Joint Logistics Support Group Standard Operating Procedure

704

Joint Logistics Support Group Operations
(JLSG Ops)

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References:

A MC 0526 - Logistics Support Concept for NATO Response Force (NRF) Operations, 01 Jul 2005
B JLSG SOPs Serial 700

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700	JLSG General

AIM

1. To provide the conceptual framework for JLSG operations in support of NATO Operations. It is designed to be broad enough to allow commanders the flexibility to develop detailed arrangements for specific operations, while detailed enough so that Statements of Requirements (SOR), Directives, Plans and Procedures to be established.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT CONCEPT

2. Vision. To provide the logistics support to the operational requirements, JLSG support forces must be useable and available, and as cohesive, flexible, tailorable and agile as the force itself. To achieve this versatility and agility, the JLSG must operate under the principle of Unity of Effort and should adhere to the maximum extent possible to Unity of Command by reducing national or component support stovepipes and increasing multinational joint logistics cooperation. As the JLSG Commander assumes more responsibility for theatre-level logistics, to include greater reliance on multinational solutions, there should be a corresponding reduction in the size of NSEs. Nations, need only to provide through their NSE those functionalities, which are not carried out at the theatre level. Redundancy and competition for scarce resources has to be avoided. Nations are to be encouraged in this case to look for multinational solutions. Because the NATO Response Force (NRF) will be pre-generated to meet the requisite readiness timelines, planners will be better able to develop multinational support solutions prior to its stand-by period. Pre-generation will also permit the certification of the effectiveness of these multinational solutions to meet the military requirement.

3. The Operational Environment.

   a. NATO Operational Concepts clearly anticipate the requirement to deploy away from Alliance territory into an austere environment. NATO Commanders therefore should make maximum use of HNS or In Country Resources (ICR) where available, and efficient integration of commercial support solutions.

   b. The JLSG faces a myriad of potential deployment options. Poor infrastructure, long intra-theatre movement, challenging climate and terrain all must be anticipated in the preparation of strategic and operational guidance to provide the necessary flexibility for force tailoring and operational planning once the precise mission and area of operations is identified.

   c. The logistic support for each operation will be designed to provide efficient, effective support by deploying only what is needed for the operation. It is possible that only the JLSG or a single component commander may be deployed (e.g., immediate response to a natural disaster) and will be responsible for in-theatre logistics. In fact, it is conceivable that a unit or element assigned to a NATO mission may be deployed with its integral logistics support only, when the situation dictates.

   d. Most military operations today will be joint, or are potentially joint in nature. This has significant logistical implications and all sustainment solutions must therefore appreciate the complexities of the joint dimension. “Thinking joint” is necessary even if the mission begins as a single component operation. Joint logistics also implies planning for the most efficient utilization of assets with components taking on force-wide responsibilities. Truly joint and combined

theatre logistics will increase efficiency without sacrificing effectiveness by avoiding competition between components and/or between contributing nations. It will allow the commander to allocate possibly scarce resources where necessary to achieve the required operational effect. In order for the JF COM to optimise the logistic effort, the force requires integrated logistics with a command and control structure that can properly plan and coordinate RSOM and theatre sustainability, as well as maintain the visibility of assets.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

See JLSG SOP 700 (JLSG General).

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

See JLSG SOP 700 (JLSG General).

DEPLOYMENT

4. The JLSG HQ will conduct RSOM during the deployment phase using its assigned units, but the responsibility for Integration will lie with the deploying units' parent CCs. At the same time, the TLB will be built up to provide the core of sustainment support to the force. This will involve not only storage of the necessary stocks, but also building ammunition, fuel and other storage areas, and ensuring freedom of movement within the JLSA. The JLSG HQ will also establish the appropriate logistic coordination mechanisms as soon as possible and deploy its medical capabilities.

5. As soon as possible after deployment, the JLSG HQ will set up the routine sustainment system, processing all daily demands and passing them to the TLB HQ to assemble the necessary convoys.

6. While air assets for Intra Theatre Airlift System (ITAS) are likely to be the mostly required transportation assets, JLSG HQ also tries to enhance intra-theatre land movement including rail and road and intra theatre sea lift as far as assets and infrastructure are available and support can be contracted.

RECEPTION, STAGING AND ONWARD MOVEMENT (RSOM)

7. RSOM is an essential stage of any expeditionary operation. It transitions deploying forces (personnel, equipment and materiel) into forces capable of meeting the operational requirements. Because arriving troops have not yet re-formed into mission capable forces, RSOM must take place in a permissive environment as provided by security and force protection measures. RSOM units and other critical enablers will be required to enter the JOA before the main body and should be identified in the OPLAN.

8. The RSOM is unique in that the force may be required to conduct a two-staged RSOM: first for the entry of the IEF itself and secondly for follow-on forces. In an opposed entry operation, for example, the IEF would be required to conduct RSOM at a FMB. They would then conduct the initial entry in the JOA and provide the requisite security to enable the arrival of the RSOM elements of the larger follow-on force Further details are described in SOP 705 (RSOM/ Reverse RSOM), which will require specific enablers that will be part of the CJSOR.

SUSTAINMENT

9. The NATO Force Commander must develop a comprehensive sustainment plan to meet the pre-determined stand-alone requirement. To maximise the operational flexibility, sustainment systems should aim to establish a network comprised of a set of logistics nodes. These nodes provide the structure for a distribution-based system where requirements are generated through highly accurate predictive models or automated requisitions. This will enable the JLSG HQ and subordinate elements to deliver sustainment stocks forward to the components as they are needed. Tactical units would then be supplied from those stocks as determined by the Components.

10. **Provision of Supplies**. Provision of the AS is the responsibility of respective TCNs. Follow-on-supplies (FOS) is the responsibility of the LRSN/LLN within the JLSG. Locally procured supplies are provided under centralised contracts and Basic Ordering Agreements (BOAs) negotiated through the JLSG HQ, supported by NAMSA, and will be subject to MOUs and TAs between Nations and NATO. Non-common user spare parts or specific services, which cannot be delivered through multinational and/or joint arrangements, will remain the responsibility of NSEs.

11. **Operational Reserve**. Any stocks held in the JLSA will be considered as an Operational Reserve for the force. Where possible these reserves are to be compiled based upon in-theatre arrangements such as HNS, contractor's support and In Country Resources (ICR).

12. **POL Storage and Distribution**. Petroleum requires a discrete supply chain using dedicated means of distribution and specialist manpower to assure its fitness for use. Expeditionary operations will require the NATO force to operate away from the fixed infrastructure of the NATO Pipeline System. To reduce the demand on strategic lift assets to carry fuel into the expeditionary JOA, maximum use should be made of HNS or pre-arranged contracts (e.g. NAMSA's Basic Contractual Instruments BCIs). Even without these resources, NATO and nations should strive to satisfy the operational requirement, and achieve economies of scale and consistency of quality, through multinational solutions like LLN/LRSN or MILUs and adherence to the Single Fuel Policy.

13. **Medical Support**. This concept outlines generic medical support for the NATO missions. It will be expanded in a separate Medical Support Concept for NATO Operations.

    a. The Medical Advisor reports directly to the NATO Force Commander and will be responsible with his medical staff element for the overall planning and execution of medical activities of the force. He will coordinate joint medical issues through the respective component Medical Directors/Advisors/Officers. When deployed, an appropriate level of medical representation is required in the JLSG to coordinate and integrate the medical support within the JLSG into the overall support plan.

       Medical support functionalities which would normally be the JLSG HQ medical staff responsibility are: RSOM, medical resupply and control of JLSG Medical Treatment Facilities (MTFs). The JLSG Medical Advisor is not responsible to support both the tactical and strategic fixed wing aero medical evacuation.

    b. All Role 2 and Role 3 Medical Treatment Facilities (MTFs) will normally be considered force medical assets under the functional control of the respective Component or JLSG Commander, specific relationships will be dependent on

the circumstances prevailing. Nations should strive to achieve efficiency and economy of effort through bilateral or multinational medical options. In common with the Logistics community, information flow is essential for effective medical support, enabled by access to all appropriate CIS capabilities. Further details regarding JLSG medical support are described in SOP 707.

14. **Supplies and contractual services** provided on a theatre-level basis will be subject to reimbursement according to agreed NATO Financial Control guidelines. Nations, then, need only provide through the NSE those functionalities not carried out at the theatre level. Redundancy and competition for scarce resources will then be reduced or avoided.

15. **Logistic Information Management (LIM)**. As the logistics HQ subordinate to the JFC HQ, the JLSG HQ is also responsible for providing the necessary reports and returns to contribute to the formulation of the overall recognised logistic picture using LOGFAS. As an integral part of this requirement, information management within the HQ is seen as an essential element in maintaining its effectiveness.

16. A real-time **Recognised Logistic Picture** (RLP) will provide the commander greater adaptability, speed and agility of the force through sensor-driven, network-centric capabilities. LIM is the critical enabler for distribution-based sustainment systems to ensure that units are appropriately stocked at all times. Among other significant benefits, it allows the commander to appropriately monitor the phasing of deployment and RSOM to achieve desired effects and increase efficiency of multinational logistics formations that rely on national data to carry out their missions.

17. **Logistics Intelligence**. Logistics intelligence is the analysed information required by the logistician to plan and execute the operational and tactical logistics support to the force. Accurate and thorough logistics intelligence assessments conducted well in advance of the strategic deployment can minimise potential problems during deployment and reduce the cost of moving forces, supplies, and equipment to the JOA. Some items to be considered in a logistics intelligence assessment include, but are not limited to:

    a. HNS or ICR available in the JOA

    b. Condition and vulnerability of Lines of Communication.

    c. Environmental, geographical, climatic and topographical factors that may affect logistics operations, including alteration consumption factors

    d. Capabilities of potential Ports of Debarkation and facilities to support reception, staging and sustainment operations.

REDEPLOYMENT

18. Upon completion of the mission, the IEF will re-deploy and reconstitute, as necessary. As with the deployment, redeployment will be a NATO responsibility for NATO-owned forces and equipment and those units that have been transferred to the NATO Commander's authority. The transportation assets will be provided according to the existing regulations. Appropriate arrangements must be made for the strategic withdrawal from the JOA to include transfer of NATO assets to any follow-on forces, if applicable. On redeployment of the IEF, TOA back to SACEUR will normally occur on leaving either the JOA or the theatre, as determined by the Joint Force Commander. TOA back to nations will normally occur at the end of redeployment, unless otherwise

agreed by the concerned nations.

19. When the NATO Force is used as an IEF, they may re-deploy when they are relieved by the follow-on force to prepare for further tasking.