17 Information Program strategy, Edward Snowden started to reveal the existence of mass surveillance programs operated by the NSA and other intelligence services. Reviewing the civil liberties portfolio at this point in time will allow us to reassess and, if needed, adjust our strategy in light of the Snowden revelations. Also, the digital rights field is young and growing – both in terms of active NGOs and funders – and this is a good moment to think through how to best target our resources.

In the following pages, we will highlight trends in the current political and funding environment, discuss our contribution to the field over the past three years, highlight what we have learned and ask questions that we should consider as we re-assess our funding strategy.

[1] The budget of $500,000 also included work on affordable access to communications infrastructure in Africa, in addition to work on civil liberties.

IV. The current environment

1. The political context

We are at a crossroads. The Snowden revelations have uncovered the existence of massive state surveillance and civil society is only beginning to understand the implications for open societies. The following are some of the major developments in the political environment that we will need to take into account as we assess our funding strategy:

- The Snowden revelations will speed up shifts in the global governance of the internet, moving power from the United States to the BRIC countries. For example, Brazil is leading the charge on the acceleration of the internationalisation of ICANN oversight. Other changes may follow and strengthen more repressive voices, such as China and Russia, in the global debate.
- As a result of the Snowden revelations, the authority of Western democracies to advocate for human rights standards in the digital environment has been compromised. Several governments around the world are responding by advancing the idea of "technological sovereignty", proposing legislation on the localisation of data centres and preferential market access policies, which would give these governments more control over the internet in their territory.
- The IT industry has become both a censor of our networked public sphere (by imposing its speech norms via platforms like Google and Facebook) and an extension of law enforcement and intelligence services (by providing them, willingly or not, with access to our data). In fact, Snowden revealed the almost seamless ties that bind the several intelligence and other government agencies to the major IT companies.
- As we witness the growth of walled gardens, where for many, particularly in the Global South, access means access to Facebook, Twitter, Google and Wikipedia, but not the rest of the internet, the power of these companies – and by extension governments – is further amplified.
- Finally, the Snowden revelations have put a spotlight on the use of data mining and algorithmic predictions. There is the risk that the use of algorithmic predictions will increasingly challenge long-standing democratic values and practices such as the presumption of innocence and evidence-based policy making, introducing changes as consequential as those ushered in by internet itself.

2. The funding environment

Over the past months, we have mapped the funding strategies of 11 of the 13 digital rights policy funders, i.e. OSF, Ford Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Wellspring Advisors, Media Democracy Fund, International Development Research Center (IDRC), Hivos, US State Department, Dutch Foreign Ministry, UK Foreign Commonwealth Office. SIDA and Google were not in a position to share funding strategies and budgets.[2]

- The total funding from these organizations for this work, *worldwide*, is around $30m, with more than two thirds coming from the Ford Foundation ($12m), OSF ($5.2m) and the US State Department ($4m), with many of the others contributing of the order of $1m each. We understand that Ford's budget is set to increase to $20m in 2014. Around half of the funding is concentrated in the U.S. The remaining funds are spread very thinly across more than 30 countries around the world, with the majority of the funds going to the Global South and only $1m going to Europe.
- There seems to be little coordination between funders. This results in grants being scattered, which is exacerbated by the fact that much of the funding goes to re-granters with only a general mandate to support local work on internet freedom. The re-granters themselves mostly tend not to have specific regional strategies. Also, an explicit field-building approach among funders puts issues second to the development of the field, and accordingly makes it more difficult to develop coordinated initiatives around particular issues.

[2] The OSF Information Program, US Programs and IDRC have commissioned the report "Funding for Policy Work to Protect Human Rights in the Digital Environment: A Mapping and Analysis" authored by Morris Lipson.

V. Our contributions to the field

1. Our grant making explained

Over the past three years we have awarded general support grants of a total of $2,039,660 to 14 groups. In six cases these grants were coupled with support for organisational development. Given our original ambition, most of our grantees are active in Europe and Latin America and are young digital rights groups. We have a strong preference for locally rooted and capital-city based organisations, because we see access to policy makers as a prerequisite for the ability to influence law and policy. We fund groups that prioritise work on binding law as opposed to soft norms. All of our grantees use a mix of expert analysis, lobbying and public advocacy as their main tools for effecting policy change. Some of our grantees are grassroots groups (some with substantial paying membership), for example working to involve citizens in lobbying efforts (see La Quadrature du Net's "Citizen Safaris" to Brussels). See Appendix 3 for more information about our core grantees.

We are complementing our general support grants with project grants. These project grants enable us to make available additional resources for specific resources-intensive campaigns or litigation efforts. For example, we have awarded a campaigning grant to three NGOs advocating for the adoption of an export control regime for surveillance technologies by the US and EU. Our assumption is that as the field matures the need for these types of project grants will decrease. That said, project grants are also a way for us to prioritise a certain issue. For example, we are currently developing a set of project grants that will help to strengthen the European response to the Snowden revelations. Project grants also allow us to integrate different civil society communities, such as the open government data and civil liberties communities. See Appendix 4 for a list of project grants.

We are currently not funding international or internationally active digital rights groups.[3] These groups are either well-funded or we think are not well positioned to effect policy change. The one exception is Privacy International, which was foundering and we helped to turn around three years ago. We also do not support general capacity building on digital rights issues, mainly because several funders provide substantial support to re-granters to build capacity in the Global South. In addition, we have not funded research in a systematic way. This is due to our limited budget as well as to the fact that IDRC and MacArthur are prioritising research in their funding strategies. That said, we have occasionally funded policy research, mainly upon request of grantees and in response to a particular opening in the policy space. For example, we funded a study on the efficacy of web blocking of child pornography, which was used to defeat a web blocking proposal in the EU.[4] Both governmental and corporate funders are supporting events and travel generously. We provide very limited travel funding to support civil society strategy meetings.

2. Our use of OSF tools and collaboration with other Programs

Grant making: Our most common tool by far is grant making. We are coordinating our grant making most closely with the Media Program, US Programs and Latin America Program. This involves review of grant proposals, advice on contacts and, in some cases, co-funding of grants. For example, we provided support, jointly with the Media Program, to the UN Special Rapporteur on Free Expression to develop annual reports on the internet (2011)[5] and surveillance (2013).[6]

[3] The active international groups are Access Now, Reporters Without Borders, Global Partners, Internews, Citizen Lab, the Association for Progressive Communications, the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Centre for Democracy and Technology and Amnesty International. We were among the founding funders of the Global Network Initiative, but have discontinued funding it in 2011. The international free expression groups such as IFEX, Index on Censorship, Article 19 and Media Legal Defence Fund are funded by the OSF Media Program. Human Rights Watch is key actor funded by OSF.
[4] http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/internet-blocking-crimes-should-be-punished-and-not-hidden
[5] http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf
[6] http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.40_EN.pdf

Litigation: We collaborated with the Justice Initiative (OSJI) on the successful challenge of internet blocking in Turkey. This was the first ruling by an international tribunal on wholesale blocking of internet content, and hence a significant precedent.[7] We have independently funded the challenge of the EU Data Retention Directive,[8] mainly because OSJI did not work on privacy at the time. We are jointly supporting groups in Italy and Argentina with the goal of identifying litigation opportunities.

Fellowships: We had three excellent Open Society Fellows working on these issues in recent years (Evgeny Morozov, Rebecca MacKinnon and Chris Soghoian) and we are currently in conversation with the Fellowship Program about targeted recruitment of a privacy and surveillance fellow.

Communications: We have not engaged OSF Communications to date beyond enlisting their support to assist with media coverage of the ECJ Opinion on EU Data Retention Directive.

3. The field: Progress, challenges and our contribution

The field working to protect civil liberties in the digital environment is made up of two overlapping communities: first, a network of young organizations with deep expertise in technology, innovative campaigning skills and a commitment to protecting a free and open internet; and second, traditional free expression and human rights NGOs that have a background in human rights law including litigation expertise, but have not traditionally worked on technology policy. To date, our grants focussed on the first group of NGOs.

Professionalization of NGO infrastructure: Like the development of the digital environment itself, digital rights issues were initially often addressed by passionate individual actors and informal coalitions of activists. Over time it became clear to many actors that more robust institutions were needed to respond to the growing challenges for digital rights. By providing general support coupled with organisational development assistance, we have seen a much stronger digital rights NGO infrastructure emerge over the past three years in both Europe and Latin America. We saw a rise in the number of active groups and paid staff members. In several cases, critical institutions were able to strengthen governance structures, develop strategic plans and grow their organisations. For example, with our help Privacy International (PI) has grown from a two-person organisation struggling to raise funds to a 17-person professional NGO in the course of three years. In other cases, such as Digitale Gesellschaft and La Quadrature du Net, strengthening organizations requires more patience and flexibility. Demanding that these organizations adopt what might appear to be rigid organizational norms risks alienating their grassroots activist base. Our strategy is to require that essential capacities be strengthened (e.g., governance and board oversight, financial management, clear lines of decision-making) but at the same time encourage our grantees to choose the structure that allows them to retain elements vital for ensuring continued engagement by principals and volunteers.

Diversification of funding sources: More professional structures are an important contributing factor towards a group's ability to diversify its funding base. While international groups like PI and our Latin American grantees have made good progress, European organisations are still struggling to raise funds[9]. OSF is the only significant, systematic funder of digital rights groups in Europe. There are signs that new funders may enter the field as a result of the Snowden revelations; our contribution ensures that critical organisations are in place and able to absorb additional funds as they become available.

[7] In December 2012, the European Court of Human Right (ECHR) ruled that access to online content is a fundamental right, and that it can only be restricted in exceptional cases, subject to full judicial review.

[8] We supported Digital Rights Ireland to challenge the EU Data Retention Directive on fundamental rights grounds. In an interim ruling issued on December 12, 2013 the Advocate General of the European Court of Justice held that "the collection and, above all, the retention, in huge databases, of the large quantities of data generated or processed in connection with most of the everyday electronic communications of citizens of the Union constitute a serious interference with the privacy of those individuals." A final judgment on the case will be delivered in 2014.

[9] For example, European Digital Rights, the only European digital rights group based in Brussels, is relied on by numerous parties to monitor developments at EU level, but has only four staff members and an annual budget of $440,000 to do so.

Campaigning successes: The digital rights field has celebrated two highly visible wins in the past two years: SOPA/PIPA and ACTA were defeated in the US and Europe respectively. Marco Civil, a civil rights based internet framework, will, hopefully, be adopted in Brazil in early in 2014. While it's always hard to measure any one funder's contribution, I think it's fair to say that our grantees in Europe, including Panoptykon Foundation, La Quadrature du Net and the European Digital Rights (EDRi), were instrumental in convincing the European Parliament to reject ACTA in 2012. Similarly, we have been funding the Center for Technology and Society/the Institute of Technology and Society (CTS/ITS) since 2009 to, among other things, work with the Brazilian Ministry of Justice on drafting Marco Civil and advocating for its adoption. See Appendix 3 for other notable work by our grantees.

These campaigns show that the core players of the field were able to capture public imagination and mobilise resistance, employing innovative campaigning tools and tactics. However, more recent developments have been less promising and have highlighted important challenges for the field, especially as there is a need to move from a defensive to a more proactive mode of campaigning. For example, the campaign for revised European data protection rules was not able to repeat the ACTA success. Also, it is unclear whether civil society is able to respond to some of the major challenges resulting from the Snowden revelations outlined earlier in this document. For example, civil society's response to date to the those revelations is very weak outside the United States.

Why is the field struggling? Some of the challenges, such as the growth of the "cyber-security industrial complex" are daunting and civil society struggles to come up with effective responses. Also, most issues that digital rights groups are working on are formidably complex. For example, the draft EU Data Protection Directive received thousands of proposals for amendments, many highly technical, and most coming from industry rather than civil society. Capturing public imagination and mobilising pressure is challenging in these instances. Finally, in many cases legal standards are only emerging, or are being contested and rethought. In these instances, capacity to conduct policy research and facilitate coordination around standards, not to mention to create a political game plan, is essential and will need to be further developed.

Integration of the digital rights with other civil society communities*:* An important indicator for the strength of the digital rights field is the degree of integration with other communities. This integration adds available expertise to the digital rights field as well as respected voices to its campaigns. At least four funders are, at a substantial level, supporting integration of the digital rights, free expression and human rights communities through capacity building workshops in the Global South. The Information Program has advised and, in one instance, co-funded efforts fostering this integration with the Media Program.[10] It is outside the scope of this paper to assess the impact of these efforts, but here are a couple of observations we'd like to offer: (a) Coordination between funders is essential and could be improved. For example, some of our grantees have complained about the proliferation of capacity building workshops funded by different donors. (b) Other models should be considered. For example, Human Rights Watch and the Committee to Protect Journalists have hired staff members with a digital rights background and as a result have become serious contenders in the digital rights policy space. (c) Finally, it may be that events outside of our control, like the Snowden revelations, may be the biggest drivers yet of the integration of the different civil society fields. For example, several free expression groups (such as Article 19 and English PEN) have recently approached the Information Program to discuss work programs on surveillance; we should prepare for more of this in the future.

Also, in response to the Snowden revelations, the civic technology and digital rights communities have started to interact more closely: civic tech groups want to understand the legal environment better, and the policy groups are starting to offer secure communications solutions to their constituencies. The Information Program has also made an effort, in the form of project grants, to foster collaboration

[10] We co-funded the work of the UN Special Rapporteur Frank la Rue to host consultations with civil society to provide input into his annual report. We have advised the Media Program on its grant to IFEX to engage its members in digital rights advocacy campaigns.

between the open government data and digital rights communities to address the tensions between openness and privacy.

Litigation capacity*:* In order to be able to enforce human rights standards and develop strong precedents in jurisprudence, the digital rights field needs litigation capacity, which is currently underdeveloped outside the US and UK. The Information Program, in collaboration with OSJI, has supported two successful litigation efforts to date. While we were able to support strategic cases, we think it's essential to build digital rights enforcement capacity in civil society more proactively.

VI. How do we adjust?

In summary, while the digital rights field has grown in strength over the past years, and in some regions such as Europe we have seen a professional infrastructure emerge for the first time, the field struggles to move from a reactive into a proactive mode of campaigning and confront some of the field's most daunting challenges such as the emergence of a pervasive surveillance society. The available funding is growing, yet funders are currently not coordinating to, for example, ensure concerted action on strategically important issues. How do we adjust our funding strategy in light of these developments?

Geographic focus*:* Given our limited budget, we think our emphasis on Europe and Latin America remains valid. These regions are the best starting points for creating strong human rights standards. For example, Germany and Brazil were the sponsors of a recently adopted UN General Assembly resolution on the protection of privacy. We are the only committed funder in Europe, and given Brazil's global leadership, we are planning to deepen our engagement in Brazil. The question is whether we should consider work in other regions. Would it make sense to focus on other influential countries, such as India and South Africa, which are "sitting on the fence" and can be expected to play an important role in shaping the global governance of the internet? Or, while working in China directly is a major challenge, would it make sense to work in South and Southeast Asia as a way to minimise the influence of China in those countries?

Organisational development: We think we should continue supporting organisational development focussing on the younger, fragile yet promising groups. We have experience balancing the need for formal structures with respect for the "hacker culture" common to many of our grantees. To date, we have mainly worked with the help of consultants. Should we consider alternative approaches and if so, what are those? For some aspects of capacity building, would a peer-to-peer learning approach make sense? For example, could a Panoptykon staff member spend a month with the Open Rights Group to understand how to build and run a successful membership program?

Policy research capacity: The issues we confront can be very complex and to date we are often funding civil society reactions to policy initiatives from government (e.g. the response to ACTA). Policy research can assists with standard setting exercises, help to frame public discourse and establish credibility of policy advocates. For example, PI's Big Brother Incorporated helped to expose the trade in surveillance technology and is now being used to advocate for an export control regime of these technologies. Should we put a bigger emphasis on policy research? If so, should we add a research component to our grants to strengthen this capacity? Or will research capacity naturally grow as organisations expand their budgets and are able to hire research staff? What are other possible models, in particular for our smaller grantees? Or do we leave this issue to other research-oriented funders such as MacArthur and IDRC?

Enforcement capacity: There is a clear litigation capacity gap in the digital rights field. Very few lawyers outside of the United States are willing to take on even simple cases involving abuse of surveillance or violations of digital rights. Should we decide to address this gap? In Europe young technology lawyers – such as the departing Executive Director of Bits of Freedom and Max Schrems, the initiator of *Europe-v-Facebook* – are keen to build an infrastructure to both submit complaints to government authorities and bring cases before courts. To date, they have not been able to identify the financial resources to do so; should we consider helping them? In other regions, it probably makes more sense to work with the

existing human rights/free expression networks such as ADC Argentina to build their and the judges capacity to litigate and rule on digital rights matters.

Integration of civil society fields: As free expression and human rights groups are increasingly embracing digital rights issues, will we move to fund some of those groups or rather rely on the Media Program and others to do so? Our inclination would be to fund the players that we believe have strongest impact on policy. Also, we will work to more closely integrate the Information Program's own networks of grantees such as the civic tech, open data and digital rights policy groups. Our big data initiative is one place where we can start doing so.

Internet global governance: To date, we have not invested in the global internet governance conversation. For example, unlike other funders we have not funded participation in the Internet Governance Forum. This is because we have concentrated our resources on "binding law forums". In light of the globalisation of ICANN's oversight, is this a moment to re-consider our approach?

Public opinion: Even though Snowden has exposed a pervasive surveillance state, civil society finds it very hard to mobilise on the issues of privacy and surveillance. Should we consider taking a more systematic approach to public opinion formation and for example invest in focus groups and messaging efforts, for example designing projects that help bring Information Program grantees with extensive experience in "information for advocacy" together with our civil liberties grantees?

Strategic leadership: How to respond to the biggest challenges for digital civil liberties? Ultimately, a strong field with visionary, strategic leaders will ensure effective responses to some of the biggest challenges the field is facing. This will mean bringing more funding to the field and making it an attractive career also outside the United States. That said, OSF initiatives and shared frameworks allow us to prioritise specific problems and respond in a more proactive manner. We are working on an initiative on the privatised enforcement of law by internet platform: How do respond to the fact that companies like as Google and Facebook have advanced to the censor of our networked public sphere by imposing their speech norms via their platforms? We are also developing an initiative aiming to develop and advocate for international standards for foreign intelligence collection, and are considering to evolve this initiative into a shared framework on surveillance adding other components such as building the ant-surveillance capabilities of activists. What are some of the other daunting challenges we are currently not thinking about but should respond to?

Funder collaboration: Given the enormous challenges ahead, the question is whether the moment is right for funders to take a more coordinated approach. For example, because of lack of coordination, there does not appear to be a systematic approach to policy change work, either globally or in any country except for the US. And in some countries, one dominant player seems to attract all the funding. Better coordination would also highlight gaping holes on the funders' map such the fact that a key jurisdiction like Europe is dramatically underfunded. As a result of the Snowden revelations it is likely that new funders, such as the Omidyar Network and Oak Foundation, will enter the space. Coordination would become all the more important in such a situation. Challenges to working together successfully can be substantial, such as the big differences in available budgets,[11] divergent interests, and the presence of corporate and government funders.[12] That said, we will be working in the coming months with the Ford Foundation and other funders to start an ongoing dialogue.

[11] The annual digital civil liberties budget is $1.4m, compared to Ford's likely budget of $20m of which a substantial amount will be spent internationally.

[12] Some of our grantees have raised concerns that funding from Google and foreign ministries is making it difficult for otherwise independent groups to establish their credibility.

APPENDIX 1

Theory of Change for the Digital Civil Liberties Portfolio

OSF provides funding and organizational development to grantees that then

lobby policy makers as well as engage the public (who also then in turn influence policy makers)

resulting in strong human rights standards in law and regional instruments,

and in turn creating a ripple effect into other countries and globally.

APPENDIX 2

Spending by Region and Type 2011-2013



APPENDIX 3

About Our Core Grantees:

Percentage of Annual Budget Funded by General Support Grants

6%

Privacy International

11%

Bits of Freedom

9%

Institute for Technology and Society Brazil

27%

European Digital Rights Initiative

14%

Open Rights Group

14%

Karisma Foundation

41%

La Quadrature du Net

30%

Derechos Digitales

35%

Panoptykon Foundation

50%

Digitale Gesellschaft

APPENDIX 3

About Our Core Grantees: Age of Grantee Organisation



APPENDIX 3

About Our Core Grantees: Notable Work



APPENDIX 4

Selection of Project Grants 2013

GRANTEE	PROJECT NAME	REGION	GRANTED $	DESCRIPTION
Privacy International	Campaign for Export Control Regime of Surveillance Technologies	Europe	83,750	to launch a collaborative campaign for the adoption of an export control regime of surveillance technologies by the US and EU
Open Rights Group	European Data Protection Campaign	Europe	24,900	to launch Naked Citizen, a collaborative campaign for a strong European Data Protection framework
The Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam	Study on the human rights limitations for privatised law enforcement by internet intermediaries	Europe	48,000	to study the legal limitations for self-regulation and privatized enforcement following from the European human rights framework
Privacy International	Surveillance Societies are Closed Societies: Promoting Privacy and Free Expression in the Developing World	Global South	150,000	to provide technical and finanical support to four partner organisations in Africa, Asia and Latin America to launch privacy campaigns/litigation in their countries
World Wide Web Foundation	Digital Activism Strategy Meeting	Global	16,800	to organise a civil society strategy meeting at the fringes of the Stockholm Internet Forum 2013
European Digital Rights Initiative	CSISAC Travel Fund for OECD	Global	25,000	to support OECD's Civil Society Advisory Committee (CSISAC) to participate in OECD meetings on the information society
Open Knowledge Foundation	Open Data, Personal Data, and Privacy	Global	35,000	to research and host covenings to address the tensions between open data and data protection
Open Rights Group	Open Data, Personal Data, and Privacy	Global	24,900	to research and host covenings to address the tensions between open data and data protection
Demos, Guatemala	Donor Collaboration in support of the UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression and Opinion	Global	50,000	to support the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion to prepare a report on surveillance (lead Program: Media Program)
Trust of the Americas	Strengthen issues of Freedom of Expression in Latin America through the Office of the Special Rapporteur	Latin America	12,665	to support the OAS' Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression to prepare a report on internet and human rights (lead Program: Media Program)
Open Media Coalition Italy	Internet and Freedom of Expression in Italy	Italy	10,000	to monitor legal threats against the exercise of freedom of expression online and identify litigation opportunities (lead Program: OSJI)
Asociacion por los Derechos Civiles, Argentina	Internet and Freedom of Expression in Latin America	Latin America	15,000	to monitor legal developments related to the internet and free expression and identify litigation opportunities (lead Program: OSJI)
University of Hong Kong	Media Law and Policy in the Internet Age	Asia	15,000	to hold an international conference on Media Law and Policy in the Internet Age and a Meeting of the Media Defence South East Asia (lead Program: Media Program and OSJI)

APPENDIX 5

Digital Civil Liberties: Competing Interests in Civil Society



APPENDIX 6

Global Spending by Digital Civil Liberties Funders in 2013



Other Funding

International Development & Research Centre
The Sigrid Rausing Trust
Wellspring
Hivos
Dutch Foreign Ministry
UK Foreign Common Office
Google
Sida